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1. Introduction

This book is a summary of several other books focusing on history usually not spread by mainstream education. The information were directly copy-pasted from other books. I want to thank an anonymous author for giving me the idea to create such a book. The author copied information from several books to create one called 'Who Started World War II' spanning around 300 pages. I took this idea (and also some of his information/sources) to expand on this to create a somewhat consistent story starting around 1650 until today, focusing heavily on Banks, the monetary system and both World Wars. The books used as sources are:

- **(a) The Creature of Jekyll Island by G. Edward Griffin, 1998:** 608 pages about the history of money, what it is, how it is created and how it is used as a form of control.
- **(b) Web of Debt by Ellen Hodgson Brown, 2011:** 544 pages about debt slavery, how is it used, where does it come from and how we can escape.
- **(c) The Rothschilds: A Family Portrait by Frederic Morton, 2014:** 284 pages about the Rothschild family, starting at around 1770 till 1950.
- **(d) The Origins of the World War Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 by Sidney B. Fay, 1924:** Around 1000 pages covering in detail the diplomacy and other causes of World War 1 from 1871 till 1914.
- **(e) The Ruling Elite by Deanna Spingola, 2012:** 780 pages about the rise to power of the man behind the curtain and why millions of people had to die in the last 200 years.
- **(f) World History 1918-1945 by R.A.C. Parker, 1980:** 350 pages about general history of the given time frame.
- **(g) England, the Germans, the Jews and the 20. Century by Peter Haisenko, 2014:** 360 pages about the relations between the named parties starting before World War 1.
- **(h) Truth for Germany by Udo Walendy, 1963:** 536 pages about the guilt question of World War 2 and its causes.
- **(i) Churchill, Hitler and the unnecessary War by Patrick Buchanan, 2008:** 544 pages about history starting at World War 1 leading up to World War 2.

- **(j) Churchill's War by David Irving, 1991:** 696 pages about a wealth of hitherto suppressed information, that shows a shockingly unfamiliar portrait of the great statesman, Churchill.
- **(k) Hitler's War by David Irving, 1977:** 794 pages about Hitler's economic and military rebuilding of Germany following World War 1, and concluding in 1945 with the events surrounding his alleged war.
- **(l) Nuremberg: The Last Battle by David Irving, 1996:** 377 pages covering the details of the Nuremberg show trials after World War 2.
- **(m) The Chief Culprit by Viktor Suvorov, 2008:** 352 pages about Stalins involvement in starting World War 2.
- **(n) Tragedy & Hope by Carroll Quigley, 1966:** 1348 pages about the period of roughly 1880 to 1963 and is multidisciplinary in nature though perhaps focusing on the economic problems brought about by the First World War and the impact these had on subsequent events.
- **(o) Back Door To War by Charles Tansill, 1952:** 690 pages about the involvement of the United States in starting World War 2.
- **(p) Germany and the Jewish Problem by F. K. Wiebe, 1939:** Around 80 pages explaining the "Jewish Question" from the viewpoints of the National Socialists.
- **(q) The Culture of Critique by Kevin Macdonald, 1994:** 544 pages in which the author argues about a dominant Jewish influence in today's society and how it has changed the western world.
- **(r) Pawns in the Game by William Guy Carr, 1955:** Around 200 pages with bits and pieces about the revolutions that happened between 1650 and 1950.
- **(s) Hundred Years War against Germany by Steffen Werner, 2010:** Just 30 pages about how Britain plotted against Germany.
- **(t) Hitlers Revolution by Richard Tedor, 2013:** 440 pages about National Socialist ideology, social programs and foreign affairs.
- **(u) The Forced War by David Hoggan, 1961:** Nearly 350 pages about the road towards World War 2.
- **(v) President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe by Mark Weber, 1983:** Only 32 pages dealing with secret Polish documents found by the Wehrmacht in Warsaw.

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- **(w) How Britain pioneered Firebombing by Nick Kollerstrom, 2009:** Just a few pages about how Britain started with the bombing of civilians in World War 2.
 - **(x) The Bad War by M.S. King, 2015:** 245 pages shortly depicting many incidents of World War 2.
 - **(y) Gruesome Harvest by Ralph Franklin Keeling, 2012:** 150 pages about the treatment of Germany after World War 2.
 - **(z) The United Nations Exposed by William F. Jasper, 2001:** 300 pages about the creation, policies and goals of the United Nations.
 - **(ä) Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler by Antony C. Sutton, 1976:** 300 pages about the collaboration between Wall Street and National Socialism.

Not all information I present are from the mentioned books, sometimes I just copied from webpages “generally accepted history“ to create a bit of context for the rather uninformed reader (things you have probably learned in school but forgotten over time). These sections will be marked accordingly. I also want to apologize for grammar errors which might occur by copy-pasting text from other PDF-files. I tried to remove them as much as possible but I did not want to read through the entire text again just to find small errors. This book also includes around 400 pictures, hence the size of around 50Mb in PDF format.

Which Chapter from which Book?

Chapter 2.1 and 2.2: From book (b).
Chapter 2.3: Source given in the text.

Chapter 3.1: From book (b).
Chapter 3.2: From book (b) and (r).
Chapter 3.3: From book (b).
Chapter 3.4 - 3.10: From web pages to create context.

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2: From (b).
Chapter 4.3: From book (r).
Chapter 4.4: From book (e).

Chapter 5.1 - 5.3: From book (b).
Chapter 5.4: From book (a).
Chapter 5.5 - 5.9: From book (e).

Chapter 5.8: Also from book (a).

Chapter 5.10: From book (b).

Chapter 6.1 - 6.5: From web pages for context and awareness.

Chapter 6.6: From book (c).

Chapter 6.7: From book (b).

Chapter 6.8: Source given in the text.

Chapter 7.1 - 7.5: From book (d).

Chapter 7.6 - 7.9: From book (e).

Chapter 7.10: From book (s).

Chapter 7.11 and 7.12: From book (e).

Chapter 7.15 - 7.24: From book (d).

Chapter 8.1: From web pages for context.

Chapter 8.2 - 8.14: From book (e).

Chapter 8.9: Also from book (a).

Chapter 8.14: Also from book (h).

Chapter 9.1 - 9.3: From book (e).

Chapter 9.4 - 9.8: From book (f).

Chapter 9.8: Also from book (b) and (e).

Chapter 9.10: From book (m).

Chapter 9.11: From book (n).

Chapter 9.12: From book (e).

Chapter 9.13: From book (g).

Chapter 10.1 - 10.3: From book (t).

Chapter 10.4: Source given in the text.

Chapter 10.5: From bokk (b) and other sources given in the text.

Chapter 10.6: From book(p).

Chapter 11.1 and 11.2: From book (t).

Chapter 11.3 and 11.4: From book (h)

Chapter 11.5: From book (o).

Chapter 11.6 and 11.7: From book (u).

Chapter 11.8: From book (t).

Chapter 11.9: From book (h).

Chapter 11.10: From book (u).

Chapter 11.11: From book (v).

Chapter 11.12: Source given in the text.
Chapter 11.13: Source given in the text.
Chapter 11.14: Source given in the text.
Chapter 11.15: Source given in the text.
Chapter 11.16 - 11.18: From book (h).
Chapter 11.19: From book (i).
Chapter 11.20: From book (h).

Chapter 12.1 - 12.3: From book (n).
Chapter 12.4 and 12.5: From book (o).
Chapter 12.6: From book (k).
Chapter 12.7: From book (w).
Chapter 12.8: From book (j).
Chapter 12.9: From book (m).
Chapter 12.10 and 12.11: From book (o).
Chapter 12.12: Source given in the text.
Chapter 12.13: Source given in the text.
Chapter 12.14: From book (ä).
Chapter 12.15: Source given in the text.
Chapter 12.16 - 12.18: From book (t).
Chapter 12.19: From book (x).
Chapter 12.20: From web pages for context.
Chapter 12.21: Source given in the text.
Chapter 12.22: Source given in the text.

Chapter 13.1: From book (y).
Chapter 13.2: From book (l).
Chapter 13.3: From the web for context.
Chapter 13.4: Source given in the text.
Chapter 13.5: Source given in the text.

Chapter 14.1 - 14.8: From book (q).
Chapter 14.9: Source given in the text.

Chapter 15.1: From the web for context.
Chapter 15.2 - 15.5: From book (z).

Chapter 16: Source given in the text.

Quotes you might understand better after reading this Book

Benjamin Disraeli, British Prime Minister from 1868 to 1880, said, "The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes."

"If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of all property until their children wake up homeless on the continent their Fathers conquered.... I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies... - Thomas Jefferson

"Money is the reason we fight." - Karl Marx

"If ever again our nation stumbles upon unfunded paper, it shall surely be like death to our body politic. This country will crash." - George Washington

"The few who understand the system, will either be so interested from its profits or so dependent on its favors, that there will be no opposition from that class." ... "Let me issue and control a nation's money and I care not who writes the laws." – Mayer Amschel Bauer Rothschild

"Three hundred men, each of whom knows all the others, govern the fate of the European continent, and they elect their successors from their entourage." - Walther Rathenau, Foreign Minister of Imperial Germany in the WIENER FREIE PRESSE, December 24, 1909

"When a government is dependent upon bankers for money, they and not the leaders of the government control the situation, since the hand that gives is above the hand that takes. . . Money has no motherland; financiers are without patriotism and without decency; their sole object is gain." – Napoleon Bonaparte

"The division of the United States into federations of equal force was decided long before the Civil War by the high financial powers of Europe. These bankers were afraid that the United States, if they remained in one block and as one nation, would attain economic and financial independence, which would upset their financial domination over the world. The voice of the Rothschilds prevailed. . . Therefore they sent their emissaries into the field to exploit the question of slavery and to open an abyss between the two sections of the Union." – Otto von Bismarck, German chancellor, 1865

" I am a most unhappy man. I have unwittingly ruined my country. A great industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit... The growth of the Nation and all our activities are in the hands of a few men. We have come to be one of the worst ruled, one of the most completely controlled and dominated Governments in the world – no longer a Government of free opinion no longer a Government by conviction and vote of the majority, but a Government by the opinion and duress of small groups of dominant men... - US President Woodrow Wilson, 1913

In its 20 June 1934 issue, *New Britain* magazine of London cited a devastating assertion by former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, that "Britain is the slave of an international financial bloc."

Henry Ford: "It is well that the people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning."

"These international bankers and Rockefeller-Standard Oil interests control the majority of the newspapers and the columns in those papers to club into submission or drive out of office officials who refuse to do the bidding of the powerful corrupt cliques which compose the invisible government." – Theodore Roosevelt as reported in the *New York Times*, March 27th, 1922

Robert H. Hemphill, Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, wrote in 1934: We are completely dependent on the commercial Banks. Someone has to borrow every dollar we have in circulation, cash or credit. If the Banks create ample synthetic money we are prosperous; if not, we starve. We are absolutely without a permanent money system. When one gets a complete grasp of the picture, the tragic absurdity of our hopeless position is almost incredible, but there it is. It is the most important subject intelligent persons can investigate and reflect upon.

Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada from 1935 to 1955, acknowledged: Banks create money. That is what they are for.... The manufacturing process to make money consists of making an entry in a book. That is all.... Each and every time a Bank makes a loan... new Bank credit is created - brand new money.

George Orwell: "He who controls the past control the future, he who controls the present controls the past."

"There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning." - Warren Buffet

"I think a curse should rest on me - because I love this war. I know it's smashing and shattering the lives of thousands every moment -and yet - I can't help it - I enjoy every second of it." - Winston Churchill, letter to a friend, 1916

"Should Germany merchandise (do business) again in the next 50 years we have led this war (WW1) in vain." - Winston Churchill in *The Times* (1919)

"In 15 years that have followed this resolve (WW1), he (Hitler) has succeeded in restoring Germany to the most powerful position in Europe, and not only has he restored the position of his country, but he has even, to a very great extent, reversed the results of the Great War... the vanquished are in the process of becoming the victors and the victors the vanquished... whatever else might be thought about these exploits they are certainly among the most remarkable in the whole history of the world." - Winston Churchill in 1935

“Poland wants war with Germany and Germany will not be able to avoid it, even if it wants to.” - Rydz-Smigly, Chief inspector of the Polish army in a public speech in front of Polish officers (Summer 1939)

“Now we have forced Hitler to war so he no longer can peacefully annihilate one piece of the Treaty of Versailles after the other.” - Lord Halifax, English ambassador in Washington (1939)

The Polish Ambassador to Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki, In a report from Washington back to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, dated February 9, 1939, he wrote: “The pressure of the Jews on President Roosevelt and on the State Department is becoming ever more powerful The Jews are right now the leaders in creating a war psychosis which would plunge the entire world into war and bring about general catastrophe.

“It will be the Polish army that will invade Germany on the first day of war.” - The Polish ambassador in Paris (15.8.1939)

“It is not the Germany of the first decade that followed the war - broken, dejected and bowed down with a sense of apprehension and impotence. It is now full of hope and confidence, and of a renewed sense of determination to lead its own life without interference from any influence outside its own frontiers. One man has accomplished this miracle. He is a born leader of men. A magnetic and dynamic personality with a single-minded purpose, a resolute will and a dauntless heart.” - David Lloyd George (Ex-Prime Minister, UK), in the Daily Express (Sep. 17, 1936)

“We Jews are going to bring a war on Germany.” - David A. Brown, National Chairman, United Jewish Campaign, 1934

“... you can easily see how that within a few years Hitler will emerge from the hatred that surrounds him now as one of the most significant figures who ever lived. He had boundless ambition for his country, which rendered him a menace to the peace of the world, but he had a mystery about him in the way that he lived and in the manner of his death that will live and grow after him. He had in him the stuff of which legends are made.” John F. Kennedy

“Joe Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Father of John F. Kennedy) says that Chamberlain (British Prime Minister) stated that America and world Jewry forced England into World War II.” - James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy (later Secretary of Defense), Diary, December 27, 1945 entry.

“ I asked Joe Kennedy (US ambassador in London) about his talks with Roosevelt and N. Chamberlain in 1938. He said it had been Chamberlains belief in 1939 that Great Britain has nothing in its hands to fight and therefore wouldnt dare to go to war against Hitler...Neither the French nor the English would have made Poland a motive for war if they hadnt been continuously spurred on by Washington...America and the World-Jewry have driven England to war.” - US defence minister J. Forrestal 27.12.1945 in his diary (The Forrestal Diaries, New York, 1951, S. 121 ff)

“We made a monster, a devil out of Hitler. Therefore we couldn't disavow it after the war. After all, we mobilized the masses against the devil himself. So we were forced to play our part in this diabolic scenario after the war. In no way we could have pointed out to our people that the war only was an economic preventive measure.” - US foreign minister James Baker (1992)

2. Today: Who is in control?

Benjamin Disraeli, British Prime Minister from 1868 to 1880, said, “The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes.”

AEG industrial, advisor and minister of economy to the German Kaiser, the Jew Walther Rathenau wrote in 1909: “300 Men, of which everyone knows everyone, govern the economic fate of the continent and look for successors within their surroundings.”

George Orwell said He who controls the past control the future, he who controls the present controls the past

Dr. Carroll Quigley was a writer and professor of history at Georgetown University, where he was President Bill Clinton’s mentor. Professor Quigley wrote from personal knowledge of an elite clique of global financiers bent on controlling the world. Their aim, he said, was “nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole.” This system was “to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements.” He called this clique simply the “international bankers.” Their essence was not race, religion or nationality but was just a passion for control over other humans. The key to their success was that they would control and manipulate the money system of a nation while letting it appear to be controlled by the government. The international bankers have succeeded in doing more than just controlling the money supply. Today they actually create the money supply, while making it appear to be created by the government. This devious scheme was revealed by Sir Josiah Stamp, director of the Bank of England and the second richest man in Britain in the 1920s. Speaking at the University of Texas in 1927, he dropped this bombshell:

“The modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. The process is perhaps the most astounding piece of sleight of hand that was ever invented. Banking was conceived in inequity and born in sin Bankers own the earth. Take it away from them but leave them the power to create money, and, with a flick of a pen, they will create enough money to buy it back again. . . . Take this great power away from them and all great fortunes like mine will disappear, for then this would be a better and happier world to live in. . . . But, if you want to continue to be the slaves of bankers and pay the cost of your own slavery, then let bankers continue to create money and control credit.”

Professor Henry C. K. Liu is an economist who graduated from Harvard and chaired a graduate department at UCLA before becoming an investment adviser for developing countries. He calls the current monetary scheme a “cruel hoax.” When we wake up to

that fact, he says, our entire economic world view will need to be reordered, “just as physics was subject to reordering when man’s world view changed with the realization that the earth is not stationary nor is it the center of the universe.”⁴ The hoax is that there is virtually no “real” money in the system, only debts. Except for coins, which are issued by the government and make up only about one one-thousandth of the money supply, the entire U.S. money supply now consists of debt to private banks, for money they created with accounting entries on their books.

Robert H. Hemphill, Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, wrote in 1934: We are completely dependent on the commercial Banks. Someone has to borrow every dollar we have in circulation, cash or credit. If the Banks create ample synthetic money we are prosperous; if not, we starve. We are absolutely without a permanent money system. When one gets a complete grasp of the picture, the tragic absurdity of our hopeless position is almost incredible, but there it is. It is the most important subject intelligent persons can investigate and reflect upon.

Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada from 1935 to 1955, acknowledged: Banks create money. That is what they are for. . . . The manufacturing process to make money consists of making an entry in a book. That is all. . . . Each and every time a Bank makes a loan . . . new Bank credit is created – brand new money.

It is all done by sleight of hand; and like a magician’s trick, we have to see it many times before we realize what is going on. But when we do, it changes everything. All of history has to be rewritten.

2.1 Central Banks

Illusion surrounding the Federal Reserve begins with its name. The Federal Reserve is not actually federal, and it keeps no reserves — at least, not in the sense most people think. No gold or silver backs its Federal Reserve notes (our dollar bills). A booklet published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York states: Currency cannot be redeemed, or exchanged, for Treasury gold or any other asset used as backing. The question of just what assets “back” Federal Reserve notes has little but bookkeeping significance. The Federal Reserve is commonly called the “Fed,” confusing it with the U.S. government; but it is actually a private corporation.⁴ It is so private that its stock is not even traded on the stock exchange. The government doesn’t own it. You and I can’t own it. It is owned by a consortium of private banks, the biggest of which are Citibank and J. P. Morgan Chase Company. These two mega-banks are the financial cornerstones of the empires built by J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, the “Robber Barons” who orchestrated the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.

The Federal Reserve (and the other central banks like the European Central Bank) is indispensable to the bankers’ money-making machine, but the dollar bills it creates represent only a very small portion of the money supply. Most money today is created

neither by the government nor by the Federal Reserve. Rather, it is created by private commercial banks. The “money supply” is defined as the entire quantity of bills, coins, loans, credit, and other liquid instruments in a country’s economy.

“Liquid” instruments are those that are easily convertible into cash. The American money supply is officially divided into M1, M2, and M3. Only M1 is what we usually think of as money – coins, dollar bills, and the money in our checking accounts. M2 is M1 plus savings accounts, money market funds, and other individual or “small” time deposits. (The “money market” is the trade in short-term, low-risk securities, such as certificates of deposit and U.S. Treasury notes.) M3 is M1 and M2 plus institutional and other larger time deposits (including institutional money market funds) and eurodollars (American dollars circulating abroad).

In 2005, M1 (coins, dollar bills and checking account deposits) tallied in at \$1.4 trillion. Federal Reserve Notes in circulation came to \$758 billion, but about 70 percent of those circulated overseas, bringing the figure down to \$227.5 billion in use in the United States.⁷ The U.S. Mint reported that in September 2004, circulating collections of coins came to only \$993 million, or just under \$1 billion. M3 (the largest measure of the money supply) was \$9.7 trillion in 2005.⁹ Thus coins made up only about one one-thousandth of the total money supply (M3), and tangible currency in the form of coins and Federal Reserves Notes (dollar bills) together made up only about 2.4 percent of it. The other 97.6 percent magically appeared from somewhere else.

The mechanics of money creation were explained in a revealing booklet published by the Chicago Federal Reserve in the 1960s, called “Modern Money Mechanics: A Workbook on Bank Reserves and Deposit Expansion.” The booklet is a gold mine of insider information and will be explored at length later, but here are some highlights. It begins, “The purpose of this booklet is to describe the basic process of money creation in a ‘fractional reserve’ banking system. . . . The actual process of money creation takes place primarily in banks.” The Chicago Fed then explains:

“[Banks] do not really pay out loans from the money they receive as deposits. If they did this, no additional money would be created. What they do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the borrowers’ transaction accounts.”

The booklet explains that money creation is done by “building up” deposits, and that this is done by making loans. Contrary to popular belief, loans become deposits rather than the reverse. The Chicago Fed states:

“[B]anks can build up deposits by increasing loans and investments so long as they keep enough currency on hand to redeem whatever amounts the holders of deposits want to convert into currency. This unique attribute of the banking business was discovered many centuries ago. It started with goldsmiths The “unique attribute” discovered by the goldsmiths was that they could issue and lend paper receipts for the same gold many times over, so long as they kept enough gold in “reserve” for any depositors who might come for their money. This was the sleight of hand later dignified as “fractional

reserve” banking“

2.2 “Fractional Reserve” Banking

Trade in seventeenth century Europe was conducted primarily with gold and silver coins. Coins were durable and had value in themselves, but they were hard to transport in bulk and could be stolen if not kept under lock and key. Many people therefore deposited their coins with the goldsmiths, who had the strongest safes in town. The goldsmiths issued convenient paper receipts that could be traded in place of the bulkier coins they represented. These receipts were also used when people who needed coins came to the goldsmiths for loans. The mischief began when the goldsmiths noticed that only about 10 to 20 percent of their receipts came back to be redeemed in gold at any one time. They could safely “lend” the gold in their strongboxes at interest several times over, as long as they kept 10 to 20 percent of the value of their outstanding loans in gold to meet the demand. They thus created “paper money” (receipts for loans of gold) worth several times the gold they actually held. They typically issued notes and made loans in amounts that were four to five times their actual supply of gold. At an interest rate of 20 percent, the same gold lent five times over produced a 100 percent return every year – this on gold the goldsmiths did not actually own and could not legally lend at all! If they were careful not to overextend this “credit,” the goldsmiths could thus become quite wealthy without producing anything of value themselves. Since more money was owed back than the townspeople as a whole possessed, the wealth of the town and eventually of the country was siphoned into the vaults of these goldsmiths-turned-bankers, while the people fell progressively into their debt.

If a landlord had rented the same house to five people at one time and pocketed the money, he would quickly have been jailed for fraud. But the goldsmiths had devised a system in which they traded, not things of value, but paper receipts for them. The system was called “fractional reserve” banking because the gold held in reserve was a mere fraction of the banknotes it supported. In 1934, Elgin Groseclose, Director of the Institute for International Monetary Research, wryly observed:

“A warehouseman, taking goods deposited with him and devoting them to his own profit, either by use or by loan to another, is guilty of a tort, a conversion of goods for which he is liable in civil, if not in criminal, law. By a casuistry which is now elevated into an economic principle, but which has no defenders outside the realm of banking, a warehouseman who deals in money is subject to a diviner law: the banker is free to use for his private interest and profit the money left in trust. . . . He may even go further. He may create fictitious deposits on his books, which shall rank equally and ratably with actual deposits in any division of assets in case of liquidation.”

Bernard Lietaer helped design the single currency system (the Euro) and has written several books on monetary reform. He explains the interest problem like this:

“ When a bank provides you with a \$100,000 mortgage, it creates only the principal, which you spend and which then circulates in the economy. The bank expects you to pay back \$200,000 over the next 20 years, but it doesn't create the second \$100,000 — the interest. Instead, the bank sends you out into the tough world to battle against everybody else to bring back the second \$100,000.”

The problem is that all money except coins now comes from bankercreated loans, so the only way to get the interest owed on old loans is to take out new loans, continually inflating the money supply; either that, or some borrowers have to default. Lietaer concluded:

“[G]reed and competition are not a result of immutable human temperament [G]reed and fear of scarcity are in fact being continuously created and amplified as a direct result of the kind of money we are using. . . . [W]e can produce more than enough food to feed everybody, and there is definitely enough work for everybody in the world, but there is clearly not enough money to pay for it all. The scarcity is in our national currencies. In fact, the job of central banks is to create and maintain that currency scarcity. The direct consequence is that we have to fight with each other in order to survive.”

To keep the economic treadmill turning, not only must the money supply continually inflate but the federal debt must continually expand. The reason was revealed by Marriner Eccles, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, in hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency in 1941. Wright Patman asked Eccles how the Federal Reserve got the money to buy government bonds. “We created it,” Eccles replied. “Out of what?” “Out of the right to issue credit money.” “And there is nothing behind it, is there, except our government's credit?” “That is what our money system is,” Eccles replied. “If there were no debts in our money system, there wouldn't be any money.”

That explains why the federal debt never gets paid off but just continues to grow. The federal debt hasn't been paid off since the presidency of Andrew Jackson nearly two centuries ago.

2.3 In the words of Prof. Carroll Quigley

Carroll Quigley was a professor of history at Georgetown University from 1941 to 1976. He also taught at Princeton and at Harvard, and lectured at the Brookings Institution. He was a frequent lecturer at the U.S. Naval Weapons Laboratory, the Foreign Service Institute, and the Naval College at Norfolk, Virginia. In 1958, he served as a consultant to the Congressional Select Committee which set up the National Space Agency. Below are key excerpts on the history of money and banking from Prof. Quigley's masterpiece *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time*. Some key excerpts:

Commercial Capitalism

Western Civilization is the richest and most powerful social organization ever made by man. One reason for this success has been its economic organization, [which] has passed through six successive stages, of which at least four are called "capitalism." Each stage created the conditions which tended to bring about the next stage. The [first stage] of self-sufficient agrarian units (manors) was in a society organized so that its upper ranks—the lords, lay and ecclesiastical—found their desires for necessities so well met that they sought to exchange their surpluses of necessities for luxuries of remote origin. This gave rise to a trade in foreign luxuries (spices, fine textiles, fine metals) which was the first evidence of the stage of commercial capitalism. In this second stage, mercantile profits and widening markets created a demand for textiles and other goods which could be met only by application of power to production.

This gave the third stage: industrial capitalism. The stage of industrial capitalism soon gave rise to such an insatiable demand for heavy fixed capital, like railroad lines, steel mills, shipyards, and so on, that these investments could not be financed from the profits and private fortunes of individual proprietors. New instruments for financing industry came into existence in the form of limited-liability corporations and investment banks. These were soon in a position to control the chief parts of the industrial system, since they provided capital to it. This gave rise to financial capitalism. The control of financial capitalism was used to integrate the industrial system into ever-larger units with inter-linking financial controls. This made possible a reduction of competition with a resulting increase in profits. As a result, the industrial system soon found that it was again able to finance its own expansion from its own profits, and, with this achievement, financial controls were weakened, and the stage of monopoly capitalism arrived.

In this fifth stage, great industrial units, working together either directly or through cartels and trade associations, were in a position to exploit the majority of the people. The result was a great economic crisis which soon developed into a struggle for control of the state—the minority hoping to use political power to defend their privileged position, the majority hoping to use the state to curtail the power and privileges of the minority. This dualist struggle dwindled with the rise of economic and social pluralism after 1945.

The Primary Goal of Capitalism

Capitalism provides very powerful motivations for economic activity because it associates economic motivations so closely with self-interest. But this same feature, which is a source of strength in providing economic motivation through the pursuit of profits, is also a source of weakness owing to the fact that so self-centered a motivation contributes very readily to a loss of economic coordination. Each individual, just because he is so powerfully motivated by self-interest, easily loses sight of the role which his own activities play in the economic system as a whole, and tends to act as if his activities were the whole,

with inevitable injury to that whole. Capitalism, because it seeks profits as its primary goal, is never primarily seeking to achieve prosperity, high production, high consumption, political power, patriotic improvement, or moral uplift. Any of these may be achieved under capitalism, and any (or all) of them may be sacrificed and lost under capitalism, depending on this relationship to the primary goal of capitalist activity—the pursuit of profits. During the nine-hundred-year history of capitalism, it has, at various times, contributed both to the achievement and to the destruction of these other social goals.

The stage of commercial capitalism became institutionalized into a restrictive system, sometimes called “mercantilism,” in which merchants sought to gain profits, not from the movements of goods but from restricting the movements of goods. Thus the pursuit of profits, which had earlier led to increased prosperity by increasing trade and production, became a restriction on both trade and production, because profit became an end in itself rather than an accessory mechanism in the economic system as a whole. In the course of time, however, some merchants began to shift their attention from the goods aspect of commercial interchange to the other, monetary, side of the exchange. They began to accumulate the profits of these transactions, and became increasingly concerned, not with the shipment and exchange of goods, but with the shipment and exchange of moneys. In time they became concerned with the lending of money to merchants to finance their ships and their activities, advancing money for both, at high interest rates, secured by claims on ships or goods as collateral for repayment.

The Operations of Banking Were Concealed So They Appeared Difficult to Master

In sum, specialization of economic activities, by breaking up the economic process, had made it possible for people to concentrate on one portion of the process and, by maximizing that portion, to jeopardize the rest. The process was not only broken up into producers, exchangers, and consumers but there were also two kinds of exchangers (one concerned with goods, the other with money), with almost antithetical, short-term, aims. The problems which inevitably arose could be solved and the system reformed only by reference to the system as a whole. Unfortunately, however, three parts of the system, concerned with the production, transfer, and consumption of goods, were concrete and clearly visible so that almost anyone could grasp them simply by examining them, while the operations of banking and finance were concealed, scattered, and abstract so that they appeared to many to be difficult. To add to this, bankers themselves did everything they could to make their activities more secret and more esoteric. Their activities were reflected in mysterious marks in ledgers which were never opened to the curious outsider.

In the course of time the central fact of the developing economic system, the relationship between goods and money, became clear, at least to bankers. This relationship, the price system, depended upon five things: the supply and the demand for goods, the supply and the demand for money, and the speed of exchange between money and goods. An

increase in three of these (demand for goods, supply of money, speed of circulation) would move the prices of goods up and the value of money down. This inflation was objectionable to bankers, although desirable to producers and merchants. On the other hand, a decrease in the same three items would be deflationary and would please bankers, worry producers and merchants, and delight consumers (who obtained more goods for less money). The other factors worked in the opposite direction, so that an increase in them (supply of goods, demand for money, and slowness of circulation or exchange) would be deflationary [and vice versa]. Such changes of prices, either inflationary or deflationary, have been major forces in history for the last six centuries at least. Over that long period, their power to modify men's lives and human history has been increasing.

Bankers Obsessed With Maintaining Value of Money

Rising prices benefit debtors and injure creditors, while falling prices do the opposite. A debtor called upon to pay a debt at a time when prices are higher than when he contracted the debt must yield up less goods and services than he obtained at the earlier date, on a lower price level when he borrowed the money. A creditor, such as a bank, which has lent money—equivalent to a certain quantity of goods and services—on one price level, gets back the same amount of money—but a smaller quantity of goods and services—when repayment comes at a higher price level, because the money repaid is then less valuable. This is why bankers, as creditors in money terms, have been obsessed with maintaining the value of money, although the reason they have traditionally given for this obsession—that "sound money" maintains "business confidence"—has been propagandist rather than accurate.

Hundreds of years ago, bankers began to specialize, with the richer and more influential ones associated increasingly with foreign trade and foreign-exchange transactions. Since these were richer and more cosmopolitan and increasingly concerned with questions of political significance, such as stability and debasement of currencies, war and peace, dynastic marriages, and worldwide trading monopolies, they became the financiers and financial advisers of governments. Moreover, since their relationships with governments were always in monetary terms and not real terms, and since they were always obsessed with the stability of monetary exchanges between one country's money and another, they used their power and influence to do two things: (1) to get all money and debts expressed in terms of a strictly limited commodity—ultimately gold; and (2) to get all monetary matters out of the control of governments and political authority, on the ground that they would be handled better by private banking interests.

Bankers Create Money Out of Nothing

For generations men had sought to avoid the one drawback of gold, its heaviness, by using pieces of paper to represent specific pieces of gold. We call such pieces of paper

gold certificates. Such a certificate entitles its bearer to exchange it for its piece of gold on demand, but in view of the convenience of paper, only a small fraction of certificate holders ever did make such demands. It early became clear that gold need be held on hand only to the amount needed to cover the fraction of certificates likely to be presented for payment; accordingly, the rest of the gold could be used for business purposes, or, what amounts to the same thing, a volume of certificates could be issued greater than the volume of gold reserved for payment of demands against them. Such an excess volume of paper claims against reserves we now call bank notes.

In effect, this creation of paper claims greater than the reserves available means that bankers were creating money out of nothing. The same thing could be done in another way, not by note-issuing banks but by deposit banks. Deposit bankers discovered that orders and checks drawn against deposits by depositors and given to third persons were often not cashed by the latter but were deposited to their own accounts. Thus there were no actual movements of funds, and payments were made simply by bookkeeping transactions on the accounts. Accordingly, it was necessary for the banker to keep on hand in actual money ... no more than the fraction of deposits likely to be drawn upon and cashed; the rest could be used for loans, and if these loans were made by creating a deposit for the borrower, who in turn would draw checks upon it rather than withdraw it in money, such "created deposits" or loans could also be covered adequately by retaining reserves to only a fraction of their value.

The Dynasties of International Bankers

The merchant bankers of London ... brought into their financial network the provincial banking centers, organized as commercial banks and savings banks, as well as insurance companies, to form all of these into a single financial system on an international scale which manipulated the quantity and flow of money so that they were able to influence, if not control, governments on one side and industries on the other. The men who did this, looking backward toward the period of dynastic monarchy in which they had their own roots, aspired to establish dynasties of international bankers and were at least as successful at this as were many of the dynastic political rulers. The greatest of these dynasties, of course, were the descendants of Meyer Amschel Rothschild (1743-1812) of Frankfort, whose male descendants, for at least two generations, generally married first cousins or even nieces.

In concentrating, as we must, on the financial or economic activities of international bankers, we must not totally ignore their other attributes. They were, especially in later generations, cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic. They were usually highly civilized, cultured gentlemen, patrons of education and of the arts, so that today colleges, professorships, opera companies, symphonies, libraries, and museum collections still reflect their munificence. For these purposes they set a pattern of endowed foundations which still surround us today.

Bankers Felt Politicians Could Not Be Trusted With the Monetary System

The influence of financial capitalism and of the international bankers who created it was exercised both on business and on governments, but could have done neither if it had not been able to persuade both these to accept two "axioms" of its own ideology. Both of these were based on the assumption that politicians were too weak and too subject to temporary popular pressures to be trusted with control of the money system; accordingly, the sanctity of all values and the soundness of money must be protected in two ways: by basing the value of money on gold and by allowing bankers to control the supply of money. To do this it was necessary to conceal, or even to mislead, both governments and people about the nature of money and its methods of operation.

In most countries the central bank was surrounded closely by the almost invisible private investment banking firms. These, like the planet Mercury, could hardly be seen in the dazzle emitted by the central bank which they, in fact, often dominated. Yet a close observer could hardly fail to notice the close private associations between these private, international bankers and the central bank itself. Two of the five factors which determined the value of money are the supply and the demand for money. The supply of money in a single country was subject to no centralized, responsible control in most countries over recent centuries. Instead, there were a variety of controls of which some could be influenced by bankers, some could be influenced by the government, and some could hardly be influenced by either. Central banks can usually vary the amount of money in circulation by "open market operations" or by influencing the discount rates of lesser banks. In open market operations, a central bank buys or sells government bonds in the open market. If it buys, it releases money into the economic system; if it sells it reduces the amount of money in the community. The change is greater than the price paid for the securities [due to the fractional reserve system].

Central banks can also change the quantity of money by influencing the credit policies of other banks. This can be done by various methods, such as changing the re-discount rate or changing reserve requirements. By changing the re-discount rate, we mean the interest rate which central banks charge lesser banks for loans. By raising the re-discount rate the central bank forces the lesser bank to raise its discount rate in order to operate at a profit; such a raise in interest rates tends to reduce the demand for credit and thus the amount of deposits (money). Lowering the re-discount rate permits an opposite result. The powers of governments over the quantity of money are of various kinds, and include (a) control over a central bank, (b) control over public taxation, and (c) control over public spending. The control of governments over central banks varies greatly from one country to another, but on the whole has been increasing. Since most central banks have been (technically) private institutions, this control is frequently based on custom rather than on law.

The powers of the government over the quantity of money in the community exercised through taxation and public spending are largely independent of banking control. Taxa-

tion tends to reduce the amount of money in a community and is usually a deflationary force; government spending tends to increase the amount of money in a community and is usually an inflationary force. The total effects of a government's policy will depend on which item is greater. An unbalanced budget will be inflationary; a budget with a surplus will be deflationary.

Money Power-Controlled by International Investment Bankers-Dominates Business and Government

On the whole, in the period up to 1931, bankers, especially the Money Power controlled by the international investment bankers, were able to dominate both business and government. They could dominate business, especially in activities and in areas where industry could not finance its own needs for capital, because investment bankers had the ability to supply or refuse to supply such capital. Thus, Rothschild interests came to dominate many of the railroads of Europe, while Morgan dominated at least 26,000 miles of American railroads. Such bankers went further than this. In return for flotations of securities of industry, they took seats on the boards of directors of industrial firms, as they had already done on commercial banks, savings banks, insurance firms, and finance companies. From these lesser institutions they funneled capital to enterprises which yielded control and away from those who resisted. These firms were controlled through interlocking directorships, holding companies, and lesser banks. They engineered amalgamations and generally reduced competition, until by the early twentieth century many activities were so monopolized that they could raise their noncompetitive prices above costs to obtain sufficient profits to become self-financing.

But before that stage was reached a relatively small number of bankers were in positions of immense influence in European and American economic life. As early as 1909, Walter Rathenau, who was in a position to know (since he had inherited from his father control of the German General Electric Company and held scores of directorships himself), said, "Three hundred men, all of whom know one another, direct the economic destiny of Europe and choose their successors from among themselves."

The Power of Investment Bankers Over Governments

The power of investment bankers over governments rests on a number of factors, of which the most significant, perhaps, is the need of governments to issue short-term treasury bills as well as long-term government bonds. Just as businessmen go to commercial banks for current capital advances to smooth over the discrepancies between their irregular and intermittent incomes and their periodic and persistent outgoes, so a government has to go to merchant bankers (or institutions controlled by them) to tide over the shallow places caused by irregular tax receipts. As experts in government bonds, the international bankers not only handled the necessary advances, but provided advice to government

officials and, on many occasions, placed their own members in official posts for varied periods to deal with special problems. This is so widely accepted even today that in 1961 a Republican investment banker became Secretary of the Treasury in a Democratic Administration in Washington without significant comment from any direction.

Naturally, the influence of bankers over governments during the age of financial capitalism (roughly 1850-1931) was not something about which anyone talked freely, but it has been admitted frequently enough by those on the inside, especially in England. In 1852 Gladstone, chancellor of the Exchequer, declared, "The hinge of the whole situation was this: the government itself was not to be a substantive power in matters of Finance, but was to leave the Money Power supreme and unquestioned." On September 26, 1921, The Financial Times wrote, "Half a dozen men at the top of the Big Five Banks could upset the whole fabric of government finance by refraining from renewing Treasury Bills."

Montagu Norman and J. P. Morgan Dominate the Financial World

In addition to their power over government based on government financing and personal influence, bankers could steer governments in ways they wished them to go by other pressures. Since most government officials felt ignorant of finance, they sought advice from bankers whom they considered to be experts in the field. The history of the last century shows, as we shall see later, that the advice given to governments by bankers, like the advice they gave to industrialists, was consistently good for bankers, but was often disastrous for governments, businessmen, and the people generally.

Such advice could be enforced if necessary by manipulation of exchanges, gold flows, discount rates, and even levels of business activity. The powers of these international bankers reached their peak in the last decade of their supremacy, 1919-1931, when Montagu Norman and J. P. Morgan dominated not only the financial world but international relations and other matters as well. On November 11, 1927, the Wall Street Journal called Mr. Norman "the currency dictator of Europe." This was admitted by Mr. Norman himself before the Court of the Bank on March 21, 1930, and before the Macmillan Committee of the House of Commons five days later. On one occasion ... Mr. Norman is reported to have said, "I hold the hegemony of the world." It might be added that Governor Norman rarely acted in major world problems without consulting with J. P. Morgan's representatives.

Cecil Rhodes Organized a Secret Society in 1891

[Cecil] Rhodes (1853-1902) feverishly exploited the diamond and goldfields of South Africa, rose to be prime minister of the Cape Colony (1890-1896), contributed money to political parties, controlled parliamentary seats both in England and in South Africa, and sought to win a strip of British territory across Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt and to join these two extremes together with a telegraph line and ultimately

with a Cape-to-Cairo Railway. Rhodes inspired devoted support for his goals from others in South Africa and in England. With financial support from Lord Rothschild and Alfred Beit, he was able to monopolize the diamond mines of South Africa as De Beers Consolidated Mines and to build up a great gold mining enterprise as Consolidated Gold Fields. In the middle 1890's Rhodes had a personal income of at least a million pounds sterling a year [equivalent to about \$100 million a year in current U.S. dollars] which was spent so freely for his mysterious purposes that he was usually overdrawn on his account.

[An] association was formally established on February 5, 1891, when Rhodes and [William] Stead organized a secret society of which Rhodes had been dreaming for sixteen years. In this secret society Rhodes was to be leader; Stead, Brett, and Milner were to form an executive committee; Arthur (Lord) Balfour, (Sir) Harry Johnston, Lord Rothschild, Albert (Lord) Grey, and others were listed as potential members of a "Circle of Initiates"; while there was to be an outer circle known as the "Association of Helpers" (later organized by Milner as the Round Table organization).

In 1919 [Rhodes' followers] founded the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) for which the chief financial supporters were Sir Abe Bailey and the Astor family (owners of The Times). Similar Institutes of International Affairs were established in the chief British dominions and in the United States (where it is known as the Council on Foreign Relations) in the period 1919-1927. The power and influence of this Rhodes-Milner group in British imperial affairs and in foreign policy since 1889, although not widely recognized, can hardly be exaggerated. We might mention as an example that this group dominated The Times from 1890 to 1912, and has controlled it completely since 1912 (except for the years 1919-1922). In spite of the terms of the Rhodes wills, Rhodes himself was not a racist. Nor was he a political democrat. He worked as easily and as closely with Jews, black natives, or Boers as he did with English. His greatest weakness rested on the fact that his passionate attachment to his goals made him overly tolerant in regard to methods. He did not hesitate to use either bribery or force to attain his ends if he judged they would be effective.

America Becomes the World's Greatest Creditor

By 1914 Britain's supremacy as financial center, as commercial market, as creditor, and as merchant shipper was being threatened. At this critical stage in Britain's development, the World War occurred. This had a double result as far as this subject is concerned. It forced Britain to postpone indefinitely any reform of her industrial system to adjust it to more modern trends; and it speeded up the development of these trends so that what might have occurred in twenty years was done instead in five.

The war changed the position of the United States in respect to the rest of the world from that of a debtor owing about \$3 billion to that of a creditor owed \$4 billion. This does not include intergovernmental debts of about \$10 billion owed to the United States as a result of the war. At the same time, Britain's position changed from a creditor owed

about \$18 billion to a creditor owed about \$13.5 billion. In addition, Britain was owed about \$8 billion in war debts from her Allies ... and owed to the United States war debts of well over \$54 billion. Most of these war debts and reparations were sharply reduced after 1920, but the net result for Britain was a drastic change in her position in respect to the United States.

The basic economic organization of the world was modified in other ways. The more backward areas of Europe and the world had been industrialized to a great degree and were unwilling to fall back to a position in which they would obtain industrial products from Britain, Germany, or the United States in return for their raw materials and food. This refusal was made more painful for both sides by the fact that these backward areas had increased their outputs of raw materials and food so greatly that the total could hardly have been sold even if they had been willing to buy all their industrial products from their prewar sources.

The result was a situation where all countries were eager to sell and reluctant to buy, and sought to achieve these mutually irreconcilable ends by setting up subsidies and bounties on exports, tariffs, and restrictions on imports, with disastrous results on world trade. The only sensible solution to this problem of excessive productive capacity would have been a substantial rise in domestic standards of living, but this would have required a fundamental reapportionment of the national income so that claims to the product of the excess capacity would go to those masses eager to consume, rather than continue to go to the minority desiring to save. Such a reform was rejected by the ruling groups in both "advanced" and "backward" countries, so that this solution was reached only to a relatively small degree in a relatively few countries.

The system of international payments which had worked ... before 1914 worked only haltingly after that date, and practically ceased to work at all after 1930. The chief cause of these factors was that neither goods nor money obeyed purely economic forces and did not move as formerly to the areas in which each was most valuable. The chief result was a complete mal-distribution of gold, a condition which became acute after 1928 and which by 1933 had forced most countries off the gold standard.

Money Power Seeks to Create a World System of Financial Control in Private Hands Able to Dominate Every Nation on Earth

The powers of financial capitalism had [a] far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private meetings and conferences. The apex of the system was to be the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a private bank owned and controlled by the world's central banks which were themselves private corporations.

Each central bank, in the hands of men like Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Charles Rist of the Bank of France, and Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank, sought to dominate its government by its ability to control Treasury loans, to manipulate foreign exchanges, to influence the level of economic activity in the country, and to influence cooperative politicians by subsequent economic rewards in the business world.

Norman Was the Commander-in-Chief of the World System of Banking Control

The commander in chief of the world system of banking control was Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, who was built up by the private bankers to a position where he was regarded as an oracle in all matters of government and business. In January, 1924, Reginald McKenna, who had been chancellor of the Exchequer in 1915-1916, as chairman of the board of the Midland Bank told its stockholders: "I am afraid the ordinary citizen will not like to be told that the banks can, and do, create money.... And they who control the credit of the nation direct the policy of Governments and hold in the hollow of their hands the destiny of the people."

Montagu Norman's position may be gathered from the fact that his predecessors in the governorship, almost a hundred of them, had served two-year terms, increased rarely in time of crisis. But Norman held the position for twenty-four years (1920-1944). Norman was a strange man whose mental outlook was one of successfully suppressed hysteria or even paranoia. He had no use for governments and feared democracy. Both of these seemed to him to be threats to private banking. Strong-willed, tireless, and ruthless, he viewed his life as a kind of cloak-and-dagger struggle with the forces of ... sound money.

Norman had a devoted colleague in Benjamin Strong, the first governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong owed his career to the favor of the Morgan Bank. He became governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as the joint nominee of Morgan and of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company in 1914. Two years later, Strong met Norman for the first time, and they at once made an agreement to work in cooperation for the financial practices they both revered. In the 1920's, they were determined to use the financial power of Britain and of the United States to force all the major countries of the world to go on the gold standard and to operate it through central banks free from all political control, with all questions of international finance to be settled by agreements by such central banks without interference from governments.

Norman and Strong Were Mere Agents of the Powerful Bankers Who Remained Behind the Scenes and Operated in Secret

It must not be felt that these heads of the world's chief central banks were themselves substantive powers in world finance. They were not. Rather, they were the technicians

and agents of the dominant investment bankers of their own countries, who had raised them up and were perfectly capable of throwing them down. The substantive financial powers of the world were in the hands of these investment bankers who remained largely behind the scenes in their own unincorporated private banks. These formed a system of international cooperation and national dominance which was more private, more powerful, and more secret than that of their agents in the central banks.

This dominance of investment bankers was based on their control over the flows of credit and investment funds in their own countries and throughout the world. They could dominate the financial and industrial systems of their own countries by their influence over the flow of current funds through bank loans, the discount rate, and the re-discounting of commercial debts. They could dominate governments by their control over ... government loans and the play of the international exchanges. In this system the Rothschilds had been preeminent during much of the nineteenth century, but, at the end of that century, they were being replaced by J. P. Morgan whose central office was in New York, although it was always operated as if it were in London (where it had, indeed, originated as George Peabody and Company in 1838). The growth of financial capitalism made possible a centralization of world economic control and a use of this power for the direct benefit of financiers and the indirect injury of all other economic groups.

Money Power Creates an Ingenious Plan to Create and Control Giant Monopolies

[Financial capitalists eventually] sought to sever control from ownership of securities, believing they could hold the former and relinquish the latter. On the industrial side, they sought to advance monopoly and restrict production, thus keeping prices up and their security holdings liquid. The efforts of financiers to separate ownership from control were aided by the great capital demands of modern industry. Such demands for capital made necessary the corporation form of business organization. This inevitably brings together the capital owned by a large number of persons to create an enterprise controlled by a small number of persons. The financiers did all they could to make the former number as large as possible and the latter number as small as possible. The result of this was that larger and larger aggregates of wealth fell into the control of smaller and smaller groups of men.

While financial capitalism was thus weaving the intricate pattern of modern corporation law and practice on one side, it was establishing monopolies and cartels on the other. Both helped to dig the grave of financial capitalism and pass the reins of economic control on to the newer monopoly capitalism. On one side, the financiers freed the controllers of business from the owners of business, but on the other side, this concentration gave rise to monopoly conditions which freed the controllers from the banks.

There does exist, and has existed for a generation, an international Anglophile network. I know of the operations of this network because I have studied it for twenty years and was

permitted for two years, in the early 1960's, to examine its papers and secret records. I have no aversion to it or to most of its aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and to many of its instruments. I have objected, both in the past and recently, to a few of its policies ... but in general my chief difference of opinion is that it wishes to remain unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant enough to be known.

3. Europe till 1900: A brief Overview

3.1 When Money Could Grow

Located where Iraq is today, Sumer was a agrarian economy with a financial system based on abundance and shared wealth. One of the oldest known bronze coins was the Sumerian shekel, dating from 3,200 B.C. It was inscribed with the likeness of the Goddess Inanna-Ishtar, who bestowed kingship in Sumer and was the goddess of fertility, life and death. Inanna wore the horns of a cow, the sacred animal that personified the Great Mother everywhere in ancient myth. Hathor, the Egyptian equivalent, had cow ears and a human face and was the goddess of love, fertility and abundance. Her horn was the "cornucopia" from which poured the earth's plenty. Isis, an even more powerful Egyptian mother figure, was portrayed wearing the horns of a cow with the sun disc between them. In India, the cow goddess was Kali, for whom cows are sacred to this day.

Cows were also associated with money, since they were an early medium of exchange. The Sumerian word for "interest" was the same as the word for "calf." It was natural to repay advances of cattle with an extra calf, because the unit of exchange itself multiplied over the loan period. This was also true for grain, for which the temples served as storehouses. Grain advanced over the growing period was repaid with extra grain after the harvest, in gratitude to God for multiplying the community's abundance. The temples were public institutions that also served welfare functions, including the support of widows, orphans, the elderly and infirm. Temples were endowed with land to provide food for their dependent labor, and resources such as herds of sheep to provide wool for their workshops. They operated autonomously, supporting themselves not through taxation but by renting lands and workshops and charging interest on loans. Goods were advanced to traders, who returned the value of the goods plus interest. The temples also acted as central banks. Sacrificial coins inscribed "debt to the Gods" were paid to farmers in acknowledgment that wheat had been contributed to the temple. These coins were also lent to borrowers. When interest was paid on the loans, it went back to the temple to fund the community's economic and social programs and to cover losses from bad loans.

It was only after the Indo-European invasions of the second millennium B.C. that moneylending became the private enterprise of the infamous moneychangers. In the temple system, the community extended credit and received the money back with interest. In the system that displaced it, interest on debts went into private vaults to build the private fortunes of the moneychangers. Interest was thus transformed from a source of income for the community into a tool for impoverishing and enslaving people and nations. Unlike corn and cows, the gold the moneylenders lent was inorganic. It did not "grow," so there was never enough to cover the additional interest charges added to loans. When there

was insufficient money in circulation to cover operating expenses, farmers had to borrow until harvest time; and the odd man out in the musical chairs of finding eleven coins to repay ten wound up in debtor's prison. Historically, most slavery originated from debt.

Money as a Simple Tally of Accounts

Meanwhile, England was faced with the problem of what to use for money when the country was short of gold. The coinage system was commodity-based. It assumed that "money" was something having value in itself (gold or silver), which was bartered or traded for goods or services of equal value. The first known coins were issued by governments; and their value was the value stamped on them, not the price at which the metal traded. Money was a mere fiat of the law. Fiat means "let it be done" in Latin. "Fiat money" is money that is legal tender by government decree. It is simply a "tally," something representing units of value that can be traded in the market, a receipt for goods or services that can legally be tendered for other goods or services. In Mandarin China, where paper money was invented in the ninth century, this sort of fiat currency funded a long and prosperous empire. Fiat money was also used successfully in medieval England, but in England it was made of wood.

The English tally system originated with King Henry I, son of William the Conqueror, who took the throne in 1100 A.D. The printing press had not yet been invented, and taxes were paid directly with goods produced by the land. Under King Henry's innovative system, payment was recorded with a piece of wood that had been notched and split in half. One half was kept by the government and the other by the recipient. To confirm payment, the two halves were matched to make sure they "tallied." Since no stick splits in an even manner, and since the notches tallying the sums were cut right through both pieces of wood, the method was virtually foolproof against forgery. The tally system has been called the earliest form of bookkeeping. According to historian M. T. Clanchy in *From Memory to Written Record, England 1066-1307*:

"Tallies were ... a sophisticated and practical record of numbers. They were more convenient to keep and store than parchments, less complex to make, and no easier to forge."

Only a few hundred tallies survive, Clanchy writes, but millions were made. Tallies were used by the government not only as receipts for the payment of taxes but to pay soldiers for their service, farmers for their wheat, and laborers for their labor. At tax time, the treasurer accepted the tallies in payment of taxes. By the thirteenth century, the financial market for tallies was sufficiently sophisticated that they could be bought, sold, or discounted. Tallies were used by individuals and institutions to register debts, record fines, collect rents, and enter payments for services rendered. In the 1500s, King Henry VIII gave them the force of a national currency when he ordered that tallies must be used to evidence the payment of taxes.⁹ That meant everyone had to have them. In *War Cycles, Peace Cycles*, Richard Hoskins writes that by the end of the seventeenth century,

about 14 million pounds worth of tally-money was in circulation.

3.2 The Money Lenders

The image of puppet and puppeteer has long been a popular metaphor for describing the Money Power pulling the strings of government. Benjamin Disraeli, British Prime Minister from 1868 to 1880, said, "The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes." Nathan Rothschild, who controlled the Bank of England after 1820, notoriously declared:

"I care not what puppet is placed upon the throne of England to rule the Empire on which the sun never sets. The man who controls Britain's money supply controls the British Empire, and I control the British money supply."

In the documentary video *The Money Masters*, narrator Bill Still uses the puppet metaphor to describe the transfer of power from the royal line of English Stuarts to the German royal House of Hanover in the eighteenth century:

"England was to trade masters: an unpopular King James II for a hidden cabal of Money Changers pulling the strings of their usurper, King William III, from behind the scenes. This symbiotic relationship between the Money Changers and the higher British aristocracy continues to this day. The monarch has no real power but serves as a useful shield for the Money Changers who rule the City In its 20 June 1934 issue, *New Britain* magazine of London cited a devastating assertion by former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, that "Britain is the slave of an international financial bloc."

Where did these international financiers come from, and how had they achieved their enormous power? The moneylenders had been evicted not only from England but from other European countries.

Today the term Jew is used very loosely to define people who have at one time or another embraced the Jewish Faith. Many of these are not actually Semitic in racial origin. A great number of people who accepted the Jewish Faith are descendants of the Herodians who were Idumeans of Turkish-Mongol blood. They are actually Edomites. The Non-Semitic and Turk-Finnish races infiltrated into Europe from Asia about the first century after the advent of Christ. They took the land route North of the Caspian Sea. These peoples are referred to in history as Khazars. They were a pagan people. They settled in Eastern Europe and established the powerful Khazar Kingdom. They expanded their domains by military conquests until, by the end of the 8th Century, they occupied the greater portion of Eastern Europe west of the Ural Mountains, and North of the Black Sea. The Khazars ultimately accepted Judaism as their religion in preference to Christianity or Mohammedanism. Synagogues, and schools for teaching Judaism, were built throughout their Kingdom. At the peak of their power the Khazars were collecting

tribute from twentyfive conquered peoples. The Great Khazar Kingdom flourished for almost five hundred years. Then, towards the end of the 10th century, the Khazars were defeated in battle by the Varangians (Russians) who swept down upon them from the North. The conquest of the Khazars was completed by the end of the 13th Century. The revolutionary movement inspired by the Khazar-Jews went on within the Russian Empire from the 13th Century until the Red October Revolution of 1917. The conquest of the Khazars in the 13th century explains how so many people, now commonly referred to as Jews, remained within the Russian Empire.

Study of the World Revolutionary Movement (W.R.M.), from the time of Christ to the present day, proves that it is unjust to blame the whole Jewish Race for the crimes committed against humanity by a small group of false priests and money-lenders. These men always have been, and still are, The Secret Power behind Internationalism. They use Communism today (written in the 50s) as their manual of action to further their secret plans for ultimate world domination.

History proves that Seneca (4 B.C. to 65 A.D.) died because he, like Christ, tried to expose the corrupt practices and evil influence of the money-lenders who had infiltrated into the Roman Empire. Seneca was a famous Roman philosopher. He was chosen tutor to Nero who became Emperor of Rome. For a long time Seneca was Nero's best friend, and most trusted advisor. Nero married Popaea who brought him under the evil influence of the money-lenders. Nero became one of the most infamous rulers the world has ever known. His licentious conduct, and depraved habits, developed in him a character so base that he lived only to persecute and destroy everything that was good. His acts of revenge took the form of atrocities usually committed in public upon the victims of his wrath. Seneca lost his influence over Nero but he never stopped publicly denouncing the money-lenders for their evil influence and corrupt practices. Finally the money-lenders demanded that Nero take action against Seneca who was very popular with the people. So as not to arouse the wrath of the people against himself, and the money-lenders. Nero ordered Seneca to end his own life. This is the first recorded case in which the money-lenders made a person commit suicide because he had become troublesome to them, but it was by no means the last. History records dozens of similar suicides, and murders which were made to appear as accidents or suicides. Justinian I, (Flavius Anicius Justinianus 483-565 A.D.) wrote his famous book of law "Corpus Juris Civilis". He tried to put an end to the illegal methods of traffic and trade indulged in by certain Jewish merchants. By engaging in illegal trade, and wholesale smuggling, the Jewish merchants, who were only agents of the Illuminati, obtained unfair advantage over their Gentile competitors. They put them out of business. The book of law, written by Justinian, was accepted as the text book of law right down to the 10th Century. Even to-day it is considered the most important of all documents of jurisprudence. But the money-lenders were able to offset the good Justinian tried to do.

Funk & Wagnall's Jewish Encyclopedia has this to say about the Jews in those days — "They enjoyed full religious liberty ... Minor offices were open to them. The trade in

slaves constituted the main source of livelihood for the Roman Jews, and decrees against this traffic were issued in 335, 336, 339, 384 A.D., etc." There is the story in black and white. But history reveals that the Jewish merchants, and moneylenders, did not confine their illegal activities to the slave trade. It is recorded that they engaged in every form of illegal traffic including the drug trade, prostitution, wholesale smuggling of liquors, perfumes, jewels, and other dutiable goods. In order to protect their illegal trade and traffic they bribed and corrupted officials; by use of drugs and liquors, and women, they destroyed the morals of the people. History records that Justinian, although Emperor of the Roman Empire, wasn't strong enough to put a stop to their activities. Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) deals with the corrupting influence of the Jewish merchants and money-lenders. He credits them with contributing greatly to "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire". He wrote the book with that title. Gibbon gives considerable space to the part Popaea, Nero's wife, played in bringing about the conditions which started the people of Rome reeling drunkenly towards their own destruction.

With the fall of the Roman Empire, Jewish predominance was established. The nations of Europe entered into what historians name "The Dark Ages". The Encyclopedia Britannica has this to say on the subject. "There was an inevitable tendency for them (The Jewish merchants and money-lenders) to specialize in commerce for which their acumen, and ubiquity, gave them special qualifications. In the Dark Ages the commerce of Western Europe was largely in their hands, in particular, the Slave Trade." Jewish control of trade and commerce, both legal and illegal, grew tighter and tighter. It spread far and wide, until every European country's economy was more or less in their hands. Evidence in the form of Polish and Hungarian coins bearing Jewish inscriptions gives some indication of the power they exerted in financial matters during those days. The fact that the Jews made a special effort, to issue and control currency, supports the opinion that the moneylenders had adopted the slogan "Let us issue and control the money of a nation and we care not who make its laws", long before Amschel Mayer Bauer (1743-1812) used the slogan to explain to his co-conspirators the reason the Jewish money-lenders had obtained control of the Bank of England in 1694.

The barons, who were the leaders of Aryanism, determined they would break the Jewish control of trade, commerce and money in Europe. It was with this purpose in mind that in 1095 they obtained the support of certain Christian rulers to start The Crusades or Holy Wars. Between 1095 and 1271 eight Crusades were organized. Officially, the Crusades were military expeditions undertaken to ensure the safety of Pilgrims who wished to visit the Holy Sepulchre and set up Christian Rule in Palestine. In actual fact they were wars fomented for the purpose of dividing the population of Europe into two camps. One camp pro-Jewish and the other Anti-Jewish. In more recent years, the Secret Powers divided the white race into Semitic and Anti-Semitic groups. Some of the Crusades were successful, some were not. The net result was that, in 1271, Palestine still remained in the hands of the Infidels, although the countries of Christendom had spent MILLIONS IN MONEY and treasure to finance the Crusades and sacrificed MILLIONS OF HUMAN

LIVES fighting those Holy Wars. Strange to relate, the Jewish money lenders grew richer and stronger than ever.

There is one phase of the Crusades which must not be overlooked when the "Causes" are being studied in relation to the "Effects" they produced in later years. In 1215 the Roman Catholic Hierarchy held the Fourth Lateran Council. The main topic under consideration was Jewish aggression in all the countries of Europe. During this period of history the Rulers of the Church, and the Rulers of the State, worked in unity. The rulers of the Church, after due deliberation, expressed themselves in favor of continuing the Crusades. They also drew up, and passed Decrees, designed to put an end to usury and the Jewish money-lenders practice of using unethical methods in traffic and trade to obtain unfair advantage over Gentile competitors, and to curb corrupt and immoral practices. To achieve this purpose the dignitaries attending the Fourth Lateran Council decreed that in the future the Jews be restricted to living in their own quarters. Jews were absolutely prohibited from hiring Christians as their employees. This decree was passed because Jewish money-lenders and merchants, operated on the Joint Stock Company principle. They employed Christians to act as their front men while they hid in the background directing operations. This was convenient because, when anything went wrong, the Christian front men got the blame, and the punishment, while they got off scot-free. In addition, by the Decrees, Jews were absolutely prohibited from employing Christian females in their homes and establishments. This decree was passed because evidence was produced to prove that young females were systematically seduced, and then turned into prostitutes; their masters used them to obtain control over influential officials. Other decrees made it unlawful for Jews to engage in many commercial activities.

But even the power of the Church, supported by most Christian officials of the State, could not make the Money-Barons amenable to the law. All the decrees accomplished was to intensify the hatred the money-lenders had for the Church of Christ, and they started a continuing campaign to separate the Church from the State. To achieve this purpose they introduced the idea of secularism amongst the laity. In 1253 the French government ordered the Jews expelled because they refused to obey the law. Most of the Jews who were expelled went over to England. By 1255 the Jewish moneylenders had obtained absolute control of many Church dignitaries and most of the Nobility.

In 1272 King Henry died. Edward I became King of England. He determined the Jewish leaders must give up the practice of usury. In 1275 he had Parliament pass the Statutes of Jewry. They were designed to curb the power Jewish usurers were exerting over their debtors, both Christians, and fellow Jews. The Statutes of Jewry were probably the first legislation in which The Commons in Parliament had an active part. They cannot be classified as Anti-Semitic because they actually protected the interests of honest and law-abiding Jews. But, as had happened so often before, the Jewish money-lenders thought that the power they could exert over both the Church and the State, would permit them to defy the king's decree in the same way as they had set at nought those passed by the Lateran Council. They made a grave mistake. In 1290 King Edward issued another

decree. ALL Jews were expelled from England. This was the start of what historians call The Great Eviction. After Edward I started the ball rolling, all the Crowned Heads of Europe followed his example. In 1306 France expelled the Jews. In 1348 Saxony followed suit. In 1360 Hungary; in 1370 Belgium; in 1380 Slovakia; in 1420 Austria; in 1444 The Netherlands; in 1492 Spain. The expulsion of the Jews from Spain has special signification. It throws light on the Spanish Inquisition. Most people have the idea the Inquisition was instituted by Roman Catholics to persecute Protestants who had broken away from the Church. As a matter of fact the Inquisition, as introduced by Pope Innocent III, was a means of unmasking heretics, and infidels, who were masquerading as Christians for the purpose of destroying the Christian Religion from within.[10] It didn't make the slightest difference to the Inquisitors whether the accused was Jew or Gentile, black or white. The terrible ceremony of the "Auto-da-Fé" or "Act of Faith", was specially designed to be used in connection with the execution of all convicted heretics, and infidels, when Torquemada (1420-1498) was Grand Inquisitor. It is these hidden incidents which reveal so much truth. It was in Spain, during the 14th Century, that the Jewish money-lenders first succeeded in having the loans they made the State secure by the right to collect the taxes levied upon the people. They used such cruelty, when demanding their Pound of Flesh, that it only required the inflammatory oratory of the priest Fernando Martenez to produce mass action which ended in one of the bloodiest massacres recorded in history. Here again is a perfect example of how thousands of innocent Jews were victimized, for the sins and crimes committed against humanity by just a few. In 1495 Lithuania expelled the Jews. In 1498 Portugal; in 1540 Italy; in 1551 Bavaria. It is important to remember that during the general evictions certain wealthy and influential Jews managed to obtain sanctuary in Bordeaux, Avignon, certain Papal States, Marseille, Northern Alsace, and part of northern Italy. But, as stated in the Encyclopedia Britannica, "The masses of the Jewish people were thus to be found once more, in the East and in the Polish and Turkish Empires.

The few communities suffered to remain in Western Europe were meantime subjected at last to all the restrictions which earlier Ages had usually allowed to remain as an ideal; so that, in a sense, the Jewish Dark Ages may be said to begin with the Renaissance. This admission would indicate there is some justification for the claim made by certain historians that not until the Western European nations wrested economic control from the Jewish moneylenders did the rebirth of western civilization occur. Following the Great Eviction the Jews again resumed living in Ghettos or Kahals. Thus, isolated from the masses of the population, the Jews were under the direction and control of the Rabbis and Elders, many of whom were influenced and the wealthy Jewish money-lenders who remained in their various sanctuaries. The Rabbis reminded them that, as the chosen people of God, the day would come when they would have their revenge and inherit the earth. They organized these negative conditions, into the World Revolutionary Movement, based on Terrorism. From its very inception the internationalminded Money-Barons, and THEIR High Priests, designed, financed, and controlled the World Revolutionary Movement. They used it as the instrument by which they would obtain

their revenge on the Christian churches, and the Crowned Heads, of Europe. History proves, HOW the Money-Barons developed the revolutionary movement into International Communism as we know it to-day. They organized individual acts of terrorism into a disciplined revolutionary movement. They then planned systematic infiltration of the Jews back into the countries from which they had been expelled. Because their re-entry was illegal the only method by which infiltration could be accomplished was to establish Jewish Undergrounds. Because the Jews who infiltrated into the Undergrounds of the European cities could not obtain lawful employment they were supplied with funds with which to develop the Black Market system. They indulged in every kind of illegal traffic and trade. Working on the principle of the Joint Stock Co., the identity of the Money-Barons, who owned and controlled this vast underground system always remained secret. The Jews were back in England in 1600; back in Hungary in 1500. They were expelled again in 1582; they were back in Slovakia in 1562 but were expelled again in 1744; they were back in Lithuania in 1700. But, regardless of how many times they were expelled, there always remained the Jewish underground from which the revolutionary activities of the Secret Powers were conducted.

Many Khazars of Russia moved into Germany, the home of a Jewish philosopher, Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), who appealed to many non-Jews as well as Jews. He believed that the "Jews had erected about themselves a mental ghetto to balance the physical ghetto around them." His goal was to guide the Jews "out of this mental ghetto into the wide world of general culture—without, however, doing harm to their culture." People refer to this movement as Haskalah, or enlightenment. He encouraged the Jews in Germany to learn the language instead of using an altered form of the vernacular. He translated the Torah, Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, into German. However, Jews in Germany, including Moses Hess, opposed the movement, as many did in Russia, and evolved into radical nationalists.

3.3 Middle Ages

Modern schoolbooks generally portray the Middle Ages as a time of poverty, backwardness, and economic slavery, from which the people were freed only by the Industrial Revolution; but reliable early historians painted a quite different picture. Thorold Rogers, a nineteenth century Oxford historian, wrote that in the Middle Ages, "a labourer could provide all the necessities for his family for a year by working 14 weeks." Fourteen weeks is only a quarter of a year! The rest of the time, some men worked for themselves; some studied; some fished. Some helped to build the cathedrals that appeared all over Germany, France and England during the period, massive works of art that were built mainly with volunteer labor. Some used their leisure to visit these shrines. One hundred thousand pilgrims had the wealth and leisure to visit Canterbury and other shrines yearly. William Cobbett, author of the definitive History of the Reformation, wrote that Winchester Cathedral "was made when there were no poor rates; when every labouring

man in England was clothed in good woollen cloth; and when all had plenty of meat and bread...." Money was available for inventions and art, supporting the Michelangelos, Rembrandts, Shakespeares, and Newtons of the period.

The Renaissance is usually thought of as the flowering of the age; but the university system, representative government in a Parliament, the English common law system, and the foundations of a great literary and spiritual movement were all in place by the thirteenth century, and education was advanced and widespread. As one scholar of the era observes:

"We are very prone to consider that it is only in our time that anything like popular education has come into existence. As a matter of fact, however, the education afforded to the people in the little towns of the Middle Ages, represents an ideal of educational uplift for the masses such as has never been even distantly approached in succeeding centuries. The Thirteenth Century developed the greatest set of technical schools that the world has ever known... These medieval towns, ... during the course of the building of their cathedrals, of their public buildings and various magnificent edifices of royalty and for the nobility, succeeded in accomplishing such artistic results that the world has ever since held them in admiration."

The common people had leisure, education, art, and economic security. According to The Catholic Encyclopedia: "Economic historians like Rogers and Gibbins declare that during the best period of the Middle Ages – say, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, inclusive – there was no such grinding and hopeless poverty, no such chronic semi-starvation in any class, as exists to-day among large classes in the great cities ... In the Middle Ages there was no class resembling our proletariat, which has no security, no definite place, no certain claim upon any organization or institution in the socio-economic organism."

Richard Hoskins attributes this long period of prosperity to the absence of usurious lending practices.¹⁵ Rather than having to borrow the moneylenders' gold, the people relied largely on interest-free tallies. Unlike gold, wooden tallies could not become scarce; and unlike paper money, they could not be counterfeited or multiplied by sleight of hand. They were simply a unit of measure, a tally of goods and services exchanged. The tally system avoided both the depressions resulting from a scarcity of gold and the inflations resulting from printing paper money out of all proportion to the goods and services available for sale. Since the tallies came into existence along with goods and services, supply and demand increased together, and prices remained stable. The tally system provided an organic form of money that expanded naturally as trade expanded and contracted naturally as taxes were paid. Bankers did not have to meet behind closed doors to set interest rates and manipulate markets to keep the money supply in balance. It balanced the way a checkbook balances, as a matter of simple math. The system of government-issued tallies kept the British economy stable and thriving until the mid-seventeenth century, when Oliver Cromwell, the "Pretender," needed money to fund a revolt against the Tudor monarchy...

3.4 France

By about 500 AD a people called the Franks ruled northern France (they gave their name to France). From 481 to 511 a man called Clovis ruled them. He converted to Christianity and his people followed. Once they shared the same religion there was less difference between the Franks and the native Romano-Gallic people. Slowly the two intermarried and their cultures merged. Clovis also issued a body of laws called Salic law and in 507 AD he made the little town of Paris his capital. (Towns in France shrank in the 5th century with the collapse of Roman rule but they did not disappear entirely). Clovis also subdued parts of southern France. After his death in 511 at the age of 45 his descendants continued his work and by the mid-6th century the Franks ruled all of France. However the first dynasty of Frankish kings, known as the Merovingians had little power over the outlying parts of France. Provence and Burgundy kept some autonomy. So did Brittany. (Bretons migrated from southern England to Brittany in the 5th century). During the 7th century the Merovingian kings had less and less power. They became figureheads and were known as the do nothing kings. Increasingly it was a powerful family called the Carolingians who ruled France. They were a rich family who owned vast estates. They also held the hereditary post of 'mayor of the palace'.

Finally the Carolingians overthrew the Merovingian kings and in 751 the first Carolingian king, Pepin the short, took the throne. Pepin's son Charles Martel halted the Islamic advance into Europe at the battle of Poitiers in 732. He also defeated the Bavarians and the Saxons. His son Charlemagne carried on his work and created a great European empire. He also forced pagan Germans to 'convert' to Christianity. Finally in 800 AD the Pope crowned Charlemagne Emperor. Thus Charlemagne claimed to be the successor of the old Roman Emperors. Charlemagne was keen to keep the church's support so he founded many monasteries and he gave gifts of land to the church. Furthermore under Charlemagne there was a revival of art and learning called the Carolingian Renaissance. Charlemagne died in 814. His successor Louis the Pious announced that after his death the empire would be split among his sons. Louis died in 840 and after some fighting his sons made the treaty of Verdun in 843. This divided the Frankish realm into three. The western part was ruled by Charles the Bald from 838 to 877. In time it evolved into France. However from the end of the 8th century Arabs from North Africa raided France. More serious were raids by Vikings in the 9th and 10th centuries. The French kings were unable to stop them and they lost power to local magnates who offered protection to the local people. France began to fragment, especially in the south where the regions became steadily more independent. In the Northwest Brittany continued to be autonomous. Eventually in 911 Charles the Simple made a treaty with the Viking Chief, Rollo. He took Normandy in return for converting to Christianity and promising loyalty to Charles.

That ended the Viking threat but by the time Hugh Capet became king in 987 (founding the Capetian dynasty) French kings had little power over most of France. Counts and

Dukes were largely independent. The Capetian kings directly ruled only a small area around Paris. The situation became more complicated in 1066 when William Duke of Normandy conquered England. Under the feudal system he was subordinate to the French king. Yet as king of England he was the French king's equal. Worse the mid-12th century Henry Count of Anjou married Eleanor of Aquitaine. In 1154 he became king of England. Afterwards the kings of England controlled huge parts of France. However in 1202 the French king Philip II went to war with the English King John and he captured most of the English king's lands in France. By the time Philip died he had greatly increased the area over which the French kings directly ruled. The process was continued by his grandson Louis IX (1226-1270) and by the late 13th century the French kings had control of most of France. However the English still controlled Aquitaine and Brittany and Burgundy were still semi-independent. However Philip the Fair (1285-1314) gradually extended the French king's control to the east by purchase and by marriage. Meanwhile the French economy boomed. Trade and commerce expanded and towns prospered. By the late 11th century Paris was booming. The arts - architecture, sculpture and literature flourished in France. Learning also flourished and many universities were founded, Paris in 1150, Toulouse in 1229, Montpellier in 1289, Avignon in 1303, Orleans in 1306 and Angers in 1337.

Meanwhile the last Capetian king, Charles the Fair, died in 1328 and his cousin Philip of Valois became Philip VI. However Edward III of England claimed the throne because his mother was king Charles the Fair's sister. (Salic law did not allow him to inherit the throne through a woman). So in 1337 a long and terrible series of wars began between England and France. The English won a naval battle at Sluys in 1340. In 1346 the English won a famous victory at Crecy with the longbow. Then in 1348 both England and France were devastated by the Black Death, which killed about one third of the population. Nevertheless the English went on to win the battle of Poitiers in 1356 and they captured the French king John II in 1358. The English demanded a huge ransom for John. Heavy taxes had to be raised to pay for it and the discontented peasants rose in rebellion in 1358. This rebellion was called the Jacquerie and it was crushed. The peace treaty of Bretigny was signed in 1360 and France was forced to surrender much of its territory. However the peace was only temporary. War began again in 1369. This time France was successful and by 1375 the English were driven back until they held no more than a few ports. However in 1392 the French king Charles VI became insane. As a result different factions in France began vying for power. One faction was led by Jean sans Peur (John the Fearless), Duke of Burgundy and the king's cousin. The other faction was led by the king's brother the Duke of Orleans. However the Duke of Orleans was assassinated and in 1415 the English invaded again. They won a great victory at Agincourt in 1415.

The Duke of Burgundy was assassinated in 1419. However the Burgundians then made an alliance with the English. They recognized Henry V of England as heir to the French throne. They also forced Charles VI to give his daughter to Henry in marriage. King

Charles's son the Dauphin fled to the south leaving northern France in the hands of the English and the Burgundians. In 1422 when his father died he claimed the throne of France but he ruled only southern France. However in 1429 the tide turned. A woman named Jeanne D'Arc (Joan of Arc) led a French revival. Joan of Arc was a very strange person. Joan claimed she heard voices. She also wore men's clothes. Joan claimed that from about the age of 13 she heard 'voices'. We are not sure what caused to hear 'voices'. Today doctors could probably treat her but in the Middle Ages medicine was very primitive. However Joan of Arc persuaded the French king to allow her to rally the troops and inspire them at the battle of Orleans in 1429. The English were besieging the town but they were driven back. However the Burgundians captured the unfortunate Joan in 1430. They handed her over to the English who burned her as a heretic in 1431. However the French fight back continued. By 1453 the English had been driven out of all France except Calais. The defeat of the English brought the French kings control of Aquitaine, Normandy and Burgundy. Other parts of France also came under the king's control. Provence was absorbed in 1482. In 1491 Charles VIII (1483-1498) married Anne Duchess of Brittany and the region lost its autonomy. By the end of the 15th century France was a strong, centralized kingdom.

During the early 16th century France became richer and the population grew rapidly. Meanwhile in 1539 the edict of Villers-Cotterets made French the language of legal and official documents instead of Latin. Nevertheless many people continued to speak languages like Breton and Occitanian rather than French. However in the years 1494-1559 France became embroiled in a series of wars with Italy. They only ended with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. Meanwhile France was rocked by the Reformation. In 1523 Jean Valliere became the first Protestant martyred in France. The persecution of Protestants grew worse after 1540. Meanwhile in 1541 Calvinism, a new branch of Protestantism, sprung up in France. Then, in 1562, a group of Protestants were massacred at Vassy by Catholics. This terrible event led to a series of religious wars in 1562-63, 1567-68, 1569-1570, 1573-74, 1576, 1577, 1579-1580 and 1585-1598. The worst event during these wars was the St Bartholomew's Day massacre in 1572. On that day as many as 3,000 Protestants were murdered in Paris by Catholics. Similar massacres took place in other French towns and perhaps another 8,000 Protestants died there. Then in 1589 King Henry III was assassinated leaving a Protestant, Henry of Navarre heir to the throne of France. Many Catholics refused to accept Henry, however and he had to fight for his throne. Yet in 1593 he converted to Catholicism and in 1594 he entered Paris. Finally in 1598 he issued the Edict of Nantes. This granted the Protestants the right to practice their religion and the right to hold certain fortified towns as security against attack. However war was not the only problem in late 16th century France. There were also a number of poor harvests and in the 1580s and 1590s, epidemics. It was a troubled time for France.

In the 17th century the power of the French king grew and grew and by the end of the 17th century France had an absolute monarchy. Absolutism was summed up by

Louis XIV when he said 'L'etat c'est moi' (I am the state). However things did not go smoothly in France. In 1610 King Henry IV was assassinated by a Catholic fanatic, Francois Ravallac. In 1610 Louis XIII became king. Much of his reign was dominated by Cardinal Richelieu, who became principal minister in 1624 and held power until his death in 1642. At the beginning of the 17th century French Protestants or Huguenots held their own fortified cities. However Louis XIII was determined to absorb them completely into his realm. In 1627 the people of La Rochelle rebelled and royal forces lay siege. La Rochelle surrendered in 1628 after a long and terrible siege. In 1618 the Thirty Years War began between several European powers. Two of the participants were Austria and Spain. Fearing France would be encircled if they grew too powerful Richelieu entered the war against them in 1635. Eventually the war went well for France. The French won a battle against the Spanish at Rocroi in 1643 and also advanced on the eastern front. However the war was very expensive and heavy taxes had to be raised to pay for it. As a result there were several uprisings in France. In 1636 rebellion broke out in the west. In 1639 an uprising occurred in Normandy. However the government crushed all rebellions. The war with Austria ended in 1648 but the war with Spain went on until 1659.

Meanwhile in 1643 Louis XIV became king of France. He was destined to become one of the greatest French kings and he was known as the 'sun king'. However early in his reign rebellion broke out. Between 1648 and 1652 there were a series of uprisings called the Fronde. These uprisings were led by angry nobles, keen to protect their feudal privileges from the encroaching power of the king. However, once again the government crushed them and restored order. Ironically the end of the Fronde left Louis XIV even more powerful than before. Then in 1661 Louis XIV decided to do without a principal minister and run things himself. However he was helped, until 1683, by a very able finance minister called Colbert. During Louis's reign art and science flourished in France. In 1661 an Academy of Dance was founded. It was followed by an Academy of Sciences in 1666, one of Architecture in 1671 and one of Music in 1672. Then in 1682 Louis moved into a magnificent new palace at Versailles. However Louis also involved France in many wars. They were the War of Devolution 1667-1668, the War Dutch War 1672-1678, the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713). These wars were enormously expensive and taxes had to be increased to pay for them, placing a great burden on ordinary people. Furthermore in 1685 Louis revoked the Edict of Nantes, which granted the Protestants religious toleration. As a result France lost hundreds of thousands of its most skilled people as Protestants fled abroad. Worse France suffered from famine in 1693-1694 and in 1707-1710. Louis XIV finally died in 1715.

The 18th century was a prosperous time for many French people. (There was some abject poverty of course but there was in any country at that time). French trade grew rapidly. So did the numbers of middle class people - those below the rich but above the poor. The population of France also rose. It was also an age of rationalism. Rationalist thinkers such as Voltaire (1694-1778) attacked the power of the Catholic church and also

traditional laws and forms of government. Between 1751 and 1772 Denis Diderot (1713-1784) edited the Encyclopedia, which encouraged rationalist thought. Meanwhile many pamphlets and booklets were written attacking the established order. Many educated people in France were also influenced by the example of Britain. In 1726 Voltaire visited England and he wrote admiringly of it. No doubt he had an idealized view of England but at least it was ruled by parliament (even though only a small minority of men could vote). Imprisonment without trial was illegal and though there was a state church other Protestant churches were tolerated. Meanwhile in 1756-1763 France became embroiled in the Seven Years War. It proved to be a disaster. France lost Canada and its position in India. Then in 1776 the British colonies in North America rebelled. The French were keen to assist the rebels and to get their revenge on the British. France joined the war in 1778 and played a key part in the American victory at Yorktown in 1781. Britain was forced to recognize the independence of the colonies in 1783.

The Revolt of the Nobles

The French Revolution began as a revolt of the nobles. In theory the king was an absolute monarch who could do as he pleased. However after 1774 it turned out he was not so powerful as he seemed. At first resistance to the king was led by bodies called parlements. They were not elected bodies. They were bodies of nobles who acted as royal courts. However one of their duties was to register the king's decrees. In the late 18th century the nobles who made up the parlements began to feel that their traditional feudal rights were under attack and they resisted the king by refusing to register decrees. (Most importantly the nobility were exempt from many taxes and they jealously guarded this right). Whenever the parlements of a parlement disagreed with the king they were eventually forced to submit but they were becoming foci of resistance to the king. In 1778 France declared war on Britain in support of the American colonists. The war was very expensive. France had to borrow heavily to pay for the war and the loans were very difficult to repay. So in 1786 the finance minister, Calonne, proposed a new tax on land (with no exemptions for the rich) and a stamp tax. Calonne feared the parlements would resist the idea so he persuaded the king to call a Council of Notables to discuss the idea. Calonne hoped that if they agreed to it the parlements would not dare to resist.

However things did not go according to plan. The Assembly of Notables was not elected, its members were appointed by the king and they were almost all nobles. Yet when they met in 1787 the notables declared they had no power to accept the plans. Instead they suggested the king call the Estates-General. (This was an elected body that had not met since 1614). The king dismissed the assembly and in June 1787 he sent the new tax measures to the Paris parlement to register. However, as feared the parlement refused to register. In August it was sent into exile but in September 1787 the king was forced to recall it. Across France parlements continued to reject the king's schemes and clamored for the Estates-General to be called. Finally in July 1788 the king gave in. He agreed to

call the Estates-General. However the king was unlucky. The harvests of 1787 and 1788 were poor and bread (the staple food of the poor) was expensive so the people were in an ugly mood.

The French Revolution

The Estates-General had not met since 1614. It was divided into three parts. The third estate represented the ordinary people (the vast majority of the population). The second estate represented the clergy and the first estate represented the nobility. However the consent of all three estates was needed to pass a measure. So the nobles or the clergy could veto any measure passed by the third estate. The third estate thought that was not fair as they represented the vast majority of the people. They wanted the Estates-General to vote as a single unit, with all its members put together. If a majority of all the members voted for a measure it would pass. At that time half of all the members of the Estates-General were in the third estate. So if some members of the clergy and nobility voted with them they could push through reforms. The Estates-General met on 5 May 1789 and promptly began to argue over how they should vote. Finally the third estate lost patience and in June they declared themselves the true representatives of the people of France. On 17 June they declared themselves the National Assembly. On 19 June the clergy voted, by a narrow majority, to join them. However the king and his advisers were alarmed. So when the deputies arrived on Saturday 20 June they found their building locked and guarded by soldiers. However the third estate refused to disperse. They met in a tennis court nearby and took an oath not to disperse until the king met their demands. On Monday 22 June the majority of the clergy joined them.

The king prevaricated. Then finally, on 27 June, he caved in. He ordered the three estates to join together and vote as one body His decision caused rejoicing in Paris. It seemed that the reformers had one. However the king then ordered troops to march towards Paris. The people were alarmed and they searched for weapons to defend themselves. On the morning of 14 July 1789 they seized cannons and guns from the Invalides (a hospital for military veterans). They then surrounded a fortress and prison called the Bastille. The governor was forced to surrender. To the ordinary people the Bastille was enormously important as a symbol of royal power and arbitrary government. The king was then advised that the army was unreliable. The soldiers might refuse to fire on the people. So Louis backed down from using force. In one stroke the king's authority evaporated. Following the fall of the Bastille Paris was given a new city government with a man named Bailly as mayor. To preserve law and order in Paris a citizen's militia was formed. It was called the National Guard and it was led by a man named Lafayette. A wave of unrest then swept rural France. It was known as the La Grand Peur (Great Fear). Rumors spread that the aristocrats had hired brigands to take revenge on the peasants. (At a time when people were anxious and desperate rumors spread quickly). The peasants grabbed arms to defend themselves. When the bands of brigands failed to

appear the peasants turned on their masters.

The peasants had always been burdened with feudal dues to their lords. Now they seized and burned records of feudal dues. In some cases they sacked or burned buildings. Alarmed the National Assembly decided the only way to calm the situation was to abolish feudal dues as soon as possible. On the night of 4 August 1789 the assembly voted to scrap the feudal privileges of the nobility in France. On 26 August 1789 the Assembly voted for the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. It declared that all men are born free and equal. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment were outlawed. Furthermore in future all appointments to public posts would be open to everybody and would be solely on the basis of ability. However the economic situation in France grew worse. The price of bread continued to rise and the ordinary people grew more desperate. Meanwhile Louis ordered troops to move from the border to his palace at Versailles, near Paris, alarming the Parisians. On 5 October 1789 crowds of women gathered in Paris and seized arms and cannons. They marched to Versailles and entered a meeting of the National Assembly demanding bread. They also sent a deputation to the king who immediately gave in and accepted all the decrees previously made by the Assembly.

Meanwhile the National Guard marched out to Versailles. Their leader Lafayette, was reluctant to leave Paris unguarded but his men demanded it. When he arrived Lafayette 'requested' the king leave Versailles and come to Paris. However the crowds of ordinary people demanded it. Faced with popular uproar Louis gave in and on 6 October agreed to move to the capital. Meanwhile the Assembly reformed local government. The old parlements were swept away and new courts were formed. From then on 83 departments replaced the old regions of France. All were run by elected councils. The old taxes were abolished and replaced by new ones.

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy

The French revolution also broke the power of the Catholic Church in France. On 4 August 1789 tithes were abolished (until then people had to pay one tenth of their income to the Church). In November the Assembly voted to confiscate land belonging to the Church and pay the clergy a salary (making them state employees). A committee of the Assembly drew up plans to reform the Church. It decided a pay scale and changed the number of bishops. From then on there would be 83, one for each department. The number of parishes was also reduced. Furthermore in future parish priests would be elected by district assemblies. Bishops would be elected by departmental assemblies. These new plans were ready in July 1790 and they were called the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. However many of the clergy refused to co-operate and in November 1790 the Assembly voted to dismiss any clergyman who would not swear an oath of loyalty to the new constitution. Across France some clergymen did take the oath. Others refused and resigned. Furthermore from 1790 France began to split between those who felt the revolution had gone far enough and those who wanted to go further. Then in 1791 the

king made things worse by attempting to flee France. On the night of 20 June he and his family slipped away. However the king was recognized. The royal party was stopped at Varennes. It was now obvious that the king rejected the revolution and would turn the clock back if he could. Louis alienated many people in France.

Nevertheless in September 1791 the new constitution was ready and the king accepted it. The king still kept some powers including the right to appoint and dismiss ministers. Furthermore not all men could vote. The poorest class was excluded but at the time that was normal. In October 1791 a new assembly called the legislative assembly met. The new assembly had a 'lifetime' of two years. Every two years elections were to be held for a new one. Unfortunately the king was given the power to veto the assembly's decrees, not permanently but for the rest of the lifetime of that particular assembly, a maximum of two years. However the French revolution entered a new radical phase in 1792 when war began with Austria in April and with Prussia in May. However at first the war went very badly for France leading to fear and recriminations. Moreover in the Summer of 1792 public opinion hardened against the king. At that time Paris was divided into sections with sectional assemblies. On 9 August they seized power. They joined to form the Paris Commune and they sent national guards to arrest the king. The king and his family took refuge and escaped harm. However the king's Swiss guard tried to stop the national guard and were massacred. The Legislative Assembly then declared that the king was suspended. The Constitution of 1791 (which gave the king an important role) was now unworkable. The assembly then agreed to call elections for a new government, the National Convention, which met in September 1792.

Meanwhile on 17 August 1792 the Commune formed a tribunal to try people accused of political crimes. The first political prisoner was guillotined on 21 August. Then, in September 1792, massacres of political prisoners took place. At that time the Prussian army was advancing into France. The Parisians were frantic and they began killing prisoners held in jails in the city. Kangaroo courts were set up and thousands of people were killed. The killings became known as the September massacres. However on 20 August 1792 the French army halted the Prussians at Valmy. The French revolution had now entered a new phase. The new government, the National Convention, abolished the monarchy. In December 1792 the king was put on trial. He was executed on 15 January 1793. Marie Antoinette followed him to the guillotine on 16 October 1793. After the execution of the king Britain went to war with France. Increasingly desperate the French government introduced conscription in February 1793. Meanwhile in conservative parts of France the revolution was becoming increasingly unpopular and conscription was the last straw. Finally in March 1793 the Vendee and parts of Brittany rose in revolt. However by December the uprising was crushed, with appalling bloodshed. However as well as facing internal revolt the French government was faced with military defeat in early 1793. In April a kind of war cabinet called the Committee for Public Safety was formed. In June there was another popular uprising in Paris. This time the National Convention was purged. The moderate members (called Girondins) were removed and the extreme

revolutionaries (called Jacobins) took control. The French revolution now entered its most extreme phase. In August the British captured Toulon. On 23 August faced with a dire military situation the government called for the mobilisation of the whole nation for war. It was called the *Levee en masse*.

The Terror

Meanwhile in March 1793 Watch Committees were formed to monitor foreigners and other suspects. In September 1793 the committees were given much greater powers. From then on anyone who 'by their conduct, their contacts, their words or by their writings' were revealed to be 'supporters of tyranny, of federalism and or to be enemies of liberty' could be arrested. Such a catch-all phrase meant virtually anybody could be arrested and executed. In the following 9 months at least 16,000 people were executed. Meanwhile the military tide turned. In October 1793 the French army defeated the Austrians at Wattignies. In December 1793 Captain Napoleon Bonaparte recaptured Toulon. Many Jacobins were deists or atheists and were bitterly opposed to Christianity. In September 1793 a movement called De-Christianization began. The church was persecuted. Churches were vandalized and closed. The church of Notre-Dame was renamed the 'Temple of Reason'. In October a new calendar was adopted. Years were no longer counted from the birth of Christ. Instead they began on 22 September 1792, the first day of the republic. The year was divided into twelve months with names taken from nature. The seven day week was replaced by a ten day one.

However the Convention now became alarmed. The members now feared for their lives, realizing that Robespierre might arrest and execute any of them. The only way to ensure their safety was to denounce Robespierre and remove him from power. This they did. Robespierre tried to shoot himself on 27 July but he was arrested and he was sent to the guillotine on 28 July 1794. The apparatus of terror was then dismantled. Furthermore thousands of prisoners were released. In March 1795 many churches re-opened for worship for the first time since October 1793. The Convention now drew up a new constitution, which was ready in August 1794. France would have a bicameral legislature. Executive power was held by a group of five called the Directory. Furthermore In October 1794 the National Guard and the sectional assemblies were abolished.

Napoleon I

However the Directory failed to solve France's political problems and restore stability. By 1799 many people yearned for a return to stability and one man promised to provide it - Napoleon Bonaparte. He first came to the public's notice in September 1795 when he suppressed a riot in Paris with a 'whiff of grapeshot'. In 1796-97 he became a hero when he led a brilliant campaign against the Austrians in North Italy. In 1798-1799 Napoleon fought a campaign in Egypt. Although he was successful on land the French

fleet was shattered at the battle of the Nile in 1798. In October 1799 Napoleon returned to France and in November he staged a coup. The French Revolution had ended and a new era had begun. At first Napoleon was made 'First Consul'. There were two other consuls but Napoleon had the real power. The new constitution was accepted by the people in a referendum. At first Napoleon was made a consul for 10 years but in 1802 in another referendum the people voted that he should be made consul for life. Then in 1804 Napoleon crowned himself emperor.

Napoleon kept some of the achievements of the French Revolution. Equality before the law was preserved and careers were open to anyone of talent and ability. There was no return to a privileged nobility. On the other hand Napoleon introduced censorship of the press and even imprisonment without trial. Napoleon also appointed prefects to run the departments and he created a strong, centralized bureaucracy. He also reduced women's rights and reintroduced slavery to the French colonies. Napoleon also made a concordat (agreement) with the Pope in 1801. Furthermore Napoleon drew up a new code of laws to govern France. It was published in 1804 and was called the Code Napoleon. Meanwhile Napoleon's military genius allowed him to dominate Europe. In 1799 Austria, Russia and Britain formed a coalition against France. However Russia left the coalition in 1800. Austria was defeated in 1800 and forced to make peace in 1801. Britain made peace in 1802 but was begun again in 1803.

However in 1804 Russia, Austria and Britain formed a third coalition but Austria was crushed at Austerlitz in 1805. Prussia joined the war against France in 1806 but was crushed at Jena the same year. However the French and Spanish fleets were severely defeated at Trafalgar in October 1805 ending Napoleon's hopes of invading Britain. Despite that naval defeat by 1807 Napoleon was at his peak. However things began to go wrong in 1812. Napoleon's invasion of Russia ended in disaster and in 1813 Prussia joined the war against France. Austria and Sweden also joined and the French were badly defeated at the battle of Leipzig in October 1813. In March 1814 the allies entered Paris and Napoleon was forced to abdicate. He was exiled to Elba. However in 1815 he returned to France and was welcomed by the people. Yet he was defeated at Waterloo in June and forced to abdicate again. This time Napoleon was exiled to the island of St Helena. He died in 1821.

The Restoration

Napoleon was replaced by Louis XVII's brother Louis XVIII. (Louis XVI's son died in 1795 but royalists insisted he became Louis XVII after his father's death in 1793). However Louis XVIII realized he could not turn the clock back completely so he allowed France a constitution. Louis XVIII also tried to restrain those who wanted to completely undo the revolution (they were called Ultra royalists). However they gained influence after the Duc de Berry was assassinated in 1820. When Louis XVIII died in 1824 his brother Charles X became king. Charles claimed to rule by divine right and had no intention

of compromising with the liberals. Not surprisingly therefore, he provoked an uprising in 1830 and he was forced to abdicate. However the French were afraid of creating a republic because the other European powers would have been hostile and might have taken military action. Instead the Duc D'Orleans was made King Louis Philippe. He reigned for 18 years. Under him the French constitution was made more liberal. More men were allowed the vote (but only the middle classes the workers were still excluded). Meanwhile Under Charles X the French had invaded Algeria. Under Louis Philippe the conquest continued but it took many years.

At home the industrial revolution began to change France. However industrialization was slower than in other countries like Britain and Germany and France remained a mainly agricultural country. Nevertheless by 1848 there were a considerable number of urban workers in certain cities. They lived and worked in dreadful conditions and in the mid-19th century they were influenced by socialist thinkers. The July monarchy, as it was called, was really only a stopgap measure. In 1846-47 France suffered an economic crisis and popular discontent seethed. Finally in February 1848 a demonstration was held in Paris. Soldiers fired on the demonstrators and triggered a revolution. Louis Philippe abdicated and fled.

The Second Republic in France

To reduce popular discontent the provisional government created national workshops in Paris for the unemployed (some unemployed workers from the provinces came to work in them). However the workers were dissatisfied and they still held demonstrations. In June 1848 the government decided to close the workshops and they ordered the workers to disperse. However the workers refused and they manned barricades in Paris. Eventually government troops crushed the uprising known as the June Days. Then, in November 1848 the new constitution was published. All men were allowed to vote and there was to be a single elected assembly and a popularly elected president. In December 1848 Louis Napoleon, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte was elected president. However the constitution did not allow the president to serve a second term. Therefore on 2 December 1851 Napoleon led a coup. A referendum was held and the people agreed to allow the president to change the constitution. He did so and in December 1852 he made himself Emperor Napoleon III. (This was because Louis XVI was executed in 1793 and his son was never crowned. He died in 1795. However when the monarchy was restored in 1814 royalists insisted that Louis XVI's son had been Louis XVII even though he never ruled France. So the next Bourbon king was named Louis XVIII. Napoleon Bonaparte had a son who never ruled France and who died young. Following the royalist myth Louis Napoleon insisted that he had been Napoleon II and he called himself Napoleon III).

Napoleon III

Napoleon III was responsible for largely rebuilding Paris. Many wide boulevards were built during his reign. Furthermore new sewers made Paris a healthier city. The building work also provided employment for many of the masses. Meanwhile industrialization continued in France. During Napoleon's time many more railways were built and new banks were founded. However Napoleon had a disastrous foreign policy. In 1854 he went to war with Russia (The Crimean War). Although the war ended successfully in 1856 France gained nothing. Then, in 1859 he fought a war with Austria. Again the war was successful but France gained little (only Savoy and Nice). Furthermore in 1862 France joined Britain and Spain in sending an expedition to collect debt from Mexico. Spain and Britain withdrew but Napoleon foolishly tried to make Maximilian, a prince of Austria, emperor of Mexico. The Mexicans rebelled and in 1865 Napoleon was forced to withdraw his troops. Maximilian was shot.

Realizing he was losing popularity after 1867 Napoleon made his regime more liberal. He relaxed press censorship and restrictions on public meetings. Workers were given the right to strike. However in 1870 Napoleon went to war with Prussia. The French were utterly defeated at Sedan in September. Napoleon was captured and abdicated. He later fled abroad. A provisional government was formed led by Adolphe Thiers. Meanwhile the Germans surrounded Paris and the inhabitants were reduced to virtual starvation. Finally on 28 January 1871 Paris surrendered. By the peace treaty France lost Alsace-Lorraine. She also had to pay an indemnity and German troops were stationed in northern France until it was paid. Shortly after the surrender of Paris a National Assembly took control of the government. It met at Versailles. However the Parisians were outraged by the peace treaty and they rebelled. The Parisians formed their own municipal government called the commune. Thiers was determined to crush the revolt and on 21 May 1871 he sent in the army. While the Germans watched French soldiers took the city street by street with great loss of life. Afterwards Thiers was named president and he quickly managed to pay the indemnity demanded by Germany. The last German soldiers left France in September 1873. Meanwhile in 1873 Thiers was replaced by Marshal MacMahon, a monarchist. Nevertheless in 1875 the National Assembly established the Third Republic by one vote.

The Third Republic in France

In the late 19th century industrialization in France continued. Iron and chemical industries grew rapidly and in the early 20th century car making became an important industry. Meanwhile more railways were built. In the late 19th century living standards for ordinary French people improved and their diet became better. In 1900 a law was passed limiting women and children to working no more than 10 hours a day. However on 15 October 1894 Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who worked in the intelligence section of the General Staff of the French army was arrested for treason. He was accused of selling military secrets

to the Germans. Dreyfus was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment on Devils Island. However Dreyfus was Jewish and he was a victim of anti-Semitism. He was also an Alsatian and was seen as an outsider. He was completely innocent of the charge.

After two years a man named Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart uncovered evidence that the real culprit was a Major Walsin Esterhazy. However the army transferred Picquart to Tunisia and a military court acquitted Esterhazy, despite the evidence. Then the novelist Emile Zola published an article in a newspaper, which was called *J'accuse!* (I accuse) in which he denounced the army cover up. The case then split France with the right wing and the leaders of the Catholic Church against Dreyfus and the left wing for him. In 1899 Dreyfus was given a new court-martial but again he was found guilty! Nevertheless the president pardoned Dreyfus and he returned to France. Poor Dreyfus had to wait until 1906 before he was cleared of all blame.

3.5 The Holy Roman Empire

The Holy Roman Empire was a feudal monarchy that encompassed present-day Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, as well as parts of eastern France, northern Italy, Slovenia, and western Poland at the start of the early modern centuries. It was created by the coronation of the Frankish king Charlemagne (Carl the Great) as Roman emperor by Pope Leo III on Christmas Day in the year 800, thus restoring in their eyes the western Roman Empire that had been leaderless since 476. Charlemagne's Frankish successor emperors faltered under political and military challenges, and his inheritance was permanently divided in 887. After 924 the western empire was again without an emperor until the coronation of Otto I, duke of Saxony, on 2 February 962. This coronation was seen to transfer the Roman imperial office to the heirs of the East Franks, the Germans. The position of emperor remained among the Germans until the Holy Roman Empire was abolished in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars in 1806.

In 1512 the name "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" (Heiliges römisches Reich deutscher Nation) became the official title of the empire, which spanned central Europe between the kingdom of France to the west and the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland to the east. In the north it was bounded by the Baltic and North Seas and by the Danish kingdom; in the south, it reached to the Alps. At no time in its long history did the empire possess clearly defined boundaries; its people, perhaps fifteen million in 1500, spoke a variety of languages and dialects. German predominated, but the advice of the Golden Bull of 1356 that future princes of the empire should learn the "German, Italian, and Slavic tongues" remained apposite. The multilingual empire stood at the crossroads of Europe and its emerging national cultures; it also included significant Jewish communities in the south and west.

European trade and communication moved along the mighty rivers within the empire—the

Rhine, the Main, the Danube, and the Elbe. On these rivers stood some of its most important cities: Cologne, the largest in the empire with about thirty thousand inhabitants, as well as Frankfurt, Vienna, and Hamburg. By 1500 there were about a dozen big cities with over ten thousand inhabitants each, and about twenty with between two and ten thousand people. Visitors to the empire from Italy, such as Niccolò Machiavelli, noted the size and wealth of these great German cities. In 1438 Albert II of Habsburg was elected to the imperial throne; he was succeeded by his cousin Frederick III (ruled 1440–1493). From their base of power in Austria, the House of Habsburg outmaneuvered other leading families of the empire to secure their election to the imperial throne again and again; from the reign of Albert in 1438 forward, a Habsburg was always elected (except for a brief interlude from 1742 to 1745 when the Wittelsbach Prince Charles Albert of Bavaria was elected as Emperor Charles VII), and the office of the emperor became quasi-hereditary. This is less surprising when one realizes that by the mid-fifteenth century only a leading prince of the empire could benefit from the imperial title, as the prestige of the emperor's position far surpassed its actual power. In legal terms the emperor was "administrator of the empire" rather than "lord of the empire." The empire was divided into a patchwork of principalities, some large and powerful like Wittelsbach Bavaria, others small but independent, like the imperial abbeys in the southwest. In each of these principalities rulers exercised many of the functions associated by early modern and modern political theorists with sovereignty. In the first instance the princes of the empire—rather than the emperor—collected taxes, administered justice, minted coins, and claimed responsibility for the material and spiritual salvation of their subjects. Many of the principalities of the empire had their own parliamentary bodies representing the estates of the territory.

The territorial ambitions of the princes, alongside their predilection for partible inheritance, created a patchwork of German principalities that grew bewilderingly complex. By 1450 the empire contained the seven electoral principalities; twenty-five major secular principalities, such as the duchies of Austria, Bavaria, and Brunswick; about ninety archbishoprics, bishoprics, and imperial abbeys; over one hundred independent counties of very unequal importance; and seventy free imperial cities such as Cologne, Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg in the north; Strasbourg, Nuremberg, Ulm, and Augsburg in the south; and Frankfurt and Mühlhausen in central Germany.

Few European political units seem as remote and confusing as the Holy Roman Empire. At the start of the early modern period, the supranational, multiethnic structure of this feudal state made perfect sense, of course, to the people who lived in it and shaped its development. Indeed, in the period from 1450 to 1555 the Holy Roman Empire was a dynamic political unit of crucial importance to the growth of the Habsburg empire and the Protestant Reformation. It survived the chaos of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) to emerge as a guarantor of peace, if not progress, in central Europe. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, Europeans saw the Holy Roman Empire in a very different light. In a Europe of centralized, hereditary monarchies consolidating their nation-states, its polycentric, supranational structure, elected emperor, and ponderous parliament had

become ever more difficult to understand and explain. When it ceased to exist in 1806, few understood its significance.

King of the Romans

Becoming Emperor required becoming King of the Romans first. Kings had been elected since time immemorial: in the ninth century by the leaders of the five most important tribes: the Salian Franks of Lorraine, the Riparian Franks of Franconia, and the Saxons, Bavarians, and Swabians, later by the main lay and clerical dukes of the kingdom, finally only by the so-called Kurfuersten (electing dukes, electors). This college was formally established by a 1356 decree known as the Golden Bull. Initially, there were seven electors: the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the Archbishops of Köln, Mainz, and Trier. During the Thirty Years' War, the Duke of Bavaria was given the right to vote as the eighth elector. In order to be elected king, a candidate had to first win over the electors, usually with bribes or promises of land.

Until 1508, the newly-elected king then travelled to Rome to be crowned Emperor by the Pope. In many cases, this took several years while the King was held up by other tasks: frequently he first had to resolve conflicts in rebellious northern Italy or was in quarrel with the Pope himself. At no time could the Emperor simply issue decrees and govern autonomously over the Empire. His power was severely restricted by the various local leaders: after the late fifteenth century, the Reichstag established itself as the legislative body of the Empire, a complicated assembly that convened irregularly at the request of the Emperor at varying locations. Only after 1663 would the Reichstag become a permanent assembly.

Imperial estates

An entity was considered Reichsstand (imperial estate) if, according to feudal law, it had no authority above it except the Holy Roman Emperor himself. Territories governed by a prince or duke, and in some cases kings. (Rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, with the exception of the King of Bohemia (an elector), were not allowed to become King within the Empire, but some had kingdoms outside the Empire, as was, for instance, the case in the Kingdom of Great Britain, where the ruler was also the Prince-electors of Hanover from 1714 until the dissolution of the Empire.) Feudal territories led by a clerical dignitary, who was then considered a prince of the church. In the common case of a Prince-Bishop, this temporal territory (called a prince-bishopric) frequently overlapped his—often larger—ecclesiastical diocese (bishopric), giving the bishop both worldly and clerical powers. Examples include the three prince-archbishoprics: Cologne, Trier, and Mainz. And thirdly, Imperial Free Cities. The number of territories was amazingly large, rising to several hundred at the time of the Peace of Westphalia. Many of these comprised

no more than a few square miles, so the Empire is aptly described as a "patchwork carpet".

Crisis after Reformation

In 1517, Martin Luther initiated what would later be known as the Reformation. At this time, many local dukes saw a chance to oppose the hegemony of Emperor Charles V. The empire became then fatally divided along religious lines, with the North, the East, and many of the major cities—Strassburg, Frankfurt and Nuremberg—became Protestant while the southern and western regions largely remained Catholic. Religious conflicts were waged in various parts of Europe for a century, though in German regions there was relative quiet from the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 until the Defenestration of Prague in 1618. When Bohemians rebelled against the emperor, the immediate result was the series of conflicts known as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which devastated the Empire. Foreign powers, including France and Sweden intervened in the conflict and strengthened those fighting Imperial power, but they also seized considerable chunks of territory for themselves. The long conflict bled the Empire to such a degree that it would never recover its former strength.

The Thirty Years War

The Thirty Years War (1618-48) began when Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II of Bohemia attempted to curtail the religious activities of his subjects, sparking rebellion among Protestants. The war came to involve the major powers of Europe, with Sweden, France, Spain and Austria all waging campaigns primarily on German soil. Known in part for the atrocities committed by mercenary soldiers, the war ended with a series of treaties that made up the Peace of Westphalia. The fallout reshaped the religious and political map of central Europe, setting the stage for the old centralized Roman Catholic empire to give way to a community of sovereign states.

This conflict, which redrew the religious and political map of central Europe, began in the Holy Roman Empire, a vast complex of some one thousand separate, semiautonomous political units under the loose suzerainty of the Austrian Hapsburgs. Over the previous two centuries, a balance of power had emerged among the leading states, but during the sixteenth century, the Reformation and the Counter Reformation had divided Germany into hostile Protestant and Catholic camps, each prepared to seek foreign support to guarantee its integrity if need arose.

Thus in 1618, when Ferdinand II, heir apparent to the throne of Bohemia, began to curtail certain religious privileges enjoyed by his subjects there, they immediately appealed for aid to the Protestants in the rest of the empire and to the leading foreign Protestant states: Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, and Denmark. Ferdinand, in turn, called upon the German Catholics (led by Bavaria), Spain, and the papacy. In the ensuing struggle, Ferdinand (elected Holy Roman Emperor in 1619) and his allies won a major victory at

White Mountain (1620) outside Prague that allowed the extirpation of Protestantism in most of the Hapsburg lands. Encouraged by this success, Ferdinand turned in 1621 against Bohemia's Protestant supporters in Germany. Despite aid from Britain, Denmark, and the Dutch Republic, they too lost, and by 1629 imperial armies commanded by Albrecht von Wallenstein overran most of Protestant Germany and much of Denmark. Ferdinand then issued the Edict of Restitution, reclaiming lands in the empire belonging to the Catholic Church that had been acquired and secularized by Protestant rulers.

Only Swedish military aid saved the Protestant cause. In 1630 an army led by King Gustavus Adolphus landed in Germany and, with a subsidy from the French government and assistance from many German Protestant states, routed the Imperialists at Breitenfeld (1631) and drove them from much of Germany. The Protestant revival continued until in 1634 a Spanish army intervened and at Nordlingen defeated the main Swedish field army and forced the Protestants out of southern Germany. This new Hapsburg success, however, provoked France—which feared encirclement—to declare war first on Spain (1635) and then on the emperor (1636).

The war, which in the 1620s had been fought principally by German states with foreign assistance, now became a struggle among the great powers (Sweden, France, Spain, and Austria) fought largely on German soil, and for twelve more years armies maneuvered while garrisons—over five hundred in all—carried out a “dirty war” designed both to support themselves and to destroy anything of possible use to the enemy. Atrocities (such as those recorded in the novel *Simplicissimus* by Hans von Grimmelshausen) abounded as troops struggled to locate and appropriate resources. Eventually, France's victory over the Spaniards at Rocroi (1643) and Sweden's defeat of the Imperialists at Jankau (1645) forced the Hapsburgs to make concessions that led, in 1648, to the Peace of Westphalia, which settled most of the outstanding issues.

The cost, however, had proved enormous. Perhaps 20 percent of Germany's total population perished during the war, with losses of up to 50 percent along a corridor running from Pomerania in the Baltic to the Black Forest. Villages suffered worse than towns, but many towns and cities also saw their populations, manufacture, and trade decline substantially. It constituted the worst catastrophe to afflict Germany until World War II. On the other hand, the conflict helped to end the age of religious wars. Although religious issues retained political importance after 1648 (for instance, in creating an alliance in the 1680s against Louis XIV), they no longer dominated international alignments. Those German princes, mostly Calvinists, who fought against Ferdinand II in the 1620s were strongly influenced by confessional considerations, and as long as they dominated the anti-Hapsburg cause, so too did the issue of religion. But because they failed to secure a lasting settlement, the task of defending the “Protestant cause” gradually fell into the hands of Lutherans, who proved willing to ally (if necessary) with Catholic France and Orthodox Russia in order to create a coalition capable of defeating the Hapsburgs. After 1630 the role of religion in European politics receded. This was, perhaps, the greatest achievement of the Thirty Years' War, for it thus eliminated a major destabilizing in-

fluence in European politics, which had both undermined the internal cohesion of many states and overturned the diplomatic balance of power created during the Renaissance.

Peace of Westphalia

The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648 in Münster (Germany), ended the Thirty Years War, which started with an anti-Habsburg revolt in Bohemia in 1618 but became an entanglement of different conflicts concerning the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, religion, and the state system of Europe. This contest was a civil “German war,” but foreign powers played crucial a role. The Peace of Westphalia ended with the signing of two treaties between the empire and the new great powers, Sweden and France, and settled the conflicts inside the empire with their guarantees. A new electorate was established for the exiled son of the revolt’s leader, the elector Palatine. Bavaria kept the electorate that it had been given for its support of the emperor Ferdinand II during the revolt. This compromise in 1648 meant a change of the empire’s fundamental Golden Bull of 1356 and was a symbol that all conflicts occurring since 1618 were resolved and that those who made peace did not avoid radical cuts and invented fresh ideas in order to make peace. Catholics and Protestants (now including Calvinists as well as Lutherans) accepted each other. Several regulations guaranteed their balance: 1624 was declared the “normal year” of any territory’s denomination, minorities were tolerated or had a right to emigrate, and no one could be forced to convert any longer. The Peace of Westphalia is regarded as a milestone in the development toward tolerance and secularization. This settlement also strengthened the imperial Estates: they could go into foreign alliances and decide important matters, such as peace and war, along with the emperor. Habsburg’s suspected ambition for a “universal monarchy” was thereby controlled, in particular because the Franco-Spanish negotiations in Münster did not bring peace between France and Spain and left open conflict areas, such as Lorraine. Moreover, France and Sweden got territorial “satisfaction,” especially in Alsace and Pomerania. The Peace of Westphalia also confirmed the legal independence of the Swiss Confederation, whereas by a separate peace with Spain, in Münster, the United Provinces of the Netherlands officially became a sovereign state after eighty years of war. The Peace of Westphalia was crucial in German and international history. The terms of Peace of Westphalia were:

- The principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (‘whoever rules the territory determines the religion’) was reaffirmed, but construed to relate only to public life.
- Calvinism was finally recognized within the Confession of Augsburg and, except within the Bavarian and Austrian lands (including Bohemia), Protestant retention of all land secularized before 1624 was guaranteed.
- In matters of religion there were to be no majority decisions made by the diet. Instead, disputes were to be settled only by compromise.

- To all intents and purposes, the separate states of the Holy Roman Empire were recognized as sovereign members of the diet, free to control their own affairs independently of each other and of the emperor.
- Maximilian of Bavaria (1573–1651) retained his electoral title and the Upper Palatinate.
- A new electoral title was created for Karl Ludwig (1617–1680), the son of the former elector palatine, on his restoration to the Lower Palatinate.
- John George of Saxony, a leading German Protestant prince who had supported Ferdinand, was confirmed in his acquisition of Lusatia (a region of eastern Germany and southwest Poland).
- Frederick William of Brandenburg (1620–1688) acquired Cammin, Minden, and Halberstadt, along with the succession to Magdeburg.
- The emperor's claim to hereditary rights in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia was established. The Habsburg Sundgau was surrendered to France.
- The Peace of Westphalia confirmed Swedish control of the river mouths of the Oder, the Elbe, and Weser—virtually the entire German coast-line—by the occupation of western Pomerania, Stettin, Stralsund, Wismar, the dioceses of Bremen and Verden, and the islands of Rügen, Usedom, and Wollin. Sweden was also paid an indemnity of 5 million thalers.
- France acquired Habsburg territory and other jurisdictions in Alsace. Other acquisitions included Pinerolo in Savoy and Breisach and Philippsburg on the right bank of the Rhine.
- The United Provinces of the Netherlands (Dutch Republic) were declared independent of both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire (Switzerland was also acknowledged as independent of the empire).
- No prince of the empire, not even the emperor, could ally with the Spanish monarchy.

The Peace of Westphalia created a loose framework for religious and political coexistence in Germany that stood the test of time remarkably well, though after 1648 Germany was further away than ever from economic and political unity. Clearly, whether or not the Thirty Years' War retarded German development is itself a moot point. At this point, with the exception of Prussia, Germany did not play a major role in Europe until 1871, when Imperial Germany was created by Otto von Bismarck. In the mean time, France, Britain and the United States prospered.

Starting around 1815, the German people started to form nationalist aspirations backed by some universities. A youth-movement, the "Deutsche Burschenschaft" gained influence with their slogan "Freedom, Honor, Fatherland". In 1819, Prince Metternich made decisions to suppress the nationalist desires within the people but his decisions were revoked in 1848. His decisions included the surveillance of Universities, the persecution of youth movements and all liberal movements by labeling them as hate crimes or demagoguery (sounds similar to how Donald Trump is treated today? The rulers are afraid.). The nationalist movements rose up again after Prince Metternich was overthrown in March 1848 and King Frederic Wilhelm IV gave way for their desires. In May 1848 the first national assembly met in Frankfurt to formulate a constitution for all Germans. Their demands were: "freedom of speech, freedom of press (bad idea), freedom of assembly, freedom of teaching and science and equality before the law". The result was a "little-German" solution: Germany without Austria under Prussia's rule with Frederick Wilhelm IV as King. But the King refused the election by the people and with it refused the crown and no German unity was achieved.

In September 1862, Otto von Bismarck (previously ambassador to Russia and Paris) was appointed to be prime minister of Prussia by King Wilhelm I. After the North-German Federation has been achieved by him in 1866 and a constituted Reichstag (parliament) decided upon a constitution in 1867, the South-German states created protective treaties and military treaties with Prussia against France. Napoleon III wanted territory on the left side of the Rhine river and Bismarck refused. The Franco-Prussian war, in which France declared war on Prussia, was soon to follow.

3.6 Prussia

The area known as Prussia was inhabited in early times by West Slavic tribes, ancestors of the modern Poles, in the West, and Baltic tribes, closely related to Lithuanians, in the East. Sometime after the seventh century, the area was invaded and settled by pagan German tribes, later known as Prussians. In 1226, Prussia was conquered by the Teutonic Knights, a military religious order, who converted the Prussians to Christianity. The Teutonic Knights were overthrown by the Prussians with help from Poland and Lithuania in 1454. Prussia was divided into Royal Prussia in the west and Ducal Prussia in the east. Royal Prussia was incorporated into Poland providing it with a corridor to the Baltic Sea (the "Danzig Corridor"). Ducal Prussia became a Polish territory. At this time, the port city of Danzig (modern day Gdansk) was designated a "free city". The Protestant Reformation in the early to mid 1500s saw most Prussians convert to Protestantism whereas Poland remained, and still remains, solidly Roman Catholic. In 1525 Ducal Prussia became a hereditary duchy under Albrecht Hohenzollern, the last grand master of the Teutonic Knights.

In 1657, after an invasion by the Swedes, Poland surrendered sovereignty over Ducal Prussia which then became the Kingdom of Prussia headed by the Hohenzollern line. Prussia's power grew and in 1772, under King Friedrich II (Frederick the Great), consisted of the provinces of Brandenburg, Pomerania, Danzig, West Prussia and East Prussia. The new dignity achieved in 1701 by the Hohenzollern, as kings in Prussia, is only part of the reason for their growing prestige and power during the 18th century. Their underlying strength derives from the reform of the administration and the army undertaken by Frederick William (elector of Brandenburg from 1640, known as "the Great Elector") and continued by his son and grandson, the first two Prussian kings. Frederick William's internal policy has two main features. He establishes a permanent system of taxation, thus removing from the estates general their main source of power; and he spends a large slice of the resulting revenue on a standing army. This combination of an absolute monarch with a large and efficient army becomes characteristic of Prussia. By the time of the Great Elector's grandson, Frederick William I, the Prussian army amounts to 80,000 men, consisting of 4% of the population.

The system devised for keeping this many men under arms makes possible the maintenance of a highly trained citizen army without damage to the economy. Half the army is made up of foreign mercenaries. The other half is a shifting population of peasants from Brandenburg and Prussia. Each peasant is drafted into the army as a young man, but after completing his training he goes home to his everyday work for ten months of each year. Nobles are expected to serve their turn in the army too, but the mercantile classes are exempted. By means of a tightly controlled and lean bureaucracy, Frederick William I manages to combine this level of mobilization with healthy government finances. In 1740 he bequeaths to his son, Frederick II, a thriving economy, a large cash surplus and Europe's best-trained army. Better known as Frederick the Great, the son uses these

advantages to immediate effect - beginning the real expansion of Prussian influence in both Germany and Europe.

Charles VI dies unexpectedly on 20 October 1740. Less than two months later, on December 16, Frederick II astonishes Europe by marching a Prussian army into the rich Habsburg province of Silesia. The king of France, Louis XV, hearing the news, describes the young Prussian as a madman. Frederick himself says that the opportunity presented by Charles VI's death has the effect of giving "free rein to his fever". The new Habsburg ruler Maria Theresa (twenty-three to Frederick's twenty-eight) is also a woman of strong resolve, but Habsburg armies prove no match for Frederick's Prussians. Frederick's first victory over the Austrians (at Mollwitz in April 1741) persuades the French and Bavarians to join in against Maria Theresa. Their intervention is of great help to the Prussian adventurer, since it fragments Austria's response, but Frederick shows no interest in becoming involved in a wider European war. He continues to occupy Silesia and to fight battles only in defence of it. A series of three victories in 1745 display his military skill to such advantage that his contemporaries accord him the title by which he is known to history, Frederick the Great.

In the previous year the nature of the war has altered. It has become primarily a conflict between France and Britain. France's declaration of war on Britain in 1744 shifts the focus of hostilities away from central Europe. Britain, eager that Austrian armies shall concentrate on France, persuades Maria Theresa to come to terms with her real enemy, Frederick the Great. By the treaty of Dresden in 1745 she cedes the greater part of Silesia to Prussia. For the next few years Maria Theresa remains in the war as a half-hearted ally of Britain against France. Frederick has sufficient time on his hands to build the rococo summer palace of Sans Souci at Potsdam, in 1745-7. Both monarchs await the eventual settlement, which comes in 1748 at Aachen, or Aix-la-Chapelle.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle makes certain adjustments between Austria and Spain in the patchwork of Italy. Otherwise, with one exception, it restores to their previous owners the territories occupied during the eight years of the War of the Austrian Succession. Bavaria, occupied by the Austrians, has already been returned to the elector. Now the Austrian Netherlands, taken by the French, revert to Austria. The exception is Silesia. Its sudden seizure by Frederick the Great launched the war in 1740. Now the international community recognizes his sovereignty over the region, the possession of which adds about 50% to the population of Prussia.

The loss of Silesia naturally rankles with the empress Maria Theresa of Austria. Much of her diplomatic policy during the early 1750s is devoted to putting together an alliance which will enable her to recover her lost territory. In 1757 the Russians advance into Prussia and seem in a position to crush it. But mysteriously the Russian general withdraws. The probable reason is disagreement within the Russian royal family. The empress, Elizabeth, hates Prussia, but her heir, Peter, is a passionate admirer of Frederick the Great. Elizabeth's health is frail. A Russian general who destroys Prussia at the wrong moment may blight his career. Frederick makes good use of the reprieve provided by Russia's

withdrawal, and does so against great odds. Prussia is surrounded by enemies (Sweden, Austria and France in addition to Russia) and Prussian armies confront them alone on the battlefield. The campaign in the west, against France, is entrusted by Frederick to his brother-in-law Ferdinand, the duke of Brunswick.

Britain is Frederick's only ally, providing him with a useful financial subsidy but minimal practical support on the battlefield. There is no major British presence in the many battles fought in and around Germany during this war (a small force of some 8500 British soldiers serves under Ferdinand of Brunswick from the autumn of 1758). Britain's main contribution is through her war against France, at sea and in north America. In 1757-9 Frederick and Ferdinand achieve some remarkable victories, usually against much greater numbers and with fewer casualties on their own side. Frederick defeats a French and Austrian army at Rossbach in November 1757 and an Austrian army at Leuthen a month later. He holds his own against a much larger Russian force in a heavily contested encounter at Zorndorf in August 1758. Meanwhile Ferdinand defeats vast French armies at Krefeld in June 1758 and at Minden in August 1759. This summer of 1759 proves a disastrous period on all fronts for the French. It is also the moment when the tide turns in the other war going on at the same time - between Britain and France.

The year 1759, vastly improving the fortunes of Britain, does the opposite for Prussia. Within less than two weeks of his brother-in-law Ferdinand's victory over the French at Minden, in August, Frederick himself suffers a disastrous defeat by a Russian and Austrian army at Kunersdorf. Within a space of six hours he loses 18,000 men, more than a third of his army. During the next three years both Frederick and Ferdinand win some engagements and lose others. The early lustre of their campaign has gone. The war drags on. Prussian success seems impossible, eventual exhaustion and defeat very probable. Moreover by the end of 1761 Britain, well satisfied with her own successes elsewhere, is disinclined to continue subsidising Prussia in an endless continental war. The prospect for Frederick the Great seems bleak, until he is suddenly rescued by an event entirely beyond his control. It is an event which has been long and regularly expected, and which happens now just in time - from Frederick's point of view. On 5 January 1762 the ailing Russian empress, Elizabeth, dies. Her death transforms Russian policy overnight.

The new Russian tsar, Peter III, rapidly puts into effect his own pro-Prussian preferences. By May he has made peace with Frederick. There is an immediate knock-on effect. Austria, for whom it will be impossible to defeat Prussia without Russian support, loses heart for the battle. In the summer of 1762 French and Prussian armies are still engaging each other in battle from time to time in the western regions of Germany, but the combatants are ready for peace. The central discussion between Prussia and Austria begins at Hubertusburg, a hunting lodge between Dresden and Leipzig, on the last day of 1762. Agreement is reached some six weeks later. The peace treaty agreed at Hubertusburg between Prussia and Austria maintains the recent status quo in central Europe. Frederick the Great, twice the aggressor, is again allowed to keep Silesia. This

conclusion strengthens the influence of Prussia within the German empire and reduces that of the official imperial power, Habsburg Austria. It also leaves Poland flanked by two increasingly powerful neighbours, Prussia and Russia, who since 1762 have been in alliance. The development does not bode well for Poland's future. Austria too attends the feast, when it begins in 1772.

Prussia Reformed

Frederick the Great uses the years after the Seven Years' War for a thoroughgoing revision of his kingdom's administration. As with the reforms of Joseph II, his younger rival in Austria, the effect of Frederick's measures is to centralize the machinery of government and to concentrate it ever more in the royal pair of hands. As with Joseph, the intention is well-meaning even if the method is autocratic. In the shattered Prussian economy after the war, Frederick uses state subsidies to restore agriculture and to rebuild towns and villages. He funds these measures by much improved methods of tax collection and the establishment of various state monopolies. Public reserves of grain are built up, so that the price of bread can be kept down in years of famine. Standards of education are improved, with strict regulation of the part played by the religious orders. There is official encouragement for the sciences and the arts, and a new code of laws. Prussia becomes a society much regulated, but on the whole well regulated.

Frederick's long reign, his military successes, his ceaseless devotion to the furtherance of Prussia's interests, and his fame as the ruler called by Voltaire the 'philosopher king' all combine to make him the pre-eminent example of the enlightened despot so much admired in 18th-century political theory. Frederick in his old age, still devoting himself ceaselessly to the demands of government, is a familiar figure in Prussia in his threadbare military uniform. Inspiring both affection and alarm, he becomes known as *der alte Fritz*, equivalent to "old Fred". The weakness of enlightened despotism as a political system (quite apart from broader considerations of the subject's liberty) is that it depends entirely on the talents of the despot in whose hands all authority is gathered. Frederick the Great has to an exceptional degree the talents necessary for enlightened despotism. His successors - his nephew and great-nephew, Frederick William II and Frederick William III - prove less capable. Frederick William II, succeeding his uncle in 1786, scores a success requiring little talent or energy in Prussia's gains from the second and third partitions of Poland. But much of this gain is lost by Frederick William III, confronted early in his reign by the severe challenge of the Napoleonic wars.

In July 1785, Prussia made a treaty of friendship and a trade agreement with the United States: "His majesty, the King of Prussia, and the United States of America, wish to lay down the rules for commerce between their nations in a permanent and just manner." The treaty was signed by Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and Frederick the Great. The *London Monthly Review* wrote: "This treaty is phenomenal in the history of nations - a treaty full of benevolence. It is the best lesson of humanity which a

philosophical king together with a philosophic patriot could have given to the statesmen in the world." George Washington wrote to Comte de Rochambeau: "The treaty ... brings a new age of negotiation. It is novel in many of its articles. It is the most liberal treaty ever conceived between powers."

Three partitions of Poland: 1772-1796

Over a period of a quarter of a century Poland is dismembered and consumed by her neighbours. The process begins during the confusion of a war between Russia and Turkey. In 1769 Austria takes the opportunity of occupying part of Poland, to the south of Cracow. Frederick the Great follows suit in 1770, sending troops to seal off the coastal region between the two main parts of his realm (Brandenburg and the kingdom of Prussia). This valuable area, known as Polish royal Prussia, has long been part of the Polish kingdom. Frederick claims that he is acting only in precaution against an outbreak of cattle plague. But acquiring royal Prussia would neatly unify his territory.

The first official annexation of Polish land is cynically agreed in 1772 between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Russia, at war with Turkey, has an interest in keeping Prussia and Austria in benign mood. She accepts the proposal that each of them should annexe part of Poland. Russia's influence in the kingdom means that she can force acceptance of the arrangement on the Poles. By the treaties of 1772 Austria acquires the region round Lvov. Frederick secures royal Prussia (with the exception at this stage of the port of Gdansk). And Russia takes a slice of northeast Poland.

The next two partitions occur when Russia finds new excuses to intervene in Poland's internal affairs. Russian armies enter the kingdom during a disturbance in 1792, and are on hand again to tackle a national insurrection in 1794. On both occasions Polish armies offer strong resistance to superior Russian forces. But force prevails. After a two-month siege, and a massacre of Poles in the suburbs, Warsaw falls in September 1794 to a combined Russian and Prussian army. The second partition, agreed in 1793, benefits only Prussia and Russia. Prussia now receives Gdansk and a swathe of land stretching south almost to Cracow. Russia takes a vast slice of eastern Poland, amounting to some 97,000 square miles. This is greater than the territory which Poland now retains, in a strip from the Baltic coast down to Cracow and Brody. A few years later, in treaties of 1795 and 1796, this final Polish remnant is divided between the three predators. Prussia is extended east to include Warsaw. The Austrian frontier moves north to the same area. Once again the lion's share, in the east, goes to Russia.

The Franco-Prussian War

The Franco-Prussian War, was a war in 1870-1871 lost by France to the German states under the leadership of Prussia. The underlying causes of the conflict were the determination of the Prussian statesman Prince Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck to unify

Germany under Prussian control and, as a step toward this goal, to eliminate French influence over Germany. On the other hand, Napoleon III, emperor of France from 1852 to 1870, sought to regain both in France and abroad the prestige lost as a result of numerous diplomatic reverses, particularly those suffered at the hands of Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. In addition, the military strength of Prussia, as revealed in the war with Austria, constituted a threat to French dominance on the continent of Europe.

The event directly precipitating the Franco-Prussian War was the candidacy of Leopold, prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, for the throne of Spain, rendered vacant by the Spanish revolution of 1868. Leopold had accepted the candidacy under persuasion from Bismarck. The French government, alarmed at the possibility of a Prusso-Spanish alliance resulting from the occupancy of the Spanish throne by a member of the Hohenzollern dynastic family, threatened Prussia with war if Leopold's candidacy was not withdrawn. The French ambassador to the Prussian court, Comte Vincente Benedetti, was dispatched to Ems, a spa in northwestern Germany being visited by William I, king of Prussia. Benedetti had been instructed to demand that the Prussian monarch order Prince Leopold to withdraw his candidacy. William, although angered, gave Benedetti permission to communicate directly with Leopold by telegraph. Leopold could not be reached, but his father, Prince Charles Anthony, wired a retraction of the candidacy in the name of his son.

On July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia. The south German states, in fulfillment of their treaties with Prussia, immediately joined King William in a common front against France. The French were only able to mobilize about 200,000 troops; the Germans, however, quickly marshaled an army of about 400,000 men. All German forces were under the supreme command of William, with the great strategist Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Graf von Moltke, as his chief of staff. Three German armies drove into France, led, respectively, by General Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and Crown Prince Frederick William, later Frederick III of Prussia and emperor of Germany. The first engagement, a minor skirmish, was won by the French on August 2, when they drove a small Prussian detachment from the city of Saarbrücken, near the border between France and Germany. In the major battles at Weissenburg (August 4), at Wörth (August 6), and at Spichern (August 6), however, the French under Marie Edmé Patrice Maurice, comte de MacMahon were defeated. MacMahon was ordered to fall back on Châlons. Achille François Bazaine, in command of all French troops east of the city of Metz, was directed to maintain his positions. Metz itself was to be held at all costs. These orders split the French forces, which were unable thereafter to regain their unity or freedom of action. On August 12 the French emperor handed the supreme command over to Bazaine, who was badly beaten in the great battles of Vionville (August 15) and Gravelotte (August 18), and forced into Metz. There he was besieged by two German armies. MacMahon then was ordered to relieve Metz. On August 30 the Germans surprised and defeated MacMahon's leading corps at Beaumont, whereupon he decided to withdraw his army to

the town of Sedan.

The decisive battle of the war opened in Sedan on the morning of September 1, 1870 (see Sedan, Battle of). At about 7:00 AM MacMahon was severely wounded, and an hour and a half later General Emmanuel Félix de Wimpffen received the chief command. The battle continued until 4:15 PM, when Napoleon, who meanwhile had arrived in Sedan, resumed command. Recognizing the hopelessness of the situation, he ordered the white flag to be hoisted. Terms of surrender were negotiated during the night, and on the following day Napoleon, together with 83,000 troops, surrendered to the Germans.

Upon receiving intelligence of the capture of the French emperor, Paris rose in rebellion, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved, and France was proclaimed a republic. Before the close of September, Strasbourg, one of the last points at which the French had hoped to stem the German advance, capitulated, and Paris was completely surrounded. On October 7 the minister of the new French government, Léon Gambetta, made a dramatic escape from Paris by balloon, and with his chief assistant, Charles Louis de Saulces de Freycinet, established a provisional capital in the city of Tours. From there they led the organization and equipment of 36 military divisions. The efforts of these troops proved unavailing, however, and they were at length driven into Switzerland, where they were disarmed and interned.

On October 27 Marshal Bazaine surrendered at Metz with 173,000 men. Paris, meanwhile, was subjected to siege and bombardment. Its citizens, attempting to stave off the enemy with crude and makeshift weapons, and reduced to eating cats, dogs, and even rats, were at length compelled, on January 19, 1871, to open negotiations for surrender. A day earlier, January 18, an event had occurred that represented the culmination of Bismarck's unremitting efforts for the unification of Germany. William I, the Prussian king, was crowned emperor of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The formal capitulation of Paris took place on January 28, following which an armistice of three weeks was arranged. A French national assembly, elected to negotiate the peace, convened at Bordeaux on February 13 and chose Adolphe Thiers as the first president of the Third Republic. In March Parisians broke out in revolt of the new assembly and organized a revolutionary government known as the Commune of Paris (see Commune of Paris, 1871). Opposing the armistice, they fought bitterly against government troops sent by Thiers to suppress the revolt. The ensuing civil war lasted until May, when the revolutionaries surrendered.

The Treaty of Frankfurt, signed on May 10, 1871, ended the war between France and Germany. The treaty provided that the French province of Alsace (excepting Belfort) and part of Lorraine, including Metz, were to be ceded to the German Empire, and that France was to pay a war indemnity of 5 billion gold francs (\$1 billion), submitting to occupation by German troops until the amount was rendered in full. This heavy obligation was discharged in September 1873, and during the same month, after an occupation of almost three years, France was at last freed of German soldiers.

3.7 Imperial Germany

The German Confederation had been created by an act of the Congress of Vienna on 8 June 1815 as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, after being alluded to in Article 6 of the 1814 Treaty of Paris.[14] German nationalism rapidly shifted from its liberal and democratic character in 1848, called Pan-Germanism, to Prussian prime minister Otto von Bismarck's pragmatic Realpolitik. Bismarck sought to extend Hohenzollern hegemony throughout the German states; to do so meant unification of the German states and the elimination of Prussia's rival, Austria, from the subsequent empire. He envisioned a conservative, Prussian-dominated Germany. Three wars led to military successes and helped to persuade German people to do this: the Second war of Schleswig against Denmark in 1864, the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War against France in 1870–71.

The German Confederation ended as a result of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 between the constituent Confederation entities of the Austrian Empire and its allies on one side and the Kingdom of Prussia and its allies on the other. The war resulted in the Confederation being partially replaced by a North German Confederation in 1867, comprising the 22 states north of the Main. The patriotic fervour generated by the Franco-Prussian War overwhelmed the remaining opposition in the four states south of the Main to a unified Germany, and during November 1870 they joined the North German Confederation by treaty.

There was a roar of nationalism throughout all German states. The German/Prussian army won nearly all battles against France, also reaching Paris. The title of a German Kaiser was put into the Reichsverfassung (constitution). The proclamation of the Kaiser has been done on January 18th 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles which finalized the creation of the Second German Reich. It's Kaiser was Wilhelm I with Otto von Bismarck as chancellor. The Kaiser gave speech with the words: "We assume the imperial dignity with the awareness of duty to protect the laws of the Reich with German loyalty and to preserve peace and the independence of Germany ... to be an enhancer of the Reich, not through military conquering but by goods and gifts of peace on the area of national welfare, freedom and ethos." Bismarck aligned his foreign policy on the Kaisers words: "Every great power that tries to influence, outside of their own sphere of influence, the politics of other nations, the great power which tries to steer and agitate outside their land which god has given to them, this great power conducts power politics and not interest-driven politics. Such great power works towards prestige. We won't do that."

The German Empire was the historical German nation state that existed from the unification of Germany in 1871 to the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in November 1918, when Germany became a federal republic. The German Empire consisted of 27 constituent territories, with most being ruled by royal families. This included four kingdoms, six grand duchies, six duchies (five after 1876), seven principalities, three free Hanseatic cities, and one imperial territory. After 1850, the states of Germany had rapidly become

industrialized, with particular strengths in coal, iron (and later steel), chemicals, and railways. In 1871 it had a population of 41 million people, and by 1913 this had increased to 68 million. A heavily rural collection of states in 1815, the united Germany became predominantly urban. During its 47 years of existence, the German Empire operated as an industrial, technological, and scientific giant, gaining more Nobel Prizes in science than any other country. Germany became a great power, boasting a rapidly growing rail network, the world's strongest army, and a fast-growing industrial base.[13] In less than a decade, its navy became second only to Britain's Royal Navy.

Although nominally a federal empire and league of equals, in practice the empire was dominated by the largest and most powerful state, Prussia. It stretched across the northern two thirds of the new Reich, and contained three-fifths of its population. The imperial crown was hereditary in the House of Hohenzollern, the ruling house of Prussia. With the exception of the years 1872–1873 and 1892–1894, the chancellor was always simultaneously the prime minister of Prussia. The other states retained their own governments, but had only limited aspects of sovereignty. For example, both postage stamps and currency were issued for the empire as a whole. Coins through one mark were also minted in the name of the empire, while higher valued pieces were issued by the states. However, these larger gold and silver issues were virtually commemorative coins and had limited circulation. While the states issued their own decorations, and some had their own armies, the military forces of the smaller ones were put under Prussian control. Those of the larger states, such as the Kingdoms of Bavaria and Saxony, were coordinated along Prussian principles and would in wartime be controlled by the federal government.

Bismarck's domestic policies played an important role in forging the authoritarian political culture of the Kaiserreich. Less preoccupied by continental power politics following unification in 1871, Germany's semi-parliamentary government carried out a relatively smooth economic and political revolution from above that pushed them along the way towards becoming the world's leading industrial power of the time. Bismarck's "revolutionary conservatism" was a conservative state-building strategy designed to make ordinary Germans—not just the Junker elite—more loyal to state and emperor. According to Kees van Kersbergen and Barbara Vis, his strategy was: granting social rights to enhance the integration of a hierarchical society, to forge a bond between workers and the state so as to strengthen the latter, to maintain traditional relations of authority between social and status groups, and to provide a countervailing power against the modernist forces of liberalism and socialism.

Bismarck recognized the dangers of Marxism in Germany (where Karl Marx made it popular), which set its goal towards the destruction of all folk. In 1881, to forestall the revolutionary spirit, he was able to implement social reforms for the "positive support of the workers well-being" despite resistance from the parties. These included:

- 1883 - Public Healthcare
- 1884 - Corporate Accident Insurance

- 1889 - Pension Insurance and Disability Insurance

Similar policies were established much later in the other Nations, in Britain shortly after World War 2, in the USA and Canada in the 1960s. Kaiser Wilhelm I died in March 1888 and Bismarck was dismissed two years later after serving his country for 28 years by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Bismarck's post-1871 foreign policy was conservative and sought to preserve the balance of power in Europe. British historian Eric Hobsbawm concludes that he "remained undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess for almost twenty years after 1871, [devoting] himself exclusively, and successfully, to maintaining peace between the powers." His chief concern was that France would plot revenge after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. As the French lacked the strength to defeat Germany by themselves, they sought an alliance with Russia, which would trap Germany between the two in a war (as would ultimately happen in 1914). Bismarck wanted to prevent this at all costs and maintain friendly relations with the Russians, and thereby formed an alliance with them and Austria-Hungary (which by the 1880s was being slowly reduced to a German satellite), the Dreikaiserbund (League of Three Emperors). During this period, individuals within the German military were advocating a preemptive strike against Russia, but Bismarck knew that such ideas were foolhardy. He once wrote that "the most brilliant victories would not avail against the Russian nation, because of its climate, its desert, and its frugality, and having but one frontier to defend," and because it would leave Germany with another bitter, resentful neighbor.

Industrialisation progressed dynamically in Germany and German manufacturers began to capture domestic markets from British imports, and also to compete with British industry abroad, particularly in the U.S. The German textile and metal industries had by 1870 surpassed those of Britain in organisation and technical efficiency and superseded British manufacturers in the domestic market. Germany became the dominant economic power on the continent and was the second largest exporting nation after Britain. Technological progress during German industrialisation occurred in four waves: the railway wave (1877–86), the dye wave (1887–96), the chemical wave (1897–1902), and the wave of electrical engineering (1903–18).[32] Since Germany industrialised later than Britain, it was able to model its factories after those of Britain, thus making more efficient use of its capital and avoiding legacy methods in its leap to the envelope of technology. Germany invested more heavily than the British in research, especially in chemistry, motors and electricity. Germany's dominance in physics and chemistry was such that one-third of all Nobel Prizes went to German inventors and researchers. The German cartel system (known as *Konzerne*), being significantly concentrated, was able to make more efficient use of capital. Germany was not weighted down with an expensive worldwide empire that needed defense. Following Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, it absorbed parts of what had been France's industrial base.

By 1900, the German chemical industry dominated the world market for synthetic dyes.

The three major firms BASF, Bayer and Hoechst produced several hundred different dyes, along with the five smaller firms. In 1913, these eight firms produced almost 90% of the world supply of dyestuffs and sold about 80% of their production abroad. The three major firms had also integrated upstream into the production of essential raw materials and they began to expand into other areas of chemistry such as pharmaceuticals, photographic film, agricultural chemicals and electrochemicals.

From the 1890s onwards, the most effective opposition to the monarchy came from the newly formed Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which advocated Marxism. The threat of the SPD to the German monarchy and industrialists caused the state both to crack down on the party's supporters and to implement its own programme of social reform to soothe discontent. Germany's large industries provided significant social welfare programmes and good care to their employees, as long as they were not identified as socialists or trade-union members. The larger industrial firms provided pensions, sickness benefits and even housing to their employees.

3.8 Austria-Hungary

The union of Austria and Hungary, also known as the Dual (that of Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary) Monarchy, was a dualistic state (1867 –1918 C.E.) in which Austria and Hungary each had a parliament to manage their domestic affairs. A joint cabinet then handled foreign affairs, military affairs, and finances. The newly created Austro-Hungarian Empire was a good example of a marriage of convenience. The Italian and German campaigns for national unification altered the balance of power in continental Europe. These campaigns challenged the dominance of Austria's Habsburg Monarchy. Austria's defeat at the hands of French and Piedmont forces in 1859 and its crushing loss to Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War crippled Austria's influence in Europe and encouraged resistance within the borders of its empire. Faced with the dual threat of a rapidly industrializing German state and a unified Italy, Austria courted a new political partner to prevent the further erosion of its power. During the revolutions of 1848, Magyar leaders of Hungary and Czech leaders from Bohemia had asserted their independence from Austrian rule. Austrian military forces crushed the Czech revolt but the Hungarian Republic held out, until the arrival of 100,000 Russian troops helped the Austrian forces to prevail. In an effort to remain a world power and consolidate its crumbling empire in central and eastern Europe, Austria joined with Hungary to form the unusual alliance called the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This lasted 51 years before it was dissolved after World War I.

As in all through the history, the ambitions and fate of main protagonists of the mightiest political powers play the most important roles. So, in the European theatre of nineteenth century there was first Napoleon's defeat and exile in 1814, upon which the Congress of Vienna in 1815 re-established the House of Habsburg and its territories. Especially

agile in all this was the Austrian chancellor, prince Clemens von Metternich, who, by a combination of conflict and diplomacy, made the Austrian Habsburg Empire the leading power on the continent, only to be swept aside by the 1848 rebellions in Europe, which forced many Royal houses to allow limited constitutional and social reforms. Much more fateful was, however, the antagonism between Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns (Prussian) dynasties that started already well before in 1740. At question was the domination of the Deutcher Bund, a group of German speaking political entities in Europe, with the Austrian Emperor as its head. Thus, the then Prussian premier Otto von Bismarck used all the guile and political talent and eventually achieved—especially after crushing defeat of Austrian army at Graz in 1866—that Austria ceded Italy Venezia dynasty, Holstein to Prussia, and agreed to dissolve the Deutsche Bund. The way to eventual Greater Germany under Prussia, with all its later world wars, has thus begun. This may have been the final push for the Austrian Emperor to agree to the “Compromise.”

The Ausgleich (“Compromise”) of February 1867 which inaugurated the Empire’s dualist structure in place of the former unitary Austrian Empire (1804-1867) originated at a time when Austria had declined in strength and in power—both in the Italian peninsula (as a result of the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859) and in greater Germany (culminating in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866). Other factors in the constitutional changes included continued Hungarian dissatisfaction with rule from Vienna, and increasing national consciousness on the part of other nationalities of the Austrian Empire. Hungarian dissatisfaction grew partially from Austria’s suppression, with Russian support, of the Hungarian liberal revolution of 1848–1849. However, dissatisfaction with Austrian rule had grown for many years within Hungary, and had many causes. In an effort to shore up support for the monarchy, Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria began negotiations for a compromise with Hungary’s Magyar nobility to ensure their support. Some members of the government, such as Austrian prime minister Richard von Belcredi, advised the Emperor to make a more comprehensive constitutional deal with all of the nationalities that would have created a federal structure. Belcredi worried that an accommodation with the Magyar interests would alienate the other nationalities. However, Franz Joseph was unable to ignore the power of the Hungarian nobility, and they would not accept anything less than dualism between themselves and the traditional Austrian elites.

In particular, they received the Emperor’s coronation as King of Hungary, a separate parliament at Budapest with the powers to enact laws for the historic lands of the Hungarian crown (the lands of Stephen I), though on a basis which would preserve the political dominance of ethnic Hungarians (more specifically of the country’s large nobility and educated élite) and the exclusion from effective power of the country’s large Romanian and Slavic minorities: Slovaks, Bulgarians and other Balkan Slavs.

The Settlement of 1867 (also known as the Compromise of 1867) provided Habsburg rulers with a more stable empire in the short run by securing strength through numbers. The empire retained its place as a great power in Europe. Vienna later became a center for the modernist thrust in art, music, and psychology. However, the constitutional

reforms, enacted in 1867, gave the general citizenry legal rights as never before and, probably, unparalleled, at least in the Czech part of the Empire in the last 50 years of the twentieth century. The Emperor (Franz Josef 1st) made the Imperial Council, previously only an advisory entity, the only legal arbiter and, *de iure*, the parliament with ultimate legislative and control authority of its deputies. Owing to the lobby of, mostly, German bourgeoisie deputies, the new constitution now featured: installing universal law and order for everybody without exception, such as: freedom of conscience and of religion, freedom to assemble or to gather, freedom of speech, freedom of scientific research, freedom of movement, principle of universal equality *vis-à-vis* the law, inviolability of personal property. This represents the dream of every developing country in the twenty-first century. Apart from that, the judicial system was completely overhauled with the decreed (and generally upheld in practice) independence of judges on all levels and the “imperial court of law” was established to process complaints of citizens against the lawlessness of the regional (or local) governments. One very important element in this democratization process was enactment of the mandatory eight-year school-attendance and the abolition of church-control over the school system.

The Austro-Hungarian economy changed dramatically during the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Technological change accelerated industrialization and urbanization. The capitalist mode of production spread throughout the Empire during its 50-year existence. The old institutions of feudalism continued to disappear. Economic growth centered around Vienna, the Austrian lands (areas of modern Austria), the Alpine lands, and the Bohemian lands. In the later years of the nineteenth century rapid economic growth spread to the central Hungarian plain and to the Carpathian lands. As a result of this pattern wide disparities of development existed within the Empire. In general the western areas achieved far more development than the east. By the early twentieth century most of the Empire had started to experience rapid economic growth. The GNP per capita grew roughly 1.45 percent per year from 1870 to 1913. That level of growth compared very favorably to that of other European nations such as Britain (1.00 percent), France (1.06 percent), and Germany (1.51 percent) (see Good: 1984). However, the Empire's economy as a whole still lagged considerably behind the economies of other powers, as it had only begun sustained modernization much later. Britain had a GNP per-capita almost three times larger than the Habsburg Empire, while Germany's stood almost twice as high as Austria-Hungary's. Nonetheless, these large discrepancies hide different levels of development within the Empire.

Rail transport expanded rapidly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its predecessor state, the Habsburg Empire, had built a substantial core of railways in the west originating from Vienna by 1841. At that point the government realized the military possibilities of rail and began to invest heavily in their construction. Bratislava, Budapest, Prague, Kraków, Graz, Laibach (Ljubljana), and Venice became linked to the main network. By 1854 the Empire had almost 2000 kilometres of track, about 60 to 70 percent of it in state hands. At that point the government began to sell off large portions of track to

private investors to recoup some of its investments and because of the financial strains of the 1848 Revolution and of the Crimean War.

The territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire expanded still further when the Russians defeated the Ottoman Turks in 1878. An international congress (the Congress of Berlin) was held to divide up the last Ottoman possessions. Austria-Hungary was given permission to administer the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with other territories being divided up equally amongst the other powers and some becoming independent, with the most prominent of these independent states being Serbia. Lieven (2002) notes that while the Austro-Hungarian empire had one of the lowest military budgets they did not lose any territory in the five decades before 1918 and actually gained Bosnia and Herzegovina (341). In the meantime, the rise of a united Germany had created a German power to match that of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Defeated in a short conflict over control of some German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire aligned itself with the united states of Germany. In 1879, Germany (which meant: Prussia) and the Empire signed a formal alliance, joined by Italy in 1882. The pact was called the Triple Alliance.

The Imperial (Austrian) and Royal (Hungarian) governments differed also to some extent in their attitude toward the Empire's common foreign policy. Politicians in Budapest particularly feared annexations of territory which would add to the kingdom's non-Hungarian populations. But the Empire's alliance with Germany against Russia from October 1879 and the above mentioned Triple Alliance commanded general acceptance, since Russia seemed the principal external military threat to both parts. Austro-Hungarian forces occupied the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina from August 1878 under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. The Empire annexed this territory in October 1908 as a common holding under the control of the finance ministry rather than attaching it to either territorial government. The annexation set up an anomalous situation which led some in Vienna to contemplate combining Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia to form a third component of the Empire, uniting its southern Slav regions under the domination of Croats (who might have proved more sympathetic to Vienna than to Budapest).

The Multi-Ethnic Empire

One of the major challenges for the dual monarchy was the nationalities problem. Franz Joseph's empire was a multiethnic state in which more than ten languages were spoken and all European religions were represented. One problem arose from the fact that the various ethnic groups did not have equal opportunities to shape the political process. Following the Compromise with Hungary the Magyars received special privileges alongside the German-speaking elites. This created opposition from the other nationalities, with the ethnic Slav groups in particular feeling disadvantaged. Czechs and Southern Slavs vociferously demanded increased federalization of the Monarchy. The Czechs, who had assumed the leading role among the Slav peoples of the monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century thanks to rapid economic and cultural development, demanded

a position commensurate with their status the third largest nationality within the state as a whole. The hopes of the Czechs were dashed when the 'Bohemian Compromise' originally promised by Franz Joseph finally collapsed after opposition from the German-speaking groups in Bohemia in 1871. Closely connected to the nationalities issue was Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy. Franz Joseph harboured ambitious plans for expansion in south-eastern Europe, seeing the Balkans as a substitute for the Italian territories he had lost. As the Ottoman Empire continued to decline, new states (Greece, Serbia and Rumania) had emerged during the nineteenth century. The European Great Powers were involved in this process as protecting powers. A huge conflict of interest arose between Austria-Hungary and Russia, which saw itself as the protecting power of the Orthodox Balkan Slavs.

In 1878, in keeping with the resolutions of the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied, although they officially remained part of the Ottoman Empire. These underdeveloped territories were subsequently given the status of 'Reichsland' and were administered in common by the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Finance. This expansion of territory also had political consequences for the nationality issue as it resulted in an increase in the (south) Slav ethnic group and thus in the demand of all the ethnic Slav groups for trialism with greater involvement of the Slav majority and an end to German and Magyar domination. The liberal-led governments had failed to find a solution to the Balkan question. They were followed in 1879 by the conservative government headed by Count Eduard Taaffe (1879-1893). The Taaffe era is notable for its franchise reforms. Through the reduction of the minimum tax base ('Zensus') required to qualify for a vote, broader sectors of the population, in particular from the lower middle classes and peasantry, gained a political voice in general elections. This would eventually result in the formation of the modern mass parties of the Christian Socialists and Social Democrats.

The decades after 1867 were marked by progress in the cultural and economic fields. In an era known as the 'Gründerzeit', the Habsburg Empire experienced an upswing, with the emergence of new branches of industry and a financially robust middle class. The Monarchy was transforming itself from a feudal agrarian state into an industrial society, even though enormous differences still remained between highly developed and the backward parts of the empire. Franz Joseph harboured an ambivalent attitude towards this social transformation. The Viennese court remained a stronghold of tradition and was regarded as the most elite in Europe. Although the new middle-class elites and the plutocracy became the representatives and patrons of the city's cultural life, as symbolized by the Ringstrasse in Vienna, they were not regarded by the court as the equal of the old-established aristocracy. However, the effect of Franz Joseph as a counterbalancing factor thanks to his personal authority during the latter decades of his reign should not be underestimated. Although he saw himself as a 'German prince' and regarded the primacy of German language and culture as the 'glue' that held the Monarchy together, in his personal dealings he never allowed even the slightest hint to emerge that he favoured

one ethnic group over the other. Franz Joseph represented a pre-modern concept of nationhood and was unsympathetic to the conflicts between the various nationalities that beset his empire.

He also changed considerably in his attitude towards the various religious faiths. Whereas at the beginning of his reign Franz Joseph had represented an extremely reactionary political Catholicism, later on he committed himself to religious pluralism in his Monarchy, although still maintaining the unchallenged primacy of the Catholic Church. He regarded the other religious groups in his realm with benevolence; Jews and Muslims in particular saw him as a protector. During the boom years in the decades leading up to the turn of the century conditions in the Monarchy were stable, if not always free of tensions. Beneath the calm surface, however, unsolved social problems and political conflict between the various ethnic groups began to ferment.

3.9 Russian Empire

Ancient Russia (800-1200)

The early history of Russia, like those of many countries, is one of migrating peoples and ancient kingdoms. In fact, early Russia was not exactly "Russia," but a collection of cities that gradually coalesced into an empire. In the early part of the ninth century, as part of the same great movement that brought the Danes to England and the Norsemen to Western Europe, a Scandinavian people known as the Varangians crossed the Baltic Sea and landed in Eastern Europe. The leader of the Varangians was the semilegendary warrior Rurik, who led his people in 862 to the city of Novgorod on the Volkhov River. Whether Rurik took the city by force or was invited to rule there, he certainly invested the city. From Novgorod, Rurik's successor Oleg extended the power of the city southward. In 882, he gained control of Kiev, a Slavic city that had arisen along the Dnepr River around the 5th century. Oleg's attainment of rule over Kiev marked the first establishment of a unified, dynastic state in the region. Kiev became the center of a trade route between Scandinavia and Constantinople, and Kievan Rus', as the empire came to be known, flourished for the next three hundred years.

By 989, Oleg's great-grandson Vladimir I was ruler of a kingdom that extended to as far south as the Black Sea, the Caucasus Mountains, and the lower reaches of the Volga River. Having decided to establish a state religion, Vladimir carefully considered a number of available faiths and decided upon Greek Orthodoxy, thus allying himself with Constantinople and the West. It is said that Vladimir decided against Islam partly because of his belief that his people could not live under a religion that prohibits hard liquor. Vladimir was succeeded by Yaroslav the Wise, whose reign marked the apogee of Kievan Rus'. Yaroslav codified laws, made shrewd alliances with other states, and encouraged the arts. Unfortunately, he decided in the end to act like Lear, dividing his kingdom among his children and bidding them to cooperate and flourish. Of course, they did nothing of the sort. Within a few decades of Yaroslav's death (in 1054), Kievan Rus' had broken up into regional power centers. Internal divisions were made worse by the depredations of the invading Cumans (better known as the Kipchaks). It was during this time (in 1147 to be exact) that Yuri Dolgorukiy, one of the regional princes, held a feast at his hunting lodge atop a hill overlooking the confluence of the Moskva and Neglina Rivers. A chronicler recorded the party, thus providing us with the earliest mention of Moscow, the small settlement that would soon become the pre-eminent city in Russia.

The Mongols and the Emergence of Moscow (1237-1613)

Kievan Rus' struggled on into the 13th century, but was decisively destroyed by the arrival of a new invader—the Mongols. In 1237 Batu Khan, a grandson of Jenghiz Khan, launched an invasion into Kievan Rus' from his capital on the lower Volga (at present-day Kazan).

Over the next three years the Mongols (or Tatars) destroyed all of the major cities of Kievan Rus' with the exceptions of Novgorod and Pskov. The regional princes were not deposed, but they were forced to send regular tribute to the Tatar state, which became known as the Empire of the Golden Horde. Invasions of Russia were attempted during this period from the west as well, first by the Swedes (1240) and then by the Livonian Brothers of the Sword (1242), a regional branch of the fearsome Teutonic Knights. In the best news of the era for Russia, both were decisively defeated by the great warrior Alexander Nevsky, a prince of Novgorod who earned his surname from his victory over the Swedes on the Neva River.

For the next century or so, very little seems to have happened in Russia, which other than the exorbitant tax requirement was relatively left alone by the Mongols. With the Tatars off to the southwest, the northeastern cities gradually gained more influence—first Tver, and then, around the turn of the 14th century, Moscow. As a sign of the city's importance, the patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church was transferred to the city, making it the spiritual capital of Russia. By the latter part of the century, Moscow felt strong enough to challenge the Tatars directly, and in 1380 a Muscovite prince named Dmitri Donskoy had the audacity to attack them. His decisive victory at Kulikovo Field immediately made him a popular hero, though the Tatar retaliation two years later maintained their rule over the city. It wasn't until 1480, after another century had passed, that Moscow was strong enough to throw off Tatar rule for good. Its ruler at that time was Grand Duke Ivan III, better known as Ivan the Great. Ivan began by subjugating most of Moscow's rival cities, and by the time he tore up the charter binding it to Tatar tribute he was effectively in control of the entire country. However, it wasn't until the reign of his grandson, Ivan IV (the Terrible), that Russia became a unified state.

Ivan the Terrible succeeded his father Vasily III as Grand Duke of Moscow in 1533 at the age of three. His mother served as regent until she too died, when Ivan was eight. For the next eight years, the young Grand Duke endured a series of regents chosen from among the boyars (the nobility). Finally in 1547, he adopted the title of tsar and set about crushing the power of the boyars, reorganizing the military, and preparing to smite the Tatars. In 1552 he conquered and sacked Kazan (the famous St. Basil's Cathedral was built in commemoration of this victory), and in 1556 Astrakhan, having thus destroyed the lingering power of the Golden Horde. Ivan's Tatar campaigns opened vast new areas for Russian expansion, and it was during his reign that the conquest and colonization of Siberia began. Believe it or not, Ivan was not supposed to have been very terrible at all during the early years of his reign. However, as he grew older his temper worsened, and by the 1560s he carried out a pretty horrific campaign against the boyars, confiscating their land and executing or exiling those who displeased him. In 1581, in a rage, he struck his son and heir Ivan with an iron rod, killing him.

When Ivan the Terrible died in 1584, he was succeeded by his son Fyodor, who left most of the management of the kingdom to his brother-in-law, Boris Godunov, and it was not long before Godunov began to work to secure the succession for himself. In 1591, he

murdered Fyodor's younger brother Dmitri in the ancient town of Uglich, a spot now marked by the magnificent Church of St. Demetrius on the Blood. When Fyodor died in 1598, Godunov was made tsar, but his rule was never accepted as entirely legitimate. Within a few years a pretender arose in Poland, claiming to be Dmitri, and in 1604 he invaded Russia. Godunov died suddenly the next year, and the "Time of Troubles" began. For the next eight years both the first and a second false Dmitri laid claims to the throne, both supported by invading Polish armies. Finally, in 1613, the Poles were ousted from Moscow, and the boyars unanimously elected Michael Romanov as Tsar. The Romanov dynasty was to rule Russia for the next 304 years, until the Russian Revolution brought an end to the Tsarist state.

The Romanovs (1613-1825)

For the first few generations, the Romanovs were happy to maintain the status quo in Russia. They continued to centralize power, but they did very little to bring Russia up to speed with the rapid changes in economic and political life that were taking place elsewhere in Europe. Peter the Great decided to change all of that. Peter the Great was his father's youngest son and the child of his second wife. When his father, Tsar Alexis, died in 1676 Peter's brother Feodor became Tsar, but his poor health brought an early death in 1682. The family of Peter's mother succeeded in having him chosen over his mentally retarded brother Ivan to be Tsar, but no sooner was he established than the Ivan's family struck back. Gaining the support of the Kremlin Guard, they launched a coup d'etat, which resulted in a joint Tsar-ship, with both Peter and Ivan placed under the regency of Ivan's elder sister Sophia.

In 1689, just as Peter was to come of age, Sophia attempted another coup—this time, however, she was defeated and confined to Novodevichiy Convent. Six years later Ivan died, leaving Peter in sole possession of the throne. Rather than taking up residence and rule in Moscow, his response was to embark on a Grand Tour of Europe. He spent about two years there, not only meeting monarchs and conducting diplomacy but also travelling incognito and even working as a ship's carpenter in Holland. He amassed a considerable body of knowledge on western European industrial techniques and state administration, and became determined to modernize the Russian state and to westernize its society. In 1698, still on tour, Peter received news of yet another rebellion by the Kremlin Guard, instigated by Sophia despite her confinement to Novodevichiy. He returned, defeated the coup attempt and hung all of the rebels. The following day he began his program to recreate Russia in the image of Western Europe by personally clipping off the beards of his nobles.

Peter's return to Russia hit the country like a hurricane. He banned traditional Muscovite dress for all men, introduced military conscription, established technical schools, replaced the church patriarchy with a holy synod answerable to himself, simplified the alphabet, tried to improve the manners of the court, changed the calendar, changed his title from

Tsar to Emperor, and introduced a hundred other reforms, restrictions, and novelties. In 1703 he transferred the capital from Moscow to a new city to be built from scratch on the Gulf of Finland. Over the next nine years, at tremendous human and material cost, St. Petersburg was created.

Peter himself died in 1725, and he remains one of the most controversial figures in Russian history. Although he was deeply committed to making Russia a powerful new member of modern Europe, it is questionable whether his reforms resulted in significant improvements to the lives of his subjects. Certainly he modernized Russia's military and its administrative structure, but both of these reforms were financed at the expense of the peasantry, who were increasingly forced into serfdom. After Peter's death Russia went through a great number of rulers in a distressingly short time, none of whom had much of an opportunity to leave a lasting impression. Many of Peter's reforms failed to take root in Russia, and it was not until the reign of Catherine the Great that his desire to make Russia into a great European power was in fact achieved.

Catherine the Great

The future Catherine the Great was born a German princess in one of the tiny German states, but turned out to be a powerful and enlightened ruler of the vast Russian Empire. In 1745 she was married to prince Carl Peter Ulrich, the heir to the Russian throne (the future Emperor Peter III). Being a bright personality with a strong sense of determination she joined the Russian Orthodox Church, learned the Russian language and by doing a lot of reading acquired a brilliant education. In June 1762 she took an active part in a coup against her husband Emperor Peter III. He was overthrown and soon killed "in an accident", while Catherine became Russia's ruler.

Catherine went on to become the most powerful sovereign in Europe. She continued Peter the Great's reforms of the Russian state, further increasing central control over the provinces. Russia's influence in European affairs, as well as its territory in Eastern and Central Europe, were increased and expanded. Catherine was also an enthusiastic patron of the arts. She built and founded the Hermitage Museum, commissioned buildings all over Russia, founded academies, journals, and libraries, and corresponded with the French Encyclopedists, including Voltaire, Diderot, and d'Alembert. Although Catherine did in fact have many lovers, some of them trusted advisors and confidants, stories alleging her to have had an excessive sexual appetite are unfounded.

With the onset of the French Revolution, Catherine became strikingly conservative and increasingly hostile to criticism of her policies. From 1789 until her death, she reversed many of the liberal reforms of her early reign. One notable effect of this reversal was that, like Peter the Great, Catherine ultimately contributed to the increasingly distressing state of the peasantry in Russia. When Catherine the Great died in 1796, she was succeeded by her son Paul I. Paul's reign lasted only five years and was by all accounts a complete disaster. Paul was succeeded by his son Alexander I, who is remembered mostly for

having been the ruler of Russia during Napoleon Bonaparte's epic Russian Campaign.

Napoleon's Invasion

In June of 1812, Napoleon began his fatal Russian campaign, a landmark in the history of the destructive potential of warfare. Virtually all of continental Europe was under his control, and the invasion of Russia was an attempt to force Tsar Alexander I to submit once again to the terms of a treaty that Napoleon had imposed upon him four years earlier. Having gathered nearly half a million soldiers, from France as well as all of the vassal states of Europe, Napoleon entered Russia at the head of the largest army ever seen. The Russians, under Marshal Kutuzov, could not realistically hope to defeat him in a direct confrontation. Instead, they began a defensive campaign of strategic retreat, devastating the land as they fell back and harassing the flanks of the French. As the summer wore on, Napoleon's massive supply lines were stretched ever thinner, and his force began to decline. By September, without having engaged in a single pitched battle, the French Army had been reduced by more than two thirds from fatigue, hunger, desertion, and raids by Russian forces.

Nonetheless, it was clear that unless the Russians engaged the French Army in a major battle, Moscow would be Napoleon's in a matter of weeks. The Tsar insisted upon an engagement, and on September 7, with winter closing in and the French army only 70 miles (110 km) from the city, the two armies met at Borodino Field. By the end of the day, 108,000 men had died—but neither side had gained a decisive victory. Kutuzov realized that any further defense of the city would be senseless, and he withdrew his forces, prompting the citizens of Moscow to begin a massive and panicked exodus. When Napoleon's army arrived on September 14, they found a city depopulated and bereft of supplies, a meager comfort in the face of the oncoming winter. To make matters much, much worse, fires broke out in the city that night, and by the next day the French were lacking shelter as well.

After waiting in vain for Alexander to offer to negotiate, Napoleon ordered his troops to begin the march home. Because the route south was blocked by Kutuzov's forces (and the French were in no shape for a battle) the retreat retraced the long, devastated route of the invasion. Having waited until mid-October to depart, the exhausted French army soon found itself in the midst of winter—in fact, in the midst of an unusually early and especially cold winter. Temperatures soon dropped well below freezing, Cossacks attacked stragglers and isolated units, food was almost non-existent, and the march was five hundred miles. Ten thousand men survived. The campaign ensured Napoleon's downfall and Russia's status as a leading power in post-Napoleonic Europe. Yet even as Russia emerged more powerful than ever from the Napoleonic era, its internal tensions began to increase.

The Path to Revolution (1825-1905)

Since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the Russian Tsars had followed a fairly consistent policy of drawing more political power away from the nobility and into their own hands. This centralization of authority in the Russian state had usually been accomplished in one of two ways—either by simply taking power from the nobles and braving their opposition (Ivan the Terrible was very good at this), or by compensating the nobles for decreased power in government by giving them greater power over their land and its occupants. Serfdom, as this latter system was known, had increased steadily in Russia from the time of Ivan the Terrible, its inventor. By the time of Catherine the Great, the Russian Tsars enjoyed virtually autocratic rule over their nobles. However, they had in a sense purchased this power by granting those nobles virtually autocratic power over the serfs, who by this time had been reduced to a state closer to slavery than to peasantry.

By the nineteenth century, both of these relationships were under attack. In the Decembrist revolt in 1825, a group of young, reformist military officers attempted to force the adoption of a constitutional monarchy in Russia by preventing the accession of Nicholas I. They failed utterly, and Nicholas became the most reactionary leader in Europe. Nicholas' successor, Alexander II, seemed by contrast to be amenable to reform. In 1861, he abolished serfdom, though the emancipation didn't in fact bring on any significant change in the condition of the peasants. As the country became more industrialized, its political system experienced even greater strain. Attempts by the lower classes to gain more freedom provoked fears of anarchy, and the government remained extremely conservative. As Russia became more industrialized, larger, and far more complicated, the inadequacies of autocratic Tsarist rule became increasingly apparent. By the twentieth century conditions were ripe for a serious convulsion.

At the same time, Russia had expanded its territory and its power considerably over the nineteenth century. Its borders extended to Afghanistan and China, and it had acquired extensive territory on the Pacific coast. The foundation of the port cities of Vladivostok and Port Arthur there had opened up profitable avenues for commerce, and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (constructed from 1891-1905) linked the European Russia with its new eastern territories. In 1894 Nicholas II acceded to the throne. He was not the most competent of political leaders, and his ministers were almost uniformly reactionaries. To make matters worse, the increasing Russian presence in the far east provoked the hostility of Japan. In January of 1905, the Japanese attacked, and Russia experienced a series of defeats that dissolved the tenuous support held by Nicholas' already unpopular government. Nicholas was forced to grant concessions to the reformers, including most notably a constitution and a parliament, or Duma. The power of the reform movement was founded on a new and powerful force that entered Russian politics. The industrialization of the major western cities and the development of the Batu oil fields had brought together large concentrations of Russian workers, and they soon began to organize into local political councils, or soviets ("soviet" means council or

advice). It was in large part the power of the soviets, united under the Social Democratic party, that had forced Nicholas to accept reforms in 1905.

3.10 England

Edward III (1312-1377) succeeded his father at the age of 15 and reigned for 50 years. His reign was marked by the beginning of the Hundred Years' War (1337-1416) and epidemics of bubonic plague ("Black Death"), which killed one third of England (and Europe's) population. Edward III was often fighting in France, and the government was controlled de facto by his third son John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster. John of Gaunt's son, Henry Bolingbroke, took advantage of his cousin Richard II's absence to proclaim himself King Henry IV (1367-1413). Escaping several assassination attempts, Henry also had to deal with the revolt of Owen Glendower, who declared himself Prince of Wales in 1400, then with the rebellion of the Earl of Northumberland.

Henry V (1387-1422), famously defeated the French at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, but his pious and peace-loving son Henry VI (1421-1471), who inherited the throne at just one year old, was to have a much more troubled reign. The regent lost most of the English possessions in France to a 17-year old girl (Joan of Arc) and in 1455, the Wars of the Roses broke out. This civil war opposed the House of Lancaster (the Red Rose, supporters of Henry VI) to the House of York (the White Rose, supporters of Edward IV). The Yorks argued that the crown should have passed to Edward III's second son, Lionel of Antwerp, rather than to the Lancasters descending from John of Gaunt.

Edward IV's son, Edward V, only reigned for one year, before being locked in the Tower of London by his evil uncle, Richard III (1452-1485), although probably not as evil as Shakespeare depicted him in his play. The reason is that Lancastrian Henry Tudor (1457-1509), the half-brother of Henry VI, defeated Richard III at the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485, and became Henry VII, founder of the House of Tudor, for which Shakespeare wrote. Henry Tudor's son is maybe England's most famous and historically important ruler, the magnificent Henry VIII (1491-1547). He is remembered in history as one of the most powerful kings of England. Except for getting married six times, desperate for a male heir, Henry changed the face of England, passing the Acts of Union with Wales (1536-1543), thus becoming the first English King of Wales, then changing his title of Lord of Ireland into that of (also first) King of Ireland (1541).

In 1533, Henry divorced his first wife, Catherine of Aragon (Queen Mary's mother, see Peterborough) to remarry Anne Boleyn (Queen Elizabeth I's mother), the Pope excommunicated Henry, and in return, Henry proclaimed himself head of the Church of England. To assure the control over the clergy, Henry dissolved all the monasteries in the country (1536-1540) and nationalised them, becoming immensely rich in the process. Henry VIII was the last English king to claim the title of King of France, as he lost his last possession there, the port of Calais (although he tried to recover it, taking Tournai for a few years, the only town in present-day Belgium to have been under English rule). It was also under Henry VIII that England started exploring the globe and trading outside Europe, although this would only develop to colonial proportions under his daughters, Mary I and especially Elizabeth I (after whom Virginia was named).

The 10-year old Edward VI inherited the throne at his father's death in 1547, but died 6 years later and was succeeded by his elder half-daughter Mary. Mary I (1516-1558), a staunch Catholic, intended to restore Roman Catholicism to England, executing over 300 religious dissenters in her 5-year reign (which earned her the nickname of Bloody Mary). She married the powerful King Philip II of Spain, who also ruled over the Netherlands, the Spanish Americas and the Philippines (named after him), and was the champion of the Counter-Reform (read "Inquisition"). Mary died childless of ovarian cancer in 1558, and her half-sister Elizabeth ascended the throne. The great Virgin Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603) saw the first golden age of England. It was an age of great navigators like Sir Francis Drake and Sir Walter Raleigh, an age of enlightenment with the philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and playwrights such as Christopher Marlowe (1564-1593) and William Shakespeare (1564-1616).

Her reign was also marked by conflicts with France and Scotland (bound by a common queen, Mary Stuart), then Spain and Ireland. Elizabeth was an undecisive and prudent ruler. She never married, and when Mary Stuart tried and failed to take over the throne of England, Elizabeth kept her imprisoned for 19 years (most of the time in Chatsworth House under the guard of the Earl of Shrewsbury), before finally signing her act of execution. Elizabeth died in 1603, and ironically, Mary Stuart's son, James VI of Scotland, succeeded Elizabeth as King James I of England - thus creating the United Kingdom.

James I (1566-1625) was a Protestant, like Elizabeth, and aimed at improving relations with the Catholics. But 2 years after he was crowned, a group of Catholic extremists led by Guy Fawkes attempted to place a bomb at the parliament's state opening, when the king and his entourage would be present, so as to get rid of all the Protestant aristocracy in one fell swoop. The conspirators were betrayed by one of their number just hours before the plan's enactment. The failure of the Gunpowder Plot, as it is known, is still celebrated throughout Britain on Guy Fawkes' night (5th November), with fireworks and bonfires burning effigies of the conspirators' leader. The divide between Catholics and Protestant worsened after this incident. James's successor Charles I (1600-1649) was eager to unify Britain and Ireland, and wanted to do so as an absolute ruler of divine right, like his French counter-part Louis XIV. Despite being an (Anglican) Protestant, his marriage with a French Roman Catholic combined with policies at odds with Calvinist ideals and his totalitarian handling of the Parliament eventually culminated in the English Civil War (1642-1651). The country was torn between Royalist and Parliamentary troops, and most of the medieval castles still standing were destroyed during that period.

Charles was beheaded, and the puritan leader of the Parliamentarians, Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) (more on him later), ruled the country as a dictator from 1649 to his death. He was briefly succeeded by his son Richard at the head of the Protectorate, but his political inability prompted the Parliament to restore the monarchy in 1660, calling in Charles I's exiled son, Charles II (1630-1685). The "Merry Monarch", as Charles II was known, was better at handling Parliament than his father, although as ruthless with other matters. It is during his reign that the Whig and Tory parties were created, and that

the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam became English and was renamed New York, after Charles' brother, James, Duke of York (and later James II).

Charles II was the patron of the arts and sciences. He helped found the Royal Society and sponsored architect Sir Christopher Wren, who rebuilt the City of London of the Great Fire of 1666, and constructed some of England's greatest edifices. Charles acquired Bombay and Tangiers through his Portuguese wife, thus laying the foundation for the British Empire. Although Charles produced countless illegitimate children, 14 of whom he acknowledged (including the Duke of Monmouth, the Duke of Northumberland, the Duke of Grafton, the Duke of Cleveland, the Duke of Richmond and the Duke of St Albans), his wife couldn't bear an heir, and when he died in 1685 the throne passed to his Catholic and unpopular brother James.

James II's religious inclinations and despotism led to his quick removal from power in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. His Protestant daughter Mary, married to his equally Protestant nephew, William of Orange. The couple was "invited" by the Protestant aristocracy to conduct an invasion from the Netherlands. They defeated James' troops at the Battle of the Boyne, and deposed James II with limited bloodshed. James was allowed to escape to France, where he remained the rest of his life under the protection of Louis XIV. His son and grandson later attempted to come back to the throne, but without success. The new ruling couple became known as the "Grand Alliance". The parliament ratified that all kings or queens would have to be Protestant from then on. After Mary's death in 1694, then William's in 1702, James's second daughter, Anne, ascended the throne. In 1707, the Act of Union joined the Scottish and the English Parliaments thus creating the single Kingdom of Great Britain and centralising political power in London. Anne died heirless in 1714, and a distant German cousin, George of Hanover, was called to rule over the UK.

When George I (1660-1727) arrived in England, he couldn't speak a word of English, and the legend has it that he was mistakenly arrested while strolling around his palace's garden when questioned by his staff who weren't familiar with his appearance. The king's inability to communicate well with his government and subjects led him to appoint a de facto Prime Minister in the person of Robert Walpole (1676-1745). This marked a turning point in British politics, as future monarchs were also to remain more passive figures, letting the reins of the government to the Prime Minister. George II (1683-1760) was also German born, and combined the title of Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Archtreasurer and Prince-Elector of the Holy Roman Empire to that of King of Great-Britain and Ireland. He was a powerful ruler, and the last British monarch to personally lead his troops into battle.

The British Empire expanded considerably during his reign and the song "God Save the King" also developed during that period. Some other notable changes include the replacement of the Julian Calendar by the Gregorian Calendar in 1752, and the New Year was officially moved from 25 March to 1 January. The first Hanoverian king to be born in England with English as his native language, George III (1738-1820) had one of the

most troubled and interesting reign in British history. He ascended the throne during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) opposing almost all the major Western powers in two teams, chiefly British against French, and ended in a de facto victory for the UK, which acquired New France (Quebec), Florida, and most of French India in the process.

However, 13 years later, the American War of Independence (1776-1782) started after the British government imposed a series of taxes on the colonies. The 13 American colonies were finally granted their independence in 1782 and formed the United States of America. 7 years later, the French Revolution broke out, and Louis XVI was guillotined. George III suffered from an hereditary disease known as porphyria, and his mental health seriously deteriorated from 1788. By 1811 he was permanently insane. In 1800, the Act of Union merged the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland. During that time, Britain had to face the ambitions of Napoleon to conquer the whole of Europe. Admiral Nelson's naval victory at Trafalgar (off the coast of Spain) in 1805, and Wellington's decisive victory at Waterloo saved the UK, and further reinforced its international position. The 19th century would be dominated by the British Empire, spreading on all five continents, from Canada and the Caribbeans to Australia and New Zealand, via Africa, India and South-East Asia.

Another notable fact of George III's reign was the start of the Industrial Revolution, with James Watt's famous steam engine and the mechanisation of the manufacturing industry transforming the face of England to this day. Great industrial cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield emerged as the new economic centres of the country, their population booming several fold.

In 1837, William IV died of liver disease and the throne passed to the next in line, his 18-year old niece Victoria (1819-1901), although she did not inherit the Kingdom of Hanover, where the Salic Law forbid women to rule. Victoria didn't expect to become queen, was still unmarried and inexperienced in politics, and had to rely on her Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne (1779-1848), after whom the Australian city is named. She finally got married to her first cousin, Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (1819-1861), and both were respectively niece and nephew of the first King of the Belgians, Leopold I (of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha). Prince Albert organised the Great Exhibition (the first World Fair) in 1851, and the profits were used to found the great South Kensington Museum (later renamed the Victoria and Albert Museum) in London.

Britain asserted its hegemony on virtually every part of the globe, although this resulted in numerous wars, as for example the Opium Wars (1839-42 & 1856-60) with Qing China, or the Boer Wars (1880-81 & 1899-1902) with the Dutch-speaking settlers of South Africa. In 1854, the the United Kingdom was brought into the Crimean War (1854-56) on the side of the Ottoman Empire and against Russia. In 1861, Albert died prematurely at the age of 42. Victoria was devastated and retired in a semi-permanent state of mourning. The latter years of her reign were dominated by two influential Prime Ministers, Benjamin Disraeli (1808-1881) and his rival William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898). The former was the favourite of the Queen, and crowned her "Empress of India" in 1876, in return of

which Victoria creating him Earl of Beaconsfield. Gladstone was a liberal, and often at odd with both Victoria and Disraeli, but the strong support he enjoyed from within his party kept him in power for a total of 14 years between 1868 and 1894. He legalised trade unions, advocated both universal education and universal suffrage (well, at least for men).

Queen Victoria was to have the longest reign of any British monarch (64 years), but also the most glorious, as she ruled over 40% of the globe and a quarter of the world's population.

4. The Money Lenders and their Game

4.1 English Revolution

The Edict of Expulsion was an act of Edward I which expelled all Jews from the kingdom of England. To understand why Edward acted in this way, you have to go back in history. Biblical exhortations against the lending of money led to an attitude among the inhabitants of Christian Europe that the lending of money at interest was at best, un-Christian, and at worst, sinful and evil. The Jewish religion attached no such stigma to lending money, and as a result many Jews offered that service to Christians. In the years following the Conquest of 1066 the Jews were an important part of Norman English society. The nobility of England were constantly in need of money, and as a result, they borrowed heavily from Jewish moneylenders. William the Conqueror recognized the importance of the Jewish moneylenders to Norman society, and offered them special protection under law. Jews were declared to be direct subjects of the king, not subjects of their local feudal lord.

Because of this special status, however, English kings saw the Jewish moneylenders as a convenient source of funds. The king could levy taxes against Jews without needing the prior approval of Parliament. So when a king needed money - as they often did - he could simply levy a special tax on the Jews. This system would work as long as the Jews were allowed to accumulate money, but that was about to change. Throughout the period following the Norman invasion the medieval world underwent a gradual shift towards religious heterodoxy (emphasis on a single belief system), epitomized by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. The Lateran, among other measures, required Jews and Muslims to wear special dress so that they could easily be distinguished from Christians. England enforced this proclamation by requiring Jews to wear a special badge.

Church proclamations like those of the Fourth Lateran Council really gave official approval to attitudes that were already prevalent in medieval society. The large landowners resented their indebtedness to the moneylenders. Attitudes of religious persecution became more and more evident. Even before the Lateran Council, outbreaks of mob violence aimed at Jews was not uncommon in England, for example, in 1190 a mob killed hundreds of Jews in York. At the same time as attitudes of intolerance were becoming more common - and more acceptable to both the Church and the state - the emergence of the Italian system of merchant banking made the Jewish moneylenders less vital to the nobility. Measures of punitive taxation against the Jews became more common, with the result that there were fewer Jewish moneylenders with ready cash to lend. In 1285 the Statute of Jewry banned all usury, even by Jews, and gave Jews 15 years to end their practice. Unfortunately, given prevailing attitudes towards Jews in trade, few avenues of

livelihood were open to those affected by the Statute.

These matters came to a head in 1287 when Edward I peremptorily seized all Jewish property and transferred all debts to his name. In other words, everyone who had previously owed money to a Jewish moneylender now owed it directly to Edward himself. On 18 July, 1290, Edward I issued what came to be called the Edict of Expulsion. The same day that the Edict was proclaimed writs were sent to the sheriffs of most counties advising that all Jews in their counties had until 1 November to leave the realm. Any Jews remaining after this date were liable to be seized and executed. To rub salt into the wound a special tax on the Jews was agreed in Parliament. How many people were affected by the Edict of Expulsion? Records are inexact for this period, but it seems likely that about 3000 Jews were forced to leave England. Edward's Edict to banish the Jews was followed by his fellow Christian monarch in France, Philip le Bel, sixteen years later.

The moneylenders had been evicted not only from England but from other European countries. They had regrouped in Holland, where they plotted their return; but the English kings and queens staunchly resisted their advances. The king did not need to borrow money when he had the sovereign right to issue it himself. For a brief period in the 1500s, King Henry VIII relaxed the laws concerning usury when he broke away from the Catholic Church; but when Queen Mary took the throne, she tightened the laws again. The result was to seriously contract the money supply, but Queen Elizabeth I (Mary's half-sister) was determined to avoid the usury trap. She solved the problem by supplementing the money supply with metal coins issued by the public treasury.

The coins were made of metal, but their value came from the stamp of the sovereign on them. This was established as a matter of legal precedent in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth issued relatively worthless base metal coins as legal tender in Ireland. All other coins were annulled and had to be returned to the mints. When the action was challenged in the highest court of the land, the court ruled that it was the sovereign's sole prerogative to create the money of the realm. What the sovereign declared to be money was money, and it was treason for anyone else to create it. Zarlenga states that this decision was so detested by the merchant classes, the goldsmiths, and later the British East India Company that they worked incessantly to destroy it. According to Alexander Del Mar, writing in 1895:

"This was done by undermining the Crown and then passing the free coinage act of 1666, opening the way for the foreign element to establish a new Monarch, and to reconstitute the money prerogative in the hands of a specific group of financiers – not elected, not representing society, and in large part not even English."

When King Charles I was brought into disagreement with his Parliament a Jewish Money-Baron in Holland, named Manasseh Ben Israel, had his agents contact Oliver Cromwell. They offered him large sums of money if he would carry out their plan to overthrow the British Throne. Manasseh Ben Israel, and other German and French moneylenders financed Cromwell. Fernandez Carvajal of Portugal, often referred to in history as The

Great Jew, became Cromwell's Chief Military Contractor. He re-organized the Round Heads into a model army. He provided them with the best arms and equipment money could buy. Once the conspiracy was under way, hundreds of trained revolutionaries were smuggled into England and were absorbed into the Jewish Underground. Once the revolution had been decided upon, the Jewish plotters introduced Calvinism into England to split Church and State, and divide the people. Contrary to general belief, Calvinism is of Jewish origin. It was deliberately conceived to split the adherents of the Christian religions, and divide the people. Calvin's real name was Cohen! When he went from Geneva to France to start preaching his doctrine he became known as Cauin. Then in England it became Calvin. History proves that there is hardly a revolutionary plot that wasn't hatched in Switzerland; there is hardly a Jewish revolutionary leader who hasn't changed his name.

Britain thrived with government-issued currency (tallies and coins) until the king's sovereign authority was eroded by Cromwell's revolt in the mid-seventeenth century. The middle classes (the traders, manufacturers and small farmers) sided with Parliament under Cromwell, who was a Puritan Protestant. Cromwell allowed the Jews to settle again in England if they lend him money to fight the king. The nobles and gentry sided with the King – Charles I, son of James I, who followed the Church of England, the English Catholic Church. The Protestants were more lenient than the Catholics toward usury and toward the Dutch moneylenders who practiced it. The moneylenders agreed to provide the funds to back Parliament, on condition that they be allowed back into England and that the loans be guaranteed. That meant the permanent removal of King Charles, who would have repudiated the loans had he gotten back into power. Charles' recapture, trial, and execution were duly arranged and carried out to secure the loans. After Cromwell's death, Charles' son Charles II was invited to return; but Parliament had no intention of granting him the sovereign power over the money supply enjoyed by his predecessors. When the king needed a standing army, Parliament refused to vote the funds, forcing him to borrow instead from the English goldsmiths at usurious interest rates. The final blow to the royal prerogative was the Free Coinage Act of 1666, which allowed anyone to bring gold or silver to the mint to have it stamped into coins. The power to issue money, which had for centuries been the sole right of the king, was transferred into private hands, giving bankers the power to cause inflations and depressions at will by issuing or withholding their gold coins.

None of the earlier English kings or queens would have agreed to charter a private central bank that had the power to create money and lend it to the government. Since they could issue money themselves, they had no need for loans. But King William III, who followed Charles II, was a Dutchman and a tool of the powerful Wisselbank of Amsterdam. In the intervening period Jews were required to obtain a special license to visit the realm, though it seems very likely that some Jews resettled in England while keeping their religion secret.

The man who would become King William III began his career as a Dutch aristocrat. He was elevated to Captain General of the Dutch Forces and then to Prince William of

Orange with the backing of Dutch moneylenders. His marriage was arranged to Princess Mary of York, eldest daughter of the English Duke of York, and they were married in 1677. The Duke, who was next in line to be King of England, died in 1689, and William and Mary became King and Queen of England. William was soon at war with Louis XIV of France. To finance his war, he borrowed 1.2 million pounds in gold from a group of moneylenders, whose names were to be kept secret. The money was raised by a novel device that is still used by governments today: the lenders would issue a permanent loan on which interest would be paid but the principal portion of the loan would not be repaid.⁶ The loan also came with other strings attached. They included:

- The lenders were to be granted a charter to establish a Bank of England, which would issue banknotes that would circulate as the national paper currency.
- The Bank would create banknotes out of nothing, with only a fraction of them backed by coin. Banknotes created and lent to the government would be backed mainly by government I.O.U.s, which would serve as the “reserves” for creating additional loans to private parties (fractional reserve banking).
- Interest of 8 percent would be paid by the government on its loans, marking the birth of the national debt.
- The lenders would be allowed to secure payment on the national debt by direct taxation of the people. Taxes were immediately imposed on a whole range of goods to pay the interest owed to the Bank.

The Bank of England has been called “the Mother of Central Banks.” It was chartered in 1694 to William Paterson, a Scotsman who had previously lived in Amsterdam. A circular distributed to attract subscribers to the Bank’s initial stock offering said, “The Bank hath benefit of interest on all moneys which it, the Bank, creates out of nothing.” The negotiation of additional loans caused England’s national debt to go from 1.2 million pounds in 1694 to 16 million pounds in 1698. By 1715, the debt was up to 885 million pounds, largely due to the compounding of interest. The lenders not only reaped huge profits, but the indebtedness gave them substantial political leverage. The Bank’s charter gave the force of law to the “fractional reserve” banking scheme that put control of the country’s money in a privately owned company. The Bank of England had the legal right to create paper money out of nothing and lend it to the government at interest. It did this by trading its own paper notes for paper bonds representing the government’s promise to pay principal and interest back to the Bank – the same device used by the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks today.

Popular acceptance of the bankers’ privately-issued money scheme is credited to the son of a Scottish goldsmith named John Law, who has been called “the father of finance.” In 1705, Law published a series of pamphlets on trade, money and banking, in which he claimed to have found the true “Philosopher’s Stone,” referring to a mythical device

used by medieval alchemists to turn base material into gold. Paper could be converted into gold, Law said, through the alchemy of paper money. He proposed the creation of a national paper money supply consisting of banknotes redeemable in “specie” (hard currency in the form of gold or silver coins), which would be officially recognized as money.

Law planned to open a National Bank in Scotland on the model of the Bank of England; but William Paterson, who held the charter for the Bank of England, had the plan halted in the Scottish Parliament. Law then emigrated to France. He had another reason for leaving the country. Notorious for escapades of all sorts, he had gotten into a duel over a woman, which he had won; but he had wound up with a murder conviction in England. In France, Law was able to put his banking theories into practice, when the French chose him to head the “Banque Generale” in 1716. Like the Bank of England, it was a private bank chartered by the government for the purpose of creating money in the form of paper notes.

This scheme became the basis of the banking system known as “central banking,” which remains in use today. A private central bank is chartered as the nation’s primary bank and lends to the national government. It lends the central bank’s own notes (printed paper money), which the government swaps for bonds (its promises to pay) and circulates as a national currency. The government’s debt is never paid off but is just rolled over from year to year, becoming the basis of the national money supply. Law’s enduring Ponzi scheme was the one that escaped detection, the “Philosopher’s Stone” by which a national money supply could be created from government debt that had been “monetized,” or turned into paper money by private bankers. The reason this sleight of hand never got detected was that the central bank never demanded the return of its principal. If the bankers had demanded the money back, the government would have had to levy taxes, rousing the people and revealing what was up the wizard’s sleeve. But the wily bankers just continued to roll over the debt and collect the interest, on a very lucrative investment that paid (and continues to pay) like a slot machine year after year.

Until the twentieth century, banks followed the model of the goldsmiths and literally printed their own supply of notes against their own gold reserves. These were then multiplied many times over on the “fractional reserve” system. The bank’s own name was printed on the notes, which were lent to the public and the government. Today, federal governments have taken over the printing; but in most countries the notes are still drawn on private central banks. In the United States, they are printed by the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing at the request of the Federal Reserve, which “buys” them for the cost of printing them and calls them “Federal Reserve Notes.” Today, however, there is no gold on “reserve” for which the notes can be redeemed. Like the illusory ghosts in the Haunted House at Disneyland, the dollar is the fractal of a hologram, the reflection of a debt for something that does not exist.

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4.2 American Revolution

The American colonies were an experiment in utopia. In an uncharted territory, you could design new systems and make new rules. Paper money was already in use in England, but it had fallen into the hands of private bankers who were using it for private profit at the expense of the people. In the American version of this new medium of exchange, paper money was issued and lent by provincial governments, and the proceeds were used for the benefit of the people. The colonists' new paper money financed a period of prosperity that was considered remarkable for isolated colonies lacking their own silver and gold. By 1750, Benjamin Franklin was able to write of New England:

“There was abundance in the Colonies, and peace was reigning on every border. It was difficult, and even impossible, to find a happier and more prosperous nation on all the surface of the globe. Comfort was prevailing in every home. The people, in general, kept the highest moral standards, and education was widely spread. The distinction of being the first local government to issue its own paper money went to the province of Massachusetts. The year was 1691, three years before the charter of the Bank of England.”

The idea of a paper currency had been suggested in 1650, in an anonymous British pamphlet titled “The Key to Wealth, or, a New Way for Improving of Trade: Lawfull, Easie, Safe and Effectual.” The paper currency proposed by the pamphleteer, however, was modeled on the receipts issued by London goldsmiths and silversmiths for the precious metals left in their vaults for safekeeping. The problem for the colonies was that they were short of silver and gold. They had to use foreign coins to conduct trade, and since they imported more than they exported, the coins were continually being drained off to England and other countries, leaving the colonists without enough money for their own internal needs. The Massachusetts Assembly therefore proposed a new kind of paper money, a “bill of credit” representing the government’s “bond” or I.O.U. – its promise to pay tomorrow on a debt incurred today. The paper money of Massachusetts was backed only by the “full faith and credit” of the government.

Other colonies then followed suit with their own issues of paper money. Some were considered government I.O.U.s, redeemable later in “hard” currency (silver or gold). Other issues were “legal tender” in themselves. Legal tender is money that must legally be accepted in the payment of debts. It is “as good as gold” in trade, without bearing debt or an obligation to redeem the notes in some other form of money later. When confidence in the new paper money waned, Cotton Mather, who was then the most famous minister in New England, came to its defense. He argued: “Is a Bond or Bill-of-Exchange for £1000, other than paper? And yet is it not as valuable as so much Silver or Gold, supposing the security of Payment is sufficient? Now what is the security of your Paper-money less than the Credit of the whole Country?” Mather had redefined money. What it represented was not a sum of gold or silver. It was credit: “the credit of the whole country.”

Benjamin Franklin was such an enthusiast for the new medium of exchange that he has been called “the father of paper money.” He learned his trade on the job, and his trade happened to be printing. In 1729, he wrote and printed a pamphlet called “A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of a Paper-Currency,” which was circulated throughout the colonies. It became very popular, earning him contracts to print paper money for New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Franklin wrote his pamphlet after observing the remarkable effects that paper currency had had in stimulating the economy in his home province of Pennsylvania. He said, “Experience, more prevalent than all the logic in the World, has fully convinced us all, that [paper money] has been, and is now of the greatest advantages to the country.” Paper currency secured against future tax revenues, he said, turned prosperity tomorrow into ready money today. The government did not need gold to issue this currency, and it did not need to go into debt to the banks. In America, the land of opportunity, this ready money would allow even the poor to get ahead. Franklin wrote, “Many that understand ... Business very well, but have not a Stock sufficient of their own, will be encouraged to borrow Money; to trade with, when they have it at a moderate interest.”

He also said, “The riches of a country are to be valued by the quantity of labor its inhabitants are able to purchase and not by the quantity of gold and silver they possess.” When gold was the medium of exchange, money determined production rather than production determining the money supply. When gold was plentiful, things got produced. When it was scarce, men were out of work and people knew want. The virtue of government-issued paper scrip was that it could grow along with productivity, allowing potential wealth to become real wealth. The government could pay for services with paper receipts that were basically community credits. In this way, the community actually created supply and demand at the same time. The farmer would not farm, the teacher would not teach, the miner would not mine, unless the funds were available to compensate them for their labors. Paper “scrip” underwrote the production of goods and services that would not otherwise have been on the market. Anything for which there was a buyer and a producer could be produced and traded. If A had what B wanted, B had what C wanted, and C had what A wanted, they could all get together and trade. They did not need the moneylenders’ gold, which could be hoarded, manipulated, or lent only at usurious interest rates.

Representation Without Taxation

The new paper money did more than make the colonies independent of the British bankers and their gold. It actually allowed the colonists to finance their local governments without taxing the people. Alvin Rabushka, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, traces this development in a 2002 article called “Representation Without Taxation.” He writes that there were two main ways the colonies issued paper money. Most colonies used both, in varying proportions. One was a direct issue of notes,

usually called “bills of credit” or “treasury notes.” These were I.O.U.s of the government backed by specific future taxes; but the payback was deferred well into the future, and sometimes the funds never got returned to the treasury at all. Like in a bathtub without a drain, the money supply kept increasing without a means of recycling it back to its source. However, the funds were at least not owed back to private foreign lenders, and no interest was due on them. They were just credits issued and spent into the economy on goods and services. The recycling problem was solved when a second method of issue was devised. Colonial assemblies discovered that provincial loan offices could generate a steady stream of revenue in the form of interest by taking on the lending functions of banks. A government loan office called a “land bank” would issue paper money and lend it to residents (usually farmers) at low rates of interest. The loans were secured by mortgages on real property, silver plate, and other hard assets. Franklin wrote, “Bills issued upon Land are in Effect Coined Land.” New money issued and lent to borrowers came back to the loan office on a regular payment schedule, preventing the money supply from over-inflating and keeping the values of paper loan-office bills stable in terms of English sterling. The interest paid on the loans also went into the public coffers, funding the government. Colonies relying on this method of issuing paper money thus wound up with more stable currencies than those relying heavily on new issues of bills of credit. The most successful loan offices were in the middle colonies – Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York and New Jersey. The model that earned the admiration of all was the loan office established in Pennsylvania in 1723. The Pennsylvania plan showed that it was quite possible for the government to issue new money in place of taxes without inflating prices. From 1723 until the French and Indian War in the 1750s, the provincial government collected no taxes at all.

The paper currencies of the New England colonies – Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire – were less successful than those of the middle colonies, mainly because they failed to limit their issues to these “proper proportions,” or to recycle the money back to the government. The paper money of the New England colonies helped to finance development and growth that would not otherwise have occurred, but the currencies did not maintain their value, because bills of credit were issued in far greater quantities than the provincial governments ever hoped to redeem. Because the money was pumped into the economy without flowing back to the government, the currency depreciated and price inflation resulted.

King George Steps In

Rapid depreciation of the New England bills eventually threatened the investments of British merchants and financiers who were doing business with the colonies, and they leaned on Parliament to prohibit the practice. In 1751, King George II enacted a ban on the issue of all new paper money in the New England colonies, forcing the colonists to borrow instead from the British bankers. This ban was continued under King George III,

who succeeded his father in 1752. In 1764, Franklin went to London to petition Parliament to lift the ban. When he arrived, he was surprised to find rampant unemployment and poverty among the British working classes. “The streets are covered with beggars and tramps,” he observed. When he asked why, he was told the country had too many workers. The rich were already overburdened with taxes and could not pay more to relieve the poverty of the working classes. Franklin was then asked how the American colonies managed to collect enough money to support their poor houses. He reportedly replied:

“We have no poor houses in the Colonies; and if we had some, there would be nobody to put in them, since there is, in the Colonies, not a single unemployed person, neither beggars nor tramps.”

His English listeners had trouble believing this, since when their poor houses and jails had become too cluttered, the English had actually shipped their poor to the Colonies. The directors of the Bank of England asked what was responsible for the booming economy of the young colonies. Franklin replied:

“That is simple. In the colonies we issue our own money. It is called Colonial Scrip. We issue it to pay the government’s approved expenses and charities. We make sure it is issued in proper proportions to make the goods pass easily from the producers to the consumers... In this manner, creating for ourselves our own paper money, we control its purchasing power, and we have no interest to pay to no one. You see, a legitimate government can both spend and lend money into circulation, while banks can only lend significant amounts of their promissory bank notes, for they can neither give away nor spend but a tiny fraction of the money the people need. Thus, when your bankers here in England place money in circulation, there is always a debt principal to be returned and usury to be paid. The result is that you have always too little credit in circulation to give the workers full employment. You do not have too many workers, you have too little money in circulation, and that which circulates, all bears the endless burden of unpayable debt and usury.”

Banks were limited to lending money into the economy; and since more money was always owed back in principal and interest (or “usury”) than was lent in the original loans, there was never enough money in circulation to pay the interest and still keep workers fully employed. The government, on the other hand, had two ways of getting money into the economy: it could both lend and spend the money into circulation. It could spend enough new money to cover the interest due on the money it lent, keeping the money supply in “proper proportion” and preventing the “impossible contract” problem — the problem of having more money owed back on loans than was created by the loans themselves.

After extolling the benefits of colonial scrip to the citizens of Pennsylvania, Franklin told his listeners, “New York and New Jersey have also increased greatly during the same period, with the use of paper money; so that it does not appear to be of the ruinous nature ascribed to it.” Jason Goodwin observes that it was a tricky argument to make. The colonists had been stressing to the mother country how poor they were — so poor,

they were forced to print paper money for lack of precious metals. Franklin's report demonstrated to Parliament and the British bankers that the pretext for allowing paper money had been removed. The point of having colonies was not, after all, to bolster the colonies' economies. It was to provide raw materials at decent rates to the mother country. In 1764, the Bank of England used its influence on Parliament to get a Currency Act passed that made it illegal for any of the colonies to print their own money. The colonists were forced to pay all future taxes to Britain in silver or gold.

Only a year later, Franklin said, the streets of the colonies were filled with unemployed beggars, just as they were in England. The money supply had suddenly been reduced by half, leaving insufficient funds to pay for the goods and services these workers could have provided. He maintained that it was "the poverty caused by the bad influence of the English bankers on the Parliament which has caused in the colonies hatred of the English and ... the Revolutionary War." This, he said, was the real reason for the Revolution: "The colonies would gladly have borne the little tax on tea and other matters had it not been that England took away from the colonies their money, which created unemployment and dissatisfaction." John Twells, an English historian, confirmed this view of the Revolution, writing:

"In a bad hour, the British Parliament took away from America its representative money, forbade any further issue of bills of credit, these bills ceasing to be legal tender, and ordered that all taxes should be paid in coins. Consider now the consequences: this restriction of the medium of exchange paralyzed all the industrial energies of the people. Ruin took place in these once flourishing Colonies; most rigorous distress visited every family and every business, discontent became desperation, and reached a point, when human nature rises up and asserts its rights."

Alexander Hamilton, the nation's first Treasury Secretary, said that paper money had composed three-fourths of the total money supply before the American Revolution. When the colonists could not issue their own currency, the money supply had suddenly shrunk, leaving widespread unemployment, hunger and poverty in its wake. Unlike in the Great Depression of the 1930s, people in the 1770s were keenly aware of who was responsible for their distress. One day they were trading freely with their own paper money. The next day it was gone, banned by order of a king an ocean away, who demanded tribute in the coin of the British bankers. The outraged populace ignored the ban and went back to issuing their own paper money. In his illuminating monetary history *The Lost Science of Money*, Stephen Zarlenga quotes historian Alexander Del Mar, who wrote in 1895:

"The creation and circulation of bills of credit by revolutionary assemblies ... coming as they did upon the heels of the strenuous efforts made by the Crown to suppress paper money in America were acts of defiance so contemptuous and insulting to the Crown that forgiveness was thereafter impossible ... There was but one course for the Crown to pursue and that was to suppress and punish these acts of rebellion Thus the Bills of Credit of this era, which ignorance and prejudice have attempted to belittle into the mere instruments of a reckless financial policy were really the standards of the Revolution.

They were more than this: they were the Revolution itself!"

The Cornerstone of the Revolution

Like Massachusetts nearly a century earlier, the colonies suddenly found themselves at war and without the means to pay for it. The first act of the new Continental Congress was to issue its own paper scrip, popularly called the Continental. Most of the Continentals were issued as I.O.U.s or debts of the revolutionary government, to be redeemed in coinage later.¹¹ Eventually, 200 million dollars in Continental scrip were issued. By the end of the war, the scrip had been devalued so much that it was essentially worthless; but it still evoked the wonder and admiration of foreign observers, because it allowed the colonists to do something that had never been done before. They succeeded in financing a war against a major power, with virtually no "hard" currency of their own, without taxing the people. Franklin wrote from England during the war, "the whole is a mystery even to the politicians, how we could pay with paper that had no previously fixed fund appropriated specifically to redeem it. This currency as we manage it is a wonderful machine." Thomas Paine called it a "corner stone" of the Revolution:

"Every stone in the Bridge, that has carried us over, seems to have claim upon our esteem. But this was a corner stone, and its usefulness cannot be forgotten."

The Continental's usefulness was forgotten, however, with a little help from the Motherland ...

Economic Warfare: The Bankers Counterattack

The British engaged in a form of economic warfare that would be used again by the bankers in the nineteenth century against Lincoln's Greenbacks and in the twentieth century against a variety of other currencies: they attacked their competitor's currency and drove down its value. In the 1770s, when paper money was easy to duplicate, its value could be diluted by physically flooding the market with counterfeit money. In modern times, as we'll see later, the same effect is achieved by another form of counterfeiting known as the "short sale." During the Revolution, Continentals were shipped in by the boatload and could be purchased in any amount, essentially for the cost of the paper on which they were printed. Thomas Jefferson estimated that counterfeiting added \$200 million to the money supply, effectively doubling it; and later historians thought this figure was quite low. Zarlenga quotes nineteenth century historian J. W. Schuckers, who wrote, "The English Government which seems to have a mania for counterfeiting the paper money of its enemies entered into competition with private criminals."

The Continental was battered but remained viable. Schuckers quoted a confidential letter from an English general to his superiors, stating that "the experiments suggested by your Lordships have been tried, no assistance that could be drawn from the power of gold

or the arts of counterfeiting have been left untried; but still the currency ... has not failed." The beating that did take down the Continental was from speculators – mostly northeastern bankers, stockbrokers and businessmen – who bought up the revolutionary currency at a fraction of its value, after convincing people it would be worthless after the war. The Continental had to compete with other currencies, rendering it vulnerable to speculative attack in the same way that foreign currencies left to "float" in international markets are vulnerable today.

The Continental had to compete with the States' paper notes and the British bankers' gold and silver coins. Gold and silver were regarded as far more valuable than the paper promises of a revolutionary government that might not prevail, and the States' paper notes had the taxation power to back them. The problem might have been avoided by making the Continental the sole official currency, but the Continental Congress did not yet have the power to enforce that sort of order. It had no courts, no police, and no authority to collect taxes to redeem the notes or contract the money supply. The colonies had just rebelled against taxation by the British and were not ready to commit to that burden from the new Congress.¹⁴ Speculators took advantage of these weaknesses by buying up Continentals at a deeper and deeper discount until they became virtually worthless, giving rise to the expression "not worth a Continental."

Small Overview of the War

The Rothschilds heard of this they realized the opportunity to exploit the situation with considerable profit to themselves. The obvious thing to do was to have a law passed prohibiting the Colonial officials from issuing their own money and make it compulsory for them to obtain the money they required through the medium of the Banks. Amschel Mayer Rothschild was still in Germany but he was supplying the British Government with Mercenary Troops at 8 British pounds per man. Such was his influence that in 1764 he succeeded, through the Directors of the Bank of England, in having laws passed in accordance with his dictates.

On April 19th 1775, the first armed clashes between British and Colonials took place at Lexington and Concord. On May 10th the Second Continental Congress met at Philadelphia and George Washington was placed at the head of the Naval and Military Force. He took command at Cambridge. On July 4th, 1776 Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence. For the next seven years the International money-lenders urged and financed the Colonial War. The Rothschilds made plenty of money supplying the British with German Hessian soldiers with which to fight the Colonists. The average Britisher had no quarrel with his American cousins. He secretly sympathized with them. On October 19th, 1781 the British Commander, General Cornwallis, surrendered his whole army, including what was left of the Hessians. On September 3rd, 1783 the Independence of the United States was recognized by the Peace Treaty of Paris. The only real losers were the British people. Their National Debt had been increased tremendously.

The vast majority of the United States' citizens consider the Constitution an honoured, and almost sacred, document. All laws passed since then are SUPPOSED to conform with the provisions of the Constitution. The fact that subsequent legislation dealing with finance and currency, have been in violation of the provisions laid down in Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 5, proves how powerful the bankers have been in the political field. The history of how the international money-lenders obtained economic control of the United States in order to further their long range plans is decidedly interesting. Using the good old reliable Joint Stock Company principle, the Directors of the Bank of England appointed one of their hirelings named Alexander Hamilton, to represent their interests in the United States. In 1780 this man, a supposed patriot, proposed the establishment of a Federal Bank. It was to be owned by private interests as an alternative to those who insisted the issue and control of money should remain in the hands of the government elected by the people. But more about this in a later chapter.

For more than a decade before the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775, tensions had been building between colonists and the British authorities. Attempts by the British government to raise revenue by taxing the colonies (notably the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townshend Tariffs of 1767 and the Tea Act of 1773) met with heated protest among many colonists, who resented their lack of representation in Parliament and demanded the same rights as other British subjects. Colonial resistance led to violence in 1770, when British soldiers opened fire on a mob of colonists, killing five men in what was known as the Boston Massacre. After December 1773, when a band of Bostonians dressed as Mohawk Indians boarded British ships and dumped 342 chests of tea into Boston Harbor, an outraged Parliament passed a series of measures (known as the Intolerable, or Coercive Acts) designed to reassert imperial authority in Massachusetts.

In response, a group of colonial delegates (including George Washington of Virginia, John and Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, Patrick Henry of Virginia and John Jay of New York) met in Philadelphia in September 1774 to give voice to their grievances against the British crown. This First Continental Congress did not go so far as to demand independence from Britain, but it denounced taxation without representation, as well as the maintenance of the British army in the colonies without their consent, and issued a declaration of the rights due every citizen, including life, liberty, property, assembly and trial by jury. The Continental Congress voted to meet again in May 1775 to consider further action, but by that time violence had already broken out. On April 19, local militiamen clashed with British soldiers in Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, marking the first shots fired in the Revolutionary War.

When the Second Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia, delegates—including new additions Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson—voted to form a Continental Army, with Washington as its commander in chief. On June 17, in the Revolution's first major battle, colonial forces inflicted heavy casualties on the British regiment of General William Howe at Breed's Hill in Boston. The engagement (known as the Battle of Bunker Hill) ended in British victory, but lent encouragement to the revolutionary

cause. Throughout that fall and winter, Washington's forces struggled to keep the British contained in Boston, but artillery captured at Fort Ticonderoga in New York helped shift the balance of that struggle in late winter. The British evacuated the city in March 1776, with Howe and his men retreating to Canada to prepare a major invasion of New York.

By June 1776, with the Revolutionary War in full swing, a growing majority of the colonists had come to favor independence from Britain. On July 4, the Continental Congress voted to adopt the Declaration of Independence, drafted by a five-man committee including Franklin and John Adams but written mainly by Jefferson. That same month, determined to crush the rebellion, the British government sent a large fleet, along with more than 34,000 troops to New York. In August, Howe's Redcoats routed the Continental Army on Long Island; Washington was forced to evacuate his troops from New York City by September. Pushed across the Delaware River, Washington fought back with a surprise attack in Trenton, New Jersey, on Christmas night and won another victory at Princeton to revive the rebels' flagging hopes before making winter quarters at Morristown.

British strategy in 1777 involved two main prongs of attack, aimed at separating New England (where the rebellion enjoyed the most popular support) from the other colonies. To that end, General John Burgoyne's army aimed to march south from Canada toward a planned meeting with Howe's forces on the Hudson River. Burgoyne's men dealt a devastating loss to the Americans in July by retaking Fort Ticonderoga, while Howe decided to move his troops southward from New York to confront Washington's army near the Chesapeake Bay. The British defeated the Americans at Brandywine Creek, Pennsylvania, on September 11 and entered Philadelphia on September 25. Washington rebounded to strike Germantown in early October before withdrawing to winter quarters near Valley Forge.

Howe's move had left Burgoyne's army exposed near Saratoga, New York, and the British suffered the consequences of this on September 19, when an American force under General Horatio Gates defeated them at Freeman's Farm (known as the first Battle of Saratoga). After suffering another defeat on October 7 at Bemis Heights (the Second Battle of Saratoga), Burgoyne surrendered his remaining forces on October 17. The American victory Saratoga would prove to be a turning point of the American Revolution, as it prompted France (which had been secretly aiding the rebels since 1776) to enter the war openly on the American side, though it would not formally declare war on Great Britain until June 1778. The American Revolution, which had begun as a civil conflict between Britain and its colonies, had become a world war.

During the long, hard winter at Valley Forge, Washington's troops benefited from the training and discipline of the Prussian military officer Baron Friedrich von Steuben (sent by the French) and the leadership of the French aristocrat Marquis de Lafayette. On June 28, 1778, as British forces under Sir Henry Clinton (who had replaced Howe as supreme commander) attempted to withdraw from Philadelphia to New York, Washington's army attacked them near Monmouth, New Jersey. The battle effectively ended in a draw, as the Americans held their ground, but Clinton was able to get his army and supplies safely

to New York. On July 8, a French fleet commanded by the Comte d'Estaing arrived off the Atlantic coast, ready to do battle with the British. A joint attack on the British at Newport, Rhode Island, in late July failed, and for the most part the war settled into a stalemate phase in the North.

The Americans suffered a number of setbacks from 1779 to 1781, including the defection of General Benedict Arnold to the British and the first serious mutinies within the Continental Army. In the South, the British occupied Georgia by early 1779 and captured Charleston, South Carolina in May 1780. British forces under Lord Charles Cornwallis then began an offensive in the region, crushing Gates' American troops at Camden in mid-August, though the Americans scored a victory over Loyalist forces at King's Mountain in early October. Nathanael Green replaced Gates as the American commander in the South that December. Under Green's command, General Daniel Morgan scored a victory against a British force led by Colonel Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens, South Carolina, on January 17, 1781.

By the fall of 1781, Greene's American forces had managed to force Cornwallis and his men to withdraw to Virginia's Yorktown peninsula, near where the York River empties into Chesapeake Bay. Supported by a French army commanded by General Jean Baptiste de Rochambeau, Washington moved against Yorktown with a total of around 14,000 soldiers, while a fleet of 36 French warships offshore prevented British reinforcement or evacuation. Trapped and overpowered, Cornwallis was forced to surrender his entire army on October 19. Claiming illness, the British general sent his deputy, Charles O'Hara, to surrender; after O'Hara approached Rochambeau to surrender his sword (the Frenchman deferred to Washington), Washington gave the nod to his own deputy, Benjamin Lincoln, who accepted it.

Though the movement for American independence effectively triumphed at Yorktown, contemporary observers did not see that as the decisive victory yet. British forces remained stationed around Charleston, and the powerful main army still resided in New York. Though neither side would take decisive action over the better part of the next two years, the British removal of their troops from Charleston and Savannah in late 1782 finally pointed to the end of the conflict. British and American negotiators in Paris signed preliminary peace terms in Paris late that November, and on September 3, 1783, Great Britain formally recognized the independence of the United States in the Treaty of Paris. At the same time, Britain signed separate peace treaties with France and Spain (which had entered the conflict in 1779), bringing the American Revolution to a close after eight long years.

4.3 French Revolution

France was a colonial rival of Britain. It had suffered heavy defeats to the British in the Seven Years War - especially its American theatre, the French-Indian War - only years earlier. France thus wanted to help colonists get independent. The Americans also needed help so they sent Benjamin Franklin to France to form an alliance with France's King Louis XVI. The Lodge Les Neuf Sœurs was a prominent lodge attached to the Grand Orient de France that was particularly influential in organising French support for the American Revolution and later in the intellectual ferment that preceded the French Revolution. Benjamin Franklin was a member of this Lodge when he was serving as liaison in Paris. Benjamin Franklin was received with great Enthusiasm in France. They saw the revolution as an opportunity to strip Britain of their North American possessions in retaliation for France's loss of Canada a decade before. At first France sent agents to observe the war, sent secret supplies like muskets, pistols, ships, drums, food, money, and much more and began preparations for war against Britain in support of the rebels. When the American army at Saratoga captured the British army in 1777, the France saw their chance to openly declare themselves as allies of the revolutionists.

The two countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treat of Alliance on February 6th, 1778. Now fully committed to the war, France supplied arms, ammunition, supplies and uniforms. French troops and naval power were also sent to America, reinforcing and protecting Washington's Continental Army. American General Washington and French General Lafayette got an army ready to attack British General Cornwallis at Yorktown. French Admiral De Grasse blockaded by the York river to the north stopping a British fleet from retrieving Cornwallis. The Americans and French won the battle capturing Cornwallis and thousands of English soldiers thus ending the hostilities. French won the war in favor of America. French became the first country to recognize the Declaration of Independence, signed in 1776. Benjamin Franklin, American General, George Washington and French General, Lafayette who won the war of independence of America and resultantly put France in huge financial debt of Jewish Bankers were all Freemasons.

France spent 1.3 billion livres to support the Americans directly, in addition to the money it spent fighting Britain on land and sea outside the U.S (wiki) which could be another billion livres. Prior to that French had conducted another costly war The Seven Years War, lasting from 1756 to 1763. That war had cost France 1.8 billion livres. All this money was borrowed as debt from International financiers. By 1780 financial paralysis was firmly established and International Bankers and financiers were in complete control. "They possessed so large a share of the world's gold and silver stocks, that they had most of Europe in their debt, certainly France." So writes Mr McNair Wilson in his Life of Napoleon, and continues on page 38: "A change of a fundamental kind had taken place in the economic structure of Europe whereby the old basis had ceased to be wealth and had become debt. In the old Europe wealth had been measured in lands, crops, herds and minerals; but a new standard had now been introduced, namely, a form of money to

which the title 'credit' had been given."

Basing his arguments on logic and sound reasoning, Mayer Rothschild pointed out that the financial results obtained as the result of the English Revolution would be as nothing when compared to the financial rewards to be obtained by a French Revolution provided those present agreed to unity of purpose and put into effect his carefully thought out and revised revolutionary plan. The project would be backed by all the power that could be purchased with their pooled resources. This agreement reached, Mayer Rothschild unfolded his revolutionary plan. By clever manipulation of their combined wealth it would be possible to create such adverse economic conditions that the masses would be reduced to a state bordering on starvation by unemployment. By use of cleverly conceived propaganda it would be easy to place the blame for the adverse economic conditions on the King, His Court, the Nobles, the Church, Industrialists, and the employers of labour. Their paid propagandists would arouse feelings of hatred and revenge against the ruling classes by exposing all real and alleged cases of extravagance, licentious conduct, injustice, oppression, and persecution. They, would also invent infamies to bring into disrepute others who might, if left alone, interfere with their overall plans.

In 1785 a courier was galloping madly on horseback from Frankfort to Paris carrying detailed information regarding the World Revolutionary Movement in general, and instructions for the planned French Revolution in particular. The instructions originated with the Jewish Illuminati in Germany and were addressed to Grand Master of the Grand Orient Masons in France. The Grand Orient Lodges had been established as the revolutionary underground by the Duc D'Orleans after he, as Grand Master of French Masonry, had been initiated into the Jewish Illuminati in Frankfort by Mirabeau. The courier was struck by lightning while passing through Ratisbon, and killed. The documents he carried fell into the hands of the police who turned them over to the Bavarian Government. A record of historical events told in chronological order connects the House of Rothschild with the Jewish Illuminati in Frankfort and the Illuminati within French Free Masonry known as the Grand Orient Lodges as will be shown.

The moneylenders, certain High Priests, Directors, and Elders decided to organize a very secret society to serve their evil purpose — they named it "The Illuminati". The word Illuminati is derived from the word Lucifer, which means Bearer of the Light, or Being of extraordinary brilliance. The Supreme Council decided they would use the Ingoldstadt Lodge to organize a campaign by which the agents or Cells of the Illuminati would infiltrate into Continental Freemasonry and, under the cloak of social enjoyment and public philanthropy, organize their revolutionary underground. Those who infiltrated into Continental Freemasonry were ordered to establish Lodges of the Grand Orient and use them for proselytism so they could quickly contact non-Jews of wealth, position, and influence connected with both Church and State. Then, by using the age-old methods of bribery, corruption and graft, they could make them become willing, or unwilling, disciples of Illuminism. Once this policy had been decided upon, agents of the Supreme Council contacted the Marquis of Mirabeau as the most likely person in France to serve

their ends. He belonged to the nobility. He had great influence in court circles, he was an intimate friend of the Duc D'Orleans whom they had decided they would use as Front Man to lead the French Revolution. But more important still, the Marquis of Mirabeau was devoid of morals and his licentious excesses had led him heavily into debt.

It was a simple matter for the money-lenders to have their agents contact Mirabeau, the famous French orator. Under the guise of friends and admirers they offered to help him out of his financial difficulties. What they actually did was lead him down the "Primrose Path" into the very depths of vice and debauchery until he was so deeply in their debt that he was forced to do their bidding. At a meeting to consolidate his debts, Mirabeau was introduced to Moses Mendelssohn, one of the big Jewish financiers who took him in hand. Mendelssohn in due time introduced Mirabeau to a woman, famous for her personal beauty and charm but without moral scruples. This stunning Jewess was married to a man named Herz, but, to a man like Mirabeau, the fact that she was married only made her more desirable. It wasn't long before she was spending more time with Mirabeau than she was spending with her husband. Heavily in debt to Mendelssohn, tightly ensnared by Mrs. Herz, Mirabeau was completely helpless ... He had swallowed their bait hook, line, and sinker. But, like good fishermen, they played him gently for a time. If they exerted too great a pressure the leader might break and their fish might get away. Their next move was to have him initiated into Illuminism. He was sworn to secrecy and unlimited obedience under pain of death. The next move was to lead him into compromising situations which mysteriously became public. This method of destroying a man's character became known as the practice of L'Infamie. Because of scandals and organized detraction, Mirabeau was ostracized by many of his social equals. His resentment produced a desire for revenge and thus he embraced the revolutionary Cause.

Mirabeau's task was to induce the Duc D'Orleans to lead the Revolutionary Movement in France. It was implied that once the King had been forced to abdicate he would become the Democratic Ruler of France. The real plotters of the French Revolution were careful not to let either Mirabeau or the Duc D'Orleans know they intended to murder the King and Queen, and thousands of the nobility. They made Mirabeau and the Duc D'Orleans believe that the purpose of the revolution was to free politics and religion from superstition and despotism. Another factor which made the men who were The Secret Power behind the revolutionary movement decide that the Duc D'Orleans should be their Front man was the fact that he was Grand Master of French Freemasonry.

Adam (Spartacus) Weishaupt was given the task of adapting the ritual and rites of Illuminism for use of initiation into the Grand Orient Masonry. He also lived in Frankfurt, Germany. Mirabeau introduced the Duc D'Orleans and his friend Talleyrand to Weishaupt who initiated them into the secrets of Grand Orient Masonry. By the end of 1773 Phillippe, Duc D'Orleans had introduced the Grand Orient Ritual into French Freemasonry. By 1788 there were more than two thousand lodges in France affiliated with Grand Orient Masonry and the number of individual adepts exceeded one hundred thousand.

Thus the Jewish Illuminati under Moses Mendelssohn was introduced into Continental Freemasonry by Weishaupt under the guise of Lodges of the Grand Orient. The Jewish Illuminati next organized secret revolutionary committees within the lodges. Thus the revolutionary underground directors were established throughout France. Once Mirabeau had succeeded in having the Duc D'Orleans amalgamate the Blue or National freemasonry in France with the Grand Orient rites, he led his friend down the same "Primrose Path" which had led to his own social ostracism. In exactly four years, the Duc D'Orleans was so heavily in debt that he was PERSUADED to engage in every form of illegal traffic and trade to recuperate his losses. But in some mysterious manner his ventures always seemed to go wrong and he lost more and more money.

By 1780 he owed 800,000 livres. Once again the money-lenders came forward and offered him advice in regard to his business transactions and financial aid. They very nicely manoeuvred him into the position of signing over to them as security for their loans, his palace, his estates, his house, and the Palais Royal. The Duc D'Orleans signed an agreement under which his Jewish financiers were authorized to manage his properties and estates so as to ensure him sufficient income to meet his financial obligations and leave him a steady and adequate income. The Duc D'Orleans had never been too bright in regard to financial matters. To him the agreement he signed with his Jewish Bankers appeared to be a sound financial deal. They had offered to manage his business affairs and turn them from a dismal failure into a great financial success. What more could he want? It is doubtful if the Duc D'Orleans even suspected that there was a nigger hidden deep in the wood-pile. It is doubtful if he even suspected he had sold himself body and soul to the Agents of the Devil... But he had done so. He was completely in their hands. The Secret Powers directing the French Revolution appointed Choderlos de Laclos to manage the Palais Royal and the Duc D'Orleans' estates. De Laclos is thought to have been a Jew of Spanish origin. When he was appointed manager of the Palais Royal he was acclaimed as the author of *Les Liaisons Dangereuses* and other pornographic works. He publicly defended his extreme immorality on the grounds that he studied the politics of love in all its varied aspects because of his love of politics.

It matters little who Choderlos de Laclos was, it is what he did that is of importance. He turned the Palais Royal into the greatest and most notorious house of ill-fame the world has ever known. In the Palais Royal he established every kind of lewd entertainment, licentious conduct, shameless shows, obscene picture galleries, pornographic libraries, and staged public exhibitions of the most bestial forms of sexual depravity. Special opportunities were provided for men and women who wished to indulge in every form of debauchery. The Palais Royal became the centre in which details of the campaign for the systematic destruction of the French religious faith and public morals were conceived and carried out. This was done on the Cabalistic theory that the best revolutionary is a youth devoid of morals. Associated with de Laclos was a Jew from Palermo named Cagliostro, alias Joseph Balsamo. He turned one of the Duc's properties into a printing house from which he issued revolutionary pamphlets. Balsamo organized a staff of revo-

lutionary propagandists. In addition to literature they organized concerts, and plays, and debates calculated to appeal to the very lowest instincts of human nature and further the revolutionary cause. Balsamo also organized the Spy-rings which enabled the men who were The Secret Power behind the revolutionary movement to put into operation their plan of L'Infamie to be used for systematic character assassination. Men and women, who were enticed into the Web spun by de Laclos and Balsamo, could be blackmailed into doing their bidding. Thus it was the Duc D'Orleans' estates were turned into the Centre of Revolutionary Politics while, under the guise of Lecture Halls, Theatres, Art Galleries, and Athletic Clubs, the gambling rooms, brothels, and wine and drug shops did a roaring trade.

In this revolutionary underworld potential leaders were first ensnared. Their consciences were at first deadened by evil associations and then killed by indulgence in evil practices. The estates of the Duc D'Orleans were turned into factories in which the Secret Power behind the World Revolutionary Movement manufactured the Pieces they intended to use in their game of International Chess. Scudder, who wrote "Prince of the Blood" says of the Palais Royal : "It gave the police more to do than all other parts of the city". But as far as the public was concerned, this infamous place was owned by the Duc D'Orleans, the cousin of the king. Only a mere handful of men and women knew that the moneylenders controlled it and used it to create a revolutionary organization which was to be the instrument of their revenge and their manual of action to further their secret aims and ambitions.

After the secret documents of the Illuminati found on the body of the Courier had been read by the police, the documents were passed on to the Bavarian Government. The Bavarian Government ordered the police to raid the headquarters of the Illuminati. Further evidence was obtained which exposed the wide-spread ramifications of the World Revolutionary Movement. The Governments of France, England, Poland, Germany, Austria and Russia were informed of the International Nature of the revolutionary plot, but as has happened repeatedly since, the governments concerned took no serious action to stop the diabolical conspiracy. Why ? The only answer to this question is this : The power of the men behind the world revolutionary movement is greater than the power of any elected government. This fact will be proved time and time again as the story unfolds. A few illustrations will be given to show how individuals and governments have remained just as stupid and naive in regard to warnings given them concerning the evil mechanism of the real leaders of the World Revolutionary Movement. After various governments failed to act on the information made known by the Bavarian police in 1785, the sister of Marie Antoinette wrote her personal letters warning her of the revolutionary plot; the connection of the International Bankers; the part Freemasonry was destined to play, and her own danger. Marie Antoinette (1755 - 1793) was the daughter of the Emperor Francis I of Austria. She married Louis XVI of France. She just couldn't bring herself to believe the terrible things her own sister told her were being plotted by the Illuminati.

To the repeated warnings sent by her sister, Marie Antoinette wrote long letters in reply. In regard to her sister's claim that evidence had been obtained that the Illuminati operating under the guise of Philanthropic Freemasonry planned to destroy both the Church and State in France, Marie Antoinette replied : "I believe that as far as France is concerned, you worry too much about Freemasonry. Here it is far from having the significance it may have elsewhere in Europe." How wrong she proved to be is a matter of history. Because she refused consistently to heed her sister's repeated warnings she and her husband died under the guillotine. The majority of students of history believe Marie Antoinette was a woman who entered fully into the spirit and gaiety of the French Court. It is generally accepted as a fact that she engaged in many affairs d'amour with her husband's close friends, and indulged in reckless extravagances. That is the picture Balsamo and his propagandists painted of her. The fact that they made their L'Infamie stick enabled them to have the mob demand her life. But their version of the conduct of Marie Antoinette is a pack of lies, as historians have proved. In order to defame Marie Antoinette, Weishaupt and Mendelssohn thought up the idea of the Diamond Necklace. At the time, the financial resources of France were at their lowest ebb and the government of France was begging the International Money-Barons to grant them further credit. A secret agent of the arch-conspirators ordered a fabulous diamond necklace to be made by the Court Jewellers. The order for this necklace, the estimated value of which was a quarter of a million livres, was placed in the name of the Queen. When the Court Jewellers brought the Diamond Necklace to the Queen for her acceptance she refused to have anything to do with it.

She disclaimed all knowledge of the transaction. But the news of the fabulous necklace leaked out as the plotters intended it should. Balsamo put his propaganda machine into operation. Marie Antoinette was deluged with criticism; her character was smeared; her reputation dragged in the mire by a whispering campaign of character assassination. And, as usual, nobody could ever put a finger on the person or persons who started the slanders. After this build-up, Balsamo uncorked his own special master-piece. His printing presses turned out thousands upon thousands of pamphlets which claimed a secret lover of the Queen's had sent the necklace as a mark of appreciation for her favours. But those who operated L'Infamie thought up even more diabolical slanders to circulate regarding the Queen. They wrote a letter to Cardinal Prince de Rohan to which they forged the signature of the Queen. In the letter he was asked to meet her at the Palais Royal about midnight to discuss the matter of the diamond necklace. A prostitute from the Palais Royal was engaged to disguise herself as the Queen, and involve the Cardinal. The incident was played up in newspapers and pamphlets and the foulest innuendoes were circulated involving two of the highest personages of both Church and State. Knowledge of the methods these men used to manoeuvre the French Government into financial difficulty is of importance, because it set the pattern they followed in America, Russia, Spain and other countries afterwards.

Sir Walter Scott in Vol. two of *The Life of Napoleon*, gives a clear story of the initial

moves. He then sums up the situation with these words — “These financiers used the Government (French) as bankrupt prodigals are treated by usurious money-lenders who, feeding the extravagance with one hand, with the other wring out of their ruined fortunes the most unreasonable recompenses for their advances. By a long succession of these ruinous loans, and various rights granted to guarantee them, the whole finances of France were brought to a total confusion”. After the Government of France was forced into the position of seeking huge loans because of debts incurred in fighting wars to further the secret ambitions of the International Conspirators, they very kindly offered to supply the money providing they could write the terms of the agreement. On the surface their terms were most lenient. But again they had placed a nigger in the wood-pile in the person of one M. Necker. He was to be appointed to the French King’s Council as his Chief Minister of Financial Affairs. The Jewish financiers pointed out that this financial wizard would pull France out of her monetary troubles in less than no time at all. What he actually did during the next four years was to involve the French Government so badly with the Jewish financiers that the National Debt increased to £170,000,000.

Captain A.H.M. Ramsay sums up the situation aptly in *The Nameless War*. He says: “Revolution is a blow struck at a paralytic. ... When the debt-grip has been firmly established, control of every form of publicity and political activity soon follows, together with a full grip on industrialists, [both management and labour]. The stage is then set for the revolutionary blow. The grip of the right hand of finance establishes the paralysis; while the revolutionary left hand that holds the dagger and deals the fatal blow. Moral corruption facilitates the whole process.” While Balsamo’s propaganda sheets damned the higher officials of both Church and State, special agents of the Illuminati organized the men who were to be used as leaders in the Reign of Terror planned to accompany the revolutionary effort. Among these leaders were Robespierre, Danton, and Marat. To conceal their real purpose, the men who were to release the prisoners and lunatics to create the necessary atmosphere for instituting the preconceived Reign of Terror, met in the Jacobean Convent. Within the walls of the sacred edifice the details of the bloody plan were worked out. The lists of reactionaries marked down for liquidation were compiled. It was explained that while the criminals and lunatics ran wild terrorizing the population by committing mass murders and publicly performing rapes, the organized underground workers, under direction of Manuel, Procurer of the Commune, would round up all the important political figures, heads of the clergy, and military officers known to be loyal to the King.

The men who were to emerge from the Jewish organized underground were formed into Jacobin Clubs. Under leaders, who were well versed in the duties required of them to direct the “Reign of Terror”, they conducted the mass atrocities so they would serve the purpose of their hidden masters, and move them further towards their ultimate goal. Empty stomachs do not sustain a revolution. Leaders need to be enriched to be continually involved. Sustained false propaganda needs money. Among the Jewish bankers who helped finance the French Revolution are Daniel Itzig (1722-1799), David

Friedlander (1750-1834), Herz Cerfbeer (1730-1793), Benjamin Goldsmid (1755- 1808), Abraham Goldsmid (1756-1810), and Moses Mocatta (1768- 1857), partner the Goldsmid brothers, and uncle of Sir Moses Montefiore. Marquis de Mirabeau is known to have been financed by Moses Mendelssohn, head of the Jewish Illuminati. He was not only an early figure-head in French Freemasonry in the respectable years, but introduced Illuminism into France. Moses Mendelssohn is the 'learned Jew' who is quoted as saying that: "Judaism is not a religion. It is a law religionized". International Jewish Bankers and Freemasons created artificial financial crisis. They are also accused of buying and hoarding all the grain, preventing grain laden ships from anchoring at crucial times thereby creating artificial scarcity and raising price. This became catalyst for French revolution. The Bastille storming was planned at and led from "Palais Royal" headquarters of French Masonry.

4.4 Organizing Behind the Scenes

On October 13, 1843, in Sinsheimer's Café in New York City, twelve German Jewish freemasons, representing the twelve tribes of Israel, founded B'nai B'rith International, an order exclusively for Jews and half-Jews. They were Henry Jones, Isaac Rosenbourg, William Renau, Reuben Rodacher, Henry Kling, Isaac Dittenhoefer, Jonas Hecht, and a few other German-Jewish immigrants. In Benjamin Disraeli's 1852 novel, *Coningsby*, the character Sidonia mentions the dozens of Jews involved in the intellectual movement, those acting as financiers behind the European thrones and in multiple commercial and investment interests. He speaks of those involved in the recent revolutions and in an imminent revolution in Germany. He refers to the Jews who monopolize the professorial positions in Germany and even the foundations of Spiritual Christianity. Sidonia says that when he reads of peace and war in the newspapers, and that sovereigns want treasure, it is the Jews that always provide the loans. He elaborates on the Jewish diplomats and their connections between belligerent countries that always favor Jewish interests. He lists numerous countries, Russia, Spain, Prussia or Holland, which, in every case, a Jew or a *Nuevo Christiano* is usually the influential decision-maker. After this account, he says, "So you see, my dear Coningsby, that the world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes." People often fail to cite the circumstances of that last sentence, but leave it to the reader's imagination to determine the identity of those people "behind the scenes."

In 1862, the Alliance Israélite Universelle created a network of schools in order to disseminate a multicultural, humanistic education to over a million children. The organization, in its schools, promotes the significance of maintaining a special bond among Jews. The schools teach students how to create a liberal atmosphere, encourage community consensus, and how to engage in Jewish activism in their own communities. Initially, the Masonic Alliance Israélite Universelle functioned as a powerful organization for the extension of Jewish power over gentile nations, by whatever means possible, and it used

the B'nai B'rith as its executive organ. They largely developed an institutional network in the bigger urban communities. By the twentieth century, every major urban community in Germany would have Jewish hospitals, orphanages, old-age homes, and other institutions dealing with social problems. The main organizations were the B'nai B'rith lodges and the Jüdische Frauenbund.

In 1871, the elites utilized the Anglo-Jewish association to mastermind Jewish interests in Britain to work with the Alliance Israélite Universelle. The Sassoons, Rothschilds, Montefiores, and Goldsmids have always been the most prominent members. The Anglo-Jewish association later initiated daily communication with the central committee of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, an organization that often intercedes for Jewish criminals so they may escape justice. In 1878, leaders at the Congress of Berlin officially recognized the organization, whose goal was to enhance Jewish political power. The first objective was to infiltrate the governments of Rumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria to force the emancipation of the Jews in those countries. Rumania reneged on their obligation.

On June 4, 1878, just prior to the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli, the British Prime Minister (1874-1880), established a secret alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. This agreement permitted Britain to occupy the strategic island of Cyprus and enabled Disraeli to make demands and threaten warfare against Russia if that nation failed to accommodate Turkish demands. British and Austrian officials managed to find common ground—Britain agreed to support Austrian demands, while Austria would support British demands, particularly relative to any proposals about Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of these events set the stage for more warfare within the next three to four decades.

Jean Izoulet (1854-1929), a prominent freemason in the Grand Orient and member of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, wrote, "The meaning of the history of the last century has been that three hundred Jewish financiers, all masters of the chair, will rule the world." Crémieux, grand master of the Alliance, collaborating with the Grand Orient in England, created a union to plan for the Masonic world revolution. Crémieux proclaimed the goals of the freemasons: "Nations must disappear. Religions must cease to exist. Israel alone will continue to exist, since its people have been chosen by God."

Samuel Morse, an American counterintelligence officer, admitted that an extensive British espionage network functioned in America before the Civil War, with B'nai B'rith as its center. It incorporated the leading figures in the Democrat Party, Southern secessionists, abolitionists, and others, all attempting to destroy America. Palmerston, then foreign minister, with B'nai B'rith's help created the International Zionist Movement by 1860. He allegedly helped create Zionism, only one of numerous Masonic-based cults, some Jewish and some Christian, which agents disseminated throughout Europe and America. Freemasons created B'nai B'rith as an extension of the Jewish Rite of freemasonry in America. Barbara W. Tuchman wrote *Bible and Sword: England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour*, published in 1956, which portrays Britain's centuries-old involvement with the people known as the Israelites. Whether she depicts history accurately or not, she certainly promoted the "prophesied" acquisition of Palestine, previously

under Ottoman control, by just one of the Israelite tribes, the “returning” Jews. Her grandfather, Henry Morgenthau Sr., a member of the infamous Pilgrims Society, was in the unique position as ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1913-1916) and certainly influenced its domestic and foreign policies. Individuals typically underestimate or fail to understand the impact that ambassadors, persuasive highranking diplomats, have in their host countries.

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5. United States of America

5.1 The First Bank

President John Adams is quoted as saying, “There are two ways to conquer and enslave a nation. One is by the sword. The other is by debt.” Sheldon Emry, expanding on this concept two centuries later, observed that conquest by the sword has the disadvantage that the conquered are likely to rebel. Continual force is required to keep them at bay. Conquest by debt can occur so silently and insidiously that the conquered don’t even realize they have new masters. On the surface, nothing has changed. The country is merely under new management. “Tribute” is collected in the form of debts and taxes, which the people believe they are paying for their own good. “Their captors,” wrote Emry, “become their ‘benefactors’ and ‘protectors.’ . . . Without realizing it, they are conquered, and the instruments of their own society are used to transfer their wealth to their captors and make the conquest complete.”

Colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all had the same purpose – to enhance the economy of the mother country. That was how the mother country saw it, but the American colonists had long opposed any plan that would systematically drain their money supply off to England. The British had considered the idea of a land bank as far back as 1754, as a way to provide a circulating medium of exchange for the colonies; but the idea was rejected by the colonists when they learned that the interest the bank generated would be subject to appropriation by the King.² It was only after the American Revolution that British bankers and their Wall Street vassals succeeded in pulling this feat off by stealth, by acquiring a controlling interest in the stock of the new United States Bank. The first step in that silent conquest was to discredit the paper scrip issued by the revolutionary government and the States. By the end of the Revolution, that step had been achieved. Rampant counterfeiting and speculation had so thoroughly collapsed the value of the Continental that the new country’s leaders were completely disillusioned with what they called “unfunded paper.”

The Founding Fathers were so disillusioned with paper money that they simply omitted it from the Constitution. Congress was given the power only to “coin money, regulate the value thereof,” and “to borrow money on the credit of the United States” An enormous loophole was thus left in the law. Creating and issuing money had long been considered the prerogative of governments, but the Constitution failed to define exactly what “money” was. Was “to coin money” an eighteenth-century way of saying “to create money”? Did this include creating paper money? If not, who did have the power to create paper money? Congress was authorized to “borrow” money, but did that include borrowing paper money or just gold? The presumption was that the paper notes

borrowed from the bankers were “secured” by a sum of silver or gold; but in the illusory world of finance, then as now, things were not always as they seemed

While the Founding Fathers were pledging their faith in gold and silver as the only “sound” money, those metals were quickly proving inadequate to fund the new country’s expanding economy. The national war debt had reached \$42 million, with no silver or gold coins available to pay it off. The debt might have been avoided if the government had funded the war with Continental scrip that was stamped “legal tender,” making it “money” in itself; but the revolutionary government and the States had issued much of their paper money as promissory notes payable after the war. The notes represented debt, and the debt had now come due. The bearers expected to get their gold, and the gold was not to be had. There was also an insufficient supply of money for conducting trade. Tightening the money supply by limiting it to coins had quickly precipitated another depression. In 1786, a farmers’ rebellion broke out in Massachusetts, led by Daniel Shays. Farmers brandishing pitchforks complained of going heavily into debt when paper money was plentiful. When it was no longer available and debts had to be repaid in the much scarcer “hard” coin of the British bankers, some farmers lost their farms. The rebellion was defused, but visions of anarchy solidified the sense of an urgent need for both a strong central government and an expandable money supply. The solution of Treasury Secretary Hamilton was to “monetize” the national debt,ⁱ by turning it into a source of money for the country.

He proposed that a national bank be authorized to print up banknotes and swap them for the government’s bonds.⁵ The government would pay regular interest on the debt, using import duties and money from the sale of public land. Opponents said that acknowledging the government’s debt at face value would unfairly reward the speculators who had bought up the country’s I.O.U.s for a pittance from the soldiers, farmers and small businessmen who had actually earned them; but Hamilton argued that the speculators had earned this windfall for their “faith in the country.” He thought the government needed to enlist the support of the speculators, or they would do to the new country’s money what they had done to the Continental. Hamilton thought that the way to keep wealthy speculators from destroying the new national bank was to give them a financial stake in it. His proposal would do this and dispose of the government’s crippling debts at the same time, by allowing creditors to trade their government bonds or I.O.U.s for stock in the new bank. Jefferson, Hamilton’s chief political opponent, feared that giving private wealthy citizens an ownership interest in the bank would link their interests too closely with it. The government would be turned into an oligarchy, a government by the rich at war with the working classes. A bank owned by private stockholders, whose driving motive was profit, would be less likely to be responsive to the needs of the public than one that was owned by the public and subject to public oversight. Stockholders of a private bank would make their financial decisions behind closed doors, without public knowledge or control. But Hamilton’s plan had other strategic advantages, and it won the day. Besides neatly disposing of a crippling federal debt and winning over the “men of wealth,” it secured the

loyalty of the individual States by making their debts too exchangeable for stock in the new Bank. The move was controversial; but by stabilizing the States' shaky finances, Hamilton got the States on board, thwarting the plans of the pro-British faction that hoped to split them up and establish a Northern Confederacy.

Hamilton argued that to promote the General Welfare, the country needed a monetary system that was independent of foreign masters; and for that, it needed its own federal central bank. The bank would handle the government's enormous war debt and create a standard form of currency. Jefferson remained suspicious of Hamilton and his schemes, but Jefferson also felt strongly that the new country's capital city should be in the South, in his home state of Virginia. Hamilton (who did not care where the capital was) agreed on the location of the national capital in exchange for Jefferson's agreement on the bank. When Hamilton called for a tax on whiskey to pay the interest on the government's securities, however, he went too far. Jefferson's supporters were furious. In the type of political compromise still popular today, President Washington proposed moving the capital even closer to Mt. Vernon. In 1789, Congress passed Hamilton's bill; but the President still had to sign it. Washington was concerned about the continued opposition of Jefferson and the Virginians, who thought the bill was unconstitutional. The public would have to use the bank, but the bank would not have to serve the public. Hamilton assured the President that to protect the public, the bank would be required to retain a percentage of gold in "reserve" so that it could redeem its paper notes in gold or silver on demand. Hamilton was eloquent; and in 1791, Washington signed the bill into law.

The new banking scheme was hailed as a brilliant solution to the nation's economic straits, one that disposed of an oppressive national debt, stabilized the economy, funded the government's budget, and created confidence in the new paper dollars. If the new Congress had simply printed its own paper money, speculators would have challenged the currency's worth and driven down its value, just as they had during the Revolution. To maintain public confidence in the national currency and establish its stability, the new Republic needed the illusion that its dollars were backed by the bankers' gold, and Hamilton's bank successfully met that challenge. It got the country up and running, but it left the bank largely in private hands, where it could still be manipulated for private greed. Worse, the government ended up in debt for money it could have generated itself, indeed should have generated itself under the Constitution.

The charter for the new bank fixed its total initial capitalization at ten million dollars. Eight million were to come from private stockholders and two million from the government. But the government did not actually have two million dollars, so the bank (now a chartered lending institution) lent the government the money at interest. The bank, of course, did not have the money either. The whole thing was sleight of hand. The rest of the bank's shares were sold to the public, who bought some in hard cash and some in government securities (the I.O.U.s that had been issued by the revolutionary government and the States). The government had to pay six percent interest annually

on all the securities now held by the bank – those exchanged for the “loan” of the government’s own money, plus the bonds accepted by the bank from the public. The bank’s shareholders were supposed to pay one-fourth the cost of their shares in gold; but only the first installment was actually paid in hard money, totaling \$675,000. The rest was paid in paper banknotes. Some came from the Bank of Boston and the Bank of New York; but most of this paper money was issued by the new U.S. Bank itself and lent back to its new shareholders, through the magic of “fractional reserve” lending. Within five years, the government had borrowed \$8.2 million from the bank. The additional money was obviously created out of thin air, just as it would have been if the government had printed the money itself; but the government now owed principal and interest back to the bank. To reduce its debt to the bank, the government was eventually forced to sell its shares, largely to British financiers. Zarlenga reports that Hamilton, to his credit, Hamilton opposed these sales. But the sales went through, and the first Bank of the United States wound up largely under foreign ownership and control.

The first Bank of the United States was modeled on the Bank of England, the same private bank against which the colonists had just rebelled. Years later, Jefferson would say that Hamilton had tricked him into approving the bank’s charter. Jefferson had always suspected Hamilton of monarchical sympathies, and his schemes all seemed tainted with corruption. Jefferson would go so far as to tell Washington he thought Hamilton was a dangerous traitor. He complained to Madison about Hamilton’s bookkeeping:

“I do not at all wonder at the condition in which the finances of the United States are found. Hamilton’s object from the beginning was to throw them into forms which should be utterly indecipherable.”

Hamilton, for his part, thought little better of Jefferson. The feud between the two Founding Fathers resulted in the two-party system. Hamilton’s party, the Federalists, favored a strong central government funded by a centralized federal banking system. Jefferson’s party, the Democratic Republicans or simply Republicans, favored State and individual rights. Jefferson’s party was responsible for passing the Bill of Rights. Hamilton had worked with Aaron Burr in New York City to establish the Manhattan Company, which would eventually become the Chase Manhattan Bank. But Hamilton broke with Burr and the Boston Federalists when he learned that they were plotting to split the northern States from the Union. Hamilton’s first loyalty was to the Republic. Burr and his faction were working closely with British allies, who would later try to break up the Union by backing the Confederacy in the Civil War. Hamilton swung his support to Jefferson against Burr in the presidential election of 1800, and other patriotic Federalists did the same. The Federalist Party ceased to be a major national party after the War of 1812, when the Boston Federalists sided with England, which lost.

In 1801, Jefferson became President with Hamilton’s support, while Burr became Vice President. In 1804, when Burr sought the governorship of New York, he was again defeated largely through Hamilton’s opposition. In the course of the campaign, Hamilton accused Burr in a newspaper article of being “a dangerous man” who “ought not to be

trusted with the reins of government.“ When Hamilton refused to apologize, Burr challenged him to a duel; and at the age of 49, Hamilton was dead. He remains a controversial figure, but Hamilton earned his place in history. He succeeded in stabilizing the shaky new economy and getting the country on its feet, and his notions of “monetizing“ debt and “federalizing“ the banking system were major innovations. He restored the country’s credit, gave it a national currency, made it economically independent, and incorporated strong federal provisions into the Constitution that would protect and nurture the young country according to a uniquely American system founded on “promoting the General Welfare.“

Those were his positive contributions, but Hamilton also left a darker legacy. Lurking behind the curtain in his new national bank, a privileged class of financial middlemen were now legally entitled to siphon off a perpetual tribute in the form of interest; and because they controlled the money spigots, they could fund their own affiliated businesses with easy credit, squeezing out competitors and perpetuating the same class divisions that the “American system“ was supposed to have circumvented. The money power had been delivered into private hands; and they were largely foreign hands, the same interests that had sought to keep America in a colonial state, subservient to an elite class of oligarchical financiers. Who were these foreign financiers, and how had they acquired so much leverage? The Yellow Brick Road takes us farther back in history, back to when the concept of “usury“ was first devised

5.2 The Second Bank

The foreign moneylenders who had conquered Britain set the same debt traps in America, and they did it by the same means: they provoked a series of wars. British financiers funded the opposition to the American War for Independence, the War of 1812, and both sides of the American Civil War. In each case, war led to inflation, heavy government debt, and the chartering of a private “Bank of the United States“ to fund the debt, delivering the power to create money to private interests. In each case, opposition to the bank was opposed by a few alert leaders. Opposition to the First U.S. Bank was led by Thomas Jefferson, the country’s third President; while opposition to the Second U.S. Bank was led by Andrew Jackson, the country’s seventh President. The two leaders did not have much else in common – Jefferson was of the landed gentry, while Jackson was called the “roughshod President“ – but they shared a deep suspicion of any private arrangement for issuing the national currency. Both were particularly concerned that the nation’s banking system had fallen into foreign hands. Jefferson is quoted as saying:

“If the American people ever allow the banks to control the issuance of their currency, first by inflation and then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of all property, until their children will wake up homeless on the continent their fathers occupied.“

A similar wakeup call is attributed to Jackson, who told Congress in 1829:

“If the American people only understood the rank injustice of our money and banking system, there would be a revolution before morning.”

Jefferson was instrumental in Congress’s refusal to renew the charter of the first U.S. Bank in 1811. When the Bank was liquidated, Jefferson’s suspicions were confirmed: 18,000 of the Bank’s 25,000 shares were owned by foreigners, mostly English and Dutch. The foreign domination the Revolution had been fought to eliminate had crept back in through the country’s private banking system. Congressman Desha of Kentucky, speaking in the House of Representatives, declared that “this accumulation of foreign capital was one of the engines for overturning civil liberty,” and that he had “no doubt King George III was a principal stockholder.” When Congress later renewed the Bank’s charter, Andrew Jackson vetoed it. He too expressed concern that a major portion of the Bank’s shareholders were foreigners. He said in his veto bill:

“Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that in its nature has so little to bind it to our country? ... Of the course which would be pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the subjects of a foreign power, ... there can be no doubt... Controlling our currency, receiving our public monies, and holding thousands of our citizens in dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous than a naval and military power of the enemy.”

Jefferson was out of town when the Constitution was drafted, serving as America’s minister to France during the dramatic period leading up to the French Revolution. But even if he had been there, he would probably have gone along with the majority and voted to omit paper money from the Constitution. After watching the national debt mushroom, he wrote to John Taylor in 1798, “I wish it were possible to obtain a single amendment to our constitution . . . taking from the federal government the power to borrow money. I now deny their power of making paper money or anything else a legal tender.”⁵ It would be several decades before Jefferson realized that the villain was not paper money itself. It was private debt masquerading as paper money, a private debt owed to bankers who were merely “pretending to have money.” Jefferson wrote to Treasury Secretary Gallatin in 1815:

The treasury, lacking confidence in the country, delivered itself bound hand and foot to bold and bankrupt adventurers and bankers pretending to have money, whom it could have crushed at any moment. Jefferson wrote to John Eppes in 1813, “Although we have so foolishly allowed the field of circulating medium to be filched from us by private individuals, I think we may recover it The states should be asked to transfer the right of issuing paper money to Congress, in perpetuity.” He told Eppes, “the nation may continue to issue its bills [paper notes] as far as its needs require and the limits of circulation allow. Those limits are understood at present to be 200 millions of dollars.”⁶ Writing to Gallatin in 1803, Jefferson said of the private national bank, “This institution is one of the most deadly hostility against the principles of our Constitution

[S]uppose a series of emergencies should occur [A]n institution like this in a critical moment might overthrow the government." He asked, "Could we start toward independently using our own money to form our own bank?" The Constitution gave Congress the power only to "coin money," but Jefferson argued that Constitutions could be amended. He wrote to Samuel Kercheval in 1816:

Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment [L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. . . . [A]s that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, institutions must advance also, to keep pace with the times. . . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain forever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.

During the congressional debates over a Second U.S. Bank, Senator John Calhoun proposed a plan for a truly "national" bank along the lines suggested by Jefferson. A wholly government-owned national bank could issue the nation's own credit directly, without having to borrow from a private bank that issued it. This plan was later endorsed by Senator Henry Clay, but it would be several more decades before the Civil War would provide the pretext for Abraham Lincoln to authorize Congress to issue its own money. The Second U.S. Bank chartered in 1816 was 80 percent privately owned.

Who were these "subjects of a foreign power" who owned the bank? In *The History of the Great American Fortunes*, published in 1936, Gustavus Myers pointed to the formidable British banking dynasty the House of Rothschild. Myers wrote: "Under the surface, the Rothschilds long had a powerful influence in dictating American financial laws. The law records show that they were the power in the old Bank of the United States."

The Rothschilds and their friends sent in their financial termites to destroy America because it was becoming "prosperous beyond precedent." The first documentable evidence of Rothschild involvement in the financial affairs of the United States came in the late 1820s and early 1830s when the family, through their agent Nicholas Biddle, fought to defeat Andrew Jackson's move to curtail the international bankers. The Rothschilds lost the first round when in 1832, President Jackson vetoed the move to renew the charter of the 'Bank of the United States' (a central bank controlled by the international bankers). In 1836 the bank went out of business.

Like the German Hanoverian kings, the Rothschild banking empire was British only in the sense that it had been in England for a long time. Its roots were actually in Germany. The House of Rothschild was founded in Frankfurt in the mid-eighteenth century, when a moneylender named Mayer Amschel Bauer changed his name to Amschel Rothschild and fathered ten children. His five sons were sent to the major capitals of Europe to open branches of the family banking business. Nathan, the most astute of these sons, went to London, where he opened the family branch called N. M. Rothschild & Sons. Nathan's

brothers managed N. M. Rothschild's branches in Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Naples. The family fortunes got a major boost in 1815, when Nathan pulled off the mother of all insider trades. He led British investors to believe that the Duke of Wellington had lost to Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. In a matter of hours, British government bond prices plummeted. Nathan, who had advance information, then swiftly bought up the entire market in government bonds, acquiring a dominant holding in England's debt for pennies on the pound. Over the course of the nineteenth century, N. M. Rothschild would become the biggest bank in the world, and the five brothers would come to control most of the foreign-loan business of Europe. "Let me issue and control a nation's money," Nathan Rothschild boasted in 1838, "and I care not who writes its laws."

In 1811, when the U.S. Congress declined to renew the charter of the first U.S. Bank, Nathan Rothschild already possessed substantial political clout in England and was lending money to the U.S. government and certain States. "Either the application for renewal of the Charter is granted," he is reported to have threatened, "or the United States will find itself in a most disastrous war." When the charter was not granted, the United States did find itself in another war with England, the War of 1812. War again led to inflation and heavy government debt. This and an inability to collect taxes were the reasons given for chartering the Second Bank of the United States as a private national bank. The twenty-year charter was signed by President James Madison in 1816. It authorized the Bank and its branches to issue the nation's money in the form of bank notes, again shifting the power to create the national money supply into private hands.

Andrew Jackson was a hero of the War of 1812 and a leader with enormous popular appeal. He was the first of the "unlettered Scarecrows" to reach the White House, to be followed by the even mightier Abraham Lincoln (who actually looked like a Scarecrow). Jackson received an honorary degree from Harvard College in 1833. After the Federalists ceased to be a major national party, the Democratic-Republicans dominated the political scene alone for a time. In 1824, four candidates ran for President as Democratic-Republicans from different States: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William Crawford, and Henry Clay. Jackson easily won the popular vote, but he did not have enough electoral votes to win the Presidency, so the matter went to the House of Representatives, where Clay threw his support to Adams, who won. But popular sentiment remained with Jackson, who won by a wide margin against Adams in the election of 1828.

Jackson believed in a strong Presidency and a strong union. He stood up to the bankers on the matter of the bank, which he viewed as operating mainly for the upper classes at the expense of working people. He warned in 1829:

"The bold efforts the present bank has made to control the government are but premonitions of the fate that awaits the American people should they be deluded into a perpetuation of this institution or the establishment of another like it."

Whether Congress itself had the right to issue paper money, Jackson said, was not

clear; but “If Congress has the right under the Constitution to issue paper money, it was given them to be used by themselves, not to be delegated to individuals or to corporations.” His grim premonitions about the Bank appeared to be confirmed, when mismanagement under its first president led to financial disaster, depression, bankruptcies, and unemployment. But the Bank began to flourish under its second president, Nicholas Biddle, who petitioned Congress for a renewal of its charter in 1832. Jackson, who was then up for re-election, expressed his views to this bid in no uncertain terms. “You are a den of vipers and thieves,” he railed at a delegation of bankers discussing the Bank Renewal Bill. “I intend to rout you out, and by the eternal God, I will rout you out.” He called the bank “a hydra-headed monster eating the flesh of the common man.” He swore to do battle with the monster and to slay it or be slain by it.

Jackson succeeded in vetoing the bill for renewal of the bank charter, but he knew that his battle with the Bank was just beginning. “The hydra of corruption is only scotched, not dead,” he exclaimed. Boldly taking the hydra by the horns, he ordered his new Treasury Secretary to start transferring the government’s deposits from the Second U.S. Bank into state banks. When the Secretary refused, Jackson fired him and appointed another. When that Secretary refused, Jackson appointed a third. When the third Secretary proceeded to do as he was told, Jackson was triumphant. “I have it chained,” he said of the banking monster. “I am ready with screws to draw every tooth and then the stumps.” But Biddle and his Bank were indeed only scotched, not dead. Biddle used his influence to get the Senate to reject the new Secretary’s nomination. Then he threatened to cause a national depression if the Bank were not rechartered.

Biddle proceeded to make good on his threat by sharply contracting the money supply. Old loans were called in and new ones were refused. A financial panic ensued, followed by a deep economic depression. Biddle blamed it all on Jackson, and the newspapers picked up the charge. Jackson was officially censured by a Senate resolution. The tide turned, however, when the Governor of Pennsylvania (where the Bank was located) came out in support of the President and strongly critical of the Bank; and Biddle was caught boasting in public about the Bank’s plan to crash the economy. In April 1834, the House of Representatives voted 134 to 82 against re-chartering the Bank, and a special committee was established to investigate whether it had caused the crash.

In January 1835, in what may have been his finest hour, Jackson paid off the final installment on the national debt. He had succeeded in doing something that had never been done before and has not been done since: he reduced the national debt to zero and accumulated a surplus.ⁱ The following year, the charter for the Second Bank of the United States expired; and Biddle was later arrested and charged with fraud. He was tried and acquitted, but he died while tied up in civil suits. Jackson had beaten the Bank. His personal secretary, Nicholas Trist, called it “the crowning glory of A.J.’s life and the most important service he has ever rendered his country.” The Boston Post compared it to Jesus throwing the moneychangers out of the Temple. But Jackson, like Jesus, found that taking on the moneychangers was risky business. “The Bank is trying to kill me,”

he said, "but I will kill it!" He was the victim of an assassination attempt, but both the assassin's shots missed.

Abraham Lincoln would not be so lucky.

5.3 The War of 1812

At the outset of the 19th century, Great Britain was locked in a long and bitter conflict with Napoleon Bonaparte's France. In an attempt to cut off supplies from reaching the enemy, both sides attempted to block the United States from trading with the other. In 1807, Britain passed the Orders in Council, which required neutral countries to obtain a license from its authorities before trading with France or French colonies. The Royal Navy also outraged Americans by its practice of impressment, or removing seamen from U.S. merchant vessels and forcing them to serve on behalf of the British. In 1809, the U.S. Congress repealed Thomas Jefferson's unpopular Embargo Act, which by restricting trade had hurt Americans more than either Britain or France. Its replacement, the Non-Intercourse Act, specifically prohibited trade with Britain and France. It also proved ineffective, and in turn was replaced with a May 1810 bill stating that if either power dropped trade restrictions against the United States, Congress would in turn resume non-intercourse with the opposing power. After Napoleon hinted he would stop restrictions, President James Madison blocked all trade with Britain that November. Meanwhile, new members of Congress elected that year—led by Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun—had begun to agitate for war, based on their indignation over British violations of maritime rights as well as Britain's encouragement of Native American hostility against American expansion in the West.

In the fall of 1811, Indiana's territorial governor William Henry Harrison led U.S. troops to victory in the Battle of Tippecanoe. The defeat convinced many Indians in the Northwest Territory (including the celebrated Shawnee chief Tecumseh) that they needed British support to prevent American settlers from pushing them further out of their lands. Meanwhile, by late 1811 the so-called "War Hawks" in Congress were putting more and more pressure on Madison, and on June 18, 1812, the president signed a declaration of war against Britain. Though Congress ultimately voted for war, both House and Senate were bitterly divided on the issue. Most Western and Southern congressmen supported war, while Federalists (especially New Englanders who relied heavily on trade with Britain) accused war advocates of using the excuse of maritime rights to promote their expansionist agenda.

In order to strike at Great Britain, U.S. forces almost immediately attacked Canada, then a British colony. American officials were overly optimistic about the invasion's success, especially given how underprepared U.S. troops were at the time. On the other side, they faced a well-managed defense coordinated by Sir Isaac Brock, the British soldier and administrator in charge in Upper Canada (modern Ontario). On August 16,

1812, the United States suffered a humiliating defeat after Brock and Tecumseh's forces chased those led by Michigan William Hull across the Canadian border, scaring Hull into surrendering Detroit without any shots fired.

Things looked better for the United States in the West, as Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry's brilliant success in the Battle of Lake Erie in September 1813 placed the Northwest Territory firmly under American control. Harrison was subsequently able to retake Detroit with a victory in the Battle of Thames (in which Tecumseh was killed). Meanwhile, the U.S. navy had been able to score several victories over the Royal Navy in the early months of the war. With the defeat of Napoleon's armies in April 1814, however, Britain was able to turn its full attention to the war effort in North America. As large numbers of troops arrived, British forces raided the Chesapeake Bay and moved in on the U.S. capital, capturing Washington, D.C., on August 24, 1814, and burning government buildings including the Capitol and the White House.

On September 13, 1814, Baltimore's Fort McHenry withstood 25 hours of bombardment by the British Navy. The following morning, the fort's soldiers hoisted an enormous American flag, a sight that inspired Francis Scott Key to write a poem he titled "The Star-Spangled Banner." (Set to the tune of an old English drinking song, it would later be adopted as the U.S. national anthem.) British forces subsequently left the Chesapeake Bay and began gathering their efforts for a campaign against New Orleans.

By that time, peace talks had already begun at Ghent (modern Belgium), and Britain moved for an armistice after the failure of the assault on Baltimore. In the negotiations that followed, the United States gave up its demands to end impressment, while Britain promised to leave Canada's borders unchanged and abandon efforts to create an Indian state in the Northwest. On December 24, 1814, commissioners signed the Treaty of Ghent, which would be ratified the following February. On January 8, 1815, unaware that peace had been concluded, British forces mounted a major attack on New Orleans, only to meet with defeat at the hands of future U.S. president Andrew Jackson's army. News of the battle boosted sagging U.S. morale and left Americans with the taste of victory, despite the fact that the country had achieved none of its pre-war objectives.

Though the War of 1812 is remembered as a relatively minor conflict in the United States and Britain, it looms large for Canadians and for Native Americans, who see it as a decisive turning point in their losing struggle to govern themselves. In fact, the war had a far-reaching impact in the United States, as the Treaty of Ghent ended decades of bitter partisan infighting in government and ushered in the so-called "Era of Good Feelings." The war also marked the demise of the Federalist Party, which had been accused of being unpatriotic for its antiwar stance, and reinforced a tradition of Anglophobia that had begun during the Revolutionary War. Perhaps most importantly, the war's outcome boosted national self-confidence and encouraged the growing spirit of American expansionism that would shape the better part of the 19th century.

5.4 Money, Lincoln and the Civil War

In April 1836 the Administration pushed a series of monetary reforms through Congress. One of these required all banks to cease issuing paper notes under five dollars. The figure later was increased to twenty dollars, and its purpose was to compel the nation to return to the use of gold and silver coin for everyday use, leaving bank notes primarily for large commercial transactions. The White House also announced that, in the future, all federal land sales would require full payment in lawful money, which, of course, meant precious metal coins.

It must be remembered that even though the Bank of the United States was dead, banking was very much alive, and so were Jackson's enemies. Much to the disappointment of the hard-money advocates, these measures were not sufficient to usher in the millennium. Not only were they inadequate by themselves, they were soon circumvented by the development of new banking techniques and eventually were dismantled completely by a fickle Congress.

In 1837, as the Bank of the United States slipped into history, the nation was at the tail end of an economic boom. Professor Rothbard tells us that this expansion and the accompanying inflation had been "fueled by the central bank". Total money in circulation had risen by 84% in just four years. Then, as inevitable as the setting sun, that portion of the money supply which had been created by fractional reserve banking began to contract. 16% of all the nation's money totally disappeared in just that first year. Again, men were put out of work, businesses went into bankruptcy, homes and savings were lost. Many banks folded also but their operators walked away with the spoils. Only the depositors were left holding the empty bag.

There were numerous proposals advanced regarding how to infuse stability into the banking system. But, then as now, none of them dealt with the real problem, which was fractional reserve banking itself. Some of these proposals were (1) to base money on bank assets, (2) to protect deposits with a safety fund, (3) to base money on securities and (4) to back money with state credit. The fourth proposal for producing something out of nothing was to back the issuance of money by the full faith and credit of the state. This was the method tried by many of the Southern states and it, too, has survived to become one of the cornerstones of our modern-day banking system.

Alabama, for example, in 1835 created a state bank funded by a public bond issue of \$13,800,000. Instant money flooded through the economy and people were joyous over the miracle prosperity. The legislators were so intoxicated with the scheme that they completely abolished direct taxation and decided to run the government on bank money instead. In other words, instead of raising state revenue through taxes, they found it easier to raise it through inflation. Like all the others, this bubble also burst in the panic of 1837. A postmortem examination of the Bank showed that \$6,000,000 of its assets were completely worthless. The people who had loaned their real money to the venture,

backed by the full faith and credit of the state, lost almost all of their investment, in addition to what they had paid through inflation.

Money, based on the full faith and credit of the state, met similar fates in Illinois, Kentucky, Florida, Tennessee, and Louisiana. When the state bank collapsed, in Illinois in 1825, all of the "full-faith" bank notes left in its possession were ceremoniously burned at the public square. Another bank was formed in 1835 and collapsed in 1842. So devastating were these experiences that the Illinois Constitution of 1848 stipulated that, henceforth, the state should never again create a bank or own banking stock.

The Mirage of free Banking

There was a parallel development at this time called "free banking". The name is an insult to truth. What was called free banking was merely the conversion of banks from corporations to private associations. Aside from no longer receiving a a charter from the state, practically every other aspect of the system remained the same, including a multitude of government controls, regulations, supports, and other blocks against the free market. The free banks were no less fraudulent than the chartered banks. The old custom was revived of rushing gold coins from one bank to another just ahead of the bank examiners, and of "putting ballast of lead and broken glass" in the box under a thinner. (In earlier times, when the banks issued money backed by gold, meaning paper money could always be exchanged back to gold, there existed examiners going from bank to bank to make sure that the banks had enough gold. Of course the banks did not have enough gold, but to fool the examiners, the banks transported the gold from one bank to another faster than the examiners travelled.) When one such free bank collapsed in Massachusetts, it was discovered that its bank note circulation of \$500,000 was backed by exactly \$86,48.

For banking to have been truly free, the states would have had to do only two things: (1) enforce banking contracts the same as any other contract, and then (2) step out of the picture. By enforcing banking contracts, the executives of any bank which failed to redeem its currency in specie would have been sent to prison, an eventuality which soon would have put a halt to currency overissue. By stepping out of the picture and dropping the pretense of protecting the public with a barrage of rules, regulations, safety funds, and guarantees, people would have realized that it was their responsibility to be cautious and informed. But instead the banks continued to enjoy the special privilege of suspending payment without punishment, and the politicians clamored to convince the voters that they were taking care of everything.

In short, throughout this entire period of bank failures, economic chaos, and fleecing of both investors and taxpayers, America tried everything except full redemption by gold and silver. As the name of Andrew Jackson faded into history, so did the dream of honest banking.

The Union in Jeopardy

Economic conflict always played a major role, if not the only role, in fomenting war. There is not time in history in which there was more economic conflict between segments of the population than there was prior to the Civil War. It is not surprising that this period led into the nation's bloodiest war.

There are many popular myths about the cause of the War between the States. Just as the Bolshevik Revolution is commonly believed to have been a spontaneous mass uprising against the tyrannical aristocracy, so, too, it is generally accepted that the Civil War was fought over the issue of slavery. That, at best, is a half-truth. Slavery was an issue, but the primary force for war was a clash between economic interests of the North and the South. Even the issue of slavery itself was based on economics. It may have been a moral issue in the North where prosperity was derived from the machines of heavy industry, but in the agrarian South, where field had to be tended by vast work forces of human labor, the issue was primarily a matter of economics.

The relative unimportance of slavery as a cause for war was made clear by Lincoln himself during his campaign for Presidency in 1860, and he repeated that message in his first inaugural address:

"Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered.... I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it now exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so."

Even after the outbreak of war in 1861, Lincoln confirmed his previous stand. He declared:

"My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others, I would also do that."

It may come as a surprise to learn that, by strict definition, Abraham Lincoln was a white supremacist. In his fourth debate with Senator Stephen Douglas, he addressed the subject bluntly:

"I am not nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races - that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of Negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race."

If Lincoln's primary goal in the War was not the abolition of slavery but simply to preserve the Union, the question arises: Why did the Union need preserving? Or, more pointedly, why did the Southern states want to secede?

Legal Plunder, the Cause for War

The South being predominantly an agricultural region, had to import practically all of its manufactured goods from the Northern States and from Europe, both of which reciprocated by providing a market for the South's cotton. However, many of the textiles and manufactured items were considerably cheaper from Europe, even after the cost of shipping had been added. The Southern states, therefore, often found it to their advantage to purchase these European goods rather than those made in the North. This put considerable competitive pressure on the American manufacturers to lower their prices and operate more efficiently.

The Republicans were not satisfied with that arrangement. They decided to use the power of the federal government to tip the scales of competition in their favor. Claiming that this was in the national interest, they levied stiff import duties on almost every item coming from Europe that was also manufactured in the North. Surprisingly, there was no duty applied to cotton which, presumedly, was not a commodity in the national interest. One result was that European countries countered by stopping the purchase of US cotton, which badly hurt the Southern economy. The other result was that manufacturers in the North were able to charge higher prices without fear of competition, and the South was forced to pay more for practically all of its necessities. It was a classic case of legalized plunder in which the law was used to enrich one group of citizens at the expense of another.

Pressure from the North against slavery in the South made matters even more volatile. A fact often overlooked in this episode is that the cost of a slave was very high, around \$1500 each. A modest plantation with only forty or fifty slaves, therefore, had a large capital investment which, in terms of today's purchasing power, represented many millions of dollars. To the South, therefore, abolition meant not only the loss of its ability to produce a cash crop, but the total destruction of an enormous capital base.

Many Southern plantation owners were working toward the day when they could convert their investment to more profitable industrial production as had been done in the North, and others felt that freemen who were paid wages would be more efficient than slaves who had no incentive to work.

That was the situation that existed at the time of Lincoln's campaign and why, in his speeches, he attempted to calm the fears of the South about his intentions. But his words were mostly political rhetoric. Lincoln was a Republican, and he was totally dependent on the Northern industrialists who controlled the Party.

Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine

In addition to the conflicting interests between North and South, there were other forces also working to split the nation in two. Those forces were rooted in Europe and centered around the desire of France, Spain and England to control the markets of Latin America. Mexico was the prime target. This was the reason the Monroe Doctrine has been formulated 38 years previously. President James Monroe had put the European nations on notice that the United States would not interfere in their affairs, and that any interference by them in American affairs would not be tolerated. In particular, the proclamation said that the American continents were no longer to be considered as available for colonization.

None of the European power wanted to put this issue to the test, but they knew that if the United States were to become embroiled in a civil war, it could not also cross swords in Latin America. To encourage war between the states, therefore, was to pave the way for colonial expansion in Mexico. The Americas had become a giant chess board for the game of global politics.

The global chess match between Lincoln on the one side and England and France on the other was closely watched by the other leaders in Europe. One of the most candid observers at that time was the Cancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismarck. Since Bismarck was, himself, deeply obliged to the power of international finance, his observations are doubly revealing. He said:

“The division of the United States into federations of equal force was decided long before the Civil War by the high financial powers of Europe. These bankers were afraid that the United States, if they remained in one block and as one nation, would attain economic and financial independence, which would upset their financial domination over the Europe and the world. Of course, in the “inner circle“ of Finance, the voice of the Rothschilds prevailed. They saw an opportunity for prodigious booty if they could substitute two feeble democracies, burdened with debt to the financiers,... in place of a vigorous Republic sufficient unto herself. Therefore, they sent their emissaries into the field to exploit the question of slavery and to drive a wedge between the two parts of the Union... The rupture between the North and the South became inevitable; the masters of European finance employed all their forces to bring it about and to turn it to their advantage.”

In the years following Independence, a close business relationship had developed between the cotton growing aristocracy in the South and the cotton manufacturers in England. The European bankers decided that this business connection was America's Achilles Heel, the door through which the young American Republic could be successfully attacked and overcome. The Illustrated University History, 1878, p. 504, tells us that the southern states swarmed with British agents. These conspired with local politicians to work against the best interests of the United States. Their carefully sown and nurtured propaganda developed into open rebellion and resulted in the secession of South Carolina on December

29, 1860. Within weeks another six states joined the conspiracy against the Union, and broke away to form the Confederate States of America, with Jefferson Davis as President.

The plotters raided armies, seized forts, arsenals, mints and other Union property. Even members of President Buchanan's Cabinet conspired to destroy the Union by damaging the public credit and working to bankrupt the nation. Buchanan claimed to deplore secession but took no steps to check it, even when a U.S. ship was fired upon by South Carolina shore batteries. Shortly thereafter Abraham Lincoln became President, being inaugurated on March 4, 1861. Lincoln immediately ordered a blockade on Southern ports, to cut off supplies that were pouring in from Europe. The 'official' date for the start of the Civil War is given as April 12, 1861, when Fort Sumter in South Carolina was bombarded by the Confederates, but it obviously began at a much earlier date.

In December, 1861, large numbers of European Troops (British, French and Spanish) poured into Mexico in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. This, together with widespread European aid to the Confederacy strongly indicated that the Crown was preparing to enter the war. The outlook for the North, and the future of the Union, was bleak indeed. By 1864, the Mexicans were subdued, and the French monarch installed Ferdinand Maximilian as the puppet emperor. The Confederacy (South) found a natural ally in Maximilian and it was anticipated by both groups that, after the successful execution of the War, they would combine into a new nation - dominated by the financial power of Rothschild, of course. At the same time, England moved 11,000 troops into Canada, positioned them menacingly along the Union's northern flank, and placed the British fleet onto war-time alert. The European powers were closing in for a checkmate.

Russia Aligns with the North

It was a masterful move by Britain and France that possibly could have won the game had not an unexpected event tipped the scale against it. Tsar Alexander II, who incidentally had never allowed a central bank to be established in Russia, notified Lincoln that he stood ready to militarily align with the North. Although the Tsar had recently freed the serfs in his own country, his primary motivation for coming to the aid of the Union undoubtedly had little to do with emancipating the slaves in the South. England and France had been maneuvering to break up the Russian Empire by splitting off Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Crimea and Georgia. Napoleon III of France proposed to Great Britain and Austria that the three nations immediately declare war on Russia to hasten this dismemberment.

Knowing that war was being considered by his enemies, Tsar Alexander decided to play a chess game of his own. In September 1863 he dispatched his Baltic fleet of war ships to Alexandria, Virginia, and his Asiatic fleet to San Francisco. The significance of this move was explained by Russian-born Carl Wrangell-Rokassowsky:

“No treaty was signed between Russia and the United States, but their mutual interest,

and the threat of war to both, unified these two nations at this critical moment. By dispatching his Baltic Fleet to the North American harbors, the Tsar changed his position from defensive to an offensive one. Paragraph 3 of the instructions given to Admiral Lessovsky by Admiral Krabbe, at that time Russian Secretary of the Navy, dated July 14th 1863, ordered the Russian Fleet, in case of war, to attack the enemies commercial shipping and their colonies so as to cause them the greatest possible damage. The same instructions were given to Admiral Popov, Commander of the Russian Asiatic Fleet.

The presence of the Russian Navy helped the Union enforce a devastating naval blockade against the Southern states which denied them access to critical supplies from Europe. It was not that these ships single-handedly kept the French and English vessels at bay. Neither France nor England wanted to risk becoming involved in an open war with the United States and Russia and led them to be extremely cautious with overt military aid to the South. Without the inhibiting effect of the presence of the Russian fleet, the course of the war could have been significantly different.

The Emancipation Proclamation

To get people to fight, it was decided to convert the war into an anti-slavery crusade. The emancipation Proclamation was primarily a move on the part of Lincoln to fan the dying embers of support of the "Rich-man's war and the poor-man's fight", as it was commonly called in the North. Preservation of the Union was not enough to fire men's enthusiasm for war. Only the higher issue of freedom could do that. To make the cause of freedom synonymous with the cause of the North, there was no alternative but to officially declare against slavery. After having emphasized over and over again that slavery was not the reason for war, Lincoln later explained why he changed his course and issued the Proclamation:

"Things had gone from bad to worse until I felt we had reached the end of our rope on the plan we were pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics or lose the game. I now determined upon adoption of the emancipation policy."

The Proclamation had a profound impact on the European powers as well. As long as the war had been viewed as an attempt on the part of a government to put down rebellion, there was nothing sacred about it, and there was no stigma attached to helping either side. But now that freedom was the apparent issue, no government in Europe, least of all England and France, dared to anger its own subjects by taking sides against a country that was trying to destroy slavery.

Converting the war into an anti-slavery crusade was a brilliant move and it resulted in a surge of voluntary recruits into the Unions army. But even this was not enough in the end and Lincoln had to initiate conscription. This created an outrage and riots in the North, which was stuck down by the army, killing nearly 1000 civilians. Thus, under the banner of opposing slavery, American citizens in the North not only were killed on

the streets of their own cities, they were put into military combat against their will and thrown into prison without due process of law. In other words, free men were enslaved so that slaves could be made free.

Lincoln foils the Bankers

Abraham Lincoln went from hayseed to the top of his class by sheer native wit and determination, epitomizing the American dream. Following in the footsteps of Andrew Jackson, he rose from the backwoods to the Presidency without ever going to college. Lincoln's mother could barely read. Like Jackson, Lincoln risked life and limb battling the Money Power; but the two Presidents had quite different ideas about how it should be done. Jackson had captured the popular imagination by playing on the distrust of big banks and foreign bankers; but in throwing out the national bank and its foreign controllers, he had thrown out Hamilton's baby with the bath water, leaving the banks in unregulated chaos. There was now no national currency. Banks printed their own notes and simply had to be trusted to redeem them in specie (or gold bullion). When trust faltered, there would be a run on the bank and the bank would generally wind up closing its doors. Bank-fed speculation had collapsed much of the factory system; and federal support for road, canal and railway construction was halted, halting the pioneer settlement of the West along with it.

Lincoln joined the movement to restore the country's financial, industrial and political independence by restoring a national bank and a national currency. When the Whig Party disintegrated over the question of slavery, Lincoln joined the Republican Party, which was created in 1854 to oppose the expansion of slavery into Kansas. It opposed the political control exerted by southern slave owners over the national government; maintained that free-market labor was superior to slavery; promised free homesteads to farmers; and advanced a progressive vision emphasizing higher education, banking, railroads, industry and cities. Lincoln became the first Republican candidate to be elected President, but for Lincoln they started before he was even inaugurated. He had to deal with treason, insurrection, and national bankruptcy within the first days of taking office. Considering the powerful forces arrayed against him, his achievements in the next four years were nothing short of phenomenal.

His government built and equipped the largest army in the world, smashed the British-financed insurrection, abolished slavery, and freed four million slaves. Along the way, the country managed to become the greatest industrial giant the world had ever seen. The steel industry was launched, a continental railroad system was created, the Department of Agriculture was established, a new era of farm machinery and cheap tools was promoted, a system of free higher education was established through the Land Grant College System, land development was encouraged by passage of a Homestead Act granting ownership privileges to settlers, major government support was provided to all branches of science, the Bureau of Mines was organized, governments in the Western territories were

established, the judicial system was reorganized, labor productivity increased by 50 to 75 percent, and standardization and mass production was promoted worldwide.

How was all this accomplished, with a Treasury that was completely broke and a Congress that hadn't been paid themselves? As Benjamin Franklin might have said, "That is simple." Lincoln tapped into the same cornerstone that had gotten the impoverished colonists through the American Revolution and a long period of internal development before that: he authorized the government to issue its own paper fiat money. National control was reestablished over banking, and the economy was jump-started with a 600 percent increase in government spending and cheap credit directed at production.³ A century later, Franklin Roosevelt would use the same techniques to pull the country through the Great Depression; but Roosevelt's New Deal would be financed with borrowed money. Lincoln's government used a system of payment that was closer to the medieval tally. Officially called United States Notes, these nineteenth century tallies were popularly called "Greenbacks" because they were printed on the back with green ink (a feature the dollar retains today). They were basically just receipts acknowledging work done or goods delivered, which could be traded in the community for an equivalent value of goods or services.

The Greenbacks represented man-hours rather than borrowed gold. Lincoln is quoted as saying, "The wages of men should be recognized as more important than the wages of money." Over 400 million Greenback dollars were printed and used to pay soldiers and government employees, and to buy supplies for the war. The Greenback system was not actually Lincoln's idea, but when pressure grew in Congress for the plan, he was quick to endorse it. The South had seceded from the Union soon after his election in 1860. To fund the War between the States, the Eastern banks had offered a loan package that was little short of extortion – \$150 million advanced at interest rates of 24 to 36 percent. Lincoln knew the loan would be impossible to pay off.⁴ He took the revolutionary approach because he had no other real choice. The government could either print its own money or succumb to debt slavery to the bankers.

Lincoln's economic advisor was Henry Carey, the son of Matthew Carey, the printer and publisher mentioned earlier who was tutored by Benjamin Franklin and tutored Henry Clay. Clay was the leader of the Philadelphia-based political faction propounding the "American system" of economics. Carey came to consider "free trade" and the "gold standard" to be twin financial weapons forged by England for its own economic conquest. His solution to the gold drain was for the government to create an independent national currency that was non-exportable, one that would remain at home to do the country's own work. He advocated a currency founded on "national credit," something he defined as "a national system based entirely on the credit of the government with the people, not liable to interference from abroad." Like the wooden tally, this paper money would simply be a unit of account that tallied work performed and goods delivered. Carey also supported expanding the monetary base with silver.

Carey's theories were an elaboration of the "American system" propounded by Henry

Clay and the National Republican Party. Their platform was to nurture local growth and development using local raw materials and local money, freeing the country from dependence on foreign financing. Where Jackson's Democratic Party endorsed "free trade," the National Republican Party sought another sort of freedom, the right to be free from exploitation by powerful foreign financiers and industrialists. Free traders wanted freedom from government. Protectionists looked to the government to keep them free from foreign marauders. Clay's protectionist platform included:

- Government regulation of banking and credit to deter speculation and encourage economic development;
- Government support for the development of science, public education, and national infrastructure;
- Regulation of privately-held infrastructure to ensure it met the nation's needs;
- A program of government-sponsored railroads, and scientific and other aid to small farmers;
- Taxation and tariffs to protect and promote productive domestic activity; and
- Rejection of class wars, exploitation and slavery, physical or economic, in favor of a "Harmony of Interests" between capital and labor.

Lincoln also endorsed these goals. He eliminated slavery, established a national bank, and implemented and funded national education, national transportation, and federal development of business and farming. He also set very high tariffs. He made this common-sense observation:

"I don't know much about the tariff, but I know this much: When we buy manufactured goods abroad we get the goods and the foreigner gets the money. When we buy the manufactured goods at home, we get both the goods and the money."

The Greenback system undergirded Lincoln's program of domestic development by providing a much-needed national paper money supply. After Jackson had closed the central bank, the only paper money in circulation were the banknotes issued privately by individual state banks; and they were basically just private promises to pay later in hard currency (gold or silver). The Greenbacks, on the other hand, were currency. They were "legal tender" in themselves, money that did not have to be repaid later but was "as good as gold" in trade. Like metal coins, the Greenbacks were permanent money that could continue to circulate in their own right. The Legal Tender Acts of 1862 and 1863 made all the "coins and currency" issued by the U.S. Government "legal tender for all debts, public and private." Government- issued paper notes were made a legal substitute for gold and silver, even for the payment of pre-existing debts.

Did the Greenbacks Cause Price Inflation?

Lincoln's Greenback program has been blamed for the price inflation occurring during the Civil War, but according to Irwin Unger in *The Greenback Era* (1964): "It is now clear that inflation would have occurred even without the Greenback issue."⁷ War is always an inflationary venture. What forced prices up during the Civil War was actually a severe shortage of goods. Zarlenga quotes historian J. G. Randall, who observed in 1937:

"The threat of inflation was more effectively curbed during the Civil War than during the First World War. Indeed as John K. Galbraith has observed, "it is remarkable that without rationing, price controls, or central banking, [Treasury Secretary] Chase could have managed the federal economy so well during the Civil War."

Greenbacks were not the only source of funding for the Civil War. Bonds (government I.O.U.s) were also issued, and these too increased the money supply, since the banks that bought the bonds were also short of gold and had no other way of paying for the bonds than with their own newly-issued banknotes. The difference between the government-issued Greenbacks and the bank-issued banknotes was that the Greenbacks were debt-free legal tender that did not have to be paid back. As Thomas Edison reasonably observed in an interview reported in *The New York Times* in 1921:

"If the Nation can issue a dollar bond it can issue a dollar bill. The element that makes the bond good makes the bill good also. The difference between the bond and the bill is that the bond lets the money broker collect twice the amount of the bond and an additional 20%. Whereas the currency, the honest sort provided by the Constitution pays nobody but those who contribute in some useful way. It is absurd to say our Country can issue bonds and cannot issue currency. Both are promises to pay, but one fattens the usurer and the other helps the People."

The Greenbacks did lose value as against gold during the war, but this was to be expected, since gold was a more established currency that people naturally preferred. Again the problem for the Greenback was that it had to compete with other forms of currency. People remained suspicious of paper money, and the Greenback was not accepted for everything. Particularly, it could not be used for the government's interest payments on its outstanding bonds. Zarlenga notes that by December 1865, the Greenback was still worth 68 cents to one gold dollar, not bad under the circumstances. Meanwhile, the Confederates' paper notes had become devalued so much that they were worthless. The Confederacy had made the mistake of issuing fiat money that was not legal tender but was only a bond or promise to pay after the War. As the defeat of the Confederacy became more and more certain, its currency's value plummeted.

The Confederacy was not the only power that was bent on destroying Lincoln's Union government. Lurking behind the curtain pulling the strings of war were powerful foreign financiers. Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, called these puppeteers "the masters of European finance." He wrote: I know of

absolute certainty, that the division of the United States into federations of equal force was decided long before the Civil War by the high financial powers of Europe. These bankers were afraid that the United States, if they remained in one block and as one nation, would attain economic and financial independence, which would upset their financial domination over Europe and the world. Of course, in the "inner circle" of Finance, the voice of the Rothschilds prevailed. They saw an opportunity for prodigious booty if they could substitute two feeble democracies, burdened with debt to the financiers, . . . in place of a vigorous Republic sufficient unto herself. Therefore, they sent their emissaries into the field to exploit the question of slavery and to drive a wedge between the two parts of the Union. . . . The rupture between the North and the South became inevitable; the masters of European finance employed all their forces to bring it about and to turn it to their advantage.

The European bankers wanted a war that would return the United States to its colonial status, but they were not necessarily interested in preserving slavery. Slavery just meant that the owners had to feed and care for their workers. The bankers preferred "the European plan" – capital could exploit labor by controlling the money supply, while letting the laborers feed themselves. In July 1862, this ploy was revealed in a notorious document called the Hazard Circular, which was circulated by British banking interests among their American banking counterparts. It said:

"Slavery is likely to be abolished by the war power and chattel slavery destroyed. This, I and my European friends are glad of, for slavery is but the owning of labor and carries with it the care of the laborers, while the European plan, led by England, is that capital shall control labor by controlling wages. This can be done by controlling the money. The great debt that capitalists will see to it is made out of the war, must be used as a means to control the volume of money. To accomplish this, the bonds must be used as a banking basis. . . . It will not do to allow the greenback, as it is called, to circulate as money any length of time, as we cannot control that."

The system the bankers wanted to preserve was what Henry Clay and Henry Carey had called the "British system," with its twin weapons of "free trade" and the "gold standard" keeping the less industrialized countries in a colonial state, supplying raw materials to Britain's factories. The American South had already been subjugated in this way, and the bankers had now set their sights on the North, to be reeled in with usurious war loans; but Lincoln had refused to take the bait. The threat the new Greenback system posed to the bankers' game was reflected in an editorial that is of uncertain origin but was reportedly published in the *The London Times* in 1865. It warned:

"[I]f that mischievous financial policy, which had its origin in the North American Republic, should become indurated down to a fixture, then that Government will furnish its own money without cost. It will pay off debts and be without a debt. It will have all the money necessary to carry on its commerce. It will become prosperous beyond precedent in the history of the civilized governments of the world. The brains and the wealth of all countries will go to North America. That government must be destroyed,

or it will destroy every monarchy on the globe.”

Bismarck wrote in 1876, “The Government and the nation escaped the plots of the foreign financiers. They understood at once, that the United States would escape their grip. The death of Lincoln was resolved upon.” Lincoln was assassinated in 1865. He was killed by John Wilkes Booth, member of the secret society called “Knights of the Golden Circle”. Booth’s wife said that her husband had been “the tool of other men”.

The National Banking Act of 1863-64

The European financiers had failed to trap Lincoln’s government with usurious war loans, but they achieved their ends by other means. While one faction in Congress was busy getting the Greenbacks issued to fund the war, another faction was preparing a National Banking Act that would deliver a monopoly over the power to create the nation’s money supply to the Wall Street bankers and their European affiliates. The National Banking Act was promoted as establishing safeguards for the new national banking system; but while it was an important first step toward a truly national bank, it was only a compromise with the bankers, and buried in the fine print, it gave them exactly what they wanted. A private communication from a Rothschild investment house in London to an associate banking firm in New York dated June 25, 1863, confided:

“The few who understand the system will either be so interested in its profits or so dependent upon its favors that there will be no opposition from that class while, on the other hand, the great body of people, mentally incapable of comprehending . . . will bear its burdens without complaint.”

The Act looked good on its face, so what was the problem? Although the new national banknotes were technically issued by the Comptroller of the Currency, this was just a formality, like the printing of Federal Reserve Notes by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing today. The currency bore the name of the bank posting the bonds, and it was issued at the bank’s request. In effect, the National Banking Act authorized the bankers to issue and lend their own paper money. The banks “deposited” bonds with the Treasury, but they still owned the bonds; and they immediately got their money back in the form of their own banknotes. Topping it off, the National Banking Act effectively removed the competition to these banknotes. It imposed a heavy tax on the notes of the state-chartered banks, essentially abolishing them.⁵ It also curtailed competition from the Greenbacks, which were limited to specific issues while the bankers’ notes could be issued at will. Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase and others complained that the bankers were buying up the Greenbacks with their own banknotes.

The government got what it needed at the time – a loan of substantial sums for the war effort and a sound circulating currency for an expanding economy – but the banks were the real winners. They not only got to collect interest on money of which they still had the use, but they got powerful leverage over the government as its creditors.

The Act that was supposed to regulate the bankers wound up chartering not one but a whole series of private banks, which all had the power to create the currency of the nation. The National Banking Act was recommended to Congress by Treasury Secretary Chase, ironically the same official who had sponsored the Greenback program the Act effectively eliminated. In a popular 1887 book called *Seven Financial Conspiracies That Have Enslaved the American People*, Sarah Emery wrote that Chase acquiesced only after several days of meetings and threats of financial coercion by bank delegates.⁷ He is quoted as saying later:

“My agency in procuring the passage of the National Bank Act was the greatest financial mistake of my life. It has built up a monopoly that affects every interest in the country. It should be repealed. But before this can be accomplished, the people will be arrayed on one side and the banks on the other in a contest such as we have never seen in this country.”

Although Lincoln was assassinated in 1865, it would be another fifty years before the promise of his debt-free Greenbacks were erased from the minds of a people long suspicious of the usury bankers and their gilded paper money. The “Gilded Age” – the period between the Civil War and World War I – was a series of battles over who should issue the country’s currency and what it should consist of.

5.5 Social Engineering, Militarization, Socialization and Communism

Socialists, posturing as noble, caring humanitarians, unify and vociferously demand change, even if it negatively impacts others, saying that free choice or spreading democracy often represents death and destruction for people. Many churches have abandoned traditional peaceful Christianity and use their money and power to influence government to impose their views on society through the force of law. Instead of traditional theology, churches veered toward a communal, socialistic approach to humanity’s challenges, which actually serve a small, profit-seeking minority who exploit the people’s naivety and ignorance for their own objectives. In order to affect such a theological shift, the money powers had to control the theological seminaries. By 1890, all of the major seminaries in the United States promoted theories about social justice.

In December 1892, the Brotherhood of the Kingdom was organized to inculcate socialism into the nation’s churches. “If ever socialism is to succeed, it cannot succeed in an irreligious country. It must start in the churches.” In 1893, the American branch of the Christian Socialist Movement was founded a faction of London’s Fabian Society and the British Labour Party. The dissemination of socialism in the churches coincided with the spread of socialism elsewhere. In 1902, delegates and lay officials of numerous churches had attended the national convention of the Socialist Party in Chicago. “Christians” then created two Christian Socialist organizations “with the avowed purpose of extending the

principles of socialism among church people of America." The first and largest organization, created in June 1906, was the Christian Socialist Fellowship. Its officials delivered socialist sermons in thousands of churches and circulated millions of copies of its paper to preachers, teachers, and social workers. Many churches, YMCAs, and colleges were receptive to the socialist message. As the years went by, more Socialist movements were founded with some of the leading members even having ties to the Soviet Union and hundreds of US clerics being members of the socialist party in the US. By 1940, churches across the whole country were undermined by the socialist doctrine.

Many of their doctrines were even identical to freemasonry and religious leaders outside the US saw the wrongdoings. Pope Leo XIII wrote, "Let us remember that Christianity and freemasonry are essentially incompatible, to such an extent, that to become united with one means being divorced from the other."¹⁵⁹ Pope Benedict, on November 5, 1920, warned against such groups as the YMCA and similar sects, while unlike in name, apply similar Masonic principles. Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) stated, "The YMCA intends to purify and spread a more perfect knowledge of real life, placing itself above all churches and outside of any religious jurisdiction." On November 5, 1920, in a letter, he wrote that the YMCA is fundamentally Masonic in nature.

Leading theologians and prestigious seminaries promote an agenda of progressive reform and international expansion. John D. Rockefeller and J. Pierpont Morgan wholly supported their efforts in setting America's moral course at home and abroad, compatible with Woodrow Wilson's vision of building a new world order. Rockefeller also began funding the Eastern Establishment's Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Fosdick, a New World Order proponent, was one of Rockefeller's most confidential associates and a trustee (1921-1948) and president (1936-1948) of the Rockefeller Foundation. He had long supported Wilson, who he had known since 1903 when he studied at Princeton University. Fosdick was a civilian aide to General John J. Pershing and accompanied Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference (1919). He had a good relationship with Edward M. House, Wilson's adviser. Fosdick continued working toward Wilson's goal of world peace through world government after Wilson's death in 1924. In 1928, he published *The Old Savage in the New Civilization* and maintained that we must have a centralized government and dissolution of state sovereignty. The Federal Council of Churches assaulted free enterprise and capitalism and promoted socialism. In its 1932 official report, it stated, "The Christian ideal calls for hearty support of a planned economic system ... It demands that cooperation shall replace competition as a fundamental method." In December 1932, at a meeting in Indianapolis, the council unanimously espoused the socialist creed: "The churches should stand for social planning and control of the credit and monetary system and the economic processes." The council changed its name to the National Council of Churches to distance itself from its communistic image. Even with the name change, many astute people denounced the organization for its continued propagation of radical socialism and totalitarian authority. Through the Ford Foundation, the National Council of Churches has donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to militarize revolutionary

communist groups in Africa, while thousands of Americans condemn the slaughter and violence there.

Monopolizing Minds, the Government's Education System

Centralized banking devastates a nation's economy but exclusive control of education is considerably more dangerous but ultimately more effective in the management of the population. Author Gary Allen maintains, "Those who control education will over a period of several generations control a nation." On March 2, 1867, officials created the National Bureau of Education, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, with Yale-educated Henry Barnard as the first Commissioner of Education. Immediately following the Civil War, American-born George Peabody, a freemason and a British banker, funded the Southern Education Fund, reportedly to resuscitate Southern culture. It was the precedent for Rockefeller's General Education Board. In 1887, John D. Rockefeller gave \$600,000 to Frederick T. Gates, a graduate of Rochester Theological Seminary, to establish the University of Chicago. Rockefeller ultimately endowed the school with nearly \$50 million. By 1888, the Senate Committee on Education produced a 1,382 page document to define the purpose of mass education—impose conformity and subordination and restrain natural curiosity through an "anti-intellectual shift in schooling" under compulsory, regulatory standards.

In 1890, Rockefeller purchased the well-renowned Encyclopedia Britannica. By 1900, Northern businessmen and their Southern collaborators developed schools, especially in the South, where people still embraced militant populism which endangered the objectives of certain Southern liberals and Northern businessmen, like Rockefeller Jr. and Robert C. Ogden, and others who wished to renovate and industrialize the South.¹⁸¹ On January 12, 1902, with congressional approval, Rockefeller established the General Education Board (GEB) to disperse funds to advance certain predetermined objectives. Rockefeller and Gates designed the philanthropic General Education Board as an agency to transform society. Part of Rockefeller's GEB Occasional Letter Number One (1906) states, "In our dreams . . . people yield themselves with perfect docility to our molding hands. The present educational conventions (intellectual and character education) fade from our minds, and, unhampered by tradition, we work our own good will upon a grateful and responsive folk. We shall not try to make these people or any of their children into philosophers or men of learning or men of science. We have not to raise up from among them authors, educators, poets, or men of letters. We shall not search for embryo great artists, painters, musicians, nor lawyers, doctors, preachers, politicians, statesmen, of whom we have ample supply." (Sounds a bit like producing work slaves was the desired outcome).

Indoctrinating the Teachers, Shaping Children's Minds

G. Stanley Hall founded the American Journal of Psychology in 1887. In July 1892, Hall, an advocate of Darwin's theory, and twenty-five other individuals at Clark founded the American Psychological Association (APA), and he became its first president. In 1909, he invited Carl Jung and Sigmund Freud, a member of B'nai B'rith, to deliver lectures at Clark. The school played a prominent role in the development of psychology as a discipline. In 1904, Hall, the father of the child psychology movement, published the two-volume masterpiece, *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education*. In 1921, he published *Aspects of Child Life and Education*. Johns Hopkins Universities (where Stanley Hall was a staff member) first president and cofounder was Daniel C. Gilman, one of the three individuals who incorporated The Russell Trust, The Order of Skull and Bones. It was the first American university to apply the German university model developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Gilman incorporated both the John F. Slater Fund, which later became the Rockefeller Foundation and Rockefeller's General Education Board, which took over US medical education. Rockefeller gave his foundation \$100 million in its first year of operation, 1913. The elite transfer their funds into tax-exempt foundations, similar to taking money from one pocket and putting it into another pocket to escape taxes and to further grind the face of the poor by controlling and directing domestic and foreign policy. John Dewey, a graduate of Johns Hopkins University, studied under Hall and received his doctorate in 1884. In 1894, he joined the staff of the University of Chicago (1894-1904). The university, organized as the center of the Fabian socialist program in America, established an education laboratory. Beginning in late 1895, Dewey, the "Father of American Education," headed the combined departments of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. In 1886, he authored *Psychology*, a textbook on the application of revised education, which instructors used in the schools of educational training throughout the country.¹⁸⁸ Dewey, a statist, believed that a child exists exclusively for the benefit of the state, which requires the suppression of individual interests, skills, and propensities. Thus, students receive only approved knowledge.

These "Elites" took over more and more educational institutions to further their agenda. By 1942, they intended to socialize the masses by managing the law, elections, the press, and by controlling education. Equality, except ideally before the law, is impossible and illogical, even in nature. Individuals have inherent appearances, genetic intelligence, and native skills. For instance, female birds are never going to have the brilliantly colored plumage of their male counterparts. However, for generations, agent provocateurs have successfully incited the masses to parrot the term, "liberty, equality, fraternity," to provide bottom-up demands for popularity-vote-seeking politicians who exploit the enthusiastic masses who, in their naivety accommodate the elite agenda by using their irrational noble-sounding phrases. This ultimately leads to the destruction of all privileges and the existence of the very factors that protect the populace and their liberty and property from the elite. Professor Edward L. Thorndike (Columbia University) equated children

with rats, monkeys, and other animals. He applied his “science,” which de-emphasized traditional educational basics, to the training of teachers, who then conveyed it to every part of the United States. Thorndike focused on three objectives for the six-year period of elementary education: experience for the students, testing of native skills and intellect, and exploration of vocational aptitudes. This would ultimately entail psychological testing of all students. Big Pharma would be prepared with appropriate medications for those who displayed too much individualism, expended too much natural energy, or demonstrated too much native curiosity or some other demeanor incompatible with developing the herd mentality.

J. Pierpont Morgan totally dominated the administrations of the Ivy League schools from the 1880s to the 1930s. Morgan, an Anglophile internationalist, made large endowments followed by continuous communication with the administrations at Harvard, Columbia, and Yale, to a lesser degree, in order to set educational policies. The presidents of the universities owed their jobs to the financial powers. Morgan positioned Butler as president of Columbia. He was Morgan’s chief representative at Columbia for decades until the Depression-ridden 1930s, when Morgan’s power began to decrease. He retained Butler in that position long after he was physically unable to effectively manage the responsibilities of the office. Rockefeller buffered himself from criticism by pouring his millions into productive philanthropies, like education and medicine. Raymond B. Fosdick, Rockefeller Foundation president, admitted that the whole idea was about social control. The GEB granted unlimited funds to the Wundt-educated psychologists, whose goals were to radically alter US education. Rockefeller, by 1909, had given \$53 million, and, by 1921, he had personally donated over \$129 million to the GEB. In the 1921 annual GEB report, Rockefeller directed the removal of all restrictions on the board’s ability “to dispose in any manner it sees fit of the principal (and interest) of all gifts which he has made.” The sum total of educational grants through this board amounted to \$126,788,094. He created the GEB to “accomplish certain ends” and expected the recipients to administer the funds accordingly.

In collaboration, the Rockefeller Foundation would regulate domestic education, and the Carnegie Foundation would dominate international education. Their first objective was to alter the way that instructors taught history. They approached the Guggenheim Foundation, which, like the Rhodes scholarship program, granted fellowships. It agreed to fund twenty US history students who were seeking doctoral degrees. These students, after indoctrination in London, formed the nucleus of the American Historical Association. This association gave a \$400,000 grant to create a seven-volume subjective history designed to promote a socialistic future. The objective in all US government schools and most private colleges is to alter history and discredit constitutional principles as outdated and impractical. On October 17, 1979, Trilateralist Jimmy Carter, a Rockefeller minion, signed the Department of Education Organization Act, which made the US Department of Education a cabinet-level department. It began operating on May 4, 1980, administered by the Secretary of Education. George W. Bush expanded and energized it with his No

Child Left Behind law, enacted on January 8, 2002. According to this law, each school must provide a student's personal information to military recruiters and institutions of higher education. The student may choose not to have their information shared, but silence is consent. The elite have dominated the educational system since the Civil War. They wish to create a two-class economy with a master/slave subordinate society to coincide with the Communist Manifesto, which advocates a "free education for all children in public schools, abolition of children's factory labor in its present form, and a combination of education with industrial production." Public schools, regulated by the Department of Education, indoctrinate students to be patriotic and obedient and to pay their fair share of sales, income and numerous other taxes. Further, teachers instruct them that the majority rules, whether that majority is right or wrong.

Immigration, Facilitating Political Objectives

People, like pawns in the elite's global chess game, migrate for diverse reasons—natural disasters, warfare, famine, economics, and religious or ethnic persecution. Often, for political or cultural objectives, certain entities manage and fund persecution, a form of terrorism. The elites, under humanitarian auspices shift populations, through immigration, to designated areas to facilitate cultural-engineering goals. Economic depression, forcing emigration from one area, accommodates cheap labor requirements elsewhere. Governments shift "expendable" populations to camps, isolated reservations, or crowded inner-city neighborhoods. They attempt to alter the demographics in numerous countries in order to affect political change. Until the Act of March 2, 1819, laws regulating immigration were nonexistent. That act, the origination of immigration statistics, did not restrict admittance but required the government to maintain a list of all foreigners. From 1790 to 1819, about 200,000 to 300,000 aliens came to America, probably from the same part of Europe as previous settlers to America. Most of the original settlers arrived from Britain, Scotland, Wales, Holland, and Germany, bringing with them particular cultural and political propensities, such as self-reliance and the desire for a limited, nonintrusive government. Thus, they shaped a society where the people and not the state held the sovereign power. The country was English-speaking, and the government intentionally restricted and regulated immigration to maintain an ethnic balance. Between 1830 and 1880, a little over 10,000,000 immigrants came to America, about 9,000,000 from Northern Europe and over 600,000 from Canada and Newfoundland.

After the failure of the revolutions in Europe in 1848, socialists, many of who were the Jewish instigators of those revolts, emigrated from Prussia and Austria and other places to England, and, from there, they immigrated to America. From 1835 to 1855, about 250,000 Jews arrived in the United States, settling primarily in New York, Baltimore, Cincinnati, San Francisco, and other large, urban areas. The roots of the oldest Reform synagogues in America are in those communities. After 1880, certain politicians altered the nation's immigration policies, and millions of people came from Southern and Eastern

Europe. Most of them were non-Christian and held socialistic objectives hostile to the ideals and ethics that most of the population championed. Most of the assimilated Jews living in America, about 280,000 by 1877, were Sephardic from Germany. Because they were a minority, they could not contribute culturally to the hordes of new arrivals. According to official US immigration records, 3,237,079 people, mostly Jews, arrived in the United States between 1881 and 1920. They came from the area of Russia that was formerly the kingdom of Poland before the "partitions" (1772-1795). The vast numbers of incoming Eastern European Jews were decidedly more aggressive than the assimilated, westernized Jews who had settled in America before 1880.

While we usually associate socialism with the Bolshevik Revolution, we should understand that people promoted revolutionary socialistic ideas decades before that revolution. The new arrivals were more politically oriented than their coreligionists, many of whom had become successful merchants, an occupation in which they excelled. The Jews now arriving quickly entered into the professions and the industries, and participated in politics. The assimilated Jews, primarily from Germany before 1880, were very dissimilar to the newcomers (Sephardic vs Ashkenazi). After 1880, and in the first two decades of the twentieth century, emigration from Eastern Europe increased dramatically. The new arrivals, many of them Zionists, influenced the previous policies of American Reform Judaism to the extent that its leaders finally capitulated to their demands and persistent pressure.²¹¹ Many of these immigrants perceived themselves as a separate nationality, a peculiar, even a special people, and considered assimilation quite unacceptable. Author Henry P. Fairchild wrote, "In the first place, the Jews have always considered themselves a superior people. This is neither remarkable nor reprehensible. Every nationality considers itself superior. That is inherent in the nature of nationality. Perhaps the Jews have been a little more candid and outspoken than other peoples in professing their superiority." John Beaty, in his book, *The Iron Curtain over America*, wrote, "America now has virtually a nation within the nation, and an aggressive culture-conscious nation at that."

On September 11, 1891, Baron Maurice de Hirsch, a German-Jewish banker and philanthropist, who sponsored the educational work of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, created the Jewish Colonization Association as an English society, with a capital of £2,000,000 along with Baron Alfred de Rothschild. Hirsch's goal was to facilitate a mass emigration of Jews from Russia and other Eastern European countries. He planned to relocate them to fertile lands in North and South America owned by the association. It had large agricultural colonies in Canada, Palestine and Argentina. Moises Ville, the colony in Argentina (1,250,000 acres) was a home for many Yiddishspeaking Russian Jews. Each family received a 200-acre homestead, a manageable mortgage, a few cows, and some chickens. As the pogroms in Eastern Europe increased in frequency and violence, Jewish refugees fled to the United States, which had just adjusted their immigration policies. To help the arriving evacuees to acclimate, Jacob H. Schiff (who also financed the Bolshevik Revolution), closely associated with the Rothschilds, organized humanitarian committees, which systematically shifted a majority of the new refugees into large cities, like

New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Los Angeles.

Indiscriminant Immigration, Creating Crime and Chaos

Many Jewish immigrants to America engaged in numerous criminal activities, such as murder, racketeering, bootlegging, prostitution and narcotics. They also participated in New York's socialistic labor movement, activities that naturally generated anti-Semitism. The Jewish mobsters competed with the Italian and Irish gangs, but generally operated in the Jewish neighborhoods in New York's Lower East Side. Jacob Levinsky headed the Yiddish Black Hand, and, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Jewish underworld was more influential in New York than the Italian or Irish gangs. In 1901, Joseph Petrosino, a New York City police officer who fought against organized crime, especially the Black Hand, assigned his intelligence network to infiltrate the Italian-based anarchist organization, a member of which, Benedetto Cairoli, had assassinated King Umberto of Italy on July 29, 1900. Petrosino's men discovered that the group intended to kill President William McKinley when he attended the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo in 1901. He alerted the Secret Service, but officials ignored his warning. Leon F. Czolgosz shot McKinley on September 6, 1901. Vice President Theodore Roosevelt, who had a close relationship with the B'nai B'rith, stepped into the presidency when McKinley died on September 14, 1901. Simon Wolf, the Washington DC representative for the B'nai B'rith, and Roosevelt later organized Jewish American backing for the collapse of the Russian czar.

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), then known as the Publicity Committee of the B'nai B'rith, condemned Bingham (New York City Police Commissioner), one of their first targets, and accused him of anti-Semitism and of "maligning Jews" even though he focused his efforts against all criminal activity. Because of the human trafficking emanating from New York, key Jewish families in the United States, Germany, France, and Britain held a meeting, the Jewish International Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Girls and Women, in London in April 1910. Arthur R. Moro, the keynote speaker, presented an account describing the association of Jewish gangsters in the worldwide prostitution and white slave trade. In 1909, Rabbi Judah P. Magnes led prominent families in New York to create their own Bureau of Social Morals. The bureau engaged Abe Schoenfeld, the same investigator that John D. Rockefeller Jr. used in order to penetrate the criminal network on the Lower East Side. In 1922, the rabbi moved to Jerusalem, taking all of Schoenfeld's files with him. He founded the Hebrew University, which is the current repository of those voluminous files detailing organized crime in New York, in the university's carefully secured archives, part of the school's most guarded records. The B'nai B'rith established the ADL, in large measure, to protect Jewish-surnamed gangsters and possibly to counter criticism of many of the individuals responsible for the Federal Reserve.²³⁴ Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Reagan lavished praise on the ADL's efforts.

In October 1913, through the instrumentality of Sigmund Livingston, a Jewish attorney from Chicago, the B'nai B'rith formally founded the ADL, headquartered in New York, as an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) to thwart criticism and discrimination on an international basis regarding organized crime and international anarchist networks. He not only founded but also directed the ADL's activities its first thirty years. Prior to that, he headed the powerful B'nai B'rith Midwest Lodge #6. He was a lawyer for the Chicago and Alton Railway, whose owner, William Moore, had ties to J. Pierpont Morgan since the 1890s. In the early 20th century, the US education system was completely undermined, banks, industry and media under heavy Jewish influence and they even owned a big part of the alcohol industry. The "Jewish agents of Jewish capital" built a huge network for generating massive revenues, complete with a propaganda apparatus to shape public opinion.

Currently, the ADL promotes the activities of the homosexual lobbies in Washington and in numerous state legislative bodies. It also supports pro-abortion groups and the gun-control lobby. They collaborate with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the People for the American Way, groups that work to prohibit voluntary religious expression in schools and other public facilities. Instead of thwarting anti-Semitism, their policies and practices, which strip the majority of the population of basic freedoms, might in fact generate anger and resentment. Additionally, the ADL attempts to prevent the publication of books negative to Israeli policies or that divulge Jewish history. The ADL promotes hate-crime legislation in order to eliminate free speech for the majority of the population. It views the Bible as "hate speech" and wishes to proscribe words that imply dissent against abortion, homosexuality, or other behaviors or actions. Subtly, by transforming words and titles, this has already occurred with the use of such words as "homophobic," and "gay" instead of "homosexual" and "pro-choice" rather than "abortion." This began decades ago. On July 27, 1935, in the Jewish Daily Bulletin, Vladimir Jabotinsky said, "There is only one power which really counts—the power of political pressure. We Jews are the most powerful people on earth, because we have this power, and we know how to apply it." The objectives of the ADL seem to be scrutinizing the population, censorship, infiltrating existing organizations, intimidation, and pushing an anti-Christian agenda.

Multiculturalism, United States Immigration Policy

Professor Kevin MacDonald wrote, "Jews have been at the forefront in supporting movements aimed at altering the ethnic status quo in the United States in favor of immigration of non-European peoples. These activities have involved leadership in Congress, organizing and funding anti-restrictionist groups composed of Jews and gentiles, and originating intellectual movements opposed to evolutionary and biological perspectives in the social sciences." Communism's deceptive dogma, a tool of the wealthy, appeals to the "poor," the "wretched," and the "homeless." America opened its doors to some of the very people

who promoted communism and to the oppressed peoples who would unhesitatingly accept it, even though they relocated to a “free” country. Jewish immigrants, mainly from Eastern Europe, advanced “an internationalist foreign policy” because an “internationally minded” America was more likely to be sensitive to the problems of foreign Jews. Now, politicians still advocate a liberal immigration policy to guarantee a pluralistic instead of a unified, homogeneous society, the kind formerly found in Europe. While Jews prosper in their host countries, pluralism serves multiple Jewish interests, yet they, a distinct minority, concurrently reject assimilation for themselves and survive nicely by practicing partial crypsis (sufficiently mingling with others to conceal their exclusivity). Promoting liberal immigration policies makes them appear magnanimous. Yet, ironically, this generosity often involves jeopardizing the rights and properties of the majority of the host population, whereas it hardly affects their wellbeing.

In 1894, two years after the avid socialist Francis Bellamy wrote the Pledge of Allegiance, many Americans began demanding immigration restraint, similar to today. Theodore Roosevelt, an internationalist, then a member of the US Civil Service Commission, declared, “It is a base outrage to oppose a man because of his religion or birthplace A Scandinavian, a German, or an Irishman who has become an American has the right to stand on exactly the same footing as any native-born citizen in the land, and is just as much entitled to the friendship and support, social, and political, of his neighbors.” According to author Gary Gerstle, Roosevelt, as US president, believed in “racial mixing” and limited “racial assimilation” as long as a “superior race” controlled that particular process.

Israel Zangwill, a freemason and close friend of H. G. Wells, wrote *The Melting Pot*, a popular sensation in America (1908-1909). He used the metaphorical phrase, “melting pot,” to depict or promote America’s incorporation of immigrants and the ostensible contributions they made. The hero of the play, David Quixano, immigrated to America after the Kishinev pogrom, which occurred April 6-7, 1903, in the capital of the Bessarabia Province in Russia, during which the government had killed his entire family. David had musical talent and created a splendid symphony, *The Crucible*, conveying his optimism for a classless society devoid of ethnic distinction. Zangwill encouraged the concept of the merging of the races into an American nation. The hero of his popularized play proclaims, “America is God’s Crucible, the great Melting Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming Germans and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russians—into the crucible with you all! God is making the American.” Roosevelt later wrote a letter to Zangwill in which he said, “I do not know when I have seen a play that stirred me as much.” Pluralism allows Jews, about 2 percent of the American population, to associate, conduct business, and participate in society as just one of the many groups with its unique religious tenets and political convictions. In a pluralistic, diverse society, it is almost impossible for non-Jews, with such diversities, to unite in opposition to Judaism’s predatory activities. MacDonald wrote, “Historically, major anti-Semitic movements have tended to erupt in societies that have been, apart from the

Jews, religiously and/or ethnically homogeneous." Anti-Semitism is almost nonexistent in America, as compared to some European nations, largely due to the pluralistic nature of the society. In America, with some notable exceptions, Jews were rather inconspicuous, both religiously and culturally, until the twentieth century, because of their prominent role in many highly influential fields.

In the 1940s, Emanuel Celler (Democratic Party) Celler opposed the isolationists and the Roosevelt administration by advocating a change in immigration laws on an emergency basis to allow those leaving Germany entrance to the United States. In 1943, he accused Roosevelt, because of his immigration policy, of being "cold and cruel." (In 1938, Germany asked in the Evian conference if any country would like to take the Jews, yet, every country refused and they had no place they could emigrate to). Celler, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee (1949-1973) participated in the drafting and passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Voting Rights Act. In January 1965, he proposed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, regarding succession to the presidency. In 1965, he also proposed the Hart-Celler Act, eliminating national origins as a consideration for immigration.

Unlike individuals coming from Western Europe, individuals coming into the country after 1965 typically lacked the equivalent education level of the average American. In addition, they required more social services, paid for by the taxpayer through plundering politicians and their efforts to redistribute wealth. Furthermore, by then, Europeans were not motivated to emigrate because their countries were more modern and industrialized. From 1901 to 1920, the percent of Latin American immigrants comprised about 3 percent. The percent of Europeans during that same period was 88 percent. Yet, from 1980 to 1993, Latin American immigrants had risen to 43 percent and Europeans were down to 13 percent. These Latin American immigrants were more than twice as likely not to have finished high school, compared to native-born Americans, which has obviously had economic consequences as well as political ramifications. The conspiring elite changed the economic and political culture through immigration policy reform while appearing sympathetic to the plight of the poverty-stricken. Essentially, they have restructured America into a third-world nation. The poor are easier to control and typically lend their support to the political party that promises the most entitlements. Unchecked immigration undermines our customs, culture, language, and institutions. The enslaved should attempt to emulate America within their countries rather than invade and reshape America. Our government and their governments use them as political pawns in the game of globalization. Although the politicians and the media constantly expose the population to a brainwashing blitz of politically correct thinking, it is not bigotry that motivates our wise rejection of unrestrained immigration. It is self-preservation and the preservation of our lifestyle that drives this fight. The politicians who promote diversity or multiculturalism are largely untouched by the mass migration that changes America's neighborhoods and jeopardizes our ability to take care of our families.

Nationalism, a Nation's "Right to Exist"

Benn Steil wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, "The right course is not to return to a mythical past of monetary sovereignty, with governments controlling local interests and exchange rates in blissful ignorance of the rest of the world. Governments must let go of the fatal notion that nationhood requires them to make and control the money used in their territory. National currencies and global markets simply do not mix; together they make a deadly brew of currency crises and geopolitical tension and create ready pretexts for damaging protectionism. In order to globalize safely, countries should abandon monetary nationalism and abolish unwanted currencies, the source of much of today's instability."²⁵⁸ Nationalism is anti-establishment, isolationist, neutral, and people once considered it "conservative." Nationalists, in contrast to internationalists, do not exploit or suppress the liberties of others. Government schools and the corporate media have indoctrinated and betrayed the American population to abandon nationalism, loyalty to one's country, in exchange for internationalism. Soon after the creation of the Federal Reserve, Americans became involved in a needless, senseless foreign war that had nothing to do with the best interests of the nation, the soldiers, or the target countries. Author Gian Trepp wrote, "War, a place where moneymen can gather, because money is stronger than nationalism. Even during the war, the moneymen of different nations needed to keep in touch because, when the war stops, you have to rebuild, and you need free trade."²⁶⁰ One might also accuse the leaders of multinational corporations whose greed for profit is "stronger than nationalism." Nationalists believe in reasonable tariffs that protect the nation's industry rather than free trade. So-called "conservatives," even Republican "nationalists," claim to put the United States first, but they have promoted and enacted all of the nation's free-trade agreements.

One cannot claim to cherish both sovereignty and accept free trade, via "multinational trade organizations and global financial conglomerates." Karl Marx advocated both the income tax and free trade because, he said, "it breaks up old nationalities" and eliminates the "bourgeoisie." The 1934 yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace defined their globalist aspirations by complaining about the "economic nationalism which is still running riot and which is the greatest obstacle to the reestablishment of prosperity and genuine peace." Further, writers refer to nationalism as "this violently reactionary movement." In the 1946 report of the Rockefeller Foundation, in promoting globalism, we read, "The challenge of the future is to make this world one world, a world truly free to engage in common and constructive intellectual efforts what will serve the welfare of mankind everywhere." Internationally minded foundations, under the guise of promoting world peace, want collectivism, with the elimination of all national borders, traditions, and all sentiments about sovereignty. Tax-exempt foundations have spent millions to indoctrinate the masses to subtly relinquish their sovereignty, and they even abhor the very concept of nationalism communicating this through education and the entertainment media. Albert Einstein, an ardent globalist, said, "Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind."

Globalists thoroughly vilify the word “nationalist” in their battle to induce us to accept world governance. Willis A. Carto explained that nationalists are populists and patriots who do not blindly follow bureaucratic wishes. They believe in maintaining their own race and culture and in strengthening their own sovereign nations. They have no imperialistic designs, nor do they engage in aggressive warfare, but rather respect the nationalistic endeavors of other countries. Imperialists criticize nationalism because it obstructs their exploitative objectives to bring all nations into one “Global Plantation” under their rule. Nations whose citizens thoughtlessly relinquish their nationalism are destined for destruction. The internationalists use numerous successful tactics to shift a nationalistic movement away from its objectives. Michael Collins Piper claims that infiltrators have taken over what used to be this country’s nationalistic movement and have transformed and popularized it into the “right-wing” neo-conservative movement, which is diametrically opposed to nationalism. Leo Strauss attended the University of Hamburg and received his doctorate in 1921. In 1932, Strauss left his position at the Academy of Jewish Research in Berlin, and ultimately, with the help of a Rockefeller Fellowship, he and his family relocated to England. In 1937, he was a research fellow at Columbia University. In 1949, he joined the University of Chicago’s faculty, where he taught his neo-conservative philosophy, a mix between the teachings of Trotsky and Lenin. He preached the necessity of using deceptive propaganda in politics and promoted the concept of a hierarchical society, in which the elite rules the subservient masses.

From Emancipation to Eugenics

Officials did not emancipate the slaves out of humanitarian or benevolent ideals but because of economics. As industrial capitalism and wage labor expanded, it became advantageous to eliminate the competition from slavery. Freed blacks became the target of a far deadlier enslavement, often with the help of the very people they trusted the most. After emancipation, the whites feared retribution and worried about the financial implications of freed slaves, formerly considered assets or property. Their new freedom constituted a potential liability. Northern residents, including the most vocal abolitionists, did not want them to travel northward, and they passed laws to prevent migration and potential intermarriage with the whites. The elite, working with Congress, financed numerous colonization programs in order to deport the emancipated blacks to other countries. While the blacks were enslaved, white “owners,” for economic exploitation, encouraged them to have an abundant number of children. Eugenics, a pseudoscience, appeared to resolve some of the whites’ concerns regarding the black population. Sir Francis Galton, a cousin to Charles Darwin and a eugenics pioneer, along with others, surmised that darker-skinned races were mentally and physically inferior to whites.

The NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) is an African-American civil rights organization in the United States, formed in 1909) leadership was predominantly Jewish. That community contributed to its founding and continued fi-

nancing. Initially, Dubois was the only black on its executive board. Joel E. Spingarn, a Columbia University professor, was the chairman (1913-1919). He recruited other board members and cofounders, Julius Rosenwald, chairman of Sears Roebuck, Lillian Wald, Rabbi Emil G. Hirsch, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Jacob H. Schiff (who financed the Bolshevik Revolution) and Jacob Billikopf also sat on the NAACP board. While it seems to have humane objectives, the actual motives might have been to create a rift between the white and black populations. The NAACP currently addresses the rights guaranteed in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, disparities in economics, health care, education, voter empowerment, and the criminal justice system.

The Rockefeller Foundation chartered in 1913, soon began funding eugenics research at Cold Spring (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory is a private, non-profit institution with research programs). Louis Marshall functioned as the legal advisor to the laboratory. Inasmuch as it would have been inappropriate to promote the extermination of specific races, their real objective, they used code words to promote the sterilization of certain groups. These included feeble-mindedness, moron, immoral, insane, unfit, criminal, and imbecile. This verbal camouflage amounted to medical apartheid. Some of the same slave-trading corporations who once exploited the blacks now viewed them as expendable and shifted their focus to the employment and financing of likeminded minions to push birth control. Margaret Sanger (1879-1966), a fervent eugenics advocate, a visiting nurse on Manhattan's Lower East Side and a member of the Socialist party, worked with the Industrial Workers of the World and orchestrated several militant strikes. She promoted feminism and, with atheist and anarchist Emma Goldman, believed that women should have liberal access to birth control and freedom from all sexual inhibitions and restraints. In 1914, Sanger organized the Birth Control League, which evolved into the American Birth Control League (ABCL). In 1939, the ABCL merged with the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau (BCCRB) to form the Birth Control Federation of America (BCFA). On January 29, 1942, because the word "control" might be offensive to some people, the BCFA would adopt a more acceptable name, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) (Today known for trading parts of fetuses). The program was the same, but they now promoted abortion under the guise of "quality of life," and "better health" through "family planning." Rather than eliminate poverty through adequate education and occupational opportunities, they simply planned to exterminate the poor.

After this merger, Sanger developed the Negro Project. A national Negro Advisory Council guided the project, composed of representatives from twenty-five major black organizations and universities. It included many prominent black leaders. The Project, with the help of local community organizations, assembled clinical data in order to position clinics and ready access to contraceptive techniques in predominantly black communities of the South." Sanger cleverly manipulated black religious to collaborate with her in an effort to reduce the black population. She said, "The most successful educational approach to the Negro is through religious appeal. We do not want word to go out that we want to exterminate the Negro population, and the minister is the man who can straighten out

that idea if it ever occurs to any of their more rebellious members." She also worked with W. E.B. Dubois of the NAACP. In her book, Sanger wrote, "Eugenics seems to me to be valuable in its critical and diagnostic aspects, in emphasizing the danger of irresponsible and uncontrolled fertility of the 'unfit' and the feebleminded, establishing a progressive unbalance in human society, and lowering the birth rate among the 'unfit.' But in its so-called 'constructive' aspect, in seeking to reestablish the dominance of healthy strain over the unhealthy, by urging an increased birth rate among the fit, the Eugenists really offer nothing more farsighted than a 'cradle competition' between the fit and the unfit. They suggest, in very truth, that all intelligent and respectable parents should take as their example in this grave matter of child-bearing the most irresponsible elements in the community."

In 1933, the Federation of Jewish Women's Organizations voiced their support of the legalization of birth control. Other groups that actively promoted birth control included the National Council of Jewish Women, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA). Sanger, of the National Committee on Federal Legislation for Birth Control, spoke at the Annual Convention of the Federation of Jewish Women's Organizations on January 25, 1937.²⁷⁶ She said, "Last month, several hundred physicians, scientists, and representatives from birth control clinics met in a two day Conference of Contraceptive Research ... There was discussion at one interesting session as to what a birth control center should be called. Many thought it might better be called a Mother's Health Center or a Race Betterment Center, and these terms well describe what such a center is."

What are the consequences of the eugenics movement today? Prior to *Roe v. Wade* in 1973, the majority of those seeking an illegal abortion were white. Times and circumstances have changed. Pastor Johnny Hunter, head of the African American evangelical pro-life ministry LEARN, Inc., said, "Abortion is the number-one killer of blacks in America. We're losing our people at the rate of 1,452 a day. That's just pure genocide. There's no other word for it. (Sanger's) influence and the whole mindset that Planned Parenthood has brought into the black community . . . say it's okay to destroy your people. We bought into the lie; we bought into the propaganda." He also points out that "black people were once exploited by the slave industry and are now being exploited by the abortion industry, yet this time they're not fighting it." Black women are more likely to have an abortion than white women, according to the Alan Guttmacher Institute.

Communism in America

Before the czar's overthrow, Lenin announced, "After Russia we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia, then we will encircle the United States, which will be the last bastion of capitalism. We will not have to attack. It will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands" The state is an artificial entity that produces no product or wealth, but rather seizes and redistributes the assets resulting from the labor of its citizens to select residents

or foreign countries. Such Marxist policies, disguised as charitable policies, function to centralize power into one entity. The Marxists, using Trotsky's devious method of subterfuge and infiltration, rather than Lenin's brutal revolt, would incrementally and ultimately shift the USA far left, through a series of situational legislative maneuvers, acceptable to a propagandized population, into a communist tyranny.

David Hirsch fled Germany due to his revolutionary activities. He settled in New York and opened David Hirsch & Company. Hirsch employees all belonged to the International Workingmen's Association, which moved its headquarters to New York in 1873. In that same year, twenty-three year old Samuel Gompers learned about the Knights of Labor when he was working for Hirsch, the only union shop in the city. Gompers swore several oaths, as is the custom, in response to the Master Workman's questions. Afterward he went through an initiation ceremony, where he heard several speeches, and, once the others accepted him as a member, they taught him the secret signs, grips, passwords, and ritual answers. Gompers, a Talmudist, could read Hebrew, but not German. Ferdinand Laurrell, a coworker, gave him a copy of the Communist Manifesto, and he learned to read German. He wrote, "Then, I read all the German economic literature that I could lay my hands on, Marx, Engels, Lassalle and the others." Although Marx urged the conquest of political power, he always regarded the unions as very important. He discouraged self-employment and promoted corporatocracy, which required low-interest loans, available through government intervention, which necessitated political action in order to capture the state. On December 8, 1886, Gompers helped found and was president (1886-1894, 1895-1924) of the American Federation of Labor (later AFL-CIO), an alliance of craft unions disaffected from the Knights of Labor. Supposedly it was hostile to the communists.

While there are many key players following the socialist agenda in the US even before 1900, having important positions in unions and education, one sticks out. Louis D. Brandeis from Prague, whom President Woodrow Wilson appointed to the Supreme Court, against substantial opposition due to his "radicalism." He blackmailed President Wilson and in return became the first Jewish person in US politics/justice system. He interpreted the law, not from precedent or constitutionally, but according to his personal Judaic worldview. He felt that the "Constitution must be given liberal construction." He played a role in persuading Wilson to get the United States into the war. During World War I, he studied the political aspects of Jewish affairs in every country. He then adopted Zionism and visited Palestine in 1919. Since his time on the court, there has been a tendency to adjudicate, not by law, but like a legislative body. Wilson told Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, regarding Zionism, "Whenever the time comes, and you and Justice Brandeis feel that the time is ripe for me to speak and act, I shall be ready."

Dedicated Bolsheviks established a branch of the Communist Party in America (CPA) during a convention, September 1-7, 1919, in Chicago, as the Moscow-directed American Section of the Third International. There were approximately 125 delegates. Many of those who established the official Communist Party had emigrated from Russia, Poland,

and other countries. Their initial objective was to overthrow the US government, not through revolution, but by deception and infiltration. They infiltrated the churches, where they disseminated socialist doctrine. Just as in other countries, socialist infiltrators emerged in America, a productive nation of independent workers. Assuming control of the workers of America, part of the world's workers, was logical, particularly because many employers exploited and oppressed them, and they had very little recourse, had no legislative power, and lacked media influence. This was very problematic, and labor unions, like the National Textile Workers Union (1889), the Workers International Relief, created in Berlin on September 12, 1921, per Lenin's instructions, and the International Labor Defense (1925), headed by William L. Patterson, were all powerful groups founded and led by immigrants, who could conceivably provide ready solutions. These Marxist immigrants, hawking socialism disguised as humanitarianism, like those editors and writers in the 1850s, began publishing numerous newspapers targeted at disgruntled workers, a group extremely vulnerable to communist exploitation, indubitably by design. Keep in mind that the House of Rothschild sought to control labor, through what he called the European plan, a characteristic that the capitalists have in common with the communists. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge addressed the Senate on January 7, 1924, and presented evidence of the manipulations manufactured in Moscow for world revolution. The Senate's Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations convened hearings under the chairmanship of William Borah, during which its members issued a recommendation for the recognition of the Soviet Government in Russia.

Before the Bolsheviks overthrew Russia, between 1880 and 1914, waves of immigrants came to the United States. After the Bolsheviks seized control in 1917, there was a five-year period (1919-1924) where "communist-inclined immigrants" from Eastern Europe immigrated to the United States, until Congress passed a restrictive law in 1924. During that period, about 3,000,000 people came from Eastern Europe, many of whom were Soviet agents, among them—Sidney Hillman. Twenty-two years later, he was working with President Franklin D. Roosevelt (US President before and during WW2). The immigrants were not all confirmed Marxists, but enough of them to influence national policy were. Most of those largely non-Christian Eastern European immigrants embraced the Democrat Party. They helped to elect Franklin D. Roosevelt. He won over Herbert Hoover (9,129,606 to 8,538,221). They were attracted to the Democratic Party, because its insiders had transformed it into a leftist collection of several groups. On May 1, 1932, the Proletarian News, the newspapers of the Communist International, reported, "The organization in America that is preparing the workers for the momentous act of selfemancipation is the Proletarian Party."

On February 15, 1932, that paper reported, "We must spread the message of communism to all. Workers, Comrades, Friends support the Proletarian News. It is needed to instill class consciousness into the American workers, to organize them for the approaching conflict. Build for Communism in America!" By 1933, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA (1934-1945), estimated that there were 1,200,000 members

in the party. By 1936, communists were editing about 600 newspapers and periodicals. According to the Fourth Report of the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities of 1948, "The Communist Party of the United States is the agent of the Soviet Government and its totalitarian dictator, Joseph Stalin. The committee finds that the Communist Party is, in no sense, a domestic political party."

As it can be seen, between 1920 and 1950, the world was heavily influenced by communism. It took hold in Russia, gained influence in the US, but also tried in Germany, Poland, Hungary, UK and France. The arch enemy of communism, national socialism, took hold in Germany in 1933. Being surrounded by the socialist movement, war seemed inevitable.

5.6 Imperialism and Warfare

Imperialism necessitates "international military commitments," including a substantial number of permanent military bases. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it also required an increase in military forces. Therefore, business-friendly Congress authorized a 300 percent increase in the Marine Corps to forcefully facilitate imperialist objectives. This included for instance the annexation of Hawaii in 1893 in order to strengthen the US naval presence in the Pacific Ocean. In 1897, Theodore Roosevelt, then assistant navy secretary, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, backed by J. Pierpont Morgan and other international bankers, began promoting US supremacy and warfare. Certain globalist politicians had long dreamed of a canal linking the Atlantic and the Pacific. Roosevelt, a pragmatist, felt that a canal was practical, vital, and indispensable to the globalist destiny of supremacy over US coastal waters. The globalist goal, even then, was US control of key islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific.

According to Roosevelt, the United States needed to fulfill certain requirements in order to enter the global schematic. Initially, the United States should control an isthmian canal to establish US dominance in the Caribbean and the Pacific. To protect and exploit the canal, the United States also required a militarized navy. Lastly, to dominate, the United States had to position naval bases in strategic areas adjacent to the canal. Using an Anglo American alliance and military power, the British would supervise the east while the United States dominated the west. Each power would secure the best interests of "civilization" against the "barbarians" in their designated sphere. Their respective navies, the best in the world, would enforce peace. He recapped the New World Order strategy in 1899, "Together ... the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race ... can whip the world."

Imperialism continued with the Philippines. In September 1898, Rudyard Kipling, a colleague of Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, wrote to his imperialist friend Roosevelt, urging the US seizure of the Philippines as the spoils from the Spanish-American War. "Now go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on permanently to the whole Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pickaxe into the foundations of a rotten house,

and she is morally bound to build the house over again from the foundations or have it fall about her ears." The implications were that the United States should rule their new colony the way that Britain ruled the nonwhite populations of India and Africa. In November, Kipling sent his poem "The White Man's Burden" to Roosevelt. President McKinley, regarding the Philippines, said, "I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance and one night late it came to me this way. We could not leave [the Filipinos] to themselves, they were unfit for self-government, and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was. There was nothing left for us to do but take them all and educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them." On December 21, 1898, McKinley, in his skillfully worded Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, claimed that the United States did not come as "invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights." However, the document extended US military control, with 75,000 troops by 1899 and, within a few years, 126,000 men. It arrogantly granted military dominion over the entire country in fulfillment of the rights of US sovereignty.

The Sugar Trust

The Havemeyers were the sugar-kings of the East, as they had established their conglomerate long before Adolph Spreckels started his business. William and Frederick C. Havemeyer emigrated from Bueckeburg, Germany, where they had learned the art of sugar refining. They established a business in New York City and, beginning in 1828, their sons ran the business under the name of W. F. & F. C. Havemeyer. In 1857, they opened the Havemeyer, Townsend and Company in Williamsburg, Virginia, the site of a deep-water harbor. Henry O. Havemeyer's grandfather, the immigrant, made a fortune from his refining business and, upon his death in 1861, left Henry \$3 million. Henry collaborated with his cousin William F. Havemeyer, the three-term mayor of New York, in the refining business. Union soldiers and the devastation of the Civil War destroyed the South's sugar industry, along with other industries. The Civil War accelerated the growth of manufacturing and the power of the men who owned corporations. Afterward, corporations campaigned to eliminate the legal restrictions that prohibited industrial corruption. America's sugar consumption has drastically increased since then. America, according to William Dufty, consumes about one-fifth of the world's sugar every year. Mark Hanna and Henry O. Havemeyer instituted the continuing, systematic bribing of corrupt officials, like Senator Nelson W. Aldrich and his congressional and judicial cronies. Most Supreme Court judges were former corporate lawyers.

Manufacturers produce the majority of sugar, which is equally as addictive as cocaine, from sugar cane or sugar beets that they then reduce to sucrose. The process extracts all of the vitamins, minerals, proteins, enzymes, and nutrients, leaving an artificial, heroin-like substance. Sugar is more destructive than other poisons, drugs, or narcotics, in that people regard it as a food and consume it in enormous amounts. It is one of the first

toxins innocently introduced to an infant, either through its formula or through sugar-contaminated breast milk. Producers process heroin and sugar the same way. Workers extract opium from the poppy plant, and then process the opium into heroin and refine it into morphine. With sugar, juice is extracted from the cane or beet, refined into molasses, and then into brown sugar, and then into white crystals (C₁₂H₂₂O). Both sugar and heroin are biologically unfamiliar to the body, which cannot naturally metabolize them.

Manufacturers centered their sugar-refining in New York City, where it became the city's most profitable industry (1870-1920). In 1880, Henry O. Havemeyer retained attorney Elihu Root, an influential man with numerous powerful friends in Washington.³⁰¹ New York producers processed about 59 percent of the country's raw sugar in 1872, growing to about 68 percent by 1887. The sugar-refining business focused on imported sugar and companies, like Havemeyer, who maintained large waterfront plants in Brooklyn. They began working to expand and consolidate their controlling interests by 1887. Havemeyer resided at Penataquit Point on Long Island, where his neighbors included Simon F. Rothschild.

Before August 1887, free competition existed throughout the sugar trade. Raw sugar producers throughout the world came to New York and other US ports to market their produce. Numerous buyers were prepared to purchase, according to the flexible price of supply and demand.³⁰³ Havemeyer, like other industrialists, attempted to fix prices, control the market, and destroy his competition. In the fall of 1887, he formed the Sugar Refining Company, a holding company, or trustee device, comprised of twenty-one major Brooklyn sugar refineries. Under President Grover Cleveland, US foreign policy, particularly toward Cuba, was dependent on the economic goals of America's leading business interests. According to Edwin F. Atkins, Richard Olney was "always willing to listen to what I had to say upon the Cuban situation." Havemeyer and Atkins were some of the first Americans to invest money in the Cuban sugar industry, and their joint investments were extremely profitable. Atkins had good political connections and aggressively pushed tariff legislation favorable to his investment interests. He worked with Olney, the Attorney General, on the tariff issues of the late 1890s.

Senator John Sherman, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and a Rockefeller associate, sponsored antitrust legislation. Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, and President Benjamin Harrison signed it into law on July 2, 1890, the first federal statute to limit cartels and monopolies, declaring that trusts were illegal according to courts. Rather than limit trusts, it really functioned to restrict competition. On January 10, 1891, Havemeyer, with Elihu Root's legal advice, reorganized and incorporated the trust into the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC) in New Jersey, a state that had altered their regulations regarding corporations although he kept the offices at 117 Wall Street. Havemeyer reorganized and capitalized his company at \$50 million.

Roger Q. Mills, chairman of the US House Committee on Ways and Means (1887-1889), was a leading authority on tariffs in Congress. He was a tariff-for-revenue-only Democrat. He argued that a tax on raw sugar was one of the least obnoxious taxes that Congress

could impose, which generated good steady revenue. Interestingly, William McKinley, supported by big money, replaced him as chairperson of the US House Committee on Ways and Means (1889-1891). McKinley then introduced his legislation. Essentially, the McKinley Bill of 1890, which became law on October 1, 1890, made raw sugar free and allowed one-half cent a pound for refined sugar, a huge benefit to the Sugar Trust. The economic panic temporarily depressed sugar-trust certificates and other securities on the New York Stock Exchange. Yet, under the McKinley Act, the sugar-trust certificates went above par and ultimately reached 134 or 135, from 85 points in January 1890, when McKinley introduced the bill. The sugar trust certificates, at 85 Points, or \$42,500,000 advanced to \$63,750,000 on the American Sugar Refining Company's Stock. In 1890, the Sugar Trust had 8,000,000 shares, worth \$800,000,000. Havemeyer admitted on the witness stand in 1894, that the trust profited by about \$25 million in three years. He stated, "as long as the McKinley Bill is there we will exact that profit." Without the McKinley Bill, this would have been impossible.

Havemeyer contributed large amounts to both parties. He once claimed, "We get a good deal of protection for our contributions." With donations, he manipulated congressional votes on tariffs and taxes placed on foreign goods. The larger, high-volume refineries secured the majority of their raw-sugar imports from Cuba, and preferential treatment guaranteed stable supplies at low prices. From 1891 on, tariffs excluded the importation of refined sugar, which would have competed with the domestic refiners. Havemeyer convinced Congress to lower the tariffs on imported raw sugar. He also wanted protection against competing imports of his product—refined sugar. He used price-cutting and price wars in the early 1890s against domestic refiners, especially against Adolph Spreckels, the West Coast's dominant sugar refiner. Spreckels even built a refining plant in Philadelphia. However, Havemeyer won this war by acquiring all sugar-refining firms in Philadelphia, including the Spreckels Sugar Refining Company. Within several years, the American Sugar Refining Company controlled about 90 percent of the industry.

Lenient New Jersey corporation laws enabled Senator Aldrich to expand his railway interests, resulting in the Union Traction and Electric Company of New York. His company was a consolidation of smaller firms of which he was president, in addition to being president of the Pawtucket Street Railway Company, which was in the process of constructing eighteen miles of road, a source of potential profit. Aldrich needed cash and called on his friends to supply it. In 1892, the directors of the Union Traction and Electric Company, also members of the Sugar Trust, gave \$1,500,000 cash to Aldrich's enterprise. One of those directors was John E. Searles, Secretary/Treasurer of the trust. The cash contribution helped Aldrich to complete his scheme and probably seemed insignificant to Searles. The citizens elected Aldrich for another six years. The Sugar Trust, over three years, according to Havemeyer, made about \$35 million because of his legislation.³¹⁴ August Belmont, affiliated with the Tammany Society, also invested Rothschild money in New York traction companies. The New York Times reported that the Sugar Trust, in the mid-1890s, had agents in Washington "seeking by every means in their power to

defeat every attempt to deprive them of the benefits which the trust was enjoying under the operation of the McKinley Tariff."

In the spring of 1894, the House bill angered the Sugar Trust. Accordingly, one or more of its officers visited Washington, negotiating with members of the Senate and the administration. Havemeyer, Theodore A. Havemeyer, and Searles, with massive political influence, persuaded reluctant committee members to provide a schedule that would give them as large a benefit as they had under the McKinley Bill. The Sugar Trust opposed the House of Representatives' sugar schedule that the House had sent to the Senate on February 2, 1894. The Senate made alterations on the House bill by March 20, but the Sugar Trust wanted to retain the McKinley Tariff, which was impossible.

Rumors were abounding about the Sugar Trust, and, on March 20, 1894, Congress levied a rate of about one cent a pound on raw sugar and an additional one-eighth of a cent per pound on refined, which caused an immediate outcry from the Sugar Trust. Congress then made further changes, making it more intricate and more advantageous to the refiners. There were rumors about bribes, deals, and threats. A journalist for The Philadelphia Press claimed that the Sugar Trust had contributed \$500,000 to the Democratic campaign fund in exchange for promises regarding the trust. When the House removed the duty, the trust reminded the administration of its promises. Secretary Carlisle, at the direction of President Cleveland, told the sub-committee that the party was financially obligated. Many senators took advantage of the congressional information regarding the sugar schedule and speculated in sugar stock. The media heard that numerous senators had invested in sugar, which compelled other congressmen to investigate but many of the allegations were discredited by Congress.

On June 4, 1894, The New York Daily Commercial Bulletin reported in an editorial column that the trust controlled the government. The newspaper estimated that the trust's profit, because of the protective tariff and duty on raw sugar, amounted to \$34,620,000 during a sixmonth period.³²² The New York Times of June 20, 1894, also exposed the background of McKinley's Tariff Act of 1890. Senator Aldrich, of the Finance Committee, inserted changes into Representative McKinley's bill when he managed its passage in the Senate. The changes decreased duties on raw sugar and allowed the Sugar Trust to acquire an unwarranted \$35,000,000 in profits at the citizen's expense. Aldrich claimed that there was no trust, and that the decreased duty benefited everyone. The Finance Committee, composed of both parties, had passed the bill, which later became a law. On August 27, 1894, Congress passed the Revenue Act or Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, which minimally decreased the US tariff rates. Both Wilson and Gorman were financially indebted to the Sugar Trust. Instead of imposing tariffs and making the industrialists responsible for appropriately providing money, through legitimate tariffs, for the government to function, they shifted the entire responsibility to the taxpayer by imposing a peacetime 2 percent tax on income over \$4,000. Wilson was the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Senator Arthur P. Gorman, both Democrats, supported the tariff-reform bill, along with other party members.

On July 18, 1899, Atkins told the industrial commission that the tariff had commercially ruined Cuba, especially if it became an independent nation. No one in the US government seriously thought that Cuba would become independent. There were too many Americans investing money in sugar mills, supported by the policies of the US government. Those investors ignorantly expected that American blacks would migrate to Cuba to work on the plantations, which would Americanize the country. Havemeyer was not worried about sugar refiners in Cuba competing with the Sugar Trust. Apparently, whether America legally annexed Cuba or not, it was immaterial to them as long as Cuba provided sugar at the prices he wanted to pay.

By 1900, Havemeyer had eliminated the remaining competition in the area by merging them into the National Sugar Refining Company of New Jersey, of which the most important company was the American Sugar Refining Company. By 1907, the Havemeyers controlled, directly or indirectly, about 98 percent of all national sugar production.³²⁹ According to *The New York Times* of January 15, 1902, the board of National City Bank reelected Havemeyer to their board. He also sat on the board of Kennecott Copper Company and participated as a board member with other corporations engaged in the sugar, coal, and railroad business and was a trustee with Solomon R. Guggenheim on the Guggenheim Foundation. He, with his neighbor Simon F. Rothschild, was a director at the Williamsburgh Trust Company in Brooklyn.³³² He was on the board of the Colonial Trust Company, the Colonial Safe Deposit Company, the City Trust Company of New York, and the Central Realty Bond and Trust Company.

In 1906, Havemeyer collaborated with other investors and bought into the Cuban American Sugar Company. In 1906, he refused to raise the wages of striking workers to eighteen cents per hour, though his company posted profits of \$55 million. In 1907, the courts found the American Sugar Refining Company guilty of taking illegal railroad rebates. When he died on December 4, 1907, he left an estate of \$17 million. The American Sugar Refining had only 49.3 percent of the US market, despite its twenty-five plants. After his death, his company sold off a number of holdings and developed its own brand of sugar for the marketplace, Domino.

Political Puppets for Corporate Interests

Wealthy industrialists and lawyers installed Democrat Grover Cleveland into the US Presidency twice (1884-1888, 1892-1896). Their management of Cleveland instituted an ongoing precedent for succeeding administrations of both parties—financial donations entail specific commitments and obligatory political appointments. Cleveland then appointed William C. Whitney (S&B), a corporate lawyer, as Navy Secretary in his first administration. Whitney was married to Flora Payne, daughter of Ohio Senator Henry B. Payne and a sister of Whitney's Yale classmate, Oliver H. Payne, later Standard Oil's treasurer. Whitney, with counsel from industrialists, directed the navy's expansion, including building the USS *Maine* and the USS *Texas*, authorized by Congress on August 3,

1886, as part of the "New Navy." The USS Maine was the first steel warship that workers totally constructed in the United States. Whitney facilitated the domestic production of advanced weaponry and plate armor and reorganized the finances and logistics of the Navy Department and helped make the Naval War College a success.

William McKinley, a popular politician, caught the attention of Mark Hanna, a Cleveland industrialist who was anxious to install another obliging president. Hanna helped McKinley become Ohio's governor in 1891 and 1893. In 1893, McKinley, because of his assistance to a friend, had a staggering debt of \$130,000. Hanna and his wealthy cronies, Myron T. Herrick, Samuel Mather, Charles Taft, Henry C. Frick, Andrew Carnegie, and others, paid this debt. On August 15, 1896, after an informal meeting between Mark Hanna and James J. Hill, CEO of the Great Northern Railway, Hill offered to introduce Hanna to some of his close Wall Street connections. Within a week, the entire J. Pierpont Morgan clique transferred their allegiance to McKinley. Standard Oil donated \$250,000 to the Republican Party, as did every Wall Street bank and most of the insurance companies. New York Life (Morgan), the Mutual Life (Rockefeller), and Equitable Life (Ryan-Harriman) all generously backed McKinley. Taft, Harding and McKinley were all from Ohio, the center of the Standard Oil Empire, a huge supporter of Hanna beginning in 1876.

Hanna succeeded in getting the political support of Booker T. Washington, the director of the Tuskegee Institute, located in Georgia. The Republicans had strong Northern and Midwestern support, but needed to win in the South. Hanna rented a cottage in Thomasville, Georgia, where he and McKinley scheduled daily visitors, among whom were journalists, publishers, and politicians. He soon had the support of numerous Southern delegates. The 1896 election, a "realignment" election, was the last one in which a candidate attempted to capture the presidency with a majority of agrarian votes. Beginning with the election of 1800, presidential campaigns had been a competition between agrarian or mercantile interests. It was a struggle between the independent farmers and common people and the industrial interests, represented by Wall Street and later, after the Civil War, became corporate interests. Elites installed McKinley as president in 1896, and Hanna was elevated to the Rockefeller-controlled Senate, controlled by Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island. After a visit from J. Pierpont Morgan and an instructive letter from Andrew Carnegie, President McKinley, a freemason, appointed Philander C. Knox as his Attorney General, despite strong opposition from the labor sector. An Attorney General is supposed to protect the general population, and he should have prosecuted numerous individuals for anti-trust-law violations. Knox did nothing to halt the predatory monopolists, most of whom were former clients.

J. Pierpont Morgan financially backed McKinley's Assistant Navy Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, a freemason (Lodge #806, Oyster Bay, New York), and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who were the nucleus of a jingoistic Washington cabal that promoted war and worked tirelessly to provoke it. James D. Bulloch, the Confederate States main foreign agent in Britain, was the half-brother of Martha Bulloch Roosevelt, the mother of Roo-

sevelt and the grandmother of Eleanor Roosevelt. In other words, Bulloch was Theodore Roosevelt's uncle. Lodge, Roosevelt's professor at Harvard, was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on Cuba. The president appointed Roosevelt as Assistant Navy Secretary on April 19, 1897. He worked with Harvard-educated John D. Long, who the president appointed as Navy Secretary on March 5, 1897. Within a week of his appointment, Roosevelt began warning McKinley about potential trouble with Cuba and pushed for warfare preparation. Within two months, Roosevelt delivered a speech at the Naval War College, during which he promoted US supremacy and the need for the United States to become a world power. He also 1) advocated the importance of being adequately prepared for war; 2) the duty of Congress to fund better equipment; 3) the preeminence of offense rather than defense in naval tactics; 4) the ineffectiveness of diplomacy without force; 5) the delusion of "peace at any price," the clash of the races, and most importantly; 6) the virtues of war. His superiors never refuted his speech. He used the word "war" sixty-two times during his speech.

McKinley's administration allegedly opposed war. For Roosevelt, who had no combat experience, war was a test of greatness. His book, *The Naval War of 1812*, published in 1882, was required reading at the War College. He intended to use public opportunities to push the government into a war. He finished the book on his five-month European honeymoon, beginning in May 1881. In the first chapter, he talked about the Aryans' racial purity, and how the Norsemen were excellent fighters and seaman, as opposed to the Portuguese and Italians. In a letter to a friend in 1897 he said, "In strict confidence ... I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one." During McKinley's presidency, the United States invaded Cuba, seized Manila in the Philippines, and occupied Puerto Rico. Roosevelt, in reviewing history, consistently justified the numerous government atrocities against the existing native population during the 1800s with three arguments—the land did not really belong to them, the whites would put the land to better use, and "it was our manifest destiny to swallow up the land of all adjoining nations who were too weak to withstand us." He felt that war was "purifying and ennobling."

War Secretary Elihu Root built up America's military machine. On November 27, 1901, US officials, through his plans and promptings, established, by General Order 155, the US War College in Washington, DC. He also reorganized the administrative system of the War Department and established US authority in the Philippines. William C. Sanger (Pilgrims Society), related to the Dodge and Cleveland families, was assistant War Secretary. On February 21, 1903, Roosevelt, now president, after McKinley's assassination, attended the Masonic laying of the cornerstone of Roosevelt Hall, part of the War College. Samuel Young (Pilgrims Society), a veteran of the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, was the first president of that institution (1902-1903). Roosevelt ordered the construction of new ships and by February 22, 1909, laborers had constructed sixteen US battleships.

By the time Roosevelt was ready to leave office on March 4, 1909, the navy had acquired the "Great White Fleet"—those sixteen first-class battleships. To appear more warlike, they would paint future ships battleship gray. Author Warren Zimmerman claims that

John Hay, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Roosevelt could be called the “fathers of modern American imperialism and the men who set the United States on the road to becoming a great power.”

Annexing Hawaii for Its Own Good

In 1778, Captain James Cook and his men found a group of people who were much healthier and stronger than their European counterparts, with a much longer life expectancy. They had no major health issues, were vigorous, strong, and well nourished. Among other things, Cook's men brought tuberculosis to Hawaii. Like most ship captains, his crew was from the dregs of English society, which was chronically plagued with numerous diseases, such as typhus, smallpox, typhoid fever, measles, bronchitis, whooping cough, and venereal diseases. In 1846, Adolph Spreckels, born in Germany, immigrated to Charleston, South Carolina, where he worked in a grocery store. By 1856, he and his family relocated to San Francisco, where he established a brewery, a big source of wealth. In 1863, he opened the Bay Sugar Refining Company. He returned to Germany and spent two years studying the sugar industry, including eight months as a day laborer. Thereafter, with extensive notes and experience, he operated his newly established California Sugar Refinery to become the West Coast's major sugar refinery. He used raw cane sugar from US planters in the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Senators Justin S. Morrill, the sponsor of the Morrill Land-Grant Colleges Act in 1857, and John Sherman, author of the Sherman Antitrust Act and brother of General William T. Sherman, sat on the Senate Finance Committee. They opposed any official trade agreements with Hawaii. Morrill represented the East Coast sugar refiners, who worried that an overabundance of sugar would reduce profits. Free trade would also affect Louisiana's cane-sugar growers. Kalakaua, the reigning king of the Hawaiian Kingdom, close to the sugar growers, sent representatives to the United States as early as October 1874, to negotiate a reciprocity treaty in an attempt to halt an economic depression in the islands because of excessive exploitation by the growers. In November, he went to Washington to meet with President Ulysses S. Grant. The United States drafted a treaty on January 30, 1875, allowing the tax-free US importation of Hawaiian goods, mainly sugar and rice.

However, Spreckels opposed that treaty, as it contained no provisions for higher grades of raw sugar or refined sugar, offering no protection for his products. In addition, he feared that Hawaiian planters would refine and export sugar into the United States and bypass him. Congress passed another treaty in May 1876, about the same time that he visited Hawaii, to buy the bulk of the 1876 sugar crop, along with investing in the Waihee Plantation on Maui. While there, he loaned \$50,000 to Kalakaua, among other gifts, and was able to purchase several thousand acres of Crown land on Maui. He diversified into banking and began loaning the Hawaiian government money. Soon, Kalakaua removed all government officials antagonistic to Spreckels. In 1878, Spreckels purchased additional

land in Hawaii and formed the Hawaii Commercial Company. He also built a \$250,000, thirtymile-long irrigation ditch. In 1880, he acquired another 24,000 acres of choice Wailuku Crown land. In 1879, Spreckels bought controlling interest in W. G. Irwin & Company, Hawaii's leading brokerage firm, giving him control over a significant amount of the island's sugar crop. He purchased *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser* in 1880 and became its publisher. In 1881, he organized the Oceanic Steamship Company, giving him the ability to grow and ship the sugar to his West Coast refinery, where he marketed it under his own brand, Spreckels. He bragged that he owned Hawaii's government officials, who appointed Spreckels's personal attorney, John T. Dare, as Hawaii's Attorney General. By 1887, that government owed him \$700,000.

As early as 1854, Secretary of State James G. Blaine, a prominent Republican (1865-1900) and a huge fan of government expansion, promoted Hawaii annexation. Using the 1875 version of the reciprocity agreement, he extended the US security perimeter to Hawaii. Antiimperialist opposition had prevented Grant, and later Blaine, from further realizing their imperialistic plans. US officials took steps toward a formal empire during the immediate decades following the Civil War. In 1878, a treaty consolidated the US connection to Samoa and the rights to a coaling station at Pago Pago. In 1881, Blaine originated the reciprocity treaty with Hawaii, which allegedly put Hawaii within the US system. The United States renewed the treaty on January 20, 1887, with an amendment giving the United States exclusive rights to build a naval base at Pearl Harbor.

Corporate greed, including passive and/or aggressive regime change, drives America's long-term foreign policy. Trade agreements or "reciprocity treaties" (tariff-free trade akin to economic annexation or the creation of US protectorates), always favor business. These obligatory contracts generally include the exclusive right to extract resources, sell products, and maintain commercial properties and military bases, despite the justifiable objections of the native populations. US sugar growers, eager to expand their Hawaiian production found a compliant Hawaiian monarch, Kalakaua, who signed the "Bayonet Constitution," on July 6, 1887, which was written by Hawaii's Interior Minister Lorrin A. Thurston, an elite resident who considered his white-supremacist mentality a form of patriotism. This document reduced the king's executive power and deprived native Hawaiians of their voting rights. The composition of the islands in 1890 was 40,612 native Hawaiians, 27,391 Chinese and Japanese laborers, and 6,220 Americans, Britons, Germans, French, Norwegians, and Hawaii-born whites who were not the least bit interested in equality. Thurston set up a secret organization called the Hawaiian League to infiltrate and ultimately overthrow the monarchy. League members, who were fellow conspirators, controlled Kalakaua's administration. Kalakaua, much to his sister's horror, relinquished Pearl Harbor, the best natural port in the Pacific, to the United States. She regarded it as "a day of infamy in Hawaiian history." He died on January 20, 1891, and she soon became queen. Thurston, authorized by the Harrison administration, tried to bribe Queen Liliuokalani and each of her likeminded associates with the sum of \$250,000. She refused and introduced a new constitution, restoring native political power and equal

voting rights to every resident.

William J. McGee, geologist for the US Geological Survey in 1881, was the vice president of the National Geological Society, and then president. He managed the Bureau of American Ethnology (1893-1903), established in 1879 by an act of Congress. He insisted that Hawaii's annexation was a "natural" step by an "enlightened" nation interested in "the elevation of humanity and the ultimate peace and welfare of the world." He further asserted that "enlightened," invincible Americans, on a higher moral plateau, could subjugate lower-level people. White-skinned men, he said, lead the world and Americans should "take up the White Man's Burden," to lift up them world's weaklings—white, yellow, red, or black. President Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893), a grandson of President William H. Harrison, and his administration attempted to annex Hawaii in 1893. They feared that the reciprocity agreements would not protect Hawaii's white sugar growers from paying duties. Henry A. P. Carter, Hawaii's minister to Washington, and Blaine devised an agreement in 1889 to establish Hawaii as a US protectorate, which assured complete trade reciprocity between the United States and Hawaii.

Additionally, the United States guaranteed Hawaii's independence on the condition that Hawaii would not enter into agreements with other governments without US approval. Further, the agreement allowed the US military to enforce domestic peace and guard Hawaii from foreign takeovers. The Hawaiian monarch was justifiably suspicious that the United States would manipulate this provision to seize control of the island, so she rejected the agreement. Accordingly, Congress passed the McKinley Tariff in 1890, removing sugar from the tariff list, which placed Hawaii at a severe economic disadvantage, as industrialists could now import sugar from anywhere. The entire economy of Hawaii was based on sugar; this would destroy the islands. Blaine told Harrison that the United States could now easily annex the island. Blaine appointed John L. Stevens as US minister to Hawaii. He was a partner and coeditor of *The Kennebec Journal*, an Augusta, Maine, newspaper that had advocated for Hawaiian annexation since the 1850s. Stevens arrived in Honolulu in the summer of 1889. Thurston and a group of sugar-stock-owning wealthy, immigrant collaborators, including Samuel Castle, the country's largest landowner, met to discuss the situation. In the dark of night, the conspirators visited Stevens, and they decided to overthrow Hawaii's queen. Within a couple of days, more white landowners rallied. The queen's supporters also rallied. The conspirators had leverage—the support of the 3,000-ton cruiser USS *Boston*, sitting in the harbor.

In January 1893, the conspirators, with Stevens' support, staged a coup d'état. On January 16, Stevens ordered armed sailors and marines from the ship to disembark and guard certain locations in Honolulu that were under the queen's control. The unwary citizens assumed they had dispatched the military to protect the monarchy. The queen resisted, but Stevens had the support of the obedience-trained troops. Judge Sanford Dole, grandson of early missionaries, agreed, at the conspirator's request, to take control of a new provisional government which the US government recognized within forty-eight hours. Dole facilitated the annexation with Congress. The Hawaiian general public

made two attempts to restore their government, which resulted in numerous deaths and penalties for the insurgents. Ambassador Stevens went to Hawaii to do exactly what the president wanted him to do. The task of all US ambassadors is to protect US business interests. Official orders from Blaine or his successor, John W. Foster, grandfather of the John Foster Dulles and Allen Welsh Dulles, were unnecessary. Stevens alerted Washington officials of the impending coup. Thurston, an annexation advocate and leader of the Annexation Club, and Stevens devised the scheme to put Hawaii under US control. Stevens met with Blaine in 1892 to inform him of the political unrest in Hawaii, allegedly caused by the queen's rule. Thurston admitted later that Blaine told him that the United States would not oppose forced annexation.

On March 2, 1895, Lodge revisited the imperial idea and praised Alfred Thayer Mahan's writings regarding the influence of sea power. He was adamant about Hawaii's strategic and commercial importance. Lodge, a war hawk Republican, used every imaginable tactic to convince the Senate to seize Hawaii. He showed a map of Britain's bases throughout the world and suggested that Japan was a rival. He sought funding for more battleships and nine torpedo boats for a worldclass navy. Roosevelt supported him, but was not yet in a position to promote expansionism. Lodge was the internationalist's point man. He wrote numerous magazine articles promoting expansion and "the advancement of the race." He claimed, "We must have a record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century." Cleveland's Secretary of State, Richard Olney, a Boston attorney and board member of the Morgan-run Boston and Maine Railroad, pursued an aggressive policy of interventionism. He manipulated the Monroe Doctrine to extend it to Hawaii or anywhere else big business wanted to go. He informed the British that the United States was "practically sovereign" on the continent. He shifted the doctrine from a prohibition against foreign interference to a justification of unilateral US intervention and American imperialism.

Mahan's advocacy for Hawaiian seizure coincided with Hawaii's 1893 revolution and annexation. He wrote a letter to the editor of *The New York Times*, urging the islands' acquisition by "a great, civilized maritime power" instead of taking the chance of losing them to the control of barbaric nations like China or Japan. At their request, he wrote an article for *Forum Magazine*, entitled, *Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power*, in which he elaborated on the correlation between the islands and the proposed isthmian canal. He adamantly maintained that Hawaii was paramount to America's commercial and military hegemony of the Pacific, especially the northern Pacific. In a letter, Mahan reiterated to Roosevelt that the Cleveland administration could have taken Hawaii easily, and the failure to do that led to a "present danger of war" with Japan. He wrote, "The decision not to bring under the authority of one's own government some external position, when just occasion offers, may by future generations be bewailed in tears of blood." Roosevelt responded, "as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my way, we would annex those islands tomorrow. If that is impossible I would establish a protectorate over them ..." He stated that Secretary of the

Navy John D. Long held those same opinions. Roosevelt prompted Long to goad the administration to take immediate action before Japan became stronger. He wrote, "With Hawaii once in our hands, most of the danger of friction with Japan would disappear." He was also angry over Cleveland's mismanagement of the Hawaiian issue, and viewed the possession of the islands as vital to building an isthmian canal and the expansion of US naval strength.

William McKinley, the new president, appointed Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1897-1898), which delighted Mahan. Mahan expressed his concerns to Roosevelt about Japan's rising naval power, especially after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), and urged the use of US naval forces in the Pacific. He, through his writings, criticized the Cleveland administration over its "crass blindness" and failure to take Hawaii in 1893. He said that the United States should have seized the islands and afterward resolved any accompanying problems after the fact. He wrote, "We stand at the opening of a period when the question is to be settled decisively, though the issue may be long delayed, whether Eastern or Western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and to control its future."

In June 1897, Mahan shared a letter with Roosevelt that he received from the Oriental Association of Tokyo. Apparently, members of the Club of Naval Officers of Japan had translated Mahan's book, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, into Japanese and had sold several thousand evidence of Japan's objectives. Roosevelt immediately shared the "very remarkable" letter to Long, who advised President McKinley to take "immediate action" in Hawaii." Roosevelt then enlisted Mahan's assistance to persuade indecisive senators to favor annexation. Mahan, at Roosevelt's request, wrote to Senator George Frisbie Hoar, who questioned the wisdom of annexation. Mahan recommended that the senator read *Interest of America in Sea Power*, which Mahan had just published. Early in 1898, Roosevelt urged Senator James H. Kyle to write to Mahan, requesting his expert assessment of the "strategic importance of Hawaii to the United States." Mahan responded that possession of Hawaii would unquestionably enlarge the United States militarily. A naval base in Hawaii would impede any communication in the event that a potential enemy from East Asia ever decides to attack the Pacific Coast. However, if Hawaii fell to antagonistic or neutral control, the likelihood of an invasion would be more probable. Therefore, according to Mahan, the United States should maintain a superior force in the Pacific to defend the West Coast.

The US Justice Department admitted that Congress had not sanctioned Hawaii's July 7, 1898, annexation, and it was technically illegitimate. In addition, the US government signed Public Law #103-150, acknowledging the illegality of the overthrow of the Hawaiian government. Hawaiians did not want annexation and never surrendered their sovereignty.

Early Expansionism in the Caribbean

US commercial relations with Cuba go back to the days of smuggling and piracy and the old colonial system. By the early 1790s, Cubans welcomed neutral ships. Yankee traders exchanged lard, flour, and hardware for sugar, coffee, molasses, and rum. By 1818, many Americans moved to Cuba, as officials did not enforce laws against foreigners, allowing them to avoid taxation. In 1837, Americans, with British loans, finished the first railway connecting Havana and Güines. They introduced steam engine machinery to the sugar industry in Matanzas and Cárdenas. Spanish officials then imposed a duty on US flour, and US officials retaliated by levying a duty against Cuban coffee. By 1850, the United States was exporting about \$8 million in goods to Cuba and importing about \$12 million from Cuba. Between 1851 and 1855, half the ships entering Cuban ports were from America. Sugar comprised 84 percent of Cuba's exports to the United States, where sugar consumption quadrupled between 1840 and 1860. Cuba was the world's largest exporter of sugar, man's first and most accessible mind-altering drug. It was the most profitable commodity in world trade at that time.

Hamilton Fish, named after Alexander Hamilton, was President Ulysses S. Grant's handler. Every president—a mere figurehead—as a mentor, especially since the Civil War. Fish, a Whig, graduated from Columbia College, where he belonged to the Philolexian Society and Sons of Liberty, a secret organization. Fish became a New York attorney and practiced law in New York with William B. Lawrence. Fish and his family spent two years traveling in Europe, and he returned in order to campaign for Lincoln, who was running for US president. Fish was the vice-president general of the Society of the Cincinnati (1848-1854), and then was president general from 1854 until his death. The Society of the Cincinnati (founded May 13, 1783) sought the complete seizure of power in order to install a dictatorship in the United States, as proposed by the Federalists. The rich would dominate this dictatorship, a highly centralized government. Fish was New York's sixteenth governor (1849-1850) and a member of the New York Historical Society, founded with the aid of Peter G. Stuyvesant, who donated the land that is now Stuyvesant Square in Manhattan. Fish was a trustee at Columbia University (1840-1849, 1851-1893) and board chairman (1859-1893).

Fish befriended "war hero," General Grant, a potential president, and even provided money for Grant's family, for which he might prove acquiescent to Fish and his friends. The world traveler, Fish, apparently possessing very deep pockets, financed Grant's campaign and influenced others to support his candidacy, despite the scandalous rumors of Grant's corruption and alcoholism. Fish was Grant's Secretary of State for two terms (1869-1877), and, during that crucial time, he negotiated the Treaty of Washington on May 8, 1871, which settled many issues between Britain and the United States. President Grant and Secretary of State Fish, both ambitious expansionists, targeted Latin America and the Pacific, beginning a chain of expansionist efforts from Grant to Theodore Roosevelt and beyond. William H. Seward had attempted to sign a reciprocity treaty with Hawaiian

officials, the first port beyond the continent, but was unsuccessful. Fish presided over the Washington Peace Conference between Spain, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia and promoted a litmus test for job applicants in the State Department.

Fish wanted to annex several Caribbean islands and maintain them under US ownership. He had visited Cuba, a Spanish colony, in 1855, and was impressed with its climate and beauty. Yet, he noted, "With its present population, the island of Cuba is anything other than a desirable acquisition to the United States, and I can see no means of getting rid of a population of some 450,000 called white, but really every shade and mixture of color, who own all the land on the island." Like Grant, Fish was prejudiced against people with a darker skin.

Spain had lost most of their Latin American colonies earlier in the century. Now, US industrial interests, to accommodate their own agenda, supported the Cubans in their revolt against Spain, their colonial masters. The revolutionaries wanted the United States to annex Cuba, or at least to officially recognize them. Secretary of State Fish rejected this proposal, but Grant favored it. Numerous sugar industrialists wanted the United States to recognize the belligerent Cubans, an act that would inevitably lead to war with Spain. Grant favored recognition, and, in August 1869, he signed a proclamation of neutrality and encouraged Spain to grant Cuban independence and free the slaves. He then provoked the situation by sending US expeditionary forces, which greatly displeased the Spanish colonial administration.

Fish tried to persuade Grant to withhold the neutrality document until his annual message on December 6, 1869. By then, Grant had already decided that recognition was unwarranted. Some Rebel Cubans purchased a US steamer, *Virginius*, registered it in the United States, and deceptively flew the US flag while supplying contraband to the Cuban rebels, but Spain surprised them and seized the ship and forced it to Cuba. The Spanish colonial government executed the captain and fifty-three predominantly US crewmembers, which destroyed any negotiation possibilities with Spain. On November 14, 1870, Fish issued an ultimatum to Spain, giving the nation twelve days to release the survivors. He demanded punishment for the officials who had seized the ship and ordered them to officially salute the US flag, a demand that they would drop if they could prove that the ship was illegally registered, which it was. The Spanish dismissed the other demands, which added to the conflict between the two nations. The president appointed Caleb Cushing as US Minister to Spain in February 1874. He pressured Spanish officials for reforms, abolition of slavery, and self-government for Cuba. Instead, Spain reinforced their military presence on the island, which temporarily suppressed the rebel forces. The US conflict with Spain regarding Cuba continued for over two decades.

The Ten Years' War ended with the Pact of Zanjón on February 10, 1878. After the war, the United States did not recognize the new Cuban government, while other European and Latin American nations did. The bloody ten-year battle devastated Cuba, apparently without it obtaining independence or any practicable resolutions, producing nothing but bitterness and resentment against the United States. About 208,000 Spanish soldiers

died, while 50,000 Cubans lost their lives. Other planters, seeking protection against pain, became US citizens as insurance against the economic consequences of future rebellions. At the same time, beet-sugar production, as opposed to cane-sugar production, coupled with the upheaval of the revolt, decreased sugar production and bankrupted many Cuban planters, who then relinquished their plantations to US bargain hunters. Certain US interests now had the best of both worlds—property and the control over the profitable production of natural resources without the challenge of political responsibilities.

The Phillipines

In the tenth century, Chinese merchants began trading in the Philippines (7,000 islands), a Spanish colony by 1575. In exchange for Chinese goods, Spanish traders received gold and silver from the New World and Mexico. These traders returned to Luzon's Manila Bay from Acapulco with ships laden with precious metals, making Manila an important financial center by the sixteenth century. Chinese middlemen made a reasonable profit and sent the majority of the gold and silver to China to pay for goods. The Spanish, intimidated by Chinese capabilities and economic access, denied them citizenship and prohibited them from owning land. Occasionally, they would massacre the ghetto-dwelling Chinese, sending a persuasive message while reducing the ethnic population. Inevitably, the Chinese cohabited with Malay girls to produce a large number of Chinese mestizo children. Parents raised these minority children as good Catholics, who often inherited their father's financial acuity, bought land, and acted as moneylenders and arbitrators.

The Spanish mestizos, not as business-savvy as their Chinese counterparts, used the law to manipulate the native Malays into forfeiting their land. This ultimately resulted in a lengthy Katipunan Rebellion (1834-1897), with another uprising against Spanish dominance beginning on August 23, 1896. Emilio Aguinaldo, a member of the Chinese-mestizo minority, led that rebellion. It initially failed, and he fled to Hong Kong, where he purchased weapons to continue the struggle for Philippine independence.

When wealthy industrialists installed William McKinley as US president in 1896, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge visited the president-elect's home in Canton, Ohio, to persuade him to appoint Theodore Roosevelt, a member of the British Royal Society, as the assistant navy secretary, a position initially created on August 1, 1861. Lodge also approached John D. Long the new navy secretary, and Mark Hanna, McKinley's political mentor. It took Lodge four months of persistence until he received Roosevelt's cable on April 6, 1897- he got the job. Lodge spent thirty-seven years in Washington and had friends, enemies, and plenty of influence. Lodge, a native Bostonian, was a former Harvard history professor who owed his political position to J. Pierpont Morgan, whose money dictated policy at Harvard. Roosevelt was a former student of the now-powerful politician. McKinley, like most presidents, was really a front man for big business and the banks.

Despite McKinley's campaign rhetoric, Long and Roosevelt were huge advocates of US naval superiority and expansionism. McKinley soon rescinded Cleveland's policy regarding

Hawaii by signing the annexation treaty in June 1897, which still required congressional approval. However, the continuing Cuban revolution soon overshadowed annexation issues. McKinley asked Elihu Root, a powerful corporate lawyer and millionaire, to go to Madrid in 1897 to participate in the negotiations over the Cuban controversy. However, Root declined McKinley's request. Root, always associated with the elite, would become the vice president of the Pilgrims Society after World War I.

Roosevelt viewed George Dewey, president of the Board of Inspection and Survey, of the Navy Department, an avid expansionist, as just the kind of man he wanted to command the Asiatic Squadron. On October 21, 1897, Dewey, now sufficiently appreciative and acquiescent, left the United States and went to Japan, where he would replace Admiral Frederick G. McNair as commander of the Asiatic Squadron, composed of the flagship Olympia, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, Boston, and McCulloch, and later the USS Baltimore. On January 1, 1898, Commodore Dewey officially took command of the cruiser Olympia, at Nagasaki.

Soon, Roosevelt sent Dewey the cable, "ORDER THE SQUADRON, EXCEPT THE MONOCACY, TO HONG KONG. KEEP FULL OF COAL. IN THE EVENT OF DECLARATION WAR [against] SPAIN, YOUR DUTY WILL BE TO SEE THAT THE SPANISH SQUADRON DOES NOT LEAVE THE ASIATIC COAST AND THEN [begin] OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN PHILIPPINE ISLAND. KEEP OLYMPIA UNTIL FURTHER DETAILS. ROOSEVELT." Neither McKinley nor Long rescinded his message. The United States had no grievances with the Filipinos, but the vulnerable islands were a good place to defeat the Spanish. Roosevelt's only challenge was to engineer the circumstances that would justify a US declaration of war against Spain. On February 11, 1898, before the explosion on the USS Maine, the Olympia left Japan headed toward Hong Kong. US officials scheduled the Philippine invasion, but needed a pretext to justify their aggression, conveniently provided by the USS Maine operation, which the same collaborators planned. Following the timely incident in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron waited in Hong Kong for the USS Baltimore on its way from Honolulu with adequate ammunition. Dewey could not remain in Hong Kong, as Britain was allegedly neutral, so the British governor ordered Dewey out of the area.

It took time and newspaper propaganda to provoke Congress and the masses to support military action. However, on April 21, 1898, before Congress approved of the war resolution on April 25, the US fleet began a blockade of Cuba. Dewey cabled Washington for instructions, and, with McKinley's approval, Secretary Long responded, "PROCEED AT ONCE TO THE PHILIPPINES, COMMENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SPANISH SQUADRON, YOU MUST CAPTURE OR DESTROY, USE UTMOST ENDEAVORS."⁴⁷⁰ On April 24, officials formally notified Dewey that the United States had declared war against Spain. The squadron proceeded thirty miles north to Mirs Bay, and then, on April 27, departed for the Philippines, arriving in Manila Bay on the night of April 30. They quickly defeated the Spanish fleet the next day. Dewey, known to be vain and arrogant, defeated and sank the entire Spanish fleet in six hours with the loss of

one American life. On March 24, 1903, because of his performance, his superiors would promote Dewey to admiral of the navy, an office created by Congress.

On May 1, 1898, in America's first acknowledged overseas war of conquest, the United States claimed victory against Spain. Interestingly, Adam Weishaupt formalized the Illuminati on May 1. If assistance to the Filipinos had been the actual objective, they should have departed, satisfied and victorious. Instead, on May 2, Congress voted a war emergency credit of \$34,625,725. Soon, the government replaced Dewey's fleet of seven ships with twenty ships. On May 19, 1898, Aguinaldo, the popular leader in the Filipino's fight for independence, at the invitation of the United States, returned from his Hong Kong exile. On May 25, the Philippine Expeditionary Force of 8,500 men, Eighth Army Corps, left San Francisco and arrived at Cavite. Aguinaldo declared independence on June 12, established the First Philippine Republic, and proceeded to establish a fully functioning government. While the public's attention was riveted on the war, on May 4, 1898, the House, with McKinley's consent, approved the annexation of Hawaii. On June 11, McKinley said, "We must have Hawaii to help us get our share of China."⁴⁷² On June 21, the United States seized Guam, a small Spanish-held island. On July 7, the United States annexed Hawaii. In relation to the United States, the Philippines are 7,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean, 600 miles from the Asian continent, and more than 4,500 miles from Hawaii. On August 14, the United States seized Puerto Rico. On December 10, Spain ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Cuba. On January 17, 1899, the United States took Wake Island, an uninhabited island in the North Pacific Ocean, located about two-thirds of the way between Honolulu and Guam.

In September 1898, Rudyard Kipling, a colleague of Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, wrote to his imperialist friend Roosevelt, urging the US seizure of the Philippines as the spoils from the Spanish-American War. "Now go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on permanently to the whole Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pickaxe into the foundations of a rotten house, and she is morally bound to build the house over again from the foundations or have it fall about her ears." The implications were that the United States should rule their new colony the way that Britain ruled the nonwhite populations of India and Africa. In November, Kipling sent his poem "The White Man's Burden" to Roosevelt.

President McKinley, regarding the Philippines, said, "I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance and one night late it came to me this way. We could not leave [the Filipinos] to themselves, they were unfit for self-government, and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was. There was nothing left for us to do but take them all and educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them." On December 21, 1898, McKinley, in his skillfully worded Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, claimed that the United States did not come as "invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights." However, the document extended US military control, with 75,000 troops by 1899 and, within a few years, 126,000 men. It arro-

gantly granted military dominion over the entire country in fulfillment of the rights of US sovereignty. In George F. Kennan's official version of the Spanish American War, the US population and the media forced the war upon "an unwilling President McKinley and a disapproving business and financial community." The historian and diplomat blamed US imperialism on the American people, who wanted to see the US flag flying on distant tropical isles and to bask in the "sunshine of recognition as a great imperial power." He did not mention the thousands of Americans who opposed both the war and a US empire. Somehow, he claimed, the leaders just could not resist the citizen's demands.

The National Geographic

Harvard-educated Gardiner Greene Hubbard, the National Geographic Society's (NGS) first president, was a lawyer, financier, philanthropist, and member of the Massachusetts Board of Education. His wife was Gertrude McCurdy, the sister of Richard A. McCurdy, a Pilgrims Society member and a director of Guaranty Trust. Hubbard's daughter Mabel married Alexander Graham Bell. The NGS had published the first issue of National Geographic in October 1888. The magazine soon became a propaganda tool for the government, especially during the war, by promoting territorial acquisition and economic exploitation. Geographers reinforced these ideologies in National Geographic during America's first ten years in the Philippines. The June 1898 issue of National Geographic was devoted to "the enormous possibilities of an extended commerce that now lie within our reach as a nation." One article demanded that the United States "take its rightful position among the nations of the earth" through overseas expansion and commercial exploitation. By controlling the island's resources, Henry Gannett, Chief Geographer of the United States, unabashedly claimed that the United States "shall become the dominant power of the Pacific, both politically and commercially."

In 1899, Gilbert H. Grosvenor, Taft's cousin, became the full-time editor of the magazine. In 1900, McKinley appointed Taft as the Philippines governor general, and also chair of the US-Philippine Commission, he began organizing a civilian government. Taft wrote articles for National Geographic (1901-1905) focusing on the civic and scientific progress in the Philippines, allegedly for the benefit of the Filipinos. He claimed that US motives in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were selfless but admitted that the United States had spent \$170 million to suppress guerilla warfare, which Aguinaldo led. He failed to mention the Filipino death toll during this so-called selfless endeavor. The United States established American-directed education to indoctrinate future workers for the developing US commerce.

Between 1898 and 1908, pro-imperialist authors, employees of federal and military agencies, such as the US Geological Survey, and the War and Navy Departments and university professors wrote at least thirty articles about the Philippines, the US "foothold in the development of the Orient." National Geographic articles claimed that the United States had a moral obligation to deliver progress, self-government, and material prosperity to

the “weaker races of the earth.” Authors elaborated that the political, naval, and industrial possibilities in the islands, located at “the very ideal center of all the land that face the Pacific,” can all have “practical value to the US.” Gannett, a vice president of the American Statistical Association, became the president of the National Geographic in 1909, soon to be tax-exempt.

The Philipinos as Test Subjects

On February 4, 1899, General Elwell S. Otis ordered US military forces to encircle not just Manila, but to extend into the Philippines Army territory. He then ordered the sentries to fire on any Filipino intruders. Privates William Grayson and Orville Miller, on guard duty, saw four drunk and unarmed men. Grayson yelled, “Halt!” One of the Philipinos drunkenly responded “Halto!” Grayson recalled, “Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him.” Before it was over, the sentries killed four inebriated, unarmed Philipinos. General Arthur MacArthur Jr., a freemason, used this incident, characterized as Filipino aggression, to initiate the Battle of Manila. Within twenty-four hours, US soldiers had slaughtered over 3,000 Philipinos, whose corpses lay in the streets. The Philipinos killed between fifty and sixty Americans in defense. Soldiers dug trenches and buried the Philipinos in a mass grave. McKinley announced, “Insurgents had attacked Manila” and Aguinaldo was now an “outlaw bandit.”

US officials viewed the 3,000 dead Philipinos as insurgents because of the Treaty of Paris. Technically, the Senate did not ratify it until February 6, 1899, two days after the killing of the four unarmed people. Possibly, the Philipinos might not have dissented had it not been for the killings. The United States, after the treaty, considered all revolutionaries as insurgents. Once the United States legally established sovereignty, they would not tolerate the government at Malolos, just as the United States had forbade an independent government at Richmond, Virginia. The Senate had only one choice according to one newspaper—go to war against the insurgency, forcing the Philipinos to trade one imperial antagonist for another. On February 9, 1899, The New York Times ran an article entitled “The Status of the Philipinos.” The Treaty of Paris imposed a military government, chosen by the president, in each of three countries, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, all former Spanish colonies. Thinking they were free from their longtime oppressor, citizens had begun to set up independent governments. The indigenous peoples did not view the US military as liberators, especially in the Philippines, where they concluded that they had invaded and had “taken up arms against us.”

Attorney and Congressman Joseph Wheeler, a West Point graduate and a Confederate Army veteran, arrived in the Philippines in August 1899, where he commanded the First Brigade under General Arthur MacArthur until January 1900. On June 16, 1900, his superiors commissioned Wheeler, a volunteer, as a brigadier general in the regular army. After he left the Philippines, he moved to New York and authored numerous books on military strategy, including *A Revised System of Cavalry Tactics*. One book, *The Santiago*

Campaign in 1898, detailed Major General William Shafter's assault on Santiago, Cuba, July 3-17, 1898. Wheeler said, "My plan would be to disarm the natives of the Philippine Islands, even if we have to kill half of them to do it."⁴⁹² He was at the organizational meeting of the Pilgrims Society in 1902 in London and became one of their US vice presidents. He was also a Smithsonian Institution regent (1886-1900).

For imperialist expansion, Britain and the United States officially formed an alliance in 1897. Britain also had prior alliances with France and Japan. Chauncey M. Depew, of the Pilgrims Society and a New York Senator supported war hawk Theodore Roosevelt as the US vice president in 1900. He said, "by the providence of God, by the statesmanship of William McKinley, and by the valor of Roosevelt and his associates, we have our market in the Philippines, and we stand in the presence of eight hundred millions of people, with the Pacific as an American lake."

General Arthur MacArthur, a Union veteran, took charge on May 25, 1900. He had warred against America's native population for thirty years and was fighting in the Dakota Territory when the Spanish-American War began. On December 20, 1900, MacArthur declared that the Filipinos were an "inferior race" and further stated that guerrilla warfare was contrary to "the customs and usages of war. Further, he said that those who engaged in it automatically "divest themselves of the character of soldiers, and if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war" but were to be treated as criminals. According to official hearings, the United States frequently employed waterboarding, which often proved lethal to the recipient.^{499 500 501} As early as 1556, in Antwerp, many countries banned that morally repugnant practice. By 1902, despite the deceptive language of liberation and freedom, US citizens were perplexed by the news that US soldiers were torturing Filipinos with water.

The US military also subjected the Filipinos to biological experimentation. In 1900, the US Army began conducting tests using biological weapons. As reported in the US Philippine Health Service Report, in 1903, the military dictatorship, despite the vibrant health of the native population, enacted a compulsory countrywide vaccination program. The residents, with access to clean air, water, and unadulterated food, were quite healthy. Smallpox was relatively unknown, but the military rounded up the unwilling Filipinos and herded them into vaccination centers. By 1905, there was a smallpox epidemic and numerous deaths, and, by 1910, vaccination was mandatory. Given the smallpox outbreak in a relatively virgin population, one would suppose that the countrywide would halt the program there and in the countrywide as well. However, they were intent on testing and marketing the vaccines rather than promoting health. They actually increased the vaccination program each year. This produced another horrific epidemic in 1907 and 1908.

In February 1927, Dr. William W. Keen, the first brain surgeon in the United States, part of the propaganda apparatus, wrote an article for the *American Review of Reviews*, in which he praised the effectiveness of the vaccine program in the Philippines. He wrote that, by 1921, in the Philippines, there had been 130,264 cases of smallpox, resulting in

74,369 deaths, and then he praised the fact that, in 1921, General Wood reinstated the vaccination program. There had been one epidemic after another from 1905 to 1923, when Wood began suppressing reports to give the impression that he had “conquered smallpox.” The mortality rate varied from 25 percent to 75 percent, depending on the location in the islands. There were fewer cases of smallpox in the more remote jungle areas, where people fled to avoid shots, but in the cities, where they vaccinated people, the epidemics were a critical calamity, the worst smallpox statistics in the world, along with the highest percentages of vaccinations.

Many doctors, government statisticians, and others determined that the vaccine program increased the incidence of smallpox rather than decreasing it. Dissenters accused the government of deliberately attempting to kill off the Filipinos so that the United States could seize the islands. They also charged that the drug companies and US doctors were using the population, whom they apparently cared nothing about, as guinea pigs for their experimental vaccines and drugs. The military is one of the biggest vaccine and drug-company customers, not only in the United States but in other countries. Drug companies, with their vaccine racket, lobby the government to inoculate all military personnel at taxpayer expense, including the health consequences resulting from those vaccines. The vaccine manufacturers viewed 11,000,000 Filipinos, under military occupation, as a profitable market, especially for the overstocked or spoiled vaccines. Otherwise, they would have to foist them on senior citizens, institutionalized soldiers, orphans, or prisoners. Currently, the drug companies use children in the foster-care system as guinea pigs. The vaccines caused preventable diseases such as typhoid, malaria, beriberi, and tuberculosis.

The biological experimentation in the Philippines, with its accompanying propaganda, government deception, and complicity with the drug companies, provided a shameful testing ground for introducing the beginnings of socialized medicine in America through the imposition of compulsory vaccination programs in the government schools. In 1981, Dr. Eleanor McBean wrote, “Medical practice is too haphazard, unscientific, unreliable, and dangerous to be trusted with the health and lives of the people. The United States is one of the sickest nations in the world at the present time.” US health statistics, despite the claims that we have the best health system in the world, have greatly decreased since she wrote those words.

Death by drugs was not the only manner in which the military assaulted the Filipinos. In writing about the battles of February 4-5, 1899, E. D. Furnam said, “We burned hundreds of houses and looted hundreds more. Some of the boys made good hauls of jewelry and clothing. Nearly every man has at least two suits of clothing, and our quarters are furnished in style; fine beds with silken drapery, mirrors, chairs, rockers, cushions, pianos, hanging-lamps, rugs, pictures, etc. We have horses and carriages, and bull-carts galore, and enough furniture and other plunder to load a steamer.” Anthony Mischea, of the Third Artillery, wrote, “We bombarded a place called Malabon, and then we went in and killed every native we met, men, women, and children. It was a dreadful sight, the killing of the poor creatures. The natives captured some of the Americans and literally hacked

them to pieces, so we got orders to spare no one."

H. L. Wells, a correspondent for the New York Evening Post, stated that there had been no widespread outrageous acts committed by US troops. He wrote, "There is no question that our men do 'shoot niggers' somewhat in the sporting spirit, but that is because war and their environments have rubbed off the thin veneer of civilization . . . Undoubtedly, they do not regard the shooting of Filipinos just as they would the shooting of white troops. This is partly because they are 'only niggers,' and partly because they despise them for their treacherous servility ... The soldiers feel they are fighting with savages, not with soldiers ..." The US recruiters had promised the troops, many of whom were mercenaries, good wages, in addition to war booty and confiscated land. Military leaders applied Abraham Lincoln's General Order Number 100 in the Philippines, which authorized the shooting, on sight, of all persons not in uniform or acting as soldiers and those committing, or seeking to commit, sabotage. The Seventh Cavalry Regiment, originally organized on September 21, 1866, occupied the Philippines (1904-1907), and again (1911-1915). It employed the same scorchedearth policies against the Filipinos as it had against the vulnerable Plains Indians. They burned entire villages, and killed unarmed Filipinos, including women and children. The troops thought they all looked alike and similar to the "red savages." In fact, they called the Filipinos "Apaches" or "gooks."

US military leadership in the Philippines consisted of men who had warred against the Apaches, Comanches, Kiowas, and Sioux. The Seventh Cavalry Regiment had taken part in the Wounded Knee massacre on December 29, 1890, where they slaughtered 370 unarmed women and children. One squad killed more than 1,000 "dark-skinned" Filipinos in just one village. General MacArthur defended his army's civilian massacres as "carrying out the civilizing mission of its Aryan ancestors." For three years, US troops battled to "emancipate" the Filipinos from the influence of Aguinaldo, who had hoped that America, a nation that had rebelled against England's imperial power, would not colonize another freedom-loving people. In the process, US troops killed hundreds of thousands of Filipinos, while about 4,000 US soldiers died for the imperialistic industrialists who coveted the resources in the Philippines. Beginning in the first year of the conflict, reports of US atrocities, the torching of villages, and the killing of prisoners, appeared in newspapers. Apparently, the military censors overlooked what reporters were writing or what soldiers revealed in the uncensored letters they sent home.

Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines became America's first "colonies," though it was unacceptable to use that word. The Supreme Court claimed, "Constitutional freedoms must follow the flag." Therefore, the Justices referred to them as "nonincorporated territories," entities that were not allowed to fly the US flag. The voters reelected McKinley in 1900. Leon F. Czolgosz shot him on September 6, 1901, at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo. Reportedly, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, both immigrants from Russia in the 1880s, influenced Czolgosz, an emotionally demented anarchist. McKinley died from his wounds on September 14, 1901. Theodore Roosevelt, the vice president, succeeded McKinley. Robert Todd Lincoln, President Lincoln's son, was with McKinley

when Czolgosz shot him. He was also with President James Garfield when Charles J. Guiteau shot him on July 2, 1881. Robert T. Lincoln associated with the individuals who had escaped culpability in his father's death. Lincoln, upon later discovering documents that implicated his friends, destroyed the evidence. Lincoln was President Garfield's war secretary (1881-1885) and US ambassador to Britain (1889-1893) under President Benjamin Harrison. He was general counsel to the Pullman Company and then president after George Pullman's death on October 19, 1897. He was Pullman's chairman until his death on July 26, 1926. Researcher Charles Savoie claims that Pullman Company investors included charter members of the Pilgrims Society, such as Marshall Field, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Mellon, and the Vanderbilts. Presumably, Lincoln was also a member, given his British ambassadorship and his business associations.

Some years after his death, family members discovered McKinley's handwritten note, scribbled right after his aides notified him of Dewey's victory over the Spanish. He wrote, "While we are conducting war, and, until its conclusion, we must keep all we can get. When the war is over, we must keep what we want." A short time before, McKinley admitted to a friend that he "could not have told where those darned islands were within two thousand miles." By an act of Congress, dated July 1, 1902, establishing the Philippine government, officials conducted a census that revealed a population of 7,572,199. According to Manuel Arellano Remondo's book, *General Geography of the Philippine Islands*, there were 9,000,000 people in the Philippines in 1895. The war officially ended on July 4, 1902, but hostilities and the work of death continued for almost a decade.

There are more imperialist incidents that could be mentioned, especially regarding the Panama-Channel and the Third World. Industrial and imperialist desires are not satisfied to this day, always trying for more profit, more control, more usury, a slavery without visible chains.

5.7 Capitalism and Corporatism

The Secretive Pilgrims Society

Cecil Rhodes, a freemason, and his brother floundered in their efforts to develop a cotton plantation in Africa. Funded by Rothschild, they went into the diamond-mining business. Rhodes, with his exploitation of the resources of Rhodesia, later renamed Zimbabwe, soon amassed a huge fortune through his De Beers diamond conglomerate, with Rothschild as the biggest shareholder. Rhodes earned £5,000 in 1872. In 1873, he returned to England to attend Oxford, leaving his associate, Charles Rudd to manage the business. Rhodes met Ruskin at Oxford.

William T. Stead, a journalist and social reformer, introduced Rhodes to Reginald B. Brett, Sir John B. Seeley, Albert Grey, and Edmund Garrett, who soon became Rhodes's

disciples. On February 5, 1891, Rhodes established the British Round Table, a Masonic organization, later formalized as the Pilgrims Society. He envisioned such a society for almost twenty years. Stead, Brett, and Milner made up the executive committee. Arthur J. Balfour, Harry Johnston, Nathan "Natty" Rothschild, and Albert Grey were the "Circle of Initiates." An outer circle was composed of associates. Rhodes left the majority of his estate to Rothschild, a freemason and eldest son of Lionel de Rothschild, to manage a scholarship program. Rhodes left about \$150 million to the Rhodes Foundation, for the exclusive purpose of fulfilling his ideological objectives of bringing about a one-world government through the machinations of a network of secret societies.

Rhodes was intent on the "ultimate recovery" of the United States as an "integral part of the British Empire" to culminate in an Illuminati utopian global system with an Imperial Parliament. Rothschild appointed Milner to chair the group. Milner recruited Rudyard Kipling, Balfour, and other illuminated alumnae from Oxford to form the Round Table, after the Knights of the Round Table, known as Milner's Kindergarten. In 1902, after Rhodes's death, Milner led the group. The Round Table created other organizations in the coming years. The Round Table had many influential member like Walter Lippmann, who later became a presidential advisor to US President Woodrow Wilson during WW1 and who is partly responsible for his "14 Point Programm", which handled the "peace" after WW1. Another important member was Edward M. House, also advisor to Woodrow Wilson. It is said that Wilson followed House's advice without question, especially concerning financial topics which ultimately led to the modern slave system know as the Federal Reserve.

Rothschild, as the Rhodes trustee, managed his estate according to one of the seven wills that Rhodes left. The Pilgrims Society would devote its efforts to "the extension of British rule throughout the world." Rhodes argued that the "British elite" were entitled to rule the world for the benefit of mankind. In the past, rule meant the seizure and exploitation of the world's raw materials, like gold and oil, through her military dominance overseas. An attachment to his will mandated the creation of the Rhodes scholarship. His will also directed "the furtherance of the British Empire, for the bringing of the whole uncivilized world under British rule, for the recovery of the United States, for the making the Anglo-Saxon race but one Empire." In another will, he states, "To and for the establishment, promotion, and development of a secret society, the true aim of which and object whereof shall be the extension of British rule throughout the world ... and finally the foundation of so great a power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity." The Pilgrims Society's major economic target was Germany, a country whose citizens were highly skilled. Other important names associated with the Pilgrims Society are, DuPont, Loeb (Kuhn-Loeb Banking), , Morgan (J.P. Morgan Banking), Rockefeller, Schiff (financed the Bolshevik Revolution) and Warburg (Banking Brothers, one mastermind of the Federal Reserve System, the other involved in Imperial Germanies government and also involved in sending Lenin to Russia via train). In 1915, There are now about 1,500 members, most of them US citizens who manage huge corporations,

banks, law firms, and insurance and media companies.

Lord Frederick Roberts, president of the British Pilgrims, died on November 14, 1914, which prompted memorials in New York and London. Major General Leonard Wood, military governor of Cuba for four years, remarked in his eulogy that Roberts encouraged the “strengthening of the military and naval defenses of the country,” a euphemism for militarizing a country for offensive warfare. Loeb banking family. John L. Loeb Jr. was also a Pilgrims Society member. J. & W. Seligman & Company had offices in Manhattan by 1878. They later relocated to 54 Wall Street and interlocked with the Anglo-California Bank. Seligman was a London correspondent for the London Rothschilds and associated with Nathan Rothschild, a member of Parliament (1865-1885). The Rothschilds, the Morgans, and the Seligmans backed the Society’s first transaction of \$55 million.

Winston Churchill advocated total war and pushed for “victory at any price” during the Boer War (October 11, 1899-May 31, 1902). He supported Lord Herbert H. Kitchener’s scorched-earth policies against the civilian population. In the early 1930s, Churchill wrote, “I have always urged fighting wars and other contentions with might and main till overwhelming victory, and then offering the hand of friendship to the vanquished.” Kitchener was a freemason, a fellowship whose upper echelon appears to support genocide. The whole point of the Boer War was to enable Britain to seize South Africa’s mineral wealth. In 1886, explorers had discovered massive gold deposits in the South African Republic, which immediately drew British interests to that country. Lord Frederick Roberts and Kitchener, during the Second Boer War, gained notoriety for incarcerating thousands of Boers and black Africans in concentration camps, where many of them starved to death. The pair orchestrated the burning of farms, which forced the inhabitants to flee. They also salted the fields to senselessly destroy productivity causing many farmers to abandon their farmlands. Kitchener was Roberts’s chief-of-staff and earned a reputation for his utter ruthlessness. Expansionists and soldiers, like Rhodes, Milner, Kitchener, and Roberts, became national heroes due to the “imperial propaganda” that saturated society. People then embraced the imperial dogma, because imperialism generated profits instead of expenses.

As the media grew in importance, secret alliances seized and dominated the flow of information. In 1920, Milner and Lord Robert Cecil, along with J. P. Morgan associates, created the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA). On July 29, 1921, they incorporated the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a branch of Britain’s RIIA, in New York. In 1925, they established the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). Lippmann, a Fabian, was a member of the American Round Table. There is a lengthy, close relationship between the Milner Group, J. P. Morgan, and the Carnegie Trust. Those directly involved included Thomas W. Lamont, a Morgan banker who focused on information control, and Jerome Greene of Lee, Higginson and Company. The London Rothschilds established a business alliance with Lee, Higginson & Company of Boston in 1901. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil treasurer, Charles Pratt, bestowed his New York mansion to the CFR to use as its world headquarters. Greene, with both Morgan and Rockefeller interests, chaired the

Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (1929-1932), a CFR spinoff. Lamont also had an influential position in that organization. J. P. Morgan immediately seized control of the CFR after its creation in New York. Carroll Quigley claimed that the US Eastern Establishment was a branch of the British Establishment.

The Pilgrims Society awards an honorary membership to London's secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, the American minister in London, the British consul general in New York, the British ambassador to America, the US ambassador to England, the British ambassador to the United Nations, the US secretary of state, and the US president. The secretary of state manages all official state business with all foreign ambassadors. Since 1903, the very secretive Pilgrims Society has granted an honorary membership to every US president and secretary of state.

Standard Oil Trust

Author Larry Abraham wrote, "If you wish to establish national monopolies, you must control national governments; if you wish to establish international monopolies or cartels, you must control a world government." The Rockefellers and their multiple industrial interests are a prime example of a monopoly trust. "

In 1861, John D. Rockefeller and Henry M. Flagler set up a small oil refinery in Cleveland, and, by 1870, Standard Oil Company of Ohio had absorbed all of its rivals. Rockefeller controlled the entire oil trade of the country from his Cleveland headquarters. He attempted to control the US oil and natural gas industries and crush his competitors through illegal price rebates. Oil was the fourth-largest US export by 1872 and the number one man-made export product. Within five years, Rockefeller was selling millions of gallons of oil and making millions of dollars and paying huge dividends, as much as 50 percent.⁶⁴⁶ He negotiated and obtained better freight prices and preferential treatment from the Pennsylvania, New York Central, and Erie Railroads, which agreed to give him rebates giving him incredible competitive advantages. Standard controlled a majority of the pipelines, engaged in price-cutting, and maintained a spy network to report on his competitors' operations, many of whom he bankrupted. By 1879, he would control about 90 percent of the US refining business and every important pipeline in the oil fields.

European buyers resented Standard's practices and terms, but Standard had a monopoly. The Germans were particularly anxious to disentangle themselves from Standard. By the late 1870s, other European countries were also seeking to break Standard's hold on them, especially when Standard raised its domestic and foreign prices for refined oil. Germans held meetings to determine how to manage the elevated prices and the devious policies, and they then began purchasing crude oil from independents who escaped Standard's competitive clutches. The Germans built refineries and processed the crude themselves, which infuriated Rockefeller.

These neophyte corporate owners in the US were greedy for their share of the market and,

in an effort to accumulate capital, decreased wages and prices to quash their competitors. Almost 16,000,000 recent immigrants, anxious for employment and a new life composed almost 15 percent of the population by 1890 and about 25 percent of the population of the more industrialized Northeastern states. Machines replaced many of the functions that skilled craftsmen previously employed to earn their living. Thus, many faced insecurity and unemployment. They, along with migrants, farmers, immigrants, and recently unemployed workers, soon resorted to working in the factories. By 1900, difficult times had compelled about 20 percent of the nation's women to abandon full-time household chores to work long hours in the factories, where oppressive owners paid them low wages. By 1900, corporations produced three-fourths of all manufactured goods. The Civil War produced an industrial system, and the predatory men who devised the corporations were ultimately the real victors.

Congressman Charles A. Lindbergh Sr. said, "We absolutely know that the trusts, as a result of the centralizing of the control of the industrial agencies and material resources, operated in connection with their juggling of credits and money, have made us dependent upon the trusts for employment. This is the industrial slavery that the capitalistic interests prefer to chattel slavery. If we were chattel slaves, they would have to care for us in sickness and old age, whereas now they are not concerned with us, except for the time during which we work for them." By 1910, the united states was at the bidding of the industrialists and bankers, who also owned most of the media. The only thing important for them was economy power, controlling people through money.

On April 11, 1914, Henry H. Klein wrote to President Woodrow Wilson regarding Standard Oil's greedy, oppressive monopolization of business that was crushing the nation's economic life. He told Wilson that, during the last twenty-five years, Standard Oil had distributed \$800,000,000 in dividends to its stockholders, and the value of its shares had increased from \$1,000,000 to \$1,300,000,000. Its annual profits were \$150,000,000, and only twenty people owned a majority of the stock. He said that Standard and its beneficiaries controlled the major railroads, mines, public utilities, key banks, and other financial institutions and were the leading stockholders in most of the large industrial corporations. Rockefeller had invested a significant amount of money into the public-service corporations. Without his oil, every large city in America would have been dark. Additionally, with his and his associate's investments in transportation, he could have halted transportation, essential to the vast majority of American businesses. Regarding public services, before the beginning of World War II, people in the cities paid in excess of one billion dollars a year for light, heat, and local transportation to respective corporations. Rockefeller and Standard Oil owned the largest share, or controlling interest, in those corporations. People in New York City annually paid \$152,000,000 to public-service corporations, which obviously benefitted John D. Rockefeller, the largest individual shareholder.

The American Medical Monopoly

I will give a brief history of how the industrialists created a profit-based “medical” system that has always focused on addressing patient symptoms with chemicals or surgery instead of investigating the foundational causes of disease, not only in America but in other highly-populated countries, like China.

In June 1901, John D. Rockefeller Sr. founded the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, similar to France’s Pasteur Institute (1888) and Germany’s Robert Koch Institute (1891), the first such institution in America. In 1861, Simon Flexner, a former Johns Hopkins University student and brother of Abraham and Bernard, was the institute’s first director (1901-1935). Bernard Flexner was a key member of the Zionist Organization of America, an advisor for the Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1918-1919), president of the Palestine Economic Corporation and one of the founders of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Simon Flexner, after studying poliomyelitis, would later direct the development of a serum treatment for meningitis.

Rockefeller and other industrialists sought dominance over many resources including the petroleum and petrochemical industries and could envision the possibilities in a pharmaceuticals market. Therefore, in 1909, with cooperation from the AMA, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching funded Abraham Flexner’s investigative tour of 155 medical schools in America and Canada. He planned to evaluate the entrance requirements, the qualifications of the staff, the financial endowments, the quality and suitability of the laboratories, and the relationship between medical schools and hospitals. He concluded that medical education in America was abysmal. The results of his investigation resulted in a drastic reform of America’s medical education for the benefit of the profit-seeking industrialists. He wrote: “It is necessary to install a doorkeeper who will, by critical scrutiny, ascertain the fitness of the applicant, a necessity suggested, in the first place, but consideration for the candidate, whose time and talents will serve him better in some other vocation, if he be unfit for this, and in the second, by consideration for a public entitled to protection from those whom the very boldness of modern medical strategy equips with instruments that, tremendously effective for good when rightly used, are all the more terrible for harm if ignorantly or incompetently employed.”

Flexner determined that any instruction that failed to utilize the new progressive drugs to treat their patients amounted to quackery. Officials at the AMA informed medical schools that offered a curriculum that included studies in bioelectric Medicine, Homeopathy or Eastern Medicine that they would have to discontinue these courses. Some schools maintained their right to offer alternative classes but ultimately, the majority of the schools either closed their doors or adapted. Accordingly, the members of Congress, always happy to acquiesce to the demands of deep-pocketed industrialists and the imminent establishment of their tax-exempt foundations, readily accepted Flexner’s recommendations and the need for public protection. Congress decided that the AMA would function as the ever-vigilant doorkeeper and authorized it to officially approve or disapprove of any of the

nation's medical schools based on its criteria. In 1906, there were 160 medical schools in America. By 1920, there were eighty-five and by 1944, there were only sixty-nine medical schools in the country.

Rockefeller, promoted as an altruistic humanitarian, launched the International Educational Board with \$21 million to fund educational activities in foreign universities. In 1927, he established the China Medical Board, and built the Peking Union Medical College and then spent another \$45 million in an attempt to westernize Chinese medicine by replacing inexpensive herbal remedies in favor of the American-made carcinogenic and teratogenic miracle drugs. Additionally, the Rockefeller Foundation, in conjunction with the Chinese government, established the China Medical Board. By 1921, there were twenty-six medical schools in China, the most notable facilities being the Peking Union Medical College (Rockefeller Foundation), the Medical Department of the University of Hong Kong, the Japanese Medical School at Mukden and the Army and Naval Medical Schools at Peking and Tientsin respectively.

In 1920, the Rockefeller Foundation spent \$7 million to adapt the Peking Union Medical College, a facility "destined to be the nucleus of advanced medical teaching in China." The corporate media, in conjunction with the AMA, waged a ruthless campaign of disinformation and deception while deliberately concealing successful alternative remedies, and the practitioners who helped their patients improve or regain their health. Other monopolies and regulatory organizations include the American Dental Association (ADA), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the American Cancer Society (ACS), and the American Diabetes Association (ADA). There are also unelected officials staffing countless bureaucratic agencies, functioning as a formidable regulating force that impacts every American. These corporations include but are not limited to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). These agencies disseminate propaganda and cooperate with the corporations who hold a monopoly over America's health and the other nations that depend on technical support from the US government.

The Banking Trust and Congress

In July 1875, 349 bankers from thirty-one states met in Saratoga, New York to create the American Bankers Association (ABA). On April 2, 1876, the ABA testified before Congress for the first time. The ABA, currently in the top twenty-five lobby groups, lobbies for many of America's largest financial institutions including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo. The ABA urged students who were associated with the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations located on 250 colleges throughout the United States to enter banking.

The ABA sent out a Panic Circular, dated March 11, 1893, to all national banks. It

read, "The interests of national banks require immediate financial legislation by Congress. Silver, silver certificates, and Treasury notes must be retired and national bank notes upon a gold basis made the only money ... You will at once retire one-third of your circulation and call in one-half of your loans. Be careful to make a monetary stringency among your patrons, especially among influential businessmen. Advocate an extra session of Congress to repeal the purchasing clause of the Sherman Law and act with other banks of your city in securing a large petition to Congress for its unconditional repeal, per accompanying form. Use personal influence with your Congressman, and particularly let your wishes be known to your Senators. The future life of national banks, as fixed and safe investments, depends upon immedincreasing sentiment in favor of Government legal-tender notes and silver coinage."

British investors began withdrawing their funds, transferring gold from America to England, greatly contributing to the 1893 Panic. The United States gold reserve fell below the acceptable level of \$100 million as a result of revenue losses from tariff reductions and veteran's bonuses. Over 15,000 companies failed, unemployment skyrocketed, mines closed, grain prices fell causing an agricultural depression, and labor strikes took place. Despite what happened to other banks, during these calculated financial expansions and contractions, the House of Morgan always managed to come out on top. In the bank panics of 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907, while other banks failed, Morgan's bank not only survived but prospered. In 1893, Max M. Warburg and his younger brother Paul joined the family firm, M.M. Warburg and Company (founded 1798), of Hamburg. In January 1907, Paul M. Warburg, now a Kuhn Loeb partner, wrote Defects and Needs of Our Banking System, which The New York Times published in the Financial Supplement. Adolph S. Ochs (Pilgrims Society) owned The New York Times. Warburg claimed, "Nothing short of a modern central bank will affect a final solution of the problem." An economic panic struck New York on October 14, 1907, and it subsided on November 6, 1907. On November 12, 1907, Warburg published a seven-page pamphlet, A Plan for a Modified Central Bank, defining methods of preventing financial panics using "a central bank with limited powers." Warburg claimed that a "modified" central bank would be different from the European central banks. Again, Ochs promoted Warburg's propaganda through The New York Times Annual Financial Review. On March 21, 1911, Warburg, recognizing that he and other bankers could manipulate the nations' currency, became a citizen.

Aldrich, the grandfather of David Rockefeller, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, managed the National Monetary Commission. He and Representative Edward B. Vreeland, a banker, sponsored the Emergency Currency Act, enacted on May 30, 1908 which created the group which they co-chaired. It was composed of nine members each from the Senate and the House. At the taxpayer's expense, it investigated the banking and currency systems of England, France and Germany, industrialized countries similar to the United States. The commission published (1909-1911) a series of twenty-one reports on banking, a compilation of 9,000 pages of material, 6,500 of which dealt with the three countries. Germany had one of the world's key currencies. Private bankers dominated

Germany with their jointstock banks. The central bank of issue as of 1875, was the privately owned Reich bank. However, it was under tight government control, with a very stable currency, called the Goldmark until 1914.

Paul M. Warburg helped to devise the basic principles of the infamous Aldrich Plan, the genesis of the Federal Reserve System, a plan that many bankers opposed prior to its passage. In the fall of 1910, Senator Aldrich, wanting to design a Republican alternative to the banking reforms that politicians were then proposing in the Democrat-controlled Congress, allegedly met with six influential bankers at Jekyll Island, to establish the Federal Reserve System. Those bankers represented the interests of J. Pierpont Morgan, Rothschild, Rockefeller, Warburg, and Kuhn, Loeb & Company. J. Pierpont Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb organized the conference where they drafted the Federal Reserve Act. Aldrich and Warburg, Henry P. Davison, Benjamin Strong, Frank A. Vanderlip, all Pilgrims Society members, and Charles D. Norton, attended. 735 736 The result of that meeting was the blueprint for the Federal Reserve System. Though officials ultimately offered Warburg the job as Fed chairman, he rejected their offer, and instead served as a director until 1918. Reportedly, Warburg developed a nationwide propaganda campaign in favor of the Aldrich Plan.

Academics at Princeton, Harvard, and the University of Chicago assisted in the campaign to promote the feasibility and effectiveness of a central bank. Woodrow Wilson, Princeton's former president, became a spokesman and advocate. Congress intended to grant control of the nation's money to a private corporation owned by the banks, and controlled by Wall Street. This would create an absolute monopoly over the printing and issuing of all public currency. Congress placed Americans, then totaling 94,000,000, into financial and political bondage, to the calculating, centralized, greedy incorporated money trust. Instead of the people ruling the country, the Congress-created corporation would dominate the people, their currency, and their labor. Initially, people could redeem the currency for gold. They secured the money by a reserve of "at least one-third the volume in actual gold," dispensed through the accredited banks. The Monetary Commission, an independent group of politicians, proposed the regulations, which the government did not necessarily guarantee. The Monetary Commission recommended a debt-based, paper currency, created by a corporation, issued for profit, without any legal restraints on the quantity they could print. The Aldrich Plan, which shattered and even destroyed all party lines, made the population subservient to Congress and their collaborators, the bankers.

The money issue is the "greatest political contest" that the public should address, as it touches every human being. Cozier said, "The victors will rule the republic for all future time, the vanquished being subservient." The law shields the wealthy, because of their power, from the consequences of their fraudulent criminal conduct. At the time of the legislation, there were 24,392 banks, which would fall into their grasp, destined to destroy popular government, accommodate the moneychangers by establishing the gold standard, and, largely destroy silver as a medium of exchange, while instituting a paper currency. Wall Street, the big banks and Congress, precipitated a new financial and

political entity on the country, an informal branch of the government that dominated the other branches. Congress forfeited their exclusive responsibility to issue, and to regulate the supply of public funds, and bank credit for fifty years to a corporation controlled by Wall Street banks. 745 However, did Congress, a cabal of lawyers, and bankers, really forfeit its duty or create a cash cow that it could milk for decades.

The Aldrich Plan, Corporate Currency

Ferdinand Lundberg, referring to Senator Nelson W. Aldrich wrote, "Seven Presidents served under Aldrich, Republican Senate whip." He had as "unsavory a record as one could conceive." McClure's Magazine, February 1905, exposed the Rhode Island political machine, corrupt state senators, all dominated by Aldrich and Charles R. Brayton. "Brayton, Aldrich, and Marsden J. Perry manipulated the legislature, gave themselves perpetual public utility franchises, and passed laws worth millions to themselves. When Aldrich gave up his wholesale grocery business in 1881 to enter the Senate, he was worth \$50,000; when he died, after thirty years in politics, he was worth \$12,000,000." He made a fortune investing in railroads, banking, sugar, mines, and rubber during King Leopold's reign of terror in the Belgian Congo, an exploitive corporate state where slave labor, mutilations and genocide were rampant.

Aldrich was certainly not the first or last politician to exploit his government position. In 1798, John Robison revealed that opportunists wanted to influence a country's military apparatus through the establishment of academies to teach and promote warfare. 728 Military colleges and naval academies are essential to the militarizing of a country. Congress authorized the first military school, West Point on March 16, 1802, and has established others since. On September 18, 1775, the Second Continental Congress sanctioned the Secret Committee, whose members bought arms and gunpowder, from friends or family, for which they overcharged the government, and received a kickback. During the War of 1812, the Livingstons, Elbridge Gerry, Stephen Girard, Thomas Cushing, and Benjamin Harrison, all merchants and members of the Committee, acquired huge fortunes. They kept their transactions private, and destroyed records to maintain confidentiality. Thomas Willing, the first chairman, was a business partner of Robert Morris, the so-called "Financier of the Revolution."

Eleuthère Irénée du Pont opened the first powder factory in America, and, within four years, his mills produced 600,000 pounds of high quality powder. Prominent in the philosophical movement, he had friends amongst America's most influential politicians, including Thomas Jefferson, who helped him obtain orders. Secretary of War, Henry Dearborn saw no need to order gunpowder during peacetime. The War of 1812 erupted, and du Pont sold the country all the powder that it needed. Although he sold gunpowder to foreign countries, and to the mining industry, warfare generated the most profit. Naturally, his profits soared during the brutal fratricidal Civil War. The du Ponts cemented a permanent relationship with the US government. By 1896, they made smokeless powder

in several colors. In 1899, the government, collaborating with du Pont, built a smokeless powder plant at Indian Head (NH). Congress then appropriated \$167,000 to build a gunpowder plant in Dover (NJ). By 1907, du Pont seized control of all existing powder companies in the nation. 730 In 1916, government officials, uniting with yet another firm, awarded Bethlehem Shipbuilding, a subsidiary of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, a generous contract for eighty-five destroyers at a cost of \$134,000,000.

After World War I, the du Ponts testified before a Senate committee where they claimed that their powder won the war. Their average earnings were \$6 million a year (1910-1914). During the war, they averaged \$58 million a year, an increase of over 950 percent. Bethlehem Steel's yearly earnings averaged \$6 million (1910-1914) but increased to \$49 million a year during the war. US Steel's yearly profits went from \$105 million to \$240 million a year during the war. Anaconda Copper's yearly earnings went from \$10 million a year to \$34 million a year during the war. Utah Copper's yearly profits increased from \$5 million to \$21 million. 732 Senators obviously recognized exactly where to invest their money for maximum profits.

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Reportedly, Warburg developed a nationwide propaganda campaign in favor of the Aldrich Plan. Academics at Princeton, Harvard, and the University of Chicago assisted in the campaign to promote the feasibility and effectiveness of a central bank. Woodrow Wilson, Princeton's former president, became a spokesman and advocate. Nationally-chartered banks were obligated to contribute to a fund to raise \$5 million to pay for the campaign to convince the American public that the bank plan was beneficial and that Congress should pass it into law. In November 1911, the New Orleans chapter of the American Bankers Association based in Washington, DC, officially resolved to commit itself to the "banking fraternity," and to Aldrich's central bank plan. When people, through their efforts, honestly and fairly produce wealth for themselves, there is no stigma. They are due the full protection of the law in retaining that wealth. Yet, when individuals combine, and create wealth by improperly manipulating the law to their benefit, and, in the process, confiscate the results of the people's efforts, and place burdens upon them,

for the benefit of a few, they neither deserve or should receive the protection of the law.

On January 8, 1912, the National Monetary Commission issued its final report and made recommendations for a proposed bill, known as the Aldrich Plan. Three days later, Senator Theodore E. Burton introduced the Aldrich bill (S. 4431). In that same year, Alfred O. Crozier published a book warning the public against Wall Street and the banking trust, who were then struggling to assume the management of both parties, by offering to finance the campaigns of friendly candidates from both parties. It already had control of many individuals from both parties, who would have blocked a legitimate investigation of the money trust. It was quite willing to spend millions, in order to acquire billions in the future, as well as political control of the nation over the next century. The people might have defeated the proposed measure in 1912, if officials had honestly presented it for open debate. Wall Street and the banks engineered it as a secret issue to prevent all discussion in Congress, and to force the bill through before the end of the session, and the presidential term beginning on March 4, 1913. According to Crozier, the people should have “publicly pledged every delegate, candidate and convention.” If a candidate refused to take a stand against the bank, then he should not be in the campaign; “neutrality was not an option.” The issuance of the money, government money vs. corporate currency, was of concern to every individual living then, or in the future. Congress intended to grant control of the nation’s money to a private corporation owned by the banks, and controlled by Wall Street. This would create an absolute monopoly over the printing and issuing of all public currency.

Crozier wrote, “Remember, those who have power to make money scarce or plenty have power over the business of every man, the happiness of every home, to make or break, to confer or destroy general prosperity. It gives them a hunger-hold on every man, woman and child.” Congress created a corporation and implemented a criminal plan beneficial to its members. Yet, the people could have destroyed the long-lasting, dangerous, and daring scheme, which amounted to a legalized hold-up if they had known, but even then, complicity existed between the media and the Congress. If Congress passed the Aldrich Bill, it could not repeal it, because it was a contract for at least fifty years. Congress placed Americans, then totaling 94,000,000, into financial and political bondage, to the calculating, centralized, greedy incorporated money trust. Instead of the people ruling the country, the Congress-created corporation would dominate the people, their currency, and their labor.

Initially, people could redeem the currency for gold. They secured the money by a reserve of “at least one-third the volume in actual gold,” dispensed through the accredited banks. The Monetary Commission, an independent group of politicians, proposed the regulations, which the government did not necessarily guarantee. The Monetary Commission recommended a debt-based, paper currency, created by a corporation, issued for profit, without any legal restraints on the quantity they could print. The Aldrich Plan, which shattered and even destroyed all party lines, made the population subservient to Congress and their collaborators, the bankers. The money issue is the “greatest political

contest“ that the public should address, as it touches every human being. Cozier said, “The victors will rule the republic for all future time, the vanquished being subservient.”

On March 12, 1912, Andrew J. Frame, president of Waukesha National Bank, gave an address, Diagnosis of the National Monetary Commission Bill, before the Bankers and Business Men’s Club of Memphis, Tennessee. He condemned the Aldrich bill because it would destroy independent banking, and create a great banking and money monopoly. He said it was a “scheme for wild and dangerous currency and credit inflation, certain to react on the banks, and the country in the shape of frequent panics, following periods of excessive expansion, and speculation, and that the proposed remedy is worse than the claimed disease.”

Aldrich Plan proponents waged an aggressive war against all opposition. Warburg was behind the establishment of the National Citizens’ League led by Professor Oliver Sprague, Professor of Banking and Finance at Harvard and Harvard-educated James L. Laughlin of the Economics Department of the University of Chicago, the recipient of \$50 million from John D. Rockefeller. Sprague, an advisor to the Bank of England wrote History of Crises under the National Banking System for the National Monetary Commission. He took a leave from Harvard when the president appointed him executive assistant to US Secretary of Treasury in 1933.

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5.8 The third Bank of the United States

President William Howard Taft (1909-1913), according to a descendant, had refused to pass the Federal Reserve legislation. Yet, Taft (S&B), who had empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission, accommodated Philander C. Knox, the Secretary of State (1909-1913), who lied about the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. They added it to the Constitution on February 3, 1913, just before Taft left office. In addition, Taft targeted underdeveloped Latin American and Asian nations through his Dollar Diplomacy, using US military enforcement. While he implemented some profitproducing plans, he failed to accommodate those who wanted a central bank, and was soon out of a job.

On April 7, 1913, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced the Aldrich Bill. On June 23, 1913, President Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress on banking and currency reform. Senator Robert L. Owen introduced S.2639 (Senate Report, Pt. 2, pp. 33-66). Representative Carter Glass, future Treasury Secretary (1918-1920) a skilled orator, introduced H.R.6454 on June 26, 1913 (House Report, pp. 111-130), the first official introduction of Wilson's Federal Reserve Act proposal. On July 2, 1913, Representative Charles A. Lindbergh Sr. introduced H.R.6578 (HR, pp. 151-155) which included a stipulation, for the period of twenty years from its organization, unless sooner dissolved by Act of Congress. 748 Congress, co-benefactors of the Federal Reserve Act, can dissolve the Fed any time, by legislation, the same way in which it created that corporation.

From September 2 to October 27, 1913, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, chaired by Owen, conducted hearings during which Frank A. Vanderlip gave testimony. On November 6, 1913, Vanderlip persuaded the Senate Banking Committee to adopt some of his ideas which put the Committee into a deadlock by November 20. Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, on November 22 (CR 50, p. 5962), proposed that the Senate accept the Vanderlip plan and the Senate made such amendments to H.R. 7837 on November 24, 1913 (Senate Report, Part 3, pp. 6-24) creating Owen's 131-page substitute bill. The Senate discussed the amended H.R. 7837 and passed it on December 18, 1913 with 54 yeas to 34 nays with 7 not voting (CR 51, pp. 22, 1230). The House disagreed with the Senate amendment and opted for a conference report (CR 51, p. 1464). Both legislative bodies reached an agreement, and each voted, for the passage of the 30-page H.R. 7837 in the House (435 members), on December 22, with 298 (a majority) to 60 and on December 23, in the Senate (96 members), 43 to 25 with 27 not voting. President Wilson signed H.R. 7837 on December 23, 1913 (CR 51, p. 1688). 753 Article I, section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution provides that one-fifth of those present (11 Senators, if no more than a quorum is present) can order the yeas and nays—also known as a roll call vote or a recorded vote.

When the House approved the measure, Congressman Lindbergh said, "The money trust caused the 1907 panic and thereby forced Congress to create a National Monetary Commission." Further, he said, "the money trust would cause a money stringency in order to force the bill through Congress ... This bill is passed by Congress as a Christmas present to The money trust". Congressman Lindbergh, according to the Congressional record of February 12, 1917 wrote articles of impeachment for members of the Federal Reserve Board, William P. G. Harding, governor; Paul M. Warburg, vice governor; Frederick Delano, Adolf C. Miller and Charles S. Hamlin. He charged them with "high crimes and misdemeanors in aiding, abetting, and conspiring with certain persons and firms hereinafter named, and with other persons, and firms, known and unknown, in a conspiracy to violate the Constitution and the laws of the United States." Probably for retribution or his continued criticism, thugs kidnapped his grandson on March 1, 1932, and then murdered him.

Lindbergh, father of the famous aviator, criticized the banking trust and wrote a book, *Why is Your Country at War*, attempting to explain the corruptness of the banking trust, and its complicity with Congress. He also referred to the Hazard Circular, distributed by Jay Cooke, the government's fiscal agent, at the end of the Civil War. This pamphlet had the statement, "We lay down the proposition that our national debt made permanent and rightly managed, will be a national blessing. The funded debt of the United States is the addition of three thousand millions (\$3,000,000,000) to the previously realized wealth of the Nation. It is three thousand millions added to the actual available capital." 755 Alexander Hamilton also used the phrase "national blessing" when referring to the national debt. Several large Wall-Street-controlled newspapers vilified Lindbergh for calling attention to the banking trust.

A Pilgrims Society member typically manages the New York Federal Reserve. Many bankers, industrialists, diplomats and politicians have been Pilgrims Society members—Mellon, Rockefeller, Astor, Warburg, Rothschild, Du Pont, Harriman, Vanderbilt, Duke, Reynolds, and Cullman. These are the same family names revealed in Lundberg's *America's 60 Families*. He provides credible evidence that a hierarchy of the country's sixty richest families own and control the United States, actually a corporation. These politically incestuous families cooperate with each other, belong to secret societies, and interact at various levels. The inner circle of wealth and power often delegates others to implement certain activities.

Fractional reserve banking, used by the Rothschilds with great success, is dishonest and enslaving. Federal Reserve currency replaced US Treasury Department Notes. The Federal Government does not redeem them for gold, silver, or anything else. Up to 1928, currency carried this statement, "Redeemable in gold on demand at the United States Treasury, or in gold or lawful money at any Federal Reserve Bank." Prior to 1933, the government redeemed them for gold. Before 1964, people could redeem some notes for silver. From 1934 to 1971, only foreign note holders could redeem them for gold at a fixed rate. Now, all assets held in collateral, by the Federal Reserve, including Social Security number holders and their assets, back Federal Reserve Notes. Twenty years after they created the Federal Reserve in 1913, its influence on United States domestic and foreign policy became well established. In 1933 Congressman Louis T. McFadden wrote, "Every effort has been made by the Federal Reserve Board to conceal its powers, but the truth is, the FED has usurped the government. It controls everything here (in Congress) and it controls all our foreign relations. It makes and breaks governments at will." Since Wilson's presidency, the Federal Reserve has managed the majority of the US presidents.

Twenty years after they created the Federal Reserve in 1913, its influence on United States domestic and foreign policy became well established. In 1933 Congressman Louis T. McFadden wrote, "Every effort has been made by the Federal Reserve Board to conceal its powers, but the truth is, the FED has usurped the government. It controls everything here (in Congress) and it controls all our foreign relations. It makes and breaks governments

at will." Since Wilson's presidency, the Federal Reserve has managed the majority of the US presidents. Alternatively, is it the other way around? Does the US corporation control the Federal Reserve in behalf of those few wealthy families who control Congress?

In 1901, the national debt was less than \$1 billion. After World War I, it was \$25 billion. Between the world wars, it increased to \$49 billion. In 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, under U.N. command, the debt stood at \$72 billion. In 1962, it was \$303 billion, which increased to \$383 billion by 1970, during the Vietnam War. By 1976, the end of the Vietnam War, it was \$631 billion. During the 1980s, with the Cold War military buildup, the debt increased substantially. International bankers funded the weaponization of both the United States and the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Executive Order in 1953 classified all congressional records showing the massive bankerfunded technological transfers beginning in 1916. 760 By 1998, the debt was over \$5.5 trillion. Now, it is over \$15 trillion and climbing. This does not include personal indebtedness such as credit cards, car loans or mortgages.

According to authors Geraldine Perry and Ken Fousek in *The Two Faces of Money*, the two kinds of money are debt-based, which is owed, and debt-free or owned money. The Federal Reserve, since its inception, has kept the nation burdened with a debt-based system. Debt-based money represents credit which includes usury. A legitimate monetary authority should create debt-free money that bears no interest which people spend into circulation as money of exchange. Owned money is based on one's own productivity. Debtbased money, used by central banks in over 170 countries, employs money of accounts. People have used many items as money including livestock, grains, beads, shells, tally sticks, hemp, gold and silver, all owned by the people who used them which represented real wealth. People produced, owned, and circulated those debt-free items as a medium of trade. Currency printed by the Federal Reserve represents money owed to that entity by whoever borrows it, an individual, a bank, an institution or a government. Our money supply, the currency in circulation, is a result of Federal Reserve loans which means debt. It's a perpetual system in which there will never be enough money to pay the interest. Continuous currency printing creates additional debt and an unstable economic environment. The Federal Reserve is a banker's bank, a private cartel. It creates money by purchasing government securities with their money and burdens citizens with un-payable, accumulating interest and taxes with an exponentially increasing debt which has inherent instability based on flawed mathematical principles.

Congress created the Federal Reserve, a corporation, to function as a central bank. Many people repeat Eustace Mullins' claims that foreign banks own and control the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, just one of twelve such banks. Dr. Edward Flaherty questions Mullins' evidence that foreign banks own and annually profit from the system. Flaherty claims that the Fed actually pays its profits to the government. At least, that was the way that Congress initially set it up. It organized the twelve FR Banks into separate corporations. Commercial banks operating within the bank's district purchase shares. Those shareholders select the president and six of the nine directors for their FR

Bank. In 1983, Mullins claimed that Chase Manhattan Citibank, Morgan Guaranty Trust, Chemical Bank, Bankers Trust Company, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, National Bank of North America, and the Bank of New York owned sixtythree percent of the stock of the New York Fed's stock. He wrote that the Rothschild banking dynasty and approximately a dozen other European banks owned those banks holding that stock. According to a House of Representatives 1976 report, six banks, Chase, National City, Guaranty Trust, J. P. Morgan, Hanover, and Manufacturers Trust purchased controlling stock in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York in 1914.

Mullins claimed that the financial power of England, centered with the House of Rothschild controlled the most powerful men in the United States with the implications that, since 1910, England, and more specifically, the Rothschilds ruled America. He further claimed that when Congress passed the FR Act, "the Constitution ceased to be the governing covenant of the American people, and our liberties were handed over to a small group of international bankers." That document ceased to exist decades before when Congress began functioning in their own behalf instead of serving the citizen's needs. If the Rothschilds and their ilk currently maintain a large measure of financial influence in the United States, we need to remember that they could not function without the assent of Congress. Mullins stated that the FR Bulletin contained the names of the New York Fed stockholders although, according to Flaherty, neither it, nor any other Fed periodical, ever published such information. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), established in June 6, 1934, does not require the publication of a list of key shareholders in a non-publicly traded corporation. One may scrutinize the legalities of acquiring such stock to determine ownership. The FR Act required national and state banks to buy shares in their regional FR Bank in order to join the System. The eight nationally-chartered banks that Mullins named were within the New York Federal district, and, as such, were required to buy stock in that entity, and were, as he argued, probably the primary shareholders.

Gary Kah, who claims anonymous informants, is a former Europe and Middle East trade specialist for the Indiana state government. His list of shareholders, different than Mullins' list, is the Rothschild Banks (London and Berlin), Lazard Brothers Banks (Paris), Israel Moses Seif Banks (Italy), Warburg Bank (Hamburg and Amsterdam), Lehman Brothers (New York), Kuhn, Loeb Bank (New York), Chase Manhattan, and Goldman, Sachs (New York). According to Kah, foreign owners did not purchase major interests in US banks but owned them directly despite the fact that officials never issued public stock. Title 12, US Code, Section 283, Public subscription to capital stock, states, "No individual, co-partnership, or corporation other than a member bank of its district shall be permitted to subscribe for or to hold at any time more than \$25,000 par value of stock in any Federal reserve bank. Such stock shall be known as public stock and may be transferred on the books of the Federal Reserve Bank by the chairman of the board of directors of such bank." According to the FR Act, officials could sell public stock only if the member banks, in 1913, failed to initially generate \$4 million, which they did. Therefore, officials

never sold public stock to anyone, including foreigners, but rather to banks that belonged to the FR System. However, given the passage of time and congressional corruptness, what has changed since 1913?

Mullins claimed that the New York banks owned the largest percentage of stock in the New York Fed and could select the president and board of directors, giving them managerial control of the Fed's actions. However, official policy restricts each commercial bank to only one vote despite the number of shares it holds, as opposed to other corporations in which the biggest shareholder dominates. It is highly unlikely that any small group of member banks would spend the necessary billions of dollars to exercise control over the votes of at least half of over 1,000 member banks that make up the New York FR district.

While it is easier to attribute the nation's apparent economic woes to ominous, untouchable foreign bankers, the fact is that Congress has control. Mullins and Kah claimed that foreign interests, by controlling the New York Fed, rule the FR System, and therefore manage the United States economy. Yet, the president-appointed seven-member Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) control the System, not the New York Fed, which has only one vote out of twelve. The Senate approves the president's selection of the Board which then determines interest rates, commercial bank loans, the obligatory reserve ratio, and the issuance of new currency each year (12 USCA 248). The FOMC, composed of the Board, the New York Fed president, and four presidents from other Fed Banks, regulates the amount of government bonds that the Fed Banks may trade. The FR Bank must maintain its reserve ratio and cannot issue additional currency, or buy government bonds unless the Board or the FOMC approves. The Board and the FOMC determines United States economic policies, and not international bankers, or the Federal Advisory Council, a Board-appointed nonvoting group that consults quarterly with the Board about economic conditions. Mullins attributes extraordinary power to this Council, which directly contradicts his claim that European bankers control the New York Fed, and the nation's economy.

The FR System, a corporation, is incredibly successful, and accrues huge profits. According to an agreement between the Board and the Treasury, since 1947, the Fed pays the majority of those profits to the US Treasury. It dispenses the remainder, less than one percent, to its stockholders as dividends. Every issue of FR paper is a lien upon the products of labor. The federal government is responsible for the unequal distribution of wealth. Warfare is one of the biggest expenditures, currently exceeded by bureaucratic agencies. The elite view these as more important than the reasonable needs of society. The parasitic elite, who produce nothing but live off the efforts of others, use bureaucrats and brute force to control the masses. The question one should always ask is *Cui bono*—"To whose benefit?" or literally "as a benefit to whom?"

Conspiracy at Jekyll Island

Jekyll Island was a property off the coast of Georgia owned by J. P. Morgan. A meeting was hosted in 1910 by Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, a business associate of Morgan and the father-in-law of John D. Rockefeller Jr. The Republican “whip” in the Senate, Aldrich was known as the Wall Street Senator, a spokesman for big business and banking. Although Aldrich hosted the meeting, credit for masterminding it is attributed to a German immigrant named Paul Warburg, who was a partner of Kuhn, Loeb, the Rothschild’s main American banking operation after the Civil War. Other attendees included Benjamin Strong, then head of Morgan’s Bankers Trust Company; two other heads of Morgan banks; the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; and Frank Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New York, then the most powerful New York bank (now called Citibank), which represented William Rockefeller and Kuhn, Loeb. Morgan was the chief driver behind the plan, and the Morgan and Rockefeller factions had long been arch-rivals; but they had come together in this secret rendezvous to devise a banking scheme that would benefit them both. Vanderlip wrote later of the meeting:

“We were instructed to come one at a time and as unobtrusively as possible to the railroad terminal . . . where Senator Aldrich’s private car would be in readiness. . . . Discovery, we knew, simply must not happen. . . . If it were to be exposed publicly that our particular group had written a banking bill, that bill would have no chance whatever of passage by Congress . . . [A]lthough the Aldrich Federal Reserve plan was defeated its essential points were contained in the plan that was finally adopted.”

The panic of 1907 was triggered by rumors that the Knickerbocker Bank and the Trust Company of America were about to become insolvent. Later evidence pointed to the House of Morgan as the source of the rumors. The public, believing the rumors, proceeded to make them come true by staging a run on the banks. Morgan then nobly helped to avert the panic by importing \$100 million worth of gold from Europe to stop the bank run. The mesmerized public came to believe that the country needed a central banking system to stop future panics. Robert Owens, a co-author of the Federal Reserve Act, later testified before Congress that the banking industry had conspired to create such financial panics in order to rouse the people to demand “reforms” that served the interests of the financiers. Congressman Lindbergh charged:

“The Money Trust caused the 1907 panic [T]hose not favorable to the Money Trust could be squeezed out of business and the people frightened into demanding changes in the banking and currency laws which the Money Trust would frame.”

The 1907 panic prompted the congressional inquiry headed by Senator Aldrich, and the clandestine Jekyll Island meeting followed. The result was a bill called the Aldrich Plan, but the alert opposition saw through it and soundly defeated it. Morgan had another problem besides the opposition in Congress. He needed a President willing to sign his bill. William Howard Taft, the President in 1910, was not a Morgan man. McKinley had been succeeded by his Vice President Teddy Roosevelt, who was in the Morgan camp

and had been responsible for breaking up Rockefeller's Standard Oil. Taft, who followed Roosevelt, was a Republican from Rockefeller's state of Ohio. He took vengeance on Morgan by filing antitrust suits to break up the two leading Morgan trusts, International Harvester and United States Steel. Taft was a shoo-in for reelection in 1912. To break his hold on the Presidency, Morgan deliberately created a new party, the Progressive or Bull Moose Party, and brought Teddy Roosevelt out of retirement to run as its candidate. Roosevelt took enough votes away from Taft to allow Morgan to get his real candidate, Woodrow Wilson, elected on the Democratic ticket in 1912. Roosevelt walked away realizing he had been duped, and the Progressive Party was liquidated soon afterwards. Wilson was surrounded by Morgan men, including "Colonel" Edward Mandell House, who had his own rooms at the White House. Wilson called House his "alter ego."

To get their bill passed, the Morgan faction changed its name from the Aldrich Bill to the Federal Reserve Act and brought it three days before Christmas, when Congress was preoccupied with departure for the holidays. The bill was so obscurely worded that no one really understood its provisions. The bill passed on December 22, 1913, and President Wilson signed it into law the next day. Later he regretted what he had done. He is reported to have said before he died, "I have unwittingly ruined my country." The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a major coup for the international bankers. They had battled for more than a century to establish a private central bank with the exclusive right to "monetize" the government's debt (that is, to print their own money and exchange it for government securities or I.O.U.s). The Act's preamble said that its purposes were "to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford a means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes." In plain English, the Federal Reserve Act authorized a private central bank to create money out of nothing, lend it to the government at interest, and control the national money supply, expanding or contracting it at will. Representative Lindbergh called the Act "the worst legislative crime of the ages." He warned:

"[The Federal Reserve Board] can cause the pendulum of a rising and falling market to swing gently back and forth by slight changes in the discount rate, or cause violent fluctuations by greater rate variation, and in either case it will possess inside information as to financial conditions and advance knowledge of the coming change, either up or down. This is the strangest, most dangerous advantage ever placed in the hands of a special privilege class by any Government that ever existed. . . . The financial system has been turned over to . . . a purely profiteering group. The system is private, conducted for the sole purpose of obtaining the greatest possible profits from the use of other people's money."

In 1934, in the throes of the Great Depression, Representative Louis McFadden would go further, stating on the Congressional record:

"Some people think that the Federal Reserve Banks are United States Government institutions. They are private monopolies which prey upon the people of these United

States for the benefit of themselves and their foreign customers; foreign and domestic speculators and swindlers; and rich and predatory money lenders. In that dark crew of financial pirates there are those who would cut a man's throat to get a dollar out of his pocket; there are those who send money into states to buy votes to control our legislatures; there are those who maintain International propaganda for the purpose of deceiving us into granting of new concessions which will permit them to cover up their past misdeeds and set again in motion their gigantic train of crime. These twelve private credit monopolies were deceitfully and disloyally foisted upon this Country by the bankers who came here from Europe and repaid us our hospitality by undermining our American institutions."

In *The Creature from Jekyll Island*, Ed Griffin writes that "modern money is a grand illusion conjured by the magicians of finance and politics." The function of the Federal Reserve, he says, "is to convert debt into money. It's just that simple." The mechanism may seem complicated at first, but "it is simple if one remembers that the process is not intended to be logical but to confuse and deceive." The process by which the Fed converts debt into money begins after the government's bonds are offered to the public at auction. Griffin explains:

"[T]he Fed takes all the government bonds which the public does not buy and writes a check to Congress in exchange for them There is no money to back up this check. These fiat dollars are created on the spot for that purpose. By calling these bonds "reserves," the Fed then uses them as the base for creating 9 additional dollars for every dollar created for the bonds themselves. The money created for the bonds is spent by the government, whereas the money created on top of those bonds is the source of all the bank loans made to the nation's businesses and individuals. The result of this process is the same as creating money on a printing press, but the illusion is based on an accounting trick rather than a printing trick."

The result is the same with this difference: in the minds of most people, printing press money is created by the government. The accounting trick that generates 99 percent of the U.S. money supply today is the sleight of hand of private banks.

Who owns the Federal Reserve?

The "Federal" Reserve is actually an independent, privately-owned corporation.⁹ It consists of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks owned by many commercial member banks. The amount of Federal Reserve stock held by each member bank is proportional to its size. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York holds the majority of shares in the Federal Reserve System (53 percent). The largest shareholders of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are the largest commercial banks in the district of New York. In 1997, the New York Federal Reserve reported that its three largest member banks were Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. In 2000, JP Morgan and Chase Manhattan merged to become JPMorgan Chase Co., a bank holding company with com-

bined assets of \$668 billion. That made it the third largest bank holding company in the country, after Citigroup (at \$791 billion) and Bank of America (at \$679 billion). Bank of America was founded in California in 1904 and remains concentrated in the western and southwestern states. Citigroup is the cornerstone of the Rockefeller empire.

In January 2004, JPMorgan Chase & Co. undertook one of the largest bank mergers in history, when it acquired BankOne for \$58 billion. The result was to make this Morgan-empire bank the secondlargest U.S. bank, both in terms of assets (\$1.1 trillion to Citigroup's nearly \$1.2 trillion) and deposits (\$490 billion to Bank of America's \$552 billion). JPMorgan Chase now issues the most Visas and MasterCards of any bank nationwide and holds the largest share of U.S. credit card balances. In 2003, credit cards surpassed cash and checks as a medium of exchange used in stores. Thus Citibank and JPMorgan Chase Co., the financial cornerstones of the Rockefeller and Morgan empires, are not only the two largest banks in the United States but are the two largest shareholders of the New York Federal Reserve, the branch of the Fed holding a majority of the shares in the Federal Reserve system. The Federal Reserve evidently remains squarely under the control of the Robber Barons who devised it. The central Federal Reserve Board in Washington was set up to include the Treasury Secretary and Comptroller of the Currency, both U.S. government officials; but the Board had little control over the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks, which set most of their own policy. They followed the lead of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, where the Fed's real power was concentrated. Benjamin Strong, one of the Jekyll Island attendees, became the first president of the New York Federal Reserve. Strong had close ties to the financial powers of London and owed his career to the favor of the Morgan bank.

A popular rumor has it that the Federal Reserve is owned by a powerful clique of foreign financiers, but this is obviously not true. It is owned by Federal Reserve Banks, which are owned by American commercial banks, which are required by law to make their major shareholders public; and none of these banks is predominantly foreignowned. ¹² But that does not mean that the banking spider is not in control behind the scenes. According to Hans Schicht (the financial insider quoted in the Introduction of the book "Web of Debt"), the "master spider" has just moved to Wall Street. The greater part of U.S. banking and enterprise, says Schicht, is now controlled by a very small inner circle of men, perhaps headed by only one man. It is all done behind closed doors, through the game he calls "spider webbing." As noted earlier, the rules of the game include exercising tight personal management and control, with a minimum of insiders and front-men who themselves have only partial knowledge of the game; exercising control through "leverage" (mergers, takeovers, chain share holdings where one company holds shares of other companies, conditions annexed to loans, and so forth); and making any concentration of wealth invisible. The master spider studiously avoids close scrutiny by maintaining anonymity, taking a back seat, and appearing to be a philanthropist.

Before World War II, the reins of international finance were held by the powerful European banking dynasty the House of Rothschild; but during the war, control crossed

the Atlantic to their Wall Street affiliates. Schicht maintains that the role of master spider fell to David Rockefeller Sr., grandson on his father's side of John D. Rockefeller Sr. and on his mother's side of Nelson Aldrich, the Senator for whom the precursor to the Federal Reserve Act was named. David Rockefeller was a director of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1949 to 1985 and its chairman from 1970 until 1985, and he founded the Trilateral Commission in 1976. Schicht states that he also convoked the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, at which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were devised; and he was instrumental in founding the elite international club called the "Bilderbergers."

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an international group set up in 1919 to advise the members' respective governments on international affairs. It has been called the preeminent intermediary between the world of high finance, big oil, corporate elitism, and the U.S. government. The policies it promulgates in its quarterly journal become U.S. government policy. The Trilateral Commission has been described as an elite group of international bankers, media leaders, scholars and government officials bent on shaping and administering a "new world order," with a central world government held together by economic interdependence. 16 Former presidential candidate Barry Goldwater said of it:

"The Trilateralist Commission is international [and] is intended to be the vehicle for multinational consolidation of commercial and banking interests by seizing control of the political government of the United States. The Trilateralist Commission represents a skillful, coordinated effort to seize control and consolidate the four centers of power — political, monetary, intellectual, and ecclesiastical."

The "Bilderbergers" were described by a June 3, 2004 BBC special as "one of the most controversial and hotly-debated alliances of our times," composed of "an elite coterie of Western thinkers and powerbrokers" who have been "accused of fixing the fate of the world behind closed doors." The group has been suspected of steering international policy. Some say it plots world domination. But nobody knows for sure, because its members are sworn to secrecy and the press won't report on its meetings.

5.9 Localized Warfare and Asset Exploitation

Iranian Oil Exploitation, a Precursor to Further Warfare

Between 1850 and 1880, numerous individuals from rival companies in France, Belgium, Britain, Russia, and America competed for the opportunity to construct and finance railways and other projects in Persia. However, these various attempts were never productive. Persia had lost territory to Russia in the early nineteenth century so Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, the King of Persia (1848-1896) compensated for this territorial loss by seizing Herat, Afghanistan (1856). Britain regarded the move as a threat to British India and declared war on Iran, forcing the return of Herat as well as Iranian recognition

of the kingdom of Afghanistan. In 1872, Shah Qajar granted a concession to Baron Julius de Reuter (born Israel B. Josephat), a British citizen, for the control of all Persian roads, telegraphs, mills, factories, extraction of resources, and other public properties. In exchange de Reuter would pay the king a specific sum over a five-year period and de Reuter would receive sixty percent of the net profits for twenty years. The public immediately protested this outrageous concession. The Russian government also opposed the agreement. Because of immense pressure, the Shah rescinded, despite his deteriorating financial condition. He was the first Persian monarch to visit Europe (1873, 1878) and was impressed with Britain's technology. In 1873, Queen Victoria made him a Knight of the Order of the Garter, the first Persian monarch to receive it. During his visit, he met with several Jewish leaders, including Sir Moses Montefiore. The Shah, possibly thinking of the financial benefits, suggested that the Jews buy land and establish a state for the Jewish people.

Others had interests in what we now refer to as the Middle East. Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French developer, initially obtained a construction concession (1854 and 1856) from Sa'id Pasha, the Khedive (viceroy) of Egypt and Sudan (1854-1863). The Frenchman visualized a canal, the Suez Canal, as a passage to ships of all nations. Later, people referred to it as the Highway to India, opening in 1869, joining the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Ismail Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt and Sudan (1863-1879), modernized Egypt through industrial investments, infrastructure projects, and expansion of the nation's borders into Africa. However, his modernization efforts came with a huge burden of debt that he could not pay. Benjamin Disraeli, Britain's first Jewish Prime Minister, borrowed £4,080,000 from his friend, Nathan M. Rothschild and bought 176,000 shares in the Suez Canal Company on November 25, 1875. The British government then assumed managerial control on December 8, 1875 through the Administrative Council of the General Company of the Suez Maritime Canal. Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman Sultan, outraged over foreign bankers, and corrupt officials, ousted Ismail Pasha in 1879, and Tewfik Pasha succeeded him, followed by anarchy and a military mutiny. In September 1879, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, along with the French ambassador in London, decided that Britain and France would not tolerate any political influence in Egypt by what they viewed as a competing power. Both countries would take military action, to the extent necessary, to prevent such a situation. Friedrich Engels viewed the British occupation of Egypt, actually under Turkish jurisdiction, as in the pursuit of human interests. The British military intervened on 1882, to protect its financial interests, the Suez Canal, and to quell nationalist rioting, which resulted in the Battle of Tel el-Kebir, on September 13, 1882. Occupation authorities reinstated Tewfik Pasha twelve days later.

Winston Churchill's father, Lord Randolph Churchill, was intimate friends with Nathan M. Rothschild, the great-grandson of Mayer A. Rothschild, and head of the London branch of the family bank after his father's death in 1879. As a boy, Churchill had befriended the Rothschilds, especially his schoolmate Nathan or Natty, as they called

him. Nathan paid for Randolph's trip to South Africa, to evaluate the natural resources in the area, and then lent him £65,000 to invest in the mining syndicates. Randolph died before he repaid the loan. Rothschild also funded Cecil Rhodes, and the creation of the British South Africa Company (1889), patterned after the British East India Company, and the De Beers diamond conglomerate. He administered Rhodes's estate after his death (1902) and helped establish the Rhodes scholarship program at Oxford University. Randolph Churchill was a staunch supporter of Jewish causes, especially the issues that were important to his close associates, and friends. In 1881, as a member of parliament (1874-1895), he persuaded the government to investigate the reports of pogroms against the Jews in Russia. On January 11 and 13, 1882, *The Times*, now owned by a subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch's NewsCorp, attracted worldwide attention to the pogroms. In 1883, Churchill favored the political emancipation for all of the Jews living in Britain. In 1882, after Britain sent a military force to Egypt, Churchill was annoyed at Prime Minister William E. Gladstone, when he sent a member of the gentile Baring Bank to examine Egypt's financial records, instead of a Rothschild, whose money had enabled the British to attain their financial interest in the canal.

Major part about colonization, oil here and there, natural gases, gold in Australia, diamonds in Africa, drugs in China etc. By 1905, British financiers had realized that petroleum was more efficient and less labor-intensive than coal, which made it strategically and financially important. Britain imported oil from Standard Oil, of Mexico, a country dominated by the US oil firm, or from Russia. Energy-poor Britain was actually behind technologically, agriculturally and industrially. British strength was in naval power, and they kept ships in the Gulf to deter other countries from the resources of India, a country they had exploited for generations. In 1912, the Royal Commission charged with investigating British oil supplies, agreed with Winston Churchill who said, "We must become the owners or at any rate the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the oil which we require." In 1912, a British, Dutch and German group created the Turkish Petroleum Company, which obtained a concession to prospect for oil in the Baghdad and Mosul Wilayet.

The Committee of Imperial Defence planned for a war against Germany to begin in 1914. Individuals installed Churchill into a managerial position in the Admiralty in order to prepare for that war. In 1913, Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, anticipating not just a local European war, but instead a world war, recognized the necessity of oil-powered ships to win that war. Thus, on June 17, 1914, he urged the government to spend £2 million, financed in part by N.M. Rothschild, to purchase fifty-one percent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, founded in 1908, after an oil discovery in Masjed-Soleyman, Iran, a transaction that gave Britain the major interest in the oil company. On May 23, 1914, the *London Petroleum Review* published a map of Mesopotamia (Iraq) showing all of the oilfields that would conceivably fall into the hands of certain British citizens, if they triumphed in what would be a very bloody battle. Mesopotamia is where the Germans had recently contracted to build the railroad between Berlin and Baghdad, a situation that provoked the British into devising a war. The Germans were also interested in cotton,

oil, farming, and trade with the locals, not just a railroad. In August 1914, Britain was bankrupt when it declared war against Germany. The British and other participants in the war had secret agreements, numerous credits, and systematic schemes to redistribute the vast raw materials and the “physical wealth of the entire world after the war, especially areas believed to hold significant petroleum reserves in the Ottoman Empire.”

British and Rothschild foreign policy were uniquely compatible. Britain's interests became inseparable from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the only oil producing enterprise in the Middle East until 1927. In the first few years, Britain, through Anglo-Persian extracted millions of barrels of oil, while treating thousands of indigenous workers like slaves. Britain established a system of filling stations in the UK and retailed Iranian oil to several European countries and in Australia. 815 Britain, experts at imperialistic exploitation, all but drained the life's blood out of that desert land. People know the company by various names: Anglo-Iranian, British Petroleum, or just BP, which ultimately merged with Standard Oil. On September 17, 1928, Henry Deterding of Shell Oil, John Cadman, of Britain's Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Walter Teagle, president of the Standard Oil Company formalized the Achnacarry Agreement.

It was a secret pact that established the Seven Sisters oil cartel wherein Britain and France agreed to let the United States share in the oil resources in the Middle East, which they parceled out to the three countries. By 1932, Esso (Standard of New Jersey), Mobil (Standard of New York), Gulf Oil, Texaco, Standard of California (Chevron), Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (British Petroleum) had become part of the Achnacarry cartel, which set world oil prices. That pact is apparently still in effect. 816 This oil cartel is part of the global banking and financial interests of the Rockefellers, the Morgans, the Warburgs, the Rothschilds, and others.

Standard's Procedures

China, Russia, America and Germany were independent, intellectually resourceful and therefore, represented “dangerous competition“ to the banker-dominated British Empire. Consequently, the British, puppets working in behalf of the international bankers, collaborating with or exploiting other nations, have methodically terrorized each target country using numerous methodologies. The British included the following cycle of repression just against China:

Overview of Resource-Wars		
War	British Allies	British Target
<i>First Opium War</i> , 1839 – 42	France	Qing Dynasty
<i>Second Opium War</i> , 1856 – 60	France	Qing Dynasty
<i>Revolution</i> , 1857 – 58	France	Chinese Nationalists
<i>Storming of Peking</i> , 1860	France	Qing Dynasty
<i>Revolution</i> , 1860 – 65	France	Chinese Nationalists
<i>Sino – Japanese War</i> , 1894 – 95	Japan	Qing Dynasty
<i>Boxer Rebellion</i> , 1899 – 1901	8-Nation Alliance	Qing Dynasty
<i>Revolution</i> , 1916 – 27	France, Japan, Spain	Gen. Chiang Kai-Shek
<i>Manchurian Conquest</i> , 1931	Japan	Gen. Chiang Kai-Shek

Several factors contributed to Chinese discontent and the development and expansion of the Boxer movement, called the “Righteous Fists of Harmony” or the “Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists” (Boxers in English). Chinese opposition, by the Boxers, initially began in 1869 when they first used the slogan “Support the Qing, destroy the foreign.” These important factors were: 1) a drought and subsequent flooding in Shandong province (1897-1898) forced farmers to flee to cities to seek food; 2) an increasing number of Christian missionaries, both Protestant and Catholic; 3) the exemption of missionaries from numerous laws; 4) the French Minister, in 1899, aided the missionaries to obtain special status enabling them to ignore local officials; 5) Since 1840, foreign powers had been fragmenting sovereignty; 6) foreign powers had forced China to import opium, causing widespread addiction; 7) foreign powers appeared to be incrementally colonizing China; 8) foreigners claimed the right to promote Christianity; 9) foreigners imposed unequal treaties whereby their companies were immune from Chinese law; and 10) foreign powers seized land and demanded extraterritorial rights for their citizens living in China. This caused resentment and angry reactions among the Chinese. One official stated it very succinctly, “Take away your missionaries and your opium and you will be welcome.”

France, Japan, Russia, and Germany each had spheres of influence and it appeared, at least to the Chinese, that these countries might actually dismember and rule their country. By 1900, the Qing Dynasty, that ruled China for over 200 years, was faltering and powerful foreigners, with unfamiliar religions, were assaulting the culture and attempting to replace it with materialism. By January 1900, the Empress Dowager Cixi, of the Manchu Yehenara clan, the powerful ruler of the Qing Dynasty (1861-1908) and her supporters came to the defense of the Boxers and their expanding movement. She refused to adopt the Western style of government, although she did approve of, and supported, technological advancement, and the modernization of China’s armies, which undoubtedly benefitted the same bankers and armament manufacturers who were militarizing Japan. The Chinese were completely dependent on foreign petroleum, as they had not yet developed their own resources. By 1900, Standard Oil already had a network of local Chinese merchants, who understood the culture, and had existing business con-

nections, thus avoiding the stigma of a foreign company. Well-compensated merchants built a complex distribution system of transport and storage facilities throughout China, of which Standard maintained indirect ownership. Local agents promoted Standard's petroleum products, especially kerosene for lamps and stoves.

American Minister Edwin H. Conger cabled Washington, referring to the Chinese, "The whole country is swarming with hungry, discontented, hopeless idlers." On May 30, 1900, British Minister Claude M. MacDonald and other foreign diplomats requested military aid to defend the foreign legations. The Chinese government unwillingly agreed. The following day, over 400 soldiers, part of the Eight-Nation Alliance, disembarked from warships, coincidentally already in the area. The 400 soldiers then traveled from Tianjin to Peking by train. Upon arrival, they established defensive boundaries around their respective missions. The alliance included Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Britain and the United States. Given the size of their combined military forces of fifty-four warships, 4,971 US Marines and 49,255 soldiers, its intentions were obvious. These foreign forces intervened in China to forcibly suppress the pro-national, anti-foreign Boxers and halt their angry siege of the diplomatic legations in Peking. On June 5, 1900, the Boxers cut the railroad line from Tianjin and isolated Peking. On June 13, Chinese soldiers murdered a Japanese diplomat. On the same day, under the direction of the German Minister, Clemens von Ketteler, German soldiers captured and executed a Boxer, apparently just a boy. In retaliation, thousands of Boxers broke through the walled city of Peking, and burned many Christian churches. US Marines halted a Boxer attack on the Methodist Mission, where many British missionaries had taken refuge. Soldiers at the British Embassy and German Legations killed several Boxers, which disaffected Peking's Chinese population. The Muslim Kansu braves, many Boxers and other Chinese residents killed Chinese Christians, seeing them as agents for foreigners, as a reprisal for the long-term, foreign assaults on the Chinese. Ultimately, the US government sent 100,000 troops to protect foreign business owners during the Boxer Rebellion. By August 14, 1900, US troops, along with the other forces, crushed the short-lived rebellion against foreign exploitation.

In addition to Standard Oil's interests in China, Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State (1909-1913), using the same "Dollar Diplomacy" as he had in Central and South America, tried to coerce the Chinese to negotiate with the Harriman railroad, financed by Kuhn & Loeb, Morgan, the First National Bank and the Rockefeller-controlled National City Bank, instead of working with the British, French and the Germans as they had been doing. The Chinese, with an upsurge of nationalism and anti-foreignism, some of the causes of the Boxer Rebellion, demanded revisions of the treaty system. The big powers considered the requests at the Washington Conference (November 1921-February 1922), and decided to allow China to gradually "regain control over the customs and to permit the interim collection of a 2.5 percent tax on imports and exports." Some of the signatories did not ratify the Washington Treaty so it was invalid. 824 825 President Harding signed it on June 9, 1923. Officials had not invited Russia to this conclave. By 1921, the

United States had assumed Britain's position as the world's super power. The conference leaders, to satisfy Standard's demands, adopted inequitable procedures, very similar to those they had used a couple of years earlier against Germany, which people referred to as the "Versailles-Washington" system of international relations. The United States, while sounding agreeable and obliging, with its complicit corporate partners, quashes many countries that have attempted to develop a nationalistic self-government.

African Resources and the Boer Wars

In 1867, individuals found the first diamonds in the vicinity of the Orange River in South Africa. The Boers, the Dutch and Afrikaans, word for farmer, were the descendants of the Dutch-speaking settlers of the eastern Cape frontier. In September 1870, individuals found diamonds on the farms of Dutoitspan and Bulfontein. 838 In July 1871, merchants founded a diamond mine at Kimberley, a city in South Africa. 839 People found diamonds along the banks of the Vaal River. By October 1871, Britain annexed the Vaal/Harts region. 840 In 1880, the British attempted to annex the Transvaal which led to the First Boer War, December 16, 1880 to March 23, 1881. It led to the signing of a peace treaty, on August 3, 1881, and later the Pretoria Convention, between the British and the newly created South African Republic, ending the First Boer War, which was shortly followed by the second Boer War in 1899 due to claims regarding natural resources.

Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit organized and managed the De Beers Mining Corporation and the diamond business. Rhodes and Beit played a part in provoking the war (1899-1902). The indigenous population militantly opposed British control. Germany also sought influence in the area. The Boers held two positions in Bechuanaland while Britain attempted to expand its control of the region, despite the 1884 Anglo-Boer treaty. The Transvaal relinquished its claim in Bechuanaland and withdrew. Rhodes persuaded British officials to provide protection to native chiefs against Germany, in addition to impeding the Boers' attempts to acquire a republic in Zululand that would give them access to the sea. In 1886, prospectors discovered gold on the Witwatersrand which increased Rhodes' economic and imperialistic aspirations. He obtained additional powers for his London-chartered South Africa Company, expecting that they would compel acquiescence from the Transvaal. In July 1890, Rhodes assumed the position of Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. Using his company, he added a large portion of Rhodesia to Britain's Empire and envisioned a Cape to Cairo railroad.

Winston Churchill and Cecil Rhodes, intimate friends, shared the same Anglo-American beliefs of returning the United States to British rule. On June 2, 1899, Churchill and Rhodes had breakfast at London's Burlington Hotel and planned South Africa's war. Also in 1899, Churchill, referring to the Muslims, wrote, "How dreadful are the curses which Mohammedanism lays on its votaries! Besides the fanatical frenzy, which is as dangerous in a man as hydrophobia in a dog, there is this fearful fatalistic apathy." Further he wrote, "No stronger retrograde force exists in the world ... Mohammedanism is a militant and

proselytizing faith. The Second Boer War (October 11, 1899-May 31, 1902) occurred because the bankers and industrialists, backed by an imperialistic government, lusted for the massive South African gold and diamond resources. The British government sent 400,000 propagandized soldiers who waged war against about 30,000 armed farmers, who defending their farmlands, resisted the military onslaught. Lord Alfred Milner, per Rothschild's instructions, in opposition to the wishes of the British population, arranged the Boer Wars. Kruger, the State President of the South African Republic (Transvaal), advocated the use of guerrilla warfare, which the residents used to defy the invaders in the Second Boer War. To avoid these kinds of difficulties in the future, the bankers formulated a system of managed conflict for their next warfare efforts.

When the Boers attempted to expel the British, Lord Herbert H. Kitchener used the scorched earth policy in the Second Boer War and destroyed farms and homes to prevent rebels from obtaining food and supplies, which left women and children without homes, crops, and livestock. The British then erected camps (One of the first concentration camps) for displaced persons until the war ended. Overcrowding, insufficient food and supplies caused the death of 27,927 Boers, 26,251 of whom were women and children. Three factors prompted British aggression in Africa. They were, 1) Britain wanted to control the trade routes to India around the Cape; 2) the 1867-1868 discoveries of diamonds in the Kimberley area on the common borders of the South African Republic which the British called the Transvaal and a major gold find first in the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony, and, in 1886 in the Transvaal and; 3) competition with other European powers that were viewing colonial expansion into Africa. Those other countries included Portugal which controlled what is now Angola and Mozambique. Germany had influence in what is now Namibia while Belgium controlled what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo and France had interests in what is now West and Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar.

The Transvaal, in South Africa, since the Boer War, was a Crown Colony, governed by a Legislative Assembly, presided over by the governor of the Colony, Lord Alfred Milner. By 1913, Hoover, presumably still a Rothschild minion, had large financial interests in at least sixteen major companies dealing with the natural resources of China, Burma, Russia, and other areas. By 1917, he had vast interests in the Maikop areas of Russia. Fortuitously, before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, he had withdrawn from one of the major corporations and had sold his holdings. The Soviet government confiscated his numerous concessions and mines. Hoover, at the Paris Peace Conference, criticized Bolshevism, and allegedly remained a foe of the Soviets for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, he was one of the first Americans to offer massive aid to prevent a major uprising against the faltering Bolshevik regime. On November 28, 1917, his colleague, Edward M. House cabled President Wilson within days after the Bolsheviks had seized power. House told Wilson, "It is exceedingly important that such criticism be suppressed." Officials concealed the telegram for several years. An armed intervention failed in Russia because of the strong support given the Soviets by France, England and the United States. Ameri-

cans were adamantly opposed to sending men, arms, food, and money to the anti-Soviet armies because the media had so thoroughly propagandized the public. People organized “Hands off Russia!” committees, and laborers and soldiers refused to fight, and support interventionist policies. Journalists, educators and businessmen protested any attack on the Soviets. On December 1, 1919, England’s Chief of Staff wrote, “The difficulties of the Entente in formulating a Russian policy have, indeed, proved insurmountable, since in no Allied country has there been a sufficient weight of public opinion to justify armed intervention against the Bolsheviks on a decisive scale, with the inevitable result that military operations have lacked cohesion and purpose.”

Failure to intervene was due to imperialistic rivalries. The British were concerned about France’s objectives in the Black Sea and Germany’s aspirations in the Baltic. Americans were supposedly worrying about Japan’s aims in Siberia. Any covert efforts to halt the Soviets predictably ended in disaster and created an atmosphere of hatred and distrust in Europe. Hoover, as Food Relief Administrator, initially gave aid to the White Russians, and withheld supplies from the Soviets, the Red Russians, which caused the starvation deaths of hundreds of thousands. Finally, after the fact, he, due to public pressure, sent food to the Soviets. He raised money for food commodities, which the Soviets quickly appropriated, and which Lenin and his thugs used to manipulate the surviving starving peasants, who had previously resisted them. Hoover’s unique brand of humanitarianism actually rescued the Soviet regime. The Vanderlips, Harrimans, and Rockefellers helped save the Russian economy. Frank A. Vanderlip compared Lenin to George Washington.

Hoover used Rickard’s New York office as his personal address when he began campaigning for the presidency, as he had not resided in the United States since 1895. J. Schröder financed his campaign. Hoover became the US President on March 4, 1929. On March 28, Henry L. Stimson, his Secretary of State initiated efforts to assist Rockefeller’s Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) to obtain oil rights in Bahrain from the Gulf Oil Company.

Japan, the Banker’s Mercenary in Asia

Third parties frequently benefit from the conflict between two other parties, a situation that is applicable to people as well as nations. It works like this—conflict erupts in which two factions fight each other instead of recognizing the real troublemakers behind the scene. The obscure instigators support both factions and seek economic and political influence while initiating dissension. The strongest apparatus for generating discord is the international secret societies, like freemasonry, which functions in every nation. Its machinations interlink capital, politics, economy and even religion. This is the elementary level in which the elites create nations, instigate wars, and install leaders, who if they do not function as required, they eliminate them, by assassination, by exposure of private indiscretions or crimes, followed by public humiliation, resignation or prosecution, and incarceration.

Another Rothschild agent, Aaron H. Palmer, also worked for the US government as a consultant. According to Palmer's plan, US Commodore Matthew Perry left New York in the spring of 1853 bound for Japan two warships and two steam-powered side-wheelers. The Navy Department was certain that Perry's ships were superior and more intimidating than anything that the Japanese possessed. Perry was prepared to use military force if the Japanese rejected the provisions in President Fillmore's letter. Perry gave the Japanese sufficient time to grasp the letter's contents. On March 31, 1854, on his next trip to Japan, Perry signed the Convention of Kanagawa which opened the Japanese ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American trade, part of the objectives of the initial mission. This opened the country to Jewish traders and merchants who flocked to Japan. The treaty ended Japan's 200-year policy of seclusion.

During the early Meiji period ((1867-1912), the military began to exert a strong influence on Japanese society. Internal revolts like the Saga and Satsuma Rebellions, and numerous peasant uprisings, gave rise to Japan's militarization. Japan, as part of its militarization development, acquired ships from England and France, often through Jewish brokers, many of which the Japanese ordered in 1868, with loans from the international Jewish bankers. Japan's leadership, in the military, politics or business, was composed of ex-samurai or their descendants. The Meiji government soon began to feel threatened by western imperialism. To counter this, they devised the *Fukoku Kyohei* policy (enrich the country, strengthen the military), in order to strengthen its economic and industrial foundations, and defend Japan against outside powers. This policy entailed long-range policies to transform Japanese society in an effort to catch up with the West.

Members of the Army Staff College and the Japanese General Staff requested help from Prussia in transforming their system. Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke sent Meckel to Japan, where he worked closely with future Prime Ministers General Katsura Taro and General Yamagata Aritomo. He introduced Clausewitz's military theories, the Prussian concept of war games, and made numerous recommendations. Thereafter, Japan reorganized the command structure of the army, and strengthened their transportation infrastructure. In 1873, Japan's newly-appointed War Minister, Yamagata Aritomo introduced universal military conscription. Then in 1882, with the Imperial Rescript proclamation, the Japanese military indoctrinated thousands of men from various backgrounds with military-patriotic values in conjunction with the idea of absolute loyalty to the Emperor. The Prussian example, of transforming itself from an agricultural state to a leading modern industrial and military power, influenced Yamagata who also favored military expansion abroad, and an authoritarian government at home. However, this imperialistic expansion was/is incredibly costly. The development of a strong military, coupled with an aggressive foreign policy is expensive, money that was only available through the international bankers. However, with these new policies, Japan might win the respect of western nations and a revision of the unequal treaties.

Meanwhile, in Korea, Empress Myeongseong (1851-1895), also known as Queen Min, was the first official wife of King Gojong, the twenty-sixth king of the Joseon Dynasty, and

the first emperor of the Korean Empire. In 1873, Queen Min overthrew the dictatorship of Heungseon Daewongun (1863-1873), but retained his closed door policy to European powers. France and the United States had already attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish commerce during the previous decade. Following that overthrow, despite Queen Min's stated policies; many new progressive officials supported the idea of commerce with foreign countries. During that period of Korea's political instability, Japan, with pressure and loans from the international bankers, initiated a plan to exert influence on that vulnerable country. On July 25, 1871, the Imperial Japanese Navy received the Un'yo, a small warship, built in Scotland. In May 1875, Japan dispatched Inoue Yoshika, in command the Un'yo to survey coastal waters without obtaining Korean permission. On September 20, 1875, the ship reached Ganghwa Island, the site of fierce confrontations between Koreans and foreigners in the previous decade.

In 1871, the United States sent a military naval force to Korea, part of an American diplomatic delegation, to try to establish trade and political relations. On June 1, 1871, seeing the intimidating US warships, a Korean shore battery fired on the ships. The US admiral commanding the expedition failed to receive an official apology from the Koreans for what he called an "unwarranted" assault. Therefore, on June 10, 1871, in retaliation, he sent about 650 Americans to shore where they immediately captured three forts, killing approximately 350 Koreans in the process, referred to as Shinmiyangyo. Only three Americans died due to their superior weaponry. Afterwards, Korean officials understandably refused to negotiate with the United States until May 22, 1882, in Incheon. Because of these prior confrontations, the Koreans would inevitably shoot at all approaching foreign ships. Perhaps to provoke an incident, Commander Inoue launched a small boat, allegedly in search of drinkable water. Predictably, the Koreans opened fire on the warship and the Japanese, with their superior firepower, responded. Then the Japanese attacked another Korean port before returning home. Japan, using gunboat diplomacy, compelled Korean officials to sign a trade treaty that opened three Korean ports—Busan, Incheon and Wuson—which ended Korea's status as a tributary state of China's Qing dynasty (1644-1912). This would allow Japan to seize and later annex Korea without military intervention from China. Koreans, hoping to import some defense technologies to avoid future invasions, signed the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity, also known as the Treaty of Ganghwa.

The treaty awarded Japan some of the same privileges in Korea that Westerners acquired, using the same tactics, from Japan, including extraterritoriality. The Japanese learned their gunboat diplomacy from Commodore Matthew Perry. During the Meiji era, Western influences transformed Japan from a feudal society into a capitalist economy. Japanese students studied abroad to attain tactical skills, practical expertise, and an understanding of various cultures unavailable in Japan. Prussian advisors instructed Meiji army leaders, modeled after the Prussian style, whose doctrines, methods and organization were meticulously evaluated and implemented. In 1885, General Meckel reorganized the Imperial Japanese Army's command structure into divisions and regiments. He instructed them

on logistics, transportation, and the establishment of artillery and engineering regiments. He taught at Japan's Army Staff College (1885-1888) and worked directly with future Prime Ministers, General Katsura and General Yamagata. A more aggressive, financially-backed Japan, once an isolationist country, soon emerged as a strong world power. Japan restructured its Imperial Navy after the British model, the world's leading naval power. Japanese officials sent eager naval students to Britain to observe the Royal Navy and master its techniques. They were very adept students, and quickly acquired seamanship skills. Japan lacked the financial resources to build a large fleet, so the international bankers funded their purchases of warships and torpedoes from British and French shipyards. The French constructed the basic components and the Japanese assembled ships and weaponry in their own country. By the 1890s, the Japanese were prepared, trained and well equipped. By 1894, the Imperial Japanese Army had a force of 120,000 men while the number of their steamships increased from twenty-six in 1873 to 1,514 by 1913. Railroad track, in that same period, increased from eighteen miles to 7,100 miles. All they needed to execute their new skills and power was the right provocation. China's young men, severely weakened by opium use, and Britain's two opium wars, proved to be an appealing target, and China had abundant public and private plunder.

In 1895, when Japan defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War, Calvin S. Brice, a former senator and railway lawyer created the American China Development Company. Its shareholders included railroad mogul Edward H. Harriman, Jacob H. Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, James A. Stillman of the Rockefeller-controlled National City Bank, Levi Morton, the former US Vice President, the Carnegie Steel Corporation, and railroad expert, Charles Coster, a J. P. Morgan associate.

Following China's defeat, the nation sought to develop economic reforms in order to build a defense, something the country did not previously need. Opportunistic bankers and concession hunters from other countries offered such tempting arrangements that Chinese officials found hard to resist. China had to acquire foreign capital to finance railway construction. However, Chinese leaders also recognized that their foreign creditors would threaten their empire's dominion. The Americans claimed no political accommodations in return for their monetary advances. The United States had valuable experience in the railway field, given their transcontinental lines. Charles H. Denby, the US Minister in Peking promoted United States involvement and simply awaited the decisions of the Chinese leadership.

US Secretary Olney, in discussions with British officials, agreed to join forces to besiege Asia. They manipulated Japan into providing the military manpower to attack Russia within the next decade. Then Britain and the United States would divide the spoils—one of which was an open door to the lucrative Asian resources. Britain agreed to forfeit their Latin American interests and share the Asian resources. To move forward with further imperialist expansion, Britain and America formalized their alliance in 1897, the year of the first official Zionist conference.

On February 12, 1902, shortly after Theodore Roosevelt became president (1901-1909),

the Japanese announced that Hayashi Tadasu, the Japanese minister in London, and Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, representing Britain, signed the Anglo-Japanese Treaty on January 30, 1902. They had been considering this alliance, recognizing Japan's special interest in Korea, renewable in 1905 and 1911, since 1895, when Britain opted not to join France, Germany and Russia in opposition to the Japanese occupation of China's Liaotung peninsula. This alliance meant that Britain would side with Japan if any nation joined with Russia against Japan. As part of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, 300 British-trained Japanese bankers set up the Japanese banking system, a structure that then began creating devastating hardships requiring loans from the international banking cartel. Britain, challenged with heavy war debt, to America's J. P. Morgan, would terminate the 1902 alliance, in December 1921. J. P. Morgan and other banks, flush with war profits after the First World War, focused on investment opportunities in Japan.

Roosevelt believed that millions of Asians would benefit through a Japanese conquest. The Japanese accepted the Anglo-American Open Door policy, even though Britain and the United States exploited Japan because of their strategic location, which functioned as an Open Door to China, while Japan expanded their power and influence into Korea. The whole objective was cooperative opposition to Russia. Roosevelt anxiously awaited Japan's invasion, and even bragged that he "would not hesitate to give Japan something more than moral support against Russia." Despite his bravado, he recognized that Congress would probably not authorize him to use military force in North Asia. Because of Hay's deteriorating health and advanced age, Roosevelt essentially functioned as his own Secretary of State in addition to having excessive influence in the War Department. During a cruise to Asia, in company with President Roosevelt, War Secretary William Howard Taft met for confidential meetings in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro from July 27-29, 1905. They discussed three items during the meeting. They were, 1) Katsura wanted the support of the United States and Britain for Japan's foreign policy; 2) Concerning the Philippines, Taft indicated that it would be best to have a strong nation like the United States govern the Philippines; and 3) Katsura maintained that the Japanese colonization of Korea was vital as he claimed that Korea caused the recent Russo-Japanese War. Taft agreed that the creation of a Japanese protectorate over Korea would stabilize East Asia. Taft said that President Roosevelt, who would never win Senate approval for such a constitutionally illegal treaty, would accept Taft's decisions on these matters. This dastardly agreement sealed Korea's fate—forty-five years under Japanese subjugation and sanctioned Japan's plundering of Asia. Britain and the financiers readily approved, as they funded Japan's vicious warfare. People did not discover the treaty papers until 1924..

Japan would be "the Crown's policeman in Asia," to do the dirty work—the killing and the dying. The alliance included high-interest loans from Rothschild-controlled British banks to finance Japan's armament purchases and ships from British firms. Britain then demanded that Russia abandon the Kwantung Peninsula, territory leased from China six years before. Russia had already spent \$300 million on improvements.

Dividing the Spoils, Japan's War against Czarist Russia

President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), intimately connected to J.P. Morgan and Company, manipulated Japan into attacking Russia. Sir Ernest Cassel, by absorbing the Maxim-Nordenfolt Company, created Vickers-Maxim. Cassel, a phenomenally wealthy Germanborn Jew, interested in South-American finance, reorganized Uruguay's finances, lent money to Mexico, acquired the Royal Swedish railway and built the Central London railway. He loaned money to the Chinese after the war with Japan. He was the personal banker to Edward VII (1901-1910) whose advisory staff included various members of the Sassoon family and Leopold and Alfred de Rothschild, who was a violent Russophobe. Cassel was a close friend of Winston Churchill and his father, Randolph, who was an intimate friend of Nathaniel Rothschild. Cassel made a vast fortune in Siberian gold mines, steel concerns, and railway companies.

On February 6, 1904, Japan suspended all contact with Russia. Roosevelt, though he sided with Japan, pretended to maintain neutrality, but would apply the Roosevelt Corollary to Korea. He wrote that impotent nations were appropriate prey for civilized nations. A naive official in Seoul told a reporter, "We have the promise of America. She will be our friend whatever happens." 924 On February 8, 1904, without a declaration of war, Japan attacked Russian ships at Port Arthur and Incheon. The surprised Russians accused the Japanese of violating international law while Jews in America were quite pleased. After Japan's assault, Roosevelt quickly warned Germany and France against assisting Russia, "I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf." On February 10, 1904, Japan officially declared war on czarist Russia, referred to as the Russo-Japanese War, lasting a little more than a year and a half. Jacob H. Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, with \$196 million, financed Japan's invasion of Russia while the European Rothschilds financed Russia. Unfortunately, and probably purposefully, Russia failed to receive timely armament deliveries, which greatly affected their defense capabilities. Russia's objectives, in 1895, were an ice-free Pacific port and the acquisition of just enough leased territory in Manchuria for the continuation of her transcontinental railway. 926 Warfare decimated her economy, preparatory to the Marxist revolution in 1905. Oscar S. Straus, a friend and later Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce and Labor, wrote to the president that he hoped Japan would be victorious. Roosevelt wrote his son, "I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game."

On September 5, 1905, officials of the victorious and the vanquished parties met at the Portsmouth Naval Base in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Roosevelt, advised by attendee, Jacob H. Schiff, the major financier of Japan's warfare, mediated the post war peace agreement, ending the Russo-Japanese War. Count Sergei Witte, was the architect of the October Manifesto, of October 17, 1905, in response to the Russian Revolution of 1905. Witte, a decisive policy-maker, the First Prime Minister of Imperial Russia, represented his nation. Adolf Krause, of B'nai B'rith, told Witte, who was married to a

Jewess, Matilda Lisanevich, during the peace negotiations in the summer that the Jews in Russia would revolt again if the Russian government failed to appropriately accommodate them.

Japan's acquisition included the South Manchurian branch of the China Far East Railway, which became the South Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu), spoils that Edward H. Harriman wanted to purchase. Manchuria had abundant natural resources such as forests, land, and mineral deposits. United States and British investors intended to exploit Manchuria. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox's, whose clients included Carnegie, Vanderbilt, J.P. Morgan, Rockefeller and Harriman, planned to internationalize all existing and future Manchurian railways. That would guarantee an open door policy to China and access to all of the country's resources. On November 6, 1909, Knox wrote to his counterpart, Sir Edward Grey of the Milner Group, regarding an alliance of the United States and British for the Chinchow-Aigun Railway. On January 21, 1910, Foreign Minister Komura formally objected to Knox's proposals. Japan's involvement in the 1905 treaty caused negative public sentiment and had required heavy sacrifices in blood and wealth. Former President Roosevelt wrote to President Taft about Knox's proposal. He wrote, "if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are averse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England plus an army as good as that of Germany."

5.10 The Invisible Hand

President Woodrow Wilson, who signed the Federal Reserve Act into law in 1913, said: "I am a most unhappy man. I have unwittingly ruined my country. A great industrial nation is now controlled by its system of credit. We have come to be one of the worst ruled, one of the most completely controlled governments in the civilized world – no longer a government of free opinion, no longer a government by a vote of the majority, but a government by the opinion and duress of a small group of dominant men."

Who were these dominant men? Wilson only hinted, saying:

"Some of the biggest men in the United States, in the field of commerce and manufacture, are afraid of something. They know that there is a power somewhere so organized, so subtle, so watchful, so interlocked, so complete, so pervasive, that they had better not speak above their breath when they speak in condemnation of it."

Many other leaders hinted that the government was controlled by invisible puppeteers. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Teddy Roosevelt's distant cousin, acknowledged in 1933:

"The real truth of the matter is, as you and I know, that a financial element in the large centers has owned the government since the days of Andrew Jackson. . . . The country is going through a repetition of Jackson's fight with the Bank of the United States – only on a far bigger and broader basis."

Felix Frankfurter, Justice of the Supreme Court, said in 1952:

“The real rulers in Washington are invisible and exercise power from behind the scenes.”

Congressman Wright Patman, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, said in a speech on the House floor in 1967:

In the U.S. today, we have in effect two governments. We have the duly constituted government, then we have an independent, uncontrolled and uncoordinated government in the Federal Reserve, operating the money powers which are reserved to congress by the Constitution. Two decades later, Senator Daniel Inouye would state on the Congressional Record at the conclusion of the Iran Contra hearings:

“There exists a shadowy Government with its own Air Force, its own Navy, its own fundraising mechanism, and the ability to pursue its own ideas of national interest, free from all checks and balances, and free from the law itself.”

In 1927, Mayor John Hylan of New York compared the invisible government to a “giant octopus,” recalling the “hydra-headed monster” battled by Andrew Jackson. In a speech in the New York Times, Hylan said:

“The warning of Theodore Roosevelt has much timeliness today, for the real menace of our republic is this invisible government which like a giant octopus sprawls its slimy length over City, State, and nation . . . It seizes in its long and powerful tentacles our executive officers, our legislative bodies, our schools, our courts, our newspapers, and every agency created for the public protection. . . . [A]t the head of this octopus are the Rockefeller-Standard Oil interest and a small group of powerful banking houses generally referred to as the international bankers. The little coterie of powerful international bankers virtually run the United States government for their own selfish purposes. They practically control both parties, write political platforms, make catspaws of party leaders, use the leading men of private organizations, and resort to every device to place in nomination for high public office only such candidates as will be amenable to the dictates of corrupt big business. . . . These international bankers and Rockefeller-Standard Oil interests control the majority of the newspapers and magazines in this country. They use the columns of these papers to club into submission or drive out of office public officials who refuse to do the bidding of the powerful corrupt cliques which compose the invisible government.”

In 1934, these international bankers and businessmen were labeled the “Robber Barons” by Matthew Josephson in a popular book of the same name. The Robber Barons were an unscrupulous lot, who “lived for market conquest, and plotted takeovers like military strategy.” John D. Rockefeller’s father was called a snake-oil salesman, flimflam man, bigamist, and marginal criminal – never convicted but often accused, of crimes ranging from horse theft to rape. He once boasted, “I cheat my boys every chance I get, I want to make ’em sharp.” Once the Robber Barons had established a monopoly, they would raise prices, drop the quality of service, and engage in unfair trading practices to drive other firms out of business. There were many Robber Barons, but J. Pierpont Morgan, Andrew

Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller led the pack. Morgan dominated finance, Carnegie dominated steel, and Rockefeller monopolized oil. Carnegie built his business himself, and he loved competition; but Morgan was a different type of capitalist. He didn't build, he bought. He took over other people's businesses, and he hated competition. In 1901, Morgan formed the first billion dollar corporation, U.S. Steel, out of mills he purchased from Carnegie.

Rockefeller, too, dealt with competitors by buying them out. His company, Standard Oil, became the greatest of all monopolies and the first major multinational corporation. Before World War I, the financial and business structure of the United States was dominated by Morgan's finance and transportation companies and Rockefeller's Standard Oil; and these conglomerates had close alliances with each other. Through interlocking directorships, they were said to dominate almost the entire economic fabric of the United States.

Other industrialists, seeing the phenomenal success of the Morgan and Rockefeller trusts, dreamt of buying out their competition and forming huge monopolies in the same way. But with the exception of Carnegie, no other capitalists had the money for these predatory practices. Aspiring empire-builders were therefore drawn to Morgan and the other Wall Street bankers in search of funding. Corporations began drifting to New York to be near the big investment houses. By 1895, New York had become the headquarters for America's major corporations and the home of half its millionaires. Morgan's bank at 23 Wall Street, known as the "House of Morgan," was for decades the most important address in American finance.

Early in the twentieth century, Morgan controlled a Wall Street syndicate that financial writer John Moody called "the greatest financial power in the history of the world." Morgan dominated a hundred corporations with more than \$22 billion in assets. In 1913, in a book called *Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It*, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that the greatest threat to the American economy was the "money trust." According to *The Wall Street Journal*, the "money trust" was just another name for J. Pierpont Morgan, who had founded the world's most powerful bank. Like the Rothschilds in England, Morgan had extraordinary political influence in the United States. Morgan men routinely represented the U.S. government at international monetary meetings, something they continue to do today. Alan Greenspan, longstanding Chairman of the Federal Reserve, was a corporate director for J. P. Morgan before President Ronald Reagan appointed him to that post.

Who Pulled the Strings of the Robber Barons?

Rockefeller and Morgan were rivals who competed for power on the political scene, but they both had the support of powerful British financiers. John D. Rockefeller Sr. first made his fortune with some dubious railroad rebate deals during the Civil War. By 1895, he had acquired 95 percent of America's oil refining business. Chase Bank (named after

Salmon P. Chase in honor of his role in passing the National Banking Act) was bought by Rockefeller with financing traced to the Rothschilds. The funds came from a New York banking firm called Kuhn, Loeb, & Co., which was then under the control of a German immigrant named Jacob Schiff. Schiff had bought into the partnership with financial backing from the Rothschilds. He later bought out Kuhn and married the eldest daughter of Loeb. The Manhattan Company (the banking firm established by Hamilton and Burr at the turn of the nineteenth century) also came under the control of the Rothschilds through the banking interests of Kuhn, Loeb and the Warburgs, another Rothschild-related Frankfurt banking dynasty. In 1955, Rockefeller's Chase Bank merged with the Manhattan Company to become the Chase Manhattan Bank. The Morgan family banking interest could be traced back to England in an even more direct way. In the 1850s, Junius Morgan became a partner in what would become Peabody, Morgan, and Company, a London investment business specializing in transactions between Britain and the United States. During the Civil War, the partnership became the chief fiscal agent for the Union. John Pierpont Morgan, Junius' son, later became head of the firm's New York branch, which was named J. P. Morgan & Co. in 1895. J. P. Morgan Jr., John Pierpont's son, then became a partner in the branch in London, where he moved in 1898 to learn the central banking system as dominated by the Bank of England.

Although the Rothschilds were technically rivals of the Peabody/ Morgan firm, rumor had it that they had formed a secret alliance. Nathan Rothschild was not well liked, in part because of religious prejudice. Morgan biographer George Wheeler wrote in 1973, "Part of the reality of the day was an ugly resurgence of anti-Semitism. . . . Someone was needed as a cover." August Belmont (born Schoenberg) had played that role for Morgan during the Civil War; but when the Belmont/Rothschild connection became common knowledge, the ploy no longer worked. Wheeler wrote, "Who better than J. Pierpont Morgan, a solid, Protestant exemplar of capitalism able to trace his family back to pre-Revolutionary times? That could explain why, in the periodic financial crises of the Gilded Age, Morgan's bank always came out on top. In the bank panics of 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907, while other banks were going under, Morgan's bank always managed to come up with the funds to survive and thrive.

In 1879, Rockefeller turned his company Standard Oil into the new vehicle called a "trust" in order to coordinate all of its production, refining, transportation, and distribution activities. The Rockefeller trust consisted of a network of companies that were wholly or partially owned by Rockefeller and that invested in each other. The scheme worked until 1882, when Standard Oil was driven out of Ohio due to antitrust investigations. In 1883, Rockefeller's trust moved to New York, where it proceeded to systematically devour independent oil producers and refiners across the country and the world. It was aided in these rapacious practices by illegal railroad rebates from Morgan, who had bought up the railroads with funding from the Rothschild bank. Independent oil refiners, being unable to compete, were forced to sell out at a huge loss or face financial ruin. By 1890, Rockefeller owned all of the independent oil refiners in the country and had a monopoly

on worldwide oil sales. In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Standard Oil cartel was a “dangerous conspiracy” that must be broken up “for the safety of the Republic.” (“Conspiracy” is a legal term meaning an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action.) In 1914, Standard Oil was referred to in the Congressional Record as the “shadow government.” Following the Court’s antitrust order, the Standard Oil monolith was split into 38 new companies, including Exxon, Mobil, Amoco, Chevron, and Arco; but Rockefeller secretly continued to control them by owning a voting majority of their stock.

The invention of the automobile and the gasoline engine gave the Rockefeller-Morgan syndicate a virtual stranglehold on the energy business. Rather than conserving oil and finding alternatives to the inefficient gasoline engine, they encouraged waste and consumption and ruthlessly suppressed competition. International strategist Henry Kissinger would say much later that whoever controlled oil controlled the world. That was true so long as the world was powered by oil, and the oil cartel evidently intended to keep it that way. Early in the twentieth century, energy genius Nikola Tesla was reportedly on the verge of developing “free energy” that would be independent of both fossil fuels and wires. But Tesla had the ill fortune of being funded by J. P. Morgan. When Morgan learned that there would be no way to charge for the new energy, he cut off Tesla’s funding and took steps to insure the latter’s financial ruin. Tesla wrote in a plaintive letter to Morgan, “I came to you with the greatest invention of all times. I knew you would refuse What chance have I to land the biggest Wall Street monster with the soul’s spider thread?”

The Information Monopoly

Secrecy has been maintained because the Robber Barons have been able to use their monopoly over money to buy up the major media, educational institutions, and other outlets of public information. While Rockefeller was buying up universities, medical schools, and the Encyclopedia Britannica, Morgan bought up newspapers. In 1917, Congressman Oscar Callaway stated on the Congressional Record:

“In March, 1915, the J.P. Morgan interests, the steel, shipbuilding, and powder interests, and their subsidiary organizations, got together 12 men high up in the newspaper world, and employed them to select the most influential newspapers in the United States and sufficient number of them to control generally the policy of the daily press of the United States. . . . They found it was only necessary to purchase the control of 25 of the greatest papers. The 25 papers were agreed upon; emissaries were sent to purchase the policy, national and international, of these papers; . . . an editor was furnished for each paper to properly supervise and edit information regarding the questions of preparedness, militarism, financial policies, and other things of national and international nature considered vital to the interests of the purchasers [and to suppress] everything in opposition to the wishes of the interests served.”

By 1983, according to Dean Ben Bagdikian in the *The Media Monopoly*, fifty corporations owned half or more of the media business. By 2000, that number was down to six corporations, with directorates interlocked with each other and with major commercial banks. Howard Zinn observes:

“[W]hether you have a Republican or a Democrat in power, the Robber Barons are still there. . . . Under the Clinton administration, more mergers of huge corporations took place [than] had ever taken place before under any administration. . . . [W]hether you have Republicans or Democrats in power, big business is the most powerful voice in the halls of Congress and in the ears of the President of the United States.”

In *The Underground History of American Education*, published in 2000, educator John Taylor Gatto traces how Rockefeller, Morgan and other members of the financial elite influenced, guided, funded, and at times forced compulsory schooling into the mainstream of American society. They needed three things for their corporate interests to thrive: (1) compliant employees, (2) a guaranteed and dependent population, and (3) a predictable business environment. It was largely to promote these ends, says Gatto, that modern compulsory schooling was established.

The Robber Barons had succeeded in monopolizing the money spigots, the oil spigots, and the public’s access to information; but Morgan wanted more. He wanted to secure the banks’ loans to the government with a reliable source of taxes, one that was imposed directly on the incomes of the people.

6. Some Essentials

6.1 The Order of the Illuminati

The leader of the Illuminati was a man named Dr. Adam Weishaupt who was born on February 6, 1748... . When his father died in 1753, he was converted to Catholicism by Baron Johann Adam Ickstatt, who turned the early training of the boy over to the Jesuits. Ickstatt, in 1742, had been appointed by the Jesuits to be the curator of the University [of Ingolstadt] in order to reorganize it. He had retired in 1765, but still controlled its policies. Although Weishaupt later became a priest, he developed a distinct hatred for the Jesuits, and became an atheist. Given access to the private library of Ickstatt, his godfather, the young man became interested in the works of the French philosophers, and studied law, economics, politics, and history. One such philosopher, Voltaire (1694-1778), a revolutionary who held liberal religious views, had written in a letter to King Frederick II ('the Great'), a Mason:

“Lastly, when the whole body of the Church should be sufficiently weakened and infidelity strong enough, the final blow (is) to be dealt by the sword of open, relentless persecution. A reign of terror (is) to be spread over the whole earth, and ... continue while a Christian should be found obstinate enough to adhere to Christianity.”

It is believed that Weishaupt got his ideas concerning the destruction of the Church from Voltaire's writings. He studied in France where he met Robespierre (who later led the French Revolution), and became friends with a few people in the French Royal Court. He graduated from the University of Ingolstadt, [Bavaria] in 1768. He served four years as a tutor until he was promoted to Assistant Instructor. In 1772, Weishaupt was made Professor of Civil Law. In 1773, he was made Professor of Canon Law, a post which had been held by the Jesuits for 90 years. They had founded most of the Universities, and kept strict control of them in order to eliminate Protestant influence. In 1773, Weishaupt got married, against the wishes of Ickstatt, who denounced him. Two years later, at the age of 27, he was made Dean of the Faculty of Law. The Jesuits, worried about his quick progression, tried to thwart his influence by secretly plotting against him, and his liberal thinking. Not wanting to become a martyr for his free-thinking ideas, he began focusing on establishing his organization. To confuse his detractors, he based the organizational structure on the one used by the Jesuits, however, his intention was to have a secret coalition of liberalism.

He studied the anti-Christian doctrines of the Manicheans, whose teachings revolved around astrology, medicine, and magic. He had been indoctrinated into Egyptian occult practices by an unknown merchant named Kolmer, from Jutland (the area around the border of Denmark and West Germany), who had been traveling around Europe since

1771. He studied the various Masonic writings after meeting a Protestant Freemason from Hanover. At first he thought about creating a superior Masonic-like organization that would be made up of men possessing superior abilities in all fields but concluded that Masonry was too open. Weishaupt spent five years working out a plan through which all of his ideas could be reduced to a single system which would be used to fight the oppression of religion, thereby loosening social ties. He wanted to replace Christianity with a religion of reason. An initial idea was to form an organization comprised of 'Schools of Wisdom,' whose goal was to "make of the human race, one good and happy family." They were to strive for the perfection of morals, so he thought about naming the group the 'Perfectibilists,' but it lacked the air of mystery and intrigue that he sought.

In 1774, he published a fictitious article called Sidonii Apollinarus Fragment, which he said was to prepare the people for the doctrine of reason. Weishaupt wrote:

"Princes and nations will disappear without violence from the earth. The human race will then become one family, and the world will be the dwelling of rational men." He wrote of their aims: "To make the perfecting of reasoning powers interesting to mankind, to spread the knowledge of sentiments, both humane and social, to check wicked inclinations, to stand up for suffering and oppressed virtue ... to facilitate the acquirement of knowledge and science."

On May 1, 1776, under the direction of the newly formed House of Rothschild ([along with] Wessely, Moses, Mendelssohn, and the bankers Itzig, Friedlander, and Meyer), Weishaupt founded the "Ancient Illuminated Seers of Bavaria" which became known as the "Order of the Illuminati". Weishaupt said that the name was derived from Luciferian teachings, and means, 'Holders of the Light.' In Latin, it means, the 'enlightened ones.' In layman's terms, it means 'to illuminate,' or 'to give light.' It refers to someone who is enlightened, spiritually and intellectually. Satan, when he was an angel, was known as Lucifer, the 'Bearer of Light,' and being that the group's name evolved from this, we can see the underlying nature of its goals.

Organization of the Order

Starting with only five members (Weishaupt and his inner circle...), the Illuminati wasn't fully operational until 1778. Weishaupt wrote:

The great strength of our Order lies in its concealment, let it never appear, in any place in its own name, but always covered by another name, and another occupation. None is fitter than the three lower degrees of Freemasonry; the public is accustomed to it, expects little from it, and therefore takes little notice of it... For the Order wishes to be secret, and to work in silence, for thus it is better secured from the oppression of the ruling powers, and because this secrecy gives a greater zest to the whole." "How can the weak obtain protection? Only by union, but this is rare. Nothing can bring this about but hidden societies. Hidden schools of wisdom are the means which we will one day free

men from their bonds...”

The Order was made up of three degrees: Novice, Minerval, and Illuminated Minerval. It was organized in a manner similar to Freemasonry and the Jesuits. Even though he admired the structure of the Jesuit hierarchy, he wrote that no ex-Jesuits were to be admitted, except by special permission. He wrote that they “must be avoided as the plague.” Their rites and ceremonies were similar to that of the Masons. Their aim, he said, was to have a one-world government, to allow the elite to govern the world, thus preventing future wars. One of their early programs was to distribute anti-religious material to criticize clerical leaders, who they saw as obstacles to social progress, and to oppose the “enemies of the human race and of society.” All members were required to adopt classical names. Weishaupt was called ‘Spartacus’ (who had been the leader of the slave insurrection in ancient Rome). His right-hand man, Xavier von Zwack, a lawyer to Prince von Salm, was known as ‘Cato’; Nicolai, the bookseller, was ‘Lucian’; Professor Westenreider was ‘Pythagoras’; Canon Hertel was ‘Marius’; Marquis di Constanza was ‘Diomedes’; Massenhausen was ‘Ajar’; Baron von Schroeckenstein was ‘Mohomed’; and Baron von Mengenhofen was ‘Sylla.’

Their headquarters was in Munich, Germany, and known as the Grand Lodge of the Illuminati (or Lodge of the Grand Orient) code-named ‘Athens’. Among their other four lodges: Ingolstadt was known as ‘Ephesus’, Heidelberg as ‘Utica’, and Frankfurt was known as ‘Thebes’. The calendar was reconstructed, and the months known by names reminiscent of the Hebrew language: January was known as ‘Dimeh,’ and February as ‘Benmeh,’ etc. They dated their letters according to the Persian Era, named after the king who began to rule in Persia in 632 B.C., Jezdegerd. Their new year began on March 21st. In 1777, Weishaupt joined the Eclectic Masonic lodge ‘Theodore of Good Counsel’ in Munich, and towards the end of 1778, he came up with the idea of merging the Illuminati and the Masons. Xavier von Zwack became a Mason on November 27, 1778, and working with a brother Mason, Abbe Marotti, he divulged the secret of the Order. By the middle of 1779, the Munich Masonic lodge was under the complete influence of the Illuminati.

During the first four years, about 60 active members had been recruited by a committee known as the ‘Insinulators’, and close to 1,000 had become indirectly affiliated with the Order. Soon, three more lodges were established.

Few knew the supreme direction of the Order. Only those within the inner circle, known as the ‘Areopagite’ (meaning ‘Tribunal’), were aware of their true purpose. To all others, Weishaupt said that he wanted a one-world government to prevent all future wars. The book *World Revolution* (by Nesta Webster) stated:

“The art of Illuminism lay in enlisting dupes as well as adepts, and by encouraging the dreams of honest visionaries or the schemes of fanatics, by flattering the vanity of ambitious egotists, by working on unbalanced brains, or by playing on such passions as greed and power, to make men of totally divergent aims serve the secret purpose of the

sect.”

Foolish, naive people, with money to burn, were especially welcomed. Weishaupt wrote:

“These good people swell our numbers and fill our money box; set yourselves to work; these gentlemen must be made to nibble at the bait ... But let us beware of telling them our secrets, this sort of people must always be made to believe that the grade they have reached is the last.” Weishaupt explained: “One must speak sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, so that our real purpose should remain impenetrable to our inferiors.”

And what was that purpose? It was “nothing less than to win power and riches, to undermine secular or religious government, and to obtain the mastery of the world.” Initiates were told that the Order represented the highest ideals of the Church, that Christ was the first advocator of Illuminism, and his secret mission was to restore to men the original liberty and equality they had lost in the Garden of Eden. Weishaupt said that Christ exhorted his disciples to despise riches in order to prepare the world for the community of goods that would do away with property ownership. Weishaupt wrote to Zwack:

“The most admirable thing of all is that great Protestant and reformed theologians (Lutherans and Calvinists) who belong to our Order really believe they see in it the true and genuine mind of the Christian religion.”

However, when one of Weishaupt’s followers would reach the higher degrees, their secret was revealed:

“Behold our secret ... in order to destroy all Christianity, all religion, we have pretended to have the sole true religion... to deliver one day the human race from all religion.”

Women were also enlisted. He wrote:

“There is no way of influencing men so powerful, as by means of women. These should therefore be our chief study; we should insinuate ourselves into their good opinion, give them hints of emancipation from the tyranny of public opinion, and of standing up for themselves...”

He also wrote: “This sex has a large part of the world in their hands.” Female members were divided into two groups: one group of society women, to give the organization an air of respectability; and the other group “who would help to satisfy those brothers who have a penchant for pleasure.” The Illuminati also used monetary and sex bribery to gain control of men in high places, then blackmailed them with the threat of financial ruin, public exposure, and fear of death.

The Congress of Wilhelmsbad (1781)

An understanding was reached between the Masons and the Illuminati, and on December 20, 1781, a combined Order was proposed which would add to the Illuminati organization the first three degrees of Masonry. It wasn't until the Congress of Wilhelmsbad from July 16th to August 29th, 1781 (which was attended by Masons, Martinistes, and representatives from other secret organizations from Europe, America and Asia) that the alliance was official. Those at the meeting were put under oath not to reveal anything. Comte de Virieu, a Mason from the Martiniste lodge at Lyons, upon his return home when questioned about the Congress said:

"I will not confide [the details] to you. I can only tell you that all this is very much more serious than you think. The conspiracy which is being woven is so well thought out, that it will be, so to speak, impossible for the Monarchy and the Church to escape it."

Because of a movement begun by Dohm's book *Upon the Civil Amelioration of the Condition of the Jews* in 1781, and a book by Mirabeau in London, a resolution was passed at the Congress to allow Jews into the Lodges. It was obvious that it was done for financial reasons, because the Illuminati moved their headquarters to Frankfurt, Germany, a stronghold of Jewish finance. As the Order spread throughout Germany, money was contributed from such leading Jewish families as the Oppenheims, Wertheimers, Schusters, Speyers, Sterns, and of course, the Rothschilds. Gerald B. Winrod wrote in his book *Adam Weishaupt: A Human Devil* that "of the thirty-nine chief sub-leaders of Weishaupt, seventeen were Jews." [However,] arguments that the Illuminati was solely of Jewish origin are completely unfounded.

The Growth of the Order (1781-1784)

From Bavaria, the Order of the Illuminati spread into the Upper and Lower Rhenish provinces, Suabia, Franconia, Westphalia, Upper and Lower Saxony; and outside Germany into Austria and Switzerland. Soon they had over 300 members from all walks of life, including students, merchants, doctors, lawyers, judges, professors, civil officers, bankers, and ministers. By 1783, there were over 600 members; and by 1784, their membership reached nearly 3,000. By 1786 they had numerous lodges across the various German provinces, Austria, Hungary, England, Scotland, Poland, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Holland, Spain, Sweden, Russia, Ireland, Africa, and America. By the time of the 3rd Masonic Congress in Frankfurt in 1786, the Illuminati virtually controlled all the Masonic lodges, and at this meeting their goals were stated as:

- 1.) Pantheism for the higher degrees; atheism for the lower degrees and the populace
- 2.) Communism of goods, women, and general concerns
- 3.) The destruction of the Church and all forms of Christianity, and the removal of all

existing human governments to make way for a universal republic in which the utopian ideas of complete liberty from existing social, moral, and religious restraint, absolute equality, and social fraternity, should reign.

Students who were members of wealthy families with international leanings were recommended for special training in internationalism. Those selected by the Illuminati were given scholarships to attend special schools. Weishaupt wrote:

“I propose academies under the direction of the Order. This will secure us the adherence of the Literati. Science shall here be the lure.” He also wrote: “We must acquire the direction of education, of church, management of the professorial chair, and of the pulpit.”

To insure that the activities of the Order would remain a secret, a warning as to the consequences of betraying the Order was included in the ceremony of initiation. They would point a sword at the initiate and say:

“If you are a traitor and a perjurer, learn that all our Brothers are called upon to arm themselves against you. Do not hope to escape or find a place of safety. Wherever you are, shame, remorse, and the rage of our Brothers will pursue you, and torment you to the innermost recesses of your entrails.”

The Order Exposed and Suppressed (1784-1790)

In October 1783, Joseph Utzschneider, a lawyer who had dropped out of the Order in August, presented to the Duchess Maria Anna a document which detailed the activities of the Illuminati. He was upset because he had been promoted too slowly, and was constantly prodded to prove his loyalty. The Duchess gave the information to the Duke. On June 22, 1784, Duke Karl Theodore Dalberg, the Elector Palatinate of Bavaria, after discovering from the information that the goals of the Illuminati were to “in time rule the world” by overthrowing all civil government, criticized all secret societies and groups established without government sanction. On March 2, 1785, he issued a proclamation identifying the Illuminati as a branch of the Masons, and ordered that their Lodges be shut down. The government began a war against the Order by initiating judicial inquiries at Ingolstadt. In an attempt to preserve the secrecy of their motives, the Areopagite burned many of their documents; however, the government was able to seize many of their papers when they raided the Lodges. After being replaced at the University in February, Weishaupt fled across the border into Regensburg, finally settling in Gotha, where he found refuge with another Illuminati member, the Duke of Saxe-Gotha.

In April, 1785, Utzschneider was able to convince three other members to come forward. They were fellow professors at the Marienburg (Marianen) Academy who had doubts about the validity of the organization’s principles when they discovered that they would receive no mystical powers. They were also disgruntled over Weishaupt’s tyranny. Cossandey, Grunberger, and Renner went before the Court of Inquiry on September 9,

1785, where they supplied valuable information, such as membership lists, and revealed their aims and goals, which they consolidated into the following six points:

Abolition of the Monarchy and all ordered government.

Abolition of private property.

Abolition of inheritance.

Abolition of patriotism.

Abolition of the family, through the abolition of marriage, all morality, and the institution of communal education for children.

Abolition of all religion. (Sounds already like Communism)

The purposes of these six points were to divide the people politically, socially, and economically; to weaken countries and create a one-world government. They testified that "all religion, all love of country and loyalty to sovereigns, were to be annihilated..." The government pardoned all public officials and military leaders who publicly admitted membership. Those who didn't, and were discovered to be members, lost their rank and standing, were removed from office, and openly disgraced and humiliated. Weishaupt was preparing to set his plans into motion for the French Revolution, which was slated to begin in 1789. In July, 1785, he instructed Zwack to put their plans in book form. This book contained a history of the Illuminati, and many of their ideas for expansion and future endeavors. A copy was sent by courier (identified as Jacob Lanze) to Illuminati members in Paris and Silesia. However, after leaving Frankfurt, as the courier rode through Regensburg on horseback, he was struck by lightning and killed. The authorities found the document and turned it over to the government.

Xavier Zwack ('Cato'), a government lawyer and one of the Order's most prominent leaders whose name was on Renner's list, had his house in Landshut illegally searched by the police in October 1785 and his papers seized. He was dismissed from his position. Many books, documents, papers and correspondence were discovered including over 200 letters written between Weishaupt and the members of the Areopagite which dealt with matters of the highest secrecy. The following year more information was taken from the houses of Baron Bassus and Count Massenhausen ('Ajar'). Among the confiscated documents were tables which contained their secret codes and symbols, secret calendar, geographical locations, insignias, ceremonies of initiation, recruiting instructions, statutes, a partial roster of members, and nearly 130 official seals from the government which were used to counterfeit state documents. Needless to say, all of this information shed more light on the Order and the danger first realized by the government had now become a national emergency. In 1786 the government gathered all of the confiscated documents and published them in a book called Original Writings of the Order and Sect of the Illuminati which was circulated to every government and crowned head in Europe, including France, to warn them of the impending danger.

The leaders of the Order who appeared before the government's Court of Inquiry testified that the organization was dedicated to the overthrow of church and state. However, these

revelations and the publication of their documents did little to alert the public because of their unbelievable claims. New measures were taken by government officials. The leaders of the Order were arrested and formally interrogated then forced to renounce the Illuminati. The final blow came on August 16, 1787, when Dalberg issued his final proclamation against the Illuminati. Anyone found guilty of recruiting members were to be executed, while those who were recruited, would have their property confiscated and then be deported. Zwack, who was banished, sought sanctuary in the Court of Zweibrücken, where he was later appointed to an official position in the principality of Salm-Kyburg. He contributed to the Illuminati movement in Holland. He was later summoned by Dalberg, as the government tried to deal with the problem of fugitives who might attempt to reorganize the Order. Zwack fled to England. On November 15, 1790, another Edict was announced against the members of the organization. Anyone found to be an active member was to be put to death. The following year a list of 91 names of alleged members was compiled. They were hunted down and banished. This harassment didn't end until 1799 when Dalberg died. The apparent demise of the Order was taken into stride by its highest members, who continued to operate underground. Weishaupt wrote:

“The great care of the Illuminati after the publication of their secret writings was to persuade the whole of Germany that their Order no longer existed, that their adepts had all renounced, not only their mysteries, but as members of a secret society.”

Weishaupt had a contingency plan ready, and wrote:

“By this plan we shall direct all mankind. In this manner, and by the simplest means, we shall set in motion and in flames. The occupations must be allotted and contrived, that we may in secret, influence all political transactions ... I have considered everything and so prepared it, that if the Order should this day go to ruin, I shall in a year re-establish it more brilliant than ever.”

To hide their subversive activities, the highest members of the Order began to masquerade as humanitarians and philanthropists. Weishaupt fled to Switzerland, later returning to Germany, where the Duke of Saxe-Gotha gave him sanctuary. The Order moved their headquarters to London, where it began to grow again. Weishaupt told his followers to infiltrate the lodges of Blue Masonry and to form secret circles within them. Only Masons who proved themselves as Internationalists and were atheists were initiated into the Illuminati.

From this point on, the Illuminati won't be mentioned anymore, simply because actual proof of their involvement after 1800 is lacking. One of their main goals was the infiltration of the Freemason Lodges around the world and it is well known that many relevant persons in history were freemasons. But the Illuminati threat was real and many people knew about it. On July 19, 1789 David Pappin, President of Harvard University, issued a warning to the graduating class concerning the Illuminati's influence on American politics and religion. In April 1793 France sent new ambassador Edmond Genet to America so he

could collect payment for the American debt incurred during the American Revolution. The money was to be used to finance France's war with England. However, his real reason for being here was to gain political favor for France and spread Illuminism, which he did through the establishment of 'Democratic Clubs.' Washington said [the clubs] "...would shake the government to its foundations," while John Quincy Adams, oldest son of the 2nd President, John Adams who became our 6th President in 1825, said that these clubs were "so perfectly affiliated with the Parisian Jacobins that their origin from a common parent cannot possibly be mistaken." Because of the Illuminati threat, Washington and Adams lobbied Congress to pass the Alien and Sedition Act which was "designed to protect the United States from the extensive French Jacobin conspiracy, paid agents of which were even in high places in the government."

On May 9, 1798 Rev. Jedediah Morse, pastor of the Congregational Church in Charleston, South Carolina preached a sermon at the New North Church in Boston about the Illuminati:

"Practically all of the civil and ecclesiastical establishments of Europe have already been shaken to their foundations by this terrible organization; the French Revolution itself is doubtless to be traced to its machinations; the successes of the French armies are to be explained on the same ground. The Jacobins are nothing more nor less than the open manifestation of the hidden system of the Illuminati. The Order has its branches established and its emissaries at work in America. The affiliated Jacobin Societies in America have doubtless had as the object of their establishment the propagation of the principles of the illuminated mother club in France ... I hold it a duty, my brethren, which I owe to God, to the cause of religion, to my country and to you, at this time, to declare to you, thus honestly and faithfully, these truths. My only aim is to awaken you and myself a due attention, at this alarming period, to our dearest interests. As a faithful watchman I would give you warning of your present danger."

Later in July, Timothy Dwight, President of Yale University, told the people of New Haven: "Shall our sons become the disciples of Voltaire (a French writer) and the dragoons of Murat, or our daughters, the concubines of the Illuminati?" To infiltrate the Masonic lodges in Europe, Weishaupt had enlisted the aid of John Robison who was a long time, high degree Mason in the Scottish Rite, a professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh University in Scotland, a British historian, and Secretary-General to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. When he went to Germany, he was given Weishaupt's revised conspiracy plans to study, in order to expand the Illuminati's influence in the British Isles. However, Robison didn't agree with their principles, and after warning American Masons in 1789, published a book to expose the organization in 1798 called *Proofs of a Conspiracy Against All Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried On In the Secret Meetings of Freemasons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies* which presented the Protestant view. He wrote:

"I have observed these doctrines gradually diffusing and mixing with all the different systems of Freemasonry till, at last, an association has been formed for the express

purpose of rooting out all the religious establishments, and overturning all the existing governments of Europe.”

During the summer of 1798, Rev. G. W. Snyder, a Lutheran minister, wrote a letter to President Washington and included a copy of Robison’s book expressing his concern about the Illuminati infiltrating the American Masonic lodges. In Washington’s response, dated September 25, 1798, he wrote: “I have heard much about the nefarious and dangerous plan and doctrines of the Illuminati,” but went on to say that he didn’t believe that they had become involved in the lodges. A subsequent letter by Snyder, requesting a more reassuring answer resulted in a letter from Washington, dated October 24, 1798, which can be found in *The Writings of George Washington* (volume 20, page 518, which was prepared under the direction of the U.S. George Washington Bicentennial Commission and published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1941). He wrote:

“It was not my intention to doubt that the doctrines of the Illuminati and the principles of Jacobinism had not spread in the United States. On the contrary, no one is more satisfied of this fact than I am. The idea I meant to convey, was, that I did not believe that the lodges of Freemasons in this country had, as societies, endeavored to propagate the diabolical tenets of the first, or pernicious principles of the latter. That individuals of them may have done it, or that the founder or instruments employed to have found the democratic societies in the United States may have had this object, and actually had a separation of the people from their government in view, is too evident to be questioned.”

Shortly before his death, Washington issued two more warnings about the Illuminati. On July 4, 1812, Rev. Joseph Willard, the president of Harvard University, said in a speech in Lancaster, New Hampshire:

“There is sufficient evidence that a number of societies, of the Illuminati, have been established in this land of Gospel light and civil liberty, which were first organized from the grand society in France. They are doubtless secretly striving to undermine all our ancient institutions, civil and sacred. These societies are closely leagued with those of the same Order, in Europe; they have all the same object in view. The enemies of all order are seeking our ruin. Should infidelity generally prevail, our independence would fall of course. Our republican government would be annihilated...”

The Order of the Illuminati was real and especially in the United States the danger was known, while in Europe it was ignored. Another goal of their ways was not only to subvert the Masonic Lodges but also to create new secret society to create confusion.

Going further into the Conspiracy

In 1829, the Illuminati held a secret meeting in New York, which was addressed by a British Illuminist named Frances “Fanny” Wright, from Scotland, who was an associate of socialist Robert Dale Owen. She had come to America in 1818, then again in 1824. In 1828, she became the co-editor of the *New Harmony Gazette* with Owen. In 1829, they

moved to New York, and called their publication the Free Enquirer. At the meeting, she spoke of equal rights, atheism, and free love, as she promoted a Women's Auxiliary of the Illuminati. Those present were told that an international movement of subversives was being developed along the lines of Illuminati principles, who would be used to ferment future wars. They were to be known as 'Communists.' This movement was to be used to make the idea of a one-world government more appealing by bringing chaos to the world through war and revolution, so the Illuminati could step in to create order. In 1843, poet Heinrich Heine, revealed what he knew about this new group, when he wrote a book called *Letece*, which was a compilation of articles he wrote for the Augsburg Gazette from 1840-1843. A passage from that book read:

"Communism is the secret name of this tremendous adversary which the rule of the proletariat, with all that implies, opposes to the existing bourgeois regime ... Communism is nonetheless the dark hero, cast for an enormous if fleeting role in the modern tragedy, and awaiting its cue to enter the stage."

Clinton Roosevelt, Horace Greeley (1811-72, Editor of the New York Tribune which he founded in 1841), and Charles Dana (1819-97, City Editor on the New York Tribune, and later Editor of the New York Sun), prominent newspaper publishers at that time, were appointed to a committee to raise funds for the project which was being financed by the Rothschilds. In 1841, Clinton Roosevelt wrote a book called *The Science of Government Founded on Natural Law* which was the blueprint of the conspiracy to eliminate the U.S. Constitution and to communize the country based on the principles of Weishaupt. It contained the detailed plan for the New Deal and the National Recovery Act that was implemented 92 years later by his direct descendant Franklin D. Roosevelt. His book "The Science of Government Founded on Natural Law" was also the blueprint of "The Communist Manifesto" by Karl Marx who copied much of its content.

Conspiracy or Theory?

There are much more information regarding the Illuminati than shown here and it seems all too unpalatable. Yet, there are people with wide ranging influence and access to secret documents who very well believe in all this and also made this knowledge public. One of such people is Sir Winston Churchill, Lord of Admiralty in World War 1 and British Prime Minister in World War 2. In 1920, he published a newspaper article labeled "Zionism versus Bolshevism" where he wrote:

"In violent opposition to all this sphere of Jewish effort rise the schemes of the International Jews. The adherents of this sinister confederacy are mostly men reared up among the unhappy populations of countries where Jews are persecuted on account of their race. Most, if not all, of them have forsaken the faith of their forefathers, and divorced from their minds all spiritual hopes of the next world. This movement among the Jews is not new. From the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down to Trotsky (Rus-

sia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxemburg (Germany) and Emma Goldman (U.S.), this world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the reconstruction of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malevolence, and impossible equality, has been steadily growing.“

In Churchill's view, it was all a Jewish conspiracy for the One World Government. As we will see in later chapters, he himself became a Zionist at the end of World War 1 and was bribed to do their bidding. With his corruption, he sacrificed the very thing he fought for his entire life, the British Empire, in order to destroy the only movement which could oppose this worldwide conspiracy. Today, we know of this as the Second World War.

6.2 Socialism/Communism

Introduction

The words socialism and socialist were first used about the year 1830 but the origin of the ideas which led to the establishment of the modern labor movement goes back to the time of the French Revolution. For a variety of reasons Jews were attracted to socialism as it developed in Western Europe. Some regarded it as the building of a “just society“ based on the teachings of the Bible and the Prophets, while others were attracted by its revolutionary nature. Thus, while some Jews saw socialism as a reply to antisemitism, there were also Jews who saw in it a way of getting rid of their Jewish heritage and serving the cause of the “Brotherhood of Man.“ Socialism was particularly attractive for Jews anxious to leave the ghetto behind them and who, disappointed with the slow progress of 19th-century liberalism, were keen to embrace a new universal faith.

France

The forerunners of modern socialism were two Frenchmen, Count Henry Claude de Rouvroy de Saint-Simon (1760–1825; see Saint-Simonism) and Charles Fourier (1772–1837). Saint-Simon was impressed by Jewish messianic ideals and, referring to the persecution of the Jews, wrote that he looked forward to the time when all men would be brothers. Two of his followers, Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin (1796–1864) and Armand Bazard (1791–1832), considered the emancipation of the Jews as being one of the preconditions for the liberation of humanity. They believed that Jewish monotheism foreshadowed the approaching unity of mankind and their supporters included many French Jews, among them the poet Léon Halévy, the bankers Émile and Isaac Péreire, and the financier Olinde Rodrigues (1794–1851). On the other hand, Charles Fourier identified Jews with capitalism and opposed their emancipation on the grounds that they were “parasites, merchants, usurers.“ Nevertheless, in his last writings he argued that the Jews should be helped to escape from persecution in Europe by returning to Palestine and once more become a recognized nation with their own king, their own flag, their own consuls, and their own

currency. A number of Fourier's followers were Jews who rejected their master's anti-semitism. Thus Alexander Weil wrote in 1845 that it was unfair to blame one section of the population for what he regarded as the iniquities of Catholicism and capitalism. He also described the serious condition of the Jews in Eastern Europe, in order to draw the attention of the public to their plight. Similarly, Jean Czynsky, a Polish refugee of Jewish origin, wrote that freedom for Poland and the emancipation of Polish Jews were concepts for which all socialists must strive.

Great Britain

The early development of socialism in Britain at the beginning of the 19th century had little to do with the Jews, who numbered only 20,000 in the country. Nevertheless, Robert Owen (1771–1858), “the father of British socialism,” actively campaigned for equality for the Jews and in 1830 submitted a petition to the House of Commons urging the abolition of religious disabilities. His example was followed by a number of leaders of the Chartist movement. Jews first became prominent in British socialism in the latter half of the 19th century and in May 1876 the Aguddat ha-Sozialistim ha-Ivrim was formed in London, its founders including A.S. Liebermann and Lazar Goldenberg. German radical groups were also active in London and largely influenced the ideology of Jewish socialists in Britain. They kept in contact with the Russian revolutionary Peter Lavrov (1823–1900), who published the socialist organ, *Vpered*, in London. Toward the end of the 19th century an increasingly large number of Russian Jews became active in British socialism. Theodor Rothstein was a leader of the Marxist Social Democratic Federation, founded by H.M. Hyndman in 1884. Rothstein, who was shocked by an antisemitic outburst by Hyndman, later played an important part at the congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in London in 1907, and after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 was their unofficial representative in London. Later he helped found the British Communist Party, in which his son Andrew Rothstein was a prominent figure for many years. He was anti-Zionist, as were Joe Finberg, and Boris and Zelda Kahn, all refugees from Russia who played a major part in the British socialist movement. An outstanding figure of the British socialist movement was Eleanor Marx-Aveling (1855–1898), Karl Marx's youngest daughter, who felt a close affinity with the Jewish people and affirmed that “my happiest moments are when I am in the East End of London amid Jewish workpeople.”

Germany

In Germany, many of the pioneers of socialism were Jewish. Among them was Moses Hess, whose study *Die Philosophie der Tat* (“The Philosophy of Action”), linked the ideas of the German philosophical school with the concept of historical materialism on which communism was based. Hess largely influenced the thinking of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels but differed from them in that his brand of socialism was based upon ethical

concepts. The course of socialism in Germany, however, was dominated not by Hess but by Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle, the former as the founder of the school of economic materialism and the latter as the father of German Social Democracy. But while Marx was the great theoretician who set out to revolutionize international politics, Lassalle was the political strategist who brought socialism into German political life. Both showed a marked hostility to Judaism. On the other hand, Marx's non-Jewish colleague Friedrich Engels, who at first equated Jews with capitalists, later took a stand against antisemitism which he described as the weapon of the German governing class.

The First International

A number of Jews became prominent during the 19th century in the International Working Men's Association, formed in 1864 by Marx and Engels, which became known as the First International. Among them were several French Jews, including E.E. Fribourg, an opponent of Marx, who was a disciple of the non-Jewish anarchist writer Pierre Proudhon (1809–1865). Fribourg advocated membership in the association only to people engaged in physical work, a move against Marx, whereas Lazare Lévy, another leading member of the French section of the First International, was a strong supporter of Karl Marx. Jews were also prominent in the workers' uprising in the Paris Commune in March 1871, one of the leaders being Léo Frankel.

The Second International

The Second International set up at the Paris Congress of 1889 was largely dominated by German socialists, whose delegates represented a strong socialist party in effective control of the trade unions. They included August Bebel, William Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, and Eduard Bernstein, the son of a Jewish worker, who had a profound influence on the development of socialism in Germany and elsewhere. Bernstein combined Marxist ideology with British pragmatism in a concept which became known as "Revisionism." He considered assimilation the best solution to the Jewish problem but Jewish suffering in World War I made him a supporter of Jewish settlement in Palestine and of Po'alei Zion. His non-Jewish colleague August Bebel was also sympathetic to the Jewish cause, describing antisemitism as "socialism of the fools," and, while there were antisemites among the German socialists, the party was committed to fight against discrimination. By 1912 there were 12 Jews among the 100 Social Democrats in the German Parliament. Many other Jews were prominent in the party, the majority of them favoring assimilation, especially after Karl Kautsky's book, *Race and Judaism*, was published in 1914. Most members of the Social Democratic Party were hostile to Zionism, as was the party organ *Die Neue Zeit*, but the Revisionists showed understanding of the labor Zionist cause and their newspaper *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, edited by Joseph Bloch, was pro-Zionist. In Austria, many prominent figures in the Socialist Party were Jews, among them Victor

Adler, Friedrich Adler, Otto Bauer, Max Adler, Hugo Breitner, and William Ellenbogen. They all supported assimilation and opposed Jewish national aspirations. In particular, Otto Bauer's work *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (1907), which denied that the Jews were a separate nationality, had considerable influence in socialist circles. On the whole, Jewish socialists in Austria avoided discussion of the Jewish question and were hostile to Zionism, but a notable exception was Julius Braunthal, who supported the labor Zionist movement.

Goals from the Communist Manifesto

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production

6.3 Nationalism

Nationalism was the most successful political force of the 19th century. It emerged from two main sources: the Romantic exaltation of "feeling" and "identity" [see Herder above all on this] and the Liberal requirement that a legitimate state be based on a "people" rather than, for example, a dynasty, God, or imperial domination. Both Romantic "identity nationalism" and Liberal "civic nationalism" were essentially middle class movements. There were two main ways of exemplification: the French method of "inclusion" - essentially that anyone who accepted loyalty to the civil French state was a

“citizen“. In practice this meant the enforcement of a considerable degree of uniformity, for instance the destruction of regional languages. The US can be seen to have, eventually, adopted this ideal of civic inclusive nationalism. The German method, required by political circumstances, was to define the “nation“ in ethnic terms.

Although nationalism is unique to the modern world, some of its elements can be traced throughout history. The first roots of nationalism are probably to be found in the ancient Hebrews, who conceived of themselves as both a chosen people, that is, a people as a whole superior to all other peoples, and a people with a common cultural history. The ancient Greeks also felt superior to all other peoples and moreover felt a sense of great loyalty to the political community. These feelings of cultural superiority (ethnocentrism), which are similar to nationalism, gave way to much more universal identifications under the Roman Empire and with the Christian Church through its teaching of the oneness of humanity.

As strong centralized monarchies were built from petty feudal states, as regional languages and art forms were evolved, and as local economies widened, popular identification with these developments became increasingly strong. In areas such as Italy, which were not yet single nations, recurring invasions led such thinkers as Niccolò Machiavelli to advocate national political federation. The religious wars of the Reformation set nation against nation, though the strongest loyalty continued to adhere to the sovereign. In the 16th and 17th cent. the nationalistic economic doctrine of mercantilism appeared.

The growth of the middle classes, their desire for political power, and the consequent development of democratic political theory were closely connected with the emergence of modern nationalism. The theorists of the French Revolution held that people should establish governments of equality and liberty for everyone. To them the nation was inseparable from the people, and for the first time in history a people could create a government in accordance with the nation’s general will. Although their aims were universal, they glorified the nation that would establish their aims, and nationalism found its first political expression.

It was in the 19th cent. that nationalism became a widespread and powerful force. During this time nationalism expressed itself in many areas as a drive for national unification or independence. The spirit of nationalism took an especially strong hold in Germany, where thinkers such as Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte had developed the idea of Volk. However, the nationalism that inspired the German people to rise against the empire of Napoleon I was conservative, tradition-bound, and narrow rather than liberal, progressive, and universal. And when the fragmented Germany was finally unified as the German Empire in 1871, it was a highly authoritarian and militarist state. After many years of fighting, Italy also achieved national unification and freedom from foreign domination, but certain areas inhabited by Italians (e.g., Trieste) were not included in the new state, and this gave rise to the problem of irredentism. In the United States, where nationalism had evinced itself in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, national unity was maintained at the cost of the Civil War. In the latter half of the 19th cent.,

there were strong nationalist movements among the peoples subject to the supranational Austrian and Ottoman empires, as there were in Ireland under British rule, and in Poland under Russian rule. At the same time, however, with the emergence in Europe of strong, integrated nation-states, nationalism became increasingly a sentiment of conservatives. It was turned against such international movements as socialism, and it found outlet in pursuit of glory and empire.

6.4 Imperialism

Imperialism has been the most powerful force in world history over the last four or five centuries, carving up whole continents while oppressing indigenous peoples and obliterating entire civilizations. Yet, it is seldom accorded any serious attention by our academics, media commentators, and political leaders. When not ignored outright, the subject of imperialism has been sanitized, so that empires become “commonwealths,” and colonies become “territories” or “dominions”. Imperialist military interventions become matters of “national defense,” “national security,” and maintaining “stability” in one or another region.

The earliest victims of Western European imperialism were other Europeans. Some 800 years ago, Ireland became the first colony of what later became known as the British empire. A part of Ireland still remains under British occupation. Other early Caucasian victims included the Eastern Europeans. The people Charlemagne worked to death in his mines in the early part of the ninth century were Slavs. So frequent and prolonged was the enslavement of Eastern Europeans that “Slav” became synonymous with servitude. Indeed, the word “slave” derives from “Slav”. Eastern Europe was an early source of capital accumulation, having become wholly dependent upon Western manufactures by the seventeenth century.

The preponderant thrust of the European, North American, and Japanese imperial powers has been directed against Africa, Asia, and Latin America. By the nineteenth century, they saw the Third World as not only a source of raw materials and slaves but a market for manufactured goods. By the twentieth century, the industrial nations were exporting not only goods but capital, in the form of machinery, technology, investments, and loans. To say that we have entered the stage of capital export and investment is not to imply that the plunder of natural resources has ceased. If anything, the despoliation has accelerated.

Of the various notions about imperialism circulating today in the United States, the dominant view is that it does not exist. Imperialism is not recognized as a legitimate concept, certainly not in regard to the United States. One may speak of “Soviet imperialism” or “nineteenth-century British imperialism” but not of U.S. imperialism. A graduate student in political science at most universities in this country would not be granted the opportunity to research U.S. imperialism, on the grounds that such an undertaking would not be scholarly. While many people throughout the world charge the United States with being

an imperialist power, in this country persons who talk of U.S. imperialism are usually judged to be mouthing ideological blather.

Imperialism mixed with Capitalism

Imperialism is older than capitalism. The Persian, Macedonian, Roman, and Mongol empires all existed centuries before the Rothschilds and Rockefellers. Emperors and conquistadors were interested mostly in plunder and tribute, gold and glory. Capitalist imperialism differs from these earlier forms in the way it systematically accumulates capital through the organized exploitation of labor and the penetration of overseas markets. Capitalist imperialism invests in other countries, transforming and dominating their economies, cultures, and political life, integrating their financial and productive structures into an international system of capital accumulation.

A central imperative of capitalism is expansion. Investors will not put their money into business ventures unless they can extract more than they invest. Increased earnings come only with a growth in the enterprise. The capitalist ceaselessly searches for ways of making more money in order to make still more money. One must always invest to realize profits, gathering as much strength as possible in the face of competing forces and unpredictable markets. Given its expansionist nature, capitalism has little inclination to stay home. Almost 150 years ago, Marx and Engels described a bourgeoisie that “chases over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. . . . It creates a world after its own image.” The expansionists destroy whole societies. Self-sufficient peoples are forcibly transformed into disfranchised wage workers. Indigenous communities and folk cultures are replaced by mass-market, mass-media, consumer societies. Cooperative lands are supplanted by agribusiness factory farms, villages by desolate shanty towns, autonomous regions by centralized autocracies.

Consider one of a thousand such instances. A few years ago the Los Angeles Times carried a special report on the rainforests of Borneo in the South Pacific. By their own testimony, the people there lived contented lives. They hunted, fished, and raised food in their jungle orchards and groves. But their entire way of life was ruthlessly wiped out by a few giant companies that destroyed the rainforest in order to harvest the hardwood for quick profits. Their lands were turned into ecological disaster areas and they themselves were transformed into disfranchised shantytown dwellers, forced to work for subsistence wages—when fortunate enough to find employment. North American and European corporations have acquired control of more than three-fourths of the known mineral resources of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But the pursuit of natural resources is not the only reason for capitalist overseas expansion. There is the additional need to cut production costs and maximize profits by investing in countries with cheaper labor markets. U.S. corporate foreign investment grew 84 percent from 1985 to 1990, the most dramatic increase being in cheap-labor countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Spain,

and Singapore.

Because of low wages, low taxes, nonexistent work benefits, weak labor unions, and nonexistent occupational and environmental protections, U.S. corporate profit rates in the Third World are 50 percent greater than in developed countries. Citibank, one of the largest U.S. firms, earns about 75 percent of its profits from overseas operations. While profit margins at home sometimes have had a sluggish growth, earnings abroad have continued to rise dramatically, fostering the development of what has become known as the multinational or transnational corporation. Today some four hundred transnational companies control about 80 percent of the capital assets of the global free market and are extending their grasp into the ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe. Transnationals have developed a global production line. General Motors has factories that produce cars, trucks and a wide range of auto components in Canada, Brazil, Venezuela, Spain, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Singapore, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea and a dozen other countries. Such "multiple sourcing" enables GM to ride out strikes in one country by stepping up production in another, playing workers of various nations against each other in order to discourage wage and benefit demands and undermine labor union strategies.

Some writers question whether imperialism is a necessary condition for capitalism, pointing out that most Western capital is invested in Western nations, not in the Third World. If corporations lost all their Third World investments, they argue, many of them could still survive on their European and North American markets. In response, one should note that capitalism might be able to survive without imperialism—but it shows no inclination to do so. It manifests no desire to discard its enormously profitable Third World enterprises. Imperialism may not be a necessary condition for investor survival but it seems to be an inherent tendency and a natural outgrowth of advanced capitalism. Imperial relations may not be the only way to pursue profits, but they are the most lucrative way.

6.5 Zionism

Zionism is the Jewish national movement. Zionism derives its name from Zion, (pronounced Tzyion in Hebrew) a hill in Jerusalem. The word means marker or commemoration. Shivath Tzion is one of the traditional terms for the return of Jewish exiles. The term Zionism was coined by the Zionist publicist Nathan Birnbaum in 1890. Zionism did not spring full blown from a void with the creation of the Zionist movement in 1897. Jews had maintained a connection with Palestine, both actual and spiritual. This continued even after the Bar Kochba revolt in 135, when large numbers of Jews were exiled from Roman Palestine, the remains of their ancient national home. The Jewish community in Palestine revived. Under Muslim rule, is estimated to have numbered as many as 300,000 prior to the Crusades, about 1000 AD. The Crusaders killed most of the Jewish population of Palestine or forced them into exile, so that only about 1,000 families remained

after the reconquest of Palestine by Saladin. The Jewish community in Palestine waxed and waned with the vicissitudes of conquest and economic hardship. A trickle of Jews came because of love of Israel, and were sometimes encouraged by invitations by different Turkish rulers to displaced European Jews to settle in Tiberias and Hebron. At different times there were sizeable Jewish communities in Tiberias, Safed, Hebron and Jerusalem, and numbers of Jews living in Nablus and Gaza. A few original Jews remained in the town of Peki'in, families that had lived there continuously since ancient times.

From time to time, small numbers of Jews came to settle in Palestine in answer to rabbinical or Messianic calls, or fleeing persecution in Europe. Beginning about 1700, groups of followers led by rabbis, reached Palestine from Europe and the Ottoman empire with various programs. For example, Rabbi Yehuda Hehasid and his followers settled in Jerusalem about 1700, but the rabbi died suddenly, and eventually, an Arab mob, angered over unpaid debts, destroyed the synagogue the group had built and banned all European (Ashkenazy) Jews from Jerusalem. Rabbis Luzatto and Ben-Attar led a relatively large immigration about 1740. Other groups and individuals came from Lithuania and Turkey and different countries in Eastern Europe.

The French revolution and the rise of Napoleon hastened the emancipation of European Jewry, who were no longer confined to the ghettos of European cities, and became citizens like everyone else. Eventually, the liberalization reached Eastern Europe and Russia as well. The enlightenment of the 18th century and the emancipation of the 19th were a great shock for Jewish culture and identity. Jews split into several groups during the nineteenth century. Ultraorthodox Jews remained faithful to the culture of the ghetto, which excluded the possibility of intermingling in modern society or gaining a modern education. A second group attempted to assimilate completely into European society, converting to Christianity and losing their Jewish identity. A third group believed that they could assimilate as modern citizens, with equal rights and still maintain their Jewish faith, while renouncing any cultural or group allegiance to Judaism.

At the same time, after the French Revolution and the emancipation of European Jewry, the vague spiritual bonds of the Jewish people began to express themselves in more concrete, though not always practical ways. About 1808, groups of Lithuanian Jews, followers of the Vilna Gaon (a famous rabbi and opponent of Hassidism) arrived in Palestine and purchased land to begin an agricultural settlement. In 1836, Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer petitioned Anselm Rothschild to buy Palestine or at least the Temple Mount for the Jews. In 1839-1840, Sir Moses Montefiore visited Palestine and negotiated with the Khedive of Egypt to allow Jewish settlement and land purchase in Palestine. However, the negotiations led to nothing, possibly frustrated by the outbreak of an anti-Semitic blood-libel in Damascus. Thereafter, Montefiore continued with less ambitious philanthropic schemes in Palestine and in Argentina. In the 1840s, Rabbi Kalischer in Poland, and Rabbi Yehuda Alkalai, a Sephardic Jew, wrote articles urging practical steps for hastening redemption by settling in the Holy Land, to be sponsored by the efforts of philanthropists.

The idea of a Jewish restoration also took the fancy of British intellectuals for religious and practical reasons. The restoration was championed in the 1840s by Lords Shaftesbury and Palmerston, who in addition to religious motivations thought that a Jewish colony in Palestine would help to stabilize and revive the country, Jewish national stirrings were also voiced by novelists and writers such as Lord Byron, Benjamin Disraeli, George Eliot and Walter Scott. Through an accident of history, European (Ashkenazy) Jews took the lead in organized Zionism for many years. However, Sephardic (Spanish) Jews and Jews in Arab lands maintained a closer practical tie with the holy land and with the Hebrew language than did Ashkenazy Jews and also influenced and participated in the the Zionist movement from its inception. Sarajevo-born Judah ben Solomon Hai Alkalai (1798-1878,) is considered one of the major precursors of modern Zionism. Alkalai believed that return to the land of Israel was a precondition for the redemption of the Jewish people. Alkalai's ideas greatly influenced his Ashkenazy contemporary, Rabbi Tsvi Hirsch Kalischer. Alkalai was also a friend of the grandfather of Theodore Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism. Another Sephardi Jew, David Alkalai, a grand-nephew of Judah Alkalai, founded and led the Zionist movement in Serbia and Yugoslavia., and attended the first Zionist Congress in Basel (1897).

The modern formulation of Zionism was divorced from religious aspirations. The 19th century enlightenment allowed the Jews to leave the ghettos of Europe for the first time. Some converted to Christianity and assimilated to surrounding society. Others, exposed to a general education, dropped their religious beliefs, but understood that both they and others still considered them to be Jews. This suggested a conundrum. If one could be a non-believer and still be a Jew, then "Jew" must be more than just the name of a religion. Moses Hess, a more or less secular Jew and a socialist, was probably the first to enunciate these ideas in so many words in his book *Rome and Jerusalem*, published in 1862, calling for a Jewish national movement similar to the Italian risorgimento nationalist movement. These and similar sentiments were adopted by numerous small groups that formed primarily in Eastern Europe, but also in Britain and in the United States.

Moses (Moshe) Hess (1812-1875), a Jewish philosopher, was the teacher of Karl Marx. Marx became a freemason and an agitator who edited the *Rheinische Zeitung* (1842-1843). Initially, Marx, who did "not actually originate anything but merely streamlined Talmudism for Gentile Consumption,"⁵⁹ opposed mass demonstrations, but, through his mentor's guidance, he soon adapted. In the fall of 1844, in Paris, Hess introduced Marx to Friedrich Engels, which began a lengthy collaboration. Hess formulated the communist ideology, including the abolition of all personal property. He advocated class warfare as a method of preventing mutual cooperation. He hoped to use Judaism, racism, and the class struggle to initiate a revolution and maintained that socialism was akin to internationalism, as socialists have no homeland and do not acknowledge nationality. However, he stated, this did not apply to Jews, as he believed that internationalism operated in the best interests of Judaism. He wrote, "Whoever denies Jewish nationalism is not only an apostate, a renegade in the religious sense, but also a traitor to his people

and to his family." Hess maintained that Judaism would evolve into a godless socialist, revolutionary ideology. In an 1845 article, "About the Monetary System," He said that the Jews' function was to change mankind into a savage animal. Marx and Engels advocated many of his ideas, and Theodor Herzl endorsed and advanced Hess's Zionist dogma in the 1890s. Levi Baruch stressed that the Jews should retain Judaism so that other Jews would not view them as traitors. In earlier centuries, in Spain, some Jews pretended to convert to Christianity to gain access to important government and church positions. Baruch promoted this as a way for "revolutionary Jews" to conceal their Judaism. When ensconced in these administrative positions, they could enact laws prohibiting private property, thus allowing vast riches to fall into their hands and fulfilling the Talmud mandate that they would control the world's riches. According to Baruch, Jews would control the world, merge the races, abolish borders, eliminate the royal families, and establish the Zionist state.

The Dreyfus affair, which developed in France beginning in 1894, made Western European Jews conscious of their national identity, and in particular, affected a young Vienna journalist, Theodor Herzl. His pamphlet *Der Judenstaat*, *The Jewish State*, was published in 1896. Herzl's plan for creating a Jewish state, which evolved after he had weighed other solutions as well, provided the practical program of Zionism, and led to the first Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, in August, 1897. After the first Basle Congress, Herzl wrote in his diary, "Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word- which I shall guard against pronouncing publicly- it would be this: "At Basle, I founded the Jewish State. If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. If not in 5 years, certainly in 50, everyone will know it."

Herzl thought that diplomatic activity would be the main method for getting the Jewish homeland. He called for the organized transfer of Jewish communities to the new state. Herzl attempted to gain a charter from the Sultan of Turkey for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, then ruled by the Ottoman Empire. To this end he met in 1898 with the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in Istanbul and Palestine, as well as the Sultan, but these meetings did not bear fruit. Later, Herzl negotiated with the British regarding the possibility of settling the Jews on the island of Cyprus, the Sinai Peninsula, the El Arish region and Uganda. All these negotiations came to naught. The insistence of Eastern European Jews on Palestine as the Jewish homeland, coupled with the failure of alternatives, maintained the focus of the Zionist movement on Palestine.

There have always been Jews in Jerusalem, Safed, Nablus, and Hebron. Individual immigration to the area has never ceased. Thousands of Jews had settled peacefully and assimilated in Palestine before others ever viewed the area as an exclusive, designated Jewish homeland. In 1948, Benjamin H. Freedman addressed a large audience at the Pentagon, including high ranking army and military intelligence officers regarding the developing situation in the Middle East. He explained the origin of the Khazars so they would have a comprehensive understanding and be able to evaluate the events that had occurred since 1917, starting with the Bolsheviks in Russia and ultimately culminating

in Palestine. For centuries, the Christian world opposed any kind of Jewish settlement in the Holy Land, as it would certainly place the control of the traditional Christian holy sites under Jewish jurisdiction. With the establishment of the enlightenment philosophy, Napoleon Bonaparte, a freemason (initiated into the Army Philadelphie Lodge in 1798), while camped near Acre, announced in a written proclamation to the Jews, dated April 20, 1799, that he was going to restore Palestine to them. He ascended the throne as Emperor of France (1804-1815).

Even before the fatal Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815, several individuals in Britain had already adopted Napoleon's idea of "restoring" Palestine to the Jews. Rothschild allegedly provided the funds that guaranteed the victory at Waterloo. He had established a courier service that allowed the brothers to have daily communication, which gave them major advantages over their competitors. Napoleon lost the war and had to rescind his promise to restore the Jews to Palestine. Thereafter, apparently with a change of heart, he tried to eliminate Jacobinism, a belief in a nationally uniform and centralized government, in France and its plan for world government and acquired other benefactors. Rothschild, by 1815, opposed him and funded the opposition.

With time, Jewish organizations, often financed and lead by the Rothschild family, worked towards establishing Palestine as their homeland. Their agents even asked the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid I (1839-1861) if the British Jews could relocate to Ottoman Palestine. On August 11, 1840, Lord Palmerston wrote to the British ambassador at Constantinople regarding the Jews. He wrote, "There exists at the present time among the Jews dispersed over Europe, a strong notion that the time is approaching when their nation is to return to Palestine ... It would be of manifest importance to the Sultan to encourage the Jews to return and to settle in Palestine because the wealth which they would bring with them would increase the resources of the Sultan's dominions ... I have to instruct Your Excellency strongly to recommend to (the Turkish government) hold out every just encouragement to the Jews of Europe to return to Palestine." The sultan rejected the request. In 1841, Queen Victoria appointed Michael Alexander as the Protestant bishop in Jerusalem, as suggested by King Frederick William IV of Prussia. Reportedly, the Jews Society and the German Rothschilds persuaded King Frederick and the Lutherans to establish Protestant representation in Jerusalem, akin to the Vatican.

The Damascus Affair, a terrible but not necessarily isolated incident against minorities, laid the indispensable foundation for the creation of a Jewish state. England, a historically imperialistic country, in addition to its religious interest in the Holy Land, saw economic, political, and colonial opportunities as early as 1840. Cohn made numerous visits to Jerusalem. In 1854, rich European Jews and the Rothschilds would send him to Jerusalem to evaluate missionary activities, financially assist the Christian missionaries, and establish a hospital, a society of manual workers, a girls' school, and a loan society. Lord Palmerston was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom twice (1855-1858; 1859-1865) and the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs three times (1830-1834; 1835-1841; 1846-1851). On July 13, 1841, he signed the Straits Convention, wherein five

countries agreed to the permanent closure of the straits to all warships. This superseded the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, signed on July 8, 1833, between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, through which Czar Nicholas I sought to preserve the authority and territorial integrity of the existing states in Europe and the Near East. The treaty also initiated an eight-year alliance between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, calling for Russian aid if another country attacked the sultan. The czar hoped that this alliance would keep the straits in the hands of the Ottomans and French and English warships out of the straits. They did not renew the treaty, which paved the way for the Crimean War.

William H. Hechler, an avowed Zionist, had tutored the children of Friedrich I, the Grand Duke of Baden. During this time, he had the opportunity to develop a relationship with Friedrich's nephew, the young Hohenzollern prince, who would later become Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918). Through Hechler's instrumentality, Herzl first contacted Friedrich I, which led to Herzl's meeting with Wilhelm II in Eretz Israel in 1898. Wilhelm, of Germany, very sympathetic to Turkey, had previously offered to intervene with the sultan in behalf of the Zionists. Dr. Max Bodenheimer, the attorney for the Zionist Congress, and others accompanied Herzl on his journey to meet Kaiser Wilhelm in Constantinople. Wilhelm journeyed in the Near East (October 13-November 24, 1898), after the policy-setting Second Zionist Congress, when he visited Constantinople, Syria, and Palestine. The Zionists viewed this as an unprecedented opportunity to acquire German support, and Herzl attributed undue significance to a meeting between Sultan Abdülhamid II and Kaiser Wilhelm.⁷⁶ Theodor Herzl, searching for a strong country to support a Jewish homeland, proudly showed the Kaiser a Jewish settlement in Palestine. However, the Kaiser rejected the idea of sponsoring a Jewish homeland. Wilhelm II withdrew whatever support he ever had for Zionism. His attitude influenced some of the leaders of other countries regarding their potential support. One of those countries was Russia.

Ultimately, the European powers intimidated the Ottoman government into only applying restrictions to Jews coming to Palestine en masse. Single families could immigrate and could purchase land. In 1911, Abdülhamid II, then in exile, told his physician, "I am sure that with time they can and will be successful in establishing their own state in Palestine."¹¹⁷ In 1915, Louis D. Brandeis wrote, "It is not a movement to remove all the Jews of the world compulsorily to Palestine. In the first place, there are 14,000,000 Jews, and Palestine would not accommodate more than one-third of that number." Most immigrants to Palestine following World War I were predominantly Eastern European Jews of Soviet and satellite origin. Therefore, the Soviets and Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia supplied them with weapons. Political Zionists encouraged the use of violence, especially after the discovery of the vast mineral wealth of Palestine.

There were numerous reasons for wanting Palestine. Interest in the potential resources in the Dead Sea began before World War I. Novomeysky (Russian engineer and political Zionist) made the first survey of the Dead Sea in 1911, and recognized its potential wealth. Winston Churchill, secretary of state for the colonies (1921-1922), gave Novomeysky a grant for the exploitation of the Dead Sea.¹²¹ Novomeysky then estab-

lished the Palestine Potash Company in 1929, the company that would supply 50 percent of Britain's potash during World War II.

In February 1924, in 1925, and in 1928, Weizmann and Marshall conferred with potential investors willing to further their interests in Palestine. In 1926, the Brandeis-Mack Group, headed by Louis D. Brandeis and Julian W. Mack, both members of the American Jewish Congress, founded the Palestine Economic Corporation (PEC) to develop enterprises in Palestine. By 1946, PEC funded more than ninety operations and launched or enhanced industries such as chemicals, citrus products, paper, plastics, and tires. In 1967, PEC had 11,000 stockholders, primarily in the United States, with millions invested in Israel's industries.¹²² Investors included Leon Blum, Albert Einstein, Herbert Samuel, Felix M. Warburg, Cyrus Adler, and Lee K. Frankel. Suddenly, Weizmann had support from American Jews. Marshall and Warburg assured him that his financial troubles were over, and he would no longer have to travel to make appeals to save his movement from bankruptcy. On January 14, 1947, in *The New York Herald Tribune*, Zionist opponents inserted a full-page article, entitled *According to Zionists: Misleading World with Untruths for Palestine Conquest*, as an advertisement. Experts estimated the chemical and mineral wealth of the Dead Sea to have a proven value of \$5 trillion (1947 money). In order for bankers and Zionists to acquire the resources, it was necessary to establish a Jewish state there. Rose M. Schoendorf, of the Cooperating Americans of the Christian Faiths, signed the article, along with Habib I. Katibah, of the Cooperating Americans of Arab Ancestry, and by Benjamin H. Freedman of the Cooperating Americans of the Jewish Faith. Apart from the Dead Sea minerals, people discovered oil in the Negev Desert in 1951, in addition to the rest of the oil resources in the Middle East.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly resolved to divide Palestine into three parts—as proclaimed, “Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem ... shall come into existence in Palestine.” On May 14, 1948, in the Provisional State Council in Tel Aviv, David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, standing below a portrait of Theodor Herzl, proclaimed the State of Israel.

Zionism and the American War Congress

In 1897, after the first World Zionist Congress in Basel, the Jews of Shanghai holding British citizenship, numbering several hundred people, mostly from Baghdad, supported Britain's views on Zionism and the Zionist movement. Nissim E. Benjamin Ezra, from India, launched the Shanghai Zionist Association (SZA) in 1903, one of the three earliest Zionist organizations in Asia; the others were in Iraq and Turkey. 1869 The Kadoories were dedicated Zionists by the early twentieth century. Officials in Hong Kong appointed several Jews to government positions such as Sir Matthew Nathan, governor of Hong Kong (1904- 1907).

On June 11, 1918, the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), founded in 1897, to

support the Jewish National Home in Palestine, sent a letter to each member of what they described as the “War-Congress” in order to assess their individual attitudes about the Zionist movement. They included a copy of the letter from British officials to Arthur J. Balfour, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It stated that French (February 11, 1918), and Italian officials (February 23, 1918), had both formally endorsed the British Declaration. This campaign, with endorsements from other countries, is a form of Sigmund Freud’s crowd behavior theory. People who act as a group, like Congress or a jury, tend to blend their behavior to reach a consensus as opposed to most independent thinkers who base their conclusions on objectivity, moral principles and pertinent data. In herd mentality, each person’s enthusiasm increases based on the group’s subtle energy and the leadership’s persuasiveness. The letters to members of Congress, undoubtedly discussed with others by leading congressional figures, requested five things.

1. Do you approve the official Declaration of England, France and Italy on the Zionist question?
2. Would you please let us have your reasons for favoring the Declaration? (If you do not favor it, please give us your reasons.)
3. Do you favor action by the United States Government in line with the British Declaration, now or within the near future?
4. Do you favor the adoption of an appropriate resolution by Congress in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Centre?
5. What are your views in general with regard to the effort of the Jewish people to establish a national home in Palestine?

The US government had not yet declared their position on a Jewish homeland in Palestine. A few months after the ZOA had sent its letters to Congress, President Woodrow Wilson wrote to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, New York, on August 31, 1918:

“My Dear Rabbi Wise, I have watched with deep and sincere interest the reconstructive work which the Weizmann Commission has done in Palestine at the instance of the British Government, and I welcome an opportunity to express the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist movement in the United States and in the Allied countries since the declaration by Mr. Balfour on behalf of the British Government, of Great Britain’s approval of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and his promise that the British Government would use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, with the understanding that nothing would be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish people in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in other countries. I think that all Americans will be deeply moved by the report that even in this time of stress the Weizmann Commission has been able to lay the foundation of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, with the promise that that bears of spiritual rebirth.”

Regarding the letters that the ZOA sent to Congress, sixty-one senators favorably responded while 239 representatives favorably responded for a total of 300 members of Congress who supported a Zionist state in Palestine. Similarly, nearly 300 members of Congress signed a similar declaration in March 2010, addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reaffirming their commitment to “the unbreakable bond” that exists between the United States and the Israeli State. The United States Senate and House of Representatives, for almost a century, have promoted, represented, and acted in behalf of the best interests, financially and politically, of an ethnic/religious/cultural minority, comprising about two percent of the population, a group whose loyalties are to a country in another part of the world.

6.6 The Rothschild Family

In 1743 a goldsmith named Amschel Moses Bauer opens a coin shop in Frankfurt, Germany. Above his door he hangs a sign depicting a Roman eagle on a red shield. The shop became known as the Red Shield (German: Rothschild). Amschel Bauer had a very intelligent son, Meyer Amschel Bauer. His father spent much of his time teaching him everything he could about the money lending business and in the dynamics of finance. After his father's death in 1755, Meyer went to work in Hannover as in a bank, owned by the Oppenheimer Family. Meyer's immense ability was quickly recognized and he quickly advanced within the firm. He was awarded a junior partnership. His success allowed him to return to Frankfurt and to purchase the business his father had established in 1743. The Red Shield was still displayed over the door. Recognizing the significance of the Red Shield (his father had adopted it as his emblem from the Red Flag which was the emblem of the revolutionary minded Jews in Eastern Europe), Mayer Amschel Bauer changed the family name to Rothschild. It was at this point that the House of Rothschild came into being.

Through his experience with the Oppenheimers, Rothschild learns that loaning money to governments is much more profitable than loaning to individuals. The loans are not only much bigger, but they are secured by the nation's taxes. The Rothschild Banking Dynasty becomes the richest family business in world history. (1) Forbes Magazine refers to Mayer Amschel Rothschild as “a founding father of international finance”. (2) Rothschild's five sons will later branch out to head banking dynasties in Austria, Italy, France, and England, becoming lenders to the Kings of Europe, often financing both sides of the European wars that will so enrich them. To this very day, the House of Rothschild and its allies remain the dominant force behind world finance, Globalism, “environmentalism”, and ‘liberalism’. The Jewish-Zionist Rothschild Family will also play a major role in establishing Israel in the 1900's (Zionism).

In [1789], he became a court agent for Prince William IX of Hesse-Kassel, who was the grandson of George II of England, a cousin to George III, a nephew of the King

of Denmark, and a brother-in-law to the King of Sweden. Soon Rothschild became the middleman for big Frankfurt bankers like the Bethmann Brothers, and Rueppell & Harnier. After expanding his business to antiques, wineries, and the importing of manufactured materials from England, the Rothschild family began to amass a sizable fortune. Prince William inherited his father's fortune upon his death in 1785, which was the largest private fortune in Europe. Some of this money had come from Great Britain paying for the use of 16,800 Hessian soldiers to stop the revolution in America, because the money was never given to the troops.

The Rothschild estate in Frankfurt had something unique in the garden, a secret office used only for secret documents not for the "public" eye. The room was not bigger than eight square meters and within was a huge iron-chest. It could not be opened by key, but by lifting the lid from the backside of the chest. But even this chest was just a diversion. Behind, there were additional hidden shelves and a hatch leading down to a cellar which had no connection to the cellar of the main estate. Here, he Mayer stored secret documents, papers and contracts showing his correspondence with Prince William IX of Hesse-Kassel. From here, the Rothschild schemes started to take form.

Important for Mayer were his sons. Amschel later became financier of the German confederation, Salomon went to Vienna and Nathan, which later received more influence than any other British citizen ever. Then the fourth son Kalman, who went to Italy and Jacob going to France. Through trade and speculation, they quickly increased their fortunes and made friends with the aristocrats in their respective countries. They created the first large scale banking network throughout Europe with the power still localized in Frankfurt. For more than 20 years, the taxes payed by Mayer were around 2000 guilder per year due to his limited fortune. Suddenly in 1795, the amount of taxes to be payed doubled and was at 15000 guilders in 1797.

In 1804, the Rothschilds secretly made loans to the Denmark government, on behalf of Prince William. Denmark was bankrupt and needed help and Rothschild secured himself his first loan given directly to a foreign state, leaving other established German bankers furious. By now, he also stored stocks/securities and gold in his secret office. The Rothschild influence grew and the two oldest sons now worked also for the German war treasury. But their plans to gain more and more influence seemed to be destroyed when Napoleon arrived in 1806 and Frankfurt was occupied. All international trade lines were interrupted and Nathan seemed to be isolated in Britain. Napoleon declared that the House of Hesse-Kassel shall be removed from power and with that, Rothschilds most relevant friend.

Rothschild versus Napoleon

During the night of November 1st 1806, Mayer Rothschild buried a huge package of documents and protocols of the secret hessian state council. But this was not the only thing Prince William wanted to hide from Napoleons troops. Servants of his house also

hid expensive jewelry and gems in Williams villas. The riches were found, the documents were not. One of Williams merchants paid General La Grange 1 million Francs and the jewelry could be retrieved and were back in Williams hands. But these were only a small part of his wealth. As one of the riches person back then, he loaned money to other aristocrats and also had british investments which guaranteed him monthly interest payments. Now he still had a lot of his wealth, but was in exile sitting in Denmark, cut off from his financial affairs. To keep his finances with all the other aristocrats and countries afloat, he asked Mayer Rothschild to take care of this. Through a verbal contract, part of the earnings from William were guaranteed to Mayer for his work.

Napoleons newly founded ministry of finance in Hesse tried to find and seize all the wealth of the local aristocrats. But the Rothschilds already had a private courier service which wandered through the countries to collect the interest from the debtors. When the police went to into the Judengasse in Frankfurt, they only found an old house where an old jewish married couple could barely keep their shop afloat. Ah! - this evil war had cost them their grown up sons scattered to the four winds. Such a tragedy. Also all the book keeping seemed to be in order and no trace of the dealings with Prince William was found. All the real books were still in the secret cellar in the garden or in constant motion hidden in one of the Rothschilds couriers carriage. This carriage had a false bottom to store secret documents, all of which were in Hebrew, Yiddisch or German in addition to using aliases as names. The investments in Britain were called "Stockfisch", Mayer was called "Arnoldi" and William was called "Herr Goldstein". To take care of Mr. Goldstein was Mayers main task, meaning getting all of Williams earnings to him in Denmark in time.

Meanwhile in London, the son Nathan Rothschild bought huge amounts of cotton and food, colonial goods and all the other things which couldn't be bought on European mainland due to Napoleons economic blockade. All these things suddenly disappeared in London and resurfaced in Hamburg, where by pure coincidence, Amschel and Salomon Rothschild went along with their business. Suddenly all the missing goods could be found again in the stores, not only in Germany, but also Scandinavia, the Netherlands and France. Cotton, swering threads, tabacco, coffee, sugar and Indigo were suddenly available again and for extreme prices. Who cares if someone might get extremely rich, right?

Napoleons police cared and after a while they thought there might be a connection between the Rothschilds and William. They raided all storehouses in Frankfurt and again the old house in the Judengasse. Again, they found nothing. The reason was that Mayer Rothschild gave all his businesses officially to his sons and could no longer be made liable for their dealings. Especially Nathan on London was immune against Napoleons doings and he was the mastermind behind ignoring the economic blockade.

Nathan moved from Manchester to London in 1804. He was known as he big merchant banker for textiles with his company N.M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd., which you can find in the telephone book still today. Soon he stopped earning money by trading goods and

switched to the “goods of goods“, financing. Since Napoleon owned all the lands, the millions of pounds of the Rothschild family could only be invested reliably in Britain and they invested in Consols, the government bonds of England. In addition, they convinced Prince William to invest big parts of his even greater wealth into these Consols. In 1810 they invested 550.000 Pound Sterling into Consols. To compare this wealth: 550.000 Pounds in 1800 would be worth nearly 20 million today. In addition, costs of living were lower. You could live a luxury live for 1500-2000 pounds a year with male servants earning 20-50 pounds a year and female servants earning 5-15 pounds a year. Thus they invested over 25000 times the yearly salary of a servant into Consols.

Nathan told Prince William that he would buy Consols for 72 a piece. In reality, he waited till the price dropped to 62 (as he expected) and put the difference into his own pocket, using Williams money for profit. He also did this with other goods like gold. This was possible because the Rothschilds delayed the payments to William on purpose and they always gave him some excuses “you know, it isn’t easy with Napoleon ruling these lands.“ Having all this wealth from Prince William available also had another positive effect for Nathan Rothschild. All dealing in London were registered in his name and moving around such huge sums of money made great impression with the other bankers and they wondered how he could become so wealthy so quickly... he must be doing something right. When Nathan reached the age of 34 in 1811, his own wealth he invested already surpassed that of the invested money from Prince William.

When Nathan was old, he told further stories about the time with Napoleon. The East Indian Trading Company wanted to sell gold worth 800.000 Pounds. He bought it all, knowing that the Duke of Wellington could needed this gold. Thus, the British government came to Nathan, wanting to buy this gold from him. But they didn’t know how to get it to Wellington, who was in Portugal fighting with British troops against Napoleon. Nathan made sure to send this gold through France, under Napoleons nose, to Portugal. Nathan had created an artificial shortage of goods in 1807 to disturb Napoleons schemes. Now he was to face him again. Through the British government, Nathan became the main dealer for financial interests regarding the war with Napoleon and he became the chief paymaster for Britains most important army.

To get the gold through France and Paris, Mayers youngest son, now called James, was needed. He was only 19 years old at that time. He arrived in Paris on March 24 1811 and two days later he already appeared in a report of the Ministry of Finance given to Napoleon. “A Frankfurt Rothschild is now in Paris and his main task is moving British cash money from the British coast to the city of Dunkirk. He is in contact with Parisian bankers of highest reputation. He received letter from London saying to prevent exporting Gold out of England.“ The Minister seemed to have received fake information he thought were true: He know about the gold but didn’t know what was supposed to happen with it. He received letter from James Rothschild depicted England feared the loss of gold would weaken them. Of course, the complete opposite was their goal. Thus a 19 year old Rothschild tricked the French government into allowing the transportation of gold

through their country.

Nathan moved huge amounts of gold to the coast where James picked it up, moved it to Paris and made sure that the gold would be on its way to certain Spanish banks. South of Paris, Kalmann Rothschild went to action, making sure the gold would reach Spain and Wellington. Salomon Rothschild was also part of the scheme, making sure to keep everything secret. Of course, some French policemen discovered the secret behind the gold but the Rothschilds took also care of these problems. For instance was the Chief of Police of the town Calais suddenly able to live a luxury life and it was more and more difficult for him to secure the northern coast. The police in Paris tried to arrest James Rothschild twice but he was protected by the French Minister of Finance, who still thought getting the gold out of Britain would weaken the empire.

While Napoleon lost his forces in the Russian Winter, the Rothschilds strengthened the army which threatened his back. It didn't take long and the Rothschilds became Britain's most important bankers, not only because of Wellington, but also because the Rothschilds gave them connections to allies: Austria, Prussia and Russia received big loans in the last year of the war against Napoleon from Britain. To get all this money to these countries, the Rothschilds helped again. Through their network moved a total of 15 million pounds to Britain's allies, roughly 750,000 times the yearly salary of the average worker in England at that time.

The Battle of Waterloo made England the leading force in Europe. But the hard work for defeating Napoleon began a few years earlier. The Rothschilds developed a private messaging service throughout Europe, which still existed in London in the days of the Second World War. They had carriages, ships, they were everywhere. They transported cash money, securities, letters, news, everything relevant for the biggest banking network at that time. And through these messengers they delivered the most important message, that of the Battle of Waterloo. The London stock market waited nervously already for days for the news. Should Napoleon win then the value of the Consols would plummet. Would Napoleon lose and his empire crumble, then the value of the Consols would rise.

On June 19, 1815, Mr. Rothworth, one agent of the Rothschilds, jumped on a ship in "Ostende" and in his hands he had a Dutch newspaper which print was still wet. In the morning of June 20, Nathan Rothschild read this newspaper in the Port of Folkestone and he moved directly to the British government. He arrived hours before the messenger of Wellington. He told the government correctly that Napoleon was defeated and then went immediately to the stock market. Usually everybody would have used his entire wealth to buy Consols to make profit of the coming rise in value. But he sold everything he had. His name was important enough, and his wealth was big enough, to reduce the value of the Consols. He kept selling and selling and all the other bankers thought "Rothschild must know already, Waterloo was lost for England". The Consols fell and fell because all the other bankers started selling in a panic. And then when the price was very low, Nathan bought all available Consols for a minimal amount of money and a few hours later, the message of Britain defeating Napoleon arrived. The Consols rose drastically in

value and and Nathan made a huge fortune. In addition to Nathan owning nearly all of the Consols (government bonds), Britain also paid interest to Nathan for these Bonds.

After Waterloo, there was peace. On September 16. 1812, an old wound of Mayer Rothschild from a previous operation reopened in Frankfurt. He barley was able to create a testament, giving all of his remaining businesses to his sons. He also gave them instructions to never let anyone except his sons have a look into the Rothschild business, not their wives and only their sons should they be ready some day. Mayer died on September 19. 1812 hin the arms of his Wife Gudula.

The other nations in Europe did not accept Jews as official bankers and so they struggled to gain influence and respect, especially with aristocrats and other bankers. Thus, during peace times, the Rothschild family used their money and schemes to increase their influence and improve the living standards of Jews in Europe. Hence, they all used their money to push liberal agendas wherever they could. At first, some Rothschilds even received aristocrat titles and would be called "von Rothschild", but this was not enough for them. They wanted more power and influence to even have a say in government and influencing monarchs. The Rothschilds used their combined wealth to outplay other influential bankers, bankrupted many through their schemes, especially with artificial market crashes.

One could write much more here of the time after 1820. They received the highest honors though their money, monarchs thought them as important for their finances and they even got into British parliament before 1900. They fought for liberal agendas, financing institutions everywhere, all to improve the rights of Jews. They also profited from wars, financing both sides and even have their hand in the "World Revolutionary Movement". They and other bankers suberted democracies with their money, becoming the real rulers behind the scenes.

Nathan Mayer Rothschild:"I care not what puppet is placed on the throne of England to rule the Empire, ... The man that controls Britain's money supply controls the British Empire. And I control the money supply."

The wife of Mayer, who nearly reached 100 years of aged, is quoted in saying:"If my sons did not want nations to war, there would be none".

6.7 The Gold Standard and the Strawman of Inflation

Humbug is a word that isn't used much today, but in the Gilded Age it was a popular term for describing frauds, shams and con artists. Vernon Parrington, a Pulitzer prize-winning historian writing in the 1920s, used it to describe the arguments of the bankers to silence the farmers who were trying to reform the banker-controlled money system in the 1890s. It was the farmers who particularly felt the pinch of tight money when the bankers withheld their gold. Parrington wrote that the farmers "pitted their homespun experience

against the authority of the bankers and the teaching of the schools." In response to their clear-headed arguments, the bankers defended with a smokescreen of confusing rhetoric:

"Denunciation took the place of exposition, and hysteria of argument; and in this revel of demagoguery the so-called educated classes – lawyers and editors and business men – were perhaps the most shameless purveyors of humbuggery. Stripped of all hypocrisy the main issue was this: Should the control of currency issues – with the delegated power of inflation and deflation – lie in the hands of private citizens or with the elected representatives of the people? . . . [But] throughout the years when the subject was debated in every newspaper and on every stump the real issue was rarely presented for consideration. The bankers did not dare to present it, for too much was at stake and once it was clearly understood by a suspicious electorate their case was lost. Hence the strategy of the money group was to obscure the issue, an end they achieved by dwelling on the single point of inflation."

The gold standard and the inflation argument that was used to justify it were based on the classical "quantity theory of money." The foundation of classical monetary theory, it held that inflation is caused by "too much money chasing too few goods." When "demand" (the money available to buy goods) increases faster than "supply" (goods and services), prices are forced up. If the government were allowed to simply issue all the Greenback dollars it needed, the money supply would increase faster than goods and services, and price inflation would result. If paper money were tied to gold, a commodity in limited and fixed supply, the money supply would remain stable and price inflation would be avoided.

A corollary to that theory was the classical maxim that the government should balance its budget at all costs. If it ran short of money, it was supposed to borrow from the bankers rather than print the money it needed, in order to keep from inflating the money supply. The argument was a "straw man" argument – one easily knocked down because it contained a logical fallacy – but the fallacy was not immediately obvious, because the bankers were concealing their hand. The fallacy lay in the assumption that the money the government borrowed from the banks already existed and was merely being recycled. If the bankers themselves were creating the money they lent, the argument collapsed in a heap of straw. The money supply would obviously increase just as much from bank-created money as from government-created money. In either case, it was money pulled out of an empty hat. Money created by the government had the advantage that it would not plunge the taxpayers into debt; and it provided a permanent money supply, one not dependent on higher and higher levels of borrowing to stay afloat. The quantity theory of money contained another logical fallacy, which was pointed out later by British economist John Maynard Keynes. Adding money ("demand") to the economy would drive up prices only if the "supply" side of the equation remained fixed. If new Greenbacks were used to create new goods and services, supply would increase along with demand, and prices would remain stable.² When a shoe salesman with many unsold shoes on his shelves suddenly got more customers, he did not raise his prices. He sold more shoes. If he ran out of shoes, he ordered more from the factory, which produced more. If he were to

raise his prices, his customers would go to the shop down the street, where shoes were still being sold at the lower price. Adding more money to the economy would inflate prices only when the producers ran out of the labor and materials needed to make more goods. Before that, supply and demand would increase together, leaving prices as they were before.

That theoretical revision helps explain such paradoxical data as the “economic mystery” of China. The Chinese have managed to keep the prices of their products low for thousands of years, although their money supply has continually been flooded with the world’s gold and silver, and now with the world’s dollars, as those currencies have poured in to pay for China’s cheap products. The Keynesian explanation is that prices have remained stable because the money has gone into producing more goods, increasing supply along with demand.

The Remarkable Island of Guernsey

While U.S. bankers were insisting that the government must borrow rather than print the money it needed, the residents of a small island state off the coast of England were quietly conducting a 200- year experiment that would show the bankers’ inflation argument to be a humbug. Guernsey is located among the British Channel Islands, about 75 miles south of Great Britain. In 1994, Dr. Bob Blain, Professor of Sociology at Southern Illinois University, wrote of this remarkable island:

“In 1816 its sea walls were crumbling, its roads were muddy and only 4 1/2 feet wide. Guernsey’s debt was 19,000 pounds. The island’s annual income was 3,000 pounds of which 2,400 had to be used to pay interest on its debt. Not surprisingly, people were leaving Guernsey and there was little employment. Then the government created and loaned new, interest-free state notes worth 6,000 pounds. Some 4,000 pounds were used to start the repairs of the sea walls. In 1820, another 4,500 pounds was issued, again interest-free. In 1821, another 10,000; 1824, 5,000; 1826, 20,000. By 1837, 50,000 pounds had been issued interest free for the primary use of projects like sea walls, roads, the marketplace, churches, and colleges. This sum more than doubled the island’s money supply during this thirteen year period, but there was no inflation. In the year 1914, as the British restricted the expansion of their money supply due to World War I, the people of Guernsey commenced to issue another 142,000 pounds over the next four years and never looked back. By 1958, over 542,000 pounds had been issued, all without inflation.”

Guernsey has an income tax, but the tax is relatively low (a “flat” 20 percent), and it is simple and loophole-free. It has no inheritance tax, no capital gains tax, and no federal debt. Commercial banks service private lenders, but the government itself never goes into debt. When it wants to create some public work or service, it just issues the money it needs to pay for the work. The Guernsey government has been issuing its own money for nearly two centuries. During that time, the money supply has mushroomed to about 25 times its original size; yet the economy has not been troubled by price inflation, and

it has remained prosperous and stable.

The Gold Humbug

The requirement that paper banknotes be backed by a certain weight of gold bullion, was a fiction. Banks did not have nearly enough gold to “redeem” all the paper money that was supposed to be based on it, and there was no real reason the nation’s paper money had to be linked to gold at all.

The gold standard just put America at the mercy of the foreign financiers who controlled the gold. When national imports exceeded exports, gold bullion left the country to pay the bill; and when gold stores shrank, the supply of paper money “based” on it shrank as well. The real issue, as Vernon Parrington pointed out, was not what money consisted of but who created it. Whether the medium of exchange was gold or paper or numbers in a ledger, when it was lent into existence by private lenders and was owed back to them with interest, more money would always be owed back than was created in the first place, spiraling the economy into perpetual debt. A dollar borrowed at 6 percent interest, compounded annually, grows in 100 years to be a debt of \$13,781.8 That is true whether the money takes the form of gold or paper or accounting entries. The banks lend the dollar into existence but not the additional \$13,780 needed to pay the loan off, forcing the public to go further and further into debt in search of the ephemeral interest due on their money-built-on-debt. Merchants continually have to raise their prices to try to cover this interest tab, producing perpetual price inflation. Like the Tin Woodman whose axe was enchanted by the Witch to chop off parts of his own body, the more people work, the less they seem to have left for themselves. They cannot keep up because their money keeps shrinking, as sellers keep raising their prices in a futile attempt to pay off loans that are collectively impossible to repay.

Challenging Corporate Feudalism

The popular grassroots movements that produced the Greenback and Populist Parties in the 1890s represented the interests of the common man over these corporate and financial oppressors. “Populism” today tends to be associated with the political left, but the word comes from the Latin word simply for the “people.” In the nineteenth century, it stood for the “government of the people, by the people, for the people” proclaimed by Abraham Lincoln. According to Wikipedia (an online encyclopedia written collaboratively by volunteers):

“Populism . . . on the whole does not have a strong political identity as either a left-wing or right-wing movement. Populism has taken left-wing, right-wing, and even centrist forms. In recent years, conservative United States politicians have begun adopting populist rhetoric; for example, promising to “get big government off your backs.”

Although the oppressor today is seen to be big government, what the nineteenth century Populists were trying to get off their backs was a darker, more malevolent force. They still believed that the principles set forth in the Constitution could be achieved through a democratic government of the people. They saw their antagonist rather as the private money power and the corporations it had spawned, which were threatening to take over the government unless the people intervened. Abraham Lincoln is quoted as saying:

“ I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. Corporations have been enthroned, an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until the wealth is aggregated in the hands of a few and the Republic is destroyed.”

Lincoln may not actually have said this. As with many famous quotations, its authorship is disputed. But whoever said it, the insight was prophetic. In a January 2007 article called “Who Rules America?”, Professor James Petras wrote, “Today it is said 2% of the households own 80% of the world’s assets. Within this small elite, a fraction embedded in financial capital owns and controls the bulk of the world’s assets and organizes and facilitates further concentration of conglomerates.” Professor Petras observed:

“Within the financial ruling class, ... political leaders come from the public and private equity banks, namely Wall Street, especially Goldman Sachs, Blackstone, the Carlyle Group and others. They organize and fund both major parties and their electoral campaigns. They pressure, negotiate and draw up the most comprehensive and favorable legislation on global strategies (liberalization and deregulation) and sectoral policies ... They pressure the government to “bailout” bankrupt and failed speculative firms and to balance the budget by lowering social expenditures instead of raising taxes on speculative “windfall” profits. . . . [T]hese private equity banks are involved in every sector of the economy, in every region of the world economy and increasingly speculate in the conglomerates which are acquired. Much of the investment funds now in the hands of US investment banks, hedge funds and other sectors of the financial ruling class originated in profits extracted from workers in the manufacturing and service sector.”

6.8 Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion

History

In 1884 the daughter of a Russian general, Justine Glinka, was in Paris obtaining secret political information to be communicated back to Russia. She employed a Jewish assistant, Joseph Schorst, a member of the Miz-raim Lodge in Paris. Schorst offered to obtain for her a document of great importance to Russia, on payment of 2,500 francs. She forwarded the French original, accompanied by a Russian translation, to the Tsar in St Petersburg, but it was suppressed by those under obligation to wealthy Jews. The

Tsar never received it, and Glinka was eventually banished to her estate in Orel. Glinka gave a copy to Alexis Sukhotin, who showed the document to two friends, Stepanov and Professor Sergius A. Nilus; the former had it printed and circulated privately in 1897; the second, Nilus, published it for the first time in Russia in 1901, in a book entitled *The Great Within the Small*. At about the same time, a friend of Nilus, G. Butmi, brought a copy to England, where it was apparently deposited in the British Museum on August 10, 1906. [Ed: The British Museum deny ever having received a copy of the Protocols.]

Meantime, through Jewish members of the Russian police, minutes of the proceedings of the Basle congress in 1897 had been obtained and these were found to correspond with the Protocols. In January 1917, Nilus prepared a second edition, revised and documented, for publication. But before it could be put on the market, the revolution of March 1917 had taken place, and Kerenskii, who had succeeded to power, ordered the whole edition of Nilus' book to be destroyed. In 1924, Prof. Nilus was arrested by the Cheka in Kiev, imprisoned, and tortured; he was told by the Jewish president of the court, that this treatment was meted out to him for "having done them incalculable harm in publishing the Protocols". Released for a few months, he was again led before the GPU (Cheka), this time in Moscow and confined. Set at liberty in February 1926, he died in exile in the district of Vladimir on January 13, 1929. A few copies of Nilus's second edition were saved and sent to other countries where they were published: in Germany, by Gottfreid zum Beek (1919); in England, by The Britons (1920); in France, by Mgr. Jouin in *La Revue Internationale des Societes Secretes*, and by Urbain Gohier in *La Vieille France*; in the United States, by Small, Maynard & Co. (Boston 1920), and by The Beckwith Co. (New York 1921). Later, editions appeared in Italian, Russian, Arabic, and even in Japanese.

The Protocols gained widespread recognition upon their translation into English, in 1920. They soon became notorious. Esteemed newspapers such as *The Times* and *The Morning Post* (whose Moscow correspondent Victor E. Marsden was responsible in 1921 for the translation used in this document) covered the story in numerous articles, much to the chagrin of world Jewry, who immediately began the propaganda bandwagon rolling. They not only denied that the Protocols were a Jewish plot, but also that there was any plot whatsoever. The latter was quite clearly false to all educated men and women of the time. "Probably so much money and energy were never before in history expended on the effort to suppress a single document." The period of 1920 "marks the end of the time when the Jewish question could be impartially openly discussed in public." (Douglas Reed – "The Controversy of Zion").

Fraud or Genuine?

There have been many attempts to discount *The Protocols* as a fraud, and the fact remains that there is no documentary proof that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion are what they say they are. Allegations of forgery and fraud have dogged their public

history. However, despite many opinions to the contrary, the documents have never been categorically proved to be fraudulent. The fact also remains that since the apparent publication, world events have unfolded exactly according to their description - surely this should be proof enough that a plan such as the Protocols exists? M. Henry Ford, in an interview published in the New York World, February 17, 1921, put the case for the Protocols tersely and convincingly thus:

“The only statement I care to make about the PROTOCOLS is that they fit in with what is going on. They are sixteen years old, and they have fitted the world situation up to this time. THEY FIT IT NOW.”

What are they about?

Today, the entire document can easily be found via quick web-search. It starts off with the contents looking like this while covering around 50 pages worth of information:

THE PROTOCOLS OF THE LEARNED ELDERS OF ZION

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PREFACE

Without going too much into detail here, the protocols outlined the plan for the Zionist World Order or New World Order [ZWO / NWO]. It will be accomplished by control of the money and the media. Goyim are mentally inferior and can't run their nations properly. For their sake and ours, we need to abolish their governments and replace them with a single government. This will take a long time and involve much bloodshed, but it's for a good cause. Here's what we'll need to do:

- 0 Place our agents and helpers everywhere
- 1 Take control of the media and use it in propaganda for our plans
- 2 Start fights between different races, classes and religions
- 3 Use bribery, threats, blackmail, lies and deception to get our way
- 4 Use Freemasonic Lodges to attract potential public officials
- 5 Appeal to successful people's egos
- 6 Appoint puppet leaders who can be controlled by blackmail
- 7 Replace royal rule with socialist rule, then communism, then despotism
- 8 Abolish all rights and freedoms, except the right of force by us
- 9 Sacrifice people (including Jews sometimes) when necessary
- 10 Eliminate religion; replace it with science and materialism
- 11 Control the education system to spread deception and destroy intellect
- 12 Rewrite history to our benefit
- 13 Use our media to create entertaining distractions
- 14 Corrupt minds with filth and perversion
- 15 Encourage people to spy on one another
- 16 Keep the masses in poverty and perpetual labor
- 17 Take possession of all wealth, property and [especially] gold
- 18 Use gold to manipulate the markets
- 19 Introduce a progressive tax on wealth
- 20 Replace sound investment with speculation
- 21 Make long-term interest-bearing loans to governments [FED, IMF, BIS, ECB]
- 22 Give bad advice to governments and everyone else
- 23 Blame the victim

Eventually the Goyim will be so angry with their governments (because we'll blame them for the resulting mess) that they'll gladly have us take over. We will then appoint a descendant of David to be king of the world, and the remaining Goyim will bow down and sing his praises. Everyone will live in peace and obedient order under his glorious

rule.

Some supporting quotes:

“Goyim were born only to serve us. Without that, they have no place in the world – only to serve the People of Israel,” “In Israel, death has no dominion over them. . . . With gentiles, it will be like any person – they need to die, but [God] will give them longevity. Why? Imagine that one’s donkey would die, they’d lose their money. This is his servant. . . . That’s why he gets a long life, to work well for this Jew. Goyim were born only to serve us. Without that, they have no place in the world; only to serve the People of Israel. Why are gentiles needed? They will work, they will plow, they will reap. We will sit like an effendi and eat,” Rabbi Ovadia Yosef October-18-2010 during his weekly Saturday night sermon on the laws regarding the actions non-Jews are permitted to perform on Shabbat. The crowd responded with laughter.

880,000 including many elected and unelected US policy makers as well as influential world leaders attended the funeral of Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef.

“Our race is the Master Race. We are divine gods on this planet. We are as different from the inferior races as they are from insects. In fact, compared to our race, other races are beasts and animals, cattle at best. Other races are considered as human excrement. Our destiny is to rule over the inferior races. Our earthly kingdom will be ruled by our leader with a rod of iron. The masses will lick our feet and serve us as our slaves.” Menaheim Begin, 6th Prime Minister of Israel. speech to the Knesset (24 June 1982), quoted in “Begin and the ‘Beasts’” Amnon Kapeliouk, in *The New Statesman* (25 June 1982);

“give me control of a nations money and I care not who makes the laws” – Mayer Amschel Rothschild

The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries.” – David Rockefeller, *Memoirs*

“By this means [printing money] government may secretly and unobserved, confiscate the wealth of the people, and not one man in a million will detect the theft.”- John Maynard Keynes

“The real rulers in Washington are invisible, and exercise power from behind the scenes.” Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, 1952

The world is governed by very different personages from what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes.” Benjamin Disraeli 1844

“Three hundred men, each of whom knows all the others, govern the fate of the European continent, and they elect their successors from their entourage.” Walter Rathenau *WIENER FREIE PRESSE*, December 24, 1912

“Fifty men have run America, and that’s a high figure.” Joseph Kennedy, father of

JFK, in the July 26th, 1936 issue of The New York Times.

“We will have a world government whether you like it or not. The only question is whether that government will be achieved by conquest or consent.” James (son of Paul) Warburg quotes (Banker, Shareholder, Founder, US Federal Reserve, Founder Council on Foreign Relations 1896-1969) while speaking before the United States Senate, February 17, 1950

“Today the path of total dictatorship in the United States can be laid by strictly legal means, unseen and unheard by the Congress, the President, or the people. Outwardly we have a Constitutional government. We have operating within our government and political system, another body representing another form of government – a bureaucratic elite.” Senator William Jenner, 1954

“The New World Order cannot happen without U.S. participation, as we are the most significant single component. Yes, there will be a New World Order, and it will force the United States to change it's perceptions.” — Henry Kissinger, World Affairs Council Press Conference, Regent Beverly Wilshire Hotel , April 19th 1994

“The Protocols of the Elders of Zion were in point of fact not the original Protocols at all, but a compressed extract of the same. Of the 70 Elders of Zion, in the matter of origin and of the existence of the original Protocols, there are only ten men in the entire world who know. I participated with Dr. Herzl in the first Zionist Congress which was held in Basle in 1897. Herzl was the most prominent figure at the Jewish World Congress. Herzl foresaw, twenty years before we experienced them, the revolution which brought the Great War, and he prepared us for that which was to happen. He foresaw the splitting up of Turkey, that England would obtain control of Palestine. We may expect important developments in the world.” —(Dr. Ehrenpreis, Chief Rabbi of Sweden, 1924)

“With Gold one can buy the most upright consciences, with Gold one can fix the value of every stock, the price of every merchandise, one can loan it to states that afterwards one holds at ones mercy. “Already the principle banks, the stock exchanges throughout the world, the loans to all governments are in our hands. “The other great power is the press. By ceaselessly repeating certain ideas, the press in the end makes them considered as truths. The Theatre renders similar services, every where theater and press follow our directives. By an indefatigable campaign in favor of the democratic form of government, we will divide the Gentiles amongst themselves in political parties, we shall thus destroy the unity of their nations, we will sow the seeds of discord. Powerless they will have to accept the laws of our bank, always united, always devoted to our cause.” Rabbi RZEICHORN speech in Prague – 1865

It is up to the reader to decide what of these things remind him/her about our modern world, especially after having read this “copy-pasted” book. Looking up the entire document online is recommended.

7. The long Road towards World War 1

7.1 Underlying Causes of the War

The underlying causes are so complex and reach so far back into the past that any attempt to describe them adequately would involve nothing less than the writing of the whole diplomatic history of Europe since 1870, or rather from 1789 ; some questions go back to the age of Louis XIV, and even to that of Charlemagne. It would also involve the difficult technical study of the military and naval forces of the various countries, their plans of campaign, the relation of the military to the civilian authorities in each country, the psychology of fear, and all the other factors which go to make up the somewhat vague conceptions of "militarism" and "navalism" as causes of war. No less important would be the analysis of that complex force which first began to be a powerful, disruptive agency during the French Revolution, and which steadily gathered strength for a century and a quarter, which we call "nationalism." This in turn is closely bound up with psychological and political questions of race, religion, democracy, education, and popular prejudice. Still more important, in many minds, as underlying causes of the War are the intricate political and economic problems which have arisen from the transformation of society during the past hundred years by the modern industrial system which began in England and subsequently penetrated more or less all the great countries of the world — problems of excess population, food supply, foreign markets and raw materials, colonial possessions, and the accumulation of capital seeking investment abroad. Several factors play a role in the start of World war I. Thus, the causes can be summarized as: (a) the system of secret alliances, (b) militarism, (c) nationalism, (d) economic imperialism and (e) the newspaper press.

The greatest single underlying cause of the War was the system of secret alliances which developed after the Franco-Prussian War. It gradually divided Europe into two hostile groups of Powers who were increasingly suspicious of one another and who steadily built up greater and greater armies and navies. Though this system of alliances in one sense tended to preserve peace, inasmuch as the members within one group often held their friends or allies in restraint for fear of becoming involved in war themselves, the system also made it inevitable that if war did come, it would involve all the Great Powers of Europe. The members of each group felt bound to support each other, even in matters where they had no direct interest, because failure to give support would have weakened the solidarity of the group. Thus, Germany often felt bound to back up Austria-Hungary in her Balkan policies, because otherwise Germany feared to lose her only thoroughly dependable ally. Similarly, France had no direct political (only financial) interests in the Balkans, but felt bound to back up Russia, because otherwise the existence of the Dual Alliance would have been threatened, the balance of power destroyed, and the best

guarantee of French safety from a German attack would have been lost. Likewise, the officials of the British Foreign Office became increasingly convinced that England must support France and Russia in order to preserve the solidarity of the Triple Entente as a check to the Triple Alliance. In the crisis of July, 1914, it was not, merely a question of Austria, Serbia and the Balkans; it was a question of the solidarity and prestige of the two groups of Powers into which Europe had become divided.

Many of the documents and memoirs dealing with the immediate causes of the War contain also material on the earlier period. But the most important single contribution to our fuller knowledge of the growth of the system of secret alliances is the great set of new German diplomatic documents covering the years from 1871 to 1914. This consists of the most secret instructions sent by Bismarck and his successors to the German Ambassadors abroad, their reports to the German Foreign Office, and the secret papers exchanged between the German Emperor and his Foreign Office officials. It includes exceedingly interesting marginal notes on documents from the hand of Bismarck, and later from that of William II. Bismarck's notes reveal the Iron Chancellor's innermost thoughts on foreign policy. They formed the basis of instructions sent by the German Foreign Office to the ambassadors abroad. William II's marginal notes, which are more numerous, more emotional, and often merely indicative of the mood of the moment, are interesting as a study of the psychology of the imperial mind, but exercised somewhat less directive influence upon the German Foreign Office than did Bismarck's masterly notes. From this collection of documents one sees that the German Foreign Office did not always completely inform William II on all matters and often made its will prevail over his preferences.

The Bolshevik Materials for the History of Franco- Russian Relations from 1910 to 1914, contains much of the correspondence between the Russian Foreign Office and the Russian Embassy in Paris during the four years before the War. It enables one to see how Izvolski and Poincare were transforming the Franco- Russian alliance from its originally defensive character into a potentially aggressive combination to support Russian ambitions in the Balkans.

Parallel to this Paris-St. Petersburg correspondence, supplementing and confirming it, is the London-St. Petersburg correspondence of Count Benckendorff for the years 1908-1914. His letters and other secret papers were clandestinely copied by B. von Siebert, a counsellor in the Russian Embassy at London. They were apparently sold or conveyed to German authorities, and published by von Siebert in a German edition in 1921. They have been conveniently rearranged and published in English translation by G. A. Schrciner, *Entente Diplomacy and the World* (1921). They show the efforts of Russia and France to strengthen the friendship with England and to tighten the bonds of the Triple Entente into a combination which should be firm and powerful enough to defy the Triple Alliance, if necessary.

Militarism

A second underlying cause of the War, closely connected with the system of secret alliances, was militarism. The word is often used vaguely. But usually it includes at least two definite conceptions. First, the dangerous and burdensome mechanism of great standing armies and large navies, with the attendant evils of espionage, suspicion, fear, and hatred. Second, the existence of a powerful class of military and naval officers, headed by the General Staff, who tend to dominate, especially at a time of political crisis, over the civilian authorities.

The system of great armies, embracing the larger part of the male population capable of bearing arms, began with the French during the Revolution and under Napoleon. It was extended and efficiently developed by the Prussians in the War of Liberation. As a result of its success in the victories of Moltke and Bismarck in the Wars of 1864, '66 and 70, it came to be esteemed and imitated in the rest of Continental Europe. From the Franco-Prussian War onwards the military and naval armaments of all the Great Powers tended to grow larger and larger, and the financial burden became heavier and heavier. Armaments were alleged to be for defense and in the interests of peace, according to the fallacious maxim, *si vis pacem, para bellum*. They were intended to produce a sense of security.

That was the argument used in getting from legislatures the necessary grants of money. What they really did produce was universal suspicion, fear, and hatred between nations. If one country increased its army, built strategic railways, and constructed new battle-ships, its fearful neighbors were straightway frightened into doing likewise. So the mad competition in armaments went on in a vicious circle.

Germany and Austria, uncertain of Italy's loyalty, believed they must increase their armaments to secure their own safety. France urged Russia to increase her army and build strategic railways against Germany, and readily loaned her half a billion francs on condition that it be spent for these purposes. Russia urged France to extend the term of French military service from two to three years. "Russia is ready; France must be also," declared the Russian Minister of War in an alarming newspaper article early in 1914. So armaments were increased, not only to give security to an individual country, but also to strengthen the alliance to which it belonged.

Militarism implied also the existence of an influential body of military and naval officers, whose whole psychological outlook was naturally colored by the possibility, if not the "inevitability," of an early war. To these professional fighters war held out the prospect of quick promotion and great distinction. It would, however, be a grave injustice to them to imply that they urged war for selfish motives of personal advancement. Nevertheless, the opportunity to put into practice the results of the work of preparation for war to which their lives were devoted cannot have failed to have its psychological effect. Quite aside from any personal motives, the military officers in all countries had a high sense of national honor and patriotic duty, as they understood it. It was their supreme duty

to be ready at any moment to protect the state by force of arms. It was the constant preoccupation, day and night, of the General Staff in every country to be ready to make or meet an attack in the shortest possible time. To this end every General Staff drew up or revised every year the most minute and complete plans for mobilization and march to the frontier to satisfy all possible contingent situations. Military officers generally held to the theory that it was advantageous to take the offensive. This meant striking the foe before his mobilization was complete—at the moment, therefore, when the enemy country was in the most vulnerable process of transforming itself from a peace to a war footing.

devastation and demoralizing political and psychological effects, would be carried on in the enemy's country instead of within one's own frontiers. In a political crisis, therefore, the military leaders were always quick to conclude that war was "inevitable," and exerted all their influence to persuade the ruling civilian authorities to consent to an order for general mobilization at the earliest possible moment, in order to gain the advantage of the offensive. But a general mobilization, according to prevailing military opinion, actually did make war inevitable. It was a process virtually impossible to halt when once begun. This was one of the greatest evils of militarism. It is always at a crisis, precisely when it is most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear and their hands free, that militarist leaders exert their influence to hasten decisions for war, or get the upper hand altogether.

Another evil of militarism was the fact that the plans of the General Staff were technical and were worked out and guarded in such absolute secrecy. Not only were they unknown to Parliament and the public; they were often not even known to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or at least their details and significance were not grasped by him.

Closely akin to this influence of military and naval officers was the pressure exerted on civilian authorities by munition makers and "big business."

Some militarists believed in "preventive" war—the waging of a war upon a neighbor while he was still weak, in order to prevent him growing stronger later on. So it is often alleged that Germany wanted war in 1914, in order to have a final reckoning with Slavdom before Russia should have completed her "Great Program" of military reorganization in 1916 or 1917. M. Poincare and his associates are alleged to have wanted war in 1914 before Germany grew any stronger by reason of her rapidly increasing population, wealth, and naval force, and also before French Socialists, revolting against the burden of French military expenditure, should repeal the recently voted three-year term of service. For the same reasons Russian militarists are said to have wanted war sooner rather than later. England even is often said to have been glad of the opportunity to crush the growing German navy before it should become a greater menace to that of England.

Nationalism

Nationalism, whose essence and development have recently been so admirably analyzed by a distinguished American historian, must be accounted one of the major underlying causes of the War. In its chronic form of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism and revandte, it nourished hatred between Germany and her two neighbors on the East and West. It worked in curious and devious ways. It had contributed happily to the unification of Germany and Italy. On the other hand, it had disrupted the Ottoman Empire and threatened to disrupt the Hapsburg Monarchy. In its virulent form, it had contributed for a century to a series of wars for national liberation and unity in the Balkans. It was such an important factor in the Balkan situation and led so directly to the immediate occasion of the World War that some account of it in this corner of Europe will be given below in the chapter on Balkan Problems.

Economic Imperialism

Economic imperialism embraces a series of international rivalries which resulted in large part from the Industrial Revolution in England and its subsequent introduction into the other great countries of the world. It led to quantity production of goods which in turn involved the struggle for new markets and new sources of raw materials. It resulted in a great increase of population, part of which sought to emigrate to the still unoccupied regions of the world, thereby sharpening the colonial rivalry of the Great Powers. It brought about the accumulation of capital which sought investment abroad, thus leading to economic exploitation and political competition. In consequence of these and other factors, the Great Powers began to partition Africa among themselves, to secure territory or exclusive spheres of influence in China, and to build railroads in Turkey and elsewhere. This struggle for markets, raw materials, and colonies became more acute during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, owing to the fact that Germany and Italy entered the competition. Hitherto politically weak and divided, they had now secured national unity and wished to come forward to share with the other Powers in the partitioning of the world. It can hardly be said that any one of the Great Powers was more responsible than another for the international jealousies and friction which arose out of this economic imperialism.

By 1914, all the Great European Powers had secured slices of Africa. In China, Italy only had failed to gain something for herself. In the matter of railway construction, which was one of the most important forms of economic imperialism because it involved political as well as economic interests, one sees the English building the Cape-to-Cairo railway, the Russians the Trans-Siberian, and the Germans the so-called Bagdad Railway. The first of these came into conflict with German, Belgian and French ambitions; the second was partly responsible for the Russo-Japanese War; the third caused endless suspicions and friction between Germany and the Triple Entente.

Protective tariffs which usually accompanied the modern industrial system, except in England, were another form of economic imperialism. "Tariff wars" and retaliatory measures caused irritation between countries, especially in the mind of the man in the street and in newspaper discussion. There was always the danger that great merchants and industrialists would use official government support to secure economic advantages for themselves. This tended to bring governments into conflict with one another.

As already depicted in other chapters, especially the economic competition was a major factor for wanting war for Britain because they ought to lose their # 1 spot if peace is kept together with Anglo-American plan for world hegemony, either through a monetary system or by controlling the resources.

The Newspaper Press

Another underlying cause of the War was the poisoning of public opinion by the newspaper press in all of the great countries. This is a subject which is only beginning to receive the careful investigation which it deserves.

Too often newspapers in all lands were inclined to inflame nationalistic feelings, misrepresent the situation in foreign countries, and suppress factors in favor of peace.¹ : In the diplomatic correspondence of the forty years before the War there were innumerable cases in which Governments were eager to establish better relations and secure friendly arrangements, but were hampered by the jingoistic attitude of the newspapers in their respective countries. Ambassadors and Cabinet Ministers frequently admitted the senseless attitude of the leading newspapers in their own country, apologized for it and promised to exert themselves to restrain it, if only the other Government would do the same toward its press. These were often quite genuine efforts and may frequently be seen in Anglo-German relations in the quarter of a century before the War.

It is, nevertheless, true that the newspapers of two countries often took up some point of dispute, exaggerated it, and made attacks and counter-attacks, until a regular newspaper war was engendered, which thoroughly poisoned public opinion, and so offered a fertile soil in which the seeds of real war might easily germinate. A particularly good example of this is to be seen in the press feud carried on between Austria and Serbia in the weeks following the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand. Here was a case in which the Governments of both countries, instead of apologizing for their press or trying to restrain it, deliberately allowed the newspapers to incite public opinion (and fire it to an indignation and enthusiasm for war. It would, perhaps, be too much to say that, had it not been for this Austro-Serbian newspaper feud, the War might have been averted. But it is true that the violence of the Serbian press was one of the determining factors which led Count Tisza to change his opinion and to accept war with Serbia, whereas at first he had been stubbornly opposed to it ; and without his consent Count Bcrchtold and the militarists could not have made war on Serbia.

Bismarck's oft-quoted remark is even more true for the generation immediately preceding the World War than for his own : "Every country is held at some time to account for the windows broken by its press; the bill is presented, some day or other, in the shape of hostile sentiment in the other country."

7.2 The System of Secret Alliances 1871-1890

Consequences of the Franco-Prussian War

The Franco-Prussian War reversed a situation which had existed for two hundred years. After the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century Germany remained weak. Economically she had been exhausted by that terrible conflict in which all Europe trampled on her soil. Politically she was weak by her division into an incongruous multitude of states differing in size and character, and by the increasing rivalry for leadership between the decaying power of the Hapsburgs and the growing vigor of the Hohenzollerns. Consequently she was continually subject to the French policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, which aimed to keep her weak and divided. Occasionally, also, she was subject to actual invasion and dismemberment by French armies, as in the time of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Early in the nineteenth century, to be sure, in a time of great danger and humiliation, Prussia and Austria had temporarily sunk their mutual rivalry; with English and Russian assistance they had united in the War of Liberation to expel and dethrone Napoleon. But Waterloo did not end Germany's internal weaknesses. The loose Confederation of 1815 and the continued jealousy of Austria and Prussia left Germany still comparatively impotent and unimportant as an international power. Finally, in the 1850's at the Frankfort Diet, Bismarck became convinced that Germany's weakness could only be cured by a fratricidal war in which Austria should be forcibly expelled from the German body politic.

At Paris and at Biarritz, he learned to gauge the weakness and ambition of Napoleon III which could be turned to Germany's advantage. So he annexed Schleswig-Holstein, expelled Austria by the Prussian victory at Sadowa, and established the North German Federation under Prussian leadership. In 1870-1871, by Sedan and Versailles, he at last transformed Germany into a strong unified Empire. The situation between France and Germany was now reversed: it was no longer Germany, but France, which was weak and in danger from an attack from across the Rhine.

Bismarck's unification of Germany was hailed at the time as a desirable, even glorious, accomplishment of the spirit of nationalism. But it was accompanied by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. The French have always regarded this as a crime—"the brutal dismemberment of a nation," "the tearing of children from their mother." France, including the annexed districts of Alsace and Lorraine, had become one body, powerfully conscious of its unity and nationality; if one of its members suffered, all suffered together Bismarck had mutilated a living body and the wound would not heal; it was to remain an awful open sore, threatening the peace of Europe for forty years.

League of the Three Emperors 1872-1878

Between Russia and Prussia there had existed traditional bonds of friendship ever since their armies had fought side by side for the overthrow of Napoleon. These bonds had been further strengthened during the Crimean War and the Polish uprising of 1863. Both Powers had a common interest in preventing the reestablishment of Polish independence, which would have deprived them of the spoils of the partitions of Poland. During the Franco-Prussian War, Russia had done Bismarck the great service of maintaining an attitude of benevolent neutrality and of tending to restrain Austria from joining France and seeking *revanche* for Sadowa. The long months during the siege of Paris were for Bismarck a critical and difficult period, and Russia might, if she had chosen, have greatly embarrassed him. Bismarck therefore at once frankly recognized the service which Russia had done him in 1870-1871 by assenting to the Tsar's abrogation of the humiliating Black Sea Clauses, imposed on Russia after the Crimean War. A still stronger bond between the two countries was the close personal tie between old Emperor William and his nephew, Alexander II, a tie which was renewed by the visit which the Tsar paid to Berlin in the month following the signature of peace between Germany and France.

With Austria, Bismarck was especially anxious to establish firm and friendly relations. Having accomplished his purpose of establishing German unity under Prussian leadership, he believed that the natural relation of the two countries which contained such large German elements and which for centuries had formed part of the same Holy Roman Empire should be one of friendship. Accordingly, Bismarck was able to bring about friendly personal meetings between Emperor William and Francis Joseph in the summer of 1871 on Austrian soil.

In April, 1872, Count Andrassy suggested that Emperor Francis Joseph should pay a return visit to Emperor William at Berlin. When Tsar Alexander II heard of the intended visit he asked the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, "Have they not written to ask you whether they would like to have me there at the same time with the Emperor of Austria?" Alexander did not want to be left out in the cold while his two brother monarchs were conferring together. It was finally arranged that the three monarchs, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, should visit Berlin together in the second week of September, 1872.

Though no written agreement was signed, and though the Foreign Ministers conferred in pairs and not all together, there was established a close "understanding" or "Entente a trois"—the basis for the "League of the Three Emperors" a few months later. Now they were to stand together in defense of monarchical solidarity against the rising danger of international socialism, and for the preservation of the peace and status quo of Europe against possible moves of France or others to disturb it.

A secret military convention was soon signed by which Russia and Germany promised to each other the assistance of two hundred thousand men in case either was attacked by a European Power. Germany, as a result of her recent victories and her large army,

was the strongest of the three Powers. And of the three ministers—Gorchakov, Andrassy and Bismarck—the last was by far the ablest in grasping the European situation as a whole, in seeing what the political interests of his neighbors were, and in being willing to recognize and bargain on the basis of these interests.

But in 1875, the harmony of the League was seriously ruffled. Gorchakov's vanity made it difficult for him to play second fiddle to Bismarck. With personal inclinations toward France, which were not shared by the Tsar, he listened to anti-German reports of his representatives at Berlin, Belgrade and Constantinople. Bismarck feared, with reason, that Gorchakov might influence the Tsar against Germany and thus weaken the League of the Three Emperors. He therefore sent Radowitz to St. Petersburg to take the

place of the German Ambassador who was on indefinite sick leave. Radowitz was to represent Bismarck's views to Gorchakov energetically, and he did so successfully. But Gorchakov then circulated rumors which grew into the French legend that Radowitz had been sent to bribe Russia to give Germany a free hand against France in return for Germany's giving Russia a free hand in the Orient. This alarmed France and England and contributed to the so-called "war-scare of 1875." Bismarck was unjustly suspected of contemplating a "preventive war" against France.

The French Foreign Minister appealed to Tsar Alexander and Queen Victoria to use their influence to prevent Germany from any aggressive action. Gorchakov easily persuaded the Tsar, on his visit to Berlin, to make it clear that Russia could not allow France to be crushed. Gorchakov's pompous announcement from Berlin, "Now peace is assured," flattered his own vanity, but made Bismarck very angry, because Gorchakov seemed to have implied that Germany had really intended a preventive war and that Russia had averted it—an implication the truth of which Bismarck always energetically denied, and for which he never forgave the Russian foreign minister.

The incident led to cooler relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, but cannot be said to have really destroyed the League of the Three Emperors, since Alexander II and William I still remained close personal friends.

The near eastern Crisis 1875-1878

Another event in 1875 which threatened the harmony of the League of the Three Emperors was the outbreak of a new and prolonged crisis in the Balkans. The progressive dissolution of the Sick Man of Europe and the outrages committed by his savage soldiers on his long-suffering Christian subjects led Russia again to consider the possibility of his demise. In Herzegovina the cruelty of the land-owning aristocracy, a large part of whom were of Serb blood but who had become converted to Mohammedanism in order to live on better terms with the Turkish rulers, caused an uprising of the unhappy Christian peasantry in July, 1875.

The uprising spread rapidly into Bosnia. It awoke the fanatical sympathy of Serb brethren

in Austria-Hungary and the neighboring principality of Serbia. On account of the mountainous nature of the region and the inefficiency of the Sultan's government, the Turks seemed powerless to suppress the revolt. Russia and Austria were at once brought face to face again in their old rivalry over Balkan interests.

Bismarck now had the difficult task during the next fifteen years of preventing this rivalry from causing a rupture between the two Powers whom he wished to have as friends and whom he wished to prevent from gravitating toward France.

Russia's ambitions in the Balkans were of long standing. With the remarkable rise and consolidation of the Russian state at Moscow, the Slav Empire had begun to push steadily southward toward the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. Peter the Great, in wars with Turkey, had acquired for a short time at Azov his coveted "window" on the Black Sea, and given that impetus to Russian progress toward the south which his successors came to regard as Russia's historic mission. Catherine the Great, taking up anew the war with Turkey, had secured the Crimea and the whole northern shore of the Black Sea. Conveniently for Russia's ambitions, the spirit of nationalism awakened by the French Revolution had stimulated in Greeks and Slavs of the Balkans the desire to throw off the Turkish yoke.

Austria, had no ostensible ties of religion and blood with the oppressed Christian nationalities in the Balkans and no desire to see them achieve independence as clients of Russia. Austria-Hungary—especially Hungary—already included more Slav peoples than could be easily assimilated. With the growing spirit of nationalism, these Slav subjects were becoming more and more difficult to govern. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrassy, a Magyar, was therefore at first opposed to the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which he feared would aggravate the internal problem of the Dual Monarchy of ruling over a large number of Slavs.

He preferred to have the Great Powers act jointly by way of a Conference and enforce reforms upon Turkey for the benefit of the peasantry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but he did not desire to begin the partition of the Ottoman Empire. His desire found expression in the "Andrassy Note" of December 30, 1875, which demanded an armistice, a series of reforms, and the appointment of a mixed Christian and Mohammedan commission to look after the carrying out of the reforms. The Turks, as usual, made a pretense of accepting the demands; but the insurgent Bosnians, fired with enthusiasm by their successes and by their hope of support from their brother Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro, refused to abide by the terms of the Andrassy Note. The crisis became more serious.

Bismarck's chief concern in the whole Eastern Question was to prevent it from disturbing the peace of Europe and the satisfactory relations between Austria and Russia which had been established by the League of the Three Emperors.

Meanwhile, however, Tsar Alexander and Emperor Francis Joseph, accompanied by their Ministers, had come together at Reichstadt and on July 8, 1876, reached a secret but somewhat hazy "agreement" without Bismarck's knowledge. They agreed to refrain from

intervention in Turkey for the present. But for the future, if the Turks should regain the upper hand over the insurgents, Russia and Austria would protect the Serbs from excessive violence and insist upon real reforms. If, on the other hand, the insurgents continued their successful resistance and the Ottoman Empire in Europe should crumble to pieces, Austria was to annex part of Bosnia, Russia was to regain the part of Bessarabia lost in 1856 and territories on the eastern shore of the Black Sea [in which Austria had no interest] ; Bulgaria and Rumelia were to be autonomous; additions of territory were to be given to Serbia, Montenegro and Greece; and Constantinople was to be erected into a free city.

By this Reichstadt Agreement Gorchakov had secured Austria's agreement in principle to the partition of Turkey.

But the fortunes of war in the Balkans during the following weeks did not bear out the probable expectation of Gorchakov and Andrassy that Turkey was on the point of collapsing. On the contrary, the Turks showed an extraordinary revival of energy. They defeated the insurgents in one encounter after another, until finally on August 29, Prince Milan of Serbia called for help. Gorchakov and the Russian Pan-Slavs were not deaf to the call. They felt that they must intervene on behalf of the oppressed Orthodox Slav peasantry, in spite of the principle of non-intervention for the present, which had formed the first clause of the Reichstadt Agreement. This at once renewed the old hostility between Russia and Austria over Balkan affairs and led to a tense situation between the two Great Powers. Both accordingly turned to Bismarck.

By instructions to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Bismarck again emphasized his aim of preserving peace in Europe and harmony in the League of the Three Emperors. If Russia decided to intervene and make war on Turkey, Bismarck would use his influence to prevent Austria from attacking Russia, and he hoped he could succeed in this. If not, and if war broke out between Russia and Austria in spite of all his efforts, Germany would not necessarily abandon neutrality. He would make no promises beforehand, but he would say that German interests could not allow a coalition of all Europe permanently to weaken Russia's position as a Great Power; nor could he, on the other hand, permit Austria to be endangered in her position as a European Power or in her independence, and so cease to be one of the factors on which Germany could reckon in the European balance of power.

In April, 1877, as soon as weather conditions permitted, Russia opened against Turkey the war which she had long desired. Though checked for months at Plevna, she eventually won a series of victories which brought her armies to the outskirts of Constantinople and forced Turkey to accept the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3, 1878. This provided for the creation of a great Bulgarian State, more or less comprising the predominantly Bulgarian parts of Turkey and embracing an extensive sea coast on the Aegean.

The Treaty met with objections on every side: by Greece, Serbia, and Rumania because this "Greater Bulgaria" was to be so much more powerful than any one of themselves. It

was objected to by Austria and England who feared the greatly enlarged Bulgaria would be virtually a vassal state under Russian control; Austria did not like to see such an increase of Russia's power near her border, and England feared for the safety of the Suez Canal. Both these Powers therefore insisted on a Congress for the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. Bismarck at first had no great liking for this proposal, but finally consented to act as "Honest Broker," and invited the Powers to the Congress of Berlin.

In the various preliminary negotiations which settled almost all the essential points before the Congress met, so that the Congress merely had to register decisions which had already been arranged by Bismarck, the German Chancellor strove hard to satisfy both Austrian and Russian interests. In the end, Austria was again accorded by the Treaty of Berlin the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina and also, if military necessity required, to occupy the tongue of territory between Serbia and Montenegro known as the Sanjak of Novibazar. Russia acquired the part of Bessarabia lost in 1856 and valuable territories between the Black and Caspian Seas. These were important gains for Russia, but to Gorchakov they seemed but slight rewards after all Russia's military efforts and successes. He left the Congress with bitter feelings against Bismarck. He felt that Bismarck had betrayed Russian interests and been guilty of unpardonable ingratitude in view of Russia's benevolent neutrality during the Franco- Prussian War. In Russia there was a violent outburst in the Pan-Slav press against Germany which Bismarck regarded as altogether unjustifiable. Though he had supported Austria and England on many points, he had also done Russia a real service, getting far more for her at the Congress than she could have gotten for herself.

The result of this personal bitterness between the two Ministers and of the violent newspaper attacks of one country against the other put an end for the time being to that harmony and cooperation which had been the object of the League of the Three Emperors.

The Austro-German Alliance of 1879

The hostility between Russia and Germany was not confined merely to personal bitterness between the Ministers or to the recriminations of newspapers. In the commissions established for executing the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, the German delegates sided regularly with Austria against Russia. In reply, Russia undertook a vigorous increase in armaments-and pushed her troops westward into Poland toward the German frontier. "Russia must prepare for War," declared General Miliutin, and his declaration was reiterated by the Pan-Slavs. At last, in the summer of 1879, even Alexander himself, unable longer to restrain his feelings, poured out his grievances to the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and wrote a letter to Emperor William complaining of Bismarck's policy and warning him of "the disastrous consequences which might follow."

At about the same time Bismarck heard that his friend Andrassy was soon to resign and was likely to be replaced by Baron Haymerle, on whose friendship he did not feel sure

that he could count. In view of the danger from Russia he decided to seek at once a defensive alliance with Austria while Andrassy was still in office. He accordingly drew up with him the Treaty of October 7, 1879, which established the Austro-German Alliance. He would have liked a treaty in which Austria and Germany would promise to support each other in case either were attacked by a third Power, whether Russia, France, or Italy. But Austria was unwilling to expose her eastern frontier to a Russian attack by promising unconditionally to assist Germany in the West in case the French should undertake a war of revenge. Austria was mainly concerned with the danger from the side of Russia.

Therefore the treaty provided that should Austria or Germany be attacked by Russia, the two Contracting Parties were bound to come to the assistance one of the other with their whole war strength ; should either be attacked by a Power other than Russia [such as France or Italy], the other Contracting Party bound itself to observe a benevolent neutrality; should, however, the attacking Power be supported by Russia, then the other Contracting Party would come to the assistance of her ally with her whole strength. The treaty was to be for five years and renewable. It was also to be secret, though if the armaments of Russia really proved menacing, the Contracting Powers would consider it a duty of loyalty to let the Tsar know, at least confidentially, that they would consider an attack on either as an attack on both.

The Austro-German Alliance consolidated the Central Empires and became henceforth, until their collapse in November, 1918, the very foundation rock of German policy. It indicated a political course from which neither Bismarck nor his successors ever seriously swerved. In its origin, and as long as Bismarck remained at the helm, it was essentially defensive in purpose and fact. Germany and Austria mutually protected each other against the rising tide of Pan-Slavism ; and Germany, if attacked by an outbreak of French revanche, could count upon Austria's neutrality, just as Austria could count on that of Germany in case of an outbreak of Italian Irredentism.

Contemporary opinion regarded Bismarck's establishment of this Alliance as a master stroke. In the words of the French Ambassador at Berlin : "From the point of view of his prestige in Europe and of his popularity in Germany, Bismarck has never accomplished a work so considerable as that of the Alliance with Austria. ... He has realized without wars, without conquests dearly bought, without

burdensome or enfeebling annexations, the German political dream of union of all the States where the German race dominates in a common political system and a powerful solidarity." This contemporary opinion has for the most part been endorsed by posterity. Only here and there before the World War were there those who criticized it. But after 1914, when German support of Austria became one of the causes which involved all Europe in war, many voices, even in Germany, questioned Bismarck's wisdom. They alleged that Bismarck, by further alienating Russia through alliance with Austria, made inevitable the Franco-Russian Alliance; and that by taking sides with Austria against Russia in the Balkans, he prepared the way for the clash which came in 1914.

Such critics, however, are wrong in thinking that Russia was permanently alienated from Germany after 1879. They did not know of the very secret treaty which Bismarck made with Russia within two years (June 18, 1881) and which he renewed (with modifications) and kept effective as long as he remained in power. They are wrong in thinking that it made the Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. This was perhaps "inevitable" anyway, in view of the growth of Pan-Slavism in Russia and the persistence of Alsatian memories in France. And they are wrong in thinking that Bismarck's alliance of 1879 necessarily involved an Austro-Russian clash in the Balkans.

It was not until many years after Bismarck's dismissal that Austria began to pursue the more aggressive and independent policy, which tended to pervert the Austro-German Alliance from one which was defensive in form to one which became offensive in fact. Criticism should not be directed against Bismarck, but against his later successors—especially Bulow and Bethmann—who failed to follow sufficiently closely his conservative policy of holding Austria in check.

The Alliance of the Three Emperors 1881-1887

Among Russia's diplomats there were two who did not allow themselves to be blinded by indignation against Bismarck over the outcome of the Congress of Berlin. One of these was Giers, who soon assumed virtual charge of Russian foreign affairs in place of Gorchakov. The other was Peter Saburov, who foresaw the probability of an Austro-German alliance even before it was signed. In January, 1880, Saburov came as Ambassador to Berlin, where he had many intimate interviews with Bismarck with a view to reknitting the close personal relations between Tsar Alexander II and Emperor William I, thus reviving the League of the Three Emperors.

Saburov, like all Russian diplomats, always had one eye out for Russian control or influence at Constantinople. He had realized in 1878 how easy it was for an English fleet to threaten the Turkish capital and he feared for the future.

He therefore laid before Bismarck his view of Russia's danger in a memorandum to the following effect. In 1833 Russia had aided Turkey against the victorious army of Mehemet Ali, and was rewarded for this sendee by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, in which Turkey undertook to close the Dardanelles to all enemy fleets which sought to penetrate to the Black Sea. This stipulation, negotiated exclusively for Russia's benefit, protected her southern shores from hostile attack; but this stipulation was modified to her detriment by the Treaty of London of 1840 and the Straits Convention of 1841, in which the principle of the closure of the Straits, hitherto applied to entry into the Black Sea, was equally extended to exit from it.

Russia was thus shut off from sending her navy into the Mediterranean. These principles were confirmed in the Treaty of Paris which in addition forbade Russia and Turkey to have ships of war on the Black Sea; this treaty remained in force until the Treaty of London

of 1871. The London agreement, resulting from Russia's attempt to abrogate the Black Sea Clauses while France and Germany had their hands tied by the Franco-Prussian War, annulled the provision of 1856 forbidding Russian or Turkish war vessels on the Black Sea, but admitted for the first time the principle that foreign navies might enter the Straits if the Sultan judged it necessary for the safeguarding of the other clauses of the Treaty of Paris.

This reversed completely to Russia's disadvantage the principle of the closure of the Straits, which in its origin had been intended to provide Russia with a lock and chain at the Dardanelles for the protection of her shores and her influence over Turkey. At the Congress of Berlin, England had declared that "her obligations, concerning the closure of the Straits, were limited to an engagement to the Sultan to respect in this matter only the independent decisions of the Sultan"; in other words, England was not obliged to respect the decision of the Sultan if the latter tried to close the Straits at Russia's demand, for such a decision would not be "independent."

England, Saburov concluded, was reserving the right to enter the Straits and threaten Russian interests whenever she pleased. Russia's lock and chain were valueless therefore, unless she could get the support of Germany and Austria. This is what Saburov wanted and what Bismarck was willing to give, in return for the restoration of friendly relations with Russia. A friendly agreement with Russia would mean a renewal of the League of the Three Emperors, and tend to guarantee the peace of Europe. Saburov had also been duly impressed by the Austro-German Alliance and began to realize Russia's diplomatic isolation. Russia was anxious again for German and Austrian support.

In view of the advantages to each of the three Powers, it was not difficult to reach the very secret agreement which was signed by Bismarck, Saburov, and Szechenyi on June 18, 1881. It was regarded as so secret that Bismarck did not entrust the drawing up of documents in regard to it to the chancery secretaries, but wrote them out with his own hand; and the diplomatic correspondence dealing with it was marked with special numbers and reserved for the eye of as few initiates as possible. The secret was so well preserved that the world knew nothing of it until part of it was published by Professor Goriainov in 1918. 28 It provided among other things (Art. I) that "in case one of the High Contracting Parties should find itself at war with a fourth Great Power, the other two will preserve a benevolent neutrality toward it and will devote their efforts to the localizing of the conflict." In other words, if Germany should be at war with France, or Austria at war with Italy, or Russia at war with Turkey, the country at war need have no fear of an attack on its rear by either of the other two Eastern Empires.

In Art. II the three Signatory Powers agreed to respect the rights acquired by Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Treaty of Berlin, and to make no changes in the territorial status quo of "Turkey in Europe" except by common consent. By tacit implication this meant that Russia could still pursue her forward policy in the Caucasus where Austria and Germany were not particularly interested.

Saburov's fears of an English fleet in the Straits were quieted by Art. III:

"The three Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closure of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles. . . . They will take care jointly that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favor of the interests of any Government whatsoever by lending to warlike operations of a belligerent Power the portion of its Empire constituted by the Straits. In case of infringement, or to prevent it if such infringement should be in prospect, the three Courts will inform Turkey that they would regard her, in that event, as putting herself in a state of war towards the injured Party, and as having deprived herself thenceforth of the benefits of the security assured to her territorial status quo by the Treaty of Berlin."

The Tsar had an ineradicable distrust of Austria. He had inherited it from his grandfather at the time of Austria's "astonishing ingratitude" during the Crimean War. It had been fostered and nourished by his tutors and advisers, who belonged to the Pan-Slav group represented by Miliutin and Katkov, and it had taken a deep hold on him during the long Bosnian crisis which ended so unsatisfactorily for Russia in the Congress of Berlin.

Bismarck worked hard to bring about the renewal of the tripartite agreement of 1881. He did not want to see it "thrown behind the stove." But when he found that the Tsar was unshakeable in his distrust of Austria, he had no mind to forfeit Russia's friendship because of Austria's unnecessarily aggressive support of Serbians against Bulgarians. Moreover, his relations with France had grown very much worse during recent months as Boulanger had come into prominence, and he had heard rumors in September, 1886, and in the spring of 1887, of secret negotiations for a Franco-Russian coalition.

The Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty 1887-1890

Bismarck therefore accepted with alacrity a Russian proposal that in place of the existing tripartite agreement, Russia and Germany should make a defensive treaty of their own without Austria. With a characteristic directness of action, Bismarck drew out of his portfolio the text of the Alliance of 1879 and read it to Schuvalov, declaring that he sincerely regretted that Russia's attitude at that time had compelled Germany to protect herself by means of this treaty. Nevertheless it existed; Germany must and would remain loyal to its terms and to Austria, and therefore this fact must be taken into consideration in framing any treaty between Russia and Germany.

After the discussion of a number of alternatives, this difficulty was finally overcome by the wording agreed upon in Art. I: "If one of the High Contracting Parties shall find itself at war with a third Great Power, the other will maintain towards it a benevolent neutrality and will devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict. This provision shall not apply to a war against Austria or France resulting from an attack made upon one of these two powers by one of the Contracting Parties." This defensive arrangement was perfectly satisfactory to Bismarck as he had no intention of attacking France; and

in case France should attack Germany he had been insured since 1879 against danger on his Southern frontier by Austria's promise of benevolent neutrality.

Now, by the new treaty with Russia, he was re-insured against any danger on his Eastern frontier. Furthermore, if Russia should attack Austria, the new "Re-insurance Treaty" in no way conflicted with his obligation to protect Austria, in accordance with the Austro-German Alliance.

The success of one set of alliances, establishing the domination of the Eastern Empires, by which Bismarck for nearly a score of years conjured away an open clash between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, preserved almost unbroken the good relations of Germany with her powerful neighbors to the south and east, and thereby lessened the danger from the west. The very existence of the Alliance of 1881 with Russia and Austria had been preserved with such perfect secrecy that it gave rise to no suspicions or alarm on the part of France or other Powers.

The Tripple Alliance of 1881

The formation of the Triple Alliance is commonly attributed to Bismarck. He is pictured as encouraging France to seize Tunis with the calculation that this "would arouse such bitterness in Italy that Bismarck could undoubtedly secure the consent of the Italian Government to an alliance with Austria and Germany."

Early in 1882, Italy asked for a treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria. Italy wanted to strengthen her position and to gain support for future ambitions. Italy had come away from the Congress of Berlin "with clean hands," which meant empty hands, though Bismarck had told her that, as far as Germany was concerned, she might take Tripoli any time. She had just received what she regarded as a humiliating slap in the face from the French who had occupied Tunis, the very territory which Italy had not unnaturally been coveting for herself. And she was still afraid "the Prisoner of the Vatican" might attempt to regain his temporal possessions. Italy had everything to gain and little to risk in an alliance with Germany and Austria.

This Bismarck fully recognized, and he was not therefore especially eager to incur an Italian liability. Earlier, in 1880, when a treaty with Italy was first suggested to him, his comment was, "You don't need to run after Italy if you want something of her; moreover, her promise will have no value if it is not in her interest to keep it." Of the value of the Italians themselves as Allies, he had no very high opinion. In his private notes, recently published, he refers to "their fickle character," "their childish egoism," and "the restless, arrogant character of Italy's policy, which might easily involve her friends in trouble."

But as the German Empire did not touch Italian territory, and was not so directly interested as Austria in a number of troublesome points which would have to be settled, Bismarck suggested that Austria should negotiate the terms of the treaty with Italy. The Italian Ambassador at Berlin was told that "the key to the door which leads to us must be

sought in Vienna." Accordingly, the ensuing Austro-Italian negotiations, with occasional suggestions from Bismarck, ultimately resulted in the Triple Alliance Treaty signed at Vienna on May 20, 1882, by Kalnoky, Robilant, and Reuss.

The general purposes of Austria, Italy, and Germany were, according to the preamble, "to augment the guarantees of peace in general, to strengthen the monarchical principle, and by this to insure intact the maintenance of the social and political order in their respective states by agreeing to conclude a treaty which by its essentially conservative and defensive character aimed only to protect them against the dangers which might menace the safety of their states and the peace of Europe." It had a defensive character because the nations were only allowed to help each other if an unprovoked war was started against one of the countries.

The Treaty of Alliance was for five years, and its contents and its existence were to be kept secret. Its peaceful and defensive intent was especially marked in the case of Germany. But it became less so in the case of Italy and Austria, who later wished to use it to support their aggressive intentions. It was, in fact, not long before Italy sought to make use of her new alliance to promote her ambitions in North Africa and elsewhere. Her request for German protection against alleged interference with Italian interests by the French in Morocco caused Bismarck to reply sharply:

"I am not without just irritation over this request of Mancini's, and observe in it a dilettante—confidentially I would even say banal—ignorance of what is possible and desirable in high diplomacy. There is again manifest in this incident, to put it mildly, that lack of unselfishness which has already so often betrayed the Italians into sending other people into the water for the sake of Italian interests, without wetting even a finger of their own . . . We are ready to stand by Italy's side if she is attacked or even seriously threatened by France. But we cannot hear with indifference the expectation that we should begin trouble with France or place Europe before the possibility of a war of great dimensions, because of vague anxieties about Italy's interests which are not immediate, but which represent hopes for the future in regard to Morocco, or the Red Sea, or Tunis, or Egypt, or other parts of the world."

In 1885, Italy irritated her new allies by seizing Massowah on the Red Sea without notifying them beforehand of her intentions. When the time approached for renewing the Triple Alliance, Italy complained that she had gained nothing as a result of the treaty. Bismarck replied bluntly, but truly, that the Alliance was made to secure the peace of Europe and not to win new conquests for its members. When Italy hinted that she wanted promises of wider support given her as the price of her renewal, Bismarck at first told her flatly that she could renew it as it stood without modifications, or she could leave it and drop out. But later, in 1887, when Franco-German relations were strained, and Italy intimated that she would shift to the side of France if her desires were not heeded, Bismarck changed his mind. He was willing to recognize Italian ambitions in North Africa and even put pressure upon Austria to accept the principle that Italy had the right to share with Austria in the decision of the future fate of the Balkans, the Ottoman coasts,

and the islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

Austrian policy in the Balkans, after 1906, similarly attempted to make use of the Alliance for aggressive rather than peaceful purposes. But the details of this later perversion of the originally defensive character of the Triple Alliance cannot be discussed here. They do not alter the fact that Bismarck in no sense intended to use the Triple Alliance for aggressive action by Germany against France. For him it always remained, as it had been in its origin, a defensive treaty. Unfortunately it was not easy to convince the French of this. As its terms were secret, the French not unnaturally suspected that it constituted a menace to themselves. This suspicion was strengthened by the rapid increase in German and Italian armaments in the 1880's, and by Bismarck's rather defiant tone during the Boulanger period. It was this secrecy as to the terms of the Triple Alliance, and the exaggerated suspicions to which it gave rise, which contributed so much toward the embitterment of Franco-German relations and to the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in the early 1890's.

The Rumanian Alliance of 1883

Even the Triple Alliance did not complete the circle of treaties by which Bismarck wished to assure the peace of Europe. In the summer of 1883 King Carol, the Hohenzollern ruler of Rumania, visited Germany. Bismarck took the occasion to sound Austria, "whether it would not be desirable and possible to extend our League of Peace [Friedensliga] with Italy to the East, and thereby lead in firm paths the policy of Rumania, and eventually also that of Serbia and the Porte.

On October 30, 1883, the a treaty was signed about the purely defensive kind of an alliance which Bismarck had in mind. The Austro-Rumanian Treaty, which formed the basis of Rumania's adherence to the Triple Alliance "Treaty of Peace," provided in substance that if Rumania or Austria were attacked without provocation on their part [by Russia] , the two Contracting Powers would mutually assist one another against the aggressor. Russia was not named in the text of the treaty owing to Emperor William's wish on this point, and to the danger of adding fuel to Pan-Slav agitation in case the Treaty should leak out later through some indiscretion.

The treaty was to be secret and to endure for five years with an automatic extension for three years more if not denounced by any of the parties. In 1889 Italy, like Germany, adhered to the Austro- Rumanian treaty, and the Quadruple Agreement was usually renewed from time to time (with slight modifications). The last renewal took place on February 5, 1913, when it was extended to July 8, 1920.

Breakdown to the Wire with Russia in 1890

Thus, in the period 1871-1890, the peace of Europe was secured by the domination of the Eastern Empires and by the system of genuinely defensive alliances which Bismarck had built up, though during the last three years the system was somewhat less secure. No Power cared to risk a war against Germany's overwhelming military force, supported and insured as it was by the secret alliances which had brought Austria, Russia, Italy, Rumania, and even England more or less into cooperation with Germany. France in her painful isolation did not dare to undertake a war of revanche. England, though ready to cooperate with the Triple Alliance in the Mediterranean, did not care to depart from her traditional no-alliance policy. She still preferred to enjoy the Balance of Power between any European coalitions which might arise. No one yet threatened that proud supremacy of the seas, so vital to her commerce and her imperial relations with her colonies.

But the dismissal of Bismarck in March, 1890, brought a change, and opened the way for the formation of an alliance between Russia and France. Even during the three preceding years, in spite of the Re-insurance Treaty, friction had increased between Germany and Russia, owing to complications in Bulgaria, and to the German newspaper campaign against Russian securities. But until Bismarck's dismissal, the loyalty of M. Giers, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the German alliance, and Tsar Alexander's antipathy to France had prevented a Franco-Russian coalition which had always been Bismarck's greatest nightmare.

In December, 1889, well in advance of its expiration, Giers considered whether the Re-insurance Treaty of 1887 ought to be renewed by Russia and, if so, in what form. On the whole, it seemed more useful for Russian interests in the Balkans and for the preservation of peace than an alliance with France. The latter would endanger peace by encouraging French chauvinists and by embittering relations between France and Germany. In accordance with this policy, Count Schuvalov had an intimate conversation with Bismarck on February 10, 1890, in which both favored the renewal of the treaty. "It is a document that defines clearly the policy which we are following and which, in my judgment, ought not to be changed," said Bismarck.

But the conflict of temperament and policy which had been developing between the aged German Chancellor and his imperious young master was nearing the explosion which took place on March 17. With Bismarck out of office Schuvalov did not know what to do. He reported that what was passing at Berlin was more than strange, and that one was forced to ask oneself whether the young Emperor was in a normal state. On the night of March 21, the Ambassador was awakened by a messenger from Emperor William who requested him to come to His Majesty at eight o'clock in the morning. Scarcely had he arrived when the Emperor received him with great kindness and cordiality saying, "Sit down and listen to me. You know how much I love and respect your sovereign. Your Emperor has been too good to me for me to do otherwise than to inform him personally of the situation created by the events which have just taken place. ... I beg you to tell

His Majesty that on my part I am entirely disposed to renew our agreement, that my foreign policy remains and will remain the same as it was in the time of my grandfather."

After having read Schuvalov's despatch the Tsar wrote on it, "Nothing more satisfactory could be looked for. We shall see by the sequel whether deeds correspond to words."

But there then emerged the malign and super-suspicious influence of Baron Holstein. He and another counsellor in the German Foreign Office drew up a long memoir of finespun arguments against the renewal; with these they won over the Kaiser and the new Chancellor, Caprivi. It was decided at Berlin on March 27 to drop the negotiations for renewal, because the terms of the Re-insurance Treaty were regarded as contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Triple Alliance, and also because, "if the treaty became known, either by a deliberate or accidental indiscretion, it would endanger the Triple Alliance and be calculated to turn England away from us."

Schweinitz, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was hastily summoned back to Berlin for a consultation. He did not think it likely that Russia would deliberately divulge the treaty; but he recognized the "possibility of indiscretions from some other source,"⁵² by which probably he meant no other than Bismarck himself. When Schweinitz returned to St. Petersburg next day, and reported Germany's negative decision, the Tsar was content, but his Foreign Minister, Giers, was "in some consternation." Already old and feeble, Giers feared that under his successors the Russian militarists and Pan-Slavs might get the upper hand and threaten peaceful relations between Germany and Russia. He hoped by a treaty to bind his successors. Six weeks later he again brought up the subject and urged the renewal of the treaty. He was willing to make any changes Germany wanted, or even to have merely an exchange of notes, or at any rate some kind of a written agreement between the two countries.

Since a further refusal on Germany's part might tend to drive Russia into the arms of France, Schwemitz advised "some kind of a written agreement which, even if it became known, could not be used against us." Just after this advice reached Berlin, Bismarck gave an interview to a Russian journalist, which alarmed the German Foreign Office and made them fear that even if the Tsar were discreet, the irritated ex-Chancellor might let the dangerous cat out of the bag. The leading Foreign Office officials— Marschall, Holstein, Kiderlen, and Raschdau—all hastened to write memorials against a renewal of the Re-insurance Treaty or anything resembling it; and the Kaiser and Caprivi accepted their view. Schweinitz was told positively to drop the whole matter. Thus fell one of the main props of Bismarck's balance between Russia and Austria. Russia was left isolated and more ready to listen to the solicitous voice of the republican radicals on the Seine.

Historians have generally exaggerated the non-renewal of the Re-insurance Treaty as a factor in the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance. This is due partly to Bismarck himself. Esteemed by the German people as a demigod but neglected by the young Emperor and the new Court, the lonely and morose old man at Friednchsruh filled the columns of the *Hamburger Nachrichten* with illnatured articles justifying his own suc-

cessful policies and bitterly criticizing anonymously those of his successor: "Least of all is it Germany's business to support Austria's ambitions in the Balkans." "By following the path upon which she has entered, Germany is in danger of gradually becoming dependent upon Austria, and in the end she may have to pay with her blood and treasure for the Balkan policy of Vienna." This was bad taste on Bismarck's part, and it was very embarrassing to William II and Caprivi.

Due to newspaper articles the world accepted the idea that the Franco-Russian Alliance was the result of Caprivi's stupidity in not continuing Bismarck's juggling feat of "keeping five balls in the air at once." But if one looks more closely at the documents now in hand, one can see that historians have been misled by the apparent conjunction of events in 1890- 1891 and by Bismarck's propaganda.

The Franco-Russian Entente did not result simply from Caprivi's failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. It was due to a number of other factors. One of these was the growth of German industry, commerce, naval ambition, and colonial expansion which started Germany on "The New Course" to Constantinople and Bagdad, thereby antagonizing Russia. Emperor William's desire for a naval base led to the so-called Heligoland Treaty of July, 1890, which made Russia suspect—incorrectly—that Germany would draw closer to England. A second factor was the growth of Pan-Slavism and of Russia's determination to dominate the Balkans. This antagonized Austria and made it impossible for Berlin to continue Bismarck's policy of maintaining a delicate equipoise between Vienna and St. Petersburg. William II had eventually to choose between Russia and Austria, and he chose Austria; whether he chose rightly is another question; but the choice having been made, Russia became perforce the enemy of the Central Powers.

Therefore, according to a well-informed German writer, the mistake of Bismarck's successors was not in letting down the wire between Berlin and St. Petersburg—that was perhaps inevitable anyway; the mistake was in failing to conciliate and win England by playing off England against her natural Russian and French rivals, and by coming to a reasonable understanding with England in regard to naval and colonial questions.

A third factor which made for the Franco-Russian Alliance, was the persistence of the *revanche* idea and the slow consolidation of power in the French Republic which followed the bursting of the Boulanger bubble. France had at last sufficiently settled down so that the Tsar was willing to overcome his repugnance to an alliance with the Revolutionary Government which had never forgiven Germany for the cruel wound inflicted in 1871.

Franco-German Relations 1871-1880

In the bitter years after the Franco-Prussian War, France sat alone among the Powers of Europe, like a wallflower at a dance, watching Germany revolve with many partners. France was condemned to isolation by her own military weakness after defeat, by the methods which Bismarck adopted to keep her friendless, and by the instability of her

Republican form of government which was regarded askance by the old monarchs of Europe. She had to suffer the humiliation and the inevitable friction of German armies on her soil until the billion dollar indemnity was paid. It was not until the War Scare of 1875 that France found for the first time that she had honest neighbors who, if they did not take her to their hearts as partners, were at least not willing to sit idly by with hands crossed and see her menaced or crushed.

Tsar Alexander II of Russia gallantly informed General Le Flo, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that "the interests of our two countries are common; you would know this very quickly and you would know it from us if, as I refuse to believe, you should be some day seriously menaced." Queen Victoria likewise let it be known that in this matter she was of one opinion with the Tsar. But neither of these two Great Powers was yet ready to enter into any closer relations with the French Republic. Alexander II, with a natural antipathy to republican institutions, preferred the monarchical solidarity represented by the League of the Three Emperors, and his attention was engaged in the Eastern Question where German friendship was of greater value than French support. Similarly, the English acquisition of the Suez Canal and the resulting occupation of Egypt gave rise to a situation which made close Anglo-French relations virtually impossible for a quarter of a century.

Bismarck, however, in the ten years 1875-1885, made many efforts to win French goodwill and induce the French to accept without reserve the settlement of 1871. He encouraged the French in the same way to an extension of their colonial power in other parts of Africa and in China. The recent publication of his private memoranda leaves no doubt that he hoped that, if France would turn her attention to colonial activities outside Europe, she would be more likely to forget Alsace-Lorraine.

In his instructions for the German Ambassador at Paris on July 16, 1881, he wrote:

"There is a wide field in the Mediterranean in which we can leave to the French a wholly free hand. It is not out of the question to hope that French policy in the end will come to see that a friendly German Empire with 45,000,000 inhabitants is more desirable and a stronger figure among French assets than a million Alsace-Lorrainers. France can be certain that we shall never oppose her justifiable policy of expansion in the Mediterranean and there is reason to believe that Russia also will take the same attitude as Germany."

In his irritation at England's dilatory action in regard to Southwest Africa and in his desire for a sincere rapprochement with France, he was willing to cooperate with the French in a conference on Egypt and other African colonial questions. By the fall of 1884, there was even talk of Franco-German naval cooperation which might grow into an alliance. But the French were suspicious of Bismarck's "Machiavellian motives." They suspected that he wished to embroil them with England.

The acceptance of the loss of Alsace and Lorraine as final and unquestioned was just what the French Ambassador always expressly refused:

“A nation, as regards the dismemberments which it has suffered, unless it courts with indifference the fate of Poland, ought never to pardon anything, never forget anything [ne doit jamais rien pardonner, jamais rien oublier]. I have never said a word to the German Chancellor which could encourage him in any illusions as to us. . . . To work for peace for the present and to reserve the future [pacifier le present, reserver l'avenir], such is the program which I have always had before my eyes. . . . At the beginning of our discussions I specified with Count Hatzfeldt and with the Chancellor himself that neither Alsace nor Lorraine should ever be a question between us, that here was a domain reserved on both sides where we ought to be forbidden to penetrate, because we could never meet in good agreement on it. I shall never speak of Alsace, I have said; and on your part, if you sincerely desire an understanding with us on various points, avoid drawing the sword over our wound, because the French nation will not remain in control of her feelings.”

The result was that the period of relative friendliness which had characterized Franco-German relations in the decade 1875-1885 came to an end and was succeeded by the tense relations of the Boulanger period. General Boulanger, who became Minister of War in the Freycinet Cabinet in January, 1886, speedily became for the French masses the symbol of military revival and the hope of revanche. For fifteen long and bitter years they had borne their isolation and humiliation. Now they listened eagerly to the man on horseback who declared in chauvinistic speeches and in his organ *La France M'Hit aire*: “We remember that they are waiting for us in Alsace and Lorraine.”

For the next fifteen months French Cabinets rose and fell, but public opinion always demanded that Boulanger be included among the Ministers. During this period he aimed to increase and strengthen the French army by every means. When a more cool-headed and responsible French statesman, like Rouvier, had the courage to constitute a Cabinet without Boulanger, in May, 1887, this only increased still further the General's popularity, and with it the peril to the internal and external peace of the country- He appeared before the ecstatic crowds on the Paris boulevards. By repeatedly standing for election to the Chamber of Deputies in the provinces, he gradually began to secure a national plebiscite in his favor. There were thousands who looked forward to the overthrow of the Republic which had been too yielding and conciliatory toward Germany and who hoped for a strong dictatorship.

French chauvinism was further stirred by the fiery speeches of Paul Deroulede, by the activities of the League of Patriots, and by the intemperate editorials of the greater part of the French Press. All these manifestations of French nationalism were duly reported to Bismarck at length by the German Military Attache in Paris.

The German Ambassador, Count Munster, however, sent moderate and more quieting reports as to conditions in France, though he admitted that there was an extraordinary outburst of revanche feeling among the people-. He believed, nevertheless, that it was artificially stimulated, and that at bottom the French people really did not want *la guerre sainte*. Bismarck, however, was not at all convinced of the accuracy of Munster's diagnosis of the French situation. He covered Munster's reports with question marks

and doubts. He scolded him for writing a letter direct to the Emperor, which Miinster thereupon agreed should not be delivered. Bismarck's distrust of France rested partly on his knowledge of French history and of the events of the Second Empire when Napoleon III had talked peace and yet had entered upon one war after another. A further reason why Bismarck was unwilling to accept Munster's optimistic views on France was the fact that he was preparing to lay before the Reichstag the Army Bill of 1887, which would considerably increase the size of the German army. French chauvinism was one of the best vote-getters possible for the bill.

So great was the suspense and war-talk on both sides of the Rhine that there developed in the spring of 1888 another war scare not unlike that of 1875. On January 11, 1888, Bismarck made the famous speech in the Reichstag in which, while increasing Germany's armaments, he still insisted that Germany had no intention of provoking a war with France or with Russia.

Boulanger's credit sank more rapidly than it had risen, and Franco-German tension became less strained. But it was during this period that the first steps took place which may be regarded as the beginnings of Franco-Russian rapprochement, which later was extended to include England and thus formed ultimately the Triple Entente.

7.3 The System of Secret Alliances 1890-1907

Franco-Russian Rapprochement 1887-1891

The Franco-Russian Entente of 1891, which ripened into the Alliance of 1894, was the natural result of the suspicions, the feeling of isolation, and the irritation against Germany which existed in both countries. A rapprochement between them, in spite of the fundamental contrast between the republican and absolutist forms of government at Paris and St. Petersburg, was the obvious counterbalance to the Triple Alliance.

Notwithstanding Bismarck's generous promises to Russia in the Alliance of the Three Emperors and the Reinsurance Treaty, Alexander III had been greatly irritated at the election of Ferdinand of Coburg as Prince of Bulgaria. Ferdinand had hesitated to accept the Bulgarian throne, or at least had pretended to hesitate, but had been secretly persuaded into final acceptance, so the Tsar believed, by a treacherous intrigue on Bismarck's part. Though Bismarck had alleged openly that Germany was not interested in Bulgaria and that Russia might have a free hand to do as she pleased there.

He could not reconcile Bismarck's assurances of disinterestedness in Constantinople and the Balkans with the despatch of German officers to drill the Turkish army and with the enthusiastic reception at the German maneuvers given to the Turkish general, Muktar Pasha. Like the French, he was suspicious and irritated at the publicly announced renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1887. As its terms were secret, he not unnaturally suspected that it might contain offensive designs on the part of Austria and Italy detrimental to

Russia's ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To all these grievances was added another. In the summer of 1887, Russia suddenly found that the ruble was falling in value and that there seemed to be a systematic campaign in Berlin against Russian securities. This was partly due to a ukase in May which naturally shook German faith in Russian credit: it forbade the acquisition or inheritance of landed property by foreigners in Western Russia, or their employment as managers of estates. As Germans owned much land in Russia and were largely employed in the management of estates, the ukase looked like an unjustifiable expropriation of property. This not unnaturally led to a German newspaper campaign against Russian credit. Though Bismarck may not have inspired these newspaper attacks, he at least looked upon them with approval as tending to make the Russians realize how dependent they were upon German good-will.

The Russians, however, suspected that Bismarck had inspired this press campaign and were therefore the more ready to yield to the Pan-Slav desire that Russia should borrow in Paris. France at the moment was looking for a field of investment, because commercial conflict with Italy had shut off the Italian market for French capital. ⁴ A group of French bankers was formed at Paris and began negotiations for a series of Russian loans to be floated in France. The first, amounting to 500,000,000 francs, was at last approved by the Governments on both sides and the bonds were listed on the Paris Bourse in December, 1888. The Russians were encouraged the next year to contract two more loans, one for 700,000,000, and the other for 1,200,000,000 francs. Both met with equal success. Thus France set out on the financial path which led further than she foresaw at the moment, and which inevitably made thousands of her citizens interested financially and politically in Russia's ambitions.

Occasionally saner minds in France took alarm, and the loans did not succeed so well, but for the most part Frenchmen were ready to give up an apparently unlimited amount of savings to invest at good profits in a country which might become an ally against the common enemy, and which might one day assist in the *revanche* which so many Frenchmen had in their hearts. On the financial ground thus prepared the next step was for France to supply Russia with guns. The Grand Duke Vladimir, Alexander III's brother, on a visit to Paris, was initiated into the reorganization of the army which Freycinet had been carrying out. Pie was greatly impressed with the new Lebel rifle. Upon request he was given a model of it. Negotiations followed, and ultimately a contract was arranged by which France was to manufacture for Russia half a million rifles similar to the Lebel weapon.

Neither William II nor his Foreign Office advisers supposed that "dropping the Pilot" and abandoning the Reinsurance Treaty would be followed by a Franco-Russian Alliance. But to lessen such a possibility, the Kaiser, with exaggerated views of his own personal influence in diplomacy, proceeded to return to the conciliatory policy toward France which Bismarck had pursued during and after the Congress of Berlin. He attempted to win French good-will by innumerable well-intentioned courtesies, by telegrams of congratu-

lation and condolence, by recognizing the French protectorate over Madagascar, and by diplomatic support in other colonial questions where no German interests were involved.

With Russia also the Kaiser sought to remain on the old friendly terms. He was profuse in assurances that German policy should suffer no change as a result of Bismarck's dismissal. In August, 1890, he visited the Tsar at Narva and relations seemed cordial between the monarchs as well as between Caprivi and Giers, though the latter failed in his further attempt to get some kind of a written agreement which should replace the Re-insurance Treaty. But in fact the Russians were becoming suspicious that Germany was drawing closer to England. The Treaty of June 14, 1890, by which Germany had given up claims to a great strip of African territory near Zanzibar in return for Heligoland, seemed to point in this direction.

The London Morning Fust announced that "the period of England's isolation is over." The Kaiser's visit to England in the summer of 1890 seemed a further sign of the way the wind was blowing. His allusion to the Triple Alliance at the opening of the Reichstag May 6, 1890, even though he spoke of it as a guarantee of universal peace, and his new Army Law increasing the German forces by some 18,000 men, were no less disturbing to the Russians than to the French.

The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894

Such was the situation which at last led the Russians to listen seriously to French feelers for closer relations. In view of the form ultimately given to the Franco-Russian Alliance and later to the Anglo-French military and naval arrangements, it is interesting to note that these first definite negotiations were carried on by the French and Russian military authorities and not by the regular diplomatic representatives. This was a first step toward an Entente Cordiale which, though no written agreements had as yet been signed, was soon regarded by the Russian Ambassador at Paris as being "as solid as granite."

It had been solidified by the Empress Frederick incident and by the growing Franco-Russian suspicion that England was adhering to the Triple Alliance to thwart Russian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was just at this time that the Triple Alliance was renewed, in spite of the efforts of the French to detach Italy and the hopes of both French and Russians that Bismarck's dismissal might cause it to weaken and lapse. It had not, however, been renewed without difficulty, owing to Italy's demands for promises of greater support in the maintenance of the status quo in North Africa. Austria and Germany had been forced to yield to some extent to Italy's wishes and even to agree to exert themselves to secure England's adhesion to this new stipulation. The fact that the Triple Alliance had been renewed was published to the world by the Italian Premier, Rudini, in a speech on June 29, 1891. At the same time he also took occasion to refer to Italy's existing agreements with England in such a way as to strengthen Franco-Russian suspicions that England had in some way joined the Triple Alliance.

Giers, fearful that the French might have aggressive designs for recovering Alsace-Lorraine, wished to make the agreement vague and to extend its application beyond Europe to such places as Africa and China where peace might be threatened. It was only after several weeks that the French were able to secure a written accord.

France, in constant dread of an attack from across the Rhine and with the secret hope of some day recovering the lost provinces, thought mainly of war with Germany. She did not at this time greatly desire Russian support in North Africa or China, because, as later events showed, she could always come to a compromise agreement with Italy and England in these regions. Nor did the French wish the Russians to open the Dardanelles and control Constantinople. Giers, on the other hand, felt no great hostility to Germany. He and Alexander III were still anxious to maintain the traditional friendship between the two countries. They did not want an alliance directed primarily against the Hohenzollerns and dreaded being drawn into a war against Germany in support of French *revanche*.

Owing to this divergence of interests, as well as to the sickness of Giers and the Tsar's persistent distrust of the French, it was many months before the French were able to give the Entente a more binding and practical form. Upon Giers' visit to Paris in November, 1891, Ribot pointed out to him the danger that Germany might make a sudden surprise attack, which would find Russia and France unprepared. They would not have time to take adequate measures of defense before an irrevocable disaster might overwhelm them, so long as they merely "agreed to come to an understanding." It would be far more valuable and practical to come to an understanding beforehand, in time of peace, as to all the military arrangements which should come into force instantly in case of sudden war.

In case of a sudden German aggression, Russia and France would instantly mobilize their whole forces and use them to secure the maximum mutual advantage in accordance with plans which would have been already agreed upon. Giers not enthusiastic, consented to lay the idea before the Tsar.²⁰ Accordingly General Miribel worked out the basis for such a Military Convention. He estimated in detail the total Triple Alliance forces (even including the Rumanian) at only 2,810,000 men as against 3,150,000 for the Franco-Russian coalition. France would throw five-sixths of her forces against Germany. Russia was likewise urged to concentrate her attack upon Germany rather than upon Austria:

"The essential thing is to aim at the destruction of the principal enemy. The defeat of the others will follow inevitably. In a word, once Germany is vanquished, the Franco-Russian armies will impose their wills on Italy and Austria."

The "Draft of a Military Convention" was signed by the French and Russian Chiefs of Staff, Boisdeffre and Obruchev, and approved in principle by the Tsar on August 17, 1892. The Tsar was very anxious that absolute secrecy should be preserved, and that the document should be known only to the President and Prime Minister of France. "I fear," he said, "that if they discuss it in the Cabinet, it will have the fatal result of becoming public, and then, as far as I am concerned, the treaty is nullified."

Meanwhile, certain events took place which tended to lessen the Tsar's scruples and his distrust of France, and to increase his readiness to accept at last a binding agreement. A new German Army Law of 1892 increased the German forces by 60,000 men but reduced the term of service in the infantry from three to two years. No settlement had been reached in regard to a Russo-German commercial treaty and a tariff war was being waged between the two countries.

The Siam crisis of July, 1893, which brought France and England closer to war than was realized at the time, showed that the French were ready to take a stiff tone toward England, even in Asia, in a way which Russia liked to see, especially as England seemed to be drawing closer to the Triple Alliance. As a result, Alexander III consented to return the Kronstadt compliments by having the Russian Navy visit Toulon in October, 1893. The Russian officers and men were feted with extraordinary enthusiasm by the French both at Toulon and Paris. But the Paris Press, at a wise hint from the French Government, refrained from chauvinistic editorials and implications that a Russian alliance would aid in regaining Alsace-Lorraine. The Tsar was favorably impressed with the moderation and strength of the French Government. He accordingly gave his approval to an exchange of official diplomatic notes which was completed on January 4, 1894, and gave binding effect to the Military Convention of August 17, 1892.

As neither the exchange of notes nor the Military Convention signed only by military officers was a formal treaty, neither had to be submitted to the French Parliament for ratification. The terms of the Military Convention, known only to the supreme military officials, did not even have to be divulged to Cabinets which rose and fell so rapidly in France. The Military Convention which was given the force of a treaty on January 4, 1894, and thus became the basis of the very secret Franco-Russian Alliance:

"France and Russia, animated by a common desire to preserve the peace, and having no other aim than to prepare for the necessities of a defensive war, provoked against either of them by an attack by the forces of the Triple Alliance, have agreed upon the following provisions:

"1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany. "If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany.

"2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance or of one of the Powers which compose it should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first indication of the event, and without a previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously, and shall transport them as near to the frontiers as possible.

"3. The forces available which must be employed against Germany shall be for France, 1,300,000 men; for Russia, from 700,000 to 800,000 men. These forces shall begin complete action with all speed, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time in the east and in the west.

The Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, like the Austro- German Alliance of 1879 and the Triple Alliance of 1882, was in its origin essentially defensive in purpose. It was not until much later, in the days of Delcasse, Izvolski, and Poincare, that the Franco-Russian Alliance was essentially changed in spirit from a defensive to a potentially offensive combination.

Mobilization means War

To be sure, the Alliance embodied from the outset the militarist doctrine, prevalent since the Napoleonic Wars, that the best military defensive is to wage offensive war. Mobilization by Germany was to be followed by the instant mobilization of the French and Russian armies. Mobilization was expressly understood as being equivalent to war to the actual opening of hostilities. In the negotiations for the Military Convention in July, 1892,

“General Obruchev emphasized finally the necessity of the immediate and simultaneous mobilization of the Russian and French armies at the first news received by either of the two countries of a mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance. He understands further that this mobilization of France and Russia would be followed immediately by positive results, by acts of war, in a word would be inseparable from an 'aggression.'”

Similarly, General Boisdeffre, in talking with the Tsar the day after the Military Convention had been approved remarked:

“The mobilization is the declaration of war. To mobilize is to oblige one's neighbor to do the same. Mobilization involves the carrying out of strategic transportation and concentration. Otherwise, to leave a million men on one's frontier, without doing the same simultaneously, is to deprive oneself of all possibility of moving later; it is placing oneself in the situation of an individual who, with a pistol in his pocket, should let his neighbor put a weapon to his forehead without drawing his own.” [To which Alexander III replied], “That is exactly the way I understand it.”

Thus, the nation to start general mobilization first is completely aware of the fact that war can not be avoided, war has become inevitable. This includes the fact that mobilization must be done as secretly as possible. Should the enemy nation notice ongoing foreign mobilization plans, it must therefore strike swiftly to counter the first mobilization to gain the upper hand. This “offensive-defensive” character of the Alliance is further seen in the technical arrangements which were worked out annually later in great detail by the French and Russian General Staffs. On the generally accepted principle that the best form of defensive warfare is to take the offensive against the main enemy force, the French and Russian Staffs were “perfectly in accord on the point that the defeat of the German armies continues to be, whatever the circumstances, the first and principal objective of the Allied armies.

Though the Franco-Russian Alliance aimed primarily at crushing Germany in case the

latter should attempt an aggression, it did not at first arouse serious suspicions or antagonism beyond the Rhine. This was partly because its existence was kept so secret that for months after its establishment the German Ambassador in Paris optimistically refused to believe in its existence. Even after the open references to the "Alliance," in speeches in the French chamber in 1895, or during the visits of Nicholas II to Paris in 1896 and of President Faure to Russia in 1897, Germany was not alarmed, because she felt that the Triple Alliance was still equal in strength to the new combination.

In this sense the Franco-Russian Alliance at first tended to secure the peace of Europe; also in the sense of the proverb that "one sword holds another in its sheath."

This situation of more or less equilibrium on the Continent even led to a series of temporary diplomatic combinations in which Germany cooperated with Russia and France. In 1894, Germany and France joined hands in preventing England from acquiring a strip of Congo territory for the Cape-to-Cairo Railway. In 1895, Germany cooperated with France and Russia to compel Japan to restore part of the conquests taken from China. In 1900, Russia proposed that the same three Powers should try to mediate between England and the Boers. Germany did not wish to antagonize England by such a step, but consented to discuss it. Quite possibly the three Powers might have attempted it, had not France been unwilling to enter into an arrangement with Germany which would have involved a mutual guarantee of territories, and consequently a second renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine.

In this same year also German, French, Russian and English troops marched side by side to suppress the Boxer revolt. When the Tsar's proposal for the First Hague Conference—well meant but naive for those times—took Europe by surprise, Germany and France, and even many of Russia's own officials, joined efforts to restrict the scope of the Conference as much as possible without incurring the odium of seeming to sabotage the Tsar's proposals. Nothing sums up dozens of despatches on this topic better than the confidence which Delcasse is reported to have made to the German Ambassador in Paris:

"Our [French] interests in regard to the Conference are exactly the same as yours. You do not want to limit your power of defense at this moment nor enter upon disarmament proposals; we are in exactly the same position. We both want to spare the Tsar and find a formula for sidestepping this question, but not let ourselves in for anything which would weaken our respective powers of defense. To prevent a complete fiasco, we might possibly make some concessions in regard to arbitration, but these must in no way limit the complete independence of the Great Powers. Besides the Tsar, we must also spare the public opinion of Europe, since this has been aroused by the senseless step of the Russians."

During the decade 1894 to 1904, two changes occurred which tended ultimately to destroy this equilibrium. They are of the greatest importance in the development of the system of secret alliances, England's exchange of splendid isolation for an Entente Cordiale with France, and Italy's dubious loyalty toward her Allies.

England at the Parting of the Ways 1890-1898

England's traditional policy, generally speaking, had for centuries been one of "splendid isolation." By keeping her "hands free," she could enjoy the Balance of Power in Europe between the Continental groups and make English influence in either scale decisive. It was only at times when some one Power sought to become overwhelmingly strong, or threatened to endanger British control of the Channel and her maritime supremacy, that England intervened actively and decisively in European politics. In the years following the Franco-Prussian War, England still adhered to her traditional policy. Three times Bismarck sounded her as to an alliance with Germany—in September, 1879, in November, 1887, and in January, 1889,—but in all cases Bismarck's "feelers" came to nothing, partly because Lord Salisbury feared that he could not get Parliamentary approval for such a policy.

But at about the time of the formation of the Franco- Russian Alliance England appeared to have come to the parting of the ways. Isolation, though splendid, was not always safe or comfortable. Though a match upon the seas for either of the allied groups on the Continent, England was in danger of meeting unpleasant diplomatic defeats, if Germany and France, or Germany and Russia, coalesced against her. By her dangerously weak position in Egypt, England was continually exposed to the more or less united opposition of all the Continental Powers. Egypt was like a noose around the British neck, which any Great Power could tighten when it wanted to squeeze a diplomatic concession from the Mistress of the Seas—as France threatened to do in connection with the Siam controversy, and as Germany was felt to have done in connection with railway concessions in Turkey.

Such incidents exposed the hollowness of the phrase "splendid isolation." As Lord Grey truly says, speaking of his first Foreign Office experiences in 1892-1895, there was "the constant friction, rising on the slightest provocation to quarrel and hostility, between Great Britain and France or Russia. Some such considerations as these gradually led English statesmen to the decision that "splendid isolation" was no longer possible. In 1895, Lord Salisbury indicated the changed British attitude by hinting to Germany that the time had come to partition Turkey. Though England had formerly pursued the policy of bolstering up a decrepit Turkish Empire, Salisbury had now at last come to the conclusion that this was a hopeless task. He had been betting on the wrong horse. Turkey might as well be carved up, or at least the slices had better be provisionally assigned in case the Ottoman Empire should finally go to pieces.

The Sultan's misgovernment had steadily weakened Turkey; the Christian populations under Turkish oppression were becoming more and more restless; and the frightful massacres of Armenians, with the more or less tacit approval and connivance of Abdul Hamid, had shocked and roused Europe. Lord Salisbury's proposal was to the effect that in partitioning Turkey, Egypt should go to England, Tripoli to Italy, Salonica to Austria, and Constantinople or the control of the Straits to Russia. Such a partition, based on friendly agreement beforehand and securing a fair share to each of the three Great Powers, might

conceivably have gone a long way toward solving the Near Eastern Question, if the great difficulties connected with it could have been overcome.

Unfortunately, Berlin failed to take up Salisbury's suggestion. Marschall and Holstein, who at this time largely determined German policy, were excessively suspicious. They foresaw that France and Italy would be difficult to satisfy. Moreover, what should Germany receive? They feared that an attempt to partition Turkey would give rise to more problems than it settled, and might even involve the Powers in war. They suspected that Salisbury's proposal was intended to sow discord between Russia and the Triple Alliance, so that England would have an opportunity to fish in troubled waters. Accordingly, when Salisbury renewed his suggestion directly to the Kaiser a month later at Cowes, where William was attending the English yachting races, the Kaiser gave a cool reply; he said he believed it was best to attempt to sustain Turkey, and to force proper reforms for the protection of the Sultan's Christian subjects. Thereupon Lord Salisbury let the matter drop.

By 1898 the political situation made still more evident to the British Cabinet the advisability of abandoning the isolation policy. In Central Africa friction with France over the Niger boundary was acute; France also was extending her power eastward toward the Upper Nile; and Major Marchand, leading an exploring expedition toward the Sudan, had not yet been checked by Kitchener at Fashoda. In South Africa English friction with the Boers had been steadily increasing, and was to break out some months later in the most humiliating and costly war which England had ever fought. The Kruger Telegram had shown the lively interest which the Kaiser and his subjects took in the Boers, and the desirability therefore of putting an end to any possible support, either secret or open, which Germany might be inclined to give to the South African Republics. Finally, in the Far East, Germany had just secured the lease of a naval base at Kiauchau; Russia was getting an economic grasp on Manchuria through the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway; and by the lease of Port Arthur she would have a foothold which would menace Peking and seriously jeopardize Britain's naval and commercial predominance in the Far East. The English Press was clamoring to know how the Cabinet would stop Russia.

Alliance Proposals to Germany 1898-1901

Under these circumstances the British first turned to Russia. On January 19, 1898, they proposed to the Tsar an entente which should put an end to all the long-standing sources of friction between the Bear and the Lion. The idea was to harmonize British and Russian policy in the two decaying empires of China and Turkey, instead of being constantly opposed. But the Tsar and his shifty ambitious Ministers did not receive the proposal in a way to inspire confidence or to encourage the British to proceed with it. Thereupon Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, was allowed to try his hand at making an alliance with Germany.

On March 29, 1898, while Lord Salisbury was absent in France for his health, Count

Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, was asked to dinner with Mr. Chamberlain at Alfred Rothschild's house. Chamberlain there declared quite frankly that England had decided to abandon her isolation policy. England and Germany, he admitted, had many petty points of friction in colonial matters, but no great fundamentally opposing interests. He therefore suggested an Anglo-German defensive alliance. He hinted that if England did not succeed in making an alliance with Germany, which was the more natural for her, she might turn toward France and Russia.

There was no reason to doubt that Chamberlain was sincerely seeking to open negotiations which should lead to an alliance. To have succeeded would have been a great feather in his cap. But other members of the Cabinet, like Lord Salisbury and Balfour, not to mention the Prince of Wales, who were all more Francophil, were less enthusiastic. They were not unwilling to see his efforts fail. Chamberlain's offer was received in Berlin with the same suspiciousness as the proposed partition of Turkey three years earlier.

In this connection the Kaiser took a step which reveals the lack of honesty which he sometimes displayed in his attempts to manage German foreign policy. Without consulting his Ministers, and in spite of the fact that the Chamberlain proposals had been strictly confidential, he wrote to the Tsar on May 30, 1898, saying that England had thrice within the last few weeks asked for an alliance, making enormous offers which opened a brilliant future for Germany, and begging for a quick reply. Before answering the British, the Kaiser added, he wanted to tell "Nicky" of this, since it was a life and death matter. Such an alliance would evidently be directed against Russia. "Now I ask you, as my old and trusted friend, to tell me what you can offer me, and what you will do for me if I refuse the British offers."

This letter was a gross exaggeration, because no "enormous offers" had been made by England. The Kaiser was deliberately attempting by his exaggeration to bid Russia and England up against one another, and to use Chamberlain's offer to sow discord between Russia and England. What he wanted to secure from Nicky was Russian cooperation for bringing France into a Continental League, which should draw together the Triple and Dual Alliance, and thus make a strong group of the five great European Powers. This idea of a Continental League continually hovered before his imagination for years. By it he hoped to secure the peace of Europe. If Russia could bring the French into such a combination, France would be expected to give up the thought of revenge and the hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. This would remove one of the fundamental sources of danger to the peace of Europe. Furthermore, such a Continental League could be effectively used to check England's excessive colonial pretensions in Africa and Asia, and eventually, perhaps, after the growth of the German navy, to place a check on England's supremacy on the seas.

The Tsar, however, did not allow himself to be fooled by the Kaiser into making any commitments. But he replied at once on June 3, 1898:

Three months ago, in the midst of our negotiations with China, England handed us

over a memorandum containing many tempting proposals trying to induce us to come to a full agreement upon all the points in which our interests collided with her's. These proposals were of such a new character, that I must say, we were quite amazed and yet, their very nature seemed suspicious to us; never before had England made such offers to Russia. Without thinking twice over it, their proposals were refused. You must of course decide what is best and most necessary for your country. Germany and Russia have lived in peace since old times, as good neighbours, and God grant! that they may continue so, in close and loyal friendship. . . . I thank you once more for writing to me at such a grave moment for you! God bless you my dearest Willy. Believe me ever your loving cousin and trusting friend, Nicky.

This news of "amazing" British offers to Russia, made just before Chamberlain's proposals, made the Kaiser naturally suspect that "perfidious Albion" was trying to play Germany and Russia off against one another, and sow discord between them. It confirmed him in his temperamental suspiciousness of British good faith. So the Chamberlain proposal of March, 1898, was not grasped by Germany, and came to nothing. Though the German rejection of the Chamberlain proposals was one of the most momentous factors in shaping the fatal course of events in the following years, only a word can be said about them here.

In November, 1899, a few weeks after the outbreak of the Boer War and the consequent anti-English outburst all over the Continent, the Kaiser and Bulow visited England. Chamberlain seized upon the occasion for long talks with both. He suggested closer relations between England, Germany, and the United States. The detailed notes which Bulow made of the conversations do not indicate that he gave Chamberlain much encouragement to think that Germany would abandon the relatively favorable position which she then enjoyed in exchange for the risk of an alliance with England. Nevertheless a few days later, in a famous speech at Leicester, the English Colonial Secretary spoke glowingly of the community of German and British interests, and publicly proposed an alliance: "At bottom, the character of the Teutonic race differs very slightly indeed from the character of the Anglo-Saxon race. If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world."

But the poisonous effects of the Boer War were already at work. German, as well as French and Russian, newspapers were attacking England violently. Germans, as Bulow himself noted, were more stirred up about the Boer War than the English themselves; the anti-English feeling in Germany was stronger than the anti-German feeling in England. In view of this Anglophobia, Bulow did not have the courage, speaking in the Reichstag on December 11 in favor of the German Navy Law, to take up sympathetically Chamberlain's Leicester proposal. On the contrary, he poured cold water on it, as being quite unnecessary for Germany. It was a rude rebuff to England. Moreover, if it be true, as Chamberlain told Eckardstein, that he had made his Leicester speech at Bulow's own

suggestion, and with the expectation that it would find a friendly echo across the North Sea, Bulow's Reichstag speech was a treacherous act greatly resented by Chamberlain. At any rate, the British Foreign Office became more suspicious of the Wilhelmstrasse,—a suspicion which was now beginning to be further fostered by Tirpitz's plans for building up the German navy.

Nevertheless, in 1901, after the Kaiser's much appreciated visit to Osborne at the news that Queen Victoria was dying, Chamberlain again opened negotiations for a defensive alliance between England and Germany, or even between England, Germany and Japan. England still had her hands tied in South Africa where the Boers were resisting with dogged determination. In the Far East, following the suppression of the Boxer Revolt, English friction with Russia had reached an acute stage, because the Tsar's forces would not evacuate Chinese territory. Under these circumstances, a German alliance would have afforded a valuable support to Great Britain. But for this very reason Germany was not at all anxious to commit herself. The negotiations, which were taken over by Lord Lansdowne, dragged on through the year. They were finally dropped in December, 1901, because the British Cabinet felt unable to meet Germany's conditions that the treaty should include the Triple Alliance and that it should be approved by the British Parliament. Whether such approval could have been secured was, in fact, very doubtful.

From a variety of reasons, Holstein, Bulow, and the Kaiser failed to take advantage of the English offers. They held off in the hope of getting better terms—and got nothing. They let slip the golden moments which were never to return. The English, failing finally to arrange an alliance with Germany, turned elsewhere. In 1902 they signed with Japan the well-known alliance which protected their mutual interests in the Far East. In 1904 they signed with France the treaties which were the first step in the formation of the Triple Entente.

Italy's dubious Loyalty to her Allies

Italy, like Germany, had been occupied so long establishing her own national unity that she came late into the race for colonial possessions. But if she were to play the part of a Great Power in Europe, and find an outlet for her rapidly increasing population, she felt that she too must acquire colonies. She had naturally cast her eyes on Tunis, But the French had stepped in ahead of her. She had then sought alliance with Germany and Austria in the hope of getting their support. Bismarck, however, was not at first inclined to allow the Triple Alliance to be exploited for Italy's colonial ambitions. But in 1857, when the Boulanger crisis in France and the Bulgarian situation in the Balkans cast heavy clouds over Europe, Italy was able to extort, as the price of her renewal of the Triple Alliance, new clauses looking toward future acquisitions in North Africa, the Balkans, and the Eastern Mediterranean. As Germany's interests were not identical with those of Austria in the Balkans, and as Austria was unwilling to commit herself in regard to Italy's North African ambitions, it was decided that these matters should be dealt with in

separate treaties to be signed by Austria and Italy, and by Germany and Italy, on February 20, 1887, the same day that the Triple Alliance Treaty of 1882 was renewed.

In 1891, at the third renewal of the Triple Alliance, Italy made a number of new requests, but the only one which was finally conceded to her was an extension of Germany's obligation to support her in North Africa. Germany and Italy engaged to exert themselves for the maintenance of the status quo in Cyrenaica, Tripoli and Tunis. But, "if unfortunately, as a result of a mature examination of the situation, Germany and Italy should both recognize that the maintenance of the status quo has become impossible, Germany engages, after a formal and previous agreement, to support Italy in any action in the form of occupation or other taking of guaranty which the latter should undertake in these same regions with a view to an interest of equilibrium and of legitimate compensation." In such an eventuality both Powers would seek to place themselves likewise in agreement with England.

This opened the door, as the Italians hoped, to a possible annexation of North African territory. But Germany still hoped to be able to restrain Italy from African adventures which might antagonize England, France or Turkey. The Italians, however, were bitterly disillusioned in their hopes that these treaty arrangements would speedily enable them to acquire Tripoli. The following years were filled with demands and reproaches toward her allies, which became louder as the Abyssinian adventure went from bad to worse. Italy complained that he was being browbeaten by France, threatened by Russian intrigues in the Near East and in Abyssinia, and neglected by England—and that for all this Germany and the Triple Alliance were to blame. The French, were dominated by the thought of getting back Alsace-Lorraine, and had warned to expect no concessions from them as long as Italy remained in the Triple Alliance; on the contrary they would "aim to make life as sour as possible for him."

By the Franco-Italian Tunis Convention of 1896, Italy at last virtually recognized the French protectorate in Tunis and received in return certain political and commercial privileges. The next year, the Italian Crown Prince, Victor Emmanuel and his Montenegrin bride, visited Paris, and the fetes in their honor tended to draw the two Latin nations together. Two years later Franco-Italian commercial treaty put an end to the long tariff war which had had a ruinous effect on the trade between the two countries and had caused great bitterness.

The growing intimacy between France and Italy was now emphasized outwardly in every possible manner. President Loubet bestowed upon Victor Emmanuel the Grand Cross of the French Legion of Honor. The Italian fleet visited Toulon and was received with demonstrations of friendship which recalled the visit of the Russian fleet at the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance. On December 14, 1901, Prinetti, who was decidedly Francophil, revealed in the Italian Chamber of Deputies the existence of the secret Franco-Italian accord made twelve months before by Visconti-Venosta and Barrere. At the same time he protested profusely to the German and Austrian ambassadors that Italy was thoroughly loyal to the Triple Alliance, though he admitted it had been an act of disloyalty

on his predecessor's part not to inform Italy's allies at once of the exchange of notes with France. He tried to excuse it by alleging that he had supposed Visconti-Venosta had already notified Germany and Austria of it.

Germany feared that Italy might proceed to the annexation of Tripoli, thus antagonizing Turkey and jeopardizing German interests in the Near East, also giving a warning to Italy by remarking further that the Triple Alliance was "not a business concern for making gains, but an insurance company."

Italy, however, did not heed the warning. While carrying on negotiations for the renewal of the Triple Alliance, she at the same time listened to the wooing of Barrere, who was determined to secure a promise from Italy that she would not attack France and would give up any military conventions or other treaty obligations which might compel her to join in a German aggression against France. And in fact on June 4, 1902, several weeks before the renewal of the Triple Alliance, Prinetti secretly assured Delcasse that it contained nothing either directly or indirectly aggressive toward France. Though he stipulated that "this communication is destined to remain secret," Delcasse soon announced its substance in the French Chamber of Deputies.

Delcasse was not yet satisfied. He wanted to get from Prinetti a signed document which would bind Italy to observe strict neutrality in case France should take the initiative in declaring a war to which she had been provoked. Accordingly, by an exchange of notes between Prinetti and Barrere on November 1, 1902, it was mutually agreed:

"In case France [Italy] should be the object of a direct or indirect aggression on the part of one or more Powers, Italy [France] will maintain a strict neutrality. "The same shall hold good in case France [Italy], as the result of a direct provocation, should find herself compelled, in defense of her honor or her security, to take the initiative of a declaration of war. In that eventuality, the Government of the Republic [the Royal Government] shall previously communicate its intention to the Royal Government [the Government of the Republic], which will thus be enabled to determine whether there is really a case of direct provocation."

Practically this meant that Italy was now no longer a loyal member of the Triple Alliance. M. Poincare shrewdly summed up the real situation when he told Izvolski in December, 1912, that "neither the Triple-Entente nor the Triple Alliance can count on the loyalty of Italy; the Italian Government will employ all its efforts to preserve the peace; and in case of war, it will begin by adopting a waiting attitude and will finally join the camp toward which victory will incline." Henceforth Italy had a foot in both camps and could jump in either direction, though she was not wholly trusted by either her old ally or her new friend.

In the fall of 1903, shortly before Germany was surprised by the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente which threatened to draw Italy further to the side of these two Mediterranean Powers, she began to fear more seriously that Italy's "extra dance" might develop into an elopement after all. In April, 1904, the Triple Alliance was passed over in dead

silence by Italy.

Deputies on March 8, 1906, Sonnino attempted to explain Italy's double policy, saying: "Loyal from our heart to the Triple Alliance, we shall maintain the traditions of intimacy with England and our honest friendship with France." On this the German Emperor commented significantly:

"'No one can serve two masters,' it says in the Bible; certainly therefore not three masters! France, England and the Triple Alliance, that is wholly out of the question! It will turn out that Italy stands in the British-French group! We shall do well to reckon with this, and write this 'ally' off as smokej'

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904

M. Delcasse, who became French Minister of Foreign Affairs in June, 1898, is said to have declared that the first object of his policy would be to secure a rapprochement with England. If France were to expand her colonial empire and some day recover Alsace-Lorraine, the age-long hostility with England must be ended. Delcasse therefore took steps toward a reconciliation with "perfidious Albion." He approved a treaty settling a long-standing dispute as to Anglo-French boundaries in the Niger Valley. A few months later, in the face of Kitchener's troops and in defiance of traditional French feelings, lie had yielded to the British at Fashoda. On March 21, 1899, lie reached an agreement with England delimiting French and English spheres of influence in the region between the Upper Nile and the Congo. He had done what he could to open the way for better Anglo-French relations.

But public opinion in the two countries was still hostile. It was further aggravated by the Boer War. To overcome this was part of the work of Sir Thomas Barclay. Looking at the two countries from a commercial rather than a diplomatic point of view, he secured the approval of Salisbury and Delcasse for a visit to Paris of British Chambers of Commerce in 1900. The banquet of 800 at which he presided proved an encouraging success. This was the year of the great Paris Exposition, and thousands of other British visitors flocked to the French capital. These visits were followed by delegations of French Chambers of Commerce to England, and by a similar exchange of visits by members of Parliament and their wives.

With the ground thus prepared, Sir Thomas Barclay began to agitate for the conclusion of an Anglo-French Treaty of Arbitration, which should remove possible causes of friction and place the future of the two countries beyond the dangerous reach of popular emotions. Such a treaty, referring to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal all disputes between the two countries (except those touching vital interests, honor, or independence), was finally signed on October 14, 1903.

Meanwhile, the death of Queen Victoria in 1901, and the retirement of Lord Salisbury in 1902, opened the way for two men who were more enthusiastic than their predecessors for

closer relations with France—Edward VII and Lord Lansdowne. The new King, Edward VII, had spent much of his time as Prince of Wales in Paris or on the Riviera. He spoke French with perfect ease, had formed many warm attachments in France, and had a strong liking for the people as a nation. In the spring of 1903, on his own initiative, he paid to Paris his first formal visit as King, and was delighted by his reception.

The most important convention between the two nations was that by which France at last gave the English a free hand in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. Egypt for more than a quarter of a century had been one of the most acute sources of friction between Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. It had been the Achilles heel of British foreign policy. All the Great Powers had certain political and financial rights in Egypt which continually hampered England's freedom of action and threatened the efficiency of Egyptian administration.

England's new freedom of action was embodied in a Khedivial Decree which England speedily notified formally to the Powers and to which she secured their assent. Egypt was no longer a vulnerable point in English diplomacy. Within six months, as Kuhlmann wrote from Tangiers, "The Egyptian question is dead, but the Moroccan question is very much alive." Morocco, on the other hand, was pregnant with trouble for France and was soon to become a diplomatic nightmare for all Europe. At the close of the nineteenth century it was virtually an independent country of some four or five million inhabitants—Arabs, Berbers, Jews, negroes and others—under the nominal rule of a Sultan at Fez. But this rule was a shaky one. There were continual uprisings from hostile tribes, or from rival claimants to the Umbrella, which was the symbol of sovereignty in that sunny land.

As a result of these turbulent conditions, the thirteen Powers, including the United States, who had once cooperated to suppress the Barbary Pirates, signed with the Sultan of Morocco in 1880 the Convention of Madrid. This provided for the proper protection of foreigners in Morocco and promised the most-favored-nation treatment to all the Signatory Powers. The two European countries which were most directly interested in Morocco, because of geographical propinquity and historic associations, were Spain and France.

Spain had inherited or conquered during the sixteenth century a number of settlements on the North coast, between the Straits of Gibraltar on the West, and the French territory of Algeria on the East. These, however, were separated from the Moroccan interior by the line of Riff Mountains, so that Spain did not aspire to acquire any of the Moroccan hinterland. If a partition of Morocco was to take place, Spain merely wished to be assured of the Mediterranean coastal strip and of some seaports on the Atlantic coast opposite the Canary Islands for their protection. France, though further removed from Morocco geographically, had in reality a closer and more vital interest in the country. Beginning in 1830, she had gradually built up a great colony in Algeria, or, to speak more correctly, had extended France into Algeria, for Algeria was not a colony in the ordinary sense of the word. It was divided into departments like France, was represented in the French

Chamber of Deputies, and persons born in Algeria enjoyed all the full rights of French citizens. As the French extended their control southward toward the Sahara, there was no effective natural boundary separating their territories from those of the Sultan of Morocco.

But Italy, England, and Germany also had political, as well as commercial, interests in Morocco. Italy, being without colonies, cast her eyes covetously toward Morocco, especially after the French had stepped into Tunis ahead of her. But in 1900 France bought off Italy's claims by the secret promise not to oppose Italian aspirations to Tripoli. England, possessing one of the Pillars of Hercules at Gibraltar, was determined that the other Pillar at Ceuta must never come into the hands of a strong European Power like France; otherwise the English navy and English commerce would lose that vital control of the entrance to the Mediterranean, which Gibraltar had assured to her for two centuries. Ceuta belonged to Spain, but Spain was so weak, especially after the Spanish-American War, that England was content to have her retain it ; she had no fear that Spain would ever dispute British control of the Straits.

Germany was chiefly interested in preserving and extending her rapidly growing commercial interests in Morocco. Some Germans, including some Foreign Office personages, wanted a German colony in West Morocco which would open new markets for German goods, afford a much needed source for iron ore, and offer a convenient coaling station and naval base for the German fleet in the Atlantic. But the Kaiser was opposed to pressing this, for fear of antagonizing England and France. The future of Morocco therefore became one of the most lively subjects of secret discussion among the diplomats of Europe.

Mr. Joseph Chamberlain broached the question very privately to the German Ambassador on November 3, 1899, suggesting a secret convention: Germany was to renounce all claims to the Mediterranean coasts of Morocco, including Tangier; in return, "England could make Germany the most extensive concessions on the Atlantic coast." Chamberlain, however, wanted the matter kept secret for the present from his Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury. Bulow was interested in the suggestion, and it was discussed behind Lord Salisbury's back by the Kaiser on his visit to England a few weeks later. But the Kaiser, foreshadowing the consistent attitude he adopted in the following years, had no great desire for German territorial acquisitions on the West coast or anywhere else in Morocco. "He himself had never had great interest in this question," he told Eckardstein, "and he had never understood why Germans placed such interest in it."

In spite of recurring rumors of possible Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements contemplating a possible partition of Morocco, Bulow maintained this attitude of "wait and see" for nearly three years. Then, on March 16, 1904, he received a telegram from the Kaiser, recounting a visit to King Alfonso at Vigo. William II had congratulated the Spanish King upon the rumored Franco-Spanish arrangements for a partition of Morocco, and had declared that Germany wished no territorial acquisitions; Germany wanted only the safeguarding of her commercial interest. This declaration of German disinterestedness

in Moroccan territory caused some dismay to Bulow and his Foreign Office colleagues, who had been inclined to think Germany might well secure some share of the disintegrating Sherifian Empire. But the Kaiser's declaration tied their hands. In spite of the clamorings of Pan-Germans on the one hand, and of Anglo-French suspicions on the other, the Kaiser's declaration laid down one of the guiding principles of German Moroccan policy in the following years.

He knew that Anglo-French negotiations concerning Morocco were on the point of being signed, and wisely decided that sending a ship to Tangier just at this moment would arouse suspicion as to the genuineness of his Vigo declaration of Germany's territorial disinterestedness. He believed that,

“forceful pressure by Germany against Morocco ought to be considered only after our grievances against Morocco have been brought fully with the facts to the knowledge of the three Powers most interested in Morocco [England France and Spain]. It could then be pointed out that remedial measures against the attitude of the Moroccan Government lay in the interests, not of Germany alone, but of all Europeans, and that Germany would gladly have the support and cooperation of the three aforesaid Powers in restoring by proper measures the injured prestige of Europeans in Morocco.”

Accordingly, in spite of arguments by Bulow, Lichnowsky, and German officials in Morocco, the Kaiser's decision prevailed and no German naval demonstration took place. But the Kaiser's hope that disorders in Morocco could be dealt with through the friendly cooperation of all the Powers most directly concerned was vain.

At this very moment, Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, were signing the famous Anglo-French Convention of April 8, 1904, concerning Egypt and Morocco which has been indicated above. Its “Public Articles” disclaimed, of course, any intention of altering the political status of Morocco, but at the same time “recognized that it appertained particularly to France to preserve order there.” Important “Secret Articles,” however, contemplated an eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain:

Art. II. [England has no present intention of proposing changes in Egypt, but, in case she should consider it desirable to introduce reforms, France] will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Art. III. The two governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other presidios should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain and the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain. Nevertheless, Spain would . . . have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

is curious to note how casually Viscount Grey and M. Poincare speak of these secret articles contemplating the partition of Morocco and seek to minimize their importance. Grey says the agreement with France "was all made public except a clause or two of no importance." It is characteristic of his psychology that when he has to deal with something disagreeable or repugnant, which does not fit in with his conception of things, he rationalizes it into thinking it "of no importance." M. Poincare likewise speaks of the secret Moroccan arrangement as destined to remain "temporarily" secret.

Upon the announcement of the public articles, the Spanish professed to be furious: they had not been consulted; they had been treated as quite negligible; this humiliation endangered their dynasty; with clenched fists (prudently kept in his pocket), the Spanish Ambassador declared to Delcasse that "this Anglo-French Convention will have serious consequences and involve unforeseeable complications." By the Franco-Spanish Moroccan Convention of October 3, 1904, in secret articles, Spain gave her approval to the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, and both France and Spain piously declared that they would remain firmly committed to the integrity of the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan. But secret articles, which of course were communicated to Lord Lansdowne, frankly contemplated quite the opposite. — In delimiting the spheres of influence, the Spanish were to be given the northern coastal strip on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and the French were to have the vast hinterland. The boundaries were virtually identical with those which were actually adopted for the French and Spanish protectorates which were arranged by M. Poincare in 1912.

It has been asserted by a German historian, that the German Government in some unofficial way speedily became informed of the secret articles, and saw in them an evidence of the hostile feeling which France had nurtured against her ever since 1870. Germany correctly suspected that there was more to the Anglo-French agreements than met the eye in the published articles. But though not without suspicions as to the fate awaiting Morocco, Bulow and Holstein seem chiefly to have suspected that France and England had made some secret deal in regard to the partition of China, or had entered into some sort of an alliance aimed against Germany.

England having decided to abandon splendid isolation and having failed to receive a satisfactory response from Germany to Chamberlain's alliance feelers, England naturally turned to France. In view of the growing friction between Russia and Japan, ending in the outbreak of war between the two in February, 1904, and the fact that England was allied to Japan, and France to Russia, it was important to establish cordial relations with France to prevent the Russo-Japanese War from involving England and France against one another. England desired to avoid the danger of having the war in the Far East spread to Europe. England sincerely desired to wipe off the slate the numerous causes of friction which had so frequently brought her to the verge of war with France in the past.

On the French side the motives were in part somewhat the same. The French were determined to avoid being involved in war on account of the ambitions of her Russian ally in the Far East. They wished to end the longstanding friction with England. "They

desired freedom of action in Morocco. And they hoped to secure England as a friend, or possibly as an ally, in order to build up a combination of Powers, equal to, or stronger than, the Triple Alliance. France had come painfully to realize that her alliance with Russia was of less value than she had anticipated, at the time of its formation, that it would be. Russia had given her little or no support at Fashoda and on other critical occasions, and now she appeared to be so involved in the Far East as to be of little support to France in case of a Franco-German war.

By 1904 Delcasse had thus bought off the Moroccan claims of Italy and England, by promising these countries a free hand in Tripoli and Egypt respectively, and he had satisfied Spain with a sphere of influence in northern Morocco. He assumed that he could now proceed leisurely to the "pacific penetration" of the rest of the Sherifian Empire without paying any attention to the natural claims of Germany. He believed that France at last had risen to such a strong diplomatic position, with Russia as an ally and England as a friend, that she could risk ignoring the country which had seized Alsace-Lorraine and long dominated Europe.

In this he was mistaken. He was grievously mistaken. As a French critic has well said, "With incredible blindness the Government took precautions with everybody, except the only one of its neighbors whom it had serious cause to fear." And as Mr. Gooch has justly pointed out, "It is regrettable that the British Cabinet did not perceive—or at any rate did not help France to perceive—the wisdom of securing German consent by a solatium. Though the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share for Great Britain in the contingent partition of Morocco, and though it has been argued that it was reasonable for the contracting parties to make alternative arrangements in the event of Morocco collapsing from internal weakness, our share in the transaction which suggested double-dealing involves the British Government in partial responsibility for the crises of 1905 and 1911."

The Morocco Crisis of 1905

It is commonly believed in France and England that the Kaisers spectacular visit to Tangier on March 31, 1905, followed by Delcasse's fall on June 6, were the results of a German effort, by a threat of force, at a moment when France's ally lay prostrate in the Far East, to test or break up the newly formed Entente Cordiale and separate England from France. But this belief, as the recently published German documents show, is not altogether correct. The misconception has arisen in part from prejudice and ignorance, and in part from the fact that writers have supposed that the Kaiser's Bjorko maneuver and Bulow's Morocco moves formed parts of one and the same consistent German policy.

Confronted suddenly with the accomplished fact of an Anglo-French Agreement, in which Germany had not been consulted though German interests were involved, and in which there were good reasons for suspecting that secret clauses lurked behind the public declarations, Bulow and the Kaiser both felt that something must be done."; But they differed

as to what this should be. Bulow preferred to adopt a sphinx-like silence, waiting until Delcasse should formally notify Germany of the Moroccan agreement, and offer guarantees for her commercial interests and some equivalent compensations. When Delcasse had continued to ignore Germany for nearly a year, Bulow tried to serve notice on him by forcing the Kaiser to make the spectacular diplomatic gesture at Tangier in March, 1905. This was altogether repugnant to the Kaiser.

Their divergence in views is further indicated by the fact that Bulow did not keep his imperial master fully informed on all phases of the Moroccan affair, which he and Hoist ein were conducting. The Kaiser, on the other hand, wished to avoid antagonizing French susceptibilities. With his "anti-English complex" and his inherited traditional friendship between Hohenzollern and Romanov, he wished to avert the possible danger lurking in the Anglo-French Agreement by realizing his dream of a "Continental League." This flitted frequently before his imagination throughout his reign.

It was a method of reviving the Alliance of the Three Emperors so far as was possible after the Tsar had entered into alliance with France. He hoped to use his personal influence over the weak-willed Tsar to draw Russia into a defensive alliance with Germany. Russia would then get her ally France to join it. By thus associating the Triple and Dual Alliances, he would form a league of the five great Continental Powers. This would put an end to the danger to Europe which existed from the antagonism of the two groups. It would help to assure the peace of the world. Incidentally, it would increase his own prestige and influence, because Germany would be the dominating member of the league. (And as we know, England was already hostile towards German hegemony over European mainland). This dream perhaps was fantastic and impossible of realization, but it formed the burden of the interesting letters from "Willy" to "Nicky" during the Russo-Japanese War.¹²⁵ At last, for a brief moment of ecstatic joy in July, 1905, it did seem about to come true.

The Kaiser had been cruising in northern waters and suddenly suggested to the Tsar that they meet on their yachts at Bjorko. The fact that France had just dropped Delcasse, as we shall see later, and was inclined to accept Germany's proposal for a Moroccan Conference: seemed to indicate that France had abandoned hopes of revanche and might at last be brought into more satisfactory relations with Germany through the Tsar's influence. So the Kaiser decided to take advantage of the Bjorko interview and of the Tsar's difficulties arising from the war with Japan to reopen the negotiations of the preceding autumn with the Tsar and secure his signature to a treaty of alliance. Some months earlier such a treaty had been discussed between them and a draft had been drawn up only to be rejected by Russia for fear of offending France. Now, perhaps, was the time for getting it signed after all.

The Kaiser's prayerful optimism and emotional fervor were soon given a dash of cold water by Bulow. His Chancellor threatened to resign. The Kaiser was soon to suffer a still more stunning blow, which knocked his whole dream into a cocked hat. When the Tsar revealed the treaty to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorf "could

not believe his eyes or ears." After studying over the problem for most of the night, he explained to the Tsar the serious significance of the document signed in the cabin of the Polar Star. He made it clear to his master how contrary the Bjorko Treaty was to the spirit of the Franco-Russian Alliance, and how unlikely it was that France could be forced, *volens nolens*, into such a combination with Germany and Russia. The Kaiser's hopes for a Continental League were permanently dashed to the ground.

To return from the Kaiser's attempt to secure a defensive alliance with Russia to his Chancellor's Moroccan moves. The latter are the more important, because they gave rise to the Morocco Crisis of 1905, and led to the intimate naval and military "conversations" between France and England, which are of the highest significance in the development of the system of secret alliances.

At a dinner given in his honor at the German Embassy, and again a few days later, on March 23, 1904, M. Delcasse mentioned informally to Prince Radolin the negotiations for the Anglo-French Agreement which was about to be signed on April 8. Delcasse indicated the regions it would deal with—Newfoundland, Egypt, Morocco, Sokoto, and Siam. As to Morocco, he repeated that "he wished above all else to maintain the status quo as long as possible." But he said that the weakness of the Sultan's government endangered commerce in Morocco, and that France felt it desirable to strengthen the Sultan's position and end the anarchy. "France does not wish to have any special interests in Morocco," he said, "but it is her task, in the interest of all nations carrying on trade, to put an end as far as possible to the anarchy in this neighboring state." 131 This was the first definite knowledge which Bulow received of the impending Anglo-French Agreement. Aside from this informal notification and the fact that the Public Articles were soon printed in the newspapers, Germany was not officially notified of the text, nor formally consulted by France about this agreement, which threatened seriously to interfere with German commercial rights and political interests in Morocco. Bulow felt that Germany had been slighted, and that her prestige as well as her material interests had been injured.

Bulow certainly underestimated at first the political significance of the new Anglo-French Entente, he was far from taking it as lightly as one might be led to infer from his Reichstag speech, which was intended to quiet the fears of the German public. In fact, it caused him and his Foreign Office assistants to do a good deal of serious thinking during the following weeks. He and Holstein gradually reached a determination to hold to Germany's rights under the international Morocco Treaty of 1880, and to ignore the Anglo-French Moroccan Convention until JDelcasse should invite a discussion of it and give Germany an opportunity to be heard and perhaps get some equivalent compensations. England and France, they felt, could not by separate agreement deprive third parties of their rights in Morocco.

France, now given a free hand in Morocco by England; would try to establish a French economic monopoly there, as she had done in all her other colonies. She would "Tunisify" Morocco by "peaceful penetration." So Germany's commercial rights and interests would

be threatened, as the French would get exclusive trading and financial privileges, and a monopoly of railway and mining concessions. Furthermore, German prestige would suffer, if she allowed Morocco to be disposed of by France and England as if Germany did not exist, Holstein summed the matter up: "If we let our toes be trodden upon in Morocco without saying a word, we encourage others to do the same thing elsewhere."

There were two ways by which Germany might give expression to her wishes. The first was to tell Delcasse in a frank and friendly manner that the published Anglo-French Convention aroused concern in Germany in regard to her commercial interests, and to ask more fully what guarantees France would offer for the protection of these interests. This was the more neighborly way. But it was not adopted. The second way was to maintain an impassive and sphinx-like silence, neither recognizing nor protesting against the Anglo-French Agreement, but acting as if it did not exist for Germany, since Germany had not been officially informed of the text of it.

But this sphinx-like waiting policy did not bear fruit as rapidly as had been hoped. Delcasse was evidently becoming increasingly nervous, but he avoided broaching the question. To bring him out of his silence Germany began to encourage the Sultan to resist the police measures which the French at last, in the winter of 1904-05, planned to put into effect. Germany therefore encouraged the Sultan to resist the imposition of the French program. When he called together a patriotic Assembly of Notables from all Morocco to examine the French demands, Kuhlmann approved the measure as "a skilful anti-French move." Then, when the French Press began to demand that the Assembly of Notables be dismissed, Bulow secretly advised the contrary, believing that the proud Moroccan chieftains would declare against the French program. He did not think it likely that the French would go to the point of trying to bluff the Sultan with a threat of war, because the new Rouvier Cabinet did not wish to risk the expenditure of men and money in a Moroccan campaign, or weaken France's position toward Germany by transferring troops to Africa. Bulow, however, had been careful to warn Kuhlmann not to encourage the Sultan to expect that Germany would support him to the point of making war on France on his behalf.

It was during these rival efforts in Morocco on the part of Kuhlmann and Taillandier to win the ear of the Sultan, that Bulow suddenly decided to have the Kaiser stop on his trip from Hamburg to Corfu at Tangier and greet the Sultan. The original schedule of the Kaiser's trip did not provide for this, but Bulow had the *Kölnische Zeitung* print a despatch from Tangier announcing that the Kaiser would land there on March 31. He then sent the clipping to the Kaiser, adding, "Your Majesty's visit will embarrass M. Delcasse, block his plan, and benefit our economic interests in Morocco." The Kaiser at first agreed, but when he learned from the newspapers that the Tangier population, including the English, were planning to exploit his visit against the French, he wrote Bulow: "Telegraph at once to Tangier that it is most doubtful whether I land, and that I am only travelling incognito as a tourist; therefore, no audiences, no receptions." Bulow, however, shrewdly pointed out to him that a public announcement of the visit had been

made, and if it was given up, Delcasse would spread abroad the idea that it was owing to French representations in Berlin that the visit had been abandoned.

Delcasse would make a diplomatic triumph out of it. So the Kaiser again agreed, though at Lisbon, and even at the last moment in the harbor at Tangier, he had further hesitations. But he finally yielded to the advice of those with him, and carried out the program which had been arranged for him.

In spite of the difficulties of landing in a very rough sea and the fright caused to the Kaiser's horse by the din of Arab yelling, music, and the promiscuous discharge of firearms, the Kaiser's visit passed off smoothly enough with brilliant Oriental color. At the German Legation he received the members of the German colony and the Diplomatic Corps. To the French representative he said that his visit meant that Germany wanted freedom of trade and equality with others; that he wished to deal directly with the Sultan as a free and equal sovereign of an independent country, and he expected that France would respect his wishes. To the Sultan's Great Uncle and Plenipotentiary, he emphasized the same points, adding that such reforms as were made ought to be in accordance with the Koran and Mohammedan tradition; that European customs ought not to be blindly adopted; and that the Sultan would do well in this matter to heed the advice of his Notables.

Bulow then proposed the calling of an international conference of all the Powers who had signed the Madrid Treaty of 1880. He thought this the best way of settling the Moroccan question and securing the commercial interests of Germany, as well as of other nations, against the danger of Delcasse's "Tunisification" of the country. Here, he rightly believed, he was on solid ground. He renewed Germany's declaration of territorial disinterestedness, and made it clear that Germany was not seeking any special advantages for herself, but was only acting in the interest of all countries having commercial interests in Morocco. He felt sure that he would have the support of a majority of the Powers in such a conference. President Roosevelt was sounded and was thought to favor it, as he had always favored an "open door" policy throughout the world. Bulow hoped that Roosevelt's attitude would have a favorable effect on England and strengthen the influence of the London Times correspondent at Tangier, who had supported the German point of view. Austria and Italy, he believed, could be counted on as allies. Russia was too much absorbed by the defeats in Manchuria to interpose objections. The Sultan of Morocco himself grasped eagerly at the conference idea, when it was suggested to him, as an easy way of avoiding a virtual French protectorate. France, therefore, would be left in a minority and would have to consent to see her secret agreements with England and Spain replaced by an international settlement. As the whole French Morocco policy had been peculiarly the work of Delcasse, the thwarting of it by the holding of an international conference would probably render his position in France insecure, especially if Germany firmly insisted on a conference. Meanwhile, Bulow continued to maintain toward France his very disconcerting attitude of sphinx-like and impassive silence, still ignoring the Anglo-French Moroccan Agreement of 1904.

Within France there was a strong and growing party which felt that Delcasse had been pursuing an adventurous and dangerous imperialist policy; he was involving the risk of war with the Sultan of Morocco, and even with Germany, at a time when France was unprepared from a military point of view and weakened by the defeats of her Russian ally. This party, which included the French Ambassador in Berlin, wanted to yield to Germany's proposal for a conference, even though it meant the humiliation and the probable resignation of Delcasse as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This also was the feeling of M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, and eventually of a majority of the Cabinet.

On April 26, M. Rouvier dined with Prince Radolin at the German Embassy, and told him with evident emotion that under no circumstances would he wish to see trouble between Germany and France; that the French people inclined much more to the German than to the English side, though there were foolish irresponsible patriots who preached revanche. France and Germany must stand together and preserve the peace of the world. So long as he was at the head of affairs, this would be his purpose. As far as Morocco was concerned, he guaranteed that there would be no change in the status quo and no limitation on the commerce of foreign nations. "It is impossible and it would be criminal," he concluded, with great emotion, "that the two countries which are called to come to an understanding and draw closer to one another should quarrel, and that simply on account of Morocco."

M. Rouvier's remark had all the more significance from the fact that a few minutes before the dinner, Prince Radolin had been informed by a person in M. Rouvier's confidence that "the Prime Minister by no means identified himself with Delcasse, since he knew that the English navy did not run on wheels" and, therefore, could not protect Paris. From all this Prince Radolin gained the impression that M. Rouvier would not be unwilling to sacrifice his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This hint from Rouvier was sufficient to determine Bulow to work henceforth to overthrow the man whom he regarded as dangerous to Germany and to the peace of Europe. Not only did he regard Delcasse as the incarnation of French aggressive imperialism and of the revanche spirit, but he believed that so long as he continued at the head of the French Foreign Office, with his intrigues and misrepresentations, there could be no satisfactory relations between the countries on the two sides of the Rhine.¹⁴⁹ Another party in France, however, made up of a considerable group of newspapers and chauvinists, protested loudly against the German menace. Delcasse insisted on holding out against the German proposal for a conference. He alleged it would put the Sultan under international tutelage, but in reality he feared it would wreck his own program. Moreover, to yield in the face of German pressure would be an intolerable humiliation for France, as well as for himself personally. He declared to his colleagues that Germany was "bluffing," and he wanted to call their bluff even at the risk of war. He would rather resign than yield. But meanwhile his position was being undermined both at Fez and at Paris. At the end of May the Sultan finally rejected the French demands and adopted the German proposal of inviting the Powers to an international conference. In Paris the German Ambassador maintained a firm and unyielding attitude, and gave the impression that Germany would

back up the Sultan with force if necessary.

M. Rouvier was in a most distressing position. He feared that M. Delcasse was leading France to the brink of war. Through a confidential agent he sounded Germany further, and gathered that if he consented to drop Delcasse from the Cabinet, and accepted the idea of a conference, the critical situation would be happily relieved and Germany would not make too great difficulties when the conference met. He therefore finally went to President Loubet, taking M. Delcasse with him, and told the President that he was absolutely opposed to M. Delcasse's policy. He said that next day he would hold a Cabinet meeting, and would resign, if a majority of his colleagues did not agree with him. Accordingly, on June 6, the Cabinet was forced to choose between M. Rouvier and M. Delcasse. All the Ministers sided with the Prime Minister, according to information conveyed to Radolin. M. Delcasse resigned, and M. Rouvier took over his portfolio.

M. Delcasse's fall did not relieve the tension so much as Rouvier had hoped. There followed many weeks of difficult negotiations before the two countries could find a formula establishing the basis on which the conference should meet. Meanwhile England supported every French argument so strongly, and the English Press launched such a campaign against Germany, that the Moroccan question became almost more of an Anglo-German than a Franco-German conflict. Thanks in part to President Roosevelt's enjoying the confidence of M. Jusserand and Baron Speck von Sternburg at Washington, he was able tactfully and skilfully to secure first a French acceptance of the conference idea, and then the basis on which it should proceed.

When the conference finally met at Algeciras in January, 1906, there still remained the fundamental clash between the Anglo-French and the German positions. France and England pulled every possible political wire to secure decisions which would carry out the intention of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 and give France control. Germany pulled with equal energy, but less success, to secure equal rights for all nations and the establishment of a control in Morocco which should be genuinely international and not purely French. In sketching the development of the system of secret alliances, it is unnecessary to go into these Algeciras intrigues. Suffice it to say that Germany won in principle, but France won in practical results. The main importance of the First Morocco Crisis lies in the fact that from the outset it strengthened the ties between France and England, and led to new secret understandings between them.

More fatal still for Germany, it helped rouse the British Government to enter into those naval and military "conversations" which brought England into the World War and thus made certain Germany's ultimate catastrophic defeat.

Anglo-French Military and Naval Conversations 1905-1912

As the Franco-Russian Entente of 1891 was followed by a secret Military Convention, so the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 was soon supplemented by momentous but very

secret naval and military arrangements, or, as Sir Edward Grey euphemistically calls them, "conversations." These lacked, at first, the rigid and binding character of the Franco-Russian Alliance, but they gradually came to be, in fact if not in form, a most vital link in the system of secret alliances. In spite of the meticulous nicety with which Sir Edward Grey was careful to state that "England's hands were free," and that "it would be left for Parliament to decide," he allowed the French to hope confidently that, in case Germany caused a European war, England would take the field on the side of the French. He permitted the English and French Naval and Military Staffs to elaborate technical arrangements for joint war action, which became the basis of the strategic plans of both countries. These came to involve mutual obligations which were virtually as entangling as a formal alliance. It is always dangerous to allow the military authorities of two countries to develop inter-dependent strategic plans. They come to make arrangements which, by their very nature, necessarily involve obligations which are virtually binding upon the political authorities. Here is where Sir Edward Grey's great responsibility and mistake began. It is therefore important to note in some detail the origin, character, and consequences of these naval and military "conversations."

In Art. IX of the Anglo-French Convention of 1904, England had promised merely diplomatic support to France in connection with Morocco. But after the Kaiser's visit to Tangier, the English Press and the English Government became obsessed with the idea that Germany was endeavoring to break up the Entente by bullying France. It jarred the sporting spirit of the British to see France menaced because of her new friendship with England, at a moment when France's ally was being so disastrously defeated in the Far East. The English were also irritated by the rapidly growing German navy, as well as by the undercurrent of political and commercial rivalry which had existed for some years in Africa, Turkey, and elsewhere in the world.

Level-headed observers in the German Embassy at London, like Count Metternich and Freiherr von Eckardstein, who were not at all blinded by Anglophobia, reported the anti-German feeling in the newspapers and in society as dangerously strong. They found the British Press, in the Morocco question, "more French than the French." They warned the German Government that if war arose over Morocco, "there can be no doubt that England will stand unconditionally and actively on the French side, and go against Germany, even with enthusiasm." In accord with this public feeling, Lord Lansdowne and M. Paul Cambon entered into discussions for an exchange of notes, by which England should "take a step further," and offer the French something more substantial than mere diplomatic support.

From these discussions the French gathered that Lord Lansdowne was ready to offer an agreement, veiled from Parliament and the public under the form of an exchange of notes, to exchange views in common—an agreement which might lead to a real alliance. The Lansdowne-Cambon negotiations have advanced to the point where the notes to be exchanged had already been drawn up and transmitted in written form to M. Delcasse for his final approval. This was just at the moment when the Morocco Crisis was at its height, and he was fighting to persuade his colleagues to reject the German proposal

for an international conference. He interpreted the Lansdowne proposal as an assurance of a British alliance and armed support. He used it as an argument to try to persuade President Loubet and the Cabinet to stand by him in refusing the German demands. But, as we have seen, the Rouvier Cabinet and President Loubet declined to take the risk of war with Germany, and M. Delcasse resigned.

In October, 1905, the *Matin* published a series of revelations concerning the events of M. Delcasse's overthrow. They included the startling assertion, as coming from Delcasse, that he had been promised by the British Government that, in case of a German attack on France, the English fleet would be mobilized to seize the Kiel Canal and would land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The revelations made a sensation at the time, and have remained ever since something of a puzzle to historians, inasmuch as the British have always denied that they made any offer of alliance or armed assistance to France. Possibly the idea of landing 100,000 men in Holstein came from Sir John Fisher. It was the kind of strategy which he often urged and commended, and accords with his advice to King Edward in 1908: "We should 'Copenhagen' (destroy) the German Fleet at Kiel a la Nelson."

Admiral Fisher's idea may have been handed on to the French by King Edward, or it may have come to them as a result of the direct naval "conversations" which the French and English Staffs were already carrying on in 1905. Sir John Fisher was a very lovable old sea dog, with all the freshness of the salt spray which he loved so well, but he had an indiscreet habit of expressing himself promiscuously. At a dinner in December, 1905, he told Colonel Repington that "he was prepared, on his own responsibility, to order our fleets to go wherever they might be required. He told me that he had seen on paper Lord Lansdowne's assurances to M. Cambon, and that they were quite distinct in their tenor. He had shown them to Sir Edward Grey, and declared that they were part of the engagements taken over from the last Government, and would hold good until denounced."

It is equally interesting to note the German suspicions of an Anglo-French alliance, 172 and the fiat denials on the part of the British. On June 16, 1905, Lord Lansdowne told the German Ambassador that "the news that England had offered France an offensive and defensive alliance was completely fictitious [vollkommen erfunden]. Since Lord Lansdowne rejected the alliance rumor with the greatest decisiveness and without equivocation, as made out of air," the Ambassador said he would regard the subject as settled. He did not think that Lord Lansdowne, after such a downright declaration, was capable of trying to deceive. But a few days later, Count Metternich received further information, apparently coining through confidential sources from M. Kouvier himself, that England had promised naval aid to France. He therefore asked Lord Lansdowne about it, tactfully saying that he did so unofficially, without instructions from Berlin:

Lord Lansdowne replied that I knew that diplomatic support was assured to the French Government within the corners of the Anglo-French Agreement. This has the natural result that the questions which the Agreement touched would be discussed by the two

Governments in friendly fashion, and the most suitable ways and means would be considered to maintain unimpaired the various points of the Agreement. The question of an alliance with France, however, had never been discussed in the English Cabinet, nor had an English alliance ever been offered to the French Government either in recent times or earlier. However, he would not conceal from me that in the eventuality, which he however regarded as wholly out of the question, that Germany should light-heartedly let loose a war against France, one could not foresee how far public opinion in England would drive the Government to the support of France.

Similarly, in October, 1905, Lord Lansdowne's Under Secretary, Sir Thomas Sanderson, felt obliged by the *Matin* revelations to reiterate the denial. In view of the seriousness with which the British Government viewed the Morocco Crisis in the early summer of 1905, it is difficult to believe this last statement of Sanderson that "the eventuality of a war between Germany and France had never even been discussed on the English side." Probably these sweeping denials were as correct in letter, and as misleading in spirit, as the similar denials made in Parliament later by Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey after the Grey-Cambon exchange of notes in 1912.

On December 11, 1905, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman formed a Cabinet, in which Sir Edward Grey replaced Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office.

One of the first tasks which claimed his attention was to quiet the fears of the French. The Algeciras Conference was about to meet. Germany was thought to be pursuing a threatening policy, and the French were nervous to know whether the new Liberal Government would sustain the assurances of Lord Lansdowne, or go even further. On January 10 and 15, 1906, Cambon asked Grey the pressing question whether the British Government "would be prepared to render France armed assistance," in case of German aggression, and whether it would sanction the continuation of the naval and military conversations. Grey replied that he could not at the moment make any promises, as the Ministers were all dispersed, taking part in the elections. He could only state as his personal opinion, adopting the attitude of Lord Lansdowne, that if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the Morocco Agreement, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favor of France. As to the naval and military conversations which had been going on, the former had been direct between the French and English Naval Staffs. They were already on a satisfactory basis, having been conducted on the English side by Sir John Fisher.

Between January 10 and 15, however, Sir Edward Grey had managed to see the Secretary for War, Mr. Haldane, at an election meeting in Northumberland. Mr. Haldane had authorized Grey to say that these military communications might now proceed directly and officially between General Grierson and the French Military Attache, but it must be understood that these communications did not commit either Government.

Although Anglo-German tension was relaxed at the moment and there seemed to be a prospect of better relations between the two countries, Colonel Repington wrote an alarm

article in the Times of December 27, which gave a warning of what he supposed to be Germany's threatening intentions. Next day, in response to it, he received a visit from Major Huguet, the French Military Attache, dined with him, and was told that the French Embassy people were greatly worried about the general situation. Sir Edward Grey, who had just taken over the Foreign Office, had not renewed the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne, and M. Cambon was at the moment absent in France. Major Huguet said he knew the British navy was ready, and he trusted it, but he did not know what it would do to cooperate in case of trouble. The French Army also was ready, but he feared the Germans might attack suddenly, probably through Belgium. He therefore wanted the British to stiffen the Belgians, if war came.

Colonel Repington at once reported this by letter to Sir Edward Grey. A couple of days later he discussed the whole situation at dinner with Sir John Fisher, who said he had perfect confidence in the navy and was prepared to order it to go wherever it might be required. Colonel Repington then dined with General Grierson, Head of the Operations Bureau, who told him that, on the assumption that Germany violated Belgium, England could put two divisions into Namur by the thirteenth day of mobilization, and the Field Army, such as it then was, into Antwerp by the thirty-second day. With the authorization of Haldane and Grey these then became the basis for official discussions direct between the French and British military authorities through Major Huguet and General Grierson.

Sir Edward Grey also pointed out to M. Cambon the possible disadvantages to France of making a more formal statement of Anglo-French relations: at present, under the Agreement of 1904, France had an absolutely free hand in Morocco, with the promise of English diplomatic support; but, if England extended her promise beyond this, and made a formal alliance which might involve her in war, he was sure the British Cabinet would say that England must from time to time be consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be free to ask for alterations in French policy to avoid war. Was not the present situation so satisfactory that it was better not to alter it by a more formal engagement?

M. Cambon was not convinced by this. He pointed out that if the Conference broke up, and Germany placed herself behind the Sultan, "war might arise so suddenly that the need for action would be a question not of days, but of minutes, and that, if it was necessary for the British Government to consult, and to wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it might be too late to be of use."

To M. Cambon's request for "some form of assurance which might be given in conversation," Grey replied that he could give no such formal assurance, without submitting it to the Cabinet and getting their authority, and that were he to submit the question to the Cabinet he was not sure that they would say that this was too serious a matter to be dealt with by a verbal engagement but must be put in writing.

When M. Cambon, in summing up, dwelt upon Grey's expression of personal opinion that "in the event of an attack by Germany upon France, no British Government could

remain neutral." Grey was careful to point out that "a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a matter, a policy could be founded," and added: "Much would depend as to the manner in which the war broke out between Germany and France. I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight to put France in possession of Morocco. But if, on the other hand, it appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French 'Entente,' public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France. ... If the French Government desired it, it would be possible at any time to reopen the conversation. Events might change, but, as things were at present, I did not think it necessary to press the question of a defensive alliance."

This long and critical interview, which we have tried to summarize without bias or essential omissions, is significant for several reasons. In the first place, it reveals Sir Edward Grey's very strong sympathy with France, his evident desire to go as far as possible in giving her diplomatic support, but at the same time his unwillingness to make any formal engagement, written or verbal, which might bind England to go to war. Such an engagement must be sanctioned by Parliament, but it was very unlikely that Parliament would assent. Moreover, it would greatly increase the irritation between England and Germany. He gave France as much encouragement as he could, without going to the point where he thought he ought to inform the Cabinet and Parliament.

He was satisfied in his own mind that he had avoided changing the Entente into a formal alliance. As he wrote to his wife next day, in a letter which she was never to read on account of the carriage accident which caused her sudden and tragic death: "I had tremendously difficult talk and work yesterday, and very important. I do not know that I did well, but I did honestly."

In the second place, Sir Edward approved and confirmed the official military and naval conversations between the British and French Staffs. He assumed, as he told M. Cambon, "that all preparations are ready." As will be indicated further on, Halley at once set very actively to work to reorganize the British Army and prepare for its cooperation with the French. These preparations continued right down to the outbreak of war in 1914, and inevitably came to involve England in increasingly binding obligations of honor to support France in case of a European war arising out of any question whatsoever.

Throughout Grey's memoirs and in his dealings with the Germans, as revealed in the new German documents, one finds that Sir Edward Grey had a very strong undercurrent of sympathy with the French and a correspondingly strong suspicion of Germany's intentions. Probably therefore he preferred to be free to give Cambon his personal friendly views, in a way that he might not have been able to do, if a Cabinet had discussed the subject and adopted a formal statement of policy which would have tied his hands. At any rate he concealed the matter from the majority of his colleagues in a way which seems hardly to accord with the seeming honesty and frankness of his memoirs. He entered upon that slippery path of thinking that he could encourage the French with joint military preparations, and yet keep his "hands free"—a fatal double policy which he pursued for eight years. After the War, with more experience and with a realization of the seriousness

of the criticisms of men like Lord Loreburn, he admits in his memoirs, rather sadly and regretfully, "I think there should have been a Cabinet." In this he is right.

Lord Haldane has left an account of these secret preparations for military cooperation with France. He has told how, in the midst of the General Election of January, 1906, he "at once went to London, summoned the heads of the British General Staff, and saw the French Military Attache, Colonel Huguet, a man of sense and ability. I became aware at once that there was a new army problem. It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate (with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even farther south, if Italy, should join the Triple Alliance in an attack."

Thus, preparations for a war against Germany started in 1906, plans which already assumed Russian support.

In view of Lord Haldane's own statements of how he saw Colonel Huguet, personally authorized the direct negotiations between the French and British Staffs represented by Huguet and Grierson, and at once reorganized the British Army for cooperation with the French, a sinister light is thrown on the obliquity of the British secret preparations and the denials of their existence, by a statement which Lord Haldane himself made to the German Ambassador in London. It was occasioned by a French deputy who had inconsiderately interpellated M. Clemenceau as to the existence of an Anglo-French military convention. M. Clemenceau had replied evasively, seeming to admit a naval, but not a military, convention. This had naturally roused German fears and suspicions, especially in view of Sir John Fisher's sweeping reorganization of the British Navy, his beginning of the building of dreadnoughts, 1906 and the threatening speech of one of the civil Lords of the Admiralty, Mr. Arthur Lee, that the British Fleet would know how to strike the first blow before the other party had read the news in the papers.

When questioned by Count Metternich in regard to Clemenceau's declaration, Lord Haldane made a sweeping denial which it is difficult to reconcile with the facts. Taken in conjunction with the secret Anglo-French "conversations" and preparations which had been going on for more than a year, it made an impression in Berlin which may be seen from the Kaiser's marginal notes. According to Count Metternich's report:

Air. Haldane replied most definitely that a military convention between France and England did not exist, and had not existed; and also that no preparations had been made for the conclusion of one. Whether non-committal conversations between English and French military persons had taken place or not, he did not know [Kaiser: "Impudence! He, the Minister of a Parliamentary country, not supposed to know that! He lies!"]. At any rate, no English officer has been authorized by the English Government [Kaiser: "Indeed! He did it himself!"] to prepare military arrangements with a French military person for the eventuality of war. It was possible that a General Staff Officer of one

country might have expressed himself to the General Staff Officer of another country as to war-like eventualities. He, the Minister of War, however, knew nothing of this [Kaiser: "Magnificent lies!"].

In the course of these Anglo-French joint military preparations, British and French Staff Officers thoroughly reconnoitered the ground upon which their armies were to fight in Belgium and in France. Sir Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations, spent his holidays going all over it on his bicycle. The whole wall of his London office was covered by a gigantic map of Belgium, indicating the practicable roads which armies might follow. "He was deeply in the secrets of the French General Staff. For years he had been laboring with one object, that, if war came, we should act immediately on the side of France. He was sure that war would come sooner or later."

Not only the French, but the Russians also, soon came to count upon Haldane's Expeditionary Force as a certain and essential part of their strategic plans in case of a war against Germany. This is significantly indicated, at least as early as 1911, in the secret report, since published by the Bolsheviks, of the annual conference between the heads of the French and Russian Staffs. In August, 1911, at Krasnoe Selo, General Dubail was able to assure his Russian colleagues, as a matter of course, "that the French army would concentrate as quickly as the German army, and that from the twelfth day it would be in a position to take the offensive against Germany, with the aid of the English army on its left wing," that is, on the Belgian frontier.

While Germany, in the end, violated Belgium's neutrality first by trying to get the first strike against France, Britain had absolutely no desire to keep Belgium's neutrality intact. Even if Germany would have attacked another part of the the French border, England would have send troops into Belgium. Since Britain entered the war officially for the reason that Germany violated Belgian neutrality, this clearly exposes Britain's hypocrisy.

The Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907

An Anglo-Russian Entente, settling the long-standing sources of friction between the two countries in the Middle East, was an obvious complement to the Anglo-French Entente. It appears to have been discussed between King Edward A II and M. Izvolski during the Russo-Japanese War, and to have been warmly received by him and some of the Russian Liberals, though not by the Tsar and the Russian reactionaries and militarists.

Izvolski, though occupying at the time the comparatively unimportant diplomatic post at Copenhagen, was already ambitiously counting upon promotion to a more important position, either as ambassador at one of the great capitals of Europe, or as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was naturally flattered to be made the recipient by King Edward of a proposal of such far-reaching possibilities. Henceforth he made it one of the cardinal aims of his policy. He saw that Russia was greatly weakened by her war with Japan (which he declares he had tried to avert), and that the Franco-Russian Alliance

had consequently lost weight in the balance as compared with the Triple Alliance. Both Russia and the Franco-Russian combination needed the strengthening which would come from closer relations with the greatest sea-power in the world.

Izvolski believed that Russia was subject to two serious dangers. One was a possible renewal of trouble with Japan, who had made humiliating demands at Portsmouth and was suspected of preparing for a new struggle in the Far East. Russia needed long years of peace to recover from the effects of the war, and the only method to assure it was to make certain that the Japanese would remain quiet. The best way to accomplish this was to come to an understanding with them by a virtual partition of interests in Manchuria by a secret treaty, though publicly both were pledged to an observance of the "open door." The natural bridge between Russia and Japan was England, Japan's ally since 1902. A rapprochement with England would facilitate a sincere reconciliation with Japan, fortify Russia's position as an ally of France, and give a new and more solid basis to the somewhat weakened Franco-Russian Alliance.

The other danger for Russia was that trouble might develop with England as a result of the long-standing conflict of interests in the Near and Middle East. Men still remembered the Crimean War, the strained situation when the British Fleet threatened the Dardanelles in 1878, and the Pendjeh incident which nearly led to war between the two countries in 1885. More recently the Dogger Bank Affair and other incidents of the Russo-Japanese War had inflamed popular feeling in both countries. But a conflict with England would throw Russia into the arms of Germany, and this would endanger the Franco-Russian Alliance which was the foundation rock of Russian policy, in spite of the disappointments which both allies had suffered in connection with it.

On the other hand, if Russia could wipe the slate clean of her rivalries and quarrels with Great Britain, this would greatly strengthen her own international position. It would allow her to return to an active forward policy in the Balkans after being checkmated in the Far East. It would also be welcomed by France, who would be glad to see her ally and her new friend on better terms with one another. An Anglo-Russian Entente and a reconciliation with Japan might tend toward the formation of a quadruple combination which would quite outmatch the Triple Alliance and could hold in check Austrian ambitions in the Balkans and German ambitions in Turkey. This therefore was the program which Izvolski determined to carry out upon taking up his new position of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in May, 1906.

King Edward and Sir Edward Grey were also favorable to an understanding with Russia. The first Morocco crisis and the growing German navy had filled them with suspicions of Germany's intentions and with the desire to remove the danger of Russian enmity in case of possible trouble with Germany. Sir Charles Hardinge was another ardent advocate of a rapprochement with Russia. He had been British Ambassador at St. Petersburg since 1904, but was recalled in the fall of 1905 to become Permanent Under Secretary in place of Sir Thomas Sanderson. He took pains to explain in St. Petersburg and London that his recall would afford him an opportunity to work with further success for close

Anglo-Russian relations.

Within a few months after Izvolski took over the Foreign Office from Count Lamsdorf, the Anglo-Russian negotiations were well under way. In passing through Berlin on October 29, 1906, Izvolski admitted that, owing to fears of Japan's aggressive intentions, he was compelled to seek an understanding with England concerning Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. Grey and Nicolson worked out draft proposals. These provided for the partition of Persia into spheres of influence. This idea at first met with no approval in St. Petersburg. Russian imperialists demanded that Persia come entirely under Russian influence, and that Russia must build a trans-Persian railway and press on to the Persian Gulf. But Izvolski believed such an aggressive policy was impossible of realization and likely to lead to a conflict with England. So the English proposal for a partition of Persia into English and Russian spheres of influence was adopted. In March, 1907, the visit of a Russian fleet to Portsmouth foreshadowed the coming Anglo-Russian agreement. Upon King Edward's invitation, a deputation of Russian officers and sailors visited London, were entertained as guests at the Admiralty, and given a special show in their honor at the Hippodrome. After a banquet in the evening, there was a gala performance for them at the Alhambra, attended by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, and Sir Edward Grey. "It has certainly never happened before," commented the German Ambassador, "that an English Minister of Foreign Affairs has gone to a variety theatre to greet foreign guests."

But, as in the case of the Franco-Russian negotiations two decades earlier, the divergence in political ideals on the Seine and the Neva had delayed an understanding, so now the divergence between English liberalism and Russian autocracy hampered the conclusion of a settlement. Russian reactionaries and militarists, and also the Tsar, were at first opposed to a rapprochement with England. Izvolski later told Sir Edward Grey that he eventually had great difficulty in getting it accepted. In England likewise the criticism in the Liberal Press of Russian pogroms, the oppressive character of Tsarist absolutism, the suspension of the Duma, and the misunderstanding and friction caused by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's phrase, "La Duma est morte; vive la Duma!", did not facilitate the work of Grey.

Finally, on August 31, 1907, there was signed the Anglo-Russian Agreement dealing with the Middle East—Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. Both contracting Powers recognized the territorial integrity of Tibet under the suzerainty of China, and agreed not to interfere with the country's internal concerns or attempt to secure special concessions there. The land of the Lamas was to remain a barrier between the Russian bear and the British lion in India. As to Afghanistan, in return for an English promise not to occupy or annex it so long as the Ameer fulfilled his obligations, Russia declared the country to be outside her sphere of influence; she withdrew her diplomatic agents from Herat and agreed to deal with the Ameer only through the British authorities. Afghanistan therefore was no longer to be a field for Russian intrigue against India, and the English were freed from a great bugbear that had worried them for a century. Persia was by far the most important subject of the Agreement. Though the preamble piously declared that the two Great

Powers mutually agreed to respect the “integrity” and “independence” of Persia.

Though the Anglo-Russian Convention was all made public, included no obligations of military or diplomatic support, and did not at once lead to a closely knit diplomatic partnership, it did nevertheless complete the circle for a closer political cooperation between Russia, France and England. The Press of these countries began to talk of the new “Triple Entente.”

7.4 The System of Secret Alliances 1907-1914

Between the years 1907 and 1914 there was an increasing crystallization of opposition between the two groups into which the six Great Powers of Europe had now become divided. During the first four years it developed slowly; then, with the French occupation of Fez, the German threat at Agadir, the Italian seizure of Tripoli, Anglo-German naval rivalry, the failure of the Haldane Mission, and the Balkan Wars, it proceeded more rapidly. It was reflected in Morocco, Mesopotamia, the Balkans, and in many other matters, ranging all the way from European armaments to Chinese loans.

This opposition of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente was accompanied and accentuated by four sets of tendencies.

(1) Both systems of alliance tended to be deformed from their originally defensive character. They tended to become widened in scope to cover policies involving offensive military action. For example, Germany felt compelled to back up Austria, if her ally became involved in war with Russia by her efforts at self-preservation from the “Greater Serbia” danger—in a way which Bismarck would hardly have tolerated. In precisely the same way, France under M. Poincaré felt compelled to back up Russia, if her ally became involved in war with Austria and Germany by her efforts to safeguard her Balkan ambitions—in a way which M. Poincaré’s predecessors would hardly have permitted.

(2) Germany tried to strengthen the Triple Alliance, and, similarly, M. Poincaré tried to tighten up and strengthen the Triple Entente. But the latter was more successful than the former. The Triple Alliance, in spite of its renewal in 1907 and in 1912, tended to become relatively weaker. It was weakened by Austria’s internal troubles and Balkan complications, by the deep-seated distrust between Austria and Italy, and by Italy’s sacro egoismo, which often made her oppose her allies, especially Austria, in diplomatic questions and caused her allies to doubt her loyalty in case of war. The Triple Entente, on the other hand, became relatively stronger, because its members were not divided from one another by any such sharp conflicts of interest as between Austria and Italy, and because England, France, and Russia were able to make increasingly close arrangements for military and naval cooperation.

(3) Although the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente—and especially the latter—were tightened up and strengthened, there still remained more occasions of friction, distrust,

and suspicion within each diplomatic group than is commonly supposed. This will be seen also in the next chapter on "Balkan Problems." There was in fact by no means so much harmony and mutual confidence within the Triple Alliance as was usually assumed by writers a few years ago—nor was there so much within the Triple Entente as has been assumed by "revisionist" writers more recently. Italy's "extra dance" with France after 1902, and with Russia after Racconigi in 1909, were the most notable examples of this kind of domestic unfaithfulness within a diplomatic group, and continued to be a source of uncertainty and worry on all sides. But Italy's case was merely an example of what the Triple Entente feared might happen within its own circle. France, for instance, was much worried whenever England entered into confidential negotiations with Germany, as in the Haldane Mission or in the Bagdad Railway question ; or when Russia made with Germany the Potsdam Agreements of 1910-1911, or seemed inclined to undertake diplomatic maneuvers in the Balkans without first fully informing her French ally, as happened on several occasions. Sir Edward Grey was worried lest the Entente with Russia concerning the Middle East would break down, if he did not give her the diplomatic support which M. Sazonov desired at critical moments, as in the Liman von Sanders affair—and in July, 1914. When he made friendly arrangements with Germany in regard to the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese colonies, he thought it prudent to counter-balance them, as it were, by consenting to the desire of his two Entente friends that he should enter into negotiations for an Anglo-Russian naval convention. Germany also found herself frequently embarrassed by the "stupidities" in which Austria indulged in the Balkans, against Germany's better judgment or without her approval. Within each group therefore special efforts were continually being made to lessen the friction and suspicion, and to increase the harmony, solidarity, and security of the group.

(4) In both groups of Powers there was a rapid increase of military and naval armaments. This caused increasing suspicions, fears, and newspaper recriminations in the opposite camp. This in turn led to more armaments; and so to the vicious circle of ever growing war preparations and mutual fears and suspicions. In 1907, before the opposition had crystallized clearly, the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, in Professor Schmitt's happy phrase, "had stood side by side; in 1914 they stood face to face."

German Fear of Encirclement after 1907

Germany at first gave an outward appearance of accepting the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 with equanimity. Even before its conclusion, Count Bulow, in his Reichstag speech of April 30, 1907, had referred to the negotiations with quiet optimism. Afterwards, when the Anglo-Russian Convention was published, he instructed the German Press to be moderate and practical in its comments, and to accept the Convention for what it professed to be—a settlement of Anglo-Russian differences and not a combination inimical to German interests.

But in reality Germany felt very uneasy. She feared that the clauses in regard to Tibet,

Afghanistan, and Persia were not merely an end in themselves, but rather a means to an end—the formation of a diplomatic combination on the part of England, France, and Russia. This Triple Entente would outmatch the Triple Alliance in diplomatic strength because Italy, owing to her hatred and jealousy of Austria in the Balkans and her desire to stand well with France and England would vote with them, rather than with her own allies, as she had done at Algeciras. The Triple Entente Powers would also outmatch the Triple Alliance in economic resources and in military and naval strength. They would therefore feel able to block Germany's construction of the Bagdad Railway, obstruct her industry and commerce, and thwart her colonial ambitions, wherever these came into competition with their own.

Moreover, in the most inflammable subjects, like Alsace-Lorraine, Morocco, the Middle East, and naval competition, one or other of the Entente Powers stood in direct opposition to Germany. The Balkans also might easily prove another highly inflammable subject. If Russia's reconciliation with England should prove (as it turned out to be the case) the preliminary to a Russian effort to revive her old aggressive Balkan policy, and to recover in the Near East the prestige which she had lost in the Far East, the ally of France would almost inevitably come into conflict with the ally of Germany.

These were the considerations which proved upon the minds of the Germans and created a nervous malaise which finally took form in the conviction that they were being "encircled." Though Russia and England had protested abundantly that the Anglo-Russian Convention was in no way directed against Germany and had no ulterior purposes, their words did not carry conviction at Berlin, and their attitude in regard to the Bagdad Railway seemed to indicate a collective determination to obstruct one of Germany's dearest projects. In 1902 Germany secured from Turkey the concession for the Bagdad Railway. This was to extend the rail connection from the eastern terminus of the Anatolian Railway at Konia, already in German hands, all the way via Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. The next year the Deutsche Bank made arrangements with the Ottoman Bank for financing the construction of the line. Germany desired and invited the participation of foreign capital in the costly enterprise. But she soon met with opposition, instead of cooperation, on the part of Russia, France, and England.

Russia, on various political, economic, and strategic grounds, had been opposed from the outset to the whole German railway project. Moreover, since she had no surplus capital for investment, there was never any serious question of her financial participation in it. Her policy was to obstruct a scheme to which she had many objections and in which she was unable to take a part. In France, the bankers, for the most part, favored participation, both because they already had large investments in Turkey, and because this looked like another good business proposition. The French Government, however, favorable at first, then hesitating, finally declared its opposition to the investment of French capital in the German undertaking. This hostile attitude of the French Government was partly owing to the vigorous representations made by French commercial interests, clericals, and politicians, and partly also, if we are to believe M. Izvolski, to French desire to

support the policy of their Russian ally.

In England Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne had stated at first, on April 7, 1903, that the British Government approved the bankers' negotiations for the participation of British capital in the construction of the Bagdad Railway. But at once an outcry was raised in the British Press and in Parliament against the Government's favorable attitude the railway would injure British vested interests in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf; it would increase the influence of the Germans in Turkey at British expense and bring them too close to India; it would rouse suspicions in Russia as to British intentions; and, in any case, the English ought not to participate, unless they did so on equal terms and to the same extent as the Germans. So Mr. Balfour was forced to announce in the House of Commons on April 23 his repudiation of the approval which he had given on April 7. Henceforth the British also were inclined to obstruct the railway in various indirect ways.

In spite of this policy of opposition and non-participation on the part of the three Entente Powers, the Germans managed to push rapidly the building of the first 200-kilometer section from Konia to Ercgli. Within something over a year, on the Sultan's birthday, October 25, 1904, they were able to open this first section to traffic with pompous ceremonies and justifiable self-congratulation. But here construction came to a sudden stop, and the rail ends were left sticking out into space. The next 200-kilometer section, reaching toward the Taurus Mountains, involved innumerable engineering difficulties and a far greater expenditure per kilometer of construction. The Turkish Government could not arrange the financing of additional bonds to meet the guarantees for this section without an increase in her customs revenues. Yet it was impossible for Turkey to raise her tariff, as she desired to do, because by existing treaties she could not do so without the consent of the Great Powers; and Russia, France, and England for a long time refused to give their consent. By their refusal they practically blocked the further construction for the next few years.

Three months after the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 the Kaiser visited Windsor and was cordially received. He took advantage of the occasion to reopen the Bagdad Railway discussion with Lord Haldane and Sir Edward Grey. He found that the former, as Minister of War, was anxious that the British should control the section from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf, as a "gate," to protect India from the possibility of troops coming down the new railway. The Kaiser at once declared, "I will give you the gate," and telegraphed to Biilow to this effect. A lively exchange of views followed for a few hours in Windsor, London and Berlin. The British "recognized that the object of the commercial development of Mesopotamia was one that should not be opposed." But they desired "that the quickest route between West and East should not be under the exclusive control of a virtually foreign company, which would be in a position to affect seriously commercial relations between England and India, or to sanction its use for strategic purposes in hostility to British interests"; they "could not, however, discuss this question *d deux*, but only *a quatuor*, for the various interests, strategical, political and commercial, affect France and Russia as well." 12 Sir Edward Grey's insistence that

France and Russia must be associated with England in the discussions proved a fatal obstacle to reaching any satisfactory agreement on the Kaiser's proposal.

Sir Edward Grey's insistence on the solidarity of England, France and Russia, in this matter of the Bagdad Railway in the fall of 1907, foreshadowed the solidarity of the Triple Entente in wider fields later. It also put an end to any important further discussions of the Bagdad question until Russia deserted her friends in making with Germany the "Potsdam Agreements" of 1910-1911.

Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1904-1908

The German suspicion that England was aiming to limit Germany's freedom of action also arose in connection with the Second Hague Peace Conference and the naval discussions at the beginning of the period of Dreadnought construction and rivalry. The British navy had just been reorganized and strengthened by Sir John Fisher, while the German navy was just beginning to grow in power.

The proposal to discuss the limitation of armaments, urged by England, looked like a scheme to arrest naval development. It seemed to prevent Germany from catching up in strength at a moment when England still enjoyed a marked naval superiority. Nor could Germany, with Austria weakened by internal difficulties and Italy an ally of doubtful loyalty, consent to limit her army. There was the danger of a war on two fronts, when Russia should have recovered from her war with Japan and revived her active Balkan policy. So Germany insisted that the limitation of armaments should not be one of the subjects included in the call for the Conference. When the subject was nevertheless raised in the course of the Conference by England and the United States, Germany's opposition to it was, to be sure, largely but tacitly shared by France and Russia.

But these two countries left it to the German delegates to voice the opposition and thereby incur the odium of wrecking the proposals. No doubt Germany made a great mistake. Though limitation of armaments is a most difficult problem, as the long and sterile efforts of the League of Nations and the failure of President Coolidge's Conference have abundantly shown, it is possible that, had Germany taken a different attitude in 1907, the other European Powers might have followed her, and a beginning might have been made to check the fatal increase in rival armies and navies. At any rate Germany could not have been branded as the country which was most responsible for thwarting an effort to lessen a progressive danger which was one of the main causes of the World War. But on the other hand one could argue if Britain even had the right to dictate another country's naval policy.

By the irony of history it was during the Hague Peace Conference that Anglo-German naval rivalry reached a new and hitherto unequalled stage of mutual suspicion and bitterness. By the Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 Admiral von Tirpitz and the Kaiser laid the foundations for a strong German navy. Their motives were many and mixed. They

wished to give expression to the greatness of the New Germany by creating a fleet which should be comparable to her growing commerce and colonial interests and afford them protection. They desired preservation from the danger of being blockaded from food and raw materials in case of war. But above all, they wanted to have a naval force which could be used to back up German diplomatic arguments in the struggle for colonial and commercial advantages.

The Kaiser's marginal notes are filled with the idea that other countries, and particularly England, paid little or no heed to Germany's legitimate desires, simply because Germany had no force to back up her demands. If Germany had a navy, even a much smaller one than that of England, the British would be willing to make diplomatic concessions rather than take the risk of a naval conflict. This was Tirpitz's fundamental notion when he speaks of the new German navy as a "risk navy." He had no thought of attacking England, but a respectable German sea force would compel England to make concessions in the colonial world rather than take the "risk" of a naval struggle. For this it was not necessary for Germany to build a fleet fully equal to that of England; some proportion like 2:3 or 10:16 would suffice.

But in fact Admiral Tirpitz completely misconceived the psychological effect which his creation of even a "risk navy" would have on the British mind and policy. Though it may have contributed to induce the British to make various proposals for limiting naval competition and to enter into various diplomatic negotiations, it did not intimidate them or cause them to make important concessions. On the contrary, it rather created an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism which was altogether unfavorable for friendly diplomatic agreements concerning the Bagdad Railway and other matters. Every increase in the German navy, instead of frightening the British into making concessions, tended to stiffen their opposition and their determination to maintain the wide margin of British naval superiority deemed vital to the safety and very existence of the British Empire.

So, for instance, in 1904, as the English observed the new-born German navy, still in its infancy but already showing signs of robust growth, they began a wide-sweeping rearrangement and reorganization of the British Fleet. They proceeded to create a strong force in the North Sea and make it ready for instant action against Germany. (Paranoia?) Sir John Fisher, with his characteristically energetic policy of "Ruthless, Relentless, and Remorseless;" "brought home some 160 ships from abroad which could neither fight nor run away,"¹⁸ and effected other revolutionary changes, so that, as he himself said, "We shall be thirty per cent, more fit to fight and we shall be ready for instant war;"

The next year he laid the keels for the first Dreadnoughts. These were to be far superior to anything afloat and give the British navy a strength which no country could menace. But their introduction more than doubled the cost of capital ship construction. Furthermore, they rendered relatively less important the older and smaller types of vessel which had hitherto constituted England's naval superiority.

It enabled Tirpitz to follow England's example, and be only a little behind her in the

race in the construction of this new type of vessel, which neither country had possessed hitherto; whereas in the older types of vessel Germany was hopelessly behind. To express the same thing in figures: England had authorized the laying down by 1908 of 12, and Germany of 9 Dreadnoughts; whereas the ratio between England and Germany in vessels of the older pre-Dreadnought type was 63:26. Tirpitz also believed that Germany, where sailors were conscripted instead being paid wages for voluntary enlistment, and where cost of ship construction was relatively low, could stand longer and more easily than England the heavy strain of naval expenditure. With this double advantage on Germany's part, as it seemed to him, he was always skeptical about the sincerity and motives of British proposals for restriction of naval construction. He was steadily opposed to any serious limitation on his own program, by which he believed the German navy could gradually approach nearer in strength to the British navy, though it might never actually equal it. It would have to pass through the "danger zone" of inferiority, during which England might possibly attack and destroy it in a "preventive" war. But he did not think this danger great, especially if German diplomacy avoided irritating England in other fields. Once safely through the "danger zone," after a dozen years, Germany would have a very respectable "risk navy." Germany could stand the financial strain; in the long run England could not. So all Germany had to do was to push construction.

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in a speech on December 21, 1905, setting forth the platform of the new Liberal Government, had lamented the great expenditures on armaments: "A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences. It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores and to create new sores. We want relief from the pressure of excessive taxation, and at the same time we want money for our own domestic needs at home, which have been too long starved and neglected owing to the demands on the taxpayer for military purposes abroad. How are these desirable things to be secured if in time of peace our armaments are maintained on a war footing?"

In the course of the next three years, the English made many proposals for reducing naval expenditure and thereby lessening the growing friction with Germany. It was proposed that the subject should be discussed at the Hague Peace Conference; that Sir John Fisher should have a talk with Admiral Tirpitz; or that there should be a mutual inspection of shipyards and communication of naval programs.²² It was informally intimated that for Germany to retard her naval program, or come to some understanding for an agreed-upon ratio between the English and German navies.

But England could never get a satisfactory answer from Germany to any of these proposals. Being made after Sir John Fisher had so greatly strengthened the Home Fleet in the North Sea and begun to build Dreadnoughts, these proposals looked to the German mind like an intimation from the Supreme Naval Power that it desired naval competition to cease at the moment of its own greatest preponderance. Coinciding also with Lord Haldane's organization of the British Expeditionary Force and with England's closer diplomatic relations with France and Russia, they looked like a concerted plan on the

part of these three Powers to put pressure on Germany. Any yielding to such pressure was sharply resented as inconsistent with Germany's dignity as a Great Power. As Biilow wrote privately to Bavaria and some of the other German Governments on June 25, 1908, after President Fallieres's visit to London and King Edward's famous meeting with the Tsar at Reval: "Agreements which aim at a limitation of our defensive power are not acceptable for discussion by us under any circumstances. A Power which should demand such an agreement from us should be clear in its mind that such a demand would mean war."

By the Kaiser especially, the British proposals were indignantly repudiated as unjustifiable attempts to interfere with his sovereign right and duty to take all measures necessary for the dignity and defense of the German Empire. Commenting upon Count Metternich's report of July 16, 1908, of an informal luncheon discussion with Sir Edward Grey and Lloyd George, in which it had been intimated that a naval discussion would improve diplomatic relations, the Kaiser wrote:

Count Metternich must be informed that good relations with England at the price of the building of the German navy are not desired by me. If England intends graciously to extend us her hand only with the intimation that we must limit our fleet, this is a groundless impertinence, which involves a heavy insult to the German people and their Kaiser, which must be rejected a limine by the Ambassador. . . . France and Russia might with equal reason then demand a limitation of our land armaments. The German Fleet is not built against anyone, and also not against England! But according to our need!

The Kaiser's fears that England was trying to put a check upon Germany's navy, and "encircle" her in other ways, were increased by the numerous visits and interviews which Edward VII had with French and Russian rulers and ministers* in the summer of 1908. In May President Failures was very cordially received in London and given a dinner at the Foreign Office to which the only person invited, outside a French and English group, was the Russian Ambassador—a distinction which seemed to embarrass good Count Benckendorff. The French Press made the most of the visit, and Tardicu in the Temps expressed the hope that Anglo-French relations were taking a firmer form, provided England made fundamental changes in her military system—a hint at the universal military service which Lord Roberts and others were now beginning urgently to advocate in public speeches. In June, King Edward's visit to the Tsar at Reval seemed more than a mere act of family courtesy, since he was accompanied by Admiral Fisher, Sir John French, and Sir Charles Hardinge, who had long talks with Izvolski and the Russian Premier, Stolypin. Hardinge told Izvolski that England had no hostile feelings toward Germany and was anxious to maintain the most friendly relations with her, but that "owing to the unnecessarily large increase in the German naval program, a deep distrust in England of Germany's future intentions had been created."

This distrust was likely to increase with- the progress of time, the realization of the German program, and the heavier taxation entailed by England's necessary naval counter-

measures. "In seven or eight years' time a critical situation might arise, in which Russia, if strong in Europe, might be the arbiter of peace, and have much more influence in securing the peace of the world than at any Hague Conference. For this reason it was absolutely necessary that England and Russia should maintain towards each other the same cordial and friendly relations as now exist between England and France." Izvolski (the Russian diplomat) got the impression that the English wanted Russia to build up her army and navy as much as possible as a future check to Germany.

When Hardinge persisted that the competitive naval construction must cease, the Kaiser used his regular argument that Germany was not building in competition with England, but only for her own needs as laid down in Tirpitz's Navy Laws. When Hardinge still insisted, "You must stop or build slower," the Kaiser looked him sharp in the eye and replied, "Then we shall fight, for it is a question of national honor and dignity." Hardinge turned red, and, seeing he was on dangerous ground, begged the Kaiser's pardon, asked him to forget words said in private conversation, and changed the subject. Hardinge realized that it was not his place to demand such a thing from the German emperor.

In conversation later in the day with the Kaiser, Hardinge was as affable and friendly as could be, and was not a little surprised to be decorated with the Order of the Red Eagle, First Class. (an order of chivalry of the Kingdom of Prussia. It was awarded to both military personnel and civilians, to recognize valor in combat, excellence in military leadership, long and faithful service to the kingdom, or other achievements.)

The English Cabinet, whose views Hardinge had been representing, were determined to preserve England's supremacy of the seas and keep ahead of Germany in Dreadnought construction. But they foresaw the bitterness which would be engendered between the two countries by further naval competition, as well as the terrible financial burden it would impose on England. They therefore sincerely desired and tried to come to some sort of understanding with Germany on the subject. It was a tragic mistake of Tirpitz and the Kaiser that they should have so flatly refused discussion and thereby pushed England further into the arms of France and Russia, thus strengthening the Triple Entente and helping to crystallize its opposition.

The effect on Germany of England's opposition to the Bagdad Railway, of her efforts to limit the German navy, of the Reval meeting and the apparent consolidation of France, Russia, and England into a Triple Entente, was to produce a conviction that Germany was being "encircled." Germans believed that this encirclement was Edward VII's personal work, and that it aimed at strangling German commercial and colonial expansion, and even at crushing Germany's political and military position. There was something of a diplomatic encirclement. Germany was now surrounded by three Great Powers, whose combined strength was supposed to be equal or superior to that of the Triple Alliance, and who were growing increasingly ready to cooperate in defense of their own interests whether in Morocco, Mesopotamia, or the Balkans. Though Izvolski hoped that the Triple Entente would give him greater freedom of action in the Near East and Middle East, and though the French counted on it in the same way in Morocco, so far as England was

concerned it aimed at the preservation of peace through the establishment of a balance of power. It was insurance against the supposed danger of possible German aggression, and not for any aggression against Germany's existing position in Europe and in the commercial world. But to German eyes it had a more ominous and irritating appearance.

The Reval meeting, preceded by President Fallieres's visit to London, has caused uneasiness in Germany. Grey and Izvolski have given assurances that nothing is being planned against her. Nevertheless it would be a fatal mistake, if, trusting in these assurances, we do not recognize that our freedom of movement may be limited by what has happened. It is Germany's economic and political power, and the fear that she may misuse them, which is driving other states into the Entente against us. "These Ententes and Alliances are therefore in their origin rather of a defensive character. But perhaps they will not hesitate to proceed aggressively against us and hold us down where possible, when they think they have the power to do so." Our ally, Austria-Hungary, is threatened just as we are by this new combination, and especially so, because the passions and intrigues directed against the very existence of the Dual Monarchy arouse in other nations expectations for a successful destructive blow from the outside. The supposedly imminent break-up of Austria-Hungary is a favorite standing theme in the French and other foreign Press.

"A loyal cooperation with Austria- Hungary will and must remain in the future also the fundamental basis of German foreign policy." Germany cannot enter into a discussion with other Powers to limit her armaments, but she should avoid as far as possible giving any irritation to others and restrain all jingoistic expressions in the German Press. There was much shrewd wisdom in this statement.

Germany's Relations with France 1908-1911

While the naval friction with England continued, and the Young Turk Revolution and Bosnian Crisis led to a new tension with Russia, Germany managed to improve her relations with France in the years from 1908 to 1911.

The Algeciras Conference had not produced very satisfactory conditions in Morocco. The Sultan's brother, Mulai Hafid, had gained a strong following among the chieftains who resented the Franco-Spanish efforts to maintain order. Mulai Hafid finally revolted against his brother's authority. In the disorders which took place a French doctor was murdered, which gave the French occasion to occupy Moroccan territory at Oudjda near the Algerian frontier in the spring of 1907. Further outrages on Europeans led the French to land troops in Casablanca in August, and to place French police in other seaports on the West Coast.

While negotiations were going on concerning the terms under which Abdul Aziz should agree to abdicate in favor of Mulai Hafid, there occurred the Casablanca incident, which for a moment threatened to cause a new flare-up between France and Germany. On

September 25, 1908, the German Consul at Casablanca attempted to assist six deserters from the French Foreign Legion to escape on board a German ship. But the deserters were forcibly seized, and the consular secretary and soldier escorting them were somewhat mishandled by French soldiers. The German Consul was blamed by France for having exceeded his powers, contrary to international law, in affording protection to persons within French military jurisdiction. The local French military authorities were accused by Germany of having infringed the inviolability of consular rights. In spite of some excitement in the French and German Press, good sense fortunately prevailed in the Foreign Offices at Paris and Berlin.

On October 4 the Kaiser informed his Foreign Office that, so far as still practicable, Germany should withdraw with dignity, and come to an understanding with France as quickly as possible, in spite of the incident at Casablanca. A couple of days later, after being painfully surprised by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, he wrote more energetically to Billow: "In view of these circumstances this wretched Moroccan affair must now be brought to a conclusion, quickly and definitely. There is nothing to be made of it; it will be French anyway. So let us get out of the affair with dignity, so that we may finally have done with this friction with France, now that great questions are at issue."

Soon afterwards Germany gave her approval to the terms which the French had drawn up, highly favorable to themselves, as the conditions on which Mulai Hafid was to be Sultan. At the same time Schoen, the German Secretary of State, told Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, that it was time for Germany and France to shake hands on Morocco, and that the Kaiser wished it. This led to negotiations which resulted in the Franco-German Agreement of February 9, 1909. "To facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras," France, still professing to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco, promised equality of economic opportunity to the Germans; and Germany, professing to pursue only economic aims, recognized France's special political interests in preserving peace and order, and promised not to interfere with them.

Bulow had taken up the idea of the German Ambassador in England, in spite of the Kaiser's absolute negative of the preceding summer, of conceding to England a modification of Germany's naval program in return for some political equivalent, such as an exchange of colonial territory, or, better still, an English promise of neutrality in case of a European war.³⁹ For success in any such negotiation it was most important to remove all Franco-German friction in Morocco, which had been one of England's original and most persistent reasons for standing by the side of France. It was reported to Billow that the English Minister in Tangier had had instructions to stir up trouble between the French and Germans, and he felt sure that anti-German propaganda by the English in Paris was likely to continue so long as England had cause to be alarmed over Germany's rapid construction of Dreadnoughts. To cut the ground from under this propaganda and to remove England's anxiety as to German intentions in Morocco it was highly desirable "to shake hands with France" once and for all in regard to Morocco.

A final reason for the speed with which the Franco-German Agreement was concluded lay in the fact that King Edward was to visit Berlin on February 9; Billore wished to be able to publish the Agreement before his arrival in order to avoid any impression among the public that Edward VII had helped to bring it about. The Agreement was warmly welcomed in the French Press as putting an end to a long-standing source of irritation between France and Germany, and as assuring to the one the political, and to the other the economic, advantages necessary to each. Grey and Hardinge congratulated Billore on it, expressing pleasure that a question which had been a constant source of anxiety to England and in which England was bound by the Entente of 1904 to give France diplomatic support was now so happily settled.

Germany's Relations with Russia 1908-1911

Though the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 seemed to Germany an indication that Russia was turning away from the old friendly relations which had united the Hohenzollerns and the Romanovs, it did not at first seriously cloud the relations between the two countries. Izvolski had been profuse in his assurances that the Convention merely aimed to do away with Anglo-Russian friction in the Middle East, and was in no way directed at Germany or inimical to her interests.

As Russia's interests seemed deeply centered in Persia, Germany carefully sought to avoid antagonizing her in that quarter. When Persia in 1906 had asked for the establishment of a German Bank at Teheran, with the hope of support against Russian encroachments, Germany had hesitated to heed the request, and informed Izvolski that Germany had no political aims or interests in Persia. In return, early in 1907, Izvolski proposed an agreement by which Russia would withdraw her opposition to the construction of the Bagdad Railway, in return for Germany's recognition of Russia's monopoly in political, strategic, and economic matters in Northern Persia. Izvolski carried on negotiations for such a Russo-German agreement during the spring and early summer of 1907, at the same time with his negotiations on the same subject with England, evidently playing off the two countries against one another. But when he had the Anglo-Russian Convention safely in his pocket, he dropped the conversations with Berlin.

In 1908, however, Germany's relations with Russia began to be less satisfactory. Izvolski wished to recover in the Near East some of the prestige which Russia had lost in her disastrous war in the Far East against Japan. He believed that the alliance with France and the Entente with England assured him their benevolent attitude, and that he could proceed to open the Straits for Russian warships. Germany had often declared that she had no objections to this, and Austria could be satisfied by being invited to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the substance of his "Buchlau Bargain" with the Austrian Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, which will be described in more detail in the next chapter on Balkan Problems.

Izvolski found that his plan for opening the Straits did not meet with French and English

approval, and his consent at Buchlau to having Orthodox Greek Bosnians placed under the Roman Catholic sovereignty of the Hapsburgs was violently denounced by the Pan-Slavs in Russia, as well as by the Serbians, who had coveted Bosnia as part of a future "Greater Serbia." Thereupon Izvolski tried to nullify the Buchlau bargain by insisting that the modification of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which was involved by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, should be subjected to revision by a Conference of the Powers. Austria refused. Serbia and Austria began to mobilize against each other.

Though the Kaiser was indignant at the sudden way in which Aehrenthal had annexed Bosnia, Biihow persuaded his master that Germany could not afford to refuse support to her ally's *fait accompli*. Germany was now surrounded by the Entente Powers, and Austria was her only reliable ally. So Germany supported Austria's refusal to accept a Conference, and hastened to propitiate France and England by the Moroccan Agreement of 1909. Meanwhile, by March, 1909, Serbia and Austria seemed on the verge of war. Serbia counted on Russian, and Austria on German, support. Unluckily for Izvolski, Russia's exhaustion and military disorganization after the war with Japan made it out of the question for her to back up by force his demand for a Conference; France was not yet ready to extend the scope of the Franco-Russian alliance to cover Russian ambitions in the Balkans; and England gave Russia little support.

To avert an actual clash of arms between Austria and Serbia, Germany then proposed a solution to extricate Izvolski from the *cul-de-sac* into which he had strayed, and demanded a yes or no answer in regard to it ; if Russia rejected it, Germany would let the Austro-Serbian quarrel take its course, and the outcome under the circumstances would certainly not have been in Serbia's favor. Izvolski thereupon accepted the German solution, and the Bosnian Crisis was ended.

The outcome of the Bosnian Crisis was a diplomatic victory for Austria and Germany, and a corresponding humiliation for Russia and Serbia, with all the feeling of soreness which such humiliations leave behind. Izvolski never forgave Aehrenthal for his quick action in annexing Bosnia without further consultation and in refusing a Conference. He claimed that in both these matters Aehrenthal had broken his word and was no gentleman. Aehrenthal denied the truth of the allegations and threatened to publish the documents, whereupon Izvolski begged Germany to prevent the publication; upon Germany's advice, Aehrenthal refrained from carrying out his threat.

In the meantime Izvolski succeeded in making a secret agreement with Italy at Racconigi, by which, among other things, Italy promised to regard with benevolence Russia's interest in the Straits in return for Russia's similar promise in regard to Italy's interests in Tripoli. Izvolski was thus getting Italy's consent to what he had failed to secure by the Buchlau bargain, and Italy was taking another "extra dance" outside the circle of her own Triple Alliance partners.

It was not until early in 1910 that Izvolski and Aehrenthal again took up "normal diplomatic" relations. Rumors of their rapprochement, and even of a secret agreement between

them, caused terror: at Belgrade it was feared that Russia was about to abandon Serbia to Austria's tender mercies; and at Constantinople it was feared that the partition of Turkey was being contemplated. 51 Even at Berlin there were fears that Izvolski, aided and abetted by France and England, was trying to make a secret agreement with Austria in order to drive another wedge into the Triple Alliance and sow discord between Berlin and Vienna. For weeks Izvolski tried to pin Aehrenthal down to signing an agreement which would put Austria on record in favor of the status quo in the Balkans and which could be confirmed by being communicated to all the Great Powers.

Aehrenthal, however, though ready to sign a private agreement with Russia, saw no need to communicate it to the Powers. After misunderstandings and recriminations, Izvolski finally published some of the correspondence without asking Aehrenthal's consent, an unfriendly act which still further accentuated the personal feud between them. Meanwhile Izvolski went ahead with other maneuvers for securing Russia's ambitions in regard to the Straits and for forming a Balkan league under Russian patronage.

The Bosnian Crisis had less disastrous effects upon the relations between Russia and Germany than upon those between Russia and Austria just described.

When Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replaced Count Biilow at the Wilhelmstrasse in July, 1909, Germany's international position seemed considerably improved. The new Chancellor, reviewing the situation of 1909 in his *Reflections on the World War*, shows that the tasks which he inherited from Biilow were by no means light and easy. The Moroccan Treaty of February 9, 1909, with France and the diplomatic triumph of Austria in the Bosnian Crisis had brought a feeling of relief at Berlin. The Triple Entente seemed definitely weakened and the danger of "encirclement" less alarming. On June 3, 1909, at a secret meeting attended by Tirpitz, Bethmann, Moltke, and Metternich, who had come over from London for it, Biilow declared that not for twenty years had Germany been so respected and feared in the world.

After bringing up the friction with England regarding Germany's naval plans, Bethmann, still Minister of the Interior, suggested that an agreement with England might be reached on the basis of Germany "slowing down" naval construction from four to three ships annually, if England would make concrete political offers in return. But Tirpitz blocked the path at every turn, refusing even the 4:3 ratio for British and German capital ships to which he had previously assented, and revealing a sly *reservatio mentalis*: if Germany slowed down from four to three new ships a year from 1909 to 1912, she might counterbalance this loss by speeding up from two to three in the following years, so that Germany's total number of Dreadnoughts would be the same around 1915 in either case. Though accepting in principle Bethmann's suggestion for slowing down, Tirpitz declined to fix or work out any formula to accomplish it, until the English had made concrete proposals. And in general he was in favor of "quietly waiting." This was very discouraging to Metternich and Biilow, and probably had much to do with Bulow's resignation on June 26, which was accepted by the Kaiser on July 14.

The ostensible reason for Bulow's resignation was the refusal of the Blue-Black-Bloc (the Conservative-Clerical coalition) on June 24 to vote the new finance bill, including a heavy inheritance tax, made necessary by the insatiable demands of new armaments. This gave Billow a good excuse to retire from office. Billow's "resignation with brilliants" was accepted on July 14. He received the Order of the Black Eagle, the highest distinction of the kind in the gift of the Kaiser. He (and Holstein) were mainly responsible for the failure to grasp Chamberlain's proffered hand at the turn of the century, and for the other policies which led to the formation of the Triple Entente. The real hollowness of his achievement, which he painted *coulcur de rose* in Imperial Germany, was revealed in the catastrophe of 1914. His reputation has exceeded his deserts. He will go down in history as a Chancellor of lost opportunities.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who took over Billow's difficult inheritance, lacked his predecessor's brilliance, but inspired more general confidence by his diligence, sincerity, and upright nobility of character, for which he was esteemed by all who knew him at home and abroad. With the Kaiser Bethmann kept on intimate and friendly terms. When both were in Berlin, they rode or walked almost daily together, discussing all political questions, in which the Kaiser had much wisdom as well as many prejudices. Bethmann was something of an idealist. He ardently desired peace in Europe. Therefore at heart he was opposed to greatly increased armaments. He hoped for an understanding with England on the naval question, and believed it could be reached—Germany slowing down her rate of naval construction, and England in return making political concessions in connection with the Bagdad Railway and perhaps even some kind of agreement to be neutral. The English were convinced of his sincerity in this purpose. Sir Edward Grey declared in 1912, after the Haldane Mission, that any possible differences between Germany and England would never assume dangerous proportions, "so long as German policy was directed by the Chancellor"; upon which the Kaiser commented indignantly, "This shows that Grey has no idea who is really Master here and that I rule. He prescribes to me who my Minister shall be if I am to make an agreement with England."

Bethmann's disinclination for increased armaments and his wish to make naval concessions brought him into conflict with the Kaiser, and he twice offered his resignation. But the Kaiser would not accept it because he had such confidence in Bethmann's character, and because he knew how highly he was esteemed abroad as an influence for peace.

In the Russian Foreign Office also a change took place. In September, 1910, Izvolski finally secured for himself the Russian Embassy in Paris and the generous salary attached to it. Ever since the fiasco of his effort to open the Straits by the Buchlau bargain and the humiliating outcome of the Bosnian Crisis, he had been the target of Pan-Slav attacks at home. He was also criticized by level-headed men like Kokovtsev and Krivoshein, the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture, who felt that he had brought Russia into a perilous situation in antagonizing Austria and Germany while the Russian army and navy were still a negligible quantity.

M. Sergei Dimitrijevitch Sazonov, who became Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs upon

Izvolski's transfer to Paris in September, 1910, was by nature of a mercurial and emotional temperament. In June, 1904, he became Counsellor to the Embassy in London, where he remained three years and acquired a friendly attitude toward England. In 1907, he was transferred to the Vatican, a pleasant but unimportant post which he filled for two years. In June, 1909, he returned to St. Petersburg as Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs under Izvolski. His selection to succeed Izvolski in 1910 was, therefore, not unnatural. His appointment was recommended by Izvolski, who thought there was no one else better fitted for the office.

In Russian domestic politics, Sazonov was conservative, solidly in favor of the retention of old Russian institutions and little in sympathy with the constitutional movement brought about by the Russo-Japanese War. In foreign politics, he was an ardent patriot. His lips trembled with emotion as he once remarked that he could not survive a second defeat such as Russia had suffered in her unfortunate war with Japan. The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg described him as "filled with glowing patriotism bordering on chauvinism. When he talks of past events in which he thinks Russia has suffered injustice, his face assumes an almost fanatical expression. Nevertheless, discussion with him is much easier and pleasanter than with Izvolski, because he always observes form, remains master of himself, and does not emphasize personal matters."

Toward Germany Sazonov was favorably inclined personally. His grandmother was German and he had many personal relations with Germany. When he talked with Bethmann, he preferred to use German rather than French. He had much sympathy with the large group at the Tsar's court who wished to see restored the old cordial relations between Germany and Russia, who looked to Berlin rather than to Paris and London, and whose shibboleth was monarchical solidarity rather than constitutional democracy. But Sazonov also believed, like so many Pan-Slavs, that Bismarck had done Russia a great injustice at the Congress of Berlin, as had Bismarck in the Bosnian Crisis. Nevertheless, he wanted to cooperate with Germany and reestablish mutual confidence. He therefore welcomed the visit which the Tsar was to pay the Kaiser at Potsdam in November, 1910.

Sazonov, like Bethmann, was sincerely desirous of peace. But, as will appear in more detail in the next chapter, he was very nervous at any advance of Austrian or German influence in the Balkans which might endanger Russia's historic mission of acquiring control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and even of Constantinople. He was also very sensitive to the criticism of the Pan-Slav Press. It is true that hardly ten per cent of the Russian people could read at all, and a still smaller proportion paid any attention to newspapers, so that there was in Russia no general "public opinion" in the Western sense of the word. Nevertheless Russian newspapers did exercise a much stronger influence on Russian foreign policy than is usually supposed, both through their criticisms of ministers at home and through their attacks on statesmen abroad.

With the Russian Revolution of 1905, the establishment of the Duma, and the formation of the Entente with the two great democracies of the West, a majority of the Russian Press had become "liberal" in domestic matters, and strongly Anglophil and Francophil

in foreign politics. (How can such a change suddenly happen? The owners of the newspapers must have changed...) It attacked Germany as the stronghold of absolutism and reaction, and as the instigator and protector of Austrian aggressions in the Balkans. It demanded that Russian Foreign Ministers should extend protection and help to the Slavs of the Balkans in their struggle to emancipate themselves from the Turkish and Hapsburg yoke. It was this Pan-Slav Press of which Sazonov, timid by nature and none too secure in his official position, was in constant fear during the next four years. It drove him at times into a stronger support of Serbia and a sharper antagonism to Austria and Germany than he personally favored himself. It partly accounts for the changeableness and instability of his policies, which worried France and England as well as Germany.

In fact, between 1908 and 1914, there was no single topic which was so frequently a subject of complaint and discussion between representatives of Germany and Russia as the malign influence of the Pan-Slav and Pan-German Press in stirring up bad blood between the two countries. After the Bosnian Crisis, for instance, "Willy" wrote to "Nicky":

A few weeks ago, when affairs threatened to become dangerous, your wise and courageous decision secured peace among the nations. I was most gratified that by my cooperation you were able to fulfil your task. I very naturally expected that you and I would win universal applause, for I ventured to think that we have earned the gratitude of all well-meaning people. But to my regret and astonishment I observe that a great many blame us both instead. Especially the press has behaved in the basest way against me. By some papers I am credited with being the author of annexation and am accused amongst other rot and nonsense of having humiliated Russia by my proposal. Of course you know better. Yet the fact must be taken note of that the papers mostly create public opinion. Some of the papers err through their ignorance and lack of correct information; they can scarcely see farther than their nose's length. But more dangerous and at the same time loathsome is that part of the press which writes what it is paid for. The scoundrels who do such dirty work, are in no fear of starving. They will always incite the hostility of one nation against the other and when at last, by their hellish devices, they have brought about the much desired collision, they sit down and watch the fight which they organized, resting well assured that the profit will be theirs, no matter what the issue may be. In this way in 99 cases out of a hundred, what is vulgarly called "public opinion" is a mere forgery.

To this the Tsar replied: "Everything you write about the Press, as you know from our previous conversations, I agree with completely. It is one of the curses of modern times."

But it would be a mistake to think that Sazonov was wholly innocent of all connection with the Press which he genuinely feared. On the contrary, the Russian Foreign Office stood in close touch with *Novoe Vremia* and other papers which were most chauvinist and critical in tone. Sazonov (or his subordinates) often furnished the information and arguments which these papers were to use against Germany. He thus stirred them up to a nationalist campaign, behind which he would take refuge as a justification of the policy which he was

“compelled by public opinion“ to adopt. In critical negotiations with Germany, as in the Potsdam Agreements and the Liman von Sanders affair, important secrets often “leaked“ from the Russian Foreign Office to the representatives of the Russian (and also of the French and English) Press in St. Petersburg; when matters thus got into the newspapers, they raised questions of prestige which made it more difficult for both Governments to make concessions toward a reasonable compromise settlement.

There were also journalists outside Russia who wrote in the Pan-Slav cause, and who exercised an influence on Sazonov while at the same time receiving funds from the Russian Foreign Office. Of these the most important was Wesselitzki, the London correspondent of the *Novoe Vremia*. He had been given subsidies and the use of a summer villa at St. Petersburg when Izvolski was Minister of Foreign Affairs. “These expenditures were not in vain,” wrote Izvolski in 1911, when urging that his successors at the Russian Foreign Office should continue to subsidize Wesselitzki. As president of the Foreign Press Association in London, and in his frequent visits to foreign capitals, as well as in the materials which he contributed to the *Novoe Vremia*, Wesselitzki took every opportunity to sow discord between Russia and Germany and to tighten up the bonds between the members of the Triple Entente. Complaints of his mischievous activities and of the articles which he wrote under the pseudonym “Argus,” appear frequently in the recently published German documents.

Neither Germany nor Russia were to be expected to modify in any way their respective alliances. But Kiderlen (German ambassador) was ready to assure Russia that Germany was neither bound nor inclined to support any new Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. Nor was Germany pursuing any political aims of her own in the Near East ; she regarded the Badgad Railway primarily as an economic enterprise; and she merely wanted to see Turkey maintained intact, in the interests of peace and the status quo. There were many subjects in which Russian and German interests ran parallel, and it would be desirable to discuss them confidentially but frankly, and thus put an end to mutual recriminations and restore the friendly contact which had been lost under Izvolski’s management of Russian foreign policy.

These views met with a warm response from the new Russian Minister. Sazonov declared that the Bosnian Crisis belonged to the past and would not influence Russian policy in the future. Russia no longer had any expansionist policy. Her single task was her own internal consolidation. Russia’s agreement of 1907 aimed purely to put an end to friction in the Middle East. If England pursued an anti- German policy, she would not find Russia on her side. Russia and Germany were neighbors and ought to live on good terms. As to Persia, the Germans again declared that they had no political aims in that troubled country, but wanted the “open door“ for their commerce, which was handicapped by the Russian tariff charged upon goods in transit and by lack of good communications.

Sazonov replied that the anarchical conditions in Northern Persia made it impossible for Russia to withdraw her troops. But if Germany would withdraw from all railway and telegraph projects in the Russian sphere in Persia, Russia would withdraw all discriminating

tariffs and other obstacles to the importation of German goods into Persia. To open up the country Russia proposed to extend her railway system from the Caucasus via Tabriz and Teheran to the western frontier of Persia at Khanikin; and the Germans could then build a line to connect Khanikin and the Bagdad Railway. Bethmann understood that "Russia would no longer lay any obstacles in the way of the construction of the Bagdad Railway as far as Bagdad." In his report to the Tsar on the Potsdam meeting, Sazonov said "the question of the Bagdad Railway was not raised"; though he admitted that he told Bethmann that "if other interested Powers were to participate in this line, Russia could not remain empty-handed and would then want to have the Khanikin-Bagdad section."

In his audience with the Kaiser Sazonov had been impressed with the Kaiser's irritation against England's naval policy, his fears of a "preventive attack," and his hope that the German fleet would soon have assumed proportions which would make England afraid to incur this risk. He had also tried to draw the Kaiser's attention to the danger to Russia, with her twenty million Mohammedan subjects, arising from the Pan-Islam propaganda.

The Potsdam conversations were cordial and frank on both sides. Bethmann and Sazonov each got a very favorable impression of the other. An excellent start was made in removing suspicions and in bringing the two countries back into the old paths from which they had strayed as a result of Izvolski's active Entente policy and unsuccessful Balkan ambitions. But Sazonov caused difficulties. On returning home, he seems to have feared criticism from the Pan-Slav Press. He had therefore, without consulting Germany, given an interview to the *Novoe Vremia*. This paper then published an account exaggerating the points conceded by Germany and minimizing those conceded by Russia. Sazonov explained apologetically to Pourtales (French ambassador) that he wished to turn aside the possible wrath of this section of the Russian Press.

Meanwhile Bethmann's Reichstag speech of December 10, 1910, summing up the Potsdam interview as a renewed assurance that Germany and Russia would not enter into any hostile combinations one against the other, had fallen like a bomb in Paris and London, where Sazonov had allowed the impression to prevail that Persia and the Bagdad Railway were the only important questions discussed. The newly appointed English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, now hastened to present his credentials to the Tsar. He emphasized England's earnest wish to see the Anglo-Russian understanding maintained and consolidated, and expressed his anxiety concerning Sazonov's negotiations with Germany. Whereupon the Tsar, always inclined to agree with whomever had his ear at the moment, assured Buchanan that Russia "would conclude no arrangement with Germany without first submitting it to His Majesty's Government."

in the course of the next six months, a Russo-German agreement on the Middle East was gradually worked out. The negotiations were delayed by England's constant efforts to limit the entrance of German influence into Persia, and to secure control or participation in the section of the railway from Bagdad down to the Persian Gulf.

Russia's withdrawal of opposition to Germany's cherished desire of pushing the Bagdad

Railway to completion opened the way for Germany's successful negotiations with Turkey and with England for further mutually advantageous arrangements. Germany acquired flocks at Alexandretta and a branch line from there northward by which railway materials could be more easily imported for extending construction east of the Taurus Mountains. The Powers consented to an increase of the Turkish tariff from r/c to 15funds for paying the railway guarantees. England was given two of the seats on the Board of Directors of the Bagdad Railway Company, assured a dominant position in the navigation rights and oil resources of southern Mesopotamia, and largely relieved of her fears that the Bagdad Railway would be a German menace to the safety of India. The negotiations for all these arrangements were protracted over three years, but had been successfully concluded on June 15, 1914, two weeks before the Sarajevo assassination; the agreements lacked only the final signatures at the moment they were tossed to the winds by the outbreak of the World War.

While Germany was thus on the way toward better relations with Russia in the summer of 1911, her relations with the two other members of the Triple Entente were suddenly made much worse by a new Morocco crisis.

The Agadir Crisis 1911

The Franco-German Morocco Agreement of 1909 was at first lived up to loyally by both parties. Pichon and Bethmann both made cordial public statements to that effect in the fall of 1909. But gradually friction developed again. The Mannesmann Brothers had acquired from Mulai Hand certain mining rights not recognized by the French, which conflicted with the claims of the international "Union des Mines Marocaines." The Franco-German consortium for the development of the Cameroon- Congo trade had finally to be given up, on account of the protests of the French nationalists that the Germans were getting the greater advantage, and the Germans were then left seriously embarrassed. The disorders in the country gave the French a pretext for a steady extension of their police and military control, and Mulai Hand was forced by an ultimatum to accept a loan which brought him more completely under French domination. It gradually became clearer and clearer that with this extension of French influence the equality of economic opportunity contemplated in the 1909 Agreement, and the idea of an independent Sultan at the head of a well-regulated government, were both fictions in contradiction with the actual trend of events. Nevertheless the fictions served as a basis for friendly relations between France and Germany for two years.

The Agadir Crisis occurred in 1911 just four years after the First Moroccan Crisis. What happened in Agadir is sometimes called the Second Moroccan Crisis. Events in North Africa were once again going to destabilise the relationships between the major European powers and while Europe was not taken to the brink of war by the Agadir Crisis, it was symptomatic of how fragile diplomatic relations had become. Between 1905 and 1906 Morocco had been a major cause of diplomatic ructions in Europe. By the end of the

Algeciras Conference of 1906, it was generally accepted that France had come out of the First Moroccan Crisis well while the opposite was true for Germany. Consequently, German politicians lost a lot of influence in Berlin while their place was taken by senior military figures. In France a more nationalistic outlook developed based upon French 'élan vitale'. In 1911 a repeat performance took place when it became even more obvious that the ante had been upped. Consequently, Europe became a far more destabilised entity.

Agadir was a port in Morocco in the southwest of the country. The 1906 Act of Algeciras had never really sorted out the problems of Morocco. However, Germany's attention was diverted after the 1905-06 crisis by other issues, mainly building up her navy. As a result France spent five years having far more influence in Morocco than Germany. They backed the corrupt Sultan, Abdul Aziz, who was accused by some of his countrymen of selling out Morocco to the French. The half-brother of Aziz, Mulay Hafid, took a stand on behalf of the Moroccan people who proclaimed him Sultan in January 1908.

It was around this time that the German government wanted a better share of the economic potential that they believed Morocco offered. The influential Mannesmann Company wanted to get what it believed would be lucrative mining concessions in southern Morocco. In February 1909, Germany and France signed an agreement whereby Germany recognised the 'special interests' France had in Morocco while France agreed not to hinder Germany's commercial and economic interests there. All seemed well between the two powers until it became clear to the Germans that France was not going to allow Germany to have any input into the building of two vital railway lines in Morocco. The German Foreign Minister, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter tried to work out an agreement with his French counterpart. However, the French Foreign Minister, Jean Cruppi, viewed all of Kiderlen-Wächter's suggestions with alarm.

While there was diplomatic discord with regards to Morocco, there were also internal problems occurring that the new Sultan, Mulay Hafid, could not deal with. The general dislocation that Morocco was experiencing encouraged certain tribes to rebel against Hafid and those who were supporting him, including the French. Rebel tribesmen attacked French forces stationed near Casablanca from January 1911 onwards. Fez also came under attack. Germany believed that if France sent more troops into Morocco to restore order, they would not leave the country and would be used to assert French authority throughout the country. This, they believed, would threaten German mining interests in the south of Morocco. As the situation in Fez became more and more threatening, a decision was taken in Paris to send in more French troops. In April 1911 a decision was made to send troops to Fez to support the foreign contingent living there. In May 1911, 20,000 French, Colonial and Moroccan soldiers arrived in the city and their presence had an impact as the rebels became less active.

Technically, this should have improved the situation as there were many foreigners living in Fez including Germans who now seemed a lot safer. However, the mere presence of 20,000 French troops in the city was too much for the German government in Berlin. However, Kiderlen-Wächter had to tread carefully. He knew that there were those in

Berlin who were sabre-rattling. He did not share their enthusiasm for taking on the French as he believed it was simply a matter of time before France took over Morocco and that it was a *fait accompli* that Germany could do nothing about. However, Kiderlen-Wächter was well aware of the clout of the military over the Kaiser, Wilhelm II. He had to persuade the Kaiser that he knew what he was doing without appearing to support the sabre-rattlers while at the same time ensuring that the French believed that he was not going to tamely let them keep a further 20,000 troops in Morocco. His plan was to send German warships to Agadir and Mogador ostensibly to defend German citizens in Morocco. He hoped that such a move would placate the hawks who seemed to be surrounding Wilhelm. But Kiderlen-Wächter also knew that it would provoke a French response which he hoped would not be aggressive. Kiderlen-Wächter gambled that his move of sending warships to Morocco would result in a positive French reaction that would ironically allow him to curb the excesses of the hawks in Berlin. Wilhelm expressed concern about the plan but he did not refuse to support it.

Kiderlen-Wächter found an unlikely ally in Jules Cambon, the French ambassador in Berlin who wanted to take the sting out of the Agadir crisis before it got out of hand. Cambon was also aware that hawks existed in the government in Paris – men who were all too prepared to push the crisis to the limit. With hindsight, it is possible to label both Kiderlen-Wächter and Cambon as the doves in the proceedings. Despite this a gunboat was sent to Agadir. This was the 'Panther' which arrived at Agadir on July 1st 1911. On July 5th, the 'Panther' was replaced by the larger 'Berlin'. However, the French and the British were aware that the Germans were simply making a statement and neither was prepared to respond in an aggressive manner. On July 9th 1911, Kiderlen-Wächter and Cambon met to discuss the situation. Both clearly stated their nation's intentions in Africa. Kiderlen-Wächter expressed Germany's interest in the French Congo in exchange for French control in Morocco. While the French were not keen on this, they were prepared to keep the discussions going. In Britain there was no desire for war over Morocco. On July 20th 1911, Grey sent out a note that stated that a war with Germany over Morocco was not worth it.

However, on the same day "The Times" published an article about Germany's desire for French Congo. It was an alarmist report that also stated that no British government worth its salt would allow such a move as it would threaten British interests in sub-Saharan Africa. On July 22nd the Germans complained about the 'Times' article, which claimed that the Germans acted like Dick Turpin. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, upped the ante when he gave a speech. Lloyd George said:

But I am also bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster, and even from national extinction.

I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international good-will except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.

This speech caused an explosion of wrath in Germany, where it was interpreted as a threat, and where it was felt that England was interfering in Franco-German negotiations which were none of her business. It made all the more effect that it was delivered, not by Grey himself, who was regarded as being unduly anti-German, but by the Chancellor of the Exchequer who had the reputation of being a man of peace and generally favorable to Germany. When he spoke out in this way he was regarded as having been selected by the Government in order to make the warning all the more emphatic. Both the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey had been consulted, and approved Lloyd George's action. Winston Churchill, the Home Secretary, was enthusiastic for it. But he makes plain that he knew it was playing dangerously with fire. It greatly increased the already existing tension between England and Germany growing out of the naval competition. It might indeed have easily led to war, had not the Kaiser and Bethmann been determined not to allow the Moroccan affair to cause a European conflict. It did, however, produce two results which ultimately contributed to a peaceful solution of the Moroccan question. It led Germany to inform England at once that she had no intention of establishing herself on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, which had been Grey's great cause of alarm. And it also caused Germany to moderate somewhat her demand on France. After four months of protracted and difficult negotiations, Kiderlen and Cambon were able to sign the agreement of November 4, 1911.

Kiderlen-Wächter continued with his policy of seemingly placating the French while convincing the Kaiser that Germany was making a resolute stand against them. Franco-German talks continued with regards to Morocco and the French Congo right through to September. However, the British media presented a more hawkish front. It was reported that Churchill had completed plans for a British expeditionary force and that he had ensured the protection of the Royal Navy's cordite supply against suspected German sabotage. It was also reported that the Royal Navy had been put on full alert. This approach by the British media forced Foreign Secretary Grey into announcing that he would not send Royal Navy warships to Morocco but that he would monitor what was happening in Africa with great care and caution so that British interests were not threatened.

On September 1st 1911 negotiations between France and Germany came to an abrupt halt. This resulted in the stock market in Berlin crashing. It showed just how sensitive the situation had become as the only reason the negotiations had halted was because of an illness to French diplomatist Cambon. Others misread the situation. By November 1911, both Germany and France had come to a conclusion over their particular stance in

Africa. France handed to Germany over 107,000 square miles of land, which the French media portrayed as “a few acres of swamp”. Germany handed over to France 6,450 square miles of land in the Upper Cameroons. But neither the Congo nor Morocco turned out to be economic goldmines.

As between England and Germany, the Agadir Crisis not only increased the friction between the two governments at the time, but it seems to have deepened Grey's suspicions of Germany's warlike inclinations. This is evident from his observations on the subject in his memoirs, where he implies (quite contrary to facts) that “the Agadir Crisis was intended to end either in the diplomatic humiliation of France or in war;” and adds: “The militarists in Germany were bitterly disappointed over Agadir, and when the next crisis came we found them with the reins in their hands.” His feeling at the time was significantly expressed in his statement to the Russian Ambassador in London: “In the event of a war between Germany and France, England would have to participate. If this war should involve Russia [the Ambassador had just assured him that it would], Austria would be dragged in too, for, although she has not the slightest desire to interfere in this matter, she will be compelled by force of circumstances to do so. There is no doubt that in such an event the situation in Albania will become aggravated. Consequently, it would no longer be a duel between France and Germany—it would be a general war.” Grey added, however, that he did not believe Emperor William wanted war. Two weeks earlier the Russian Ambassador had reported: “There is no use concealing the fact—one step further, and a war between England and Germany would have broken out as a result of the Franco-German dispute, although independent of it.”

Between England and France the Agadir Crisis, like the Morocco Crisis of 1905, led to a tightening of the bonds between the two. France was grateful for Lloyd George's speech, and for the indications that England would not only give her the diplomatic support promised in the agreement of 1904, but also the military support contemplated in the military and naval “conversations” which had been going on between the two countries since 1906.

On July 20, after Kiderlen's demand for the whole Congo and the day before Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, there took place at the French Ministry of War a Conference between General Wilson, the Head of the Department for Military Operations of the English General Staff, and General Dubail, the French Chief of Staff. It was “to determine the new conditions for the participation of an English army in the operations of the French armies in the North-East in case of a war with Germany.” The protocol of the Conference took care, as usual, to state that these “conversations, devoid of all official character, cannot bind either Government in any way,” and aimed merely “to foresee the indispensable preparatory measures.” But six weeks later, General Dubail stated to the Russians, as if there were no doubt in the matter, that the French army was ready to take the offensive against Germany “with the aid of the English army on its left wing.”

Russia, having just established more friendly relations with Germany as a result of the Potsdam agreements, did not wish to endanger these by too active a support of France in

the Agadir affair. At the beginning, when requested by her ally to make representations at Berlin, Russia had done so in a perfunctory way, but without exerting any real pressure. Later during the long Franco-German negotiations for a Congo-Cameroon exchange of territories, Izvolski himself says he worked "with all his strength" to moderate the French and urged them to yield to many of the German demands. This is confirmed by Caillaux, and by the French Ambassador in Russia, M. Georges Louis, who reported that Russia would honor her signature on the alliance, but that Russian public opinion would hardly understand a Franco-Russian war occasioned by a colonial question like Morocco.

And when M. Louis pointed out to the Tsar that Morocco was as much of a vital interest to France, as the Caucasus and the control of the Black Sea to Russia, Nicholas II replied: "Keep in view the avoidance of a conflict. You know our preparations are not complete." Russia did not at this time want to be drawn into a war over Morocco any more than France had wished hitherto to be drawn in over Balkan questions. Russia needed to build up her army and navy much further before risking a European War. But the very fact of this lukewarm support by Russia of French colonial interests, and by France of Russia's Balkan ambitions, became an added spur to Izvolski to tighten up the Franco-Russian Alliance after 1911. And in this he was soon aided by M. Poincare, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs in France early in 1912.

This shows that Russia started playing for time, trying to avoid conflict as long as their military was not strong enough. And it also shows that they would be comfortable with war the moment their military was ready.

Another effect of the Agadir Crisis and the consequent strengthening of the French grip on Morocco and the Western Mediterranean was Italy's decision that the time had come for her to seize Tripoli. This so weakened Turkey that Serbia and Bulgaria hastened to take steps toward the formation of a Balkan League, with Russia's assistance, which led to the Balkan Wars. These in turn further embittered the relations between Serbia and Austria, and so contributed to one of the main causes of the World War.

The Haldane Mission 1912

In 1908, as has been indicated above, Tirpitz had secured the adoption by the Reichstag of a naval program providing for the construction of four capital ships annually from 1908 to 1911, and for two annually from 1912 to 1917. The English had become greatly alarmed, both for their actual safety and for the disastrous effect upon Anglo-German relations. They had therefore made efforts to call a halt, or come to some understanding, but these had failed owing to the Kaiser's decisive opposition, culminating in his interview with Sir Charles Hardinge at Cronberg in August, 1908.

During the following months English alarm steadily increased, and frightened imaginations pictured a German invasion of England. Further antagonism between the two countries was caused by the unfortunate Daily Telegraph affair. The Kaiser had allowed an English

friend to summarize a confidential talk in which the Kaiser refuted the idea that he was hostile to England. The English were "mad, mad as March hares," he had said, to suspect the German navy, which was simply to protect German commerce and not to attack England. The Kaiser was the friend of England. He wished to restrain the German people, whose prevailing sentiment was not friendly to England. But the English suspicions and Press attacks made his task of preserving peace difficult. As proof of his friendly attitude in the past, he recalled that during the Boer War he had refused to join France and Russia in putting pressure on England in favor of the Boers; on the contrary, he had even sent Queen Victoria a plan of campaign for use against the Boers. The Kaiser sent the manuscript of this summary to Biilow at his summer home at Nordeney on the shore of the North Sea, and Biilow, without studying it, sent it to the Foreign Office for examination and comment. But here an official, supposing that it had received Biilow's approval, allowed it to go out, and it was published in the London Daily Telegraph on October 28, 1908.

The Kaiser had hoped the article would disarm England's suspicions and improve the relations between the two countries. It had precisely the opposite effect. It caused a storm of newspaper attacks on both sides of the North Sea, many of which were directed against himself personally. The English doubted his sincerity; they ridiculed and resented the idea that any advice of his had helped them win the Boer War; but they noted as ominous his admission that the prevailing sentiment in Germany was unfriendly to England. In Germany, the Liberals and Socialists protested bitterly against his ill-considered act and the dangers of his personal rule. Biilow tendered his resignation, but withdrew it after the Kaiser promised in the future not to talk politics without his Chancellor's advice. But in the great Reichstag debate growing out of this affair, the Kaiser felt that Biilow did not adequately defend his sovereign's position. He no longer regarded his Chancellor with the same favor and confidence.

Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in England, was greatly distressed at seeing the two countries drifting into mutual misunderstandings and recriminations which one day might lead to war. English public opinion was demanding that the Cabinet should assure the "Two Power Standard" (that the English navy should be as strong as the combined navies of any other two Powers), and that if Germany built four Dreadnoughts annually, England should build eight. Lord Roberts began to tour the country trying to arouse England to the creation of a huge army and the adoption of the continental system of universal military service, naming Germany as the enemy of the future.

Metternich suggested the desirability of slowing down Germany's program of construction from four to three ships annually, and of trying to come to some understanding with England. Biilow personally was in favor of the suggestion. To facilitate an understanding with England he hastened to make the Morocco settlement of 1909, which he hoped would remove one of the political causes of England's distrust. He sent Metternich's despatches to Tirpitz for comment. But the Admiral disagreed fundamentally with the wise Ambassador's diagnosis of the English situation. Tirpitz received part of his in-

formation about England from the German naval attaches, whose reports often sound like an echo of their master's voice and wishes. Tirpitz insisted that the fundamental cause of British alarm and agitation was not the German navy, but German industrial and commercial competition (He probably did not realize just how correct he was at that time). The British were now getting accustomed to the idea of a respectable German navy, but what troubled them was the fact that Germany, like Holland in the seventeenth century, was everywhere taking their trade and capturing their markets. It would do little good to slow down the naval program; and, anyway, it was fixed by law and could not be altered. To alter it as a result of the English clamor would be an intolerable humiliation for Germany and encourage the navy propaganda in England. Therefore Germany ought to go ahead with the creation of the "risk navy," and trust to passing safely through the "danger zone" without a British attack.

As Metternich had forecast, the British agitation continued, and under its influence Mr. McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed that for three years England should lay down six Dreadnoughts a year against Germany's four. A considerable number in the Cabinet and in Parliament thought that four British ships would still be enough to maintain a safe margin of British superiority. To overcome their objections and carry his bill, Mr. McKenna exaggerated the rate of speed at which the German ships were being completed. He alleged that Germany was exceeding the "normal rate" by secretly assembling materials beforehand, so that she might have 13 completed as early as 1911, instead of in 1912, as contemplated in the German navy law and as Metternich had expressly assured Grey beforehand was the actual intention. Thus, Germany might have 13 Dreadnoughts to England's 16 in 1911, and an even more dangerous proportion in the following years. These statements of the First Lord of the Admiralty crystallized the general feeling of uneasiness into a firstclass "navy scare." The public believed that Germany was trying to steal a march on England, and now clamored for eight ships, instead of the six which Mr. McKenna had asked for. "We want eight and we won't wait," was the popular cry. In the end, eight were voted, four at once, and four contingent upon Germany's continuing to build according to her program.

The effect on Anglo-German relations was deplorable. The Kaiser boiled with indignation at McKenna's "lies," and blamed Metternich for letting the wool be pulled over his eyes and for not taking a stiffer tone to Grey. He was particularly displeased that Metternich had given the English to understand that Germany did not intend further to increase her program in the future—"a colossal personal concession, given right out of hand without getting the slightest tiling from England in return, except untold lies, slanders, suspicions, and incivilities." Although Mr. McKenna later admitted his statements to have been incorrect, they had done their damage in further increasing Anglo-German antagonism.

Bethmann-Hollweg, -who succeeded Billow as Chancellor, agreed with Metternich as to the need for coming to a naval agreement with England. He believed that Germany could not be expected to have her 1908 program modified by a formal Reichstag amendment,

but she might "retard the rate" of construction, he hoped that in return England might make concessions in regard to colonial questions and the Bagdad Railway and perhaps give some kind of neutrality promise. With this in view he opened negotiations with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, in August, 1909, but they came to nothing. 146 In the course of the next two years he took up this idea several times, as well as various minor proposals to mitigate naval rivalry and suspicions, such as a mutual visiting of navy yards and exchange of information by naval attaches. But he had no success. 147 Finally, in the fall of 1911, after the heat of the Agadir Crisis had somewhat cooled down, the idea was taken in hand more definitely by two business men.

Albert Ballin, the head of the Hamburg-American Line, believed that the rapid building of the German navy was the main cause of Anglo-German antagonism and might some day lead to war. He considered this naval rivalry a far more serious threat to the peace of Europe than the Franco-Russian alliance. He was also on intimate and very friendly terms with Tirpitz and the Kaiser, as well as with Bethmann. He was aware that the German Government intended to lay a new navy law before the Reichstag in the spring of 1912, and he wished to bring about some understanding with England before this made matters worse. His friend, Sir Ernest Cassel, was a rich and influential London banker. Born in Germany, Cassel had emigrated to England as a boy, and had at heart the interests of the land of his birth no less than of his adopted country. Like Ballin in Germany, he enjoyed in England a social and political position of great influence without holding any office in the Government. He had become an intimate friend of Edward VII, both as his banker and political adviser. He carried great weight among English business men in the "City," (City of London financial district) as well as in English political circles.

Ballin saw Cassel, who thereupon got into touch with Sir Edward Grey. This paved the way for the Haldane Mission. On January 29, 1912, Cassel came to Berlin with a memorandum 161 which had been approved by Sir Edward Grey, Winston Churchill, and Lloyd George. This memorandum was to serve as a basis for opening official negotiations, and ran as follows:

1. Fundamental. Naval superiority recognized as essential to Great Britain. Present German naval program and expenditure not to be increased, but if possible retarded and reduced.

2. England sincerely desires not to interfere with German Colonial expansion. To give effect to this she is prepared forthwith to discuss whatever the German aspirations in that direction may be. England will be glad to know that there is a field or special points where she can help Germany.

3. Proposals for reciprocal assurances debarring either power from joining in aggressive designs or combinations against the other would be welcome.

Sir Ernest Cassel showed this memorandum to the German Chancellor, who replied in writing that he welcomed this step taken by the British Government, and was in full accord with the memorandum, except that the new 1912 German naval estimates had already

been arranged. He added that he and the Kaiser would be greatly pleased if Sir Edward Grey would visit Berlin, as the most effectual way of bringing the negotiations rapidly forward. Cassel returned to Grey and told him that if the German naval expenditure could be so arranged, by a modification of the German rate of construction or otherwise, as to render unnecessary any serious increase of British naval expenditure, "British Government will be prepared at once to pursue negotiations, on the understanding that the point of naval expenditure is open to discussion and that there is a fair prospect of settling it favorably."

If this understanding was acceptable, a British Minister would come to Berlin. Bethmann replied that it was acceptable, provided England gave adequate guarantees of a friendly orientation of her general policy. "The agreement would have to give expression to a statement that both Powers agreed to participate in no plans, combinations or warlike engagements directed against either Power." Sir Edward Grey himself was unwilling to accept the cordial invitation to Berlin. His reasons, according to his memoirs of a dozen years later, were his fears that "the visit might arouse suspicion and distrust at Paris"; that the whole plan might be "one of those petty unofficial manoeuvres that could be avowed or disavowed at Berlin as best might suit German convenience"; and that he "had no great hope that anything would come of it." Probably at the time his strongest motives were his deep distrust of Germany, and his fear of alarming France and so weakening the Entente. He decided not to go to Berlin himself, but arranged that Lord Haldane, the Minister of War, should go in his place.

In 1910, when Bethmann was trying to secure an understanding with England, Grey had written to the British Ambassador in Berlin: "The mutual arrest or decrease of naval expenditure is the test of whether an understanding is worth anything," and that in Bethmann's overtures "the naval question was not sufficiently prominent." He apparently did not think that there was any better chance of German naval reduction in 1912. He seems to have been convinced that the Kaiser had taken the initiative, and then, if he had gone to Berlin and the negotiations had come to nothing, the German Government would have tried to put the blame upon him, Grey. But above all, Grey was determined not to endanger in the slightest degree the Entente with France.

He had been told by Winston Churchill that the Admiralty was contemplating bringing home the Mediterranean ships, in order to meet the new Third Squadron which Tirpitz wanted; and that this meant relying on France in the Mediterranean (as was later actually arranged), so that certainly no change in the Entente would be possible, even if Grey desired it. To allay French fears Grey at once informed the French Ambassador of the projected negotiations and assured him that he would do nothing with Germany that would tie his hands. His statement to Paul Cambon shows what a restricted conception he had of the Haldane Mission:

Haldane was "to find out whether Germany's recent overture was serious or not. He was also to attempt to gather information about the Bagdad Railway. But there is no question of entering upon negotiations. We desire only to learn the intentions of the

German Government and to inquire about its plans for a naval program." This attitude on Sir Edward Grey's part in itself foredoomed the Haldane Mission to failure.

Lord Haldane's reception at Berlin was most cordial and aroused considerable optimism, both in his own mind and especially in that of the Kaiser. His first interview on February 8 was with Bethmann at the British Embassy. He got the impression, which he always regained, that the Chancellor was as sincerely desirous of avoiding war as he was himself. Next day he lunched with Tirpitz and the Kaiser, and had a long and friendly discussion. He emphasized England's necessity of having a fleet large enough to protect her commerce and vital supply of food and raw materials. He admitted that Germany was free to build as she pleased, but so was England, and England would probably lay down two keels to every one which Germany added to her program. After a long discussion between him and Tirpitz about the Two Power Standard and naval ratios, in regard to which they could find no mutually satisfactory basis, the Kaiser proposed that it would be better to avoid for the moment discussing shipbuilding programs; instead of attempting to define ratios between the two navies, it would be better to have the agreement deal with the political question of general policy and colonial matters; after this was concluded and published, the Kaiser would have Tirpitz tell the Reichstag that the new political agreement with England had entirely altered the situation, and the three extra ships which the new navy law proposed to lay down in 1912, 1914, and 1916, would not be asked for until 1913, 1916, and 1919.

In a long final interview on February 10, 1912, Bethmann proposed the following formula for a political agreement:

I. The High Contracting Powers assure each other mutually of their desire for peace and friendship.

II. They will not, either of them, make any combination, or join in any combination which is directed against the other. They expressly declare that they are not bound by any such combination.

III. If either of the High Contracting Parties becomes entangled in a war with one or more other Powers, the other of the High Contracting Parties will at least observe toward the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavor for the localisation of the conflict.

IV. The duty of neutrality which arises from the preceding Article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the High Contracting Powers have already made. The making of new agreements which make it impossible for either of the Contracting Parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the provision contained in Article II.

Haldane objected to Article III as being too wide-reaching. It would preclude England from coming to the assistance of France should Germany attack her and aim at getting

possession of such ports as Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. This England could never tolerate, because it was essential to her island security that these ports should remain in the friendly hand of France. Lord Haldane therefore proposed to modify Articles II and III so that they would read:

II. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any unprovoked attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with any other power directed to such an end.

III. If either of the High Contracting Parties becomes entangled in a war with one or more other powers, in which it cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other of the High Contracting Parties will at least observe towards the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality and use its utmost endeavor for the localisation of the conflict.

In his eagerness to secure an agreement Bethmann bit at this bait, without committing himself to accept it. Later, however, Germany argued, and with good reason, that the words “unprovoked” and “aggressor” were too uncertain in interpretation. In the complex situations which lead to war, it is always difficult to tell which side is really the aggressor. To make neutrality dependent on this uncertainty of interpretation would be robbing the agreement of all its value. Suppose Germany were drawn into a war with Russia and France, England’s neutrality would then depend on whether or not she judged that Germany had “provoked” the war. (Interesting to note here is that in World War II, Germany is automatically seen as the aggressor just because it allegedly started shooting first when in fact, the situation was more complex)

In regard to naval rivalry, Haldane agreed that the new Navy Law, having been publicly announced by the Kaiser, would have to be brought before the Reichstag, but he doubted very much whether the British Cabinet would regard as satisfactory the slight postponement in construction which the Kaiser had mentioned the day before. England would be compelled to take counter-measures, and English public opinion would not be likely to sanction any “political agreement” between the countries at a moment when both were increasing naval expenditures.

After all these points had been noted down for further discussion by the London and Berlin Governments, Lord Haldane returned to England, carrying in his pocket the draft of the proposed German Navy Law. This had been confidentially given to him by the Kaiser, with permission to show it privately to his colleagues, although its contents was still unknown to the Reichstag and the German public. As it was a bulky document requiring technical knowledge, Haldane had not attempted to study it in Berlin. When he handed it over to Winston Churchill and the Admiralty for examination, they believed that it would entail very serious naval expenditures on the part of both England and Germany.

In other words, as Metternich bluntly reported, the “political agreement” was in danger of being shipwrecked on the Navy Law. To save the former, Germany must abandon or

greatly modify the latter. In fact Grey told him flatly a few days later that it would be impossible to sign any political agreement at the moment when both countries were making increased naval expenditures, because public opinion would regard this as inconsistent. At Berlin this memorandum made a bad impression. Grey seemed to have damped all hopes of an understanding. He had abandoned the basis of discussion agreed to by Haldane at Berlin, shifting it away from the neutrality agreement, and giving priority to a criticism of the Navy Law and naval details.

The Kaiser was especially indignant at the change in England's attitude. He was willing to proceed with negotiations on the basis of Haldane's conversations at Berlin, but not on the new basis which Grey was taking in London. A memorandum to this effect was drawn up for Metternich; but was held back by Bethmann for several days. In spite of everything, he and Kiderlen were still making a valiant struggle to satisfy Grey. They were trying to persuade Tirpitz and the Kaiser to abandon the three extra capital ships and postpone still further the publication of the Navy Law. But the Kaiser was impatient to have the Navy Law laid before the Reichstag, inasmuch as it had already been announced in his speech, and been in English hands for more than a fortnight. At Bethmann's insistence it had been withheld from publication hitherto, in order not to jeopardize the negotiations with England.

Finally, on March 5, the Kaiser telegraphed to Bethmann that the memorandum for Metternich must be delivered to Grey on the morning of March 6, so that the Navy Law could then be laid before the Reichstag in the evening. He also took the unusual step of telegraphing himself directly to Metternich : it appeared that England had abandoned the basis agreed upon by Haldane ; the Kaiser would stick to it and to the Navy Law except for a partial postponement of capital ships; but navy personnel was not to be a subject of discussion with England; if England withdrew her ships from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, this would be regarded as a threat of war and would be replied to by an increased Navy Law and by possible mobilization.

Bethmann now sent in his resignation: he could no longer assume responsibility for such a policy or for such a direct dictation by the Kaiser to Germany's Ambassadors, without previous consultation with the Chancellor. The Kaiser hastened back to Berlin, persuaded Bethmann to remain in office, and agreed to a further postponement of the Navy Law and the continuance of the negotiations with England. Thereupon Tirpitz in turn threatened to resign, if the Navy Law were dropped altogether. After a sharp domestic conflict between the two Ministers, the Admiral virtually triumphed over the civilian Chancellor. It was decided that no reduction in the Navy Law should be made beyond the minor matter of retarding the date for the capital ships, which Tirpitz had already grudgingly conceded. Meanwhile Bethmann had been continuing his negotiations with England, but they never had any chance of success as far as a neutrality agreement or naval limitation was concerned. They were virtually abandoned as hopeless on March 29, when Grey informed Metternich that the English Cabinet had finally decided definitely against Bethmann's original neutrality formula.

On April 14 the German Navy Law was finally laid before the Reichstag, and accepted by it, unmodified, on May 14. The Haldane Mission failed primarily from two causes: England's unwillingness to make any political agreement concerning neutrality which would in any way limit her freedom to aid France; and Germany's unwillingness to make any worth-while reductions in the Supplementary Navy Law which would satisfy England. Each country was seeking a concession which dominant ministers in the other were determined not to make. Only in the third group of subjects under consideration—colonial matters and the Bagdad Railway, was it possible to continue successful negotiations; in this less difficult field of economic imperialism mutually satisfactory agreements were gradually worked out, and were complete for signature on the eve of the World War. Thus, the Haldane Mission, like the Potsdam negotiations with Russia in 1910, resulted in removing some causes of friction, but they both failed in one of their main objects—the securing of some written agreement which would lessen Germany's political isolation and loosen the bonds of the Triple Entente.

The Tightening of the Triple Entente 1912

The French view on Europe can be summarized by M. Poincaré himself:

“Germany's policy continued to be dominated by the arrogant spirit which since the war of 1870 had led to the Franco-German incidents of 1875 and 1887, and which between 1905 and 1911 had constantly poisoned affairs in Morocco. After the insult of Tangiers came the threat of Agadir. Instead of being stung into action by these repeated provocations, France, in her desire for peace,” agreed to the Algeiras Conference, and to territorial concessions in the Congo in exchange for liberty of action in Morocco. These acts of Germany, as well as her ultimatum to Russia in the Bosnian Crisis and the Kaiser's bellicose gestures, had gradually aroused in a group of French politicians a new national spirit. They had revived the desire for *revanche* and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. They had created the feeling that France had suffered long enough from the German menace from across the Rhine. There had grown up the determination that in the future, if Germany made a new threat of force, it would be better to risk war than accept a new humiliation. This new national spirit, determination, and self-confidence was greatly increased by the friendship of England and the growing conviction that in case of a conflict with Germany, England would not only stand behind France with her fleet, but would send English troops to strengthen the left wing of the French army in northern France. This would give a good prospect of victory, and the fruits of victory would be the recovery of the lost provinces and the end of the nightmare of the German menace. Most of these French leaders, like the mass of the French people, did not want war; but if Germany's desire for the “hegemony of Europe” and her attempt again to use the mailed fist to force a diplomatic triumph brought on another international crisis, it would be better to fight than to back down. As they had little doubt that Germany would attempt some new aggression, this would make war “inevitable.” France must therefore prepare

for it by increasing her own army and navy at home, and by tightening her relations with her ally on the other side of Germany and with her friend across the Channel.

This new national feeling was personified in M. Raymond Poincare and the little group of men with whom he was closely associated. (So most of the leader and the public did not want war, yet revenge was pushed by a small elite group of people) By his determination, firmness, and ability, he did more than any other man to strengthen and to stimulate it. It found expression in the overthrow of the Caillaux Ministry, which was accused of having been too yielding to Germany in the Agadir Crisis, and in the formation, on January 13, 1912, of the "Great Ministry" or "National Ministry," in which M. Poincare was Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Millerand Minister of War, and M. Deleau Naval Minister. In announcing its program, M. Poincare declared that its first task would be to unite all groups of Republicans by a single national feeling, to organize the new protectorate in Morocco, and to maintain courteous and frank relations with Germany.

The man who cooperated most closely with M. Poincare in his task of tightening the Triple Entente was the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It now is clear that Izvol'ski was vain, self-important, inclined to intrigue, and not always trustworthy. Consequently his reports must be taken with a grain of salt. One of the first tasks which occupied M. Poincare's attention, after forming his "National Ministry," was the cementing of closer relations with England. The Haldane Mission and the possibility of an Anglo-German rapprochement caused him some uneasiness, in spite of Sir Edward Grey's assurances. He therefore welcomed a curious step taken by Sir Francis Bertie, the English Ambassador at Paris. Although Grey was making no concessions which would satisfy Germany, Bertie feared that in the future he might change his mind.

Poincare pointed out to Grey the dangers involved in any neutrality agreement with Germany. Taking the hint, but not revealing where it came from, Poincare sent an energetic despatch to Paul Cambon (French diplomat) to this effect. Cambon presented the substance of it to Grey on March 29. This was the very day on which the British Cabinet finally decided to give its negative answer to Bethmann's neutrality formula, and buried the hopes which had centered in the Haldane Mission. That Poincare may have boasted later to Izvol'ski of having wrecked the Haldane Mission is quite possible.

The Haldane Mission, however, impelled Poincare to try to secure from England a binding statement in writing. Winston Churchill's plan to withdraw British ships from the Mediterranean for a stronger concentration against Germany in the North Sea, foreshadowed in his speech of March 18, 1912, 100 aroused a lively discussion in the British and French Press. It was urged that the time had come for naval cooperation between the two countries. If England withdrew her naval forces from the Mediterranean and protected the north coast of France against the possibility of a German attack, France could withdraw her fleet from Brest and look after British interests, as well as her own, in the Mediterranean. In connection with this discussion, many British newspapers urged that the Anglo-French Entente should be definitely extended to a regular defensive alliance. "The only alternative to the constant menace of war is a new system of precise alliances."

This also was the feeling of M. Poincare.

But Sir Edward Grey, who had already been severely criticized in Parliament for subserviency in following in the wake of the French and Russian imperialism in Morocco and Persia, did not feel like taking such a momentous step without the knowledge of the whole Cabinet. The majority of them were still uninformed even of the military "conversations" which had been going on since 1906. Cambon's suggestion, therefore, remained for the moment without results. Meanwhile M. Poincare strengthened the Triple Entente and the naval position of France in the Mediterranean by a Naval Convention with Russia. Grey and Churchill did not want to tie their own hands by any binding written obligation. Even a naval arrangement, by which England withdrew her Mediterranean fleet to the North Sea, while the French shifted their Brest fleet to Toulon, was in danger of creating an obligation on England's part to protect the northern coasts of France, as Grey had gathered in conversations with Cambon in July.

Churchill also was well aware of this danger. Like Mr. Campbell-Bannerman in 1906, 197 and like Mr. Asquith in 1911, 198 he perceived that the French would be encouraged to count upon British assistance ; this would virtually create an obligation and thus limit England's freedom of action. As he pointed out to Grey: "Freedom will be sensibly impaired if the French can say that they had denuded their Atlantic seaboard and concentrated in the Mediterranean on the faith of naval engagements made with us. While these Anglo-French negotiations were going on but before a decision had been reached, it was announced prematurely, through an inadvertence on the part of one of M. Delcasse's subordinates, that the Brest fleet was to be transferred to the Mediterranean. This news, says M. Poincare, caused great excitement, and was interpreted by the Press as a sign that an Anglo-French naval agreement had been definitely concluded. This incident gave a new

impulse to the negotiations. Poincare again instructed Cambon to ask Grey for a written agreement. Grey finally consented to give one. But before taking such an important step he rightly believed that it should be known to and approved by the whole Cabinet, and all its members were at last informed of the Anglo-French "conversations" which had been going on since 1906. He also insisted that it should not take the shape of a formal diplomatic document, but merely of a personal correspondence between himself and M. Cambon. Accordingly, on November 22, he handed M. Cambon a letter which had been approved by the Cabinet, and received one in similar terms from him in exchange next day.

These Grey-Cambon letters fixed the relations between the French and British Cabinets, so far as any written statements were concerned, down to the outbreak of the War. Sir Edward Grey continued to cherish the illusion that he still had his "hands free"; and this was true as far as the wording of the letters went. But as Mr. Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Asquith had pointed out, the military conversations were dangerous in the encouragement they gave to the French ; and as Winston Churchill warned, the new arrangement of the British and French navies, which took place in the fall of 1912, tied

England to France more closely still.

It created for England an inescapable moral obligation to protect the coast of France in case of a war between France and Germany—that is, to participate on the French side no matter how the war arose. To be sure, Poincare was aware that Grey had carefully stated that if there was reason to expect “an unprovoked attack,” the two Governments would “discuss” whether they would act together. He knew that Grey would have to reckon with a strong pacific group within the British Cabinet and among the British people; with them it would make a great difference how the war arose. Hence he was very careful, as will appear in connection with the crisis of July, 1914, to make it appear that Austria and Germany were the aggressors. Significant from the political point of view is this French conviction that they could count on the British navy, for this would involve British participation in the war, with all advantages to France and Russia which would accrue from England’s great naval superiority in the way of blockading Germany and shutting her off from food and war materials, to say nothing of the great moral effect of having the British Empire actively engaged on the side of the Franco-Russian Alliance.

Closely connected with these Anglo-French naval arrangements was the Franco-Russian Naval Convention of July 16, 1912. Russia wished to have absolutely undisputed naval domination of the Black Sea. She had also long wished to control the Straits and Constantinople. A first step in this direction would be to secure a free passage for her warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Izvolski had several times attempted to gain this but without success. Italy’s naval activity and closing of the Dardanelles during the Tripolitan War again made Russia acutely sensitive to the importance of the Straits Question. She believed that her French ally could and ought to aid the Russian fleet to retain its supremacy in the Black Sea, by hindering the Austrian or Italian naval forces from passing the Straits. In case of a European War this would safeguard the left flank of the Russian army; this in turn would be of advantage to the Triple Entente in the other theatres of war. Russia also wished to be able to transfer some of her Baltic fleet to augment her Black Sea fleet, and to have a possible naval base in the Mediterranean. This could be provided if the French would develop the port of Bizerta in Northern Africa and allow the Russians to use it. Such were some of the considerations which made the Russians desire a closer naval agreement with France. The French, on their part, were glad to meet all Russian wishes as far as possible, in order to strengthen the solidarity of action between the two countries.

by 1911 both countries had recognized the desirability extending their alliance by a Naval Convention analogous to the Military Convention. In the spring of 1912, upon the initiation of the Russians, negotiations to secure this took place in Paris between army and navy officers of both countries. They resulted in the secret Naval Convention signed on July 16 by Admirals Aubert and Lieven and by the Naval Ministers, Delcasse and Grigorovitch, and confirmed by an exchange of notes between Sazonov and Poincare a month later, upon the latter’s visit to Russia. It declared: “The naval forces of France and Russia will cooperate in all the eventualities in which the alliance contemplates and

stipulates the combined action of the land armies.”

When Poincare visited Russia in August, 1912, one of his main topics of conversation with Sazonov was the closer cooperation of the naval forces of the Triple Entente. He confided to Sazonov, according to the latter's report to the Tsar, that “although there does not exist between France and England any written treaty, the Army and Navy Staffs of the two countries have nevertheless been in close contact. This constant exchange of views has resulted in the conclusion between the French and English Governments of a verbal agreement, by virtue of which England has declared herself ready to aid France with her military and naval forces in case of an attack by Germany.” He begged Sazonov to “preserve the most absolute secrecy in regard to the information,” and not give the English themselves any reason to suspect that he had been told of it. He also urged Sazonov to take advantage of his coming visit to England to discuss the question of a possible Anglo- Russian naval agreement, which would thus complete the naval cooperation of the three Triple Entente Powers in case of a conflict with Germany. Sazonov followed Poincare's suggestion.

According to Sazonov's report to the Tsar, Grey declared that, if the contemplated conditions arose, England would make every effort to strike the most crippling blow at German naval power:

On his own initiative Grey then gave me a confirmation of what I already knew through Poincare—an agreement exists between France and Great Britain, under which in the event of war with Germany Great Britain has accepted the obligation of bringing assistance to France not only on the sea but on land, by landing troops on the Continent. The King touched on the same question in one of his conversations with me, and expressed himself even more strongly than his Minister. When I mentioned, letting him see my agitation, that Germany is trying to place her naval forces on a par with Britain's, His Majesty cried out that any conflict would have disastrous results not only for the German navy but for Germany's overseas trade, for he said, “We shall sink every single German merchant ship we shall get hold of.” These words appeared to me to give expression not only to His Majesty's personal feelings but also to the public feeling predominant in Great Britain in regard to Germany.

Whether Sazonov correctly reported what Poincare and Grey had said to him is not clear. But the fact that he made such statements to the Tsar shows how much the French and the Russians—and especially the Russians, were encouraged by the existence of the Anglo-French military and naval “conversations” and inclined to interpret them as a promise of British support in case of a general European War. This Naval Convention also gave rise to evasive statements on the part of the Entente Powers which naturally increased Germany's suspicions of their aggressive intentions. By some “leak” in the French or Russian Foreign Office, the French Press soon indicated the existence of the Franco-Russian Naval Convention. This led to inquiries by Germany.

Inasmuch as the German Government by the spring of 1914 had in some secret way

become informed of the Grey-Cambon letters all these denials by Entente officials caused uneasiness in Germany. This was especially the case in connection with the negotiations for an Anglo-Russian naval convention just before the War.

The Grey-Cambon letters, following the consistent diplomatic support which England had given France throughout the Morocco crises, established a very satisfactory basis of mutual confidence between the French and British Governments. This confidence and harmony was strengthened by many factors: by the common distrust of Germany; by the cordial personal relations between Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon; by the fact that England had no aggressive aims which conflicted with French interests; and by the care with which M. Poincaré sought to consult Sir Edward Grey's wishes and as far as possible conform French policy to them. There was in fact more harmony and mutual confidence between France and England, though they were only "friends," than between France and Russia who were allies.

The tightened Triple Entente encouraged Sazonov in his support of Serbia and his stiff attitude to Austria and Germany which was one of the main causes of war in 1914.

Renewal and Weakness of the Triple Alliance 1912

Bismarck, who regarded the Austro-German Alliance of 1879 as strictly defensive, had refused to permit military agreements between the German and Austrian Staffs, for fear that they might hamper the political freedom of action of the civilian authorities. This Alliance, therefore, as well as the Triple Alliance, had long remained without being supplemented by any such definite military convention, stating the number of troops which each ally was bound to furnish in case of war, as in the case of the Franco-Russian Military Convention in 1894. Nor for many years were there any regular periodical conferences between the Staffs of the Triple Alliance Powers, with written protocols fixing in detail the cooperation of their armies, as in the case of the annual conferences between the French and Russian Staffs from 1900 onwards.

But in January, 1909, when the Bosnian Crisis began to look alarming, Moltke and Conrad (Chief of Staff of Austria-Hungary), the Chiefs of Staff of the German and Austrian armies did enter into a correspondence concerning possible military cooperation. It was carried on with the knowledge and approval of the civilian authorities of the two countries, and was continued intermittently during the following years. Nowhere did Moltke and Conrad, or any other persons in authority, ever refer to this exchange of views as a "military convention." On the contrary, it was more in the nature of a general discussion of the political situation, and an exchange of information as to the plan of campaign which each intended to put into operation if war should be declared by the civilian authorities. Conrad was trying to persuade Moltke to make Germany's mobilization plan provide for as many troops as possible against Russia, so as to lessen the number which the Tsar would have available against Austria. Moltke, in turn, wanted to have Conrad plan to use few troops in Serbia, and send as many as possible into Galicia against Russia, in order

to relieve the pressure on Germany's eastern frontier, while the hulk of the German forces were being thrown against France. Their arrangements with one another were hardly as definite or as binding as those which were being made by the French and Russian Staffs. Though some of the Moltke-Conrad letters were shown to the civilian authorities, they did not legally modify the terms of the Alliance.

On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that this Moltke-Conrad correspondence tended to foster the conviction at Vienna, that if Austria attacked Serbia, she could count on a threat of German mobilization to bluff Russia into remaining inactive; or upon German support, if Russia made war. Another result of their correspondence was the fact that Moltke and Conrad made mobilization plans which were dependent for success on one another, and, as in all such cases, this enabled the military authorities in a time of crisis to exert pressure on the civilian authorities in favor of war.

Italy was the element of weakness in the Triple Alliance. Ever since the Algeiras Conference Germany had regarded her loyalty with doubt. Conrad was so convinced not only of her probable disloyalty to her treaty obligations, but of her positive hostility, that he speaks of her as Austria's "principal opponent." He made plans for mobilization against her, and even wanted a "preventive war" against her. Italy's war with Turkey for the possession of Tripoli had further displeased her allies, not only because they had not been fully consulted beforehand, but because it embarrassed them to have their nominal ally attack the Turks, whose friendship and good-will they were trying to cultivate. To be sure, the events of the war and Italy's establishment as a sea-power in the Mediterranean had led to a decided coolness in her relations with France. But these had improved again by the summer of 1912 so that Poincare and Sazonov both agreed that it was best to keep Italy as a "dead weight" in the Triple Alliance, where she would be useful to both France and Russia.

Though the Triple Alliance was to run until 1914, the question of its renewal had already begun to be discussed in the summer of 1911. Italy favored its early renewal as a means of placating her allies on the eve of her Tripolitan adventure. Germany favored it, being always glad of anything which might make for better relations between her two allies, and thus help to counter-balance the growing strength and solidarity of the Triple Entente. Aehrenthal at first was not opposed to it, but Conrad and the military officers were so incensed at Italy's insults and treacheries that they saw no use in trying to keep her even as a nominal ally. General Auffenberg related with childish indignation to the German Ambassador in Vienna evidences of Italian animosity which he had just seen in the Southern Tyrol : every day or two a patrol had to be detailed to clean up the insulting epithets scribbled on a war memorial; he had seen cigarette boxes in which all the Austrian territory from Fiume to the Brenner Pass was marked as belonging to Italy; irredentist propaganda even took the form of calling the horses and mules by the names of Austrian cities like Trent and Trieste! "In case of a war Italy would explode against us like a keg of powder," he added, declaring that the best thing for Austria to do would be to crush the irredentist hopes by war, and then Austria would be freer to deal with

Serbia or meet a Russian attack.

Aehrenthalj however, had Francis Joseph on his side, and secured the dismissal of Conrad because the latter was urging war with Italy and friendship with Russia. The Tripolitan War delayed the negotiations for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. It was finally renewed, however, on December 5, 1912, without modification, being extended for six years from July 8, 1914. A couple of weeks later, Italy notified Germany that, in view of the existing political conditions, frankness compelled her to say that she would be unable to carry out her agreement of 1888 for sending troops to cooperate with a German army on the Rhine.

7.5 Balkan Problems 1907-1914

The Balkan situation was one of the most important factors in causing the World War. It sharpened the antagonism between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, stimulated a general increase in armaments, and led to the assassination of the Austrian Archduke with its catastrophic consequences. It was an old and complicated question which had troubled the peace of Europe for a century and a half.

It arose from many elements. The progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, caused by external as well as internal causes, produced a continual unrest in the Near East. This was increased by Russia's persistent - desire to acquire increased influence in the Balkan Peninsula and to realize her age-long dream for control of the waterways to the Mediterranean. The Hapsburgs, sitting astride the Danube for centuries, were trying to preserve authority over subject peoples, many of whom had become fired with nationalism and a desire to break away and unite with their brothers living in the independent States bordering on Austria-Hungary.

The ambitions of Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece to extend their territories to include all peoples of their own nationality brought them into constant conflict with Turkey, Austria-Hungary or one another. The antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was increased by the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the creation of Albania, and the Serb agitation for national unity at Austria's expense. To understand how the World War had its beginnings in this corner of Europe, it will be convenient to review some of the Balkan problems between 1908 and 1914.

The Beginning of Austro-Serbian Antagonism

Serbian national poets and historians love to recall to their people the heroic days of Stephen Dushan in the fourteenth century, when the great Greek Orthodox Serbian Empire stretched from the Danube nearly to the Gulf of Corinth, and from the Aegean to the Adriatic. From those far-off days to the decades immediately preceding the World War, when Serbian nationalists began to dream of again extending their boundaries to

include "Old Serbia" and even more territory, the Serbian people suffered long years of oppression and hardship. First came the Turks. On Vidov-Dan, 1389, an army of Serbs, Albanians and Croats was terribly crushed at Kossovo, and submerged under the Turkish flood. But from the field of battle there rose up a Serb hero who penetrated to the victorious Sultan's tent and there slew him, as the hateful oppressor of the Slav peoples. So the anniversary of Kossovo became a great day in the Serb calendar: Vidov-Dan was a day of sorrow for the national defeat of 1389, but a day of rejoicing for the assassination of the cruel foreign oppressor. ³ For more than four centuries after Kossovo the greater part of the Serb people lived and suffered under Turkish rule. Some Serbs, for obvious reasons of convenience, abandoned Greek Orthodoxy for Mohammedanism, especially in Bosnia, and remained Moslems ever afterwards.

Austria was the European Power which first brought to the Serbs some relief, and caused the Turkish flood to recede. It was Prince Eugene, with his Hapsburg army, who recaptured Belgrade in 1717 and helped arouse in the Serbs a longing for independence from Turkish misrule. When Hapsburg troops had to retreat twenty years later, many Serb peasants followed on the soldiers' heels to escape servitude under the Sultan. They settled north of the Danube in the southern fringe of the Hapsburg lands. There they lived and multiplied and were joined by other fugitives from south of the Danube. At first these Serb settlers were well treated by their new rulers, and were appreciated as good soldiers to defend the country against the Turks. But in the later eighteenth century Roman Catholic propaganda and economic oppression by feudal Magyar landlords made existence so bitter for the Serb settlers that many preferred to escape back to their brothers of the South. As between Magyar exploitation and Turkish misrule, the latter was the lesser of two evils. So began an antagonism, which persisted ever afterwards, and was aggravated in 1567 when Emperor Francis Joseph withdrew the special privileges which had long been enjoyed by the Serbs of the "Military Frontiers." ⁴ Nevertheless, common enmity to the Turks generally tended to preserve a political friendship between the ruling authorities at Vienna and Belgrade.

In the year 1878, to be sure, Austria "occupied" the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were largely inhabited by peasants of Serb blood and were coveted by the new Kingdom of Serbia; but the pill was coated by the fact that, at the Congress of Berlin, Austria secured for Serbia the valuable Pirot and Nish districts, which Russia would have assigned to her own protege. Bulgaria. Political friendship between the Austrian and Serbian Governments, though not between the peoples of the two countries, was again secured by the secret Austro-Serbian Treaty of 1881, signed for ten years, in which both States promised to pursue a mutually friendly policy, and not to tolerate within the territory of one any intrigues against the other.

It was the misfortune of the Serbian people that, at the beginning of the movement for national independence in the days of Napoleon, there arose not one, but two, national leaders. Instead of one great man dominating the movement, and establishing a single strong dynasty, there were two rivals: Kara George and Milosh Obrenovitch. Ever since

the assassination of the former in the interests of the latter, in 1817, the unhappy country was torn by the feuds of these rival families, and by a series of palace revolutions and violent changes of dynasty. These culminated in 1903. On the night of June 11, a band of conspirators, consisting mainly of Serbian army officers, entered the royal palace at Belgrade, dragged King Alexander Obrenovitch and his unpopular wife from their hiding place, and brutally murdered them. Belgrade rejoiced; the church bells were rung; the city was decorated with flags; and the Legislature unanimously thanked the assassins for their work. Though he may not have been directly privy to the plot, Peter Karageorgevitch, grandson of the man murdered nearly a century before, profited by it, and he ascended the throne as Peter I. This hideous crime, "brutal but not unprovoked," and the favors shown to those who were responsible for it, outraged the sense of decency in the crowned heads of Europe, most of whom soon withdrew their representatives from Belgrade as a sign of their disapproval. Great Britain did not renew diplomatic relations for three years.

Though frowned on at first by Europe, the new reign marked a notable revival in Serbian life. A freer, more democratic, spirit prevailed. A patriotic national movement developed, which expressed itself in new economic activity, in newspapers and literature, and in the spread of the "Greater Serbia" idea. Peter I was personally popular, devoted to the interests of his country, and noted for his soldierly qualities of loyalty and simplicity. The fact that he had fought for the Serbian cause in the revolt of Herzegovina gave him an added popularity far beyond the bounds of his own kingdom; it made him "our King" to the Serbs beyond the Danube and the Drin.

With the accession of Peter I in 1903, Serbia started a Russophile agenda, encouraged by Pan-Slav elements in Russia and by the irritating attitude adopted by Austria-Hungary. Austrian ministers soon observed with dismay this growth of Serbian nationalism and pro-Russian feeling. If unchecked, it threatened the integrity of the Hapsburg lands. It meant that the Kingdom of Serbia would act as a dangerous magnet, tending to draw away Austria's Serb subjects to form the "Greater Serbia." If the decaying Turkish Empire should ever fall to pieces, if nationalist revolts should break out in Austria-Hungary in some crisis, such as the death of Emperor Francis Joseph, or if war should be declared in the Balkans or in Europe, Serbia would be likely to try to annex territories inhabited largely by Serbs. Probably Pan-Slav interests would lead Russia to support the Serbians. If Serbia secured Bosnia, her next step would be to attempt to unite the Croats, the Dalmatians, the Slovenes, and the Serbs in the Banat in southern Hungary. This would encourage the other subject nationalities under Hapsburg rule—the Rumanians, Czechs and Slovaks—to break away. This would spell *Finis Austriae*. Thus, Austria-Hungary fought for its existence as a whole.

In view of the danger to the Dual Monarchy from its subject nationalities, Austrian officials began to adopt measures to stifle this growing movement in Serbia for political and economic independence from Hapsburg influence. Serbia, having no direct outlet to the sea, had been virtually dependent upon Austria-Hungary for a market for her agricultural products. To strengthen herself, Serbia began in 1905 to negotiate with Bulgaria for a

customs-union; but Austria interfered. In 1906, when the Austro-Serbian tariff treaty expired, feeling in both countries ran so high that it was not renewed, especially as the Magyar landlords found that Serbian products came into competition with their own. As a consequence, a bitter tariff war, the so-called "Pig War"—ensued. But instead of crushing Serbia economically, Austria only caused the Serbians to seek other markets, especially in Germany; and at home the Serbians began to erect slaughter houses and factories of their own. Germany easily managed to supply the Serbian peasants with goods which had formerly come from Austria. This displacement of Austrian by German goods caused not a little hard feeling between Vienna and Berlin which persisted for years.

Austria's attempt at economic intimidation, far from compelling Serbia to return to an Austrophile policy, had just the opposite effect; it embittered Peter I's Ministers, and drove them more than ever into the open arms of Russia. It made them realize more clearly Serbia's need for a direct economic outlet to the sea, such as a railway connection with a port on the Adriatic in Albania or Montenegro, or on the Aegean at Salonica.⁹ They welcomed negotiations for a railway crossing Serbia from the Danube to the Adriatic which was urged on their behalf by Russia in the spring of 1908, as a counter-measure to Austria's project for a railway from Bosnia through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to Salonica. ¹⁰ The outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution in the summer hastened the negotiations, but led them to a fiasco in the most unexpected manner. It brought to a crisis the question, often discussed since 1876, and several times conditionally assented to by Russia, of Austria's "annexation" of the "occupied" provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This in turn was closely connected with Russia's much-desired aim of opening the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the passage of Russian ships of war.

Russia and the Straits

In the course of the nineteenth century, especially after the events of 1878, Russia had come to regard the closure of the Dardanelles against foreign warships by the Sultan as a valuable protection and asset for Russia. As Count Kapnist remarked in May, 1897: "Russia needs this gatekeeper [portier] in Turkish clothes for the Dardanelles, which under no circumstances ought to be opened. The Black Sea is a Russian mare clausum." This remained one of the corner-stones of Russian policy down to the World War.

But the treaties which excluded Russian war vessels from passing inward or outward through the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were quite a different matter. These were humiliating restrictions. They were inconsistent with Russia's prestige as a Great Power. So the opening of the Straits to Russian warships became one of the first aims of Russian ministers in the decades immediately preceding the World War. This was quite distinct from two other aims which are often confused with it, but which were really different and would have involved even more serious European complications; one was the forcible seizure of Turkish territory along the heights of the Bosphorus; the other

was the acquisition of control over Constantinople itself.

This city, they were inclined to admit, must remain in the hands of the Sultan so long as the Ottoman Empire survived; to try to seize it would meet with too great opposition from the Great Powers, not to mention Bulgaria and Greece. Constantinople, however, must in no case be allowed to fall under the control of any other Power. Occasionally, however, ambitious Russian ministers seriously considered in secret the project for a sudden descent with a landing force to seize in time of peace the heights of the Bosphorus in the neighborhood of Constantinople. One of these occasions was in the winter of 1896-97.

To M. Nelidov, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, the frightful Armenian massacres caused a revulsion of feeling in Europe against the Sultan and anarchic conditions in his capital which seemed likely to afford Russia a good opportunity to make a bold coup de main to seize the heights of the Bosphorus above Constantinople. Nelidov's plan was to despatch suddenly 30,000 troops on warships and transports from Odessa to the Upper Bosphorus and land them to seize control of the Straits, before England or any of the other Great Powers could prevent the filibustering expedition. Europe would be faced with a *fait accompli*, but the project was ultimately abandoned by the Tsar.

The Balkan Question Put on Ice 1897-1907

Soon after the abandonment of Nelidov's project, Emperor Francis Joseph visited Nicholas II at St. Petersburg. Friendly conversations took place which resulted in an important Austro-Russian Balkan agreement. It was at this time that Russia was embarking more actively on her policy of economic and political penetration in the Far East, and wished to be freed from possible complications in the Balkans. In the spring of 1897, therefore, consequent upon Francis Joseph's visit, the Austrian and Russian foreign ministers exchanged friendly notes declaring in favor of the status quo in the Balkans, and asserting their intentions to pursue "a policy of perfect harmony." Austria reserved her claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expressed herself in favor of an independent Albania. The status of Constantinople and the Straits, "having an eminently European character," was not to be modified by any separate Austro-Russian arrangements. By this agreement the Balkan question was said to be "put on ice," and for a decade the tension between the rival aims of Russia and Austria was in fact somewhat relieved.

But it would be a mistake to assume, as most writers do, that Russia had abandoned, even temporarily, the consideration of her ambitions in the Near East while pressing her imperialist policy in the Far East.

The Buchlau Bargain of September 1908

A few days after signing the Convention of 1907 with England and thus relieving Russia from the danger of complications in the Middle East, Izvolski visited Vienna. He was decorated with the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen, received in audience by Francis Joseph, and had a long conversation with Aehrenthal. He hinted very confidentially that he intended to solve the Straits Question in the manner desired by Russia, which was true ; and he particularly assured Austria that he had not spoken of the question to the English; which was untrue. He went on to tell Aehrenthal:

Russia has lost Manchuria with Port Arthur and thereby the access to the sea in the East. The main point for Russia's military and naval expansion of power lies henceforth in the Black Sea. From there Russia must gain an access to the Mediterranean.

Achrenthal merely remarked that it was a difficult problem, and that if the Straits Question were really opened up, Austria would want to define her attitude, adding:

I beg you to inform me in good time before the moment comes for putting the Russian plans into action, precisely as I should feel myself under obligations to inform the Russian Government in case Austria-Hungary should ever intend to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Shortly afterwards Achrenthal told Conrad, the Austrian Chief of Staff, that Russia, having limited her policy in Asia, "will now take up again her Western Balkan policy and demand freedom of the Straits for Russian vessels, but not for others"; and the two discussed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as possible compensation for conceding the freedom of the Straits to Russia.- 4 Here then at Vienna, in September, 1907, in the confidential conversation of Izvolski and Achrenthal, was foreshadowed the bargain which was struck between them at Buchlau just a year later.

On 2 July 1908, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky sent a letter to Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal and proposed a discussion of reciprocal changes to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin in favour of the Russian interest in the Straits of Constantinople and Austro-Hungarian interests in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. On 14 July Aehrenthal responded with guarded acceptance of the proposed discussions. On 10 September, after long and complex discussions within the Imperial Government discussing the Izvolsky proposals to Austria-Hungary, Aehrenthal outlined a slightly different set of counter-proposals to him: he proposed that in exchange for a friendly Russian attitude when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary would then withdraw its troops from the Sanjak. The letter then went on to offer to discuss, as a separate matter, the Straits question, on a friendly basis. Aehrenthal proposed that should agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina be reached, his Government would not - should the Russians subsequently propose to assert a right of their Black Sea fleet to both use and protect their access to the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus - automatically decide with the other powers to support collectively

the Ottoman Empire's opposition (up to and including war) to such a proposal.

On 16 September, Izvolsky and Aehrenthal met face-to-face at Buchlovice Castle. No minutes were taken during these private meetings which lasted a total of six hours. Izvolsky accepted the responsibility to write up the conclusions of the meeting and forward them to Aehrenthal. On 21 September, Aehrenthal wrote to Izvolsky asking for this document to which Izvolsky replied two days later that the document had been sent to the Czar for approval. This document, if it ever existed, has never been produced.

By Aehrenthal's account given by Albertini, Izvolsky agreed that Russia would maintain "a friendly and benevolent attitude" if Austria-Hungary were to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reciprocally, should Russia move to open "the Straits to single ships of war", Austria-Hungary would maintain a benevolent attitude. The two agreed that a likely consequence of the annexation was that Bulgaria, which was de facto independent since 1878, would declare its formal independence from the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary would offer no territorial concessions to Serbia or Montenegro, but if they supported the annexation then Austria-Hungary would not oppose Serbian expansion in the Balkans, and would support the Russian demand to revise Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin which restricted Montenegrin sovereignty. The parties agreed that "these changes could receive sanction after negotiation with the Porte and the Powers", but "there would be no more talk of Bosnia-Herzegovina". Annexation would probably take place at the beginning of October. The original of Aehrenthal's account has not been found and so historians have had to make do with an undated office copy of the document.

On 30 September, Austria-Hungary informed Izvolsky, who was in Paris at the time, that the annexation would take place on 7 October. On 4 October, Izvolsky prepared a report at the request of the British Ambassador to France, Francis Bertie. Izvolsky stated that his position was that annexation was a matter to be settled between the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin. With the compensation of Austro-Hungarian withdrawal from the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Russia would not consider the annexation as reason to go to war, but Russia and other governments would insist on changes to the Treaty favorable to themselves, including opening the Straits (Russia's interest), Bulgarian independence, territorial concessions to Serbia, and abolition of restrictions on Montenegrin sovereignty under article 29.

The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909

In Serbia the news caused great indignation and excitement. Newspaper "extras" bitterly denounced the infringement of the Treaty of Berlin and demanded preparations for a life and death struggle against Austria. Only thus could the Powers be aroused to support Serbia. Serbian Ministers assumed that war was inevitable. The Skupshtina was hurriedly called together; credits were voted for war; preparations for mobilization were made.

While Serbian Ministers protested loudly in one breath against the wicked infraction of the

Treaty, in the next they suggested “autonomy” for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and “territorial compensations” for their own Kingdom. They urged the partition of the Sanjak between Serbia and Montenegro. This would connect these two Slav countries by a common boundary and form a barrier against further penetration by Austria to the South ; it was part of the region through which the projected Danube-Adriatic railway would run, giving Serbia direct access to the sea, and cutting off Aehrenthal’s projected railway to Salonica at right angles. What would the Powers do for Serbia? And in particular what would Russia, the Protectress of the Slavs, do?

Izvolski was now in great embarrassment. He feared that Aehrenthal was about to secure the advantages of Austria’s half of the Buchlau bargain, before he had gotten French and English consent to Russia’s half. Therefore he did not want the Serbians to stir up trouble until he had the Straits safely in his pocket. So he told the Serbians to keep quiet for the moment, and wait for a conference of the Powers:

You Serbians surely cannot be thinking of driving Austria- Hungary out of Bosnia and Herzegovina by force of arms. And we Russians, on the other hand, cannot wage war on Austria on account of these provinces. ... do not understand your state of agitation. In reality you lose nothing, but gain something—our support. I trust that the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as hitherto their cultural activity for their own renaissance, and, awake as they are, it will never be possible to denationalize them.

But Izvolski soon found that in Paris he could get no effective backing for his projected opening of the Straits. Grey was absolutely opposed to Izvolski’s project, which consisted in opening the Straits to Russian warships, while leaving them still closed against war vessels of the other Great Powers. Any such purely one-sided modification of existing treaties, exclusively for the benefit of the Russians, would give them in time of war “the advantage of having the whole of the Black Sea as an inviolable harbor, from which cruisers and commerce destroyers could issue, and retire at will from pursuit by a belligerent.” Like Saburov thirty years earlier Izvolski wanted to have the door to Constantinople and the Black Sea bolted from the inside, so that Russia, and no one else, could open and lock it at pleasure. In vain he tried to frighten Grey into accepting his proposal by hinting that a refusal might break up the Anglo-Russian Entente.

Izvolski now began to lose all hope of securing the opening of the Straits to Russian warships after all. If he could not secure his half of the Buchlau bargain, perhaps it would still be possible to thwart Aehrenthal, by insisting that the annexation question be laid before a Conference of the Signatory Powers. Unless he succeeded in this, he would have to confess to a humiliating diplomatic defeat and a severe loss of personal prestige. Already the Pan-Slavs in Russia had begun to criticize him angrily and bitterly for being outwitted by Aehrenthal, for allowing Prince Ferdinand to assert his independence unaided instead of receiving it from the hands of the Tsar, and especially for having sacrificed the Orthodox Slavs of Bosnia to the Romanist sovereignty of the Hapsburgs.

Izvolski, therefore, in view of his weakened position at home and his failure at Paris and

London, began to pretend to the Serbians, in spite of what he had just said to M. Vesnich in Paris, that he had never approved Austria's annexation of Bosnia. He declared that he would do everything to protect Serbian interests and secure compensation for them. He told the Serbians to avoid war for the present, but intimated to them, that, even if the annexation was allowed to stand, it need not be regarded as a final settlement. In the course of the next four months Izvolski's embarrassment increased. But he continued to encourage the Serbians with the hope that the Annexation Question would be submitted to a Conference of the Powers for revision, and he tried by every means to accomplish this. But it became evident that he would not be successful.

Meanwhile, excitement in Serbia, as well as among the Slavs in Bosnia and Croatia, continued to increase. Demonstrations of defiance against the Hapsburgs became more frequent. Austria, on her side, redoubled her repressive measures and made wholesale arrests of agitators and suspected traitors. The situation in Bosnia and Serbia became so threatening for Austria, that in December, 1908, Conrad, the Chief of Staff, was permitted to carry out "brown mobilization," a supposedly inconspicuous measure, by which Austrian troops were pushed up toward the Serbian frontier without disturbing the normal peace traffic on the railways. 48 This threatened a local conflict between Austria and Serbia, which might easily develop into a general European war. Russia, however, wished to avoid any armed conflict at this time, since she was as yet wholly unprepared for a general European war, and would be unable to give Serbia armed support. Neither could she count on her ally, for France was not at all inclined to be dragged into a war with Germany over a Balkan dispute. So Russia was forced to continue to beg the Serbians to submit for the present, and to trust in the future. Guchkov, a leading member of the Russian Duma, told the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg:

When our armament shall have been completely carried out, then we shall have our reckoning with Austria-Hungary. Do not begin any war now, for this would be your suicide; conceal your purposes, and make ready; the days of your joy will come.

Izvolski himself was reported as saying:

Serbia will be condemned to a pitiful existence until the moment for the downfall of Austria arrives. The Annexation has brought this moment nearer, and when it comes, Russia will unroll and solve the Serbian question. Izvolski sees that the conflict with Germandom is inevitable, but Russia's policy must be purely Slavophile.

A few days later Kosutitch noted that these were also the views of Nicholas II:

The Tsar said the Serbian sky is overcast with black clouds by this blow. The situation is frightful, because Russia is unprepared for war, and a Russian defeat would be the ruin of Slavdom. The Tsar has the feeling that a conflict with Germandom is inevitable in the future, and that one must prepare for this.

As the situation on the Serbian frontier became increasingly threatening, and as the Powers, in spite of a lively interchange of despatches, could come to no solution, Germany

finally made a proposal for preserving the peace of Europe, by helping Izvolski to extricate himself from his embarrassment, while at the same time satisfying Austria.

Germany's Solution of the Crisis

It is often said that Germany instigated Aehrenthal's annexation program in the interests of the Bagdad Railway and German imperialism. There is no truth in any such statement. As a matter of fact, Germany had not even been given a timely and definite warning by her ally of the step she was contemplating, and consequently had no opportunity to interpose a restraint until it was too late. The Kaiser did not learn of Austria's intentions until the very day of annexation.

He was highly indignant, not only that he had been kept so long in ignorance, but also at Austria's action itself. He regarded it as an unjustifiable attack on Turkey, which would be disastrous to German influence in Constantinople, threaten the Bagdad Railway, and sow suspicion in England against the Central Powers. "Vienna will be charged with duplicity and not unjustly. She has duped us in a most unheard-of fashion." He feared that this was the beginning of the partition of Turkey, and might lead to a European war. "If the Sultan in his necessity declares war, and hoists in Constantinople the green flag of the Holy War, I should not blame him." "With a policy of this kind Austria will drive us into a dangerous opposition to Russia."

He was afraid that if Germany did not take a stand against the Annexation, everyone would believe that it had taken place with his approval. His Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron Marschall, favored disavowing it, even at the risk of forfeiting the alliance with Austria. Biilow, however, differed from his master. Convinced that Germany must support Austria in the Balkans, lest otherwise the Triple Alliance would be weakened, he believed that Germany must uphold Austria in the step which she had taken.

The Kaiser finally accepted Bulow's point of view; but he regretted that "Aehrenthal's frightful stupidity has brought us into this dilemma, so that we are not able to support and protect our friends, the Turks, when our ally has outraged them." Biilow thereupon informed Vienna, that, "In case difficulties or complications arise, our ally can count upon us," and that Austria was to judge of what must be done in the Serbian question. But the Kaiser's feeling of irritation remained; he may have had the shrewd political instinct to realize that in thus giving a blank cheque to Austria, he was assuming a risky liability, and creating a dangerous precedent.

After proclaiming the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Aehrenthal entered into negotiations with the Young Turks to satisfy their claims. They, like the Serbians, had at first made a loud outcry against the nullification of the clauses of the Treaty of Berlin. They assembled troops and attempted to boycott Austrian goods. But they gradually became convinced that none of the European Powers would actually go to the length of giving them armed support. In view of Germany's strong stand behind Austria,

the Young Turks finally decided, on February 26, 1909, to accept the Austrian offer of compensation (money). Turkey's acceptance of Aehrenthal's *fait accompli* did not settle the question, however. It only increased the embitterment of the Serbians. Hitherto they had comforted themselves with the hope that Turkish claims, supported by the Entente Powers, could be used as a basis for forcing Austria to submit the Annexation to a Conference of the Powers, at which Serbia could at least secure "autonomy" for the provinces and "compensation" for herself. These hopes, too, were shattered, as Austria firmly refused to make concessions.

In the weeks following Austria's settlement with Turkey, the Great Powers telegraphed urgently back and forth in an attempt to reconcile Izvolski's promise to the Serbians that a Conference should be held, and Aehrenthal's steady refusal to submit the Annexation to revision. No solution was reached, until Germany finally made a proposal which eventually relieved the situation.

To avert the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities on the Austro-Serbian frontier, which seemed imminent, and to bridge the gulf between Izvolski and Aehrenthal, Germany, on March 14, confidentially proffered mediation to Russia: Germany would request Austria to invite the Powers to give their formal sanction by an exchange of notes to the Austro-Turkish agreement, involving the nullification of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, provided Russia promised beforehand to give her sanction, when invited by Austria to do so.

This proposal had a threefold advantage: it secured to Austria a recognition by the Powers of the change in the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and deprived Serbia of legal grounds and hopes that the *fait accompli* would be overturned; it satisfied the Entente demand that no change in a treaty is valid unless formally recognized by all who signed it; and, finally, by omitting any reference to a Conference, which might still meet to consider other Balkan questions which had been raised, it avoided humiliating Russia by a direct rejection of the Conference idea which Izvolski had been steadily demanding for months.

It let Izvolski easily out of the embarrassing blind alley into which he had strayed. Izvolski appreciated the proposal and was inclined to accept it. He "recognized the conciliatory spirit ... of this effort of Germany to bring about a relaxation of the tension." But he still hesitated to give a definite answer, as he continued to cling to the hope of a Conference and the avoidance of another diplomatic defeat. His inclination to accept the German proposal, however, was stimulated by the fact that a Russian Ministerial Council on March 17 decided that Russia was totally unprepared to support Serbia by force of arms, and also by a hint from Aehrenthal that Austria might publish the documents relating to the Buchlau bargain and thus prove the untruthfulness of the assertions which Izvolski had been spreading everywhere about the origin of the Bosnian affair. Izvolski instantly begged Biliow to dissuade Aehrenthal from any such publication, and Germany accordingly did so, suggesting to Austria that it was better to keep this trump in one's hand as long as possible. Aehrenthal was willing to accept the German mediation proposal,

provided Serbia made a formal declaration admitting that the annexation of Bosnia had not infringed her rights and promising in the future to give up her attitude of opposition and protest.

Meanwhile an internal struggle was going on in Austria itself as to peace or war with Serbia. Conrad, the Austrian Chief of Staff, was again urging that the Hapsburg Monarchy should seize this favorable moment for the "inevitable" war with Serbia. By a "preventive war" now, "the dangerous little viper" could be crushed and rendered harmless for the future. Russia and Italy, he urged, were not sufficiently prepared to fight. Rumania was still loyal, and Turkey was satisfied. France and England might disapprove, but would not intervene. No such favorable moment for the reckoning with Serbia and averting the "Greater Serbia" danger was likely ever to recur, because, in the future, Russia and Italy would have reorganized and increased their armies. Austria might then have to reckon with a war on three fronts. Aehrenthal and Franz Ferdinand, on the other hand, had been inclined to peace, but Billow feared they might at any time yield to Conrad's arguments. While morally questionable, this course of action would have localized the war and removed all possible conflict with Serbia and secured the existence of Austria-Hungary, while no other country would have intervened.

On March 15 Aehrenthal did, in fact, advise Francis Joseph to approve the calling up of more troops and their secret transportation toward the Serbian frontier. The situation was therefore critical. To prevent an Austro-Serbian outbreak, Billow believed it was necessary to press his mediation proposal and secure a definite answer from Izvolski. On March 21, he sent instructions to this effect to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

Say to M. Izvolski that we learn with satisfaction that he recognizes the friendly spirit of our proposal and seems inclined to accept it . . . and that we expect an answer yes or no; we must regard any evasive, conditional or unclear answer as a refusal. We should then draw back and let things take their course. The responsibility for further events would then fall exclusively on M. Izvolski, after we had made a last sincere effort to help him clear up the situation in a way which he could accept.

By this Izvolski understood that he was "placed before the following alternatives: either an immediate regulation of the annexation question by an exchange of notes, or the invasion of Serbia." He consulted the Tsar and next day gave the formal affirmative answer desired. The Tsar had already telegraphed the Kaiser that he was heartily pleased that Germany's proposal had made a peaceful compromise possible.

Such were the events which soon became distorted into the legend that Germany had threatened Russia with force and humiliated her with an ultimatum. The legend was exploited in the Russian Press, spread in England by Sir Arthur Nicolson, and used by Izvolski as a means of saving his face before his critics in Russia. But, it was not an ultimatum. It was an attempt on Germany's part to bridge the gulf between Russia and Austria and prevent outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria.

Before the news of Russia's yielding had reached Vienna, or in spite of it, the war party had

gotten the upper hand. A Ministerial Council of March 29 finally decided to order "Yellow Mobilization" or "Mobilization B" (Balkans). This involved the full mobilization of five of the total fifteen army corps which at that time composed the Austro-Hungarian army. It was thus a "partial mobilization" for the case of a war against Serbia and Montenegro only, but was complete for the five corps involved. Conrad left the Council with the conviction that now, at last, the reckoning with Serbia, which he had so often urged, was about to begin. Serbia, however, finally heeded the warnings she had been receiving from Russia, to avoid war for the present and to trust to the future. She decided at the eleventh hour to yield to the advice of the Powers. On March 31, 1909, she made at Vienna the formal declaration which had been agreed upon by Aehrenthal and Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the English Ambassador at Vienna. The declaration included the terms:

In conformity with these declarations and with confidence in the peaceful intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will replace her army, as far as concerns its organization and the location and number of the troops, to the state in which it was in the spring of 1908. She will disarm and disband the volunteers and irregular forces and prevent the formation of new irregular corps on her territory.

Within the next few weeks the Serbian and Austrian armies were demobilized and the Annexation Crisis was relieved. But, as will be seen later, the Serbians, encouraged by Russia, did not live up to the promises which they had been forced to give, and Conrad repeatedly complained later that Germany had prevented Austria in 1909 from settling the Serbian danger in the only permanently satisfactory way, by the use of force.

It was in Russia, that the Bosnian Crisis had the most serious effects. The Pan-Slav Press was excited to a long and violent campaign against Germany, the burden whereof was that a war between Slavdom and Teutondom was "inevitable," and that Russia must consequently hasten to make preparations for it. And, in fact, it was shortly after this that Russia undertook the sweeping reorganization and increase of her army and navy which was still in progress in 1914. To Izvolski, personally, this diplomatic defeat, which he had to some extent brought upon himself, was the most bitter experience of his life. It affected his behavior all the rest of his days, filling him with a desire for revenge and for the recovery of lost personal prestige.

To the Serbians Izvolski continued to give secret encouragement, urging them to prepare for a happier future in which they could count upon Russian support to achieve their Jugo-Slav ambitions. He never really accepted the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a final settlement, but regarded it, and encouraged the Serbians to regard it, as a Serbian Alsace-Lorraine. For the liberation of these provinces all Serbs, both in Serbia and Austria-Hungary, should continue to make secret preparations. This was the policy which inspired his secret negotiations with Italy and Bulgaria in October and December, 1909, and which ultimately led to the formation of the Balkan League of 1912. All of these contemplated the possibility of changes in the Balkans which might ultimately lead to that triumph of Slavdom over Germandom which the Tsar and his Ministers had assured the Serbians was "inevitable."⁷⁸ These encouraging assurances from Russia for

the future realization of the "Greater Serbia" ambitions partly explain Serbia's failure to keep the promises made to Austria at the close of the Bosnian Crisis. That Serbia from the very outset had no serious intention of living up to her new promises, but intended merely to shift the basis and method of her secret underground campaign against Austria, is seen from the following illuminating document, drawn up only a few days after the promises of March 31 were solemnly made:

Instructions of the Royal Serbian Government of April 17, 1909, to the Serbian Minister in Vienna concerning the continuation of the Great Serbia propaganda in Austria-Hungary. The Royal Serbian Government, whose foreign policy embraces the interests of all Serbdom, trusting in the support of England, France and Russia, is firmly determined to await the moment when Serbia can with the best prospects of success proceed to the realization of her legitimate interests in the Balkans and in the whole Slavic South. Till then the Royal Government wishes to maintain with Vienna merely purely routine and scrupulously correct relations, without any political agreement of any kind. For this reason the Government will undertake no step to promote a renewal of the commercial treaty with the Monarchy; for this reason also, it must establish its national activity in the territory of the Hapsburg Crown Lands on new bases. In order that the foreign policy of the Royal Government, which embraces the whole of Serbdom, may remain intact, in spite of the above mentioned renunciation of all direct activity in Austria-Hungary, the Royal Government has placed its national propaganda in the Slavic South under the Pan-Slav national propaganda; its organization will receive its definite form in fraternal Russia July 1 of this year. Through a backing of this kind, the support of the all-powerful Government of the Russian Empire will be assured for our aspirations in decisive questions. This organization will be provided with considerable means. A new focus [of agitation] is being projected in the fraternal Czech Kingdom, around which can rally all those who wish to seek, or must seek, the salvation of their national individuality in the triumph of the Pan-Slav idea. So far as a revolutionary propaganda appears necessary it is to be cared for henceforth from St. Petersburg and from golden Prague. We shall also promote this activity through connections which in the future it will also be the business of the General Staff to maintain.

That Serbia counted confidently on Russian assistance in seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina by force in the future is further indicated by a secret circular emanating from the executive committee of a Pan-Slav Conference in St. Petersburg a few weeks later. It is addressed to the Slav organizations in the Balkans and in summary is as follows : Russia is on the point of reorganizing her army and reforming her internal administration. Until this double work of consolidation is completed, the Slav peoples must have patience and continue to trust in Russia. The Serb delegates at the Slav Conference in St. Petersburg and Moscow have been able to convince themselves on the spot that all classes of Russian society are inspired with the desire to have Russia able to take up energetically her mission as the Protectress of the Slav world.

Meanwhile all Slav peoples must unite in solidarity and work especially to increase their

economic strength. They must shut out German commerce and industry from their territories by a radical boycott. As for the money needed by the Slavs of the Balkans for their military preparations, Russia will furnish this directly or procure it with the help of France and England. Certainly within two or three years at the most, the time will come when the Slav World under Russian leadership must strike the great blow.

It was this encouragement to Serbia, secretly on the part of the Russian Government and more or less openly by the Pan-Slav Press, which helped to stimulate the violent nationalist agitation among the Serbs both in Serbia and Bosnia and also among the Croats. It helped further to unsettle the unbalanced minds of pro-Serb youths who carried out a series of attempts to assassinate Austrian officials which finally culminated in the tragic assassination of the Austrian Archduke at Sarajevo and thus led directly to the World War. Austrian Ministers were more or less aware of this encouragement and suspected that Russia rather than Serbia was the root of the Austro-Serbian antagonism.

In Germany, Billow resigned as Chancellor in July, 1909, for reasons which have already been indicated above, and was succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg, an old personal friend of William II's university days at Bonn. Bethmann possessed much native shrewdness, a high sense of honor and honesty, and a sincere desire to preserve the peace of Europe. During the Tsar's visit to Potsdam in November, 1910, he assured Sazonov, the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that if Austria should pursue expansionist plans, which he believed would not be the case, Germany was neither "bound nor inclined to support her." Henceforth, until July, 1914, Germany, while still assuring Austria of her readiness to fulfil her obligations as an ally, repeatedly exercised a restraining influence on Austria, especially during the Balkan Wars, in the interests of the peace of Europe.

Much more often his instructions to the German Ambassador in Vienna were in the direction of holding back Austria from taking action against Serbia, from antagonizing Russia, and from other reckless measures. Sometimes Austria heeded the advice, and sometimes she did not. But to represent Germany as exercising a complete control over her ally, as so many writers have done, is altogether incorrect. It was not until after the World War began and Austria exhibited such military weakness and failure that Germany gradually assumed that complete control over her ally's destiny which popular opinion ordinarily attributes to her.

The Racconigi Bargain of October 1909

While Germany was thus working, on the whole, to restrain Austria and lessen the tension in the Balkans, Russia was actively preparing for the "inevitable" conflict between Slavdom and Germandom, which would bring about the final realization of Russia's historic mission in regard to Constantinople and the Straits, and incidentally the realization of Serbia's ambition for a "Greater Serbia" at Austria's expense. With this in view, Izvolski arranged that the Tsar should visit Victor Emmanuel at the castle of Racconigi, south of Turin, in October, 1909.

He indicated his resentment over the Annexation by ostentatiously making a wide detour to avoid stepping on Austrian soil, and the fact was widely commented upon in the Press everywhere. 84 The important secret Russo-Italian agreement signed here by Izvolski and Tittoni begins with the usual pious wish for the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans, but goes on to state that, if this should prove impossible, as both Powers expected, they would agree to support the principle of nationality in the development of the Balkan states. The important clauses were the 4th and 5th:

4. If Russia and Italy wish to make agreements concerning the European East with a Third Power, beyond those which exist at present, each will do it only with the participation of the other.

5. Italy and Russia engage themselves to regard with benevolence, the one Russia's interests in the question of the Straits, the other Italian interests in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

These clauses ran so counter to Izvolski's and Tittoni's solemn public and private assurances that they were kept even more closely secret than was the case with most secret treaties. Izvolski does not appear to have informed the Russian Ambassadors in Paris and London of their exact nature at once. He did not even tell M. Poincare until after the outbreak of the Balkan War three years later, and even then he merely read the text aloud on the promise that the French Premier would not reveal it to the Cabinet or even his closest collaborators.

M. Tittoni similarly was careful that no inkling of it should reach Germany or Austria though they were Italy's allies. With characteristic duplicity, at the same time he was promising to make no agreements concerning the Balkans without Russia's participation, Tittoni was actually negotiating an agreement with Austria on the very subject. He had begun the negotiations in the preceding June, by proposing to Austria "an agreement that neither of the two states without the knowledge of the other should make an agreement concerning the Balkans with a third state." A week before the Racconigi meeting Tittoni wished to add more definitely that Italy and Austria should "agree not to conclude agreements with Russia without the participation of one another." Then he signed the Racconigi agreements. A few days later, nevertheless, Italy signed an agreement with Austria, behind Russia's back and in total disregard of the Racconigi promise, embodying essentially the proposals which Tittoni had been negotiating since June. To such deceit toward both Russia and Austria did Italian ambitions for Balkan and African territory lead M. Tittoni and the Italian Government! Racconigi betrays the same morality on Italy's part as in the agreements with France in 1902.

The Racconigi Agreement, which contemplated the possible partition of Turkey and the satisfying of Russia's ambitions in regard to the Straits, also served admirably another of Izvolski's purposes—that of tending to draw Italy away from the side of the Triple Alliance to that of the Triple Entente, or at least of neutralizing Italy as a "deadweight" in the Triple Alliance. Along with his Racconigi policy, Izvolski undertook to consolidate the Balkan States into a solid block under Russian guidance and protection. Hitherto

the greatest obstacle to harmonious action by the mutually jealous Balkan Powers had been the fact that Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece all made claims to the greater part of Macedonia, which was still in constant ferment under Turkish misrule. This obstacle could be overcome if Serbia abandoned some of her claim to Macedonia in favor of Bulgaria, and was promised compensation out of territories belonging to the Hapsburg Monarchy, when this should finally be disrupted, either by the death of the aged Emperor Francis Joseph, or by the disintegrating influence of the restless nationalities under Hapsburg rule.

At Constantinople an active newly-arrived Russian Ambassador, Charykov, appeared to be working for an entente or league between Turkey and the Balkan States, which might greatly increase Russia's influence in the Balkans and form a barrier to "the advance of Germanism."⁰⁷ But Charykov had little chance of success with the Turks, who were suspicious of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, all of whom coveted Turkish territory. With Bulgaria, however, Russia opened negotiations for a secret military convention, extending the scope of the secret treaty of 1902 by which Russia undertook to protect Bulgaria against attack by Rumania.

Russia's Racconigi Agreement with Italy and negotiations with Bulgaria and Serbia did not mean, however, that she intended any immediate warlike solution of the Balkan problem. They were merely part of that "preparation for the future," which was Russia's policy until she had finished reorganizing her army and navy, and had succeeded in winning more definite assurances from France and England for support of her Balkan ambitions. (So no war as long as Russia has not rebuilt its military, but war was already seen as inevitable) In the words of the Russian ambassador in Paris wrote to Izvol'ski in February 1910:

An agreement of this sort, concluded for a certain number of years, would leave the Balkan States at perfect liberty, both in regard to their internal development as well as to their mutual relations, which they might develop in every possible way. At the same time Russia would be placed in a position which would enable her to develop her military forces in all security and to prepare herself for those events which cannot be avoided. In the meantime the further evolution of the Ottoman Empire would be clearer—the problems would mature, and we should be able to meet the events that are to be foreseen much better equipped than otherwise.

Similarly M. Nekliudov relates that in 1911, when he was received by the Tsar before taking up his post at Sofia, Nicholas II said to him, "after an intentional pause, stepping backwards and fixing me with a penetrating stare: 'Listen to me, Nekliudov; do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. I do not wish for war; as a rule I shall do all in my power to preserve for my people the benefits of peace. But at this moment, of all moments, everything which might lead to war must be avoided. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years—in fact till 1917. . . . Though if the most vital interests and the honour of Russia were at stake, we might, if it were absolutely necessary, accept a challenge in 1915; but not a moment sooner—in

any circumstances or under any pretext whatsoever.' "

As Mr. Lowes Dickinson justly observes: "Had this remark been the Kaiser's instead of the Tsar's, all our war historians would have been citing it as a definite proof of the guilt, and the sole guilt of Germany.

Izvolski's Effort to open up the Straits in 1911

Izvolski had made two futile and unfortunate efforts to realize his ambition of opening the Straits to Russian warships. The first was made during the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the second in the Buchlau Bargain of 1908. Both had failed on account of opposition from Sir Edward Grey and lack of support from the French. But in the fall of 1911, Izvolski believed that the European situation invited a more successful effort.

When he learned from Tittoni in September, 1911, that Italy, stirred by the establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco, and taking advantage of the various secret promises made to her by the different Powers, was about to seize Tripoli, he believed that the favorable moment had come to cash in his part of the Racconigi Bargain. On learning of Italy's intended action, Izvolski immediately wrote to Neratov on September 26, recalling the Racconigi secret agreement, rejoicing in the embarrassment which Italy would cause for Germany and the Triple Alliance, and urging that the moment had come "to draw the greatest possible advantages for our own interests from the approaching events." Now was the time, while Turkey was weakened by war with Italy, to force the Young Turks to settle such questions as the railways in Asia Minor, the Turco-Persian boundary, and above all the question of the Straits.

Izvolski at once saw Tittoni at Paris, "to remind him of the conditions on which we promised on our side to recognize Italy's freedom to action in Tripoli," and to beg him that "Italy, at the moment when she was proceeding to carry out her program in Tripoli, should give us assurances in return that she would not forget in the future to fulfill the parallel obligations undertaken by her in regard to our rights to the Turkish Straits." Tittoni answered affirmatively and promised Izvolski precise written assurances. Having written to Neratov initiating a revival of the Straits Question, Izvolski went on a vacation to his family at Tegernsee in Bavaria. M. Neratov at once fell in with Izvolski's idea. He despatched instructions to Charykov at Constantinople to take advantage of the circumstances of the Turco-Italian War, the Franco-German Moroccan negotiations, and the very feeble character of the new Grand Vizier, to open conversations on the subject of Asia Minor railways, and, if Charykov deemed it wise, on the question of the Straits (and certain other subjects) on the following basis:

The Imperial Government engages to give the Ottoman Government its effective support for the maintenance of the present regime of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, extending it also to the territories adjacent. To facilitate the execution of

the above clause the Imperial Ottoman Government engages on its side not to oppose the passage of Russian warships through the Straits, on condition that these ships do not stop in the waters of the Straits unless by agreement.

Charykov was also informed that the plan was, first to secure the assent of Turkey, and to reserve the right to make explanations to the Powers concerning this modification of international treaties. Charykov therefore saw the Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, discussed with him all the subjects suggested by Neratov, and handed him a letter containing the proposal for opening the Straits and for settling other questions. The clause referring to Russian support in the Straits and "also the territories adjacent" had an ominous sound. It threatened to reduce Turkey to the position of a dependent vassal of the Tsar at a moment when Turkey was helplessly involved in war with Italy. The Grand Vizier therefore resorted to the usual Turkish dilatory tactics in dealing with disagreeable demands. For several weeks he evaded a definite reply, telling Charykov that he was delayed by having to consult other Ministers.

M. Charykov also confided his proposal to the French Ambassador in Constantinople. M. Bompard thought it opportune, but shrewdly suggested the need of getting England's assent, and telegraphed to Paris. The French Government was much alarmed, and at once inquired in St. Petersburg about the meaning of Charykov's confidences to Bompard. Neratov and Izvolski were now faced with the very delicate task of securing the assent of the Powers to this modification of international treaties concerning the Straits. With Italy and Germany this was easy enough. Italy needed Russia's diplomatic support in putting pressure upon Turkey to cede Tripoli. Tittoni quickly gave to Izvolski a definite promise, written down at Izvolski's own dictation, and guaranteed the Italian Government's approval. Germany also gave her full assent; Bethmann-Hollweg and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Kiderlen, shrewdly calculated that England would object anyway, and that there was, therefore, no occasion for Germany to offend Russia needlessly. For Germany to object would simply be pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the British.

Austria also, influenced by Germany, was ready to give her consent, qualifying it only with a reservation which would protect Austria from an attack by the Russian Fleet. With France and England, however, the task was much more delicate. M. Justin de Selves (the French diplomat) was cautious, sincere, and honest, and did not want to be precipitated into a rash promise which might encourage France's ally to risky Balkan adventures or which might displease the friend of France across the English Channel. He therefore quickly got into touch with Downing Street. He learned from Paul Cambon that news had reached London, by way of Italy, that Charykov had made an official request at Constantinople, and that England took the same stand as in 1908: England was ready to see the Straits opened, provided they were opened to the warships of all nations alike, but not if they were opened only to Russia, thus converting the Black Sea into a potential Russian naval fortress.

On November 4, Izvolski finally sought "to nail France down" to a written promise, while

de Selves was in a pleasant mood of relief at the conclusion of long negotiations with Germany, and before the inexperienced Minister should have time to get advice from England or elsewhere about the problem of the Straits. In his letter to M. de Selves, Izvolski complimented him on the Morocco settlement "to which Russia would give her full and complete agreement," and coaxingly "expressed his firm hope that at the moment at which France, the friend and ally of Russia, is proceeding to establish her position in North Africa on a new and firm foundation, the French Government, to which the Imperial Cabinet has unceasingly given its most sincere diplomatic support, is ready on its side to assure us that it recognizes our liberty of action in the Straits as well as in North China, and will not deny its assent to the measures which we might be put in a position to take for the safe-guarding of our interests and strengthening of our position there." Even to M. de Selves these honeyed words must have seemed hypocritical, since Russia's diplomatic support in the Agadir Affair had been nil and whatever success France had secured in the negotiations with Germany had been chiefly due to British support and to M. Caillaux's efforts.

M. de Selves, however, was not to be taken in so easily. His suspicions of the Russian Ambassador are indicated by the fact that he inquired at St. Petersburg whether Izvolski had written the letter on his own initiative or upon instructions from Neratov. He was shrewd enough to consult Sir Edward Grey again, and learned that England had no intention of approving a Russian guarantee of "the status quo of the Straits and the territories adjacent," which went far beyond Izvolski's proposal of 1908. Grey gave Russia "a dilatory reply." He approved the noncommittal reply which de Selves proposed to make verbally to M. Izvolski as "very wise and conceived in the same spirit of courtesy and prudence as that which he [Grey] has made to the Russian Ambassador."

While Sir Edward Grey and M. de Selves, by polite but dilatory answers, were saving themselves from being nailed down in advance to definite support of an indefinite program, events had been taking place at Constantinople which also contributed to Izvolski's chagrin. After Charykov had tried in vain for weeks to secure an answer from the Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, he turned to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. On November 27, he officially presented to Hassim Bey a note embodying Russia's request for opening the Straits and settling other points. Hassim Bey was furious. He feared that Russian warships in the Bosphorus would mean Russian domination at Constantinople, the establishment of a Russian protectorate over the Turkish Empire, or even the beginning of its final dismemberment. Russia had destroyed the independence of Persia and was preparing the same fate for Turkey.

In his peril and perplexity, Hassim Bey hurried to inform his good friend the German Ambassador. "The great blow has just been struck us," were his first words to Baron Marschall. He then proceeded to tell of Charykov's demands, and to pour out all his fears and indignation against Russia, and against the Triple Entente which he suspected (quite wrongly) was standing behind Russia. He pleaded at great length with the German Foreign Office to aid Turkey in resisting Russia and he was told that Germany would not

oppose the opening of the Straits because there was little doubt that England would oppose it, and that Germany would only be playing England's game and offending Russia needlessly.

Rumors of Charykov's negotiations had meanwhile leaked out and caused no less indignation among the Young Turks and in the Turkish Press than Hassim Bey had expressed to Baron Marschall. On December 6, the *Jeni Gazette*, though it usually inclined to favor England, published a leading article to the effect that, "The Russians want to degrade the great and glorious Turkish Empire into a province standing under a Russian protectorate, but the Ottomans will never tolerate this." Hassim Bey was further encouraged to resist Charykov's demands on learning that Sir Edward Grey had told the Turkish Ambassador in London that "Russia's step seems to me out of place at this moment," and that the assent of all the Signatory Powers would be necessary. As a result of the attitude of England, France and Turkey, it began to be clear that Izvol'ski's idea could not be realized at the moment.

He seems to have come to the conclusion after this that there were only two ways to open the Straits; either by pouncing upon them in time of peace, or as the result of a general European war. On several occasions between 1912 and 1914 Russian Ministerial Councils seriously considered the first alternative only to abandon it as impractical. So there was left only the second alternative, a general European war. To prepare for this Izvol'ski worked persistently and consistently during the two following years, and, when at last it suddenly burst forth, was said to have claimed exultingly: "C'est via guerre!" (This is my war!)

Russia and the Balkan League

Five centuries of Turkish oppression, combined with the rising tide of nationalism in the nineteenth century, had inspired the Christian peoples of the Balkans with a passion for national unity and independence. By the year 1911, owing to the progressive decay of the Ottoman Empire, long steps had already been made toward the realization of their ardent hopes. Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania had been constituted into independent kingdoms. But there were thousands of Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Rumanians, not to mention Macedonians and Albanians, still living under the foreign rule of Turkey or Austria. They, too, longed to be liberated and united with their brothers in the independent kingdoms. The supposedly democratic revolution in Turkey, and Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, for a moment seemed to indicate that these two States were showing signs of rejuvenation and that the day of Slav liberation was likely to be delayed.

But the impractical ideals of the Young Turks and their foolish disregard of traditional rights and prejudices only resulted in antagonizing more completely the non-Turkish elements, and in weakening still further the decaying Empire which Abdul Hamid's skill and ruthless methods had managed to preserve. The Tripolitan War gave it another

staggering blow, and led directly to the formation of the Balkan League, which finally drove the Turks almost completely from Europe.

During the early months of the Tripolitan War various Russian representatives were pursuing three quite different Balkan policies—a striking example of lack of unity and discipline in the Russian diplomatic service. They all wanted to take advantage of Turkey's difficulties with Italy to strengthen Russia's position in the Balkans and in Europe, but they had altogether different ideas of how this must be done. Izvolski, with the cooperation of Neratov and Charykov, had tried to open the Straits to Russian warships, and had failed. Meanwhile Charykov, on his own initiative, had at the same time been renewing his efforts for the formation of a Balkan League of which Turkey (!) should be a member. He had offered his "good offices" to Said Pasha and Hassim Bey to bring about close relations between Constantinople, Sofia and Belgrade. Such a league might be used to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, and to support Russia in a war against Austria. It would reduce Turkey to a kind of vassalage to Russia, because Turkey would be dependent on Russia for protection from the Balkan States.

While the policies of Iz/olski and Charykov were doomed to failure, a third policy, ardently pursued by Hartwig and Nekliudov in Belgrade and Sofia, ripened into success. They aimed at the formation of a Balkan Slav League under Russian patronage, nominally for the preservation of the status quo, but capable of being directed against Turkey or Austria. Active Russian efforts to create such a league had been made from time to time ever since the Young Turk Revolution and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908 but failed. The idea of a Slav Balkan League was galvanized into life again by the news of Italy's war on Turkey in September, 1911.

M. Geshov, the Bulgarian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, has given a dramatic and authentic narrative of his part, how he heard the news of the Tripolitan War at Vichy, hurried home to Sofia via Paris and Vienna, having interviews with de Selves and Aehrenthal, returned to Vienna for secret conferences with King Ferdinand and with Milovanovitch of Serbia, and finally, in a three-hours' talk between stations in a railway compartment outlined a Balkan Agreement to him. It was in the course of this interview, after they had touched upon the thorny question of the future division of Macedonia, that the Serbian Premier exclaimed:

Ah! Yes! If, at the same time with the liquidation of Turkey, the disintegration of Austria could take place, the solution would be enormously simplified: Serbia would get Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Rumania would get Transylvania, and we should not have to fear the intervention of Rumania in our war with Turkey.

But M. Geshov's narrative tells relatively little of the part played by Russia in the long and difficult negotiations which followed. These two Russian Ministers at Belgrade and Sofia worked indefatigably to smooth out the mutual jealousies and suspicions of the Serbian and Bulgarian Ministers toward one another, and to help them in the almost superhuman task of reaching an agreement as to the division of spoils to be conquered

from Turkey. At the same time they kept Neratov fully informed of each step forward in the negotiations. Finally, on March 13, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria agreed on a Treaty and signed it.

By this Treaty of March 13, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria mutually guaranteed each other's territory and independence, and agreed to support one another in case any of the Great Powers should attempt to acquire by force, even temporarily, any territory in the Balkans. This protected Serbia against any attempts of Austria to reoccupy the Sanjak of Novi Bazar or to seize the parts of Macedonia and Albania coveted by Serbia. Serbia had hoped in the early negotiations that the alliance would be primarily directed against Austria. On taking charge of the Foreign Office again at the beginning of 1912, M. Sazonov found the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty well on the way to completion. Negotiated during his absence, and containing a clause for rigid secrecy, he did not know whether he ought to inform the other members of the Triple Entente of it. Though professing to preserve the status quo, and giving Russia a kind of veto on making war (at least so he said), he appears to have realized that it might easily encourage the Balkan States to a war which in turn might involve Russia and her French Ally.

For a moment in February, 1912, he apparently thought of engaging France in a full discussion of the new aspect of the Balkan problem. He drew up a questionnaire as a basis of discussion: what should France and Russia do in case of an internal Turkish revolution, an Austrian attack on Albania or the Sanjak, or an outbreak of war between Turkey and one of the Balkan states? He showed it to M. Georges Louis. But the French Ambassador was again exceedingly cautious and saw great dangers ahead. "These are the greatest questions," he wrote M. Poincare, "with which Russia can face her ally." "It would be better for us to consent to discuss them in academic conversations, than to risk being drawn along in Russia's wake by the rapidity of events, without being able to discuss either her action or to set forth our conditions. . . . For M. Sazonov as for M. Izvolski, it is neither in China nor in Persia, but in the Balkans that Russia will direct at present her principal political effort."

Sazonov drew back and did not bring up again for discussion his questionnaire, and evaded all French efforts to draw him out as to what he had had in mind. It was not until Poincare visited St. Petersburg in August, 1912, that he learned for the first time the full text of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, and exclaimed in alarm "Mais c'est la une convention de guerre!" (But this is an agreement for war) exactly the expression which Nekliudov had used when forwarding the document to St. Petersburg. M. Poincare was indignant that the details of a treaty, likely to lead to war in the Balkans and arranged under Russia's patronage, had been so long withheld from France by her Ally. As he noted at the time:

I did not conceal from him [Sazonov] that I could not well explain to myself why these documents had not been communicated to France by Russia. . . . The Treaty contains the germ not only of a war against Turkey, but a war against Austria. It establishes further the hegemony of Russia over the Slav Kingdoms, because Russia is made the arbiter in all

questions. I observed to M. Sazonov that this convention did not correspond in any way to the definition of it which had been given to me; that it is, strictly speaking a convention for war, and that it not only reveals mental reservations on the part of the Serbs and Bulgarians, but that it is also to be feared lest their hopes appear to be encouraged by Russia, and that the eventual partition will prove a bait to their covetousness.

Nothing better characterizes the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty than these words of the French Premier, unless it be what he himself said a week after the outbreak of the Balkan War:

It is certain that she [Russia] knew all about the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, and, far from protesting against it she saw in this diplomatic document a means of assuring her hegemony in the Balkans. She perceives today that it is too late to wipe out the movement which she has called forth, and, as I said to MM. Sazonov and Izvolski, she is trying to put on the brakes, but it is she who started the motor.

The Balkan Danger and the Powers in 1912

Though M. Poincare, with his characteristic quickness and accuracy of judgment, was quite correct in his view of the dangers latent in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, he and M. Sazonov took no immediate steps to consult with the Powers to avert an outbreak of war in the Balkans. He merely told M. Sazonov that public opinion in France would not allow the French Government to take up arms for Russia over a purely Balkan question—so long as Germany did not intervene. In this latter case, Russia “could certainly count on France for the accomplishment of her exact and entire obligations” as an ally. He confidentially informed Sazonov of the secret Anglo-French “verbal agreement in virtue of which England has declared herself ready to aid France with all her naval and military forces in case of a German attack.” He discussed the new Franco-Russian Naval Convention, and urged Sazonov to try to make a similar convention with Sir Edward Grey for the cooperative action of the Russian and English navies.

After returning to France, though now fully aware of the impending danger of war in the Balkans, M. Poincare made no proposals to avert it until September 22. Even then he consulted only with the two other members of the Triple Entente, being ever anxious to preserve Entente solidarity and to get concerted agreement to proposals which could then be notified to the Triple Alliance Powers for their acceptance or rejection. This tended to sharpen the division of the Great Powers into two hostile groups, whereas Germany, and also Sir Edward Grey and Sazonov, for the most part, took the broader and wiser stand of desiring to have the Powers act collectively and in concert, in order to prevent a possible conflict between the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance.

At times, to be sure, M. Poincare asserted his solicitude for collective European action. Thus, on August 28, he told the German Charge d’Affaires that “his policy aimed that the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente should not seek to range themselves on opposite sides, but should work for the establishment of the European Concert.” This sounded

well. But did his acts correspond to his words?

On this same August 28 he telegraphed to London, "It seems to me desirable that an Entente should take place between France, England and Russia so that completely harmonious advice can be given at the Sublime Porte." Two days later he emphasized both at London and St. Petersburg: "It remains understood that the concert of the three [Entente] Powers is necessary for every collective action." In contrast to Poincare's policy of "Entente Solidarity," Count Berchtold (Diplomat of Austria-Hungary) proposed on August 13 that all the Great Powers enter collectively into a discussion, with a view to securing reforms from Turkey and restraining the Balkan States from disturbing the status quo. Count Berchtold was thus the first of the European diplomatists to propose collective European action in view of the increasing tension between Turkey and the Balkan States, although he had no such definite knowledge of the explosive material hidden in the secret Balkan Treaties as had Sazonov and Poincare. But Berchtold's proposal was so vague, both in its wording and in his own mind, that it did not commend itself to any of the Powers, and was later pushed aside when M. Poincare took the initiative out of Count Berchtold's hands.

Finally, on September 22, M. Poincare took the initiative by proposing to England and France a formula for restraining the Balkan Powers, which the Triple Entente should agree upon and then present to Germany and Austria for acceptance. Izvolski told him that he feared that this procedure would not receive the assent of Sazonov nor of England, "because it emphasized the division of Europe into two groups." M. Poincare replied that it could be kept secret, and, after some modifications to please England and Russia, secured an accord with them: the Entente Powers were to invite Germany and Austria to agree to join in advising the Balkan States not to disturb the peace, and warning them that, even if they broke it, they would not be allowed to make territorial gains.

On September 28, M. Jules Cambon broached the subject to M. Kiderlen-Wachtcr at Berlin and found a cordial reception. The only remaining question seemed to be who should assume the ungrateful office of making the announcement to the Balkan States. M. Kiderlen suggested that Russia and Austria should act in the name of the Great Powers, and his suggestion was adopted. But there were further delays due to objections raised by Russia and England. On October 7, the assent of all the Great Powers was finally secured, and the next day Russia and Austria issued the agreed warning to the now highly excited Balkan States.¹⁵⁴ It was too late. On this very day, October 8, Montenegro declared war on Turkey and was speedily joined by the other Balkan Allies.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

When Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece joined Montenegro in war upon Turkey in October, 1912, they quickly astonished themselves and the world by the rapidity and completeness of their victories. The Greeks occupied Salonica, the Bulgarians marched victoriously to the defensive forts outside Constantinople; and the Serbians swept over the whole upper

valley of the Vardar, the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, and the northern part of Albania. This gave them at last an outlet on the Adriatic. Only the Turkish fortresses of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari held out against the victorious allies.

The Serbians were greatly elated by these conquests which doubled their territory and seemed to foreshadow the possibility of the early realization of their "Greater Serbia" ambitions at Austria's expense. They were actively encouraged by Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade. He was said to have declared to his Rumanian colleague that Serbia could not possibly renounce her outlet on the Adriatic; Serbia must be the Slavic advance-post in the Balkans, and must annex Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the South Slav districts of Hungary; Rumania, he hinted, had better look out for her interests in the same way and annex Transylvania.

There was little doubt that Russia was energetically supporting the Serbian claim to Northern Albania and ports on the Adriatic. Reports came from St. Petersburg that the Pan-Slav and militarist party of the Grand Dukes was using pressure upon the peace-loving Tsar to resort to war, if necessary, on Serbia's behalf. To Austria and Italy, as well as to the Albanians themselves, the extraordinary and unexpected victories of the Serbians were most unwelcome. Though the Albanians, numbering less than two million, were still in a relatively primitive state of civilization, and divided into hostile quarreling groups of varying religious affiliations—Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Mohammedan—they scouted the idea of coming under the rule of the Serbians. They had no mind to exchange the Turkish for a Serbian yoke.

Both Austria and Italy urged the establishment of an Albanian State, though under different forms and for different reasons. Allies, yet rivals, both were in favor of creating Albania as a means of excluding Serbia from the Adriatic, which both aspired to dominate. But both were extremely jealous and suspicious of each other. Both had sought secret support from Russia for the exclusion of the other from all influence in Albania. These two jealous Powers differed, however, as to the details of the desired Albanian principality. Austria wanted a completely independent Albania, either under a native chieftain, or under some other ruler whom Austria could more or less control and influence. She hoped to find in a newly created Albania an ally against Serbia on the east and a check upon Italy on the west. Austria therefore desired that the new state be as strong as possible, and that it should include Ipek, Djakovo, Dibra, and Prizren, as well as Scutari and Janina. "An Albania without Scutari, Janina, and Prizren, would be a body without a heart and stomach." An Albania of such size and strength as Austria desired would deprive Serbia of part of the fruits of her unexpected victories, and also tend to check the dangerous "Greater Serbia" movement in the future.

Italy, on the other hand, did not want too strong an Albania, where Italy had political, commercial, and military ambitions. Italy wanted to control the harbor of Valona, build a railway across the mountains to Salonica, and check the northern advance of Greek influence. In possession of Brindisi on one shore of the Adriatic, and in control of the Albanian coast on the other, Italy aspired virtually to close up the Adriatic into an Italian

lake. Italy was satisfied merely to have the Serbians shut out from the coast. Rather than give Albania wide frontiers and a prince who might be under Austrian influence, Italy preferred leaving the region under nominal Turkish suzerainty, with a governor appointed by the Great Powers and assisted by a gendarmerie under Swedish, Spanish, Swiss, or Belgian officers.

By the end of November, this Albanian question, together with all the other rivalries and suspicions which had been accentuated by the Balkan War, began seriously to threaten the peace of Europe. Russia, in spite of some wavering on Sazonov's part, inclined to back the Serbians in their actual possession of Northern Albania, and Austria and Italy were determined to support the Albanian chieftains in their opposition to Serbia. Russia began mobilizing part of her forces against Austria. Austria had already made preparations for war against Serbia, and was believed to have mobilized three army corps in Galicia against Russia. On December 7, Conrad, the head of the Austrian militarist group, was reappointed to his old position as Chief of Staff. Russia, however, drew back when the risk of war became imminent. Poincaré, who had warned Russia from a too risky support of Serbia on his visit to Russia, before the Balkan Allies had won their great victories, now encouraged Russia to take a stiff stand. He saw that the new Balkan Alliance was virtually equivalent in strength to a Great Power.

With this on the side of Russia, the prospects were highly favorable for French revanche, if Austria should attack Russia, and thus involve France and Germany in a general war. He counted on Italy's doubtful loyalty to the Triple Alliance, and he hoped for England's armed support to the Triple Entente, in view of the exchange of notes which had just taken place between Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey in London.

Peace between the Great Powers, however, was preserved, thanks largely to efforts of the English and German Governments. Concessions were made on all sides. On December 16, the London Conference of Ambassadors accepted Sir Edward Grey's compromise proposal for an independent Albania whose boundaries were to be determined later. Like most compromises, this satisfied neither of the two states most directly interested in the fate of the unhappy little country. Serbia felt very bitterly at being deprived of the fruits of her victories and her long hoped-for economic outlet on the Adriatic. Deprived by the Great Powers of territory which she had expected to get in this direction, Serbia quite naturally felt she had a right to ask Bulgaria to revise the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, and to give her some of Macedonia south of the line from Mt. Golem to Lake Ochrida. Bulgaria refused. This eventually led to the second Balkan War, when Bulgaria made her sudden treacherous attack upon Serbia at the end of June, 1913.

Austria also complained bitterly that nearly everything which occurred in connection with Albania in the months following the adoption of Sir Edward Grey's proposal was done in opposition to her wishes and was prejudicial to her interests. This was either because the majority of the Conference took sides against her in favor of Serbia, Russia, and Italy ; or because the Serbians and Montenegrins acted in defiance of the decisions of the Powers, by placing *faits accomplis* before the Conference, which the latter was unwilling

or unable to remedy. The most notorious and grotesque case of the kind was the way in which King Nicholas of Montenegro snapped his fingers in the face of the Powers and their international fleet and continued the siege of Scutari, which the Conference had assigned to Albania.

Although the Albanian compromise averted the danger of an immediate war between the Great Powers, it remained a highly disturbing factor in Balkan politics until it disappeared into relative insignificance at the outbreak of the World War. It was indirectly the cause of the fratricidal Serbo-Bulgarian conflict of June, 1913, and it led to a new Austro-Serbian crisis in the following November. When Bulgaria suddenly attacked Serbia in the quarrel over Macedonia, and started the Second Balkan War (June 30-August 10, 1913), she was speedily crushed. Rumania and Greece seized the favorable opportunity to settle their grievances against her by joining forces with Serbia. Even Turkey returned to the attack to recover the Thracian territory which she had just lost. Attacked on four sides, and already exhausted by her efforts during the First Balkan War, Bulgaria was quickly forced to beg for peace and sign the Treaty of Bucharest.

This deprived her of a large part of her recent conquests from Turkey and some of her own former territory which was ceded to Rumania. It increased the power of her Balkan rivals, and left her isolated and embittered. Henceforth she was eager to gain the support of Austria or Russia—whichever offered her the best prospect of overthrowing the Bucharest Treaty. But she had forfeited the confidence of every one. Russia hesitated to ally with her for fear of antagonizing Serbia, and Austria hesitated similarly for fear of offending Rumania. Serbia came out of the Balkan Wars greatly increased in power and prestige, and fired with a renewed self-confidence and determination to realize her ambition of a "Greater Serbia." She had nearly doubled her territory, and increased her population from three to nearly four and a half millions. There were soon rumors that Serbia and Montenegro might merge together, as the first step in the formation of "Greater Serbia." The next step would be to take Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and the other South Slav districts belonging to Austria-Hungary.

These dangerous and reckless territorial ambitions, which were taking stronger and stronger hold of all Serbians, even of their greatest leader and Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, are reflected in the remark which he made to his Greek colleague, M. Politis, as they finished dividing up the spoils of the Second Balkan War at the Bucharest Peace Conference: "The first round is won; now we must prepare the second against Austria."

It would be a mistake, however, to think that M. Pashitch intended "the second round" against Austria immediately. Cooler reflection told him that before proceeding to this, it was necessary to consolidate the gains in Macedonia and to make more certain of Russian support. Hence his visit to Russia in January, 1914, to ask for a marriage alliance between the Serbian Crown Prince and the Tsar's daughter, as well as for "120,000 guns and ammunition and some few cannon, especially howitzers." 181 Although M. Pashitch was willing to await the favorable moment, this was not the feeling of many nationalist

Serb youths and especially of the Serbian military officers of the secret "Black Hand." Highly elated by their recent victories, they looked forward with increasing eagerness and impatience to the day, so often promised by Russia, when the great Slav Empire of the north would be ready to help them in the "inevitable" struggle between Slavdom and Germandom, and the final creation of a "Greater Serbia" at the expense of the Hapsburg Empire.

In proportion as Serbia was elated and strengthened, Austria felt discouraged and weakened in power and prestige by the results of the Balkan Wars. Though she had taken no part in them, and lost no territory, her position was seriously undermined. Her subject nationalities grew more restless and more accessible to subversive propaganda. Rumania was becoming a less reliable ally, and Serbia a more certain and active enemy. The ever-present friction and distrust between Italy and Austria had been increased, and the danger that Austria might one day have to fight a war upon four fronts—Italian, Serbian, Rumanian and Russian—had become more threatening. Realizing these increased dangers, the militarist party at Vienna again seriously considered whether Austria ought not to deal at once with the Greater Serbia danger.

Germany's Warning to Austria July 1913

When Bulgaria treacherously attacked Serbia at the end of June, 1913, and began the short but disastrous Second Balkan War, Berchtold at first adopted a reserved "wait and see" attitude, which accorded with his own hesitating nature and the wishes of Germany and Italy. ¹⁰⁵ But he did not intend to tolerate any further great increase of Serbian territory, in spite of the moderating counsels of the German Ambassador in Vienna. In Berchtold's view by writing a telegram to the German ambassador:

The South Slav question, that is to say, undisturbed possession of the provinces inhabited by South Slavs, is a vital question for the Monarchy as well as for the Triple Alliance. The Monarchy's South Slav provinces could not be held if Serbia became too powerful. As to that, all competent opinions here agree. The Monarchy might accordingly possibly be compelled to intervene, in the event of Serbia inflicting a crushing defeat on Bulgaria in conjunction with Rumania and Greece, and annexing tracts of country in excess of the territory of Old Serbia, or something approximating to that. Serbia cannot be left in possession of Monastir, in any case.... her only object was to safeguard her South Slav possessions, which of course included Trieste.

This telegram arrived at Berlin while Bethmann- Hollwgcg and Jagow, the German Secretary of State, were absent at Kiel at the Kaiser's annual yachting festival, at which the Italian King and Queen, accompanied by their Minister of Foreign Affairs, San Giuliano, were also present, Zimmcrmann, the Under-Secretary at Berlin, forwarded the telegram to Kiel, with the moderating German comment:

For the moment there hardly seems to be any ground for special nervousness on

Vienna's part, because one can scarcely talk as yet of the danger of a Great Serbia. Our business should be to exercise a quieting influence on Vienna, and see that she keeps us regularly informed of her intentions and takes no decisions before hearing what we have to say.

Meanwhile Berchtold had become increasingly nervous. He therefore telegraphed to the Austrian Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome on July 4, expressing much the same views as in his conversations with the German Ambassador quoted above, and particularly urging that Austria's two allies should "make representations at Bucharest to hold off Rumania from further steps against Bulgaria." Bethmann refused to do this, and made it clear, as he had often done before, that the way to prevent Rumania from falling upon Bulgaria was for Austria to exert energetic pressure at Sofia to induce King Ferdinand to satisfy King Carol's justifiable demands for territorial compensations. For Berchtold's edification Bethmann added the further sapient observations and effective warnings:

Austria-Hungary from the outset declared that in the present Balkan crisis she is striving after no territorial conquests. She has defined her interest as to the outcome of the Balkan War to the effect that Serbia must not reach the Adriatic, and that a viable Albania must be delivered.... I can therefore only express the hope that the people, in Vienna will not let themselves be upset by the nightmare of a Great Serbia, but will await further developments from the Serbo-Bulgarian theatre of war. Only insistently can I warn against the idea of wanting to gobble up Serbia, for that would simply weaken Austria.

This speedy and decisive warning from Germany on July 6 effectually deterred Berchtold and Conrad from rashly entering upon any reckless adventure which would have endangered the peace of Europe.

Intrigues over Kavala in 1913

The Second Balkan War, resulting in the conquest from the Bulgarians of Kavala by the Greeks and of Adrianople by the Turks, led to some very interesting diplomatic intrigues which illumine the methods of pre-War diplomatists. They throw a curious light on the support—or rather lack of support—which allies give one another when their own selfish interests are involved. In fact, the Kavala question caused such an internal split within each diplomatic group, that in the resulting Franco-Russian newspaper recriminations the *Novoe Vremia* demanded a revision of the Franco-Russian Alliance; 178 and, similarly, the *Vienna Neue Freie Presse* regretted sorrowfully the hitherto incredible "rift and serious weaknesses" in the Austro-German Alliance, "which for more than thirty years had rooted itself in our consciousness like an oak tree in its soil."

Kavala was a Macedonian walled town and seaport situated about half-way between Salonica and the Dardanelles. Its tolerably good harbor was the best port available for the Bulgarians on the Aegean. It was near the center of a rich agricultural region where

millions of dollars worth of the best Turkish tobacco was produced annually. Aside from Turks and Spanish Jews, its population was predominantly Greek, though the hinterland was predominantly Bulgarian. Greeks and Bulgarians both coveted it. In the first Balkan War the Bulgarian armies got there first and occupied it. But in the following war between the Balkan States. Bulgaria was attacked on all sides and had to yield it up to the Greeks. On both occasions the usual unspeakable atrocities were committed.

As to the final fate of Kavala. it soon appeared that the Great Powers held very divergent views. Austria and Russia, usually diametrically opposed on Balkan matters, were both very anxious to give it to Bulgaria. Berchtold and Sazonov therefore began intrigues in which their methods were precisely analogous and parallel, but in which their objectives were altogether different. Germany and France, on the other hand, were equally insistent that Kavala should go to Greece. England and Italy, less directly interested, were at first inclined to give it to Bulgaria, but both soon acquiesced in letting the Greeks stay in the coveted seaport, because, as Sir Edward Grey observed, "it would be difficult to drive the Greeks out."

Berchtold, by trying to secure Kavala for Bulgaria, hoped to set up a stronger counterweight to Serbia, now so swollen in size and conceit by her conquests in two Balkan Wars. So Berchtold, at the beginning of the Bucharest negotiations, secretly promised Kavala to the Bulgarians, without informing Germany as a frank and loyal Ally should have done. For this concealment he was very properly and severely reproached by Germany when the truth came out a little later.

Sazonov used all his efforts at the Bucharest Peace Conference to get Kavala restored to the Bulgarians. But he did not at once inform his French Ally of the importance which he attached to this policy. He did, however, secure from the Russian treasury, at the suggestion of Izvolski and the French Minister of the Interior, a second sum of 100,000 francs with which to bribe the French Press, stipulating that the money was to be used for propaganda in favor of Russia's Balkan interests as well as in favor of the new law increasing the French army. But the Turks were reported by the Russian financial agent in Paris to be spending much more generously for bribery in the opposite direction—five million francs, with 100,000 to *La Libre Parole* alone. France did not support Sazonov's Kavala policy, and the Franco-Russian newspaper feud, mentioned above, burst forth. Izvolski naturally complained: "This incident is for me personally extremely painful."

Why did Germany and France fail to support their respective allies in this Kavala question? The Kaiser's philhellenism was strengthened by his annual spring visit to Corfu and the building of the Achilleion. He might also naturally be expected to give political support to his brother-in-law. King Constantine did not hesitate to capitalize his imperial connection as far as possible. On July 31, at "Tino's" direction, "Sophy" telegraphed to "Willy," begging him to put in a good word with King Carol of Rumania on behalf of the Greek claims to Kavala. Whereupon the Kaiser telegraphed to King Carol in restrained and considerate terms: "Can you do anything about Kavala? I should regard the question sympathetically. Hearty congratulations and good wishes on your successes.—Wilhelm."

Much more important than these personal considerations, however, was the German Government's hope that German support of Greek claims to Kavala would counteract Gallophil influences at Athens and draw Greece more definitely into the wake of the Triple Alliance, thus securing Greek strategic and diplomatic support in the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor. This at the moment seemed quite possible.

As to French policy, according to M. Poincare, who cites the highly selective and relatively meager French Yellow Book on the Balkan Wars, "The preoccupation of France was always the same—to put an end to a war which might become general; she took the side of Greece against Bulgaria, that is in this case of Germany against Russia, solely in the hope of preventing a renewal of hostilities." But in reality, French policy in the Kavala question was dictated also by the traditional policy of France of friendship for Greece, by the French instructors loaned to drill the Greek armies who were supplied with French guns, and by the large investments of French in Greek loans and in the tobacco monopoly in the Kavala region (which the Bulgarians had threatened to confiscate if it came into their possession), all of which tended to make French public opinion philhellenic. But above all, according to Izvolski, it was dictated by "the fear that Germany would gain the upper hand in Athens," that French interests in the Near East would suffer, and that France must get the strategic support of the Greek navy against the rival power of Italy in the Mediterranean.

The Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia of October 18, 1913

In the summer of 1913, after the First Balkan War and the decision to establish an independent Albania, the London Conference of Ambassadors agreed to create three commissions which, it was hoped, would help bring into existence an Albanian state capable of life and survival. One commission was to delimit the southern frontier between Albania and Greece, another the northern one toward Serbia and Montenegro, and the third, the Commission of International Control, was to attempt to administer Albania until the Great Powers could find and agree upon an acceptable Prince for the country.

The representatives of the six Great Powers soon tended to divide into three groups corresponding to the political attitude of their superiors in London. The French and Russian delegates took every occasion to favor the Greeks, Serbians and Montenegrins, while the Austrian and Italian were bent on giving Albania the widest extent possible. Between these two extreme groups, whose bickerings over picayune trifles several times threatened to break up the work of the Commissions altogether, the English and German Commissioners tried to find satisfactory compromises, and at the same time conscientiously reach decisions which accorded with the facts on the spot and the instructions they received from London.

Owing to the delays of the Commissions in fixing the Albanian boundaries and to the mutual enmity of Serbians and Albanians, a frontier conflict broke out. Serbian troops reoccupied Albanian territory. The Albanians, upon this provocation, took revenge by

attacking and routing a Serbian detachment. Serbia then mobilized part of her army. The Serbian Press demanded a punitive expedition and the occupation of a considerable part of Albania. In view of the fact that Serbian troops persisted in remaining in occupation of Albanian territory, Berchtold and the Austrian Chief of Staff, Baron Conrad, again considered what more drastic measures they ought to take.

Conrad, as usual, insisted that Serbia must be dealt with once and for all, before it was too late, especially as Rumania was falling away from Austria and coming under Russian and French influence. Count Tisza, the all-powerful Magyar leader, who had become Hungarian Minister- President on June 6, 1913, though recognizing the Serbian danger, was inclined to trust to diplomatic action. He agreed that the London Conference had brought nothing but disillusionment, and therefore favored having Austria-Hungary strike out an independent policy of her own. Tisza hoped that the anti-Austrian Balkan group—Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Greece—could be offset by winning over Turkey and Bulgaria, who were on the point of coming to terms with one another. In contrast to the clear-cut program of Conrad for military action, and that of Count Tisza for diplomatic action, Count Berchtold, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had no definite idea of what ought to be done. He was finally inclined to think that some concession to Serbia in regard to the Albanian boundary might be given for the moment, and that military preparations should be made for the future, with the hope that in the meantime the general diplomatic situation might improve.

The result of the discussion was that no definite decision was taken, except the adoption of proposals in regard to finance and a small army increase to be laid before the Delegations the following November. In spite of the fact that the Serbians had burned several villages and massacred Albanians in the neighborhood of Dibra, so that the population was in flight toward the coast, Berchtold contented himself on October 14 with an "amicable request" to Serbia to withdraw her troops from Albania and respect the decisions of the London Conference, within a date which Serbia herself might fix. Sazonov and Pichon also advised Pashitch to withdraw his troops at once.

But the Serbian Prime Minister did not follow this good advice, possibly because he may not have received it in time, or more probably because he was being influenced by the ardent Pan-Slav Russian Minister, Hartwig, and by subterranean pressure from the secret society of Serbian military officers known as the "Black Hand." On the contrary, Pashitch replied to Austria that the withdrawal of Serbian troops would depend on future conditions in Albania, where the anarchical state of affairs endangered the safety of his own peace-loving subjects. He even asked the London Conference to revise its former decisions, and assign some new strategic positions to Serbia. At the same time, Montenegro, to whom a new loan had just been authorized by the French Government, occupied Albanian territory, and was reported to be on the point of ordering a general mobilization against the people whom the Great Powers were supposed to protect and govern. It was again rumored that Montenegro was about to merge with Serbia toward the formation of a "Greater Serbia." It looked to Vienna as if Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece were seriously

intending to reoccupy the unhappy distracted country and present the impotent Powers with a new *fait accompli*.

Meanwhile Berchtold informed Germany of the situation, reiterated that Albania's existence was necessary as a barrier against the Slav advance to the Adriatic, and declared that further acquiescence would be an abdication on Austria's part. He therefore expressed "the hope that Germany, who herself has a great interest in damming back the Slav flood, would stand morally solid behind Austria in this matter; because, as far as one could see, it would only be a question of moral support, since neither Russia nor France wanted war.

Suddenly, in the middle of the night of October 17-18, Berchtold, gratified at Germany's moral support but without saying anything further to her, and influenced by the latest reports concerning Albania, despatched an ultimatum to Belgrade. It insisted that Serbia respect Albanian territory and withdraw her troops within eight days; "otherwise Austria would be forced, with regret, to have recourse to the proper measures to secure the realization of her demands." Berchtold's unexpected exhibition of decisive energy took all Europe aback with surprise. To Sazonov it caused much chagrin, because, as he claims to have foreseen would be the case, Austria won an easy diplomatic victory. But he not unjustly complained of Berchtold's "policy of surprises," which her allies were unable to prevent.

At Belgrade Pashitch and Hartwig learned of the ultimatum with rage and dismay, especially as it was soon followed by strong warnings from all the Great Powers, now suddenly awakened to the possible danger of serious complications, that Serbia should respect the decisions of the London Conference. Even Rumania added her warning. So Serbia decided at once to yield, and gave orders to her troops to evacuate the occupied Albanian territory. "I do it," said Pashitch, the Serbian Premier, "not under pressure of Austria, but out of regard for the friendly advice of Russia."

These events of 1913 in connection with Albania help to explain Austria's course of action, under much greater provocation, in July, 1914. The decisions of the London Conference had brought her little or nothing, in her own opinion, except disappointments and illusions. Its delays and ineffectiveness in protecting Albanian interests, when defied by the Montenegrins at Scutari and the Serbians at Dibra, explain to some extent why Austria was absolutely unwilling, after the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, to submit her latest grounds of complaint against Serbia to another Conference of the Powers. "The course of the London Conference was so horrible to recall to memory, that all public opinion would reject the repetition of such a spectacle."

The Rumanian Riddle

The very secret treaty of 1883, by which Rumania joined the Triple Alliance Powers, had been renewed at various times, the last occasion being on February 5, 1913. During the

early years of the treaty, Austria and Germany had no serious fear that Rumania would ever fail to fulfil her treaty obligations. King Carol, a Hohenzollern educated in Germany and sympathetic in his whole being with the German point of view, was universally regarded as an honest, upright man, whose personal loyalty was trusted up to his very death in October, 1914.

But by 1914 the situation had greatly altered. King Carol remained as loyal as ever. Sentiment among the Rumanian people, however, had changed so greatly that Austria, and to some extent Germany, began to be seriously worried as to whether King Carol's personal prestige would be strong enough to carry his country with him. He was after all a constitutional monarch. Anti-Austrian popular sentiment in a parliamentary democracy might override the monarch's personal preference. Three factors had contributed toward the development among the Rumanians of a hatred toward Austria, which threatened to undo the alliance: (1) the Magyar policy toward Transylvania, (2) the Austrian policy toward Bulgaria, and (3) the Russo-Serb wooing to win Rumania away from the Triple Alliance to the side of the Triple Entente.

The Rumanians in Transylvania were refused a fair number of seats in the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, and their nationalistic desires in regard to school and language questions had been blindly disregarded. The second factor which embittered the people of Rumania, and threatened to transfer Rumania from the side of the Triple Alliance to that of the Triple Entente, was Austria's attitude toward the Bulgaro-Rumanian conflict which arose out of the First Balkan War. By their astonishing victories over Turkey in the first weeks of the war, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece had occupied wide stretches of territory, which vastly extended their frontiers and greatly increased their prestige, power, and population. Rumania, meanwhile, had maintained a dignified neutrality, remaining at peace with Turkey, while her rivals were growing strong. Her people therefore were swept in the spring of 1913 by a new wave of irredentist nationalism and indignation. When Rumania finally threatened to mobilize against Bulgaria, in order to secure the coveted territory, Austria tried to hold her back.

This restraint which Austria exercised, or rather tried to exercise, upon King Carol weakened and isolated the King still more among his own people. "King Carol is following Austria's advice for peace in Bulgaria's interests," it was said. The popular pressure became so strong that the King finally had to yield to public opinion. He joined Serbia and Greece in the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria, and secured her coveted "compensations"—a generous slice of Bulgarian territory south of the Dobrudja, stretching from Silistria on the Danube to Constanza on the Black Sea. Rumanian nationalistic aspirations and irredentist ambitions were strongly stirred by this short successful war. As the French proverb says, "L'appetit went en mangeant." As a result, Austria-Hungary now found herself seriously menaced by a "Greater Rumania" movement, which aimed at the ultimate detachment of the Rumanians in Transylvania, just as the "Greater Serbia" propaganda aimed at detaching the Serbs in Bosnia and other parts of the Dual Monarchy.

In December King Carol himself finally admitted to the Austrian Minister at Bucharest, that public feeling was such that, "to his great regret, he was not in a position to be able to guarantee to fulfil the existing secret treaty between Rumania and the Dual Monarchy." By his double-faced and futile policy of pretending to support the interests of two opposed states like Rumania and Bulgaria, Borchtold had fallen between two stools. He had lost the confidence and good-will of the one before he had secured that of the other. This "desertion" on Rumania's part was one of the most important facts in Austrian foreign policy in the spring of 1914.

Russia meanwhile was taking advantage of the situation to win Rumania over to a seat beside the Triple Entente and form a new Balkan group under Russian patronage to replace that which had been broken up by Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War. Though the Tsar ruled over Rumanian populations in Bessarabia, Russian ministers at Bucharest sought to divert Rumanian irredentist ambitions away from Bessarabia to Transylvania. Russia had shrewdly used her influence on the side of Rumania to secure for her the "compensations" in the Treaty of Bucharest. 221 Rumanians noted with gratitude that, in contrast to Austria's "perfidious" effort to bring about a revision of the Treaty, Russia had finally joined with Germany in preventing a revision. Russia's purpose in winning Rumania as part of her preparation for a general European war is well indicated in Sazonov's secret report to the Tsar in December, 1913:

While repeating my wish for the prolongation as far as possible of the status quo, it is also necessary to repeat that the Straits Question can hardly advance a step except by the favor of European complications...These complications, to judge by present circumstances, would find us in alliance with France, and in a possible but not at all assured, alliance with England, or at least with her as a benevolent neutral. In the Balkans, in case of European complications, we could count on Serbia, and perhaps on Rumania. From this there results clearly as the task of our diplomacy the creation of conditions for as intimate a rapprochement as possible with Rumania.

Early in 1914 Russia took further steps to win Rumania. She promoted a Scrb-Greek-Rumanian combination, which, while ostensibly aiming at peace and the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans, might be used by Russia to solve the Straits Question at a time of "European complications." It also fell in with Russia's policy of supporting Serbia against Austria. In order to bring about such a combination, Sazonov had long interviews with the Serbian and Greek Premiers, M. Pashitch and M. Venizelos, in February, 1914. M. Pashitch also had an encouraging and significant talk with the Tsar, of which he has left an interesting account:

The audience lasted a full hour. The Tsar received me in his cabinet. When I entered, the Tsar was already there and at my entrance he came to meet me at the door, stretched out his hand without waiting for my greeting and invited me to be seated. ... I set forth the Serbian policy which amounts to this, that she desires the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, and that new complications be avoided, since Serbia needs peace in order to recuperate, and in order that she may arm herself afresh for the defense of Serbian

national interests. I also set forth the difficulties which Serbia will have to meet in the pursuit of her peaceful policy. Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria are dissatisfied: Turkey because she lost in the war with the Balkan States; Bulgaria because she could not retain or acquire all that she wished; and Austria because she lost the prospect of an advance to Salonica. . . . Thereupon the Tsar answered: We have confidence in the new Rumanian [Bratianu] Government, that it will attach itself as closely as possible to Russia...The Tsar said that would be very good, and that Rumania had three and a half million co-nationals in Austria-Hungary and that these desired union with Rumania... The Tsar inquired how many Serbo-Croats lived in Austria-Hungary, and what they were now believing and desiring. I replied about six millions, and told him where they lived. I also told him of the Slovenes, that they, too, were gravitating to the Serbo-Croats, and would adopt the Serbo-Croatian language, owing to the fact that their dialect is bad and that they have long lost their national independence...He asked how many soldiers Serbia could put into the field. Serbia, said the Tsar, had astonished the world when she marched out 400,000 men. I replied: We believe that we can put half a million well clothed and armed soldiers into the field. "That is enough; that is no trifle; one can go a great way with that" [said the Tsar]...Upon my taking leave, the Tsar accompanied me to the door and asked me especially and repeatedly to present greetings to the King, not only from himself, but also from the Tsarina and his family, and wished him good health: "For Serbia we shall do everything; greet the King for me and tell him [in Russian] : For Serbia we shall do everything."

While thus protesting to the Tsar his desire for peace, M. Pashitch, it is to be noted, asked for "120,000 rifles and munitions and some few cannon"; he spoke of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary "who now comprehend that their salvation can come only from Russia and Serbia, and who can scarcely wait". Austria's reaction to this meeting is as Conrad states:

The result of the conference here, according to my informant, is a complete agreement of views as to the future attitude of the three States, though Rumania has not entered into any binding engagements. . . . Undoubtedly Russia wants a new Balkan League, and is working in this direction at high pressure.

As a further link to bind Russia and Rumania together the Tsar invited the Crown Prince with his wife and son, Prince Carol, to visit Russia. They started on March 27, 1914, and stayed three weeks. One of the objects in view was believed to be the possibility of arranging a marriage between Prince Carol and one of the Tsar's daughters.

After this, Sazonov concluded the Rumanian situation: "Rumania is not bound by any obligation which would force her to act with Austria and against us under all circumstances, but, in reality, in case of war between us and Austria-Hungary, Rumania will take the side which will be strongest and which will be in a position to promise her the greatest gains."

Baron Conrad, while willing to agree with any measures which aimed at winning back

Rumania, or making her declare her position more definitely, either for or against Austria, had his staff work out plans for a campaign against Rumania. He advised the building of defensive fortifications on the Rumanian frontier, or better still, a preventive war against Serbia, which would rid Austria once and for all of the Greater Serbia danger and clarify the general political situation. But his advice was not followed, because Emperor Francis Joseph, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Count Tisza, and the German Emperor were all opposed to any steps which might further antagonize Rumania.

In the hope of winning back Rumanian sentiment in favor of Austria, Berchtold also sent Count Czernin as Minister to Bucharest in October, 1913. After reaching Bucharest he made it a point to express publicly his hopes that the Hungarian Government would make concessions in the negotiations which Tisza was then carrying on. He earnestly tried to carry out Berchtold's instructions to secure better relations between the two countries who were allies in form, but were becoming enemies in fact. But in a few months Czernin realized that his mission was hopeless. He found that King Carol stood almost alone in his sympathy with the Triple Alliance. The treaties which attached his country to Germany and Austria had been kept so secret that they were known only to the King himself, to the Premier, M. Bratianu, and to one or two others. No other Ministers knew of them or felt bound by them, so that it often happened that Rumanian diplomats abroad worked on the side of the Triple Entente. So seriously did King Carol feel his own weakness in the face of Rumanian popular sentiment, that he admitted to Count Czernin in December, 1913, that "under existing circumstances he would be unable to side with Austria in a war."

As to a preventive war against Serbia, urged by Conrad, Czernin was not one of those who, like Tisza, argued that a war with Serbia was useless and undesirable because Austria-Hungary was already oversaturated with Slavs; no one, to be sure, wanted any more Serbs in the Dual Monarchy, he said; but after a successful war against Serbia, it would be possible to use Serbian territory to win the good-will of the other Balkan states; Greece and Bulgaria could be given what they wanted in Macedonia; Albania could be rounded out to the east; and Rumania be given the Timok-Njotin district, a corner in northeast Serbia partly populated by Rumanians.

Another suggestion by which Austria might offset the probable loss of Rumania was that Austria should follow Russia's example, and build up a Balkan League under her own patronage to balance the feared Serb-Greek-Rumanian league under Russian patronage. Bulgaria and Turkey, smarting from recent defeats and eager for support, might be brought together by Austria and be eventually drawn into the Triple Alliance circle to make up for Rumania's "desertion." In other words, Austria might shift the pivot of her Balkan policy from Bucharest to Sofia. Such a Bulgarophil diplomatic program had already been attempted by Berchtold during the Balkan Wars; but it had met with no success and had caused serious differences of opinion between Vienna and Berlin. In the spring of 1914, it was taken up again at Vienna and a long memorandum for its accomplishment had been worked out at the moment that Franz Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo.

The Liman von Sanders Affair

The European diplomatic world was a small one, composed of no more than a few hundred men, almost all aristocrats, most of whom knew each other to varying degrees. Between the gossip mill and ubiquitous espionage networks, it didn't take long for news to circulate—so it was only a matter of time before word got out about the appointment of a German officer, Liman von Sanders (above), to command the Turkish First Army Corps guarding Constantinople. It wasn't uncommon for Europeans to train and sometimes even command the troops of second-rank powers, but von Sanders' mission far exceeded the usual scope of these arrangements: By placing a German in charge of the Constantinople garrison, the Turks were effectively giving Germany control of the capital and the Turkish straits—a move sure to anger the Russians, who hoped to conquer Constantinople and the straits themselves in the not-too-distant future.

The “Liman von Sanders Affair,” as it was soon known, began in earnest on November 10, 1913, when the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov, instructed the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Sergei Sverbeev, to tell the Germans that the von Sanders mission, would be regarded by Russia as an “openly hostile act.” In addition to threatening Russia's foreign trade, half of which flowed through the Turkish straits, the mission raised the possibility of a German-led Turkish assault on Russia's Black Sea ports (not to mention imperiling Russia's devious plans for expansion in eastern Anatolia).

While the von Sanders mission was troubling to Sazonov, he also understood that the Germans couldn't simply back down for reasons of prestige. Thus the Russian foreign minister sought a solution that would allow them to withdraw and still save face. On November 18, the Russian premier, Count Vladimir Kokovtsov, who happened to be visiting Germany, paid a visit to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and suggested that von Sanders be given a different assignment, preferably somewhere other than Constantinople.

In the end, the affair was settled peacefully, von Sanders became an inspector of Turkish forces in Constantinople and not a military officers with the authority to command the forces.

Sazonov's Plans for Preparedness

Russia could never permit the Straits to pass into the hands of any other Power, as they had been in danger of doing when the Bulgarians advanced to the outposts of Constantinople in 1912. Therefore Sazonov and the other Russian Ministers must concert plans of preparedness to seize the Straits, in case of European complications which he feared might occur at any moment. The Straits in the possession of a strong State would mean that the economic development of all South Russia would be subjected to it. From Sazonov himself:

He who possesses the Straits will not only hold the keys of the Black Sea and the

Mediterranean; he will have also the key to the penetration of Asia Minor and the hegemony of the Balkans....Returning to the political aspect of preparedness, one must again repeat that an early dissolution of Turkey could not be desirable for us, and it is necessary to do everything possible, through diplomacy, to postpone such an outcome. [M. Sazonov then indicated the principal questions to be discussed: (1) the accelerated mobilization of an adequate expeditionary force; (2) the preparation of the lines of communication necessary for this mobilization; (3) the increase of the Black Sea Fleet so that it will surpass the Turkish Fleet, and be able to force the Straits and occupy them temporarily or permanently, if necessary; (4) the increase of naval transports; and (5) the construction of strategic railways in the Caucasus.] Renewing the wish expressed above for the prolongation as far as possible of the status quo, it is also necessary to repeat that the question of the Straits can hardly be advanced a step except through European complications.

The Tsar approved Sazonov's report, and the discussion by various Ministers, as proposed, took place on January 13, 1914. The Admiralty Staff suggested several measures for the immediate strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet: speeding up the construction of vessels already being built; the purchase of Dreadnoughts abroad, and the prevention of their purchase by Turkey; and the preparation of plans for the combined action of the Baltic and the Black Sea Fleets against Turkey.

Meanwhile, on January 5, 1914, Sazonov drew up a memorandum for circulation among the other Ministers to serve as a basis for discussion at the Special Council. It summarized the Liman von Sanders negotiations and indicated clearly Sazonov's desire, "if possible, to prevent the conflict becoming more acute, as a European war might result," but at the same time his determination to resort to "measures of compulsion" and a threat of force as a bluff to secure a diplomatic victory, and his readiness, if necessary, "to take prompt steps to translate the threat into action"—provided he could feel sure of British and French support. He told the Tsar on January 9 that he believed a firm stand on Russia's part would probably have the desired effect on Germany and Turkey, "but the risk of serious European complications must undoubtedly be kept in view." Sazonov feared particularly that England and Germany might come to some separate solution of the Liman von Sanders affair by changing the status of Admiral Limpus, and then Russia would be left alone to face Germany.

On January 13, 1914, just as the Liman von Sanders Affair was about to be given a satisfactory solution, the Special Conference, which M. Sazonov had proposed several weeks earlier, finally met under the chairmanship of the Premier and Minister of Finance, M. Kokovtsev. There were present only the most important officials: the Ministers of War (Sukhomlinov), Navy (Grigorovitch), Foreign Affairs (Sazonov), the Chief of Staff (Zhilinski), and a couple of recording secretaries from the Near East Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. Kokovtsev wished to put the brakes on any hasty aggressive action. Before proceeding to discuss measures of compulsion, he begged to lay stress on two matters of primary importance:

1. The German Government is looking for a way out of the situation created by

Russia's demands. In this connection the Berlin Cabinet points to the necessity, in the interest of a satisfactory solution of the question, of Russia's avoidance of any categorical declaration, of the character of an ultimatum to Germany.

2. The negotiations with the Berlin Cabinet, which have now been going on for two months, should be continued until the Russian Government is convinced that it is impossible to attain in this manner the object indicated.

M. Kokovtsev also pointed out that even the measures of compulsion ought to be taken only "in closest association with the other Powers of the Triple Entente. M. Delcasse has assured Sazonov, in the name of the French Foreign Minister, that France would go as far as Russia may wish." but they were uncertain about Britain. M. Kokovtsev was of the opinion that any measures of compulsion such as the occupation of Asia Minor territory "would inevitably be followed by war with Germany, and put the question: "Is war with Germany desirable, and can Russia wage* it?" In reply, Sazonov agreed with Kokovtsev "that in principle a war with Germany would be undesirable;" as to whether Russia could wage it, Sazonov "did not consider himself called upon to decide this." But "the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff declared categorically the complete readiness of Russia for a duel with Germany, not to mention one with Austria. Such a duel is, however, hardly likely; those Powers would be much more likely to have to deal with the Triple Entente."

This categorical statement of the Russian militarists disposes of the argument that Russia did not want war in 1914 because they did not think her preparations were sufficiently complete. M. Kokovtsev finally summed up the sense of the meeting to the effect that negotiations were to be continued at Berlin to secure General Liman's removal from the command of troops in Constantinople; if it became quite clear that the negotiations would fail, measures of compulsion might be applied, if the Entente Powers were in agreement; but "Should Russia not be assured of the active participation of France and England in common steps with Russia, it does not seem possible to adopt measures of compulsion which might lead to a war with Germany." It was to secure the closer support of England, which was necessary to enable Russia to carry out her ambitions in the Near East, which made Sazonov redouble his efforts in the spring of 1914 to get more definite and binding obligations from Sir Edward Grey in the shape of an Anglo-Russian Naval Convention. Negotiations for this were soon begun, but had to be dropped when news of them leaked out.

While not desiring war with Germany and preferring a diplomatic victory, Sazonov was nevertheless quite ready to adopt measures which would probably lead to war with Germany, provided he was sure of the support of the Entente. He was ready to use a threat of force, and "to translate the threat into action," if the threat did not prove to be an effective bluff. This was his attitude in July, 1914, and it led to war. In January, 1914, it did not lead to war, because Germany made timely conciliatory concessions in the Liman von Sanders Affair, and because M. Kokovtsev used his influence to prevent any over-hasty provocative action on Russia's part. This Conference reveals sharply the contrast between Kokovtsev's moderate, conciliatory, and restraining influence on the one hand,

and, on the other, the dangerous policy of military pressure urged by Sazonov and the military and naval officials.

Although the Liman von Sanders Affair had been happily settled in January, 1914, M. Sazonov, continued his examination of preparedness plans, and even took up again the discussion of the aggressive project for a sudden seizure of the Straits by an armed landing force, which had been seriously contemplated in 1896 and 1912, but in both cases postponed because of lack of preparations. At another Special Conference on February 21, 1914, presided over by himself, and including military and naval experts and also M. Giers, the active and aggressive Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, Sazonov called attention to his report of December. 5, approved by the Tsar: "that it was necessary to proceed without delay to the preparation of a program, elaborated in every direction, which should aim at the assurance in our favor of the historic question of the Straits."

According to Sazonov, the diplomatic situation seemed not unfavorable for landing an armed force to seize the Straits, even though it might lead to a collision with the Triple Alliance. But General Zhilinski, the Chief of Staff, "expressed the conviction that the struggle for Constantinople would hardly be possible without a general European war," in which case the troops which it was proposed to send to seize the Straits would be needed on the Western Front against Germany. Russian generals agreed that "The only good strategy is strong strategy. The war on our Western Front would demand the utmost application of all the forces of the State, and we could not dispense with a single army corps to be left behind for special tasks. We must direct our energies to ensuring success in the most important theatre of war. With victory in this theatre, we should secure favorable decisions in all secondary questions."

After a long discussion of the technical details involved, the Conference decided to recommend to the Tsar a series of preparatory measures. These included increasing the strength and rapidity of mobilization of the expeditionary landing army; the gathering and subsidizing of adequate naval transports provided with sufficient collapsible horse-boxes and small boats for speedy embarkation and disembarkation; the increasing of the Black Sea Fleet by a second squadron of most modern and powerful battle cruisers, if possible, by the purchase of ships abroad; and the building of more strategic railways in the Caucasus, in order to speed up mobilization there, as a necessary part of "the measures required in preparation for our offensive on the Bosphorus." The minutes of this Special Conference were laid before the Tsar on April 5, and received his entire approval.

Summary

We may now sum up very briefly the main Balkan Problems. The origin of the trouble lay in the progressive decay of the Ottoman Empire, which was no longer able to maintain control over the Christian subject nationalities. These had become filled with a natural desire for political freedom and national unity. But, owing to the events of past history,

considerable sections of these peoples still lived under Turkish or Hapsburg rule, and could not fulfil their nationalistic aspirations except by the further disintegration of Turkey and the partial dismemberment of Austria. Hence the Balkan Wars of 1876-78 and 1912-13. Hence also the antagonism between Austria and Serbia, which grew steadily more acute, because each had a vital interest at stake Austria to preserve her very existence as a State, Serbia to satisfy twentieth century ideals of political liberty and national unity.

As Turkey declined in power, Russia and Austria became increasingly jealous of each other's influence in the Balkans, Russia wishing to achieve her "historic mission," and Austria to prevent the danger threatening to her from too great Slav power on her southern frontier. Bismarck and the League of the Three Emperors, and later Russia's venture in the Far East, for many years prevented this rivalry from disturbing the peace of Europe. But with the ambitious aims of M. Izvolski and Count Achrenthal the rivalry became acute through the outcome of the Buchlau Bargain. Aehrenthal succeeded in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Izvolski failed to open the Straits, because Austria had the support of Germany, but England was unwilling to accept Izvolski's one-sided proposal to open the Straits to Russian warships but not to those of the other Great Powers. Though the Annexation Crisis was settled without war, thanks to the solution proposed by Germany, it increased the antagonism between Austria and Serbia on the one hand, and between Austria and Russia on the other. Henceforth Russia encouraged Serbia to prepare for the future, when, aided by Russia, she could achieve a "Greater Serbia" at Austria's expense. Until Russia was ready, however, Serbia was to wait.

Having made the Racconigi Bargain with Italy, and believing that he could count on the support of the Triple Entente, Izvolski took advantage of the Tripolitan War to make a third diplomatic effort to open the Straits by means of the Charykov negotiations with Turkey. But again he failed largely on account of lack of support from France and direct opposition from England. Henceforth he came to the conclusion that his aim could be achieved only in connection with a general European war, and used all his efforts to strengthen and tighten the Triple Entente for this "inevitable" conflict.

Meanwhile MM. Neratov, Hartwig, and Nekliudov had used the unrest caused in the Balkans by the Tripolitan War to help bring about the Balkan League, its nominal purpose being the preservation of the status quo, but its practical effect being an encouragement to the Balkan States to open war on Turkey. Though the Great Powers, especially England and Germany, managed to prevent Europe from being involved in a general conflict, the Balkan Wars resulted in a universal increase of suspicion, hatred, intrigues, and uncertainty, not only among the Great Powers who increased their armaments, but among the Balkan States themselves, and especially in Austria and Serbia. Serbia, greatly embittered at her exclusion by the Powers from a political and economic outlet on the Adriatic, had found some compensation in Macedonia. But this involved Bulgaria's deadly hatred. Serbia therefore tightened her relations with Greece and Rumania under Russian patronage, partly as a protection against Bulgarian revenge and partly with a view to the future struggle as the "Piedmont" of the Balkans, against the hated Hapsburg

rule. Though M. Pashitch and the Serbian civil authorities did not want or plan war in 1914, they tolerated an agitation which contributed to a series of assassinations which culminated in the tragedy of Sarajevo.

Austria meanwhile became more and more alarmed at the dangers threatening her very existence: the "Greater Serbia" agitation within and without her frontiers, the "desertion" of Rumania, and the closer ties which Russia was establishing with these two countries whose nationalist aspirations could only be satisfied through the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. Whether Austria could have averted the danger from the "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Rumania" irredentist agitation, by giving democratic and reasonably liberal rights to her Slav and Rumanian subjects, or by some form of "trialism," is a hypothetical question to be touched upon later; at any rate she did not do so. Instead she chose to see her salvation in a war in which Serbia would be reduced in power by having to cede territory to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania. Several times Austria was ready to wage such a war on Serbia, but was held back either by Germany, as in July, 1913, or by concessions on the part of Serbia, as in March, 1909, and October, 1913. But in July, 1914, as will be seen later, Austria welcomed the opportunity for a localized war on Serbia afforded by the assassination of the Austrian Heir to the Throne.

M. Sazonov, though caring little for the Serbs themselves, and leaving them in the lurch in crucial moments, nevertheless encouraged and supported them at other times as an outpost of Slavdom in the Balkans and as an asset in a future war with Austria. Desiring peace, but fearing the power and criticism of the Russian Pan-Slavs and militarists, M. Sazonov was anxious to fulfil Russia's "historic mission." Observing Izvolski's failures to open the Straits by peaceful diplomatic means and his own failure to coerce Germany into an instant modification of General Liman's command at Constantinople, owing in each case chiefly to Sir Edward Grey's attitude, the Russian Foreign Minister came to the conclusion that he could succeed in his Balkan aims only as a result of "European complications." While Izvolski had attempted the more modest task of merely opening the Straits to Russian warships, Sazonov wanted to achieve the wider Pan-Slav "historic mission" of obtaining possession of the Straits and controlling Constantinople. It was because the Liman von Sanders Mission seemed to lessen the likelihood of this that Sazonov was so alarmed by it. Hence his proposal of "measures of compulsion" to force Turkey to abandon it; these, however, were not put into effect, owing to Germany's timely concessions and M. Kokovtsev's restraining influence.

Hence also Sazonov's contemplation of a landing force to seize the Straits, which the military experts declared was impracticable at the moment but should be prepared for in case of European complications in the future. During the spring of 1914, together with M. Izvolski and President Poincare, he worked to tighten the bonds with England by negotiations for an Anglo-Russian Naval Convention, in order that, when the "inevitable" war broke out, the solidarity of the Triple Entente should be more perfect than on former occasions. Consequently, if a new crisis arose, Germany and Austria would have to yield—or fight a war in which the superior forces would be on the side of the Triple

Entente. In July, 1914, with the restraining hand of Kokovtsev removed, Sazonov believed that this Entente solidarity was virtually assured, when the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian ultimatum caused the “European complications” by means of which he calculated that Russia could finally achieve her “historic mission.”

Turkey and the Balkan States were in unstable equilibrium. An inherent opposition of interests necessarily caused persistent enmity between Greece and Turkey, between Turkey and Russia, and between Austria and Serbia. But Bulgaria and Rumania were pursuing opportunist policies, and were ready to side with whichever group of the Great Powers seemed likely to prove the stronger and offer the greatest gains. No Power ever wants to yield on a matter of prestige, but this Balkan situation made an additional reason why neither France, Russia, Germany nor Austria was at first willing to yield in the Austro-Serbian conflict of July, 1914—it might have a determining effect on the policy of Bulgaria and Rumania. For several years it had been recognized that a strong Balkan bloc would have an influence in a general European war almost equal to that of a Great Power. Hence, in the spring of 1914, Russia was seeking to win Rumania and build up such a bloc including Serbia and Greece, while Austria in turn was preparing to form a counter-bloc with Bulgaria and Turkey. Such was the situation when the shots at Sarajevo precipitated the Austro-Serbian conflict and caused a crisis involving the prestige and power of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

7.6 Germany, Historical Perspectives

Officials of the Congress of Vienna (1815) created the German Confederation, which was an alliance of German-speaking countries in Central Europe, in order to coordinate their economies, and function as a safeguard against the powerful states of Austria and Prussia, the two dominant member states. International bankers living in Britain encouraged this alliance as a way of providing peace and stability, and to prevent Russia or France from making hostile moves. Continuous rivalry and the failure of the several member states to compromise would contribute to the 1848 revolution, an early attempt to establish a unified Germany, among other things. However, French officials had other plans.

Satisfied people do not rise up against their governments, demanding change. Others, notably certain internationalist Jews, supported and participated in the revolutions of 1789 and 1848, reinforced by many writers and recently-positioned radical politicians who were attempting to reshape national governments. The Jews were the most vociferous in the press, but not because they demanded religious freedoms or the cessation of religious prejudice. In 1848, they did not advocate for equality but for extra special “material advantages for its members.” Up until 1848, the Jews living in Germany had, for whatever reason, perhaps to infiltrate the culture, adopted democratic convictions and thereafter many supported “National Liberalism,” and joined the ruling Conservative ruling parties. Then they monopolized the literary field and at least seventy-five percent of the popular

press where they pursued their own interests while working to disintegrate the Germanic state. They patterned their journalistic objectives to serve their own commercial interests, shaped public opinion, critiqued the theater and art, and wrote about politics and religion. After emancipation, the Jews further exploited the press and reduced journalism to gossip and scandal and instituted unionism. Although they made fun of their own idiosyncrasies, they viewed such conduct from the German population as a malicious demonstration of religious hatred.

Germans outwardly resigned "in favour of Judaism" after 1848 when they allowed Jewish mediation to rule every aspect of their lives wherein Jewry collected a commission. According to writer, Wilhelm Marr, Jewry staged a war against the Germans, beginning in 1848, over a thirty-year period, with their revolutionary activities, not only in Germany, but in other European countries. After 1848, a culture struggle began in which many Germans felt ostracized, as they could not criticize "anything Jewish." Marr maintained that the Germans did not oppose foreign rule sufficiently, nor the Judaic struggle to obtain world domination. The Jewish-owned press prohibited the Germans from addressing the obvious "culture struggle." Editors printed political-cultural analyses and suppressed publications about Christianity while ignoring the anomalies of Jewish statutes and rituals, like the brutalities of kosher slaughtering, which would have generated accusations of "hatred" against the Germans. According to Marr, it was "quite a different matter" if Jews criticized Germany's religious practices. The cartelized press, even in letters to the editor, excluded the German citizen's right to free expression.

In 1848, Jewish banker and freemason, Ludwig Bamberger, educated at Gießen, Heidelberg, and Göttingen, edited the Mainzer Zeitung and was one of the leaders in the republican party which participated in the revolution in Germany. He fled to Paris to escape execution and gained banking expertise while working for the bank of Bischoffheim & Goldschmidt. Germany's general amnesty enabled him to return in 1866. He joined the National Liberal Party and people elected him as a member of the Reichstag where he advocated free trade, the Reichsbank, promoted a gold currency, and opposed bimetallicism. On January 22, 1870, along with private banker Adelbert Delbruck, he founded Deutsche Bank in Berlin, specializing in foreign trade, and also founded the Group for the Promotion of Free Trade. By 1878, he would oppose Bismarck's policies of protectionism and state socialism.

The Jewish dailies in the German-speaking lands supported Jewish industrial interests and securities speculation. Meanwhile, England allied with Judaism. The Slavs dismissed the Germans and viewed them as the Jewish newspaper depicted them. The German spirit had become a stranger in the press where the majority of journalists were Jewish. Since 1866, because of Bismarck's policies, and because he typically acquiesced to their demands, most Jews held him in high esteem. The Franco-Prussian War was a military conflict between the French Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. The North German Confederation assisted Prussia, along with the South German states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria. The victorious Prussians brought about the final unification of

Germany even before the war's end and the downfall of Napoleon III. The unification of the German states occurred on January 18, 1871, when the princes of the various German states proclaimed Wilhelm I as the German Emperor when they gathered at the Versailles Palace's Hall of Mirrors in France. Following the unification, Wilhelm of Prussia became Emperor Wilhelm of the German Empire, consisting of Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Saxony, each sovereign, with its own army, flag, and titles of nobility.

From 1850 forward, German industry accelerated, because of its coal, iron, (later steel), chemicals and railways. The German Empire had the world's most powerful army, and its navy became second to Britain in less than a decade.

From 1870 onward, because Germany opposed French freemasonry, France implemented revenge and encirclement policies against Germany, as determined by liberal and democratic politicians with freemasonry connections. Leon Gambetta, a freemason and the head of the Republican Party, laid the foundation for the French Triple Alliance policy wherein the French would accept any ally in their efforts against Germany, including Russia. Edward VII, the head of English freemasonry as Prince of Wales, welcomed these Masonic associations. These international alliances overwhelmed Wilhelm II. The Jewish and Masonic-controlled world press initiated a hateful anti-German campaign incredibly similar to the propaganda campaign they waged against National Socialist Germany. The press exaggerated and exploited any errors the German Empire made and created propagandistic slogans and spoke of its alleged barbaric militarism as a threat to democracy, as it would before and during World War I. The press originated the myth of blind Prussian obedience, a danger to civilization, as compared to the professed ideals of Masonic individualism. Meanwhile, German lodges maintained their philosophy regarding the brotherhood of Folks and Races. Early on, due to the logistics and composition of the German Empire, there existed the Jewish Question, what to do about their powerful influence. Following the war, Masonic politicians discussed world peace and international unity at several congresses, an early attempt by internationalists to establish world governance. The same Masonic politicians who were expounding world peace hypocritically sought Germany's complete destruction. Even German freemasons, especially the Jewish Masons and the smaller lodges, abandoned their national loyalties and obligations in favor of the liberal democratic Masonic Internationale.

While diplomats made concessions during the Congress of Berlin, following the Russo-Turkish War (April 24, 1877-March 3, 1878), internal warfare was brewing in Germany where the victor was a minority of the population but they controlled a majority of the communications apparatus. Frequently when one country conquers another nation, the conquerors either assimilate, thus losing their ethnic identity, or the victor exterminates the indigenous population, and then assumes control over the government, and that nation's resources. In 1879, author Wilhelm Marr repeatedly referred to Jewish "foreign rule" in Germany because, every year, Jews traditionally say, "Next year in Jerusalem" which seems to affirm their foreign character and loyalties elsewhere although they, unassimilated aliens by choice, had lived in Germany for several generations. Marr maintained

that while the above statements are often the case, Jewish assimilation had not occurred. Rather, he claims that Judaism had absorbed Germanism. He further stated that the Jews relocated, via their deportation, from Spain and Portugal into the Slavic countries, and then they emigrated from the Slavic countries via Holland into Germany. During their sojourn in the Slavic countries, Marr asserts, they socially undermined the Slavic culture, a society unprepared for foreign influence. The German-speaking states, following warfare and unification, were also vulnerable due to a lack of national identity. Consequently, while there were already Jews in Germany, incoming Jews found the newly unified country, wherein it was easier to extend their web of influence.

The Germans, mostly an agricultural people, resented “the Semitic craftiness and its practical business sense” and reacted accordingly as this foreign opportunistic tribe, who viewed all Gentiles as unclean, exploited the basic German character. While this provoked the common folk, the nobility borrowed hefty amounts of money, relying on the people to pay it back via taxation. The Jews have always been “highly gifted,” particularly in trade and finance, and they began to dominate in the retail and wholesale trades beginning in the middle ages. They could easily outmaneuver “the hard working common folk.” Other ethnic groups, like Slavs, immigrated to Germany and blended in with the native population. Yet the Jews remained separate, but still attempted to diminish their image to conceal their influence. In 1879, according to Marr, “Without a stroke of the sword, peacefully, in spite of political persecution over centuries, Judaism is today the political-social dictator in Germany.”

In Germany, the Jews, represented by a handful of Jewish bankers, controlled many of the raw materials. In 1879, Marr said, following the Russo-Turkish War, “Among all the European states only Russia is left to still resist the frank foreign invasion. As current events and circumstances indicate, the final surrender of Russia is only a question of time. In this multifaceted, huge state Jewry will find the cardinal point which it needs, to completely unhinge the Western world ... and plunge Russia into a revolution like the world might never have seen before ... Are we not witnessing today that under the gentle and humane Czar Alexander, who has abolished serfdom, it is nihilism which flourishes?” Marr said, “The future and life belongs to Judaism, Germany is of the past and will die. This is the meaning of the historical-cultural development of our German people. There is no way to fight this iron law of world order. From the very beginning it was not a religious war, it was a battle for survival against the foreign rule of Judaism, of whose character we only now have become clearly aware. In addition, we lack allies which might assist us in the peaceful and deliberate emancipation of Germanism.”

On May 23, 1863, Ferdinand Lassalle founded the General German Workers' Association. In 1869, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht founded the Social Democratic Workers' Party. In 1875, the two parties merged as the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. On October 19, 1878, Otto von Bismarck enacted the Anti-Socialist Laws, outlawing the party due to its anti-monarchy attitudes. In 1880, Karl Kautsky, a Czech-German Jew, joined a group of Marxists in Zurich, financially supported by Karl Höchberg. Kautsky

began smuggling materials into the Empire. Eduard Bernstein, Höchberg's secretary, influenced his decision to become a Marxist. Kautsky founded the monthly *Die Neue Zeit* (The New Times) through which he disseminated Marxism (1883-1917).

By 1890, authorities allowed the existence of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the nation's most prominent political party with Bebel as the co-chairman (1892-1913). In 1891, Bernstein, Bebel, and Kautsky co-authored the Erfurt Program of the SPD. Kautsky became influential, along with Bebel, in devising a Marxist theory of imperialism after Engels' death in 1895. On October 9, 1895, in Breslau, in southwestern Poland, the Socialists held a Congress during which Dr. Wilhelm Ellenbogen, the Austrian Delegate, campaigned for Socialism. Clara Zetkin, a member of the Marxist faction of the SPD, had a lifelong friendship with Lenin, She edited the *Stuttgart Gleichheit*. She gave a speech on the emancipation of women at the Congress. Bebel authored *Woman and Socialism* in which he said, "The Socialist Party is the only one that has made the full equality of women, their liberation from every form of dependence and oppression, an integral part of its program; not for reasons of propaganda, but from necessity. For there can be no liberation of mankind, without social independence and equality of the sexes." Thus Feminism, which many see today as going way overboard, is of Jewish origin. The working masses were not interested in revolting but preferred to whine about their lot in life. Socialists, in principle, are typically all internationalists, not recognizing borders.

European countries, with their alliances, created a balance of power that seemed to benefit Britain. In the process, it divided Europe into two hostile camps when these countries should have united to combat Anarchism. The alliances included the secretive Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention of August 18, 1892, the Triple Entente of August 31, 1907 between Britain, France and Russia and the Triple Alliance of May 20, 1882 between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy⁹⁸² and the Entente Cordiale of April 8, 1904 between England and France. Germany had an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy but not with Russia. Germany, the next Marxist target, was sympathetic to what was happening in Russia. According to Count Lamsdorf, many German officials, and others, with great apprehension, recognized the hostile power of the movement toward Russia and in the Provinces of Prussian Poland. In May 1905, the Congress of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party held a meeting in Jena, in central Germany. There and in other meetings, they passed resolutions that enabled them to accomplish, in Germany, what they were currently achieving in Russia with their anti-monarchical war through strikes and riots. This would ultimately result in chaos and a political seizure. They intended to use these tactics, and the promise of gender equality, everywhere. By January 1906, they planned to initiate an assault against Germany, to achieve success on May 1, 1906. They began their assault in Prussia and in Saxony using the motto "Universal Suffrage."

The forces of the money lenders started to conspire against Germany while at the same time gaining more and more influence in the world. That there must be powers involved that can not be explained by the average person was described by the Germany author

Hans Grimm during a visit abroad at the end of the 19. century. In his book "Warum - Whoer - aber Wohin" from 1954, he writes: "1895, just 20 years old, he came to find a national disturbance in Lausanne. I asked myself over and over how the people just developed a dislike for Germans and what has Germany done to them, a Germany which brings its money into Switzerland?". He was even more moved by a newspaper article of the Saturday Review from August 1895 which described the foreign policy of England: "Our chief rival in trade and commerce today is not France but Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the outcome might be, we are sure to lose heavily." – OUR TRUE FOREIGN POLICY, Saturday Review, August 24, 1895, page 17". The article was authored by Sir Eyre Crow, a half German that worked for the British foreign office. Furthermore "The biological view of foreign policy is plain. First, federate our colonies and prevent geographical isolation turning the Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Germany, as Germania est delenda; (Germany must be destroyed) third, be ready to fight America when the time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting wars against peoples from whom we have nothing to fear." – A BIOLOGICAL VIEW OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. And at last: "Three years ago when the Saturday Review began to write against the traditional pro-German policy of England, its point of view made it isolated among leading organs of opinion. When, in February 1896, one of our writers, discussing the European Situation, declared Germany the first and immediate enemy of England, the opinion passed as an individual eccentricity."... "What Bismarck realized, and what we too may soon come to see, is that not only is there the most real conflict of interests between England and Germany, but that England is the only Great Power who could fight Germany without tremendous risk and without doubt of the issue."... "Our work over, we need not even be at the pains to alter Bismarck's words, and to say to France and Russia: Seek some compensation. Take inside Germany whatever you like: you can have it ... However you wish to utilize a mine, build a railroad, or convert a native from eating breadfruits to canned food, from abstinence to liquor, the German and the Englishman compete to be the first. Millions of minor conflicts gather as the most important cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were annihilated tomorrow, there isn't one Englishman who would not become richer." – ENGLAND AND GERMANY., Saturday Review, 11, 1897, page 17

Berlin to Baghdad, the Railway Concession

Wilhelm von Pressel expertly supervised railway construction in Switzerland, the Balkans and elsewhere and had an international reputation. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) contacted him, and he soon became one of Abdülhamid's technical advisors. In 1872, the Ottoman government had hired him to formulate plans for railways in Turkey, because of his experience during the construction of the trans-Balkan lines of the Oriental Railways Company. He understood Turkey's railway problems, and the cultural and commercial importance of developing transportation in the area. Dur-

ing the Commercial Revolution, from the late fifteenth through the eighteenth century, the world's cultural and educational center shifted from the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Sea routes and maritime trade replaced the caravan trails. A modern transportation system might help restore a measure of the prosperity the area lost during that era.

Abdülhamid and von Pressel envisioned a trunk line from the existing Anatolia railways, along with the new Syrian railways that would link Constantinople with Smyrna, Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Mosul, and Baghdad. In 1886 and in 1888, the Ottomans queried the British lessees of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway, to see if they would build the extension. The Sultan offered to pay a subsidy to guarantee sufficient returns on their investment, but the British showed no interest. Sir Vincent Caillard, the OPDA Chairman, was also unsuccessful in his attempts to organize an Anglo-American syndicate for the construction of the railway. Beginning in the summer of 1888, Turkey had direct railway transportation to the rest of Europe from Constantinople and Salonica. The Oriental Railways began operations, running from the Austrian border across the Balkan Peninsula through Belgrade, Nish, Sofia, and Adrianople, to Constantinople. The railway connections to Austria-Hungary, and other European countries suddenly put the Ottoman capital in communication with Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and London. In 1888, French and British financiers owned all railways in Asia Minor. The oldest railway, owned by the English, was the Smyrna-Aidin line, which opened in Anatolia in 1866. British investors also owned the Mersina-Adana Railway in Cilicia, and leased the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway. French investors controlled the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. In autumn 1888, after others turned down the investment opportunities, Germans developed a financial interest in Asiatic Turkish railways.

Dr. George von Siemens, a founder and Managing Director of the Deutsche Bank, with others, formed a German consortium, the Anatolian Railway Company, to assume control of the railway running from Haidar Pasha to Ismid, and to build an extension from Ismid to Angora. On October 6, 1888, the Ottoman government awarded the group a concession for that extension. The government intended to ultimately extend that railway to Baghdad. The Anatolian Railway Company elected financier Sir Vincent Caillard, Chairman of the OPDA, to their board hoping that he might attract other British investors. The group incorporated in Zurich, and with the aid of Swiss bankers, secured additional funding of eighty million francs, one fourth of which English bankers underwrote. German engineers began the construction of the Anatolian Railway. It began operations by January 1893. They planned to make Serbia the last northern link.

Before 1887, German companies had no financial interests in Turkey's railways. Yet, within five years, the Deutsche Bank and its partners financially controlled Turkey's railways from the Austro-Hungarian border to Constantinople. They had built a line from the Asiatic shore of the Straits to Angora and were developing numerous other railway projects. Now, the inaccessible parts of Asia Minor were within reach. Turkey was an important area of German economic interest. The Ottoman government, the resident

population, and the German investors benefitted from these enterprises. They envisioned a whole network of German-controlled railways running from Berlin to Baghdad and from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. In December 1899, the Ottoman government awarded the Baghdad concession to German financiers. Certain British elites were gratified that the Germans were in the Middle East and not Russia. Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes were even willing to collaborate with them in their economic projects. The British government preferred working with Germans instead of Frenchmen. However, conditions changed in the early years of the twentieth century and British financiers were no longer interested in any Anglo-German agreements, especially after the Ottomans finalized the Baghdad concession with the Germans in 1903, which included the mineral rights on both sides of the Baghdad railway line. The bankers and freemasons who controlled the British government wanted to avoid any kind of positive, cooperative, economic alliance between Germany, France, Turkey, Russia, Japan, and China. The construction of a railroad system, linking east and west, would make such a liaison possible and eliminate Britain's lengthy domination of the seas. The Baghdad concession would link Berlin to Baghdad, the intellectual center of the Arab world and allow Germany to bypass the ongoing British naval blockades and gain direct access to oil. The railway would bypass the Suez Canal, managed by the British and French. Germany was progressing, and clearly threatened Britain's global hegemony.

Stephen Kinzer wrote, "Internal combustion engines would soon revolutionize every aspect of human life, and control over the oil needed to fuel them would henceforth be the key to world power. Individuals had discovered and utilized oil around the Caspian Sea, in the Dutch East Indies, and in the United States, but neither Britain nor any of its colonies produced or showed any promise of producing it. If the British could not find oil somewhere, they would no longer be able to rule the waves or much of anything else." Meanwhile, Germany's naval intentions challenged Britain's control of the oceans. Germans also disapproved of England's egregious policies toward the Boers in South Africa. After the Boer War (1899-1902), Britain intended to annex two very resource-rich African Free States, Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Germans viewed the British Empire as a menace. The German consortium, because of these moral concerns, did not want to accept British investments in the Baghdad Railway project. Yet, on April 7, 1903, Prime Minister Arthur J. Balfour informed the House of Commons about the Baghdad project, and suggested that British financiers might invest in it. Heated discussion over such an alliance erupted as many viewed the German enterprise as unwanted competition. Whoever controlled the railways controlled the area's political and economic future. Mesopotamia was far too important now that oil had become an economic factor. The consensus was that the Germans had to understand that Britain was there first.

7.7 German Ingenuity, a Threat to British Hegemony

In comparison to other European countries, Germany has more natural resources, including lignite, anthracite, timber, peat, iron ore, and currently, hydroelectric power. However, Germany has very few natural gas or petroleum deposits and must import large amounts of them. Germany has two forms of coal, lignite and anthracite. Lignite, or brown coal, related to peat, has a higher moisture content. Germany is the number one worldwide producer of lignite in addition to supplying anthracite, which has the highest heating capacity of any coal. Germany presently ranks ninth in the production of this type of coal. Besides coal, Germany has an abundance of iron, nickel and copper, along with barite, cadmium, selenium, feldspar, bentonite, peat, and salt. Historically, Germany played an important part in the development of wood frame construction and woodworking expertise. With all of its forests, Germany helped develop techniques used in modern forestry. Today, Germany, with a third of its land covered with forests, has the largest standing forest in Europe. Germans developed the necessary technological skills in order to manufacture numerous hard, and soft wood products.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, people began to synthesize organic dyes. In 1704, Heinrich Diesbach produced Berlin or Prussian blue, and in 1740, Karl Barth produced the semi-synthetic dye powder blue. The introduction of the two sulfo acid groups created an insoluble indigo water-soluble, which proved much easier to use. In the 1760s, Germany made advances in technical education by establishing a commercial college at Hamburg, and mining colleges in Freiberg (Saxony) and Clausthal (Harz). On November 21, 1765, Prince Franz Xavier of Saxony agreed to establish a Mining Academy, the Bergakademie Freiberg, the world's oldest specialist school for mining and metallurgy. In the second half of the eighteenth century, in Germany, population shifts from rural areas to urban areas occurred. Prussia's population increased from 2,380,000 to 5,750,000, during the same time that Berlin's population increased from 29,000 to 141,000. Rural peasants and about 13,000 foreign craftsmen relocated to the industrial regions. Between 1740 and 1783, people founded some 200 villages in Silesia, the center of the linen industry which spurred the growth of Germany's textile and metal industries. This population growth and the expansion of industry made it necessary to efficiently increase agriculture production, to feed the population, and to provide raw materials such as wool, flax, hemp, hides timber, the madder plant, and other items. Farmers in some areas reclaimed land and introduced new crops like clover, beet, hops, and tobacco. Meanwhile less-productive peasants in areas such as Eifel and the Senne had poorer farming standards. Overall, the farmers were able to produce sufficient food for a growing population, and enough raw materials for industry.

The industrial age in the primarily agrarian Germany began with the establishment of the customs union on January 1, 1834, and the opening of the Nürnberg-Fürth railway on December 7, 1835. Three-quarters of the population lived in villages and small towns. Independent artisans manufactured textiles and metal products. By 1900, before World

War I, only America surpassed Germany's production of iron and steel. The removal of tariffs and the construction of railroads fueled the development of industry. In 1865, Friedrich Engelhorn founded Badische Anilin & Soda-Fabrik (BASF) as a joint-stock company, which later developed vital petrochemical products. BASF became a mainstay of the German economy. BASF poured all of its profits and efforts into expansion and research, kept dividends low, and avoided dependence upon banks. In 1876, BASF had 1,140 employees, which grew to 6,360 by 1900. By then BASF was the world's leading manufacturer of artificial dyes. BASF created the first telephone connection to Bavaria in 1882, and was Germany's first electrical customer. By 1913, BASF was the world's largest chemical company and produced twenty-four percent of the world's coal-tar dyes.

The international bankers in London and New York recognized that control of petroleum was essential. After Britain's Rothschild-orchestrated depression of 1873, which coincided with the US stock market crash of September 18, 1873, a growing divergence existed between the efficient German Reich, an emerging industrial European economy, and the British Empire's depressed economy. In 1885, a German engineer, Gottlieb Daimler (1834-1900), used petroleum for a road vehicle that he had developed. Karl Benz, along with Daimler, invented the modern gasoline engine. The German ports of Hamburg and Bremen-Bremerhaven were two of the most highly efficient facilities in Europe. Kaiser Wilhelm admired Albert Ballin, a Jew born in Hamburg, who, as the owner of an emigration agency, was the richest man in Germany. In 1901, he financed the construction of Emigration Halls, a reception and departure center, on the Hamburg island of Veddel, to assist the thousands of Europeans who arrived at the Port of Hamburg each week to immigrate to North America, on ships owned by the Warburg-financed Hamburg Amerika Line (HAPAG, Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Actien-Gesellschaft). In 1899, Ballin became the Director of HAPAG, established in 1847, to accommodate German immigration to America. He and the Kaiser agreed that Germany should be constructing their own ships instead of depending on English shipyards, materials, and engineers. M. M. Warburg and Company financed this new ship construction industry.

Individual entrepreneurs, encouraged by state intervention, contributed to Germany's industrial expansion. Industrialists like Werner Siemens, Emil Moritz Rathenau, father of Walther Rathenau, August Thyssen, Emil Kirdorf, Wilhelm Cuno, Bernhard Dernburg, Carl Fürstenberg, and Ballin built great commercial and financial empires. Rathenau founded the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG), an electrical-engineering company. Meanwhile, the Federal States controlled the majority of the railways and inland waterways, in addition to the extensive forests. In 1906, Prussia supervised thirtynine nationalized mines, twelve ironworks, five saltworks, and three stone quarries. Numerous states operated banks, breweries, amber works, tobacco factories, porcelain workshops, and medicinal baths. Between 1873 and 1914, according to author William O. Henderson, Germany was "the leading industrial state on the Continent and challenged Britain's supremacy in the markets of the world." Henderson cited the book, *Made in Germany* (1890) by F. E. Williams, claiming that many people in Britain were becoming alarmed

over what they viewed as “Germany’s invasion of Britain’s traditional overseas markets.” During that period, Germany’s national income rose from 15,195 million marks to 49,501 million marks, and her foreign investments increased to over 30,000 million marks. Her per capita income grew by 21.6 percent in each decade, compared to Britain with a 12.5 percent increase. The undistributed income of Germany’s joint-stock companies increased from seventy-nine million marks in 1879 to 712 million marks by 1912. German production for the export of manufactured products increased from thirteen percent in 1870 to sixteen percent in 1900. Meanwhile, Britain’s production decreased from thirty-two percent to eighteen percent.

As early as 1897, Britain wanted to neutralize and eventually eliminate Germany’s power and therefore formulated a pervasive operation to encircle the Eurasian land mass and prevent a formidable alliance between Germany and Russia, both Christian nations, which would jeopardize Britain’s imperialistic status. Francis Neilson, a former member of the British Parliament, in his book *The Makers of War*, explains that Arthur J. Balfour, then a Member of Parliament for the City of London (which is the “banking district” in London with its own laws. This Parliament is not for Britain, but for this city state harboring high finance), and Henry White, then the US Ambassador to France, met in London. White’s daughter, Muriel, who married a German count in 1909, often functioned as her father’s hostess. Possibly, her father asked her to eavesdrop and she recorded the following conversation, which transpired in June 1907: Balfour: “We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our trade.” White: “You are a very high-minded man in private life. How can you possibly contemplate anything so politically immoral as provoking a war against a harmless nation which has as good a right to a navy as you have? If you wish to compete with German trade, work harder.” Balfour: “That would mean lowering our standard of living. Perhaps, it would be simpler for us to have a war.” White: “I am shocked that you of all men should enunciate such principles.” Balfour: “Is it a question of right or wrong? Maybe it is just a question of keeping our supremacy.” White later met with the Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and reported the details of his conversation with Balfour.

In 1910, with South Africa subdued, Lord Alfred Milner and his Round Table cohorts now focused on initiating an imminent war against Germany using the same vile tactics as they had in Africa. Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian) directed the recruitment of new members to the group. Sir Francis S. Oliver, Sir Alfred E. Zimmern, Sir Reginald Coupland, Simon J. Fraser (Lord Lovat), and William Waldorf Astor (1st Viscount Astor) responded favorably to the invitation. Meanwhile Lionel G. Curtis, Milner’s secretary and others organized Round Table groups in the key British dependencies and special allies. Germany, with hard work and technology, skillfully utilized her natural resources, such as coal in the Ruhr, iron-ore in Lorraine, and potassium salts in Stassfurt and Wittelsheim. By 1913, Germany excelled Britain as a manufacturer of pig iron and steel, in addition to challenging Britain in the production of coal and lignite. Germany successfully began exporting large amounts of woolen cloth and semi-manufactured woolens. German scientists made significant

discoveries and contributions in the chemical, electrical and shipbuilding industries. In 1913, Germany supplied about nine-tenths of the world's synthetic dyes and exported more electrical appliances than any other country. Germany, from meager beginnings, expanded its shipbuilding industry, its mercantile marine and its navy. Numerous German inventions, such as the electric dynamo, aniline dyes, and petrol and diesel engines, energized the country's industrialization.

While the shipping facilities, harbors and natural waterways, were inadequate in comparison to other industrialized countries, Germany's greatest asset in terms of natural resources was "an industrious, healthy and intelligent population." In this regard, Germany had significant advantages over some of her neighboring countries with the exception of France, along with smaller nations like Belgium. German Emperor, Wilhelm I had unified Germany with the birth of the German Empire on January 18, 1871, with a proclamation, the period known as the Second Reich (1871-1918). By 1914, it was Europe's most powerful industrial nation. That industrialization, especially in scientific and engineering technology, and the resulting petrochemical industry, made Germany a powerful competitor to Britain, which targeted Germany for destruction. British bankers, adept at involving countries in war, manipulated France, Russia and ultimately the United States to wage war against Germany.

US historian Prof. Carrol Quigley, who taught in Princeton and Harvard, wrote in 1966 in "Tragedy and Hope": "There does exist ... an international Anglophile network ... which we may identify as the Round Table Groups. I know of the operations of this network because I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960's, to examine its papers and secret records ... The powers of financial capitalism had another far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private meetings and conferences.

7.8 Oil and the origins of the 'War to make the world safe for Democracy'

By F. William Engdahl, 22 June, 2007

At first almost unnoticed after 1850, then with significant intensity after the onset of the Great Depression of 1873 in Britain, the sun began to set on the British Empire. By the end of the 19th Century, though the City of London remained undisputed financier of the world, British industrial excellence was in terminal decline. The decline paralleled an equally dramatic rise of a new industrial Great Power on the European stage, the German Reich. Germany soon passed England in output of steel, in quality of machine tools, chemicals and electrical goods. Beginning the 1880's a group of leading German

industrialists and bankers around Deutsche Bank's Georg von Siemens, recognized the urgent need for some form of colonial sources of raw materials as well as industrial export outlet. With Africa and Asia long since claimed by the other Great Powers, above all Great Britain, German policy set out to develop a special economic sphere in the imperial provinces of the debt-ridden Ottoman Empire. The policy was termed "penetration pacifique" an economic dependency which would be sealed with German military advisors and equipment. Initially, the policy was not greeted with joy in Paris, St. Petersburg or London, but it was tolerated. Deutsche Bank even sought, unsuccessfully, to enlist City of London financial backing for the keystone of the Ottoman expansion policy—the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway project, a project of enormous scale and complexity that would link the interior of Anatolia and Mesopotamia (today Iraq) to Germany. What Berlin and Deutsche Bank did not say was that they had secured subsurface mineral rights, including for oil along the path of the railway, and that their geologists had discovered petroleum in Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra.

The conversion of the British Navy under Churchill to oil from coal meant a high risk strategy as England had abundant coal but no then-known oil. It secured a major concession from the Shah of Persia in the early 1900's. The Baghdad rail link was increasingly seen in London as a threat to precisely this oil security. The British response to the growing German disruption of the European balance of power after the 1890's was to carefully craft a series of public and secret alliances with France and with Russia—former rivals—to encircle Germany. As well, she deployed a series of less public intrigues to disrupt the Balkans and encourage a revolt against the Ottoman Sultan via the Young Turks that severely weakened the prospects for the German *Drang nach Osten*. The dynamic of the rise of German assertiveness, including in addition to the Baghdad rail, the decision in 1900 to build a modern navy over two decades that could rival England's, set the stage for the outbreak of a war in August 1914 whose real significance was a colossal and tragic struggle for who would succeed the ebbing power of the British Empire. The resolution of that epic struggle was to take a second world war and another quarter century before the victor was undeniably established. The role of oil in the events leading to war in 1914 is too little appreciated. When the historical process behind the war is examined from this light a quite different picture emerges. The British Empire in the decades following 1873 and the American Century hegemony in the decades following approximately 1973 have more in common than is generally appreciated.

In trying to sort out the myriad of factors at play in Eurasia on the eve of the First World War it is important to look at the processes leading to August 1914, and the relative calculus of power at the time. This means examining economic processes, including financial, raw material, population growth—in the context of relations among nations, and political and—as defined by the original and influential English geopolitician, Sir Halford Mackinder—geopolitical forces—a political economy or geopolitical approach. It was common in the days of the Great War to speak of the Great Powers. The Great Powers were so named because they both were great in size and wielded great power in

the affairs of nations. The question was what constituted “great.” Until 1892, the United States was not even considered enough a contender at the table to warrant posting a full Ambassador level diplomatic mission. She was hardly a serious factor in European or Eurasian affairs. The Great Powers included Great Britain, France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Czarist Russia. After its defeat of France in 1871, Germany too joined the ranks of the Great Powers, albeit as a latecomer. Ottoman Turkey, known then as the “sick man of Europe” was a prize which all Great Powers were sharpening their knives over, as they anticipated how to carve it up to their particular advantage. In 1914, and the decades following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, it was almost axiom that there was no power on earth greater than the British Empire. The foundations of that Empire, however, were far less solid than generally appreciated.

The pillars of Empire

Approaching the end of the 1890's, Britain was in all respects the pre-eminent political, military and economic power in the world. Since the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, which carved up post -Napoleonic Europe, the British Empire had exacted rights to dominate the seas, in return for the self-serving “concessions” granted to Habsburg Austria and the rest of Continental European powers, which concessions served to keep central Continental Europe divided, and too weak to rival British global expansion. British control of the seas, and, with it, control of world shipping trade, was one of the pillars of a new British Empire. The manufacturers of Continental Europe, as well as much of the rest of the world, were forced to respond to terms of trade set in London, by the Lloyds shipping insurance and banking syndicates. While Her Royal Navy, the world's largest, policed the major sea -lanes and provided cost-free “insurance“ for British merchant shipping vessels, competitor fleets were forced to insure their ships against piracy, catastrophe and acts of war, through London's large Lloyd's insurance syndicate.

Credit and bills of exchange from the banks of the City of London were necessary for most of the world's shipping trade finance. The private Bank of England, itself the creature of the pre-eminent houses of finance in the City of London as the financial district is called—houses such as Barings, Hambros, and above all, Rothschilds—manipulated the world's largest monetary gold supply , in calculated actions which could cause a flood of English exports to be dumped mercilessly onto any competitor market at will. Britain's unquestioned domination of international banking was the second pillar of English Imperial power following 1815.

London - a City built on gold

British gold reserves were very much the basis for the role of the Pound Sterling as the source spring of world credit after 1815. “As good as Sterling“ was the truism of that day, which was shorthand for the confidence in world markets that Sterling itself was “as good

as gold.”[2] After a law of June 22 1816, gold was declared the sole measure of value in the British Empire. British foreign policy over the next 75 years or more, would be increasingly preoccupied with securing for British private banks and for the vaults of the Bank of England, the newly mined reserves of world gold, whether in Australia, California or in South Africa. The London gold market had expanded with the famous discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in California in 1848, and the Australian discoveries three years later, to become the world’s dominant gold trading center. Gold merchant houses such as Stewart Pixley and Samuel Montagu joined the ranks of brokers. Rothschild’s added the role of becoming the Royal Mint gold refinery besides their banking business, along with Johnson Matthey. The Bank of England would certify “good delivery” status for these select gold fixing banks of the City, an essential element of growing international payments settlements in gold.

After 1886 weekly shipments of gold from especially South Africa, which comprised some two-thirds of the total in the years prior to the war, were offloaded at the docks of London, making the London gold market the unchallenged world leader. By 1871 England was joined in its gold standard by other industrializing countries, who found enough gold from their foreign export trade to link their national currencies as well to the gold standard. In 1871 Germany, on the wave of her victory over France, with its reparations in French gold, proclaimed the birth of the German Reich with Chancellor Bismark as the decisive political power. Gold was made the backing for the Reichsmark. The German Reich acquired 43 metric tons after 1871 in reparations from France, helping Germany to quadruple its gold stock immediately after 1871, giving the liquidity for the unprecedented expansion of German industry. By 1878 France, Belgium and Switzerland had followed Germany and England on to the new gold standard for international trade. Czarist Russia, a major gold producer also used gold in its official reserves.

In 1886 vast finds of gold were discovered in Transvaal. British prospectors streamed over the border from the Cape Colony, earlier annexed by Britain. Cape Colony Prime Minister was a British miner, Cecil Rhodes, who held a vision of an African continent controlled by England from the Cape to Cairo. As nationalist Boers became ever more assertive of their independence from the British in the 1890’s it was clear in London that they must take South Africa by force. The financial future of the City of London and the future of the Empire rested on that conquest. By 1899 when the Anglo-Boer War broke out, a war for control of the gold of Transvaal, the region had become the world’s largest single producer of gold. Rhodes’ mines were the largest operators. French and German investors also had large stakes, but British miners controlled between 60 and 80% of the mine output. The bloody victory of England in that war, ensured the continued domination of the City of London as the “world’s banker .” The serious loss of industrial hegemony by Britain after 1873 was largely obscured by her role in grabbing the vast gold reserves discovered in 1886 in Transvaal.

British Empire's onset of economic decline

Behind her apparent status as the world's pre-eminent power, Britain was slowly deteriorating internally. After 1850 a sharp rise in British capital flowing overseas took place. After the US Civil War and with the emerging of German and Continental European as well as Latin American industrialization in the early 1870's, this flow of capital out of the City of London became massive. Britain's wealthy found returns on their money far greater abroad than at home. It was one consequence of the 1846 Corn Law Repeal, the introduction of free trade in agriculture to force cheaper wages and to feed that labor with cheaper foodstuffs imported from Odessa, the United States, India and other foreign suppliers. Buy Cheap, Sell Dear had become the dominant economic pattern.

After 1846, wage levels inside Britain began falling with the price of bread. The English Poor Laws granted compensation for workers earning below human subsistence wage, with income supplement payments pegged to the price of a loaf of wheat bread. As bread prices plunged, so did living standards in England. As a consequence, while the merchant banks and insurers of the City of London thrived, domestic British industrial investment and modernization, which had allowed England to lead the industrial revolution after the introduction of Watt's improved steam-powered engine in the 1760's, stagnated and declined after 1870. One consequence was the shift in economic weight from the industrial north of England—Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Newcastle, Liverpool—south to London and the financial and trade services tied to the growing role of the City in international finance. From trade in "visibles" like coal, machines and steel products, Britain shifted to a nation earning from what were termed "invisibles," or financial return on overseas investment and services.

Britain increased its dependence on imported goods following the introduction of free trade. From 1883 to 1913 the Sterling value of her imports rose by 84%. The real effect of the shift to import dependence was obscured by the phenomenal success of earnings from invisibles. In 1860 Britain led the world in coal production, the raw material feeding her industry and fuelling her navy, with almost 60% of the total. By 1912 that fell to 24%. Similarly, in 1870 England enjoyed an impressive 49% share of total world iron forging output. By 1912 it was 12%. Copper consumption, an essential component of the emerging electrification transformation, went from 32% of world consumption in 1889 to 13% by 1913. The final quarter century of the 1800's was the beginning of the end of the hegemonic position of Britain as the world's dominant economic power.

In 1873 a severe economic depression, dubbed in English history the Great Depression, spread, persisting until 1896, almost a quarter Century, a decisive period in the development of the forces leading to the Great War in 1914. The 1873 depression led to the further decline of British industrial competitiveness. Price levels went into steady fall or deflation, profit margins and wages with it. Huge sums of capital remained idle or went abroad in search of gain. While the crisis in England was severe, the effects outside Britain were short-lived. By the mid-1890's the German Reich was in the midst of an

economic boom unlike any before. The rival German and other Continental economies were rapidly industrializing and exporting to markets once dominated by British exports.

By the 1880's Britain's leading circles and advocates of Empire realized that they needed to not only send their entrepreneurs like Cecil Rhodes to mine the gold to feed the banks of the City of London. Increasingly, they realized a revolution in the technology of naval power was required if the Royal Navy was to continue its unchallenged hegemony of the seas. That required a radical shift in British foreign policy. The revolution in technology was the shift from coal to oil power. After the 1890's, though little publicized, the search for secure energy in the form of petroleum would become of paramount importance to Her Majesty's Navy and Her Majesty's government. A global war for control of oil was shaping up, one few were even aware of outside select policy circles.

A revolution in Naval Power

In 1882, petroleum had little commercial interest. The development of the internal combustion engine had not yet revolutionized world industry. One man understood the military -strategic implications of petroleum for future control of the world seas, however. In a public address in September 1882, Britain's Admiral Lord Fisher, then Captain Jack Fisher, argued to anyone in the British establishment who would listen, that Britain must convert its naval fleet from bulky coal-fired propulsion to the new oil fuel. Fisher and a few other far-sighted individuals began to argue for adoption of the new fuel. He insisted that oil-power would allow Britain to maintain decisive strategic advantage in future control of the seas. Fisher argued the qualitative superiority of petroleum over coal as a fuel. A battleship powered by diesel motor burning petroleum issued no tell-tale smoke, while a coal ship's emission was visible up to 10 kilometers away. It required 4 to 9 hours for a coal-fired ship's motor to reach full power, an oil motor required a mere 30 minutes and could reach peak power within 5 minutes. To provide oil fuel for a battle ship required the work of 12 men for 12 hours. The same equivalent of energy for a coal ship required the work of 500 men and 5 days. For equal horsepower propulsion, the oil-fired ship required 1/3 the engine weight, and almost one-quarter the daily tonnage of fuel, a critical factor for a fleet whether commercial or military. The radius of action of an oil-powered fleet was up to four times as great as that of the comparable coal ship.

In 1885 a German engineer, Gottlieb Daimler, had developed the world's first workable petroleum motor to drive a road vehicle. The economic potentials of the petroleum era were beginning to be more broadly realized by some beyond Admiral Fisher and his circle. By 1904 Fisher had been named Britain's First Sea Lord, the supreme naval commander, and immediately set to implement his plan to convert the British navy from coal to oil. One month into his post, in November 1904, a committee was established on his initiative to "consider and make recommendations as to how the British Navy shall secure its oil supplies." At that time it was believed the British Isles, rich in coal, held not a drop of oil. The thought of abandoning the security of domestic British coal fuel in favor of reliance

on foreign oil was a strategy embedded in risk. The Fisher Committee had been dissolved in 1906 without resolution of the oil issue on the election of a Liberal government pledged to work for arms control. By 1912, as the Germans began a major Dreadnought-class naval construction program, Prime Minister Asquith convinced Admiral Fisher to come out of retirement to head a new Royal Commission on Oil and the Oil Engine in July 1912. Two months later on Fisher's recommendation, the first British battleship using only oil fuel, the Queen Elizabeth, was begun. Fisher pushed the risky oil program through with one argument: "In war speed is everything." Winston Churchill had by then replaced Fisher as First Lord of the Admiralty and was a strong advocate of Fisher's oil conversion. Churchill stated in regard to the Commission finding, "We must become the owners or at any rate the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the oil which we require."

From that point, oil conversion of the British fleet dictated national security priority to secure large oil reserves outside Britain. In 1913 less than 2% of world oil production was produced within the British Empire. By the first decade of the 20th Century securing long-term foreign petroleum security had become an essential factor for British grand strategy and its geopolitics. By 1909, a British company, Anglo-Persian Oil Company held rights to oil exploration in a 60-year concession from the Persian Shah at Maidan-i-Naphtun near the border to Mesopotamia. That decision to secure its oil led England into a fatal quagmire of war which in the end finished the British Empire as the world hegemon by Versailles in 1918, though it would take a second World War and several decades before that reality was clear to all.

Germany emerges in a second industrial revolution

Beginning the 1870's the German Reich, proclaimed after the Prussian victory over France in 1871, saw the emergence of a colossal new economic player on the map of Continental Europe. By the 1890's, British industry had been surpassed in both rates and quality of technological development by an astonishing emergence of industrial and agricultural development within Germany. With the United States concentrated largely on its internal expansion after its Civil War, the industrial emergence of Germany was seen increasingly as the largest "threat" to Britain's global hegemony during the last decade of the century. After England's prolonged depression in the 1870's, Germany turned increasingly to a form of national economic strategy, and away from British "free trade" adherence, in building a national industry and agriculture production rapidly.

From 1850 to 1913, German total domestic output increased five-fold. Per capita output increased in the same period by 250%. The population began to experience a steady increase in its living standard, as real industrial wages doubled between 1871 and 1913. In the decades before 1914, in terms of fuelling world industry and transportation, coal was king. In 1890, Germany produced 88 million tons of coal while Britain, produced more than double as much at 182 million tons. By 1910, the German output of coal

had climbed to 219 million tons, while Britain had only a slight lead at 264 million tons. Steel was at the center of Germany's growth, with the rapidly-merging electrical power and chemicals industries close behind. Using the innovation of the Gilchrist Thomas steel-making process, which capitalized on the high-phosphorus ores of Lorraine, German steel output increased 1,000% in the twenty years from 1880 to 1900, leaving British steel output far behind. At the same time the cost of making Germany's steel dropped to one-tenth the cost of the 1860's. By 1913 Germany was smelting almost two times the amount of pig iron as British foundries.

The German rail revolution

The rail infrastructure to transport this rapidly expanding flow of industrial goods, was the initial locomotive for Germany's first *Wirtschaftswunder*. State rail infrastructure spending doubled the kilometers of track from 1870 to 1913. The German electrical industry grew to dominate half of all international trade in electrical goods by 1913. German chemical industry became the world's leader in aniline dye production, pharmaceuticals and chemical fertilizers. Paralleling the expansion of its industry and agriculture, between 1870 and 1914 Germany's population increased almost 75% from 40,000,000 to more than 67,000,000 people. Large industry grew in a symbiosis together with large banks such as Deutsche Bank, under what became known as the *Grossbanken* model of interlocking ownership between major banks and key industrial companies. One aspect of that economic expansion after 1870, more than any other, aside from the program of Admiral von Tirpitz to build a German Dreadnaught-class blue water navy to challenge British sea supremacy, that brought Germany into the geopolitical clash which later became World War I, was the decision of German banking and political circles to build a rail link that would connect Berlin to the Ottoman Empire as far as Baghdad in then-Mesopotamia.

Towards the end of the 19th Century, German industry and the German government began to look in earnest for overseas sources of raw materials as well as potential markets for German goods. The problem was that the choice pieces of underdeveloped real estate had been previously carved up between rival imperial powers, especially France and Britain. In 1894 German Chancellor, Count Leo von Caprivi, told the Reichstag, "Asia Minor is important to us as a market for German industry, a place for the investment of German capital and a source of supply, capable of considerable expansion, of such essential goods (as grains and cotton) as we now buy from countries of which it may well sooner or later be in our interests to make ourselves independent." Caprivi was supported in turning to Asia Minor by large sections of the German industry, especially the steel barons, and by the great banks such as Deutsche Bank, as well as the foreign policy establishment and the military under General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff.

The answer for Berlin's need to secure new markets and raw material to feed its booming industries clearly lay in the east—specifically in the debt-ridden, ailing Ottoman Empire of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The situation in Ottoman Turkey had become so extreme

that the Sultan had been forced by his French and British creditors to put the finances of the realm under the control of a banker-run agency in 1881. By the Decree of Muharrem (December 1881) the Ottoman public debt was reduced from £191,000,000 to £106,000,000, certain revenues were assigned to debt service, and a European-controlled organization, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA), was set up to collect the payments. The OPDA subsequently acted as agent for the collection of other revenues and as an intermediary with European companies seeking investment opportunities. Its affairs were controlled by the two largest creditors—France and Britain, the French being the larger. The Germans set about to change that dependency of Ottoman Turkey on the British and French. For his part, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was all too pleased to open his door to growing German influence as a welcome counterweight and a source of new capital to solve the economic problems of the empire.

In 1888, the Oriental Railway from Austria, across the Balkans via Belgrade, Sofia, to Constantinople, was opened. This linked with the railways of Austria-Hungary and other European countries and put the Ottoman capital in direct communication with Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. It was to be significant for later events. By 1898, the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works had applications from several European groups to build railways in the Anatolian part of the empire. These included an Austro-Russian syndicate, a French proposal, a proposal from a group of British bankers, and the proposal of the German Deutsche Bank. The Sublime Porte had no desire to have significant Russian presence on its territory, because of Russian desires for access for its navy through the Dardanelles. The British government backing for its bankers faded away with outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. The French proposal was considered significant enough that Deutsche Bank entered into negotiations with the French Banks about a joint venture.

The Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, on November 27, 1899, awarded Deutsche Bank, headed by Georg von Siemens, a concession for a railway from Konia to Baghdad and to the Persian Gulf. In 1888 and again in 1893, the Sultan had assured the Anatolian Railway Company that it should have priority in the construction of any railway to Baghdad. On the strength of that assurance, the Anatolian Company had conducted expensive surveys of the proposed line. As part of the railway concession, the shrewd negotiators of the Deutsche Bank, led by Karl Helfferich, negotiated subsurface mineral rights twenty kilometers to either side of the proposed Baghdad Railway line. Deutsche Bank and the German government backing them made certain that included the sole rights to any petroleum which might be found. The Germans had scored a strategic coup over the British, or so it seemed. Mesopotamian oil secured through completion of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway was to be Germany's secure source to enter the emerging era of oil-driven transport.

The German success was no minor event. The geographical position of the Ottoman Empire, dominating the Balkans, the Dardanelles straits, and territory to Shatt-al-Arab at the Persian Gulf, from Aleppo to Sinai bordering the strategic Suez Canal link to the British Empire India trade, down to Aden at the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. The

German-Ottoman agreement assuring construction of the final section of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway meant the shattering of England's hope of bringing Mesopotamia, with its strategic location and its oil, under her exclusive influence and it meant as well a major defeat for France.

Britain reacts

Systematically, Britain took measures to secure her exposed flank in Mesopotamia. By 1899, Britain had secured a 99-year exclusive agreement between Britain and Kuwait, nominally part of the debt-ridden and militarily weak Ottoman Empire from the unscrupulous Shaikh Mubarak-al-Sabah. By 1907 they had converted it to a 'lease in perpetuity.' In 1905, through the machinations of British spy, Sidney Reilly, Lord Strathcona, secured exclusive rights to Persian oil resources and what in 1909 became the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, after discovery of oil there in 1908. The company negotiated an agreement with Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, shortly before World War I, for major financial backing by the British Government in return for secure oil for the Royal Navy. In 1912 the government, at Churchill's urging, bought controlling interest secretly in Anglo-Persian Oil Company. She had negotiated with the Sheikh of Muhammerah to also build an oil refinery, depot and port on Abadan Island adjacent to the Shaat-al-Arab as part of the emerging British policy to keep the Germany out of the strategic Mesopotamian oil-rich region.

A German-built rail link to Baghdad and on to the Persian Gulf, capable of carrying military troops and munitions, was a strategic threat to the British oil resources of Persia. Persian oil was the first crucial source of secure British petroleum for the Navy. Already, the decision by the German Reichstag to approve the massive naval construction program of Admiral von Tirpitz in the German Naval Law of 1900, to build 19 new battleships and 23 battle cruisers over the coming 20 years, presented the first challenge to Britain's rule of the seas. At the Hague Convention of 1907 Germany refused to continue an earlier ban on "aerial warfare." Under Count Zeppelin, the Germans had been the first to develop huge airships. Turkey, backed and trained by Germany, had the potential, should it get the financial and military means, to launch a military attack on what had become vital British interests in Suez, the Persian route to India, the Dardanelles. By 1903 the German Reich was prepared to give the Sultan that means in the form of the Baghdad Railway and German investment in Ottoman Anatolia.

By 1913 that German engagement had taken on an added dimension with a German-Turkish Military Agreement under which German General Liman von Sanders, member of the German Supreme War Council, with personal approval of the Kaiser, was sent to Constantinople to reorganize the Turkish army on the lines of the legendary German General Staff. In a letter to Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, dated April 26, 1913, Freiherr von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador to Constantinople declared, "The Power which controls the Army will always be the strongest one in Turkey. No Govern-

ment hostile to Germany will be able to hold on to power if the Army is controlled by us...". German intelligence operatives, led by Baron Max von Oppenheim, a German Foreign Ministry diplomat and an archaeologist, had made extensive surveys of Mesopotamia already beginning 1899 to explore the proposed route of the Baghdad Railway, confirming the estimated of Ottoman officials that the region held oil. The British referred to Oppenheim as "The Spy." He was also an ardent German imperialist. In 1914 shortly before outbreak of war, Oppenheim reportedly told Kaiser Wilhelm, "When the Turks invade Egypt, and India is set ablaze with the flames of revolt, only then will England crumble. For England is at her most vulnerable in her colonies." He was author of a German strategy of encouraging a Turkey-led Jihad or Holy War and against the colonial powers of Britain, France and Russia as a strategy of war.

Isolating the German Reich

By the end of the 1880's fundamental shifts in security and trade alliances had begun. Britain, France and Russia were all growing alarmed at the emerging power and potential threat of the German Reich. In October 1903 Britain and France came together to agree spheres of influence which resulted in signing of an Entente Cordiale in April 1904, ending their imperial rivalries over Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and allowing both to concentrate on the threat posed by Germany in alliance with Austro-Hungary. By 1907, following its defeat in the Russo-Japan War of 1905 in a conflict that Britain overtly helped along by providing battleships to the Japanese to destroy the Russian Pacific Fleet, Russia settled its disputes with Britain over Afghanistan, The Great Game as Kipling termed the fight between Britain and Russia for control of the Afghan passage to India. Russia also settled their dispute with Britain over Persia and in June 1908 at the Baltic port of Reval, King Edward VII met his cousin Czar Nicholas II to agree on an Anglo-Russian alliance. The system of carefully built diplomatic alliances laid by Bismark which saw France in 1887 as the only country hostile to Germany, had, by 1908 turned to one in which by then the only friendly ally of Germany was the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a remarkable reversal of alliances and the prelude to the Great War.

In the months up to outbreak of war in 1914, there were efforts at cooling down a mounting confrontation between the two great power blocks—the Triple Entente of England, France, Russia and the alliance of Germany with Austro-Hungary. In 1911 Germany and Russia signed the Potsdam Agreement over rights to northern Persia in return for Russian agreement not to block the Baghdad Railway progress. Clear, however, was that Germany was fully committed to completing the Baghdad project. Following the Balkan wars from 1910-1912, it was obvious to all that the next part of the Ottoman Empire to be carved up was Anatolian Turkey itself. The balance between the Great Powers was endangered with the result of the Balkan Wars, and the stunning defeat of the Ottoman army by small opponents. In a very short period, Turkey lost most of her territory in Europe except for Istanbul and a small hinterland, and retreated back to defence line

in Çatalca. Britain and British intelligence was active in the Balkans stirring revolt and opposition to Constantinople's rule. The Entente Powers—France, England and Russia—knew that despite all her efforts, Germany did not have strong cards in the Balkans. And the Balkans constituted a strategic link between Berlin and Baghdad as a glance at a good typographical map reveals.

The success of the so-called Young Turk revolution of 1908-9 in forcing the Sultan to reinstate a constitutional monarchy with a parliament unleashed a series of destabilizing revolts in the Balkan provinces of the empire. British intelligence was actively engaged in pushing events along. The Young Turk revolutions of 1908 and 1909, which ended the reign of Abdul Hamid in the Ottoman Empire, offered France and Great Britain an unprecedented opportunity to assume moral and political leadership in the Near East. Many members of the Committee of Union and Progress, the revolutionary party, had been educated in western European universities—chiefly in Paris—and had come to be staunch admirers of French and English institutions. In 1908, as Constantinople was under the chaotic rule of the secular Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Anglo-Turkish relations were quite warm. The British Ambassador, Sir Gerald Lowther, at least in the initial days after the takeover in 1908, extended unlimited British support for the revolution. He told the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, "Things have gone as well as they could." The role of the Yung Turks, most of whom were members of various European freemason lodges, is a rich and important story beyond the scope of this brief essay. Initially at least the Young Turk regime viewed the agreements between the Sultan and the Germans on the Baghdad Railway and oil rights to be a symbol of the corruption and destruction of Turkish national resources.

British diplomatic and intelligence operatives also played a role in Albanian independence in the Balkans. A key if little-known figure of British machinations at the time was Aubrey Herbert, Member of Parliament and British intelligence officer who was close to Gertrude Bell and T. E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"). Herbert had been active since 1907 in fomenting Albanian independence from Constantinople, and was offered the Crown of Albania for his efforts, an offer which his friend, Asquith, dissuaded him from taking.

British active measures

As well in Serbia British military and intelligence networks were most active prior to outbreak of war. Major R.G.D. Laffan was in charge of a British military training mission in Serbia just before the war. Following the war, Laffan wrote of the British role in throwing a huge block on the route of the German-Baghdad project:

"If 'Berlin-Baghdad' were achieved, a huge block of territory producing every kind of economic wealth, and unassailable by sea-power would be united under German authority," warned R.G.D. Laffan. Laffan was at that time a senior British military adviser attached to the Serbian Army.

“Russia would be cut off by this barrier from her western friends, Great Britain and France,” Laffan added. “German and Turkish armies would be within easy striking distance of our Egyptian interests, and from the Persian Gulf, our Indian Empire would be threatened. The port of Alexandretta and the control of the Dardanelles would soon give Germany enormous naval power in the Mediterranean.”

Laffan suggested a British strategy to sabotage the Berlin-Baghdad link. “A glance at the map of the world will show how the chain of States stretched from Berlin to Baghdad. The German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, Turkey. One little strip of territory alone blocked the way and prevented the two ends of the chain from being linked together. That little strip was Serbia. Serbia stood small but defiant between Germany and the great ports of Constantinople and Salonika, holding the Gate of the East...Serbia was really the first line of defense of our eastern possessions. If she were crushed or enticed into the 'Berlin-Baghdad' system, then our vast but slightly defended empire would soon have felt the shock of Germany's eastward thrust.”

In 1915, after returning from a mission to Bulgaria, British MP, Noel Buxton wrote in the introduction to his book similar views of the strategic role of the Balkans for British strategy of blocking Germany and Austro-Hungary:

“No one now denies the supreme importance of the Balkans as a factor in the European War. It may be that there were deep-seated hostilities between the Great Powers which would have, in any case, produced a European War, and that if the Balkans had not offered the occasion, the occasion would have been found elsewhere. The fact remains that the Balkans did provide the occasion. . .”

Buxton added, “The Serbian army would be set free to take the offensive, and possibly provoke an uprising of the Serbian, Croat, and Slovene populations of the Austrian Empire. Any diminution of the Austrian force would compel the Germans to withdraw a larger number of troops from the other theatres of war.” The only Great Power whose interest lay in preventing the further deterioration of Ottoman control of its territories on the eve of war was Germany. The success of its grand economic and political project to win Ottoman Turkey as an informal sphere of influence, as well as securing the rights of the Baghdad Rail link to Mesopotamia and eventually to the Persian Gulf depended on preserving a stable political regime in Constantinople as partner. In April 1913, His British Majesty's Foreign Office handed the Turkish Ambassador to London an official British statement of intent regarding Mesopotamian oil: “His Majesty's Government. . . rely on the Ottoman Government to make without delay arrangements in regard to the oil wells of Mesopotamia which will ensure British control and meet with their approval in matters of detail.”

Ironically, just on the eve of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke and heir to the Habsburg throne in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, a member of a Serbian Black Hand secret society with reported French Masonic ties, agreements were finally reached between the Germans, the British and the Turkish parties over oil rights in Mesopotamia.

In 1909, the National Bank of Turkey was founded following a trip, on request of England's King Edward, by the influential London banker, Sir Ernest Cassel. Cassel was joined by the mysterious and wealthy Ottoman subject, of Armenian origin, Calouste Gulbenkian. The bank had no representation of Ottoman origins. Its board included Hugo Baring of the London bank, Earl Cromer, Barons Ashburton, Northbrook and Revelstone. At the time Lord Cromer was Governor of the Bank of England. This elite British entity in Constantinople then created an entity called the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which Gulbenkian was given 40% share. The purpose was to win from the Sultan an oil concession in Mesopotamia. Simultaneously, a second British-controlled enterprise, Anglo-Persian Oil Company was actively trying to extend its Persian oil claims into the disputed borders with Mesopotamia. The third player, the only one with exploration rights from Sultan Abdul Hamid II was the Baghdad Railway Company of Deutsche Bank. The crafty British were about to change that.

The combined British efforts forced the German group into a compromise. In 1912 and again in early 1914 on the eve of the war, with the backing of British and German governments, the (British) Turkish Petroleum Company was reorganized. Share capital was doubled. Half went to Anglo-Persian Oil Company, now secretly owned by the British Government. Another 25% was held by the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell group. A final 25% was held by the Deutsche Bank group, the only ones with rights to exploit the oil resources to either side of the Baghdad rail line. Finally, Shell and Anglo-Persian each agrees to give Gulbenkian 2.5% of their shares for a total of 5%. On June 28, 1914, in one of the great ironies of history, the Turkish Petroleum Company won the oil concession from the Sultan's government. It did not matter. War had broken out and British forces would secure the entire oilfields of Mesopotamia after Versailles in a new League Protectorate called Iraq.

In June 1914, just days before outbreak of war, the British Government, acting on First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill's urging, bought the majority share of the stock of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and with it she took automatically APOC's major share in Deutsche Bank's Turkish Petroleum Company. London left nothing to chance. Why would England risk a world war in order to stop the development of Germany's industrial economy in 1914? The ultimate reason England declared war in August, 1914 lay fundamentally, "in the old tradition of British policy, through which England grew to great power status, and through which she sought to remain a great power," stated Deutsche Bank's Karl Helfferich, the man in the midst of negotiations on the Baghdad Railway, in 1918. "England's policy was always constructed against the politically and economically strongest Continental power," he stressed. "Ever since Germany became the politically and economically strongest Continental power, did England feel threatened from Germany more than from any other land in its global economic position and its naval supremacy. Since that point, the English-German differences were unbridgeable, and susceptible to no agreement in any one single question." Helfferich sadly noted the accuracy of the declaration of Bismarck from 1897, "The only condition which could

lead to improvement of German-English relations would be if we bridled our economic development, and this is not possible."

7.9 Marxism, Terrorism and Assassinations

The Rothschilds, along with their salaried agents, conducted preferential business with numerous banks. By the end of the 1840s, they associated with banks in Baltimore, New York, Amsterdam, Berlin, Cologne, Constantinople, Florence, Hamburg, Milan, Odessa, Rome, and Trieste. The owners of the German banks, Warburg and Bleichröder, were, by 1848, part of a vast network. The Rothschilds valued the services of smaller banks and the influence and trust those banks had developed in their respective communities. 1018 By 1850, despite Russia's gold mines in the Urals and Altai, and "inexhaustible treasures" in the Petropavlovsk vaults, even the czar had no immediate money and had to extract silver reserves from the vaults to cover the paper issue. He also offered government bonds on the Paris Bourse (exchange). He then approached the City of London for a loan of 30 million silver rubles to cover expenses associated with the revolutions of 1848-1849.

Karl Marx, with a Doctorate in Philosophy (1841), was obscene and vulgar in his correspondence with Frederick Engels, 1020 and could not secure a teaching job because of his revolutionary activities. Marx, though a Jew, regularly voiced his hatred of them, especially Jewish capitalists. He wrote *On the Jewish Question* (1843), *A World without Jews* (1844) and *Das Kapital* (1867). He derived many of his ideas from Adam Weishaupt (founder of the actual Illuminati), François-Noël Babeuf, Louis Blanc, Étienne Cabet, Robert Owen, William Ogilvie, Thomas Hodgkin, John Gray, Robert Thompson, William Carpenter, and Clinton Roosevelt. 1022 Roosevelt, of the New York banking family, wrote *The Science of Government Founded on Natural Law*.

Marx's tenets appealed to the Khazar Jews who readily accepted his ideals of state control and equality as most of them were accustomed to authoritarian rabbinic rule, having lived under the Babylonian Judaic Pharisaic Talmud, consisting of at least 5,894 pages. Because of their unique lifestyle, self-imposed exclusivity, and predatory monetary practices, people had ostracized them for centuries. Marx, descended from rabbinical families on his paternal and maternal sides, understood the unique character and atmosphere of living under Talmud tenets. 1023 The multi-volume Talmud includes over 12,000 regulatory restraints so people did not object to or question further rigorous regimentation. Because of the revolutions (1848-1849), Russia, by necessity, became involved in European politics to avoid losing its influence in Constantinople. In early 1850, Marx and Engels predicted a Russo-Turkish War. They stated that "the war against Turkey will necessarily be a European war." This, they said would allow Russia "a firm foot in Germany," to complete the counter-revolution and help the Prussians to capture Neuchâtel, in northern Switzerland, then march to the "center of the revolution, Paris." Neuchâtel claimed independence from Prussia in 1848, and was a refuge for German revolutionaries

after their defeat of May and June 1849.

From France, Herzen, an associate of Vissarion Belinsky and the Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, the founder of collectivist anarchism, traveled to Italy where he stayed from December 1847 to April 1848, until he heard about the sweeping revolutions. Herzen immediately left for Paris, and then traveled to Switzerland. He championed the revolts and was disillusioned when they failed. In August 1852, he relocated to the safe political haven of London where he resided for about twelve years, promoting socialism, and where Karl Marx befriended him. 1025 In London, Herzen and Bakunin worked on the journal *Kolokol* (The Bell). Herzen would greatly influence the political environment that ultimately led to the emancipation of the serfs in Russia in 1861. In June 1853, Henry J. Temple, known as Lord Palmerston, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and Lord John Russell, gathered George Sanders, a former Bank of England employee, and now the American Consul in Liverpool, along with August Belmont, the Ambassador to Holland, James Buchanan, a freemason and future US president (1857-1861), and Senator Pierre Soule for a series of meetings in London. There, they met with Giuseppe Mazzini, a freemason and the organizer of Young Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi, a freemason, and Felice Orsini, leader of the Carbonária. Others joined them, including Arnold Ruge of Young Germany, Herzen, of Young Russia, and Lajos Kossuth, a freemason, 1026 of Young Hungary. Reportedly, during that meeting, they organized the international assassination bureau of the Scottish Rite Order of Zion.

Czar Alexander II (1818-1881) ascended the throne in 1855 during the midst of the Crimean War (1853-1856), a conflict over the Holy Land, between Russia, and an alliance of Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia. On March 28, 1854, France and Britain declared war on Russia, the Jew's longtime enemy, as France demanded recognition as the sovereign authority in the Holy Land. Russia had been the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire and had assisted Austria-Hungarian efforts in suppressing the 1848 revolutions. The French and the British, unlike the Austrian and Prussian officials, refused to negotiate, making war inevitable. The Crimean War saw the first tactical use of railways, the electric telegraph and modern military tactics. 1029 The czar ended the conflict via the Treaty of Paris on March 30, 1856. Russia relinquished control of the left bank of the mouth of the Danube River, including part of Bessarabia. Russia also had to abandon their protection of Christians in the Ottoman Empire to accommodate France. The Turkish sultan promised to improve the status of the Christians in his empire. The Crimean War, along with the revolutions of 1848, would be a factor in the emancipation of the Russian serfs. The czar witnessed Russia's military defeat by Britain and France's free troops.

Czar Alexander II attempted to appease the Jewish minority who were willing and anxious to hold Russian citizenship, even though they were ethnic and cultural separatists. The czar approved of many new liberties for them and the serfs. On March 3, 1861, he issued the Edict of Emancipation abolishing serfdom throughout Russia, one of his most notable acts, increasing Russia's esteem throughout the world. People referred to him

as “the Czar Liberator.” However, the majority of the land was still in the possession of the nobles and the massive proletariat population still possessed no property. The czar, to win the Jewish minority, offered them citizenship and other liberties. However, his policies contributed to Christian Russia’s ultimate collapse. He removed many regulations and allowed Jews unrestricted travel and to attend any school they wished. He failed to anticipate the consequences, as this allowed them, still a “state within a state,” to develop influential anti-government power. Through the use of terror, specifically assassinations, they advanced their goals. The czar attempted to halt their antagonism through additional concessions but it was unsuccessful and it soon cost him his life. Theoretically, everyone was free. The peasants, now wage slaves were still miserable, and they were no different from the peasants of Prussia and Austria, where the government had also granted liberation. The government established schools, and, together with media officials, reduced the incidence of censorship, but failed to totally eliminate it. Certain interests enthusiastically encouraged a process of Russification and the adoption of nationalism or statism, the aggrandizement of the state over individual desires and needs.

After emancipation, many serfs adopted Narodnism, a political force whose advocates accused the government of imposing wage slavery on them. The Narodniks opposed the bourgeoisie, those who then controlled capital, and who replaced the landowners. The Narodniks, though resentful of the previous land ownership system, contested the displacement of the peasants from the traditional communes. The Narodniks concentrated on the mounting divergence between the peasantry and the prosperous farmers. The Marxist groups promised to destroy the monarchy, the wealthy, and then redistribute their wealth among the poor. The Narodniks acknowledged that they could not achieve revolutionary changes on their own but would need extraordinary leaders. There were other Narodniks who demanded an immediate revolution without considering philosophical and political discussions with political leaders. In the spring of 1874, the Narodnik intelligentsia left the cities to try to persuade the peasants in the villages to revolt, but the peasants initially refused to support the Narodniks who were from the middle and upper middle classes, and who could not relate to the peasants. The Narodniks revised their tactics, learned about the peasant culture, and in 1877, initiated a revolution, assisted by thousands of peasants.

Professor Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a freemason, promoted the philosophy that ultimate peace comes only through conflict. Rhetorical conflict and physical warfare (or pogroms) are theoretically essential for ultimate peace achieved through globalization. Author David Icke, simplifies the process with the term—Problem, Reaction, Solution (P-R-S). He explains, 1) Provocateurs create a problem and shift the blame elsewhere. 2) They use the media to present a false version of the problem. 3) They maneuver the public by creating fear and outrage. 4) The public demands a solution. 5) Those who “engineered the problem” offer a solution that they wanted all along. This successful tactic motivates people to accept and even plead for changes they would have

rejected prior to the problem.

The government suppressed the revolt and imposed additional regulations, which led to the formation of the first organized revolutionary party, the Narodnaya Volya, or the People's Will. The party used secret society-directed terrorism to exert pressure on the government for change and improvement and to demonstrate the czar's vulnerability. Alexander Soloviev attempted to kill Czar Alexander II on April 14, 1879. He fired at him five times, but missed and authorities soon captured and executed him. On November 19, 1879, Leo Hartmann, Grigory Goldenberg, Sophia Perovskaya, all Narodnaya Volya members arranged an explosion on the railroad line but they missed the czar's train. They may have used dynamite, invented by Alfred Noble, patented in 1867. In another attempt, on February 17, 1880, when the explosive detonated, it killed Ignacy Hryniewiecki, one of the Polish terrorists. Three people admitted to making the explosives— Alexander Mikhailov and Andrei Zhelyabov, both on the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Volya and Nikolai Kibalchich. Hartman escaped to France where he celebrated with French revolutionaries and avoided extradition, but later authorities expelled him. On November 18, 1890, Stanislaus Padlewsky, a Nihilist, murdered General Michael de Seliverstoff, the former St. Petersburg police chief, in Paris. Padlewsky, in a story in *The New York Times*, on January 30, 1892, claimed that Hartman ultimately found refuge in America among other Nihilists.

Alexander II, with numerous reforms, improved conditions. Educated, liberal Jews became an influential political and social force. They viewed Marxism, using persuasive propaganda, mixed with violence, as a way of altering or eliminating established institutions, and the existing culture, and replacing it with a new society, based on Marxist principles. Jews joined with revolutionary non-Jewish radicals, the professed intelligentsia, and practiced terrorism and assassination as they believed that progress was only possible by purging certain officials. Alexander II attempted to immobilize the terrorist's hostility by permitting even greater concessions. However, on the day that he proposed his latest resolution, March 13, 1881, after four earlier attempts, the terrorists, the very people he was trying to help, murdered him. The Narodnaya Volya assassination of Alexander II horrified the peasantry. The government hung many of the Narodnaya Volya leaders, most of whom were Jews, which left the group without strong effective leaders. Later, other groups, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Popular Socialists, and the Trudoviks embraced the same philosophies and used the same terrorist tactics. These revolutionary groups laid the foundation for the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. The people justifiably blamed the revolutionary Jews for the assassination. Czar Alexander III, the czar's son, replaced him on March 13, 1881, and would be in power until his death on November 1, 1894. Within a month, pogroms in the Ukraine, in response to the terrorism, destroyed thousands of Jewish homes and injured hundreds of people in approximately 166 towns as latent anti-Semitism erupted. Nationwide pogroms would begin in earnest in Russia around 1890. Alexander III accused Jewish provocateurs of starting the riots in which non-revolutionary Jews were victims. Resentful Cossacks slaughtered thousands of

men, women and children. Pogroms occurred simultaneously in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, seemingly in a well-organized fashion.

Because of the pogroms, Nicolai Ignatyev, the Minister of Internal Affairs, in a Problem, Reaction, Solution (P-R-S) response, proposed regulations for the Jews. Alexander III approved and enacted the May laws on May 15, 1882: 1) Authorities forbid Jews to create new settlements outside of towns and boroughs, except in the case of existing Jewish agricultural colonies. 2) People could not issue mortgages and other deeds to Jews, or register Jews as lessees of real property situated outside of their towns and boroughs; or issue powers of attorney to Jews to manage and dispose of such real property. 3) Jews could not transact business on Sundays and on the principal Christian holy days, the existing regulations concerning the closing of places of business belonging to Christians on such days to apply to Jews also. 4) The measures laid down in 1, 2, and 3 shall apply only to the governments within the Pale of Jewish Settlement.

Members of the Narodnaya Volya attempted to kill Alexander III. On May 5, 1887, the state executed Vladimir Lenin's older brother, Aleksandr Ulyanov, because he had participated in that attempt. Perhaps Vladimir Lenin, born Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, felt an obligation to retaliate against the Romanovs, especially Nicholas II, the grandson of Alexander II, if only for the sake of his brother. Lenin, while attending the University of Kazan, adopted Marxism. Because of expulsion orders, in 1886, in Kiev, and in 1891, in Moscow, a huge number of Jews, possessing a globalist strategy, immigrated to other European countries and to America. It was not the first time that governments had deported Jews because of their activities. Emigration accelerated even more under Nicholas II. However, many Jews opted to stay in Russia despite the persecution, hoping that it would dissipate. In 1913, Russia's Jewish population would total 6,946,000. 1047 Over 2,000,000 Jews left Russia between 1880 and 1920. The majority of them immigrated to the United States. By 1905, Russia suffered a great loss in the Russo-Japanese War, causing increased revolutionary turmoil.

7.10 1905 Revolution, Funded by International Bankers

By 1860, the Jews had the Alliance Israélite Universelle, headquartered in Paris, with massive monetary means, a huge membership, and various Masonic lodges which represented an organization that promoted equality and universal suffrage. The Alliance directed its efforts toward anti-Christian and anti-monarchist activities using socialism, an easy tool for the "ignorant masses." Russia, a land of laborers, Orthodoxy and monarchism proved to be an obstacle. In order to impose Marxism, rebels had to debilitate the existing government, which they would do, using Japan as a mercenary. The State Duma temporarily removed the existing obstacles to the triumph of Jewry in Russia yet hostility erupted right after the October Manifesto, which presumably alleviated those concerns. The Jews subsequently engaged in terrorism against the state. Angry Russians

then assaulted innocent Jews in numerous pogroms in retaliation. Because of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, well-organized Jews in every country acted in concert as one determined body. They had efficient intelligent leaders, weapons and sufficient financing all promoting a revolution. Time and experience reveals the international character of the movement. If one evaluates the revolutionary spirit in France (1789), numerous countries in Europe (1848), America (1861), Russia (1905, 1917), and the Ottoman Empire (1908) and again in Germany (1921) it becomes apparent that a common source exists that uses similar tactics. They use strikes, military force, assassination, media control, education, and they seize or infiltrate the government. Afterwards, they control credit, currency, production, and distribution. They create civil or class warfare, debase the culture, degrade ethical standards, and promote the patriotic participation in foreign warfare to morally, and financially desecrate a country.

For years, John D. Rockefeller (1839-1937) and Standard Oil aggressively competed with the Royal Dutch Company for the worldwide oil reserves and markets, particularly those under the control the British, especially in Saudi Arabia. The British Crown, the Dutch Crown and the Isaacs, Samuels, Rothschilds and the Sassoons controlled Royal Dutch. The czar gave Royal Dutch an exclusive oil concession in the Baku oilfields making those fields inaccessible to Rockefeller. There were three ways that he could gain access 1) support the destruction of Russia through revolution; 2) create a division between the czar and Royal Dutch; 3) and the least feasible, destroy the British to acquire access to Arabia and the Middle East. In May 1885, Rockefeller sent George Kennan (1845-1924, who was employed by the Russian-American Telegraph, surveyed a route for a possible overland telegraph line starting in San Francisco under the Bering Sea and across Siberia to Moscow) back to Russia, including Siberia, where he joined with many of the revolutionaries who had remained in Russia following the 1880s pogroms. He encouraged their rebellion against the czar, who he had earlier supported. He returned to the United States in August 1886 and spent the next twenty years promoting a revolution in Russia, primarily through lectures. He spoke before a million or more people during the 1890s. London's wealthy Anglo-Jewish community voiced its concerns over the reported pogroms and organized a protest meeting where Samuel Montagu, an Orthodox Jew, whose daughter Lily founded Liberal Judaism and Nathaniel M. Rothschild spoke and advocated political intervention.

Lev D. Bronstein (usually known as Trotsky), born October 26, 1879 in Yanovka (now Ukraine), to a rich farmer, was a revolutionary student in Odessa. He helped re-establish the South Russia Workers Union in 1897, which had disbanded in 1881. Several hundred workers, including Russians, Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians comprised the original group. The group demanded extensive economic changes, collective ownership of land and factories, shorter working hours, and it used terrorism to achieve its aims, including sabotage, and the murder of factory managers and owners.

On October 7, 1897, in Vilna, individuals founded the General Jewish Labour Bund, a secular party, to exclusively represent the Jewish working class. About 315,000 Jews were

illegally living outside the Pale, mostly in St. Petersburg and Moscow. In 1897, revolutionaries founded the Bolshevik Party in Russia, which then included Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine and most of what is now Poland. Jews participated in revolutionary activities on a huge scale in those areas. At the same time, American and British officials agreed to share intelligence, weaponry and military spoils. The establishment of Cecil Rhodes' Pilgrims Society cemented the alliance to purportedly facilitate "the extension of British rule throughout the world." In 1897, with the imminent Spanish American War, the Second Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, a military power trust consisting of Vickers, DuPont, Nobel, Koln, Kottweiler and others, began preparing for a major world war. In 1898, Bronstein helped found the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) in Minsk, which had its First Congress, March 13-March 15, 1898, to oppose the Narodniks. It later split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. In January 1898, authorities arrested him and incarcerated him in Odessa, where, over the next two years, he initiated his investigation of freemasonry.

Bronstein concluded that freemasons intend to eliminate nations and their cultures in order to institute a world government. Apparently, elevation to the thirty-third Degree indicates acceptance of this goal. Freemasonry necessitates revolution. Bronstein, understood that Jews would dominate the world's population through multiculturalism and the eradication of national borders. They had to create a Jewish-ruled international republic because no other group was capable of controlling the masses. In 1902, Bronstein escaped to London where he met Vladimir Lenin (born Vladimir I. Ulyanov); Bronstein changed his name to Leon Trotsky. In July 1898, Lenin married Nadeshda Krupskaya, a Marxist revolutionary. Alexander Parvus, Trotsky's mentor, then living in a Munich suburb, provided the money for the 1905 coup attempt and made Lenin the editor of the Russian Social-Democrats' newspaper *Iskra* in 1901, in addition to allowing him to live in his flat. Parvus organized a printing office in Leipzig and ascertained that the newspaper reached Russia. Trotsky and Lenin collaborated on *Iskra*. Lenin led the Bolsheviks at the Second Congress of the RSDLP, July 30-August 23, 1903, while Trotsky acted as one of the Menshevik leaders. This congress finalized the formation of the Marxist party in Russia, first proclaimed at the First Congress of the RSDLP.

Russia annexed Batumi in accordance with the Treaty of San Stefano with the Ottoman Empire. 1058 In exchange, per a secret Anglo-Ottoman Cyprus Convention, the British occupied Cyprus. The Russians occupied Batumi beginning on August 28, 1878, and declared the town a free port until 1886. In 1883, they began the construction of the Batumi-Tiflis-Baku railway which they completed in 1900, along with the Baku-Batumi pipe-line. Batumi, 439 miles from Baku, soon became the chief Russian oil port on the Black Sea, and its population rapidly expanded from 8,671 in 1882, to 16,000 by 1902, when 1,000 men worked in Rothschild's Caspian and Black Sea oil refinery. On June 1, 1903, officials placed the region of Batumi under the General Government of Georgia's direct control. In 1902, Joseph Stalin (born Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili), began working at Rothschild's refinery in Batumi. The next day, someone, probably Stalin or

his cohorts, deliberately set Rothschild's refinery ablaze. Stalin organized and engaged in creating strikes, mayhem, espionage, banditry, extortion, agitation, and murder in Batumi where he ordered the first killings of those he considered traitors. 1059 During the revolution, the Rothschilds had their termites, possibly Stalin, in Russia who destroyed and sabotaged the oil wells and refineries, even their own. Economic disaster and joblessness followed industrial sabotage.

At the Communist Party's Brussels-London conference (1902-1903), Lenin endorsed the more violent Marxist program, and won the group's support by a vote of twenty-five to twenty-three. More pogroms erupted beginning in 1903 through 1906. Jews, a distinct cultural minority, readily endorsed the three aims of International Communism, 1) seizing power in Russia, 2) Political Zionism and, 3) sustained migration to the United States, while retaining their nationalistic separatism. Lenin and Trotsky disagreed on one very important policy; Lenin supported violent revolution, adapted for expediency, to alter society while Trotsky and his followers favored a non-violent approach. The Trotskyites evolved into what Americans currently refer to as neoconservatives. Lenin retained the leadership after the demise of the less violent faction in 1903. The communist Jews, along with other Russian revolutionaries, were such a force that success was sure but timing and funding was everything. Marxists exploit religion and labor through unions. In 1903, Father Georgiy A. Gapon, an Orthodox priest, organized the Assembly of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of St. Petersburg, which the Department of the Police and the St. Petersburg Okhrana supported, as they believed it was the way to control it. Gapon intended, through the Assembly, to defend workers' rights and increase their moral and religious status. His organization, composed exclusively of members of the Russian Orthodox community, had twelve branches and 8,000 members. His friend, Pinhas Rutenberg, an associate of Alexander Parvus, and a freemason¹⁰⁶² and a member of the Socialist- Revolutionary Party, was a workshop manager at the Putilov plant, the center of the Assembly of Russian Factory and Plant Workers. Rutenberg, an engineer, businessman, Marxist and a Zionist leader, participated in the two revolutions, in 1905 and 1917. During World War I, he helped found the Jewish Legion of the American Jewish Congress. Later, in the British Mandate of Palestine, he obtained an exclusive concession for the production and distribution of electric power and founded the Palestine Electric Company, currently the Israel Electric Corporation. He would also participate in the formation of Haganah, a nucleus of the future Israel Defense Forces, and would serve as a President of the Jewish National Council.

apon, an obedient police instrument, began, by the end of 1904, to cooperate with radicals, and champion the czar's abolition. On December 29, 1904, a foreman fired four at the Putilov plant, St. Petersburg's largest industrial plant, which produced military supplies during the Russo-Japanese War. Workers organized a strike, beginning on January 3, with more than 12,000 workers. Sympathetic workers in other city plants organized strikes so there were over 80,000 striking workers. On January 2, 1905, Russia relinquished Port Arthur, while the Japanese critically hurt the Russian Baltic Fleet at

Tsushima. On January 7-8, the strike became a general one and according to the incomplete data of the factory inspectorate, it affected about 456 companies with 113,000 workers (150,000 by some sources). It paralyzed the city's industrial and commercial life. By January 8, 1905, the city was without electricity and the newspapers had stopped publishing. The authorities closed all public areas. This well-timed strike impacted Russia's ability to fight the Japanese, a war that Japan initiated without a declaration of war on behalf of the international banking cartel. On Bloody Sunday, January 22, 1905, in St. Petersburg, during the depression that was sweeping Russia, more than 300,000 unarmed, striking workers and their families, organized and led by Father Gapon, along with Rutenberg, marched to the Winter Palace. They intended to present a petition to Czar Nicholas II demanding an end to the war, and the introduction of universal suffrage. The workers were peaceful, singing religious and patriotic songs and proceeded without the police interfering in their march.

According to official documents, Parvus and Rutenberg positioned some Jewish terrorists in the trees in Aleksandrovsk Park and ordered them to shoot at the guards. The Imperial Guard then fired warning shots, in self-defense, and then opened fire on the crowd. Rutenberg took Gapon out of harm's way. Although the czar was not present, people blamed him for the massacre. The people generally supported him but this massacre had serious consequences. Czar Nicholas II described the day as "painful and sad." 1064 He awarded a subsidy to the families of those who the guards had shot. However, the revolutionaries claimed that "thousands of people lost their lives.", when in reality, it only were a few hundred. After Trotsky heard about Bloody Sunday, he returned to Russia, and, in December, the people elected him as the President of the St Petersburg Soviet. Immediately, the Russian people resented his autocratic rule. Authorities arrested, tried him and sent him to Siberia in 1907. Reportedly, the protesters were unarmed, but others claim that some of them had guns and took the first shots at the Imperial Troops. They then retaliated. This incident provoked the first Russian Revolution of 1905. Gapon and Rutenberg fled to Europe where prominent Russian emigrants Georgy Plekhanov, Vladimir Lenin, Peter Kropotkin, and French socialist leaders Jean Jaurès and Georges Clemenceau welcomed them. In the spring of 1905, the British Fabian Society, a group founded on January 4, 1884, to incrementally introduce socialism into society, met in London, with the Bolsheviks, and arranged additional loans for them so they could proceed with their nefarious plans. Many notable people were Fabians, as well as freemasons, including George Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb (pro-Soviet historian), two of the four founders of the London School of Economics (1895). All British prime ministers (like Tony Blair) coming from the Labour Party are members of the Fabian Society. Rothschild financed the London School.

In September 1902, Beatrice and Sidney Webb had formed the Coefficients, which included Herbert George "H. G." Wells, key ideologist, Leopold M. Amery, Richard B. Haldane, Robert Cecil, Edward Grey, Bertrand Russell, Alfred J. Balfour and Alfred Milner, most of whom were freemasons. In 1929, Wells, a spokesman for the international con-

spiracy, wrote the pamphlet, *The Open Conspiracy: Blueprints for a World Revolution*, in which he defined the Masonic objectives, 1) Control of the world's natural resources; 2) reduction of world population through warfare; 3) the destruction of sovereign nations; and 4) imposition of a world dictatorship through the instrumentality of a superior race. Wells maintained that the elite, through control of information, would manipulate people who would willingly, incrementally accept the New World Order, gradually, one precept at a time. The conspiracy operates as a sinister system, existing as a nation within a nation, working to eradicate each nation in order to institute world government. The Fabian philosophy (socialism) spread to other countries—America, India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, Denmark, and Germany. Dean Acheson clerked for Justice Louis D. Brandeis (1919-1921), having been recommended by one of his Harvard professors, Felix Frankfurter. By 1933, Acheson was a Fabian and the Undersecretary of the US Treasury.

He advocated US recognition of the Soviet Union. Joseph Fels, a Fabian and an American-based soap manufacturer, loaned the Bolsheviks a huge amount of money. He also financed the Jewish Territorialist Organization, founded in 1903, by author, activist and freemason, Israel Zangwill and Jewish journalist, Lucien Wolfe. Fels funded it from 1906 to 1912, when he died. Fabians helped finance the Bolsheviks while Jacob H. Schiff financed the Russo-Japanese War, Japan's assault against Russia (and later the Bolshevik Revolution). Trotsky set up the Saint Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, a Menshevik group that organized a strike in more than 200 factories. By October 26, 1905, over two million workers were on strike and they had deactivated rail travel throughout Russia. The strikes provided chaotic pressure from below. Accordingly, people refused to pay taxes and they withdrew their money from the banks. Sergei Witte and Alexis Obolenskii devised the October Manifesto of 1905, a response to the revolution, which they presented to the czar on October 14. It granted basic rights, the development of political parties, universal suffrage, and the continuation of the Duma. The czar, after resisting for three days, ultimately signed it on October 17, 1905, to circumvent another massacre. He lacked the military force to stop further rebellion. The workers in St. Petersburg and in other areas ended their strikes.

The revolutionaries initially ignored the majority of the Russians who then, because of the Jew's actions against the government, waged warfare against the Jews in the form of pogroms, killing as many as 3,000 Jews. Count Vladimir Lamsdorf confirmed the connection between the revolutionaries and foreign Jewish organizations through items that appeared in the press. Arms dealers in Europe transferred goods through England. In June 1905, in England, the Anglo-Jewish Committee began collecting money for the Russian Jews at the same time that Rothschild and his group collected money in France, England, and Germany to aid the pogrom victims in Russia. Jewish bankers in America collected funds for the victims and "for the arming of the Jewish youths." The Bolshevik revolution, January 22, 1905-July 16, 1907, failed miserably despite the financial and ideological support of the bankers and the Fabians. Thereafter, authorities sent Stalin

to Siberia, Lenin fled to Switzerland; Trotsky lived in exile in London, Vienna, Zurich, Paris, and then he ultimately went to New York. He maintained connections to B'nai B'rith, a Masonic order that assisted the revolutionaries. Jacob H. Schiff, of Kuhn, Loeb, managed the communications between B'nai B'rith and the Jewish revolutionaries in Russia. Simon Wolf, the Washington DC representative for the B'nai B'rith during the Civil War, worked with President Theodore Roosevelt to organize Jewish-American backing for the collapse of Russia. In his autobiography, Wolf revealed that he visited with Roosevelt at his estate, Sagamore Hills. They devised an international operation to accuse the czarist regime of anti-Semitism. Roosevelt regularly communicated with Count Sergei Witte, Russia's First Prime Minister, November 6, 1905-May 5, 1906. Witte presided over extensive industrialization within Russia while serving under Czar Nicholas. According to their plan, Wolf accused the Russian regime of defaulting on its pledge to curtail the anti-Jewish pogroms. The B'nai B'rith then managed several American Jewish organizations that sent guns to the insurrectionists.

Count Lamsdorf, a Russian diplomat of German descent, was the Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, during the critical time of the Russo-Japanese War and the revolution. On January 3, 1906, he produced a document called *The Proposed Anti-Semitic Triple Alliance* which detailed the activities of the anarchists in 1905, especially beginning in October following a number of strikes culminating in an armed revolt in Moscow and other cities. He asserts that the revolutionary movement, although there were serious internal issues, had an international character, supported largely from abroad, by Jewish capitalist circles that fund revolutionary movements. Lamsdorf claims that the rebels, hostile to the government, acquired a huge quantity of arms from abroad and considerable financial support to use in organizing various kinds of strikes. This support did not originate from governments but from foreign organizations. Further, an alien racial nature characterizes the revolutionary movement. Jews are the most active in such endeavors, and are more likely to use aggression and revolution, either as individuals, or as leaders, or they create organizations, such as the Jewish Bund, for revolutionary activities. Lamsdorf was certain of the connection between the Russian revolution and the foreign Jewish organizations. Many of the Jews attending the Russian universities accepted the dogma of Ferdinand Lassalle, a member of the Communist League, and Karl Marx. The revolutionary movement was completely under Jewish control, a fact not published in Russian newspapers. However, members of the Jewish Workingmen's Union in Amsterdam and Jewish groups in other countries understood that they controlled the movement in Russia. Essentially, international Jewry supports revolution in all countries.

The Bolsheviks, unsuccessful the first time, would, with sufficient financing, succeed the next time. Lenin and Trotsky met with US industrialists between 1907 and 1910. Rockefeller, Andrew Mellon, Andrew Carnegie and J. Pierpont Morgan founded the American International Corporation and capitalized it with \$50 million for Russia's Bolshevik revolution and the ultimate destruction of the czar's family. Rockefeller, whose banker was Schiff, promoted revolution to further his business interests. Ideology is insignificant. Per

congressional testimony, Rockefeller helped finance the 1905 revolution. State Department records, later destroyed, show that US bankers helped finance the Bolsheviks, including Max Breitung, Benjamin Guggenheim, Kuhn, Loeb and Company whose directors were Schiff, Felix M. Warburg, Otto H. Kahn, Mortimer Schiff and Jerome J. Hanauer. Other contributors include the Lazard Brothers of Paris, the Westphalian-Rhineland Syndicate, and Speyer Brothers of London and others. Warburg was a grandson of Moses M. Warburg, one of the founders of the M. M. Warburg bank (1798) in Hamburg.

The ruling class, concurrently, in different locations, use both Capitalism and Bolshevism as governing structures. In reality, the two do not diametrically oppose each other but are two alternative, ambitious methods of achieving world domination, by subtle, deceptive infiltration, or through violent revolutions, followed by the obliteration of the legitimate governments of one sovereign country after another. The theoretical conflict between them is a misleading, terrible deception, creating enmity among peoples who would otherwise share common aspirations. Capitalism is not the solution for Bolshevism, which is, in reality, a violent, impatient extension of Capitalism.

7.11 British Foreign Policy

In August 1895, a series of articles began in the British weekly *The Saturday Review*, which called for the annihilation of Germany and whose disastrous greed for German plunder still reverberates to the present day. With the Second Reich, a German state came into being which was rapidly creating a modern economy which imperiled the economic predominance of Great Britain. Coal and steel were the two indicators by which national economies were measured prior to the First World War. The production of raw materials in Germany grew by 334% in the quarter-century before the First World War, from 4 million to 17.8 million tons, while the figures for Great Britain rose from 7.7 to 9 million, therefore an increase of 17%. During the same period the mining of coal in Germany increased from 76.2 to 255.8 million tons (240%) but in Britain only 60%, to 240 million tons. Germany's foreign trade was reaching proportions alarming to Great Britain. An investigation by the English Parliament in 1885 noted that the Germans produced more cheaply and their products were geared to the preferences of their buyers. Knowledge of languages, tirelessness and flexibility were considered to be the merits of the German commercial travelers. A trademark law was passed in England as a counter-measure, which prescribed that German products be marked "Made in Germany," yet the British middlemen and consumers nevertheless still often preferred the German goods, on which account the obligatory mark was modified to "Foreign made."

Paul Valery in a British commissioned work from the year 1896: "One learns that the military victories through which this [German] nation established itself are small when compared with the economic triumphs which it has already wrested; already their many markets in the world are more tightly held than the territories which it owes to its army [...]"

one grasps that Germany has turned to industry and trade as it once did to its military: with level-headedness and resolve. One senses that it is omitting no means. If one wishes to explain this new [...] greatness, then one should call to mind: constant hard work, most precise investigation of the sources of wealth and unrelenting manufacturing of the means for producing it; exact topography of the favorable sites and most convenient connecting routes; and above all, perfect obedience, a subordination of all motives under a sort of simple, exclusive, powerful thought - which is strategic in form, economic in purpose, scientific in its profound design and its realm of authority. Thus does the totality of the German enterprises have its impact upon us."

The European upper classes saw their indolent life imperiled by this upswing of the German economy. They were living, according to Max Scheler, in a Paradise: "For our Eastern neighbors there was more dreaming, plotting, feeling, praying, and quiet submission to the yoke of fate, but also the drinking of schnapps, strolling romantically through life, careless and illicit coarse enjoyment [...] For the English, it was easy to buy and sell, according to the old way, accustomed to winning, and in the manner of old grand merchants, proud of the old proven types of goods, without adapting to the needs of customers in the world market [...] it was also, however, to enjoy life in sports, wagering, gaming, country life, traveling, to end the week's work on Friday evening and to go to the sports stadium [...] - but to do all this with a matter-of-fact feeling, grounded in the situation and geography of the island, of having been divinely chosen to be Lord of the Sea [...] not as a member of Europe, but as a power equal to all of Europe, indeed, a power which was a match for the entire world, equal to guiding the nations outside of Europe, of leading them and of being their political arbiter. And the same paradise meant for France: increasing financial wealth with few children, pensions after 20-30 years of work, great colonial empire, time and idle leisure for luxury, intellect, outward appearances, adventures full of sensuality with beautiful women."

The terror which the German power of achievement set loose in these European upper classes, was captured by Max Scheler in the parable: "There [...] appeared on their every horizon [...] the image of a new, strange archangel, the face [...] as severe and iron-like as the old one of the myth, but otherwise quite different [...] He bore the stamp of a plain workman, with good, tough fists, he was a man who labored and kept working, on and on, according to the inner testimonial of his own convictions, not in order to outdo or for the sake of some sort of renown, and not for enjoyment apart from or after the work, nor in order to contemplate and admire the beauty of the world in that spare time following work, but quietly and slowly, immersed in his labor, yet with a terror-exciting steadiness, exactitude and punctuality when seen from the outside, and wholly lost within himself and his task, he worked, worked on and kept working - and this the world was least able to grasp - out of pure joy in boundless work in itself - without goal, without purpose, without end. What will become of us, what shall happen to us - felt the nations [...] How shall we exist, faced by these new masses? Shall we change ourselves, seeking to emulate him? No and again no! We cannot obey this new demand! But we do not

want it and shall not do it;'

In 1895 these upper classes, beginning with Great Britain, formed a War Party against Germany which is still at work today.

"OUR TRUE FOREIGN POLICY(Sir Eyre Crowe, English Conservative Party): The Saturday Review of 24 August 1895: "First of all, we English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and commerce; and our chief rival in trade and commerce to-day is not France but Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the issue might be, we stand to lose heavily. (Sir P. Chalmers Mitchell, Professor of Astronomy and Biology at Oxford and Captain in the British General Staff from 1916 to 1919 and had connections to Crowe) Of European nations, Germany is most alike to England. In racial characters, in religious and scientific thought, in sentiments and aptitudes, the Germans, by their resemblances to the English, are marked out as our natural rivals. In all parts of the earth, in every pursuit, in commerce, in manufacturing, in exploiting other races, the English and the Germans jostle each other. Germany is a growing nation; expanding far beyond her territorial limit, she is bound to secure new foothold or to perish in the attempt. [...] Were every German to be wiped out to-morrow, there is no English trade, no English pursuit that would not immediately expand. Were every Englishman to be wiped out tomorrow, the Germans would gain in proportion. Here is the first great racial struggle of the future: here are two growing nations pressing against each other, man to man all over the world. One or the other has to go; one or the other will go." "First, federate our colonies and prevent geographical isolation turning the Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Germany, as Germania est delenda [Germany must be destroyed]; third, be ready to fight America when the time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting tears against peoples from whom we have nothing; to fear."

The Saturday Review of 11 September 1897(Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister): "ENGLAND AND GERMANY Prince Bismarck has long recognised what at length the people of England are beginning to understand - that in Europe there are two great, irreconcilable, opposing forces, two great nations who would make the whole world their province, and who would levy from it the tribute of commerce. England, with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, compete in every, corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the Southern sea, and in the fair North-West, wherever - and where has it not ? - the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine, to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an

Englishman in the world who would not be the richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession; must they not fight for two hundred million pounds of commerce?

The Saturday Review articles appeared anonymously between 1895 and 1897. But what sort of magazine was this? The German Brockhaus encyclopedia of 1908 mentions it as "imperialist 'magazine' published since 1855 with witty reviews of Engl., Fr. and German literature" In accordance with its importance, it is found in many German libraries, and the annual series from 1855 are partially extant. There is not much that can be said about the readers, but they must surely have come from the educated upper class. A judgment concerning the contributors, among whom can be found many illustrious British names, is more easily made. Many of them published several times, a portion of them on a regular basis. Many of the articles appear anonymously, which gives an even greater weight to the list of names, since it seems to have been customary in England for high-ranking and wealthy persons to have others write for them. But in the period between 24 August 1895 and 11 September 1897, in which this series of articles appeared, there are renowned British names: G. Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Winston S. Churchill, W. B. Yeats, Conan Doyle, Henry M. Stanley, Rudyard Kipling, and Algernon Charles Swinburne. Four of those named received Nobel prizes and one was very influential in the First World War and was the key figure in British politics in the Second World War. Not one of these authors and not any of the readers objected to the proposals in The Saturday Review for the destruction of Germany or dismissed them as insane ideas, not even after these ideas were repeatedly put forward. The global lay-out of the idea of destruction with the biological and historical recourse to Darwin's Theory of Evolution, the analogy of Rome = Great Britain and Carthage = Germany.

In 1892, Edward Grey became parliamentary Under-Secretary under Lord Rosebery, who took over the Foreign Office. In 1895 Rosebery is voted out and Grey loses his office. Grey writes that these years were "very important" for his life. To these experiences clearly belongs also the world-view that England must oppose Germany and turn to France. In his memoirs, couched in a very vague diplomatic language, we read: "In light of after-events, the whole policy of these years from 1896 to 1904 may be criticized as having played into the hands of Germany." "We relied on German support i and we received it; but we never could be sure when some price for that support might not be extracted." The England of Grey wanted to remain the sole master of the world and not share the power with anyone, most certainly not Germany. This is the basic thought, which runs through Grey's memoirs, and his joy when the British policy of 1904 draws closer to France expresses itself effusively in comparison with his otherwise dry text: "The real cause for satisfaction was that the exasperating friction with France was to end, and that the menace of war with France had disappeared.

The gloomy clouds were gone, the sky was clear, and the sun shone warmly. Ill-will, dislike, hate, whether the object of them be a person or a nation, are a perpetual discomfort; they come between us and all that is beautiful and happy; they put out the sun. If the

object be a nation with whom our interests are in contact, they poison the atmosphere of international affairs. This had been so between Great Britain and France. [...] That was all to be changed; it was to become positively pleasant, where we had seen before only what was repellant; to understand and to be understood where before there had been misrepresentation and misconstruction; to have friends instead of enemies - this, when it happens, is one of the great pleasures of life."

Of course, the price for this was "perpetual discomfort," "poison," "misrepresentation," and "misconstruction" in the relationship to Germany, but that did apparently not let anything come between Grey and "all that is beautiful and happy." In Grey's eyes, France was no longer a match for England, whereas Germany was about to outperform England economically. In 1905, Grey took over the Foreign Office and subsequently surrounded himself with the gentlemen from the anti-German circle of the Foreign Office. Crowe, Mallet, Tyrell, and Bertie all reached key positions and collaborated closely with Grey. Carnock is the only one about whom I did not find anything. Bertie had already previously been ambassador in Paris and in future formed one of the pillars of the new British policy. According to Margaret Bovari, the ambassadors of the most important European nations were exchanged under Grey, but the Parisian embassy, with Sir F. Bertie, remained unchanged, and "it emerges from the private letters between him and Grey that close relations and an excellent accord must have prevailed between the two men." From 1905 to 1906, Louis Mallet was Private Secretary to Grey, and from 1906 to 1907, he was Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office. From 1907-1913, he was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and diplomat in Constantinople between 1913 and 1914. Margaret Boveri sees the influence of Mallet upon Grey as having been "considerable" and numbers him "amongst the most zealous advocates of English-Russian friendship. Still more pronounced with him than this tendency is the anti-German attitude." William Tyrell was Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office from 1907 to 1918 and from 1907 to 1915 he was Private Secretary to Edward Grey.

Eyre Crowe finally became Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office in 1906 and was Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1912 to 1920. His role in the British policy toward Germany cannot be overestimated. For Hermann Lutz, expert in the investigatory committee of the Reichstag for the war-guilt question, Eyre Crowe is "the Evil Spirit of the Foreign Office.", and Margaret Boveri confirms this: "Although we [...] must assess his direct influence upon the daily decisions in the Foreign Office as small [because of his relatively low position; due to his German mother he presumably climbed only slowly], his fixed stance was however surely of enormous effect upon the shaping of the atmosphere which prevailed in the Western Department and from which policy was made." It should be briefly remarked - this will be developed later - that from a subordinate position, as expert on Germany, Crowe decisively influenced official policy several times. Edward Grey himself gives Crowe prominent mention in his memoirs: "It has been a great satisfaction since I left office to see great knowledge, ability and unsurpassed devotion to the public service recognized in the promotion of Sir Eyre Crowe

to be head of the Foreign Office." Under Grey, the anti-German circles which were behind the Saturday Review article of 1895, thereby ascended to key positions.

Grey knew portions of the pattern of thinking there and approved indirectly. Thus, Grey recorded a conversation of 28 April 1908 with Clemenceau and considered it to be so important that he included it as one of the few documents in his memoirs. There we read: "M. Clemenceau had some conversation with me at the Foreign Office this morning. He dwelt with great emphasis upon the certainty that we should have to intervene on the continent of Europe against any power which attained a position of domination there, just as we had had to do in the time of Napoleon. He said we ought to be prepared for this. [...] He felt this to be most important. The fate of Napoleon had been decided not at Trafalgar but at Waterloo. And so it would have to be again, in the case of any Power which attempted to dominate the continent." Clemenceau is consciously making use of those modes of thought from the Saturday Review articles in order to drive England into war against Germany, and Grey responds in such a way that not only are these modes of thought familiar to him, but he is also influenced by them. This is also shown by a quotation from Grey, which is found in Margaret Boveri: "The Germans are not clear about the fact that England always has gotten into opposition to or has intentionally proceeded against any power which establishes a hegemony in Europe."

From 1905 onward, the Foreign Office begins systematically to construct a front with Russia and France against Germany. This development is proven on the basis of the public documents from the German side after the lost war. Crowe, but not only he, worked systematically against Germany through numerous papers, but above all through his memorandum of January 1, 1907, in which he claimed that Germany was striving for world rule and wanted to secretly attack England. In a counter-expert opinion, Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1894 to 1906, dismissed the worst distortions in Crowe's memorandum. Grey passed the paper on only to his like-minded comrades; otherwise it went nowhere.

7.12 Woodrow Wilson, a Zionist Puppet

Woodrow Wilson was the son of one of the founders of the Southern Presbyterian Church. Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, an interesting coupling, in their book, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson, a Psychological Study*, claim that Wilson was a "laughed at mama's boy," a sensitive "bundle of nerves." Bullitt (CFR), a Yale graduate, attended the Paris Peace Conference with Wilson where he advocated official recognition for the Bolsheviks. Wilson, while attending Princeton, edited the *Daily Princetonian*, and he was a speaker for the American Whig Society, founded in 1769 by James Madison, William Paterson, and Aaron Burr. After graduation from Princeton (1879), he attended law school at the University of Virginia, and then attended Johns Hopkins University for graduate work in political science and history. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Congressional

Government.

Fabian Socialist, James Ramsay MacDonald, later England's Prime Minister (1924, 1929-1935), visited the United States as early as 1897 with his new wife, Margaret Gladstone, a feminist, social reformer, and daughter of John H. Gladstone. Her substantial inheritance enabled them to enjoy extensive travel. MacDonald felt that the US Constitution was obsolete and needed replacing. Wilson, in his first book, *Congressional Government: a Study in American Politics* (1901), also criticized what he called outdated principles. He promoted a centralized government with increased control over the citizen's lives. MacDonald, Wilson and British-educated Edward M. House (Huis), Wilson's controller shared similar views. Wilson's classmate at Princeton was Cleveland H. Dodge, whose father, William E. Dodge, Jr., a wealthy industrialist, helped organize the YMCA in America. Cleveland H. Dodge succeeded his father as its national president. Dodge became a director at National City Bank, and a trustee of Princeton. He flattered Wilson by telling him that many Wall Street bankers viewed him as good presidential material. In 1890, to enhance his credibility for the potentiality of high public office, Dodge and his mother donated heavily to Princeton, apparently with the understanding that Wilson would secure a professorship there. Thereafter, Dodge and the other trustees selected Wilson as president of Princeton, a very coveted position. Wilson, after his selection, invited J. Pierpont Morgan, George W. Harvey, Walter H. Page, Grover Cleveland, Cyrus H. McCormick Jr., Thomas B. Reed, Speaker of the House, Samuel Clemens and others to his celebratory luncheon, on October 25, 1902. Dodge and Moses T. Pyne, a Princeton trustee and the director of four banks subsidized Wilson with \$5,000 a year during his tenure at Princeton.

Wilson publicly endorsed Morgan following the banker-orchestrated crash of 1907. He said, "All this trouble could be averted if we appointed a committee of six or seven public-spirited men like J. P. Morgan to handle the affairs of our country." Rockefeller, Cleveland H. Dodge, J. Ogden Armour, James A. Stillman, George F. Baker, Jacob H. Schiff, Bernard Baruch, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., and Adolph S. Ochs, publisher of *The New York Times*, also supported Wilson. After years of financially manipulating campaigns and elections in Texas, Edward M. House decided to exercise his skills nationally. In 1910, to prepare for World War I, he began "to look about for a proper candidate for the Democratic nomination for President." Morgan cronies had encouraged Wilson to enter politics. With the financial support of Rockefeller, Schiff, Baruch, and others, he won the governorship of New Jersey.

In the spring of 1912, Wilson spent the weekend at Beechwood, Frank A. Vanderlip's estate in Scarborough, on the Hudson River, along with William Rockefeller and others. Vanderlip and Rockefeller, in Wilson's presence, elaborated on the role of American capital in the world. Cyrus H. McCormick Jr., another former Princeton classmate, was then president of McCormick Harvesting Machine Company. He donated \$12,500 to Wilson's campaign through Dodge. Wilson returned it, a ploy to convince people that big corporations could not influence him. With encouragement from the bankers,

Wilson ran for president in 1912. President William Howard Taft, though popular and usually acquiescent to the banker's plans, opposed the Aldrich Plan. They were anxious to maneuver him out of the White House. Harvey continued to extol Wilson's virtues during his gubernatorial term. People knew that Harvey was a Morgan agent so Wilson asked him to limit his editorial praises as it might jeopardize his presidential chances. Therefore, Harvey acted disenchanted with Wilson, and even supported the opposition at the 1912 Convention while Wilson pretended to oppose the bankers.

To split the Republican vote, the bankers persuaded Theodore Roosevelt to run on his new Bull Moose Party, in order to put Wilson, a Democrat, into the White House. Newspaper publisher Frank A. Munsey and George W. Perkins funded Roosevelt and Taft. Perkins was the vice-president of New York Life Insurance Company and the Morgan partner who negotiated the creation of International Harvester, International Mercantile Marine Company, the Northern Securities Company and the restructuring of Carnegie's steel operation. He sat on the board of Carnegie's company. Paul M. Warburg, a Republican, contributed substantial funds to Wilson's campaign while his brother contributed to Taft's campaign. The third party candidate assured Wilson's triumph in the Electoral College. He took 41.8 percent of the popular vote and won 435 electoral votes from forty states. Wilson, exhibiting a characteristic psychopathic grandiose sense of self-worth, told his campaign manager, "... God ordained that I should be the next president of the United States." Two-thirds of his financial support came from only seven people—all affiliated with Wall Street. Dodge, McCormick, Morgenthau, Abram I. Elkus, Frederick C. Penfield, William F. McCombs, and Charles R. Crane promoted him as a "man of peace." Like most politicians, he concealed his affiliation with the banking cabal. He would appoint both Morgenthau and Elkus as Ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire, recently targeted by the Young Turks (cryptic Jews).

Colonel House, never legitimately employed, used his inheritance to influence Texas politics. He helped elect five governors (1893-1911). In 1911 he supported Wilson for president and maneuvered the very decisive Texas delegation which ensured Wilson's nomination. House's long-term scheme all but guaranteed the presidential victories (1912, 1916), as well as the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944) and Harry S. Truman (1948). Most of the Jews in America were from Germany and were adamantly opposed to Zionism. However, by 1910, one million out of less than 15,000,000 worldwide, new Zionist Jews had arrived from Russia. They soon became an important group of voters. Rabbi Wise remarked, after the election, "We received warm and heartening help from Colonel House; close friend of the president ... House not only made our cause the object of his very special concern but served as liaison officer between the Wilson administration and the Zionist movement." During a thirty-day period, House wrote a novel in New Haven, the site of Yale University. The novel, from which Wilson developed his program, 1115 Philip Dru: Administrator, a title that might refer to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which state, "The Administrators whom we shall choose . . ." His book, published anonymously (1912), elaborated on plans for America's

overthrow by establishing “socialism as dreamed by Karl Marx.” House wrote, “. . . (It) cannot be entirely brought about by a comprehensive system of state ownership and by the leveling of wealth . . . (but not) without a spiritual leavening.”

In August 1912, during the presidential campaign, Louis D. Brandeis and Wilson first met for a private three-hour conference in New Jersey to discuss economic issues. Afterwards, Brandeis supported Wilson and urged his friends to do likewise and Wilson began using Brandeis' term “regulated competition.” The bankers installed House as Wilson's mentor when he entered the White House on March 4, 1913. The Schiffs, Warburgs, Kahns, Rockefellers and Morgans had complete confidence in House's abilities to properly manage Wilson. While the bankers sought the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, they pretended to oppose it to keep the public from suspecting that they were actually behind it. In addition to House, others greatly influenced Wilson-Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Walter Lippmann, Bernard Baruch, Sydney Hillman, and Florence Kelley. 1121 Allegedly, Brandeis was instrumental in developing the Federal Reserve Act and he decisively argued to break the deadlock on the issue. He convinced the Wilson administration to devise proposals for further legislation that would allow the Justice Department the authority to enforce antitrust laws. He helped create the Federal Trade Commission and was Wilson's Key economic adviser (1912-1916).

Two days after Wilson took office, William G. McAdoo (Pilgrims Society), a lawyer and businessman became Treasury Secretary. J. Pierpont Morgan and his associates previously befriended and helped McAdoo resolve his difficult financial problem, for which he was very grateful. 1122 Thereafter, they appointed him as the President of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad Company, now known as the Port Authority Trans-Hudson. The bankers introduced him to Wilson in 1910 and McAdoo later worked on his campaign. McAdoo married Wilson's daughter, Eleanor R. Wilson at the White House on May 7, 1914. He was the first chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and was part of the Morgan cabal for the rest of his financial and political career. Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act on December 23, 1913. On July 28, 1914, after assassins killed Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo, the warmongers, now that the United States had a central bank with money to loan, began the Great War. On that same day, The Wall Street Journal reported the exportation of \$14,750,000 in gold, mainly to London. It was a new record for “a single day's consignment.” Three other ships left at about the same time carrying \$25,450,000 in gold, the German ship Kronprinzessin Cecilie going to Bremen, the Carmania heading for Liverpool, and the steamship La Savoie headed for Le Havre.

The Austrian Ultimatum of July 23, 1914, to Serbia triggered this huge exportation, of gold in less than a week. Guaranty Trust Company sent \$10 million; National City Bank sent \$6.5 million; Lazard Frères sent \$2.5 million; and Goldman Sachs sent \$1.75. Skull and Bones members headed Guaranty Trust Company almost entirely. This same firm financially supported the Bolsheviks. 1129 The total sum exported out of New York, July 23, 1914 to July 29, 1914, was \$27,850,000 (Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1914). The

Treasury regularly provided monthly data on all gold exports and imports in its yearly reports. They show that from the beginning of 1900 to the end of 1913, the United States exported an average of \$5,338,784 in gold each month, with a standard deviation of \$6,556,493. The United States, a debtor nation, now with a central bank and a system of national loans, ultimately gave the Allies \$25 billion dollars. Actually, one cannot call it a loan, as they never repaid it. However, the New York bankers collected interest on it which was the whole point. Despite the fact that almost half of all US citizens were of German descent, because of official propaganda targeting Germany, US citizens would soon begin fighting Germans. In October 1915, J. P. Morgan issued a \$500 million bond for Britain and France. This joint Anglo-French loan was very suitable for the US population in denominations of \$100, \$500, and \$1,000 and put the United States into the position of an international moneylender, mostly to foreign countries. Between January 1, 1915 and April 5, 1917, New York bankers issued \$2.6 billion. The United States also joined Britain in accepting gold as the standard.

Wilson's worldviews included four main components, 1) the League of Nations as a global forum for the settlement of territorial disputes through arbitration, along with the power of enforcement; 2) free global trade, as later elucidated in his Fourteen Points, "equality of trade" and "removal ... of all economic barriers." Wilson, a friend to big corporations wanted an absence of war, and market expansion for US industries through a binding global treaty; 3) a regional integration of both political and economic levels, as noted in his "Pan-American Pact" proposal of 1914-15, a welding of North and South America together as a union. Both House and Wilson viewed the Pan-American Pact as a model for the political organization of Europe; 4) the US should assume global leadership to enforce peace and justice throughout the world. There was not a hint of any of these concepts in Wilson's campaign rhetoric. Like other politicians, he had promised to oppose imperialism and warfare. His indiscretions, useful knowledge for blackmail, his complicity in the establishment of the Federal Reserve, and his disdain for the Constitution, and the fact that the bankers, through Edward M. House, managed his perceptions, led to the bloodshed of World War I. The public elected him through the machinations of Roosevelt's third party charade and through the maneuverings of the international bankers.

The US also had further involvement with World War 1. The pressure to involve the American government started in 1909, long before the actual assassination of the Archduke. Norman Dodd, former director of the Committee to Investigate Tax Exempt Foundations of the U.S. House of Representatives, testified that the Committee was invited to study the minutes of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as part of the Committee's investigation. The Committee stated: "The trustees of the Foundation brought up a single question. If it is desirable to alter the life of an entire people, is there any means more efficient than war.... They discussed this question... for a year and came up with an answer: There are no known means more efficient than war, assuming the objective is altering the life of an entire people. That leads them to a question: How do we involve

the United States in a war. This is in 1909.”

So the decision was made to involve the United States in a war so that the “life of the entire people could be altered.” This was the conclusion of a foundation supposedly committed to “peace.” The method by which the United States was drawn into the war started on October 25, 1911, when Winston Churchill was appointed the First Lord of the Admiralty in England. Winston Churchill is an interesting individual, as he later came to the conclusion that there was indeed a master conspiracy at work in the major events of the world, when he wrote the following in 1920: “From the days of Spartacus—Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, to those of Trotsky (Russia)... this world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization... has been steadily growing.” The second key appointment made during the pre-war period was the appointment of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy by President Woodrow Wilson.

Roosevelt is also on record as concluding that there was a conspiracy, at least in the United States. He once wrote to Colonel Edward Mandell House: “The real truth of the matter is, as you and I know, that a financial element in the larger centers has owned the government ever since the days of Andrew Jackson, and I am not wholly excepting the administration of W.W. (Woodrow Wilson.) The country is going through a repetition of Jackson’s fight with the Bank of the United States—only on a far bigger and broader basis.”

7.13 Assassination in Sarajevo

Mihailo Obrenović, the Prince of Serbia (1860-1868), supported the concept of a Balkan federation against the Ottoman Empire. On June 10 1868, assassins, probably the Karađorđevićs shot and killed him. Milan Obrenović succeeded him as the Prince of Serbia. In 1876, Obrenović declared war on Turkey and unified with Bosnia. The delegates of the Congress of Berlin, with the Treaty of Berlin, formally recognized Serbia’s independence but prohibited it from uniting with Bosnia and Raška and placed them under Austro-Hungarian occupation. In June 1881, Obrenović signed a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary, vowing that Serbia would not act against the interests of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and would not make political agreements with other countries. In 1882, Serbia became a kingdom, Obrenović declared himself king. Meanwhile bankers in London and Paris were worried that, with the Ottoman Empire’s diminishing power, Russia would expand to the south. By 1878, Britain and France had already targeted Egypt and Palestine for colonization.

In the 1880s and 1890s, Germany and Austria-Hungary allied with Russia, Serbia, and Italy. By the early 1900s, Russia and Serbia had issues as the Young Turks had enacted reforms that would weaken Austrian positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On October 6, 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Serbia and Russia opposed. German support for Austria-Hungary, and financial aid to Constantinople from

Vienna convinced Russia, Serbia, and the Ottoman Empire to consent to the annexation, and resolve the crisis in Bosnia by amending the Treaty of Berlin of April 1809. After the Bosnian Crisis, Vienna's pro-war party viewed a war with Serbia as unavoidable and pushed for a preventative war. House, representing President Woodrow Wilson, arrived in Europe in January 1914, where he remained until the end of July. In mid-June, he had what he considered a very pleasant visit with Kaiser Wilhelm II, in Potsdam, the residence of the Prussian kings until 1918. Based on claims from certain entities in Europe, he believed that the German leader threatened Europe's peace, but he soon discovered that the Kaiser had no intentions of starting a war. In fact, he was the only European politician who was open to mediation. Leaders in Paris and London did not want to discuss peace but were primed to go to war.

By June 1914, Germany and England had settled their differences regarding Mesopotamia, and the Baghdad Railroad. The two countries were getting along better than they had in the previous eighteen years. This Anglo-German alliance would likely prevent Britain from joining France and Russia, if they decided to go to war. Germany and England had no reason to fight each other. Wilhelm did everything he could to prevent war and for his efforts, the victors ultimately made him the scapegoat, and accused him of the crimes that they had committed. Winston Churchill, always looking for a battle, waited for the right justification, even if he had to maneuver the circumstances. He did not wait long as the conspirators had a plan, followed by huge reparations—the Treaty of Versailles and the sequel, a second world revolution. Upon receiving orders from Paris telling him to be ready for a full-scale war, the future French Marshal, Hubert Lyautey, said, "They are completely insane; a war between Europeans is a civil war. It is the most colossal folly the civilized world has ever committed!"

Franz Ferdinand was the oldest son of Archduke Karl Ludwig of Austria, the younger brother of Maximilian and Franz Joseph. If he came to power, he planned to drastically revise the constitution of the whole Hapsburg Empire by creating a "United States of Austria," and federalizing the government. He believed in giving autonomy to ethnic groups within the Empire and advocated listening to their grievances, particularly the Czechs in Bohemia and the Slavic peoples in Croatia and Bosnia. If he controlled the Hapsburg Empire, he would remove the Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza (1875-1890), who was married to a Jewess, Ilona Degenfeld-Schomburg, and who, through his decisions, accommodated the Jews. Franz Ferdinand would alter the election laws that allowed Tisza, part of the landed gentry, and his base to maintain power. The masses attributed the national misery to his policies which triggered widespread anti-Semitism. Franz would allow equal rights and permit agricultural workers, the non-property owners to vote. This would allow the 3,000,000 Croats within the Hungarian borders to have a voice against their oppressors. Officials did not invite Croat delegates to the Austro-Hungarian compromise of March 30, 1867, which reestablished the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hungary and separated it from the Austrian Empire. After 1867, Tisza formed a coalition of the nobility, business interests, and small landowners into the new

Liberal Party. István Tisza, Kalman's son was Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hungary (1903-1905). In 1895, in Prague, Ferdinand met the former Countess Sophie Chotek from an old Czech family. Her family failed to meet the eligibility standards for marrying into one of the reigning European families. Despite this, and amid family pressure, they married on July 1, 1900. Emperor Franz Joseph reluctantly agreed to the marriage but compelled his nephew to renounce all possibilities to the Hapsburg throne, for himself, his wife, and their future children.

Archduke Ferdinand, while reserving the right of succession to the throne, despite his marriage, systematically increased Austria's power, while eliminating German influence. State officials within the German districts gradually promoted the integration of languages. The Czechs, traditionally hostile to the Germans, viewed Vienna as "their" biggest city. Because of the Archduke's marriage, the royal family favored the Czech language. Evidently, the Archduke was determined to institute a Catholic Slav State in Central Europe to function as a fortification against Orthodox Russia. During other times in Habsburg history, officials exploited religion to attain political objectives, a disastrous policy to German interests. Ultimately, this proved a detriment to the House of Habsburg, which lost the throne, and to the Catholic Church, which lost the state. The monarchy's mingling of religion and politics, to quench Germanism, instead, ignited the Pan-German Movement in Austria.

In 1912, leading freemasons met in Switzerland, a neutral country where people devise international schemes. They purportedly decided to assassinate Ferdinand in order to initiate worldwide warfare. Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, Duchess Sophie, arrived in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 to observe military maneuvers in his official capacity as commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian army. The couple's car, part of a four-car procession, was traveling on the quay alongside the Miljacka River toward town hall, their first destination. Hardly had they begun, when a terrorist threw a bomb at the archduke. It bounced off the back of the car and exploded under the vehicle behind them, injuring two officers. The alarmed couple continued traveling to the town hall. Upon their arrival, the archduke indignantly reprimanded the mayor. Then the motorcade left to visit the hospital where one of the wounded officers was receiving medical attention. The mayor then joined the procession sitting in the lead car. The driver turned on the wrong street and the driver of the archduke's car followed him. General Oskar Potiorek, the military governor of Bosnia, corrected the driver who backed up to return to the correct route. When the driver stopped, Gavrilo Princip, a 19-year-old Serbian, took careful aim, and fired two shots into the open car, a Graef and Stift luxury automobile. One bullet hit Ferdinand in the neck, while the other bullet struck Sophie in the stomach. She immediately collapsed against her husband, he whispered, "Sophie, live for our children." They both died within a few moments on June 28, 1914.

Allegedly, the assassination was retaliation for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, which the Serbs had already claimed. Sarajevo, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a quiet Balkan town in Bosnia,

previously the seat of a province of the Ottoman Empire. There were mosques rising above the meandering streets of the marketplace. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had administered the area since 1878. Nedjelko Cabrinovic, a freemason, and Trifko Grabež, militants associated with the Pan Serbian Black Hand threw the initial bomb that failed to explode under the vehicle transporting the royal couple. The notes taken during the military trial of the assassins seem to corroborate freemasonry involvement. On October 12, 1914, Cabrinovic, of the Narodna Odbrana, part of the Young Bosnia faction, admitted that freemasons, Major Vojislav Tankosic and Milan Ciganovic, had influenced his decision to participate. He said that freemasonry tenets permitted people to kill. He said, "Ciganovic told me that the freemasons had condemned the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to death more than a year before." Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence, Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, from Belgrade, directed Princip and the other assassins, all members of the Black Hand Society, and all of whom, were under twenty. This terrorist brotherhood, created by army officers, used a skull and bones insignia and had a constitution. Dimitrijević, a leader of the Black Hand, had sent the three men to kill the Archduke and his wife, furnishing the culprits with a revolver, two bombs and sufficient cyanide to commit suicide afterwards, to prevent them from revealing the identity of the organizers. All three men suffered from terminal tuberculosis.

On July 5, 1914, Wilhelm II received a letter from Emperor Franz Josef explaining Austria's objections against Serbia, the southern Slavic state. Franz Josef feared that Serbia's actions would destroy the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, which might also affect the German Empire. Franz Josef, through his letter to a man he had a friendly relationship with, was assessing Wilhelm's attitude about the murders. According to Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes, their "dynastic fortunes" were also "closely linked." The Kaiser quickly met with his advisors and wrote back on the same day, "Austria may judge what is to be done to clear up her relation to Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can with certainty upon it that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and a friend." Kaiser Wilhelm thought it inconceivable that the assassination would lead to a European war. He thought that the czar was unprepared for a war, and would not oppose "the proper punishment of Serbia." He also believed that England would remain neutral. On July 9, 1914, Colonel House wrote a "brush-off" letter to the Kaiser. His last sentence read, "I left Germany happy at the thought that Your Majesty would use its high influence in favor of peace." Wilson, in a letter was "elated" by House's success with the Kaiser in Germany. On July 31, 1914, House wrote to Wilson, before returning home. He said, "If my project could have been advanced further Germany could have exerted pressure on Austria and the cause of peace might have been safe." Had they followed his proposals, they could have negotiated before the murders in Sarajevo. The Kaiser, in his post-war exile said, "House's visit in Berlin during the spring of 1914 almost prevented the war."

German and Austria-Hungarian citizens viewed the assassination as a local police matter that they could settle peacefully, without diplomatic clashes. However, the politicians had other ideas. They made unreasonable demands, flung accusations, and told incendiary

lies. Serbian politicians failed to meet the demands, known as the July Ultimatum, so Austria-Hungarian politicians declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, on the grounds that it had a role in the assassinations. Russia declared war on Germany on July 29, 1914. Max M. Warburg, Albert Ballin, Arthur Zimmermann, and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg advised Kaiser Wilhelm to support Austria-Hungary by declaring war on Russia, which he did on August 1, 1914. Britain entered the war on August 4, 1914 theoretically to protect Belgian neutrality. Austria-Hungarian politicians declared war against Russia on August 6, 1914. Citizens never declare war; they just fight and die in them!

By the fall of 1914, US business interests recognized that they could gain windfall profits from the European war. President Wilson said the United States would “remain neutral in fact as well as in name.” However, now that the United States had the Federal Reserve, he loaned \$500 million to the Triple Entente in October 1914. US bankers eventually loaned the Triple Entente \$2.3 billion. Loans originating in the United States to the Triple Alliance totaled \$27 million. On April 15, 1915, Sir Gilbert Parker, a Member of Parliament, addressed the Pilgrims Society of London. He confidently assured them that the United States would enter the war on Britain's side.

Colonel House, for eight years, was the power behind Wilson and was the key figure between 1914 and 1918. In the Intimate Papers of Colonel House, he wrote, “There were few citizens of the United States who could claim any knowledge of European affairs of state or who had any interests in them.” House would deliver two million young men and billions of dollars to the Allies. Wilson was indifferent to and had absolutely no experience or interest in European problems. The Allies lusted for war and refused to negotiate, despite the deaths it would cause. House, whose loyalties were always with those who controlled Britain, knew exactly who had started the war. On April 15, 1915, he wrote, “I never commit myself. But here I can say what I think; I do not believe the Kaiser wanted the war.” The so-called “Great War” was the first global war. Although it began in Europe, it quickly spread throughout the world. The hostilities ensnared several countries within a month while others joined during the next four years. Honduras declared war against Germany on July 19, 1918 and Romania entered the war, for the second time, on November 10, 1918.

More details about the events leading up to World War I in the following chapters.

7.14 The Archduke Franz Ferdinand

Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who became Heir-Presumptive to the Austrian throne after the death of his father, Karl Ludwig, in 1896, has remained, both living and dead, one of the most enigmatic of political personages. Even Austrians themselves held the most contradictory views as to the supposed purposes and influence of this sphinx. By many he was regarded as the chief of the Austrian militarists, eager for a “preventive war”

against Italy or Serbia. Others, however, believed that he had little active influence on Austrian policy. Still others even thought the Heir to the Throne was almost a pacifist. There was the same wide divergence of opinion as to his views on domestic politics. He was commonly believed to hate the Magyars and to favor the Serbs. He was credited with having in mind a regeneration of the Monarchy by giving to the Slavic nationalities an equal political recognition with that enjoyed by the Germans in Austria and by the Magyars in Hungary, that is, he was thought to favor a federalistic "triple" organization of the Monarchy known as "Trialism" in place of the existing "Dualism." By fanatical Serbs, however, he was blindly hated as being a powerful and determined enemy and oppressor, as a man who might well be assassinated in the interests of a Greater Serbia. In fact at the trial of the Sarajevo assassins in October, 1914, Chabrinovitch, who threw the bomb, frankly declared, "The Heir-Presumptive was a man of action, I knew that at the Ballplatz there existed a clique, the so-called war-party, which wanted to conquer Serbia.

At its head stood the Heir-Presumptive. I believed that I should take vengeance on them all in taking vengeance on him." And Princip, who fired the fatal shots, defiantly asserted, "I am not at all sorry that I cleared an obstacle out of our path. He was a German and an enemy of the South Slavs." 1 By Russians likewise he was regarded as an enemy, of whom the Tsar was fortunately rid by the crime of Sarajevo. "Not only in the press, but also in society, one meets almost nothing but unfriendly judgments concerning the murdered Archduke, with the suggestion that Russia has lost in him an embittered enemy," reported the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The German Kaiser, on the other hand, in one of those marginal notes which unrestrainedly expressed his inmost thoughts and first impressions, wrote in comment on this report, "The Archduke was Russia's best friend. He wanted to revive the League of the Three Emperors."

Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este, born on December 18, 1863, was the eldest son of Karl Ludwig, brother of Emperor Francis Joseph. His consumptive mother, a daughter of the late Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II, died while he was a child, but he was affectionately cared for by a Portuguese stepmother. In his youth he had not been seriously thought of as a possible successor to the throne, until the tragic death of Crown Prince Rudolph at Meyerling in 1889 left Francis Joseph without a direct male heir. Franz Ferdinand had not therefore at first been given any special training in politics, but, like Austrian Archdukes generally, had been placed in the army for a military career.

Since the Archduke had a family to provide for, he spent a considerable part of each year on his estate at Konopischt, where he established a model farm, which, like Wallenstein, he managed very profitably. This determination to live may actually have contributed toward the more vigorous health which he enjoyed in his last years. But he never outgrew his tendency toward aloofness from society and from the public. He had, in fact, very few intimate friends. He did not try to make them. But the few friends whom he did admit to his intimacy, who saw him sitting on the floor playing with his children, like his secretaries or like Emperor William, were affectionately devoted to him.

Franz Ferdinand and the Army

Franz Ferdinand's chief interests in life, aside from his hobbies as a hunter and collector and gentleman farmer, were the army, the navy and his wife and children. In 1906, with the appointment of Major Brosch as his personal adjutant, the Archduke began to exercise a more direct influence on the army. Brosch was an extremely intelligent and able officer, anxious to increase his own influence and also that of the Archduke in military matters. After long opposition he was able to bring it about that the Archduke was given a military chancery (*Militarkanzlei*) of his own, similar to that of the Emperor. Henceforth all the important military documents, as well as the reports of the military attaches, were made out in duplicate so that Franz Ferdinand received a copy at the same moment that the Emperor received his, and the nephew was kept as fully informed as his uncle. In fact he soon came to take a more active part in military reforms and reorganization than the Emperor himself.

Franz Ferdinand regarded the Austro-Hungarian army as a potentially important unifying political instrument for counteracting the disintegrating elements in the Dual Monarchy, as well as for defending it in case of foreign war. He wanted one language of command—German—to be the tongue of at least all the officers, though those who commanded non-German regiments should also be masters of the tongue spoken by the rank and file under their command. It was one of his main aims in life to strengthen and increase the army. It was this aim that lay at the bottom of his hatred of the Magyar politicians who refused to vote the military credits asked for, and who insisted that Magyar should be the language of command in the Hungarian half of the army.

The most important step in Franz Ferdinand's energetic efforts for improvement of the army was his insistence in 1906 upon the appointment of a new Chief-of-Staff. Beck, the officer who held this position at the time, was generally recognized by experts as totally unfit for the place. He was a shrivelled-up old man belonging to the same generation as the aged Emperor. His days of usefulness were long outlived, and yet the kindly heart of Francis Joseph had hated to dismiss him. "One might see him any day going for a walk in Vienna, looking like a good-natured little monkey, a living picture of military inefficiency." Beck was, however, an honest and upright officer and a thoroughly likable, easy-going personality, and enjoyed a certain popularity. He and the corps of officers whom he had carefully selected represented the chivalry, the dignity, and the *esprit de corps* of the best old Vienna society. They were regarded by Francis Joseph as one of the main supports of his ancestral throne. "Efficiency" had not been born to disturb their quiet routine; their ideal was "the development of Austria's defensive force gradually along the line of natural evolution."

Conrad's appointment as Chief-of-Staff, urged by the Heir to the Throne and acquiesced in by the Emperor, never, however, really commended itself to Francis Joseph. The aged Monarch, who had taken the greatest pride in the old army at whose head he had fought so many years, now found himself importuned by Conrad to make sweeping changes

and reforms. With impulsive self-confidence Conrad urged that the army maneuvers be speeded up to approximate war conditions as closely as possible, and that an early opportunity be seized for "preventive wars" against Italy and Serbia. At Christmas, 1906, scarcely a month after Conrad's appointment, the old Emperor remarked ruefully: "Conrad is a restless organizer! He is lacking in experience; one sees this from everything he puts his hand to! And moreover his hand does not look to me like a lucky one!" The Emperor's distrust of the new regime tended, as years went on, to estrange him from the army with which he had grown up. It was one of the things which added loneliness and sadness to the last years of the loneliest and saddest of the Hapsburgs. Conrad's policy of conducting the great annual maneuvers, "under conditions like actual war" without carefully prepared plans, with the aim of developing initiative and self-reliance among his officers, often had the most distressing results. All emphasis was placed on a hasty offensive; the soldiers were totally exhausted by the forced marches; they often arrived at the objective completely worn out and in greatest confusion, too tired and hungry to have ears and eyes for anything, even for their King and Emperor.

The fact that it was Franz Ferdinand who selected Conrad, secured his appointment, and remained intimately associated with him, was one of the reasons for the lack of cordiality between the Emperor and the Heir to the Throne. It was also one of the reasons that it was commonly believed, especially among Austria's enemies, that Franz Ferdinand held the same militaristic views which Conrad so freely proclaimed in memorials, interviews and coffeehouses. It is true that the Heir remained Conrad's staunchest supporter, except for occasional bursts of irritation, in spite of all the criticism and jealous opposition directed against the new Chief-of-Staff. When Conrad was forced to resign in November, 1911, because of his conflicts with Aehrenthal and Schonaich on foreign and military matters, it was Franz Ferdinand who secured his re-appointment the following year.

In conversation with Conrad, "the Archduke emphasized that their guiding star must be cooperation between Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, primarily out of regard for monarchical interests, and added, 'Possibly it may come to some action against Serbia, merely to chastise her, but under no conditions must a square kilometer be annexed! . . . War with Russia must be avoided, because France is stirring it up, **especially the French Freemasons and anti-monarchists, who want to bring about a revolution by which monarchs will be cast down from their thrones.**' He called attention to a letter of the German Emperor which represented the same views; hence his determination: 'No war!'"¹⁸ One sees that both the Archduke and the German Emperor were altogether opposed to war with Russia and inclined toward the old policy of the League of the Three Emperors for protection against France and the safeguarding of monarchical interests.

Toward Italy Franz Ferdinand always had a strong antipathy and deep distrust, based partly on political hatred for the country which had seized his family lands in Modena and Este, partly from bigoted religious dislike for the state which had dispossessed the Pope and seemed to be ruled by Freemasons and anti-clericals, and partly on a shrewd

suspicion of the duplicity of Italian diplomacy. Nevertheless, he refused to support Conrad in his repeated efforts to let loose a preventive war against Italy in 1907 and again in 1911, when Italy was involved in war with Turkey.

Franz Ferdinand and the Navy

There was another subject on which Franz Ferdinand and Conrad did not see eye to eye. This was the Austrian navy. At the close of the nineteenth century the Austrian navy was almost negligible. It was Franz Ferdinand who, by his great energy and interest, virtually created the new navy, hoping it would be a counterweight to that of Italy in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. Before his day the view had prevailed that Austrian interests were purely continental; that any conflict with a foreign power would ultimately be decided by land armies; that the army therefore was the branch on which money should be spent, not the navy; a navy was merely a luxury. The Dual Monarchy, it had been thought, did not possess sufficient resources to maintain a proper army and at the same time to create a navy which could ever face that of Italy, to say nothing of opposing the great naval forces of France and England in the Mediterranean. Conrad adhered to this older way of thinking. With his endemic suspicion of Italy, he naturally would have been glad to see the Austrian navy developed, but only if this could be done without detriment to the interests of the army. When, therefore, the legislatures drew the purse strings tight, and one was faced with the alternative of choosing between the absolutely necessary demands of the army, as he saw them, and the laudable desire of creating a navy, he used all his influence in favor of the former. With equal jealousy he opposed recruiting for the navy at the expense of the army.

Emperor Francis Joseph had still less understanding for, or interest in, the navy. In his last years he did, to be sure, visit the ship-yards and witness naval evolutions, but he did it in a perfunctory way, merely to do his duty as a sovereign. He would stand on the bridge by the hour, almost never taking the marine glasses from his eyes. He gave an appearance of following the evolutions with intelligent interest. But it was remarked by those close to him that he never asked an intelligent question on naval matters, never showed any enthusiasm for the fleet, and never wore the naval uniform; in fact, he never even possessed one, though he had a large and very expensive wardrobe of military uniforms. The mighty battleship of the twentieth century, with its complicated mechanism of steel, steam and electricity, was a thing strange and new to him. He and Bismarck belonged to the older generation who felt at home in a general's uniform and knew what armies were good for. Emperor William and Franz Ferdinand were of the new age, who believed that "the future lies on the water." Interest in naval matters was in fact one of the common bonds which tended to draw the German Emperor and the Austrian Heir together. In spite of this opposition, or lack of enthusiasm, from Conrad and the Emperor, Franz Ferdinand had succeeded by 1914 in raising the Austrian navy to a respectable size; though scarcely half as strong as that of Italy, it gave a good account

of itself during the War and showed that the spirit of Admiral Tegetthoff was not dead.

Franz Ferdinand's Political Views

In his views on foreign affairs Franz Ferdinand was at one with his uncle in regarding the Dual Alliance with Germany as the corner stone of Austrian policy. This conviction was strengthened by his strong personal regard for William II, whose great tact in the matter of the Archduke's wife had won his heart. With Rumania Franz Ferdinand sought to strengthen the ties of loyalty and alliance. He and his wife were charmed with the visit they paid to King Carol and Carmen Sylva in July, 1909. They adored the simplicity of life of the Rumanian royal family at their summer castle at Sinaia, which was so different from the stiff ceremonial and stifling court atmosphere at Vienna. His heart was touched at the genuineness and friendliness with which the Queen of Rumania entertained his Countess, took her to ride, and served her tea at a rustic farm house. He long remembered it as one of the happiest visits of his life. Italy, however, the Archduke regarded with deep distrust, but not to the point of thinking it wise to unmask her suspected disloyalty to the Triple Alliance by a preventive war. On the contrary, he wanted to remain at peace with Italy and maintain as firm relations as possible with her.

With Russia Franz Ferdinand wanted to be on terms of friendly understanding. Autocratic himself by nature, he had admired the autocratic government of Russia before the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905 had begun to shake the Tsar's throne. But later he was disillusioned as to Nicholas II's stability. This may have been one of the reasons he sought more close personal relations with Emperor William and King Carol. The French he frankly disliked. He never forgot the humiliation imposed upon Austria by Napoleon I, and he regarded Napoleon III as responsible for Austria's downfall in the nineteenth century. Great Britain, on the other hand, he held in respect, and there had even been rumors at one time that he might marry Princess Mary. Such are the views on foreign affairs ascribed to Franz Ferdinand by men who knew him well. There is no reason to doubt their substantial accuracy.

Of Franz Ferdinand's views on the internal nationality problems of the Hapsburg Empire it is less possible to speak with certainty. It was the conviction of those who stood close to him, like Major Brosch,²⁰ and his private-secretary, Nikitsch-Boulles,²⁷ that if the Archduke had come to the Throne, he would have come to the rescue of the oppressed nationalities and attempted a federal organization of the Monarchy, substituting "Trianism" for the existing "Dualism." This was also the commonly expressed opinion in the Austrian and German obituary notices of the Archduke.

Though in many respects conservative, as one might expect from his Roman Catholic traditions, there is no doubt that Franz Ferdinand possessed qualities of character which indicate that he was quite the kind of man to undertake a reorganization of the Monarchy. He had no sympathy with preserving an institution simply because it had long existed. On the contrary, he looked to the future rather than to the past, and was inclined to reform in

accordance with modern conditions rather than to conserve that which was old. Possessed of restless energy and an iron will, he had no patience with the traditional ceremonial of the Vienna Court or the antiquated methods of the old Austrian administrative machine which was managed in large part by old men who belonged to Francis Joseph's generation rather than to the twentieth century. His influence in substituting Conrad for the aged Beck as Austria's Chief of Staff, and in building up the army and navy, was typical of his reforming tendencies. Wherever he had authority, he showed his executive ability in modernizing and improving the arrangements which he found in existence.

Francis Joseph was a Monarch by the Grace of God in the old sense. He still ruled or wanted to rule in patriarchal fashion. One of his greatest faults was his insistence on dealing himself with all matters of minutest detail. His mind was so occupied with these minor matters that he had no breadth of view for the wider interests of the Monarchy. As was natural in his old age, he was inclined to live in the past rather than to look to the future. He was extremely conservative and hesitated to make any changes in the red tape of the old Hapsburg machine, even when it was pointed out to him what advantages could be secured by modern methods. The contrast in attitude between the uncle and nephew is seen in an incident of 1911 concerning the administration of some Hapsburg family property left by the Empress Maria Theresa. This was still being administered under provisions a century and a half old, which were no longer adapted to modern conditions. The Archduke looked into the question carefully and ventured to hand the Emperor a long memorandum in which he pointed out how the administration of this family property needed reorganization.

He therefore begged the Monarch to examine the question with a view to economic reforms corresponding to the twentieth century. The Emperor left the letter unanswered for weeks. After his attention had been called to it several times, he finally replied in characteristic fashion: "I have fully considered the question in its various aspects and come to the conclusion that as the responsible guardian of this family property, I cannot bring myself to permit an experiment which would so destroy a long tried administrative system which has worked without criticism for so many years for the advantage of our property." This is a good example of Emperor Francis Joseph's opposition to innovation, and of his nephew's readiness for energetic administrative and political reforms.

Franz Ferdinand was very keenly aware, much more so than the Emperor, of the violent discontent among the subject nationalities of the Empire. He had one characteristic which is of great value in a ruler—he was ready and anxious to know the facts, even if they were unpalatable. Though he had a very violent temper, it was far more likely to be vented upon any one whom he suspected of trying to deceive him, than on one who told him disagreeable truths. He took pains to read opposition newspapers, with the result that he was well informed of the public feeling on the part of the Czechs, Transylvanians, Croats, and Serbs within the Dual Monarchy, and realized the danger which they constituted for the future unless something was done to satisfy them.

Further indication of Franz Ferdinand's intention of making constitutional reforms in the

direction of curbing the power of the Hungarian magnates and extending political rights to the minor nationalities is seen in various draft proposals which have been published from his papers.³⁰ One of the most recent of these is the draft Manifesto which he had prepared for publication in case the old Emperor's periodical bronchial trouble should sometime suddenly cause his death and open the way for a new regime. Though expressed in somewhat vague and general terms, it indicates that the Heir to the Throne was a true friend to the Croats and Bosnian Serbs and that he intended important constitutional reforms in the interests of all the minor nationalities before taking the oath to the Hungarian Constitution.

Count Czernin, who was more intimately acquainted with Franz Ferdinand's ideas than most men, says: "The Archduke was a firm partisan of the Great-Austria program. His idea was to convert the Monarchy into numerous more or less independent National States, having in Vienna a common central organization for all important and absolutely necessary affairs—in other words, to substitute Federalism for Dualism. . . . However, it had many opponents who strongly advised against dissecting the State in order to erect in its place something new and 'presumably better,' and the Emperor Francis Joseph was far too conservative and far too old to agree to his nephew's plans.

Two projects closely connected with the federalization idea had been much discussed. One of them is suggested in Conrad's letter to the Archduke of December 14, 1912: "The unification of the South Slav race is one of those nation-moving phenomena which cannot be denied nor artificially prevented. The only point is whether this unification shall take place within the control of the [Dual] Monarchy—that is at the expense of Serbia's independence—or whether it shall be accomplished under the aegis of Serbia at the cost of the Monarchy. This cost for us would consist in the loss of our South Slav lands and thereby of nearly all our coast. This loss in territory and prestige would depress the Monarchy into a Small State."

Franz Ferdinand's Marriage

One of the most fateful influences on the Archduke's life was his marriage. In the early 'nineties it was rumored at Vienna that he was paying attention to the Archduchess Marie Christine, eldest daughter of the Archduke Frederick and the Archduchess Isabella. He paid such frequent visits to them in Pressburg, sometimes twice a week, that the parents began to flatter themselves that their daughter would one day be Empress. But in reality Franz Ferdinand had fallen deeply in love with one of the ladies-in-waiting in their household—Countess Sophie Chotek. She was a handsome, proud, tall woman with flashing eyes and an eager step. She belonged to an ancient but impoverished Czech family. For nearly a year their love ran on in secret and unsuspected. When absent from one another they exchanged letters weekly through one of the Archduke's trusted officers. But then came a catastrophe. After a tennis party at Pressburg Franz Ferdinand changed his clothes, but forgot his watch. A servant brought it to the Archduchess Isabella. She

opened the locket, expecting perhaps to find a photograph of her daughter—and found instead that of her lady-in-waiting. One can imagine the feelings of a disappointed mother! Countess Sophie was instantly dismissed in disgrace and had to leave the house that very night.

The tongues of the gossips at the Austrian capital began to wag vigorously. But Franz Ferdinand, with his usual determination and obstinacy, declared that he would marry her. All his Hapsburg relatives objected. She was not a princess and did not belong to a ruling family. She was only a countess and therefore debarred from an “eligible” (ebenbürtige) marriage with an Archduke. To the old Emperor, Francis Joseph, the announcement of his nephew’s determination came as a terrible blow. It was a disgrace unworthy of the family. It seemed like the last drop in his cup of bitterness and family sorrows. His brother, Maximilian, had been shot against a wall in Mexico, and Maximilian’s wife had gone insane with grief. His own and only son, Rudolph, had died by violence under the most suspicious circumstances—by suicide or assassination. His wife, the Empress Elizabeth, was assassinated by an Italian anarchist in 1900. His wife’s insane nephew, Louis of Bavaria, escaping from his guardian, strangled his pursuer and together the two were drowned in the Starnbergersee. His younger nephew, Otto, Franz Ferdinand’s brother, living a riotous life and weakened by the disease which he had contracted, caused frequent shocks to the old Emperor’s sense of dignity and decency. And now his own heir insisted on defying European traditions and Spanish etiquette by marrying a mere impoverished countess with a possible taint of insanity in her blood. “Was I not to be spared even this?” the Emperor was heard to murmur.

For months Francis Joseph remained absolutely opposed to the marriage. But when he saw that this only increased the obstinate determination of his nephew, and that Franz Ferdinand would sooner give up the right to the throne than the hand of the woman he loved, the old formalist sadly gave his final consent to a compromise. The marriage might take place, but it was to be only amorganatic alliance. On June 28, 1900, the marriage declaration was solemnly registered in the small council room of the Vienna Hofburg in the presence of the Emperor, the Archdukes, and the leading government officials.

After the marriage Countess Chotek was raised in rank with the title of Duchess of Hohenberg through the graciousness of Francis Joseph. Yet notwithstanding this elevation in rank, she was still regarded as inferior in position to the youngest Archduchess. Her lot was far from happy. “Greatness is dearly bought,” she is said to have confessed to an intimate friend a year before her death. As Franz Ferdinand found that his wife was slighted and rebuffed at Vienna, he was all the more grateful for the more generous attitude which Emperor William displayed towards her. This explains in part the increasingly close relations which developed in the years before the War between the German Kaiser and the Archduke.

The Konopischt Meeting: Legend and Fact

The meeting at Konopischt, according to the official announcement in the Austrian Press, was a purely personal affair, "in order that the Kaiser might see the Archduke's wonderful roses in full bloom." Horticulture and landscape gardening were in fact one of the Archduke's most passionate hobbies. Having bought the Konopischt estate in 1886, he had spent years of thought, and sums of money which shocked his stewards, in laying out one of the finest parks in Europe. A sugar-factory, a brewery and peasants' houses had been removed, an artificial lake had been created, and rare and beautiful plants had been set out, so that from every window in the castle only the most pleasing prospect met the eye. Here at Konopischt Franz Ferdinand knew every tree and every bush.

According to the London Times correspondent, Mr. H. Wickham Steed, who based his account upon an anonymous informant "whose position and antecedents entitle his statements to careful examination," the German Emperor had been deliberately courting the good-will of Franz Ferdinand by attentions to his wife for political purposes, which found their expression in the "Pact of Konopischt." (Many months later Mr. Steed is said to have admitted in private conversation that he no longer believed in this fantastic story. Nevertheless he repeats it in abbreviated form in his interesting but unveracious work, *Through Thirty Years*)

Mr. Steed would have us believe that "the Kaiser opened to the Archduke Franz Ferdinand a magnificent horizon, and spread out before him a grandiose plan which promised presently to place his sons, Maximilian and Ernest, at the head of two vast realms in Eastern and Central Europe." Russia was to be provoked to a war for which Germany and Austria were ready; France was to be reduced to impotence by a few vigorous strokes; and the abstention of England was considered certain. The result of the war was to be the transformation of Europe. The ancient kingdom of Poland, with Lithuania and the Ukraine, was to be reconstituted, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This was to be the inheritance of Franz Ferdinand; after his death it was to pass to his eldest son. For his younger son was reserved, under his father's direction, a new realm comprising Bohemia, Hungary, and the Jugoslav lands, including Serbia, Dahnatia, and Salonica. Franz Ferdinand, according to this story, saw great thrones prepared for his sons, and Sophie Chotek saw herself the mother of Kings. Emperor William, on his part, was to give up to the new Polish state a part of Posen, and to indemnify himself by bringing into the German Empire a new state comprised of German Austria and Trieste and ruled by Franz Ferdinand's nephew, the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph. Germany would thus acquire a coveted outlet upon the Adriatic, and would be enlarged by the addition of another state equal in importance to Bavaria. Between the enlarged German Empire, the reconstituted kingdom of Poland, and the new Bohemian-Hungarian-Jugoslav realm, a close and perpetual military and economic alliance was to be formed. This alliance would become the arbiter of Europe, and would command the Balkans and the route to the East.

Such, according to Mr. Wickham Steed, were the terms of the agreement. Knowledge of it, he thinks, came to the ears of the Austrian Imperial family, and herein lies the explanation of the shabby way in which Franz Ferdinand and his wife were unceremoniously hurried to their graves after being murdered at Sarajevo. He darkly hints that the Austrian Court itself was guilty of complicity in the murder. He then goes on to exaggerate or distort in sensational newspaper fashion a number of other circumstances calculated to leave the reader with the impression that the assassination of the Archduke was brought about through the complicity of Austrian officials and that Serbia was in no way responsible.

“General Potiorek, who was sitting in the archducal car, escaped injury. Neither he nor any other military or civil dignitaries were punished for their failure to protect the visitors. General Potiorek remained Governor and presently commanded the Bosnian army through the first campaign against Serbia. After the defeat of his troops he was deprived of his command, was reported to have lost his reason, and was placed in a lunatic asylum. . . . When the Emperor Francis Joseph visited Sarajevo in June, 1910, the number of police available exceeded a thousand; probably double that number of secret agents were employed; yet when the Heir to the Throne visited the city the police were warned off! No evidence proving the complicity of the Serbian Government in the plot to assassinate the Archduke has ever been adduced. ... It would certainly not be beyond the power of the Austro- Hungarian secret service agents to work up a plot at Belgrade or at Sarajevo ... to 'remove' obnoxious personages or to provide a pretext for war.”

After describing at length the indignity of the funeral arrangements made for the murdered couple which “were hardly less astonishing than had been the circumstances of the assassination,” Mr. Steed adds as a further incriminating circumstance the fact that it was at first announced that the German Emperor would attend the funeral, but “on the 2nd of July it was announced in Berlin that owing to a slight indisposition, the German Emperor had abandoned his journey to Vienna. He nevertheless gave audiences as usual on that day.” He implies that the German Emperor and the other sovereigns were instructed from Vienna not to attend the funeral and that this is a further indication that the Archduke’s death was contrived by Austrian officials because of his having plotted at Konopischt a partition of the Hapsburg lands to provide crowns for his sons.

But as a matter of fact the failure of the Kaiser to attend the funeral was not due to any hint from the authorities in Vienna who wanted to deprive the Archduke and his wife of due honors even after death. He abandoned his intention of going to Vienna because a warning had come from the German consul at Sarajevo that the Serbs might make an attack on his life also, and because his Chancellor declined to assume the responsibility of allowing the Emperor to risk his life by going to Vienna.

Fortunately for the cause of truth, documents have recently been published which give precise and trustworthy accounts of what really took place at Konopischt and which will lead all serious students to consign Mr. Steed’s amazing theory to the limbo of propagandist war myths. One of these documents is the official report sent to the

German Foreign Office the day after the interview by Baron von Treutler, the Minister in attendance upon William II. The main topic of conversation at Konopischt, however, like that between William II and Francis Joseph at Vienna three months previously,⁴⁸ dealt with internal Austrian politics—Tisza's treatment of the Rumanians in Transylvania and its dangerous effect on public feeling in the Kingdom of Rumania. In view of these precise contemporary documents, one may therefore confidently relegate to the realm of legend all the fantastic tales of Mr. Wickham Steed and the French writers, that William II and Franz Ferdinand were planning a rearrangement of the map of Europe, or plotting a European war which was to be provoked by the Archduke's maneuvers near the Serbian frontier at Sarajevo. The Magyar oppression of the Transylvanian Rumanians, and the consequent indignation that was being stirred up among King Carol's subjects, involving as it did the danger that Rumania might cease to be loyal to her secret treaties with the Triple Alliance Powers, was a sufficiently serious question, aside from the roses and personal friendship, to account for the meeting at Konopischt. In this connection it is significant that the Rumanian question, and its relation to Germany and Austrian policy, fills a large place in the documents recently published by Conrad von Hötzendorf and by the German Government.

Perhaps after all, however, the most important result of the meeting at Konopischt was the effect that it had on the Kaiser's psychology. On his impetuous and emotional nature the murder made all the more vivid impression inasmuch as it had struck down a friend at whose home he had been visiting so intimately only a few days previously. The pistol shots at Sarajevo followed so closely upon the roses at Konopischt that they intensified all the more the horror with which he regarded all tyrannicide. Whereas heretofore he had been restraining Austria from rash action against Serbia, now he instantly envisaged Serbia as a den of murderers, and unwisely allowed Count Berchtold complete freedom to take any steps against Serbia which should be deemed advisable at Vienna.

The Trip to Sarajevo

The Archduke's fatal trip to Bosnia and Sarajevo in June, 1914, was decided upon many months beforehand. On September 16, 1913, during the Austrian army maneuvers in Bohemia he spoke to Conrad of it. On September 29 Conrad discussed it in Vienna with General Potiorek, Governor of Bosnia, who said it was the Archduke's intention to visit Bosnia as Heir to the Throne, to attend the maneuvers of the XVth and XVIth Army Corps, and to take advantage of the occasion to bring his wife with him. This conversation indicates the three-fold purpose of the visit and explains the somewhat unusual details in connection with it.

From the political point of view it was highly desirable that a member of the imperial family should show himself in the recently annexed provinces. Among the impressionable simple peasant populations of Europe, who before the War had a deep-rooted respect for royalty and a traditional feeling of loyalty to a personal ruler, nothing was better

calculated to stimulate and strengthen this feeling of personal loyalty than such official visits of princes. They flattered local pride. The simple peasant liked the pageantry of princes. He liked to see his ruler and find in him a flesh and blood human being like himself, who walks and rides about and eats three good meals a day. Merely to see him or hear him speak was to renew the human bond of common understanding and interests. So throughout history, from Henri Quatre and Frederick the Great in the past to the Prince of Wales in the present, it has been a common practice for popular princes and rulers to make royal progresses, which tend to strengthen the bonds between ruler and ruled.

The main object of the trip, however, was that the Archduke might attend the maneuvers of the XVth and XVIth Army Corps, which were regularly stationed in Bosnia. As Inspector-in-Chief of the Army he had in recent years regularly represented the Emperor at such maneuvers. The Bosnian maneuvers of 1914 are commonly represented by Austrophobe writers as "planned as a kind of rehearsal for military operations against Serbia." Mr. Jovanovitch, the Serbian Minister in Vienna, says: "The plan was to hold the maneuvers in the district between Sarajevo and the Romanija and Han Pisesak [to the east of Sarajevo]— thus just against the Serbian frontier. With maneuvers so planned the 'enemy' was naturally Serbia. . . . The maneuvers were to be held in Bosnia on the Drin just opposite to Serbia." There is no truth in these assertions. All the provisions for a campaign against Serbia were taken care of in an altogether different way, namely by Baron Conrad's "Mobilization B"[alkan] plan. This included not merely the two Corps regularly stationed in Bosnia, but the use of live more Corps from the rest of Austria-Hungary comprising altogether about half the total army; it contemplated of course a direct offensive against the Drin, which forms the boundary between Bosnia and Serbia! This plan had been worked out in all its details by Conrad and his General Staff, and, like the General Staff mobilization plans of all countries, was always in readiness. But the Bosnian maneuvers which the Archduke was to inspect comprised merely two Army Corps and were merely part of the routine training to which parts of the army were regularly subjected. They had no connection with any concrete war preparations, but simply had as their main object the practicing of considerable forces moving in a relatively difficult and varied terrain.

So far as the Bosnian maneuvers can be said to have had any practical immediate objective in view at all, they were designed to acquaint the officers, not with the terrain for a war with Serbia, but rather with that for a campaign for the protection of Albania or for the defense of Bosnia against troops landing on the Adriatic Coast.

As the Archduke's trip was primarily a military tour of inspection, the details of it were worked out by his Militärkanzlei in conjunction with Baron Conrad and General Potiorek. M. Bilinski, who as Joint Finance Minister had charge of the civil administration of Bosnia, was not consulted. M. Bilinski insists in his memoirs 63 that he was in no way responsible, since he and his officials had been systematically disregarded in regard to the preparations for the Archduke's journey. He even says he did not know "the program

of the Archduke's trip to Bosnia" until he read it in the *Neue Freie Presse* about eleven o'clock on the fatal Sunday morning, before taking his carriage to go to church. Bilinski's denial of any prior knowledge of the Archduke's intended entry into Sarajevo can hardly be true, because the *Neue Freie Presse* does not contain on June 28 any "program of the Archduke's trip to Bosnia". Moreover, three weeks earlier, on June 4, it had already printed an outline of the Archduke's trip, including the proposed visit to Sarajevo, which he can hardly have failed to see.

The Archduke appears finally to have undertaken the trip more from a sense of duty than from the desire, as usually stated, to have an opportunity to have his wife received with royal honors by his side. As already noted they travelled to Sarajevo by different routes. In the last weeks he had some doubts about going at all, because of his health and the heat. He discussed the point with the Emperor, who said, "Do as you wish." 68a His private secretary has noted several remarks which indicate that Franz Ferdinand was the reverse of enthusiastic about the trip. On June 23 the special railway carriage regularly reserved for him had a hot-box, so that he and his wife had to travel in an ordinary first class compartment after leaving their three children at Chlumetz. Franz Ferdinand remarked sarcastically, "Well, the journey is beginning in a right promising fashion!" 69 A little later, when told that the train by which he and his wife intended to leave Sarajevo on June 29 would have to start at 5 A. M. instead of 6 A. M. as originally planned, he exclaimed, "Tell Colonel Bardolff that if he continues daily to make the Bosnian trip still more disgusting with new difficulties and unpleasantnesses he can hold the maneuvers alone, and I will not go down there at all." The secretary adds that the idea "that the Archduke himself wanted the trip to Bosnia in order to provide a triumphal journey is a pure invention."

He was greeted with enthusiasm at the railway stations on the way from the Adriatic to Sarajevo, and joined his wife on the afternoon of June 25 at the pleasant little resort of Ilidze, a dozen miles from Sarajevo, where they were to stay. The maneuvers passed off very satisfactorily in spite of heavy rain, and the Archduke complimented General Potiorek on the spirit and training of the troops. On Friday afternoon, June 26, after returning from the first day's maneuvers, Franz Ferdinand and his wife motored in to Sarajevo to do some shopping in the bazaars. The Mayor of the town had already issued a proclamation expressing the loyalty of the population to Francis Joseph and their pleasure that he had sent his Heir to visit Bosnia; he urged the people to decorate the stores and houses with flags and flowers, and this was done; everywhere his picture was in the windows.

On this afternoon Franz Ferdinand was in uniform and was continually recognized and acclaimed with loyal shouts of "Zivio." The crowd was so dense that the officers accompanying him had some difficulty in making way for him from one shop to another.⁷² Had there been really a "bevy of assassins" waiting to do away with him, here was ample opportunity. But the visit passed off without any incident, and the Archducal pair returned to Ilidze, much pleased with the town and the way they had been received. On Sunday morning the Archduke telegraphed to his children at Chlumetz that everything was going

well with "Papi" and "Mami," and that they were looking forward to seeing them again on Tuesday. These were the last words he ever wrote.

7.15 The Assassination Plot

The immediate occasion of the World War was the murder of the Austrian Archduke at Sarajevo. Had it not occurred, there would have been neither an Austro-Serbian War, nor a World War, in the summer of 1914. In spite of the increasing tension between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, it is probable that European diplomacy would have succeeded for months, perhaps for years, in averting a conflict which all statesmen foresaw as unspeakably terrible, and for which the Franco-Russian forces planned to be better prepared in 1917 than in 1914. The murder of the Archduke ignited material which would not otherwise have taken fire as it did, or perhaps not at all. It is, therefore, of importance to trace the origins of the plot to which he fell a victim and to determine the responsibility for the deed which was to have such awful and world-racking consequences.

The Narvodna Obdrana

In the 'sixties and 'seventies of the nineteenth century many Serbian revolutionaries gathered in Switzerland and came under the influence of Russians like Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Herzen. They adopted a revolutionary program which was to be brought about by anarchist deeds of violence and terrorism. They were responsible for the Zajecar revolt against King Milan in Serbia in 1853. Their tendency toward revolution by violence and assassination has continued to exert an influence over a certain group of Serbs ever since. But not all the young Serbians studying in Switzerland adopted these views completely. Among the latter was M. Nikola Pashitch. He believed in the gradual building up of the moral and material forces of Serbia as a means for the eventual liberation and union of all Serbs in a powerful state, after the manner in which Italy had accomplished her unification in the generation immediately preceding. Serbia should be "the Piedmont of the Balkans." With this aim in view, M. Pashitch founded in Serbia in 1881 the Radical Party, which under his venerable leadership long preserved its original name, though in character it is today the very opposite of radical.

The program of the Radical Party, as stated in the first issue of its organ, *Samouprava*, on January 8, 1881, was: "The people's welfare and freedom at home, and the country's independence and unification with the other parts of Serbdom abroad." A special section was devoted to the importance of organizing and training the Serbian army; but until the time should come for the army to fulfil these tasks, the program provided, under the heading "Foreign Policy," that "there must be organized, in the field of intellectual development, a way of helping the divided and unliberated parts of Serbdom, as well as of keeping alive the sense of our national unity in the Serb provinces which, being far

away, are exposed to the influence of foreign elements." In other words, discontent must be kept alive in the Serb districts of the Turkish and Hapsburg Empires until the future war of liberation should join them to a Greater Serbia.

These two political ideals—individual acts of assassination practiced by immature half-baked students and by military cliques on the one hand, and national unification by a well-prepared movement and eventual war with Turkey and Austria as advocated by the Radical Party-dominated Serb political leaders until the triumph of the latter in the World War. M. Pashitch and the Radicals soon became the implacable enemies of King Milan, on account of the brutal and bloody severity with which he had taken vengeance on the Zajecar rebels, his disgraceful neglect of Serbia's national interests, and his scandalous private life, much of which was spent in questionable society in Vienna. Later the same hostile attitude was assumed toward his successor, King Alexander, especially after the latter's marriage to the notorious woman who became Queen Draga. Being childless, Queen Draga was suspected by many of intending to secure the succession to the throne for one of her brothers. Fear and disgust gradually united many Radicals and revolutionary army officers against the existing regime.

On the night of June 11, 1903, these patriotic assassins suddenly forced their way into the palace, murdered the King and Queen cowering in hiding, shot down the Queen's brothers in cold blood, and killed several Ministers. One of the chief leaders in organizing this brutal palace revolution was a young army captain, Dragutin Dimitrijevitich, who received incidentally three bullets which he carried in his body the rest of his days. Another—the man who ordered the murder of the Queen's brothers—was a young lieutenant, Voja Tankositch. These two were the later leaders of the "Black Hand," and, as another "patriotic duty," helped to prepare the Sarajevo plot against the Austrian Archduke.

In 1908, on the day Austria proclaimed her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Milovan Milovanovitch, then Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, called together in the evening several ministers and notables, including Pashitch, Ljuba Stojanovitch, Professor Ljuba Jovanovitch, the Burgomaster of Belgrade, and others, to consider what action to take in the face of the Austrian "provocation." It was decided that the Burgomaster should summon next morning at the Town Hall a larger group of representative Serbians which included the historian, Stanojevitch.³⁶ In the course of this meeting next day, there was founded the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense). This association was to enrol and train volunteers and strengthen Serbia in other ways for an armed struggle to prevent Austria from carrying out her annexation program.

At its foundation, the Narodna Odbrana included political leaders of the Radical Party, as well as military officers like Dimitrijevitich, Tankositch, and General Bozo Jankovitch. It also included Zivojin Dashitch, Director of the Government Printing Office, in which Chabrinovitch was employed just before setting out to murder Franz Ferdinand; and Milan Pribichevitich, whose brother, Svetozar, was one of Austria's most bitter opponents in the Croatian Landtag, and who is said to have received from Sarajevo on the day of the assassination of the Archduke and his wife, a telegram, with apparent reference to the

crime, "Both horses well disposed of."

The organization and the activity of the Narodna Odbrana began immediately. Its Central Committee, sitting at Belgrade, directed the work of the District Committees which were established in the chief towns and divided into sections for cultural work, physical training, collection of money, and in some cases relations with neighboring lands. The Narodna Odbrana affiliated with itself and aided financially the existing patriotic associations like the Sokols, Rifleman's Clubs and Horsemen's Clubs. It began its task of enrolling comitadjis and training them in bomb-throwing, the blowing up of railways and bridges, and similar activities to be carried on in a guerilla war against Austria. It collected funds and stirred the people to hatred against Austria by an active propaganda of fervid nationalism. This activity was not limited to Serbian subjects. Bosnian emigres in Serbia were similarly enrolled, trained for treasonable activity upon their return to Bosnia, and provided with funds.

Princip, the Archduke's murderer, was, according to his own admissions at the trial, enrolled in the Narodna Odbrana in 1912, given money, and trained as a comitadji. Within Bosnia itself similar committees and "confidential men" were recruited to form a net-work of spies and serve as a "tunnel," or "underground railway," for conveying propagandist literature, weapons, and conspirators across the frontier from Serbia into Bosnia. After the settlement of the Annexation Crisis in March, 1909, when Serbia, deserted by Russia, had to promise to cease her subversive agitation and to maintain in the future friendly relations with the Hapsburg Monarchy, the Narodna Odbrana made a show of transforming itself from an aggressive and subversive organization into a society which emphasized more laudable "cultural" aims, such as education, physical training, and the fostering of national ideals.

There was undoubtedly some change in the character of the Narodna Odbrana after 1909 in the direction here indicated, it never became so completely innocent and "cultural" as is often asserted. Nor did it cease its propagandist work in the Hapsburg territories. It is nevertheless clear that the Narodna Odbrana secretly continued its work of maintaining "tunnels" and smuggling revolutionary literature from Belgrade into Bosnia. It kept in touch with the "confidential men" who were later used by the "Black Hand" and who actually assisted the Archduke's murderers on their journey. And it inspired and assisted Bosnian emigrants who came to Belgrade. It thus helped to develop the revolutionary movement in Bosnia and to prepare the ground for the Sarajevo crime. The original membership of the Narodna Odbrana and the measures which the Radical Government took to give it the appearance of a "cultural" organization show that M. Pashitch and his colleagues were perfectly acquainted with its work of propaganda, espionage, and the recruiting of "confidential men" on Austrian soil.

The Black Hand

By 1911 the old divergence of views between the Radical political leaders and the more restless and reckless military officers began to show itself again. The Radicals, in view of Russia's attitude and the existing diplomatic situation in Europe, believed that Serbians must preserve correct and peaceful relations with Austria-Hungary and confine their work for the present to strengthening the State for the future struggle which would realize their ultimate aim—the creation of a Greater Serbia. This, as we have seen, was now the ostensible policy of the Narodna Odbrana. ' But some 40 of the more hot-headed and zealous military clique which had carried out the palace revolution of 1903 were impatient of the more moderate Radical policy. They wanted "deeds." They therefore revived their old organization of 1903 in a new secret association known in its statutes as Ujedinjenje ili Smrt (Union or Death), but commonly referred to as the "Black Hand."

The Serbian Government, wishing to make it appear that the "Black Hand" was a revolutionary organization exclusively within Serbia aiming to overthrow the power of the Radical Party and even the reigning dynasty, deleted certain passages which referred to the subversive and terrorist activity of the Society outside Serbia. But M. Bogitchevitch, from information supplied by two surviving members of the "Black Hand," has been able to establish the complete text of its Rules and By-Laws.⁵¹ He has also been able to establish the identity of a large number of its members and the secret numbers by which they were known, showing that they included many Serbian civilian officials, as well as military officers. It is from his text of the Rules that the following quotations are made.

The aim of the "Black Hand" was (Art. 1) : "The realization of the national ideal: the union of all Serbs." "Art. 2. This organization prefers terrorist action to intellectual propaganda, and for this reason must be kept absolutely secret from non-members." To accomplish its aim, it brings influence to bear on Government circles and on the various social classes of the Kingdom of Serbia, which is regarded as "Piedmont." Then follow the clauses which were deleted in 1918, but which show clearly its terrorist activity in the Hapsburg lands:

Art. 4. (b) It organizes revolutionary activity in all the lands inhabited by Serbs.

(c) Beyond the frontiers of Serbia, it fights with all means those who oppose this idea.

(d) It maintains friendly relations with all States, peoples, organizations, and private individuals who are friendly toward Serbia and the Serb element.

(e) It lends help and support in every way to all peoples and all organizations struggling for national liberation and unity. . . .

Art. 7. The Central Committee in Belgrade includes, besides the members of the Kingdom of Serbia, one delegate for each of the Serb lands abroad [Pokrajina]: (1) Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2) Montenegro, (3) Old Serbia and Macedonia, (4) Croatia, Slavonia and Syrraia, (5) the Voivodina, (6) the Coast Lands [Primorje, i.e. Dalraatia].

. . .

To enlarge the society and yet secure absolute secrecy, obedience, and devotion among its members, it was provided (Arts. 23-33) that it was the duty of each new member to enrol new members and pledge his own life for those whom he introduced. Members were not generally known to each other personally, but were designated by secret numbers. Only the Central Committee at Belgrade was to know their names. "When the Central Committee at Belgrade has pronounced penalty of death, the only matter of importance is that the execution shall take place without fail. The method of execution employed is a matter of indifference." The initiation of a new member took place in a darkened room, lighted only by a wax candle, before a small table covered with a black cloth on which lay a crucifix, a dagger and a revolver. The candidate took an oath "by the Sun that warms me, by the Earth that nourishes me, before God, by the blood of my ancestors, on my honor and on my life, that I will from this moment till my death be faithful to the laws of this organization, and that I will always be ready to make any sacrifice for it."

The inspirer and leader of this singular association was Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevitich, head of the espionage department of the Serbian General Staff. On the last page of the statutes, dated "Belgrade, May 9, 1911," his name appears on the membership list as "No. 6." His chief aide was Major Voja Tankositch, "No. 7." He also had taken a leading part in the royal murders of 1903. He had organized later a comitadji school, in which he trained Bosnian emigres who came to Belgrade and on whom he exerted a large influence between 1908 and 1914.

Another member of the "Black Hand," more mysterious and enigmatic, was Milan Ciganovitch, "No. 412." Coming originally as an emigre from Bosnia to Belgrade, he served under Tankositch as a comitadji in the Balkan War against Turkey. In 1914 he was enjoying a sinecure as a subordinate official in the Serbian State Railways. He is believed by many to have joined the "Black Hand" in order to keep M. Pashitch informed of its doings/ 4 Tankositch and Ciganovitch were the two men who directly helped prepare the assassination plot in Belgrade, giving the three youths who were to murder Franz Ferdinand bombs, Browning pistols, and poison to be swallowed as soon as their deed was accomplished.

Among the other members of the "Black Hand" identified by M. Bogitchevitich were Dushan Obtrkitch, "No. 166," an intimate friend of M. Ljuba Jovanovitch; Michel Giv'kovitch, "No. 442," Secretary of the Serbian Court of Cassation; Demetrius Novakovitch, "No. 471," Secretary of the University of Belgrade; Dr. Milan Gavrilovitch, "No. 406," Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and afterwards editor of the Politika; M. A. Jovanovitch, "No. 401," Secretary of the Railway Department; Bogoljub Vutchitchevitich, "No. 407," Commissioner of Police ; and Stanoje Simitch, "No. 467," an employee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 55 These names indicate that the "Black Hand" was not so exclusively a military organization as it has often been represented. Nor was it so divorced from, and opposed by, the Narodna Odbrana, as is often stated. While it is true, as pointed out above, that the Narodna Odbrana professed to work for Greater Serbia by "cultural" preparation, and the "Black Hand," more impatient, preferred

terrorist action by assassination, the two Societies had the same ultimate goal and even had many members in common.

Milan Vasitch, who was one of the ten members of the Supreme Central Committee of the "Black Hand" at Belgrade, was at the same time mentioned by the Archduke's murderers as "Secretary of the Narodna Odbrana," and as having provided them with funds and revolutionary literature. The two organizations also made use of the same "confidential men" in Bosnia and the same "tunnels" of communication. Bado Malobabitch, for instance, who was one of the Austrian Serbs condemned for treason at Agram, and became a "confidential man" for the Narodna Odbrana in 1911, was introduced to Col. Dimitrijevitich in 1913 by Todorovitich, the frontier guard at Lozhnica, and thereupon became one of the chief spies for the "Black Hand" and the Intelligence Department of the Serbian General Staff. 57 So close was the connection between the two Societies that the members of the Carnegie Commission of Inquiry on the Balkan Wars failed to distinguish between them/'8 The three youths who planned to murder the Archduke sought to give the impression at their trial that their relations in Belgrade had been rather with the Narodna Odbrana than the "Black Hand." They declared that they knew of the latter only by hearsay or what they had read in the newspapers; but they admitted that they were aware that Tankositich and Ciganovitich were on bad terms with the Narodna Odbrana, and were perhaps providing the bombs and Browning pistols "because they were members of another society."

The Revolutionary Movement in Bosnia

For more than half a century before the World War, there had been an increasing antagonism between the Austro-Hungarian ruling authorities and the subject nationalities within the Dual Empire. This arose partly from the new feeling of nationality, which was an ever stronger force in the course of the nineteenth century, and partly from the oppressive rule of the Hapsburg Government and its disregard of the aspirations of its Slav and Rumanian subjects. This antagonism was particularly sharp in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Austrian occupation of these provinces in 1878, and especially after the annexation in 1908.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the census of 1910, the population consisted, according to religion, which was the most vital factor, of Greek Orthodox, Mohammedans, and Roman Catholics, approximately in the proportion of 4, 3, and 2: 825,000 Greek Orthodox, mainly Serbs; 612,000 Mohammedans, mainly Serbs and Turks; and 442,000 Roman Catholics, mainly Croats; altogether, with Jews and a sprinkling of Protestants and gypsies, nearly 1,900,000. Generally speaking, the Greek Orthodox sympathized with the Serbians in the neighboring kingdom; the Roman Catholics were divided between loyalty to Austria and their higher cultural connections with the West on the one hand, and, on the other, their nationalistic desires for a national Serb-Croat union, either as a selfgoverning unit in a federalized "trialistic" Hapsburg state, or as part of a "Greater

Serbia, or of an independent Yugoslav Federation ; the Mohammedans were generally loyal to the Hapsburg Monarchy.

These four political tendencies were represented respectively by the four main political parties: (1) Srbska Rijec (Serbian Party led by G. Tevtanovitch and Sola) and the Narodna Strcuika (Nationalist Party), both in bitter opposition to Austrian rule; (2) the loyalist Serb minority led by Dr. Dimovich; and the loyalist Croats, formerly a part of the Starcevitch Party, but in 1914 having an anti-Serb tendency and known as the Frankovacka Stranka after their leader, a Hungarian Jew, Dr. Frank; (3) the Starccvijcanjka Stranka, founded half a century earlier by the Croatian patriot Starcevitch; (4) the loyal Mohammedan Party. In 1914, however, the Bosnian parties and movements just mentioned represented what M. Jevtitch calls the "older generation."

In contrast to this older generation was an altogether different "new generation." This arose in Bosnia in the early years of the twentieth century. It was known as Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia). It was impatient with the politicians, the bourgeoisie, and all legal forms of opposition. It repudiated all notions of "trialism" as a solution of Serbo-Croat national aspirations. It was recruited from the youth of the "small and insignificant classes"—peasants, journeymen, school teachers, and sons of priests and young students. Its members were impatient and "desperate." They had begun to feed upon Russian revolutionary and anarchistic literature, especially the writings of Herzen and Kropotkin. They developed the "cult of the individual deed," that is, they believed that terrorist acts of assassination were the best means of putting a speedy end to the temporizing methods of Bosnian politicians and of throwing off all Austrian control to prepare the way for a new "Yugoslav" nationalism. Deeds of revolutionary terrorism served two great purposes: they created panic among the ruling authorities; and they uplifted the national spirit of the masses.

Among Bosnian youths, whose mental balance had been unsteadied by a mixture of anarchism, socialism, and nationalism, it was not unnatural that the force of mental suggestion, in an act of political assassination like that of Zherajitch (Bogdan Zherajitch was revered by the anarchists for the assassination of General Vareshanin, a military governor of Bosnia), should exercise a strong psychological influence. The man most influential in developing the revolutionary movement in Bosnia and in inspiring the Bosnian students who carried out the plot against the Archduke was Vladimir Gatchinovitch. In the spring of 1909, during the Annexation Crisis, he went to Belgrade, where he came in contact with the leaders of the newly organized Narodna Odbrana and also with the more violent spirits who favored "direct action" and later organized the "Black Hand." He remained in Serbia for a couple of years and came under the influence of Skerlitch, an active propagandist of anti-Austrian revolutionary ideas.

Gatchinovitch attended the University of Vienna; but he spent more time in organizing a revolutionary movement among the Slav students than in study. Here also he wrote his famous eulogy on the murderer Zherajitch, which, as Mr. Seton-Watson well says, "by its strange' perverted idealism and high-falutin style gives a clear insight into the

revolutionary movement which is now commencing." In 1912 Gatchinovitch was again in Belgrade, probably in connection with the printing of his pamphlet. Finding the Narodna Odbrana too mild, he joined the newly organized "Black Hand." His name appears as "No. 217" in the list of members published by the Serbian Government at the Salonica Trial. He is said to have received funds from both societies, and also a "scholarship" from the propagandist department of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This enabled him to go to Lausanne for further study. Here he came into direct touch with various Russian revolutionists, including Trotsky, who wrote an introduction, signed "L. T." to a selection of Gatchinovitch's French articles. (One does not know what he talked about with Trotsky. But as will be seen in later chapters of this book, the anarchists in the Balkans having a link to Trotsky implies also a link to the big banks at Wallstreet, especially Jacob Schiff/Kuhn-Loeb and Rockefeller. This also implies connections to other financiers like Rothschild and Warburg. The plot to overthrow the monarchies had strong financial backing and was supported by the "big capitalists" in the United States and Europe.)

Meanwhile Gatchinovitch had also found time to travel in Bosnia and organize the radical youth of Mlada Bosna into secret revolutionary "circles" known as Kruzhoc, "small groups of trustworthy persons, who do not know each other, but are in touch with one another through intermediaries." 73 This method of organization was also characteristic of the "Black Hand," from which Gatchinovitch got the idea. It gave the "Black Hand" a network of affiliated groups spread throughout Bosnia and the other Serb districts of Austria-Hungary.

The revolutionary ferment among the Bosnian youth, which arose from exasperation at Austrian oppression, from a desire for Serbo-Croat national unity, and from the influence of Russian anarchistic writings and Serbian propaganda, manifested itself also in the widespread practice of young Bosnians migrating back and forth between Serbia and their own country. These "emigres" liked to escape from the stifling atmosphere of Hapsburg control and roam about in the freer and more congenial air of Belgrade. Here they were well received, and it was easy for them quickly to secure a certificate of education. Princip, for instance with the personal approval of Al. Ljuba Jovanovitch the Serbian Minister of Education, passed off three years' work in less than two years, in spite of the fact that meanwhile he was spending much of his time in political discussions and in travelling back and forth." This practice of "emigration" is well illustrated by the case of the three youths who carried out the plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand.

Gavrilo Princip was born at Grahovo, in Western Bosnia in the wild mountains near the Dalmatian border. Though at first diligent in school, his periods of application to study were frequently interrupted by excursions into political propaganda, so that he was often suspended, and finally came to Sarajevo, where he stayed for a month. In May, 1912, he went to Belgrade, ostensibly to study; but when asked at the trial why he went there, he replied, "That is my affair." As this was just about the time that Gatchinovitch was organizing the Kruzhoc at Sarajevo and impressing upon the youth there the need of

revolutionary agitation, it is probable that Princip's journey to Belgrade was inspired by him. At any rate, Princip quickly came into touch with the "Black Hand" comitadjis in the Belgrade coffee-houses, and, according to his own declaration, was taken into the Narodna Odbrana by its secretary, Major Vasitch, who was also a leading member of the "Black Hand." When the Balkan War broke out, he went to the Turkish frontier to receive military training with comitadjis under Major Tankositch, another leading "Black Hand" terrorist and agitator.

But being only sixteen years old, with a small weak body, he was sent home by Tankositch. He had, however, become filled with the "Black Hand" ideas of terrorist action by political assassination, and spent the next fifteen months in plotting with Gatchinovitch and Hitch, and in journeys between Belgrade and Hadzhici, a village half a dozen miles west of Sarajevo. At this village he passed the winter of 1913-14, and then returned to Belgrade in February, 1914. Nedjelko Chabrinovitch, who later threw the bomb at the Austrian Archduke, left school because he made no progress and quarreled with his father. He turned from one trade to another, and finally took up type-setting. After quarrelling with various employers, he went to Belgrade, where he found work in a shop which printed anarchist literature, and where he himself drank in anarchist views. Later in Belgrade 1912 he was in touch with Princip, though at this time they held somewhat different political views. Here also he came into contact with the Narodna Odbrana. Desiring travelling money to enable him to return to Sarajevo, he was advised by a friend to apply to this Serbian society which often secretly helped Bosnian emigres. He did so, and the same Major Vasitch, who was also an active "Black Hand" member and who had befriended Princip gave him fifteen dinars, a quantity of Narodna Odbrana literature, and the advice, "Be always a good Serb." In October, 1913 he told a friend of his intention to assassinate the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The friend aided him to go again to Belgrade, where he was given employment in the Serbian Government Printing Office by its Director, Zhivojin Dachitch, one of the founders of the Narodna Odbrana.

The third member of the student trio who conspired at Belgrade to go to Sarajevo to murder Franz Ferdinand was Trifko Grabez. He was expelled from the Tuzla high school for slapping a teacher in the face during the fall of 1912, and went home for six months to his father's house at Pale, a dozen miles to the east of Sarajevo. Then he went to Belgrade to finish his studies, and managed to pass the fifth, sixth and seventh classes at Easter, 1914. Here he met Princip and other emigres, and became fired with Serbian nationalism and an eagerness to participate in political assassination.

When the newspaper clipping arrived with the announcement of the Archduke's intended visit to Bosnia, this visit was at once seized upon by the three youths as offering an excellent occasion for carrying out an assassination which had already been discussed. Princip wrote to Hitch at Sarajevo that he had determined to do the deed, and would come bringing weapons. In any case, the inspiration for the plot sprang from the group of Bosnian revolutionaries—Gatchinovitch, Princip, Hitch, and others—all of whom had been in Belgrade and in close touch with "Black Hand" members. The idea of murdering

the Archduke had certainly been discussed before his trip to Bosnia was announced.

Preparation of the Plot in Belgrade

In March, 1914, the Zagreb newspaper *Srbobran* published the announcement that the Austrian army would hold summer manoeuvres in Bosnia and that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be in command. This news at first greatly alarmed the little revolutionary group in the Sarajevo *Kruzhoc*, because it was well known that the Archduke was friendly to the Roman Catholic Croats and was believed to favor some form of "trialism." They feared that his visit would strengthen the Croatian bourgeoisie and political leaders who were ready to accept political concessions from the Hapsburgs, and that it would deal a blow at Yugoslav aspirations for national unity and independence. The Archduke's presence and the army manoeuvres would seem to be a demonstration of Hapsburg strength which might weaken the Orthodox Serb elements and the irredentist movement for a Greater Serbia. But the alarm of *Kruzhoc* members was only momentary. They at once saw that here was the opportunity for the best possible political assassination of the kind which Gatchinovitch had long been preaching.

When Chabrinovitch received the news clipping from Sarajevo, he showed it to Princip at the coffee-house where they were in the habit of meeting. In the evening they went to walk in the park to discuss it, and Princip invited Chabrinovitch to join him in murdering the Archduke. Chabrinovitch, according to his statement at the trial, had not hitherto thought of an attempt on Franz Ferdinand. He would have preferred to assassinate General Potiorek, as the personification of the Austrian system of oppression. But he now fell in with Princip's proposal. 105 Princip, however, claimed that he had had the idea of assassinating Franz Ferdinand even before Chabrinovitch received the clipping. "By myself alone I had already previously formed the decision to do the deed. When I was in Sarajevo earlier I had already determined upon it."

Among the Serbian comitadjis who frequented the coffee-houses with the Bosnian emigres was Milan Ciganovitch, a Bosnian by birth, who had come to Belgrade some years before. He had been trained as a comitadji by Major Tankositch and fought under him during the Balkan Wars. He had joined the "Black Hand" as "No. 412," and in 1914 enjoyed a subordinate position on the Serbian State Railways. He had often talked with Princip about the oppressive conditions in Bosnia before this time, fully approved the idea of murdering Franz Ferdinand, and offered to provide the weapons and other means. A little later he took Grabez to his room, and showed him a chest full of bombs which he had either secured from the Serbian arsenal or saved from the Balkan Wars. But since bombs were somewhat uncertain, only exploding after a few seconds, it was agreed that the murderers ought also to be provided with revolvers. To secure these, Ciganovitch turned to his fellow members in the "Black Hand"—to Major Tankositch, who got from Dimitrijevitich the money with which to buy them.

Ciganovitch also told the youths of the "tunnel," or underground railway, by which Serbian

officials would help them over the frontier and put them in touch with “confidential men” on the Bosnian side. At the suggestion of Tankositch, who wanted to make sure that there would be no failure, Ciganovitch also gave the students revolver practice in a shooting park near Belgrade. So far during the preparations it was Ciganovitch with whom the students dealt chiefly. But Ciganovitch evidently was acting with the approval of Major Tankositch and Col. Dimitrijevitch, who were leading members of the Supreme Central Committee of the “Black Hand.”

In order to avoid suspicion more easily and escape arrest, the three assassins finally left Belgrade for Sarajevo some three weeks before the Archduke's arrival in Bosnia. Before their departure, Ciganovitch provided them with six bombs from his room, four Browning pistols and ammunition, 150 dinars in cash, and some cyanide of potassium with which they were to commit suicide immediately after killing the Archduke, in order to lessen the possibility of any confessions or statements which might incriminate the Serbian officers in Belgrade who had helped to prepare the plot. They were also provided with a map of Bosnia showing the roads which they were to follow and the Austrian gendarmerie stations which they were carefully to avoid. Meanwhile at Sarajevo, Danilo Hich, who had been in correspondence with Princip, soon recruited a number of local men who would be armed with the extra weapons which the three assassins from Belgrade would bring with them.

From Belgrade to Sarajevo

From Belgrade to Shabats, the three assassins went up the Save by boat. They carried a note from Ciganovitch to the frontier commander at Shabats, Major Popovitch, and were to say to him that they were being sent by Major Tankositch. But they were carefully warned not to make themselves known to the civilian authorities, lest they should be arrested and sent back. Arriving at Shabats, they easily found Major Popovitch at a coffee-house, and told him that they were journeying secretly to Bosnia. He seemed to be already well acquainted with their mission. He conducted the three students to the guard-house and secured an order for them for buying half-fare tickets on the railway for the next stage of their journey from Shabats to Lozhnica, where they were to cross the frontier. He filled out for them a false pass, making it appear that one of them was a Serbian exciseman and the other two his colleagues. With the half-fare railway tickets, they went by train to Lozhnica and delivered to the frontier captain the card from Major Popovitch. He immediately telephoned to the excisemen's watch-house directly on the border, but could get no connection. He therefore told the youths to return in the morning. Next day it was arranged that Chabrinovitch should take the false pass and go on to Zvornik, where he was helped over the frontier by a Serbian exciseman and later driven across Bosnia to Tuzla. Meanwhile Princip and Grabez, with the bombs and revolvers, were driven back a few miles to a watch-house near Ljeshnica, where they were met by prearrangement by another Serbian exciseman who smuggled them over

the Drin by way of the Bosnian Islands. There he handed them over to a peasant in whose hut they spent the night. Next day they were passed on to another peasant, who conducted them safely along by-paths in Bosnia toward Priboj until they were met by Veljko Chubrilovitch.

Veljko Chubrilovitch was an Orthodox Serb school master at Priboj and the “confidential man” of the Narodna Odbrana for this region. He had made trips to Serbia, had become a member of the Narodna Odbrana, and then chairman of the Priboj Sokol, one of the apparently harmless and “cultural” Serb organizations which were a medium, however, for active Serbian propaganda. He was in touch with Narodna Odbrana officials in Serbia and other “confidential men” in Bosnia and with local peasants who appeared to be in the habit of smuggling letters and information across the frontier. He now took Princip and Grabez to the house of another peasant, Jacob Kerovitch, and arranged that the latter’s son should drive the two conspirators and their weapons on to Tuzla, where they would find another “confidential man,” the cinema director, Mishko Jovanovitch. After this, the three youths then went on safely by train from Tuzla to Sarajevo. Princip at once sought out Hitch, took lodgings with him, and told him of the weapons at Tuzla. Grabez went to his home in Pale. All three lived as quietly and inconspicuously as possible until the time for the deed. Thus, the “tunnel,” often mentioned by Ciganovitch, which Serbian officials had long prepared, had worked to perfection.

Early on the morning of the day Franz Ferdinand and his wife were to make their formal visit to Sarajevo, Princip and Chabrinovitch met Hitch at the back of the Vljajinitch pastry shop and received again from him some of the weapons they had brought from Belgrade—Princip took one of the Browning revolvers, Chabrinovitch a bomb, and Grabez both a revolver and a bomb. Then they dispersed to take their stand at various places, as agreed upon, along the route which the Archduke was to pass.

The Assassination, June 28, 1914

Sarajevo, for some five hundred years, had been the capital of Bosnia and is still its principal city. It is crowded into a narrow valley at the foot of high hills. Through its center runs a little river, the Miljachka, half dry in summer. In the older parts of the city toward the cathedral the streets are crooked and narrow. But the Appel Quay, now known as the Stepanovitch Quay, is a fairly wide straight avenue lined with houses on one side, and with a low wall on the other, where the Quay follows the Miljachka. It leads towards the Town Hall, and is connected by several bridges with the other side of the town, where one of the principal mosques and the Governor’s residence or Konak are situated. Along the Appel Quay, which was the route the Archduke and his wife were to follow, Hitch had placed the various murderers to whom he had distributed the bombs and revolvers a few hours before the assassination. Mehmedbashitch, Vaso Chubrilovitch and Chabrinovitch were on the river side near the Cumurja Bridge. Hitch and Popovitch were across the street, near the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Further along the Quay Princip

at first stood near the Latin Bridge; after Chabrinovitch's attempt, while the Archduke was at the Town Hall, he crossed over the Quay to the corner of the narrow winding Franz Josef Street, now King Peter Street, where the actual assassination finally took place. Further on toward the Town Hall Grabez was walking up and down, looking for a good place where he would not be interfered with by the police or bystanders.

On Vidov-Dan, Sunday, June 28, 1914, the day opened with glorious summer weather. The streets, at the request of the Mayor, had been beflagged in the Archduke's honor. His portrait stood in many windows. Considerable crowds were abroad in the streets to see him pass. No effort was made to keep them back, by forming a line of soldiers, as had been done in 1910 when Francis Joseph visited the city. Several of the loyal newspapers welcomed the Archduke's presence, but the leading Serb newspaper, *Narod*, contented itself with the bare announcement of his visit, and devoted the rest of its issue to a patriotic account of the significance of Vidov-Dan, an account of the Battle of Kossovo, and a picture of King Peter of Serbia framed in the national Serbian colors.

Franz Ferdinand and his party reached Sarajevo from Ilidze about 10 A. M. After reviewing local troops, they started in autos toward the Town Hall for the formal reception in accordance with the announced program. The Heir to the Throne was in full uniform, wearing all his decorations. His wife, in a white gown and large hat, sat beside him. On the seat facing them was General Potiorek, the military Governor of Bosnia, who pointed out the objects of interest as they drove along. In front of them, in another car, the Mayor and Chief of Police led the way. Then followed two other autos bearing various persons belonging to the Archduke's suite or General Potiorek's staff.

Just as they were approaching the Cumurja Bridge and Potiorek was calling the Archduke's attention to some new barracks, Chabrinovitch knocked off the cap of his bomb against a post, stepped forward, and hurled it at the Archduke's car. The chauffeur, observing him, put on speed, so that the missile fell onto the folded hood of the uncovered car and bounced off; or, according to another account, Franz Ferdinand, with extraordinary coolness, seized it and threw it back of him into the road. There it exploded with a heavy detonation, partly wrecking the following auto and seriously wounding Lieut. -Col. Merizzi and several bystanders. Chabrinovitch sprang over the wall into the river-bed, which was nearly dry at this season of the year, and tried to escape; but police agents quickly seized him and marched him off for examination. Meanwhile the fourth auto, uninjured except for a broken windshield, passed the wrecked car and closed up quickly to that of the Archduke, none of whose occupants had been hurt, except for a scratch on the Archduke's face, probably caused by the flying cap of the bomb. The Archduke ordered all the cars to stop, in order to learn what damage had been done. Having seen that the wounded men were dispatched to a hospital, he remarked with characteristic coolness and courage: "Come on. The fellow is insane. Gentlemen, let us proceed with our program."

So the party drove on to the Town Hall, at first rapidly, and then, at the Archduke's order, more slowly so that the people could see him better. The Archduke's wife met a

deputation of Mohammedan women, while the Archduke was to receive the city officials. The Mayor, who had written out his speech of welcome, started to read it, as if nothing had happened. But it hardly suited the occasion. It dilated upon the loyalty of the Bosnian people and the overwhelming joy with which they welcomed the Heir to the Throne. Franz Ferdinand, by nature quick-tempered and outspoken, roughly interrupted the Mayor, saying: "Enough of that. What! I make you a visit, and you receive me with bombs." Nevertheless, he allowed the Mayor to finish his address. This terminated the formalities at the Town Hall.

The question then arose whether the party should still follow the prearranged program which provided for a drive through the narrow Franz Josef Street in the crowded part of the city and a visit to the Museum ; or whether, in view of another possible attack, they should drive straight to the Governor's residence on the other side of the river for luncheon. The Archduke insisted that he wanted to visit the hospital to inquire after the officer who had been wounded by Chabrinovitch's bomb. General Potiorek and the Chief of Police thought it very unlikely that any second attempt at murder would be made on the same day. But as a punishment for the first, and for the sake of safety, it was decided that the autos should not follow the prearranged route through the narrow Franz Josef Street, but should reach the hospital and Museum by driving rapidly straight along the Appel Quay. Therefore the Archduke and his wife and the others entered the cars in the same order as before, except that Count Harrach stood on the left running-board of the Archduke's car, as a protection from any attack from the Miljachka side of the Quay. On reaching the Franz Josef Street the Mayor's car in the lead turned to the right into it, according to the original program. The Archduke's chauffeur started to follow it, but Potiorek called out. "That's the wrong way! Drive straight down the Appel Quay!" The chauffeur put on the brakes in order to back up. It happened that it was precisely at this corner, where the car paused for a fatal moment, that Princip was now standing, having crossed over from his original position on the river side of the Quay. These chance occurrences gave him the best possible opportunity. He stepped forward and fired two shots point blank. One pierced the Archduke's neck so that blood spurted from his mouth. The other shot, aimed perhaps at Potiorek, entered the abdomen of Sophie Chotek. The car turned and sped over the Latin Bridge to the Konak. The Archduke's last words to his wife were: "Sophie, Sophie, do not die. Live for our children." But death overtook them both within a few minutes. It was about 11 :30 A. M., St. Vitus's Day, Sunday, June 28. 1914.

7.16 The Responsibility for the Assassination

The preceding chapters on Balkan Problems, Franz Ferdinand, and the Assassination Plot have given a brief narrative of the events and an account of the conditions which contributed to the fatal tragedy at Sarajevo. They will also have indicated to some extent the responsibility for it. But they left aside several much-disputed questions which can

now be best dealt with separately, before one attempts to draw any final conclusions concerning the relative responsibility for the crime which was the immediate occasion of the World War. Chief among these disputed points are the motives of the assassins, the lack of Austrian police protection, the part played by Dimitrijevitich and the "Black Hand," M. Pashitch's cognizance of the plot and failure to prevent it, and the alleged Serbian warning to Austria.

Motives of the Assassins

In the first place, there was a personal motive—a feeling of discontent with their own lives, of the desire to be martyrs and heroes after the fashion of Bogdan Zherajitch, who fired five shots at the Governor of Bosnia and then committed suicide at Sarajevo. Both Princip and Chabrinovitch had been unhappy at home, and received little or no financial support from their parents. Chabrinovitch had quarrelled often with his father and with his fellow Socialists at Sarajevo. Both youths had early left school but had not become established in any occupation. They drifted to Belgrade where they came under the influence of anarchist and terrorist propaganda, and heard the coffee-house talk about Austria's oppression and Serbia's future role as the "Piedmont" which would bring liberation to the Bosnian Serbs.

Princip declared, after being at Belgrade but before hearing of the Archduke's coming visit to Bosnia: "I often used to go out to the grave of Zherajitch. I often passed whole nights there, pondering over our conditions and our miserable situation and over him [Zherajitch], and then I determined upon the assassination. On his grave I made an oath to myself to carry out an assassination at some time or other." Later, in prison, he told Dr. Pappenheim that, "in Sarajevo he used to dream every night that he was a political murderer, struggling with gendarmes and policemen; that he had read much about the Russian revolution, about the fightings; and that this idea had taken hold of him."

Chabrinovitch also stated: "I too went to the grave of the late Zherajitch, when I came to Sarajevo. There I fixed upon the firm determination to die as he had done. I knew moreover that I had not long to live. I was continually occupied with the idea of suicide, because I was indifferent to everything." His psychopathic thirst for notoriety is suggested by the fact that he had his photograph taken an hour or so before he threw the bomb and attempted suicide, and also by his boast a moment after his attempt on the Archduke, "Yes, I am a Serb, a hero." 9 Both youths were clearly psychopathic, maladjusted by personal suffering, discontent and failure, and easily open to suggestive influences toward murder by the example of "heroes".

A second motive was to take vengeance on Austria for the oppressive regime in Bosnia, arouse opposition to it, and prepare the way for a revolution which should put an end to it. "What moved me primarily," declared Chabrinovitch, "was revenge for the oppression which the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina had had to suffer, especially the 'Exceptional Laws' which last year continued for two full months. ... I regarded revenge as the holy

duty of a moral civilized man, and therefore I planned to take vengeance. ... I knew that there existed at the Ballplatz [the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office] a clique, the so-called war-party, which wanted to conquer Serbia. At its head stood the Heir to the Throne. I believed that I should take vengeance on them all in taking vengeance on him. ... I hated him because he was an enemy of Serbia. . . . All 'the injustices of which I read in the newspapers—all this had collected in me until it burst forth on St. Vitus's Day."

Princip likewise, on being asked if he was sorry that he had killed the Archduke replied: "No, I am not sorry. I have cleared an evil out of the way. He [Franz Ferdinand] is a German and an enemy of the South Slavs. He treated them badly. . . . Every day a high treason trial. Every day it went worse with our people. They are impoverished. I have seen how our people fall more and more into decay. I am a peasant's son, and so I can convince myself of the misery of our people. I killed him and I am not sorry. I knew that he was an enemy of the Slavs..."

A third motive was to kindle further opposition and hatred toward the Hapsburg rule, cause a revolution among the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and so prepare the way for tearing these two provinces away from the Dual Monarchy and uniting them with Serbia in some kind of a national South Slav state. This accords also with his later "Confessions" in prison: "The ideal of the young people was the unity of the South Slav peoples, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but not under Austria. In a kind of state, republic or something of that sort. Thought that if Austria were thrown into difficulties then a revolution would come. But for such a revolution one must prepare the ground, work up feeling. Nothing happened. By assassination this spirit might be prepared."

The austrian "Negligence"

Most Yugoslav sympathizers, and most critics of Austria who follow the fantastic insinuations of Mr. H. Wickham Steed, like to represent the assassination of the Archduke as virtually inevitable, both because of the Austrian oppression, the wide-spread nationalist movement in Bosnia, and the "bevy of assassins" lying in wait for him, and also because of the "criminal negligence" of the Austrian authorities in not taking adequate precautions to protect him.

After the crime, in the recriminations of Austrian officials as to the responsibility for not averting it, and in the boasts of Yugoslav survivors at having participated (or intended to participate) in a glorious deed which has ultimately resulted in the creation of a Yugoslav state, it is easy to collect many expressions of opinion which seem to bear out these views. Thus, Mr. Wickham Steed quotes the Archbishop of Sarajevo as saying that "the Archduke could not have escaped, because he would have had to pass through 'a regular avenue of bomb-throwers'". Mr. Seton-Watson also quotes this, and unhesitatingly accepts all the stories which have been told to him of heroes who would have assassinated the Archduke had not Princip done so. He even speaks of "a whole bevy of assassins on the streets of the capital."

At the same time, both these writers blame the Austrian authorities for their lack of police protection. Says Mr. Steed: "When the Emperor Francis Joseph visited Sarajevo in June, 1910, more than one thousand uniformed police and probably double the number of 'plain clothes men' were employed to protect him. In June, 1914, when the Heir Presumptive went there the police were warned off." Similarly Mr. Seton-Watson: "Every street [at the Emperor's visit in 1910] along which he passed was

lined with a double cordon of troops, and the town swarmed with special police and detectives from headquarters in Vienna and Budapest"; but in 1914 the police "showed itself strangely remiss or inefficient." "The contrast between 1910 and 1914 amply justifies us in speaking of criminal negligence on the part of those Austro-Hungarian authorities with whom the care of the Archduke lay." But to assert that the assassins were so numerous that the Archduke could not have escaped, and at the same time to blame the police for negligence in not saving him, is illogical. As a matter of fact, neither was the danger to him from residents in Bosnia so great, nor the conduct of the Austrian authorities so strangely negligent, as these writers would have us believe.

On the Archduke's journey up through Bosnia from the Adriatic to Ilidze, and at the maneuvers, he was received with demonstrations of loyalty and there were no signs of danger. Soon after his arrival at Ilidze he and his wife motored in to Sarajevo, visited some of the shops, and were everywhere recognized and acclaimed. So great was the crowd about them that a passage had to be cleared for them. Here would have been an excellent opportunity for assassins. On the fatal Sunday morning it is noteworthy that only those conspirators who had just come from Belgrade had the courage of their convictions.

If it had not been for the first three, and for the excellent chance opportunity afforded by the mistake of the Archduke's chauffeur in turning into the Francis Josef Street and stopping just at the point where Princip happened to be standing, it is altogether probable that there would have been 'no assassination.

Mr. Pashitch, the Narodna Odbrana and the Black Hand

Some indication has already been given in the preceding chapter of the activity of the Narodna Odbrana and the "Black Hand," and of the probable cognizance of a plot on the part of Mr. Pashitch and some members of his Cabinet.

The Serbian Government may be regarded as responsible for the activities of the Narodna Odbrana. This society was publicly organized by prominent Serbians, including some members of the Serbian Cabinet of 1908. Its central committee sat in the Serbian capital and its president was General Jankovitch. Its statutes were published and its activities, alleged to be "cultural," were publicly approved by members of the Serbian Government, with which it remained on intimate and friendly terms. It was organized originally to prepare forcible means for preventing Austria from carrying through her policy of annexing

Bosnia and Herzegovina. But after the crisis of March, 1909 when Russia failed to back up Serbian hopes, and Serbia was forced to make to Austria her promise to live on good and neighborly terms, the Narodna Odbrana ostensibly changed its aims from the use of force against Austria to the "cultural work" of stimulating national feeling within the Kingdom of Serbia.

As a matter of fact, it continued a secret subversive work of propaganda in Bosnia: smuggling in nationalist Serb literature and recruiting "confidential men who should organize ostensibly harmless local societies for education, physical training, and the anti-alcohol movement but who in reality were to rouse Serbian nationalism and prepare the ground for the eventual unification with Serbia of the Serb populations in the Dual Monarchy. It had also given assistance and encouragement to Bosnian youths who came to Belgrade to study or to plot assassinations and revolution against the Hapsburg authorities. Though the Narodna Odbrana probably had no knowledge officially of the plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand, its network of "confidential men" and its "tunnel" for secret communications between Serbia and Bosnia were certainly used by "Black Hand" officials and by the three youths who went from Belgrade to Sarajevo to commit the crime. This interlocking activity between the two Serbian societies which otherwise had somewhat different ostensible aims and were not altogether friendly, was facilitated by the fact that the Secretary of the Narodna Odbrana, Milan Vasitch and other members of it were also members of the "Black Hand." Thus the Serbian Government may be regarded as responsible for an organization whose secret agents in Bosnia were preparing the way for the disruption of Austria-Hungary and were actually made use of to assist the Archduke's assassins on their journey to Sarajevo. Austria was therefore justified in her demand in the ultimatum to Serbia that the Narodna Odbrana be dissolved.

The relations of the Serbian Government to the "Black Hand" were quite different. This secret society had "budded itself off" from the Narodna Odbrana, in the words of one of the witnesses at the trial of the Sarajevo assassins,³⁶ being formed in 1911. The clique of military officers, who had murdered King Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 had become impatient at the ostensibly "cultural" activities of the Narodna Odbrana and at the policy of the Pashitch Radical Party of postponing the final struggle with Austria until Serbia had liberated Serbians under Turkish rule, greatly consolidated her internal resources and strength, and made more certain of the support of Russia and France. The "Black Hand" was a very secret terrorist organization; its members were designated by numbers instead of by their names; and its curiously medieval statutes were never published until the famous Salonica Trial of 1917.

At first the relations between the Serbian Government and the "Black Hand" leaders were tolerably harmonious. This Society included Dimitrijevitich, who was advanced in June, 1913, to the position of Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Serbian General Staff, Major Tankositich, who was one of the most famous comitadji leaders, and a large number of other officers. It was regarded primarily as a group of military men, but it also included a considerable number of civilian officials, among whom were at least three

employees in the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There was an internal party conflict between Pashitch's Radical Party and the "Black Hand" military officers. It is often cited as proof that Dimitrijevitich and the Sarajevo assassins were in no way in league with the Serbian Government and would have tried to conceal all knowledge of the assassination plot from it. This is probably true. There are several indications at the trial of the assassins that they were warned by their Serbian military friends to avoid letting the Serbian civilian authorities get wind of what was on foot. So it may be regarded as perfectly certain that Mr. Pashitch and his Cabinet had nothing to do with the originating of the assassination. It was hatched behind their backs. They probably had no knowledge of it until the preparations were nearly complete and the youths were about ready to go from Belgrade to Sarajevo.

We have, on the contrary, the clear and explicit statements of the Minister of Education, Mr. Ljuba Jovanovitch, that at the end of May or beginning of June, Mr. Pashitch knew that certain persons were preparing to go to Sarajevo to murder the Archduke; that he told some of his Cabinet of it; and that orders were given to the frontier authorities to stop the assassins, but the orders were not carried out because the frontier authorities were members of the "Black Hand" organization, and reported afterwards that the orders had arrived too late and the youths had already crossed over. We have already given our reasons for believing these statements of the Minister of Education to be true.

The Serbian Neglect to arrest the Accomplices

Important is the fact that it affords one explanation of two of the most serious charges which have been brought against Mr. Pashitch : his failure to give any definite warning to the Austrian authorities after he was aware that the assassins had gone to Sarajevo, and his remissness after the murder in failing to search for and arrest the accomplices in Belgrade.

In fact Serbian police officials appear to have actually aided one of them, Ciganovitch, conveniently to disappear from sight. To have attempted to arrest Ciganovitch, who was a member of the "Black Hand," and to have exposed the part taken by such prominent members of it as Dimitrijevitich and Tankositch, would have still further accentuated the political conflict and have strengthened the antagonism which had already caused the temporary downfall of the Cabinet. Mr. Pashitch apparently did not dare to take action against the leaders of such a powerful organization, and therefore adopted a purely passive attitude hoping that Austria and Europe would not learn the truth.

Precisely when and how Mr. Pashitch learned of the plot has not been revealed from Serbian sources. One commonly accepted theory is that he was secretly informed of it by Milan Ciganovitch, who is believed to have played a double role as a kind of agent provocateur, both conspiring with the "Black Hand" leaders, and at the same time being employed by Mr. Pashitch to spy upon them and keep him informed in the interests of

the Serbian Government and the Radical Party. Ciganovitch was freely declared by all three of the Sarajevo plotters, both at their arrest and at their trial, to have taken a most active part in their preparations in Belgrade. He was a Bosnian Serb, who came as an emigre to Belgrade in 1908, was trained as a comitadji by Tankositch, and then given employment as a small official on the Serbian State Railways. In 1911 he was enrolled in the "Black Hand" as "No. 412," and fought as a comitadji under Tankositch in the Balkan Wars. In the preparation of the plot he served as the agent of Tankositch. He secured for Princip and his companions in Belgrade the bombs and revolvers which were to be used against the Archduke. He gave them the cyanide of potassium with which to poison themselves after the crime, and thus prevent revelations concerning Ciganovitch himself and his Serbian accomplices.

Upon orders from Tankositch, Ciganovitch took the youths to a shooting park near Belgrade and gave them practice in the use of the revolvers. At the end of May, when they were ready to start, he supplied them with cards of introduction to "Black Hand" agents and "confidential men" who would help them forward on their journey to Sarajevo. The reasons for believing that Ciganovitch informed Pashitch do not lie in any direct evidence prior to the assassination, but in the apparent collusion between them afterwards—in the action of the Serbian authorities in attempting to conceal Ciganovitch and have him conveniently disappear from sight, and in the evidence which Ciganovitch gave in 1917 to aid the Radical Party in convicting Dimitrijevitich and in breaking the power of the "Black Hand."

Within a couple of days after the assassination, when rumors began to reach Belgrade of the confessions made by Chabrinovitch and Princip, both Tankositch and Pashitch appear to have tried to suppress all information about the Belgrade accomplices. On the evening of June 29 three comitadjis "came to Mr. Svetolik Savitch, owner of the newspaper Balkan, and told him in the name of Major Tankositch that under no circumstances was he to publish anything in his newspaper about any of the connections and relations of the assassin Chabrinovitch with their acquaintances here [in Belgrade]. Above everything he was not to write anything which might in any way compromise Serbians; otherwise it would fare badly with him." This kind of intimidation—fear of violence and vengeance from comitadjis like Tankositch—was frequently mentioned by "confidential men" in Bosnia as one of their motives for assisting the assassins. It suggests an additional reason why Mr. Pashitch did not care or dare to make any move to arrest this popular and powerful "Black Hand" leader, until finally forced by the Austrian ultimatum to detain him for a few days.

If the Serbian Government had at once taken energetic action to arrest the Belgrade accomplices, and given genuine evidence of its often asserted desire to live on good neighborly terms with Austria, this would have mitigated Germany's indignation at the assassination, made her less ready to follow Austria's fatal path, and increased the chances of friendly mediation. In failing to do this, and in assuming the passive and negative attitude of waiting to see what definite incriminating evidence and charges Austria might

be able to bring forward, Mr. Pashitch incurred a further serious responsibility for what befell. The Serbian Government was informed on July 6 by its Minister in Vienna that the Austrian evidence from Sarajevo indicated the Belgrade origin of the plot and implicated Ciganovitch." In spite of this, it not only made no move to apprehend the accomplices in Belgrade, but it apparently actually facilitated the disappearance of Ciganovitch, the chief accomplice, in order that it might not have to hand him over to the Austrian authorities.

The Austrian authorities, having learned from the confessions of the assassins some of the facts about the Belgrade accomplices, demanded in the ultimatum of July 23 (Point 7) that Serbia "proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee." The Serbian Government replied a couple of days later that it had arrested Tankositch as requested, but "as regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to June 15 [N. S. 28, that is, the day of the assassination] was employed (on probation) by the railway administration, he has not yet been able to be found (and therefore a writ of arrest has been issued against him)." It is certainly a curious fact that the Serbian Government pretended to cease to have any knowledge of Ciganovitch precisely from the moment of the assassination. In view of the other facts given above, one may doubt the sincerity of their asserted ignorance of his whereabouts and their inability to find him. This doubt is increased by the fact that the Minister of Education, speaking of the period just after the assassination and before the Austrian ultimatum, when the Serbian authorities might have arrested Ciganovitch but did not do so, indicates clearly that his colleagues were informed about this accomplice.

7.17 The Legend of the Potsdam Council

Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador, jew and father of Morgenthau Jr (U.S. Secretary of the Treasury during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt) , published a book called "Morgenthau's Story" in 1918. In this book he depicts the story of how the German Kaiser made plans for World War 1. This story was also cited at the Versailles Peace Conference to put further blame on Germany and the Kaiser. The most interesting and picturesque account of the alleged "Crown Council" at Potsdam on July 5, as well as the one which had received widest currency, is that given by Mr. Morgenthau, in the volume just quoted, in a chapter entitled, "Wangenheim Tells the American Ambassador How the Kaiser Started the War:"

"I shall always keep in my mind the figure of this German diplomat, in those exciting days before the Marne. . . The good fortune of the German armies so excited him that he was sometimes led into indiscretions, and his exuberance one day caused him to tell me certain facts which, I think, will always have great historical value. . . .

The Kaiser, he told me, had summoned him to Berlin for an imperial conference. This meeting took place at Potsdam on July 5th. The Kaiser presided and nearly all the

important ambassadors attended. Wangenheim himself was summoned to give assurance about Turkey and enlighten his associates generally on the situation in Constantinople, which was then regarded as almost the pivotal point in the impending war. In telling me who attended this conference Wangenheim used no names, though he specifically said that among them were—the facts are so important that I quote his exact words in the German which he used—“die Hduptcr des Generalstabs und der Marine“— (the heads of the general staff and of the navy) by which I have assumed that he meant Von Moltke and Von Tirpitz. The great bankers, railroad directors, and the captains of German industry, all of whom were as necessary to German war preparations as the army itself, also attended.

Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser solemnly put the question to each man in turn: “Arc you ready for war?” All replied “yes” except the financiers. They said that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans. At that time few people had looked upon the Sarajevo tragedy as something that would inevitably lead to war. This conference, Wangenheim told me, took all precautions that no such suspicion should be aroused. It decided to give the bankers time to readjust their finances for the coming war, and then the several members went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. The Kaiser went to Norway on his yacht, Von Bethmann-Hollweg left for a rest, and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople.

In telling me about this conference Wangenheim, of course, admitted that Germany had precipitated the war. I think that he was rather proud of the whole performance, proud that Germany had gone about the matter in so methodical and far-seeing a way, and especially proud that he himself had been invited to participate in so epoch making a gathering. I have often wondered why he revealed to me so momentous a secret, and I think that perhaps the real reason was his excessive vanity—his desire to show me how close he stood to the inner counsels of his emperor and the part that he had played in bringing on this conflict. Whatever the motive, this indiscretion certainly had the effect of showing me who were really the guilty parties in this monstrous crime. The several blue, red, and yellow books which flooded Europe during the few months following the outbreak, and the hundreds of documents which were issued by German propagandists attempting to establish Germany's innocence, have never made the slightest impression on me. For my conclusions as to the responsibility are not based on suspicions or belief or the study of circumstantial data.

I do not have to reason or argue about the matter. I know. The conspiracy that has caused this greatest of human tragedies was hatched by the Kaiser and his imperial crew at this Potsdam conference of July 5, 1914. One of the chief participants, flushed with his triumph at the apparent success of the plot, told me the details with his own mouth. Whenever I hear people arguing about the responsibility for this war or read the clumsy and lying excuses put forth by Germany, I simply recall the burly figure of Wangenheim as he appeared that August afternoon, puffing away at a huge black cigar, and giving me his account of this historic meeting. Why waste any time discussing the matter after

that¹

But at the end, this is nothing more than fabricated and mis-interpreted propaganda. Without going further into detail: The story from Morgenthau was labeled untrue in the 1920s when more information about this time became available.

7.18 The Preparation of the Austrian Ultimatum

The assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife shook Berchtold out of his undecided hesitating attitude of the past. It determined him to use the crime as a good excuse for clearing up the unsatisfactory situation with Serbia and for putting an end once and for all to danger to the Dual Monarchy from the Greater Serbia propaganda and the Russian intrigues against Austrian influence in the Balkans. For months and years past there had been a growing conviction among certain groups at Vienna that the political situation was becoming dangerous and intolerable for Austria in the Balkans. Serbia, as a result of the Balkan Wars, had grown greatly in territory, population, and pretensions. The Greater Serbia movement was gathering strength and received support from the growing nationalist movement among all the South Slavs living under Hapsburg rule. In the spring of 1914 there were rumors that Serbia and Montenegro were to be fused together. This would give Serbia an outlet on the Adriatic and threaten the existence of the struggling infant Albanian State, and so endanger the arrangements by which Austria had sought to protect herself against the Slav danger on her southern borders.

Also Russian armaments, military railway construction, and trial mobilizations were proceeding apace. France was loaning Russia millions of francs for these purposes, while at the same time increasing her own military establishment. The ever-latent irritation between Italy and Austria, arising from Italian irredentist aspirations for Trieste and the Trentino and from Austro-Italian jealousy and rivalry in the Balkans, had again become recently acute because of an Austrian decree excluding persons of Italian birth from holding municipal office at Trieste. Even Germany was felt to betray an irritating disregard for her Austrian ally's Balkan interests and dangers; the best way to make Germany respect Austria as a worthy ally—as *biindnisfahig*—would be to adopt a more vigorous policy, show that she was capable of decisive action, and prove that she was really an asset and not a liability in the Triple Alliance.

Thus, even before Sarajevo, there was a general feeling on the part of many officials at Vienna that something must be done to prevent the decaying Hapsburg structure from crumbling to pieces, either from its own internal weaknesses and hesitating indecisions, or from being violently thrown down before long by its enemies. The news of the Archduke's assassination enormously strengthened this feeling. If Austria accepted this blow to her dynasty without actively resenting it and taking vigorous measures to put an end to the Greater Serbian danger once and for all, her prestige in the Balkans and in Europe would be gone forever.

Austria's existence as a Great Power was at stake. As Conrad, the Chief of Staff and head of the militarist party at Vienna, has put it:

Two alternatives stood sharply out against one another: either the preservation of Austria-Hungary as a conglomerate of various nationalities which should stand together as a whole toward the outside and find their common well-being under a single ruler; or the rise of separate independent national states which would seize upon the Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by their co-nationals and so bring about the destruction of the Monarchy. The conflict between these two alternatives, long foreseen, had reached an acute stage through Serbia's procedure; its decision could not longer be postponed. For this reason, and not as vengeance for the assassination, Austria-Hungary must draw the sword against Serbia.... The Sarajevo assassination had torn down the house of cards erected by diplomacy in which Austria-Hungary had thought herself safe. The Monarchy had been seized by the throat, and had to choose between allowing itself to be strangled, and making a last effort to prevent its destruction.

So Conrad, convinced that Austria must make war on Serbia as an act of self-preservation, urged Berchtold to approve immediate mobilization against Serbia. But Berchtold replied that there were difficulties: public opinion must be prepared; the grounds for war must first be established as a result of the investigation at Sarajevo; Francis Joseph was opposed to any immediate action; and Count Stephan Tisza, Minister-President of Hungary, was opposed to any war at all against Serbia, fearing that Russia would attack Austria and that Germany and Rumania would leave her in the lurch. Conrad was forced to admit that it was unsafe to make war on Serbia until they had made sure that Germany would protect Austria's rear from a Russian attack. Berchtold had, however, like Conrad, become convinced of the necessity of a local war against Serbia.

During the following days he proceeded to scheme to secure Germany's support, to build up a case against Serbia, and to overcome the two chief domestic obstacles to an immediate local war against Serbia—the hesitation of Francis Joseph and the opposition of Count Tisza.

Emperor Francis Joseph

Emperor Francis Joseph at the time of the Sarajevo assassination had hardly recovered from the illness of the preceding winter, which many observers had thought might prove fatal to the aged monarch. All the wars which he had waged in the past had resulted in defeat, or loss of territory, or generally both. He was not enthusiastic for Conrad as Chief of Staff, nor optimistic about the changes which had been made in the Austrian army. There is little doubt that he wanted to end his days in peace. But now, with the news of Hartwig's Pan-Slav intrigues at Belgrade, the Greater Serbia propaganda, and this final tragedy to his family, he had begun to fear that the Serbian situation might at last become intolerable. "I see a very dark future," he said to the German Ambassador on July 2; "what is particularly disquieting to me is the Russian practice mobilization which is

planned for the fall, just at the time when we are shifting our recruit contingents. Hartwig is master at Belgrade, and Pashitch does nothing without consulting him." "Every one is dying around me," he added mournfully, referring to the sudden death of the Italian Chief of Staff, General Pollio, who was one of the few loyal adherents of the Triple Alliance in Italy. But though very sad and pessimistic, Francis Joseph evidently had no immediate expectation of even a local war with Serbia, for he spoke of his plans for the summer and the prospects for the stag-hunts.

Three days later, on July 5, when Conrad urged mobilization measures, Francis Joseph refused to approve them. "No, that is impossible," he said, pointing out the danger of an attack from Russia and the doubtfulness of German support; before the Konopischt meeting he had asked Franz Ferdinand to get from Emperor William an unconditional declaration that Austria could count on Germany, but William II had avoided committing himself. We have no satisfactory accounts of the interviews which took place between him and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, but Berchtold seems not to have met with great difficulty in persuading his sovereign to approve the measures placed before him. Tisza, however, was a more difficult person.

Tisza's Peace Program

Count Stephan Tisza, the famous son of a famous father, was perhaps the ablest and most striking political figure at this time in the whole Dual Monarchy. With close-cropped hair, square dark face, and flowing Hungarian cloak, he was like a little giant among the Magyar nobles, when he led the majority party as his father had done before him. He saw clearly the dangers ahead on all sides, and had the ability to reason coolly concerning them. He knew

exactly what he wanted, and having become Hungarian Minister-President in June, 1913, he was in an official position to compel attention to his views. He had already worked out, in the spring of 1914, as will be explained in detail, a diplomatic "politique de longue main," which was to win Bulgaria to the side of Germany and Austria and secure peace in the Balkans for a few years at least.

This peace program had been adopted with some changes by Berchtold, and made the basis for a long memorandum to Berlin—just before the news from Sarajevo made him suddenly change to Conrad's war program. Tisza, however, was not the kind of man to allow his matured judgments to be overturned in a moment, even by such a crime. On June 29, the day after the assassination, he hastened to Vienna to express his country's sympathy to Francis Joseph, but with no idea that the Monarchy's policy was to be altered because of what had occurred. After condoling with the Emperor, Tisza visited the Ballplatz, little suspecting the sudden change in the attitude of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But here at the Foreign Office he learned with painful surprise of Berchtold's "intention of making the horrible crime of Sarajevo the occasion for the final reckoning with Serbia."

Tisza thereupon told Berchtold frankly that the provoking of such a war with Serbia would be "a fatal mistake"; it would pillory Austrians "before the whole world as disturbers of the peace, besides beginning a great war under the most unfavorable circumstances." But he apparently made little impression on Berchtold. In his conflict with Berchtold, Tisza wanted to play German influence in favor of his own diplomatic peace program against Berchtold's new and reckless war program. But Berchtold proceeded to take this very arrow out of Tisza's quiver, and use it, against Tisza himself.

The Balkan Wars and the Peace of Bucharest have created for Austria-Hungary an intolerable situation. Until this is improved there can be no real lasting peace. On the other hand, the general exhaustion and dismay have been too great to allow any advantageous military action in the immediate future. As to Russia, Tisza did not believe that she intended to make war immediately. Her aggressive attitude and saber-rattling was meant to impress the Balkan States and was encouraging the nationalist movement in Rumania and Serbia. It might even win Ferdinand of Bulgaria to the Tsar's side.

The Triple Entente would not attack Germany, however, Tisza believed, until Russia had won over Bulgaria and so threatened Austria with a war on three fronts. The crux of the European situation lay, therefore, in the Balkans and particularly in attaching Bulgaria to the Central Powers. This was of just as much vital interest to Germany as to Austria. Therefore the Dual Monarchy should strive to oppose Russia's Balkan policy by a wellconsidered harmonious German-Austrian policy. The best way to win Bulgaria, Tisza believed, was to hold out to Ferdinand the prospect of acquiring Macedonia. This could not be accomplished at once. Bulgaria would need several years to recover strength and heal the wounds of war. Meanwhile the Central Powers must assure Bulgaria protection against attack from Turkey or Greece. Rumanian public feeling was very strong against Hungary, but an effort must be made to keep King Carol firm in his alliance and assure him that Rumania was in no danger of an attack from Bulgaria. Germany and Austria must henceforth cooperate together to effect a favorable grouping of the Balkan States; Rumania and Greece must be wooed away from Serbia, and reconciled with Bulgaria on the basis of an enlargement of Bulgaria at Serbia's expense. Such, in outline, was the policy which Tisza thought ought to be urged upon Germany, so that the two Central Powers would support one another at Sofia, Bucharest, and Constantinople. And in closing, he again says with emphasis: "In the Balkans we must first preserve the peace and prepare a favorable development. There is no time to be lost."

Tisza's program apparently met with the approval of Francis Joseph and Berchtold, who had Baron Flotow, the Foreign Office specialist on Balkan affairs, draw up a much longer memoir developing Tisza's ideas in more detail. Flotow's memorandum, somewhat amplified by Matscheko and Pogascher, was put before Berchtold about the middle of June. Whether it was shown to Franz Ferdinand during the visit which Berchtold paid to Konopischt the day after Emperor William's interview with the Heir to the Throne is not clear. At any rate it was decided that it should be worked out in greater detail and laid before the Berlin authorities as a memorandum for guidance of the two allies in

Balkan affairs. Accordingly, an elaborate draft to this effect was completed by June 24. Berchtold then went over the draft, and gave it the final gentle form, which he hoped would prove unobjectionable and persuasive to the Berlin Foreign Office.

Beginning with an analysis of the results of the Balkan Wars, Berchtold pointed out the dangers to Germany and Austria of the existing situation. Omitting for obvious reasons all Austria's own responsibilities for the bad situation, Berchtold emphasized the dangerously aggressive intrigues of Russia and France. After detailing all the intrigues by which Russia and France were seeking to build up this new Balkan League, aimed at the territorial dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy, Berchtold dealt as tactfully as possible with the Rumanian problem, pointing out Austria's embarrassments and hinting that Germany might use pressure to make Rumania see the error of her ways. As the best method of thwarting Russia's projected Balkan League and compelling Rumania to return to the fold of the Triple Alliance, Berchtold then urged Tisza's program for an alliance with Bulgaria, adding that Turkey also might be included in it eventually.

While France aims to weaken the Dual Monarchy with the hope of promoting her plans for revanche, the intentions of Russia are much more comprehensive. If one considers the development of Russia during the last two centuries, the steady extension of her territory, the enormous increase of her population, exceeding so much that of all the other European Great Powers, and the vast progress of her economic resources and military strength, as well as the fact that this great Empire is as good as cut off from the sea by its geographical position and treaty obligations, one sees why Russia's policy has necessarily always had an inherently aggressive character. ... For these reasons the Austrian Foreign Office is convinced that it is for the common interests of Austria no less than of Germany to oppose a timely and energetic counter-action to the development which is being pushed by Russian intrigues, and which perhaps at a later time could never be undone." In this form the memorandum was complete and ready for transmission to Berlin. It was to "open Germany's eyes" to the need of supporting Austria more energetically in this diplomatic wooing of Bulgaria.

Then on Sunday afternoon, June 28, came the terrible telephone message that Franz Ferdinand and his wife had been murdered at Sarajevo. The news appears to have had a stimulating effect upon the ordinarily rather indolent and undecided mind of Count Berchtold. Many historians, and several Viennese with whom the present writer has talked, speak of Berchtold as a minister who allowed himself to be managed by others, especially by the Magyar Serb-haters in the Austrian Foreign Office, like Hoyos, Forgach, Macchio, and by Baron Conrad, the Austrian Chief of Staff. The Foreign Minister has been regarded as a mere "rubber stamp," approving what others urged upon him. While this view may be more or less true for the period before Sarajevo, it does not appear equally so for the crisis of July, 1914. The contemporary evidence seems to show that however much Berchtold may have been guided by his subordinates at the Ballplatz, and by the militarists, he took a very active and sinister part in the events which led directly to the World War. Hitherto he had vacillated between the two opposing groups of opinion

represented respectively by Conrad and by Tisza. But now, after Sarajevo, he decided to use this crime as the final justification for clearing up, once and for all, Austrian relations with Serbia.

Berthold's Appeal for German Support

Berchtold was now finally converted to Conrad's desire for immediate war against Serbia. But owing to Francis Joseph's hesitation and Tisza's opposition he could not adopt it at once. Moreover, he realized that it would be madness to embark on any such hare-brained action without first getting from Berlin an assurance of German support. Germany during the last few years had been constantly restraining Austria from aggressive action in the Balkans which might involve the Triple Alliance in conflict with the Triple Entente. Two days after Sarajevo, when even serious people in Vienna "were expressing frequently the hope that Austria had now the excuse for coming to a final reckoning with the Serbians," the German Ambassador, Tschirschky, used every opportunity to warn calmly but very energetically and earnestly against any overhasty steps.

He pointed out above all else that Austria must be clear as to exactly what she wanted, and remember that she did not stand alone in the world; she must consider her allies and the entire European situation, and especially the attitude which Italy and Rumania would take in regard to Serbia. On July 2, Berchtold set forth to him all the dangers from the Greater Serbia propaganda. News had just come that twelve assassins were on the way to assassinate Emperor William. It was as much to Germany's, as to Austria's, interest to put an end to the Belgrade plottings. Tschirschky admitted this, but observed confidentially to the Austrian Minister that the reason Berlin had not given more definite promises of support in the past was that Austria "had talked much theoretically but had never formulated a fixed and definite plan of action" ; only when such a plan was formulated, could Berlin promise full and complete support ; and he again warned Berchtold of the danger of alienating Rumania and Italy. Similarly from Berlin came expressions of sympathy, but they were accompanied with advice to be cautious. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

Zimmermann [German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] assured me that he would consider decisive action on the part of Austria, with whom the whole civilized world today was in sympathy, quite comprehensible, but still he would recommend the greatest caution, and advise that no humiliating demands be made upon Serbia.

In view of this attitude of caution and moderation on the part of Francis Joseph, Tisza, and Germany, Berchtold feared that an immediate mobilization against Serbia might result in Austria being left without German backing and the consequences might be disastrous. He saw that he must first gain an assurance of support from Berlin for whatever policy he should ultimately adopt. To secure this he decided to send Count Hoyos on a special mission to Berlin. Berchtold intended to have two strings to his bow. He would not openly abandon Tisza's peace program for winning over Bulgaria to the side

of Austria and Germany, to which Berlin would probably assent; but at the same time he would do all he could to bring Germany as far as he could in the direction of approving energetic and immediate military action against Serbia. For this purpose he would exploit to the utmost the horror of Sarajevo; he would emphasize the fact that the threads of conspiracy certainly led to Belgrade, that the crime was merely the culmination of the series of intolerable Serbian outrages which must now at last be forcibly dealt with.

The Potsdam Conversations, July 5 and 6

This royal letter, together with Berchtold's completed memorandum and postscript, were dispatched to Berlin by Berchtold's confidential Foreign Office Secretary, Alexander Hoyos, and then presented to the Kaiser by the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szogyeny, at Potsdam on Sunday, July 5. According to Szogyeny's report of what took place:

After I had brought it to the knowledge of Emperor William that I had an autograph letter to deliver, I received Their Majesties' invitation to lunch today at noon in the New Palace. I gave His Majesty the letter and the accompanying memorandum. He read both documents in my presence with the greatest attention. At first he assured me that he had expected an earnest action on our part against Serbia, but at the same time he must confess that the statements of Our Majesty raised the prospect of a serious European complication, and he therefore, wished to give no definite answer until he had consulted with the Chancellor. After luncheon, when I again emphasized the seriousness of the situation, His Majesty authorized me to report that in this case also we could reckon on Germany's full support. He must, as he said before, first hear what the Imperial Chancellor had to say, but he did not doubt at all that Bethmann-Hollweg would agree with him completely.

Russia, furthermore, he thought, as things stand today, was in no way ready for war and would certainly ponder very seriously before appealing to arms. But she would stir up the other Powers of the Triple Entente against us and blow upon fire in the Balkans. His Majesty said he understood how hard Francis Joseph, with his well-known love of peace, would find it to invade Serbia; but if we had really decided that military action against Serbia was necessary, he would be sorry if we left unused the present moment which was so favorable for us.

What were Emperor William's feelings at the time of this interview? His emotional nature had been deeply shocked at the horrible news of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife, whom he had just been visiting at Konopischt. While yachting on the preceding Sunday afternoon at Kiel he espied a little launch steaming at full speed as if to board his boat. He made a peremptory gesture to her to keep off. But, instead, Admiral Miiller, who was at the helm, made a sign that he had something to communicate. Holding up to view a piece of paper, he folded it into his cigarette case, and tossed it carefully on board. A sailor picked it up and handed it to the Emperor. William II opened the case, took out the paper, and turned pale as he read the fatal news from Sarajevo. He at

once gave orders to tack about and give up the regatta. He intended to go to Vienna to attend the Archduke's funeral and show his respect to the aged Francis Joseph in his latest bereavement. But when it was reported to him that a dozen Serb assassins were on their way from Belgrade to Vienna to bring about his own assassination, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his Chancellor to abandon his visit.

Before Sarajevo Emperor William had been inclined to think that Austria was unnecessarily nervous about Serbia, and ought to try to come to some friendly understanding with her. In the spring of 1914, when Austria was greatly alarmed at rumors that Serbia, instigated by Russia, might attempt some union with Montenegro, the Kaiser appeared to be pro-Serbian rather than pro-Austrian. Austria's efforts during the Balkan Wars to exclude Serbia from access to the Adriatic he regarded as "nonsense"; her new effort to prevent Serbia from reaching the Adriatic by union with Montenegro he pronounced "Unbelievable! This union is absolutely not to be prevented. And if Vienna attempts it, she will commit a great stupidity, and stir up the danger of a war with the Slavs, which would leave us quite cold." He agreed with Tisza, who calmly accepted the union as imminent, rather than with Berchtold and Franz Joseph who were declaring it unacceptable. He telegraphed from Corfu to Bethmann on April 5:

It is absolutely necessary that the people in Vienna should face the possibility [of union of Serbia and Montenegro] seriously, and be clear in their minds whether under all circumstances they would stand by the position taken by the Emperor and Count Berchtold, or whether they adopt Tisza's view.

While the German Kaiser had hitherto generally inclined to protect Serbia from dangerously excessive demands by Austria and hoped for a peaceful settlement of their difficulties, now, after the murder of one of his best friends, whom he had just been visiting, by assassins who had admittedly come from Belgrade, his indignation against the Serbians was thoroughly roused. His marginal notes excoriate them as "murderers," "regicides," and "bandits." He sincerely felt that the monarchical principle was in danger; that the spirit which led them to murder their own king and queen in 1903 still dominated the country; that all monarchs, Nicholas II most of all, ought to support, instead of opposing, any action on Austria's part which aimed at the suppression of the unscrupulous agitation which had been going on for years among Serbians and which, as he was now informed by Berchtold, threatened the very existence of his Austrian ally, and had made his own personal friend its victim. With his natural impetuosity he wanted Austria to take action in regard to the Serbians as quickly as possible, while the whole civilized world, still under the vivid impression of the terrible assassination, sympathized with her.

What this action of Austria's was to be, the Kaiser did not know definitely on July 5, and did not care to advise. But neither he nor Bethmann thought it at all probable on that day that the Austro-Serbian dispute would lead to a European war. Accordingly, on Sunday afternoon or early Monday, before taking the auto from Potsdam for Kiel on July 6 at 9: 15 A.M., the Kaiser had brief interviews with representatives of the army and navy. He informed each of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He told

them privately to inform their chiefs who were absent on vacation, but added that they need not cut short their vacations to return to Berlin, and that no orders for military preparations need be given, as he did not expect any serious warlike complications.

Thus, on July 6, Bethmann telegraphed to the German ambassador in Vienna:

Finally, concerning Serbia, His Majesty naturally can not take, any stand in the questions between Austria and Serbia, for they are beyond his competence, but Francis Joseph may be sure that His Majesty, in accordance with his treaty obligations and old friendship, will stand true by Austria's side.

Szogyeny however, the Austrian diplomat who talked to the Kaiser about the situation, was under the impression to not inform Italy about what was happening. Like most Austrian officials, he now wanted war with Serbia, and by this statement encouraged Berchtold not to inform Italy beforehand, for fear that Rome would let the cat out of the bag at Belgrade, or at least that Italy would make demands for territorial compensation which Austria had no intention of giving. But this policy of deceiving Italy, or of delaying to inform her, was so completely contrary to the German attitude just before and after July 5, that one is forced to doubt the accuracy of the Austrian Ambassador's assertion. Germany's whole effort in recent years had been to keep Italy loyal and to restrain Austria from doing things in the Balkans which would unduly offend her, and make her likely to abandon completely her treaty obligations in the Triple Alliance. On July 3 Tschirschky had expressed to Berchtold Germany's unvarying attitude, by reminding him of "Italy, which, in view of her relations as an ally, ought to be consulted before the adoption of any military action." Berchtold had replied: "If we should put this question before the Cabinet at Rome, they would probably demand Valona as compensation, but we cannot concede this."

By Szogyeny's own words at the end of his despatch, that Bethmann "warned us most energetically against any plans which might endanger our relations with Italy." Nothing would be more calculated to do this, as the event proved, than the presenting Italy with a *fait accompli* of which she had been told nothing by her ally Austria.

Conclusions as to Germany's Attitude on July 5 and 6

If one compares the two accounts of Germany's attitude as stated by Bethmann and by Szogyeny, he will find that they are somewhat different in substance and spirit. Bethmann devotes four-fifths of his attention to the innovation in German policy involved in the Austrian diplomatic project of winning Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. He only touches briefly, at the end of his telegram, on the question of Austro-Serbian relations, and then only to repeat a principle which he and Kiderlen had stated at one of the crises in the Balkan Wars—Germany will continue to act as a loyal ally, but must leave with Austria the decision as to what her vital interests require. Szogyeny, on the other hand, is mainly interested in Berchtold's projected military action against Serbia, of which he

had been made acquainted by Count Hoyos. His telegrams represent both the Kaiser and Bethmann as believing "an immediate action by Austria against Serbia as the most radical and best solution" and "the present moment as more favorable than a later one". He also states that Bethmann is "in complete agreement" that neither Italy nor Rumania should be informed beforehand, which was untrue.

The Kaiser and his advisers, influenced by the Sarajevo assassination and confronted with Berchtold's appeal for support, made their decision. Toward Bulgaria they agreed to adopt a new policy ; and in regard to Serbia, they stated, according to Szogyeny: "Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relation to Serbia; whatever Austria's decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend." They gave Austria a free hand and made the grave mistake of putting the situation outside of their control into the hands of a man as reckless and unscrupulous as Berchtold. The Kaiser and his advisers on July 5 and 6 were not criminals plotting the World War; they were simpletons putting "a noose about their necks" (As the Kaiser himself noted frantically on July 30, after hearing of Grey's warning, Russian mobilization measures, and Berchtold's persistent disregard of all proposed peaceful solutions: in addition to encirclement by the Entente, "the stupidity and clumsiness of our ally has been made a hangman's noose for us") and handing the other end of the rope to a stupid and clumsy adventurer who now felt free to go as far as he liked. In so doing they were incurring a grave responsibility for what happened later. (As will in later chapters be seen, this is similar to the US giving the "clean slate" to Britain, which in turn gives the "clean slate" to Poland before World War 2).

Bertold's Efforts to Convert Tisza

Having been informed by Szogyeny that Germany assented to the second part of his double-faced appeal, i.e., that Germany would stand firm as an ally in whatever Austria should decide to undertake against Serbia, Berchtold no longer pretended to advocate the first part, i.e., the peace program of Tisza. On the surface he still advocated Tisza's programm at first but he clearly stated against Serbia: peace "will only be possible when Serbia ... is eliminated as a political factor in the Balkans. After the last frightful events in Bosnia, you (The Austrian Emperor) too will be convinced that a friendly settlement of the antagonism which divides Austria from Serbia is no longer to be thought of, and that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as this source of criminal agitation in Belgrade lives on unpunished."

Berchtold could not properly or constitutionally send such an important message on foreign policy, suggesting, as it did, a modification of what had already been agreed upon, without informing the Hungarian Premier. He therefore sent a copy to Tisza; but Tisza, on reading it, was not at all pleased with it. He feared it would make Berlin "shy off" from approving the peaceful diplomatic program. He suspected the truth, that Berchtold was scheming to get the backing of Germany for military action against Serbia

rather than for the agreed-upon “politique de longue main.” He therefore telegraphed at once to Berchtold urging the omission of the words printed in italics above. 58 But at the very moment he was sending this telegram, Szogyeny was already putting the unmodified text of the letter into Emperor William’s hands at Potsdam. Berchtold had sent it off without waiting to hear from Tisza.

The best lever with which to pry Tisza from his firm stand, as Berchtold, Hoyos and Forgach believed, was to represent to Tisza that Berlin wanted immediate and energetic action against Serbia; to make it appear that if Austria did not take advantage of the present favorable opportunity, Germany would more than ever regard Austria as *bundnisunfähig*, i.e., as a weak, hesitating, decrepit state of little value to Germany as an ally; and that consequently Berlin would disregard Austria’s interests and treat her even more cavalierly in the future than in the past. In this purpose they were assisted by, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, they made use of, Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna.

On July 4, at Forgach’s suggestion, Berchtold sent to Francis Joseph and Tisza a rumor, gathered by one of the press agents in the Foreign Office, that “Tschirschky is reported to have declared, with the evident intention that it should be reported in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that Germany would support the Dual Monarchy through thick and thin, whatever should be decided against Serbia. . . . The sooner Austria attacked the better. Yesterday would have been better than today; today would be better than tomorrow. Even if the German press, which is wholly anti- Serbian today, should preach again in favor of peace, Vienna should not allow herself to be in doubt that the [German] Emperor and Empire would stick unconditionally to Austria- Hungary. One Great Power cannot speak more clearly to another than this.” Of course, this was nothing more than a rumor in the end to influence Tisza.

After further intense discussion between Berthold and Tisza, the latter was inclined to agree with Berthold that military action is probably unavoidable. Yet, he did not let himself be bluffed by Berchtold’s “rumor”:

He [Tisza] agreed with Berchtold that the situation had changed somewhat in the last few days as a result of the investigation [at Sarajevo] and the attitude of the Serbian press, and emphasized that he also regarded the possibility of warlike action against Serbia as nearer than he had believed just after the crime at Sarajevo. But he would never agree to a surprise attack on Serbia without preliminary diplomatic action... Unquestionably demands must be made on Serbia, but no ultimatum must be sent until Serbia had failed to comply with these demands. These demands, to be sure, must be severe, but not such as could not be complied with. If Serbia accepted them, we should be able to point to a notable diplomatic success, and have increased our prestige in the Balkans. If the demands were not complied with, he too would favor military action, but must still emphasize that we aim at the diminution, but not the complete annihilation, of Serbia, both because this would never be permitted by Russia without a life-and-death struggle, and because he, as Hungarian Premier, could never consent to have the Dual Monarchy

annex any part of Serbia.

Refusing to be shaken by Berchtold's assertion that Germany was in favor of immediate military action, Tisza declared further:

It is not Germany's affair to decide whether we should attack Serbia now or not. He personally was of the opinion that it was not unconditionally necessary to make war at the present moment, and that in view of the excited state of public opinion in Rumania we should have to reckon with a Rumanian attack, and in any case should have to maintain considerable forces in Transylvania to intimidate the Rumanians. At present, when Germany had happily prepared the way for the adhesion of Bulgaria, there was opened a promising prospect for successful diplomatic action in the Balkans; by joining with Bulgaria and Turkey, and by securing their adhesion to the Triple Alliance, we could out-balance Rumania and Serbia, and so compel Rumania to return to the Triple Alliance. **As to Europe, one must bear in mind that the strength of France, in comparison with that of Germany, was steadily decreasing on account of her lower birth-rate,** and that Germany therefore in the future would have more troops available for use against Russia...

Berchtold answered in reply that the last few years had shown that, though diplomatic victories had raised the prestige of the Monarchy temporarily, they had only increased the existing tension in Austro-Serbian relations. After a long discussion through the morning and afternoon, in which all the ministers except Tisza expressed views in virtual agreement with Berchtold, and in which Conrad set forth secret military plans which he asked not to be recorded in the minutes, no complete agreement was reached. Tisza was willing that specific demands should be made upon Serbia, but insisted that they should not deliberately be made so hard that Serbia could not comply with them, and that they should not be in the form of an ultimatum. He also insisted that he should see them before they were sent, so that he should not be faced with another *fait accompli*. All the other ministers, however, agreed with Berchtold against Tisza, "that a purely diplomatic victory, even if it ended with a striking humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that consequently the demands presented to Serbia must be so far-reaching that their rejection would be a foregone conclusion, and so the way would be prepared for a radical solution through a military attack." As to military preparations, Tisza made his view prevail to the extent that the others consented that there should be no mobilization (As seen in a previous chapter: mobilization means war) until after specific demands and an ultimatum had been successively presented and rejected.

Tisza presented an additional peaceful solution to the Emperor. This possible peaceful solution urged by Tisza was not at all what Berchtold wanted. Shortly after Tisza had left Vienna, he again tried to apply the German lever, by alleging in a letter to Tisza on July 8:

Tschirschky has just left me, after informing me that he has received a telegram from Berlin in which his Imperial Master directed him to declare here most emphatically that

Berlin expects Austria to act against Serbia, and that it would not be understood in Germany if we should let this opportunity go by without striking a blow. . . . From further things the Ambassador said, I could see that in Germany any yielding on our part toward Serbia would be interpreted as a confession of weakness, which would not fail to react on our position in the Triple Alliance and on Germany's future policy.

However by July 9, Berchtold had secured the approval of Francis Joseph and Tisza to the idea that some demands should be presented to Serbia, but not in the form of an ultimatum, the terms of which were to be deliberately framed to make acceptance impossible. Nevertheless, he secretly proceeded with this second purpose. On July 11 he told Tschirschky that he had summoned Tisza to Vienna for a conference on July 14, when he hoped the document would be finally drafted:

So far as he [Berchtold] could say today, the chief demands on Serbia would be to request that the King should officially and publicly make a declaration, and publish it as an army order, that Serbia abandons the policy of a Greater Serbia; secondly, the institution of an Austro-Hungarian Government agency which should watch over the strict observance of this declaration. The time-limit for the answer to the note would be as short as possible, perhaps 48 hours. If the answer was not regarded in Vienna as satisfactory, mobilization would take place at once.

The course of action which became clearer everyday was the bringing about a localized preventive war against Serbia.

On July 14 Berchtold finally succeeded in persuading Tisza to give up his opposition to an ultimatum with a short time-limit. But he had to yield to Tisza's unalterable demand that before the ultimatum was presented, a full Ministerial Council should adopt the formal resolution that "Austria, aside from slight regulations of boundary,

seeks no acquisition of territory as a result of the war with Serbia"—a resolution calculated both to safeguard what Tisza regarded as the special interests of Hungary, and to prevent Italian claims to compensation and intervention on the part of the Powers. It was also decided that the ultimatum should not be presented until it was certain that Poincare had left Russia. For otherwise Berchtold feared that "to take such a step at the moment when the President of the French Republic was being feted as the guest of the Tsar might conceivably be interpreted as a political affront, which we wish to avoid." Moreover, he feared it would be unwise to threaten Belgrade while "the peace-loving, hesitating Tsar and the cautious Sazonov were subject to the immediate influence of the two instigators, Poincare and Izvol'ski"; then Russia, under the influence of the "champagne-mood" of the warm Franco-Russian toasts and the chauvinism of the French President, Izvol'ski, and the Grand Duke Nicholas, would be more likely to intervene with military action.

At this point, the policy of Austria-Hungary's ministers was largely dominated by fear. With peace, they might get a civil war and the empire would dissolve and as time dragged on, Russia would become stronger and more aggressive towards its Balkan Policy.

Austrian Efforts to deceive Europe

During these days while the ultimatum was being drafted and Berchtold was waiting for the Poincare visit to Russia to run its course, he made every effort to preserve the greatest secrecy as to its contents. He alleged that he was waiting for the final results of the Sarajevo investigation before making demands on Serbia. In order to allay all suspicions everywhere as to his real purpose, Berchtold arranged that the Austrian Chief of Staff and Minister of War should leave Vienna as if on vacation, and all Austro-Hungarian officials adopted a more pacific and conciliatory tone in their utterances.

The officials made the impression that no immediate danger would come to Serbia. At Belgrade Baron Giesl assured a Hungarian journalist on July 11 that at the conclusion of the Sarajevo inquiry "we shall take eventual steps in the most conciliatory fashion and within the bounds of international diplomatic proprieties." And a week later he told his English colleague that "personally he was not in favor of pressing Serbia too hard since he was convinced that the Serbian Government was ready to take whatever measures can reasonably be demanded of them, and that he did not view the situation in a pessimistic light." But in reality Giesl's view was quite different. At the end of a long secret jeremiad against Serbia, he reported his conviction to Berchtold on July 21, that the best thing was "to crush the enemy which has been threatening us, and so give Austria quiet after years of crisis. Half-measures, a presentation of demands, long negotiations, and finally a rotten compromise would be the worst blow which could happen to Austria-Hungary's prestige in Serbia and position in Europe. '

Such was the Machiavellian deceit with which Berchtold and his officials sought to lull Europe into a false security before the explosion of his diplomatic bomb Berchtold, however, was not so successful in these efforts to deceive Europe concerning his real intentions, as has usually been assumed on the basis of the "colored books" published in 1914. At the opening of the War, Serbia and the Entente countries tried as much as possible to make it appear that they were taken totally by surprise by Austria's note to Serbia.⁹⁴ But as we know now from more recently published documents, the Great Powers suspected and knew more of Berchtold's intentions than has usually been supposed.

On July 16 the English Ambassador in Vienna telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey:

A kind of indictment is being prepared against the Serbian Government for alleged complicity in the conspiracy which led to assassination of the Archduke. Accusation will be founded on the proceedings in the Sarajevo Court. My informant states that the Serbian Government will be required to adopt certain definite measures in restraint of nationalist and anarchist propaganda, and that Austro-Hungarian Government are in no mood to parley with Serbia, but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used. Germany is said to be in complete agreement with this procedure, and it is thought that the rest of Europe will sympathise with Austria-Hungary in demanding that Serbia shall adopt in future more submissive attitude. . . . I asked if Russia would be expected to stand by quietly in the event of force being used against

Serbia. My informant said that he presumed that Russia would not wish to protect racial assassins, but in any case Austria-Hungary would go ahead regardless of results. She would lose her position as a Great Power if she stood any further nonsense from Serbia. Thus, even England knew what was at stake for Austria-Hungary. Similarly, on July 21, President Poincaré at St. Petersburg, as we shall see, believing that "Austria is preparing to strike a blow," undertook to give the Austrian Ambassador a rude and severe warning, saying significantly, "The Russian people are very warm friends of the Serbians, and France is Russia's ally." He was trying to bluff Austria out of doing precisely what Berchtold was intending to do, and at the same time encouraging Sazonov to stand firm in support of Serbia. Italy also appears to have gotten some inkling of what was preparing at Vienna—possibly from Count Liitzow or from Bunsen. On July 16 the Italian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, "having the impression that Austria was capable of taking an irrevocable step with regard to Serbia," advised Russia to warn Vienna that "Russia would not endure any infringement by Austria of the integrity and independence of Serbia."⁹⁹ On the evening of July 23 a Counsellor of the Italian Embassy definitely informed Prince Trubetzkoi that "Austria-Hungary would today present to Serbia a quite unacceptable ultimatum."

The Final Drafting of the Ultimatum

The precise terms of the ultimatum, or "Note with a time-limit" (befristete Demarche) as it was euphemistically called, were laid before a second secret Ministerial Council on Sunday, July 19. To make secrecy doubly sure, the meeting was held at 10 A.M. at Berchtold's private residence, instead of at the Foreign Office, and those who attended it came in ordinary autos instead of in their own official "unnumbered" cars.

After Conrad, the Chief of Staff, had made a statement about military operations, and had reassured Tisza as to the safety of Transylvania from possible Rumanian uprisings or invasion, Tisza renewed the request which he had made on July 14, that the Council unanimously declare that "no plans of conquest by Austria were connected with the action against Serbia, and that, with the exception of rectifications of frontier necessary for strategic reasons, Austria did not wish to annex a single bit of Serbian territory." Berchtold remarked that he would accept this "only with a certain reserve":

Austria, in case of victory over Serbia, ought not to annex any of her territory, but should seek to reduce her size so that she would no longer be dangerous, by ceding as large parts of Serbian territory as possible to Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and possibly to Rumania also.

This solemn obligation to declare to the Powers at the beginning of war Austria's "territorial disinterestedness" was another of the promises, as we shall see, which Berchtold did not honestly live up to. After a few hours of further discussion by the ministers, Berchtold despatched the ultimatum without the knowledge or approval of Francis Joseph. The

aged Emperor, who was away at Ischl and had been told that the "Note" was to be settled at the Ministerial Council of July 19, had heard nothing further of it, and therefore telegraphed on the 20th to know about it.

Berchtold hastened to reply that it had not been possible to complete it on July 19[!], but that it was now finished and would be sent to Ischl by a courier, and that he himself would arrive next morning, July 21, for an audience. There is no record of the explanations which he may have given to Francis Joseph in this audience on Tuesday morning, except that at its close he telegraphed to his subordinate, Baron Macchio, in Vienna: "His Majesty has approved without change the text of the Note to Serbia and that to the Powers. I beg you to inform the German Ambassador, Tschirschky, that he cannot be given the Note until early tomorrow morning since some corrections are still to be made in it." Why this falsehood? Why did Berchtold here break the promise which he had made a few days before to Tschirschky that "as soon as the text [of the Note] had been fixed on Sunday [July 19, at the Ministerial Council] , he would immediately communicate it to the Imperial [German] Government in great confidence, even before it had been submitted to Francis Joseph for approval"? If the "definitive text was fixed" 113 on July 19, secretly forwarded to all the Austrian Ambassadors on July 20, and "approved without change" by the Emperor on July 21, why did Berchtold still want to withhold it from Tschirschky and allege that "some corrections are still to be made in it"? Probably because Berchtold feared that even the Berlin Foreign Office would disapprove the extreme and intransigent tone of the Note, and might, at the last moment, stretch out a restraining hand. Berlin, as he had already alleged to the Council on July 19, was becoming "nervous," and he could "not be responsible for undesirable incidents if they should postpone the matter longer." Therefore Berlin must not know the text of the Note until it was too late to do anything. Berlin must accept the *fait accompli* that a very severe ultimatum had been dispatched, and that it was practically too late to recall or modify it

Austria's Disregard for German Advice

In this connection, and in view of Germany's repeated statements later that she did not have foreknowledge of the Austrian ultimatum, it is important to observe the change in Berchtold's treatment of Germany before and after July 14, the day on which he finally secured Tisza's consent to a severe ultimatum. Before this date Berchtold had kept Germany quite fully informed of the plans which were developing to deliver a stiff ultimatum to Serbia, and some of the probable terms to be included in it had been indicated to Berlin. He had intimated that they would be so exacting that Serbia could hardly accept them, and that an acceptance would be "very disagreeable" to him. He had asked advice, and appeared ready to receive it and act upon it. Germany, having given a *carte blanche* on July 5, acquiesced in these plans. Knowing Berchtold's hesitations and indecisions in the past, and desiring that Austria should act quickly before the horror and sympathy aroused in Europe by the Sarajevo crime had died away, Germany had not only

acquiesced, but encouraged Berchtold to speedy action. Not knowing the precise text of the intended note, and being still optimistic that any possible Austro-Serbian conflict could be "localized," Germany began to take steps and to offer advice which would help assure such localization. But now Berchtold, after July 14, having been promised German support and having converted Tisza, no longer showed the same consideration for Germany, and gave little heed to her advice and requests.

Jagow (German Foreign Minister), for instance, advised Vienna to "assemble sufficient evidence to prove that there exists a Greater Serbia agitation in Serbia which endangers the Dual Monarchy, in order that the public opinion of Europe may be convinced as far as possible of the justice of Austria's cause. This material would best be published, not separately but as a whole, shortly before submitting to Serbia the demands, or the ultimatum, as the case may be." But Berchtold did not heed this excellent advice.

Germany also urged Berchtold to come to a timely understanding with Italy. The Italian Government, owing to the threatening outpourings of the Austrian Press against Serbia and to the suspiciously silent attitude of the Vienna authorities, was becoming very uneasy. Baron Flotow, the German Ambassador at Rome, reported on July 14 that San Giuliano was very pessimistic as to plans which Berchtold might be hatching. The Italian Minister had said that he could not admit in international law that a Government could be made responsible for a criminal act of an individual, nor for political propaganda, if the propaganda did not amount to an overt act. He feared therefore that the Italian Government could not support the demands which he suspected Austria might make upon Serbia, especially as they would be contrary to the deep-seated feelings of the Italian people, contrary to liberal principles, and contrary to the principle of nationality, which Italy, with her traditions, could never oppose. Flotow concluded that San Giuliano "apparently wanted to warn us that Italy would not remain on Austria's side in case of further complications."

During the following days he sent a series of increasingly emphatic and alarming telegrams that Italy would not support Austria against Serbia, because of the prevailing popular hatred of Austria and sympathy for the Serbian nationalistic "Piedmont" movement, so similar to Italy's own struggle for national unity in the face of Hapsburg oppression half a century before. He also said that it was virtually impossible to influence the Italian Press.

Siding with Serbia, and the difficulty of bribing or bargaining with the Italians, sent Flotow's telegram on to Tschirschky at Vienna, and told him to discuss the Italian situation confidentially with Berchtold. He declared that any territorial extension of Austria, or even an extension of her influence in the Balkans, would absolutely horrify Italy; every time there was a question of Austria threatening Serbia, Italy became extraordinarily nervous; and Italian support to Serbia would materially increase Russia's lust for action. It was therefore of the greatest importance, he believed, that Austria should come to an understanding with the Cabinet at Rome, and hold out as a bait the prospect of some compensations, such as Valona, which formed part of Albania and would cost Austria

nothing but might not satisfy Italy, or even such a fat morsel as the Trentino, which would certainly stop the mouths of Austrophobe public opinion in Italy.

Two days later, on July 20, Tschirschky had a long interview with Berchtold and set forth emphatically Jagow's arguments in regard to the importance of winning and compensating Italy before it was too late. But he too had little success. Berchtold blindly insisted that Italy had no claim to compensation; that he did not need Italian cooperation or support, but only Italy's abstention from interference; that the best way to keep Italy out was to keep intended action secret from her until after the *fait accompli*; and that he had strictly forbidden Mery, the Austrian Ambassador in Rome, to speak of the Serbian question, because he was sure that the slightest hint would be at once communicated by Italy to St. Petersburg, and be seized upon at Rome as an excuse for some counter-action or for claims to compensations. Berchtold gave such a down-right refusal to have Italy get even Valona that Tschirschky apparently refrained from the more delicate proposal that Austria give up the Trentino.

Instead of acting on Germany's wise and prudent suggestion of bargaining reasonably with Italy, Berchtold sent Mery a long argument, in which he tried to contradict the interpretation held by Germany, as well as by Italy, in regard to Art. VII of the Triple Alliance, relating to compensations for Italy in case of a change in the Balkans in Austria's favor. Berchtold had promised Tschirschky that, as an act of courtesy to Italy as an ally, he would inform the Cabinet at Rome of the ultimatum before it was delivered to Serbia, so that San Giuliano and his colleagues should not have to learn of it from the newspapers, and that at the same time he would declare that Austria in her action against Serbia did not aim at any extension of territory for herself. 127 But he kept neither of these promises fully.

Berchtold likewise did not make any clear and timely declaration to Italy or to any of the Powers that Austria would not seek any extension of territory for herself at Serbia's expense, a declaration such as was desired by Tisza and by Germany. Thus, after having converted Tisza on July 14, Berchtold paid no more attention to Germany's advice in regard to Italy than in regard to publishing the Sarajevo evidence simultaneously with the demands on Serbia.

What Foreknowledge did Germany have of the Ultimatum?

Similarly Berchtold paid little heed to Germany's requests after July 14 to be informed as to Austria's final intentions and the precise terms of her contemplated demands on Serbia. Berchtold had kept the German Ambassador in Vienna quite fully informed of the progress of his plans, and of several of the probable demands which he intended to include in the ultimatum. 13 - This information was passed on to the Bavarian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, who summed it up in a long despatch on July 18:

As Zimmermann told me, the Note, so far as yet determined, will contain the following

demands: 1. The issuing of a proclamation by the King of Serbia which shall state that the Serbian Government completely dissociates itself from the Greater Serbia movement, and disapproves of it.

2. The opening of an investigation against persons guilty of complicity in the Sarajevo assassination, and the participation of an Austrian official in this investigation. 3. Proceedings against all persons who have participated in the Greater Serbia movement.

For the acceptance of these demands a 48-hour timelimit will be granted. It is evident that Serbia cannot accept such demands, which are incompatible with her dignity as an independent state. Thus the result would be war.

Here [in Berlin] they are thoroughly willing that Austria use this favorable moment, even at the risk of further complications. But whether they will actually rise to the occasion in Vienna, still seems doubtful to Jagow as well as Zimmermann. The latter expressed the opinion that Austria-Hungary, thanks to her indecision and breaking-up, has now become really the Sick Man of Europe, like Turkey formerly, for whose partition Russians, Italians, Rumanians, Serbians and Montenegrins are now waiting. A vigorous and successful move against Serbia would have the result that Austrians and Hungarians could feel themselves once more to be a national power, would again revive the decayed economic life, and would suppress the foreign aspirations for years to come. ...

What attitude the other Powers will take toward an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia will chiefly depend, according to the view here, on whether Austria is content to chastise Serbia, or will also demand territorial compensations for herself. In the first case, it would be possible to localize the war; in the other case, on the other hand, more serious complications would probably not be lacking. The German Government will immediately after the presentation of the Austrian Note at Belgrade, initiate diplomatic action with the Powers, in the interest of the localization of the war. It will claim to have been just as much surprised as the other Powers by Austria's action, pointing out that the Kaiser is on his northern cruise and that the Chief of the General Staff as well as the Prussian Minister of War are absent on vacation. ...

It will emphasize that it is a matter of common interest for all monarchical Governments that "the Belgrade nest of anarchists" be rooted out once and for all; and it will try to get all the Powers to accept the view that the settlement between Austria and Serbia is a matter concerning these two states alone. The mobilization of the German Army is to be refrained from, and they are also going to work through the military authorities to prevent Austria from mobilizing her entire Army, and especially not the troops in Galicia, in order to avoid bringing about automatically a counter-mobilization on Russia's part, which in turn would cause us, and then France, to take similar measures, and thereby conjure up a European War.

The first part of this famous report indicates that Germany had received only a brief outline of a part of the actual later ultimatum, namely, the issuing of a proclamation by the Serbian Government dissociating itself from the Greater Serbia agitation, the 48-hour

time-limit, and two demands which roughly correspond to four of the total ten points elaborated in the ultimatum.

On the other hand, while it is true that the German Government did not know half the demands nor the actual wording of the ultimatum (which in fact had not yet been definitely drawn up even in Vienna), it knew the substance of some of the probable demands which were most important; and it knew that the ultimatum was to be so framed that Serbia would not be likely to yield to it. Jagow was therefore virtually lying when he repeatedly asserted a few days later that "he had no previous knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian Note." This is a matter to which we shall return in a moment. Though it is no justification of his lie, it may be pointed out that Sir Edward Grey, who is often extolled as an example of honesty and sincerity, lied just as deliberately in regard to his foreknowledge of the probable terms of the ultimatum. He had learned on July 16, from a friend of Berchtold's who told the English Ambassador in Vienna, that "a kind of indictment is being prepared against the Serbian Government for alleged complicity in the conspiracy which led to the assassination of the Archduke. ... The Serbian Government will be required to adopt certain definite measures in restraint of nationalist and anarchist propaganda; the Ausiro-Hungarian Government are in no mood to parley with Serbia, but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used." Nevertheless on July 20, Sir Edward Grey, having "asked the German Ambassador today if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia," and having received a negative reply, remarked that he also "had not heard anything recently," except that Count Berchtold had spoken reassuringly to the Italian Ambassador. Either Sir Edward Grey was ignorant of Bunsen's important despatch received at the British Foreign Office four days before this (such ignorance seems hardly likely), or he too was making an untrue assertion of ignorance concerning what was going on at Vienna. This kind of diplomatic lying, unfortunately, was not the monopoly of any one country, but was indulged in all too freely by Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors almost everywhere in July, 1914.

Though Germany possessed, within the first week or ten days after the Potsdam Conversations, such knowledge concerning the ultimatum as has just been indicated, this was still regarded at Berlin as too indefinite. After July 14, therefore, she repeatedly requested further information as to Austria's ultimate aims and the precise terms of the ultimatum, in order to prepare public opinion in favor of "localization." Thus, on July 17, Jagow recognized that Berchtold's "plans may be influenced or modified by the course of events," but assumed that "he has in mind a general picture of the aims to be sought, including the matter of territory;" Jagow therefore instructed the German Ambassador in Vienna to "get some information on this point," and "about where the road is likely to lead us." And again on July 20: "For dealing with public opinion, it is of the greatest importance for us to be precisely informed beforehand, not only of the contents of the Note, but also as to the day and hour of its publication. Reply by telegraph." But now Berchtold paid little heed to these requests, and Germany was virtually unable to learn

anything further, except as to the date when the ultimatum would be presented and Berchtold's obstinacy in rejecting German advice as to Italy.

The German Foreign Office also applied for information to the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin. Szogyeny's instructions were that he was not to show the ultimatum to Germany until July 24, the morning after it had been delivered in Belgrade. But Szogyeny now felt himself compelled to telegraph to Berchtold, that he "considered it unconditionally necessary to inform the German Government at once, that is, before the other Powers, in a strictly confidential manner." And in a letter of the same day he wrote: "Jagow gave me clearly to understand that Germany would naturally stand behind us unconditionally and with all her strength, but for this very reason it was of vital interest to Germany to be informed betimes as to 'where our path is leading to.'" Accordingly, on the following afternoon, July 22, Berchtold finally gave his consent, and Szogyeny then showed the text of the ultimatum to Jagow.

After reading it on Wednesday evening, July 22, Jagow told Szogyeny it was, in his opinion, "too sharp," and went too far in its demands. Even then, the Emperor's approval of the Ultimatum was still lacking. Bethmann, who was at Hohenfinow at this time, apparently did not know of the text of the note until late on the night of the 22nd or the morning of the 23rd, 114 but when he saw it, he too, like Jagow, was of the opinion that it was too sharp. Emperor William, away at sea on the Hohenzollern, first heard the contents of the ultimatum later still, through a newspaper agency and not officially from the German Foreign Office, as we know from an irritated telegram which he sent to his "civilian Chancellor."

Thus it is essentially true that Germany knew the general tenor of some of the terms of the ultimatum, and was aware that they were likely to lead to a localized war with Serbia, but she did not know the text of it beforehand in time to modify or recall it. Berchtold's *fait accompli* methods had prevented that. They would have probably still adhered to the policy adopted on July 5, that the Austro-Serbian question was "beyond the competence of Germany," but that Germany must support her ally in the action she had decided upon to protect herself against the Greater Serbia danger. They felt they had to accept Berchtold's *fait accompli*. It was a consequence of their folly in giving him a free hand on July 5. To have disavowed Austria's action at the last moment, would of course, as events turned out, have been wiser. But it would have meant that the Triple Alliance would have been greatly weakened further in the face of the Triple Entente which was growing closer and stronger. The internal dissolution of Austria would have been accelerated through the encouragement to restless Slav subjects. Austria's evaporating prestige in the Balkans would have completely dried up, and Russia, with her growing population and ambitions, would have dominated the Balkans and hastened the day for controlling Constantinople and the Straits.

Bethmann and Jagow concluded that the more energetically they appeared to support Austria, the more likely they would be to succeed in "localizing" the conflict and in preventing Russia and the other Powers from interfering. Therefore on the morning of

July 24, when Austria notified the Powers of Europe of the Note delivered to Serbia the night before, Germany immediately followed with declarations endorsing Austria's charges against Serbia and emphasizing the importance of localizing the conflict.

In pretending to be wholly ignorant of Austria's step and at the same time approving it when taken, the German Foreign Office stupidly put itself in a false and self-contradictory position which not unnaturally made the Entente Powers suspect that it was acting in bad faith; it made them suspect that the German authorities were more responsible for Austria, and were harboring more reprehensible plans of their own, than was really the case—that Germany had not only approved but had instigated Austria's action; that this action was not aimed merely at Serbia, but was the pretext for a general war which would realize the ambitions voiced by irresponsible Pan-German orators and newspapers. These suspicions were not unnatural under the circumstances, and though they were far from accurate, they were assiduously spread, especially by the representatives of France, and contributed much to the later fatal course of events. Later, when Germany perceived that it might not be possible after all to "localize" an Austro-Serbian war, and therefore made genuine efforts to restrain Austria and avoid a general European War, less credence was given to her statements because of the suspicions which had been aroused by Jagow's untrue assertions that Germany had been ignorant of the ultimatum. Reputation for good faith once weakened is difficult to restore. This is what made so serious her adding to the first blunder of giving Berchtold a blank check on July 5 the second blunder of saying what was not true in regard to foreknowledge of the ultimatum.

The Ultimatum

Focusing on the demands of Austria-Hungary only...“The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity
2. To dissolve immediately the society styled “Narodna Odbrana,” to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;
3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria- Hungary ;
4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of

communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;
6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;
7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo;
8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Shabats and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;
9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,
10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July."

In the light of what has been said in the preceding chapters concerning the Sarajevo assassination, the circumstances leading up to it, Serbia's failure to take prompt steps to discover and arrest the accomplices, and Austria's conviction that her very existence was at stake, one cannot say that the demands, though very severe, were excessive from the Austrian point of view.

7.19 The Russian Danger

The first news of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand made a painful impression in Russia, as everywhere else in the civilized world. But the feeling of hatred toward Austria-Hungary which prevailed in Russia, and which had been steadily increasing since the Balkan crises, soon overshadowed all expressions of sympathy for the aged Austrian monarch in the latest of his many tragic bereavements. At the memorial services arranged in St. Petersburg by the Austrian Ambassador there was, to be sure, a full attendance of Russian officials, including Grand Dukes Boris and Nicholas, who had been

requested by the Tsar to represent the Imperial family. But aside from this perfunctory expression of feeling, the German Ambassador, Pourtales, did not notice any genuine sympathy with Austria's loss. Not only in the newspapers, but also in society, he heard virtually nothing but unfriendly comments on the murdered Austrian Archduke: that Russia, by his death, was now rid of a bitter enemy.

Championing the official Serbian attitude, Sazonov (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs) declared that the Sarajevo crime was only the isolated act of immature young persons, and there was no proof of their connection with any deep-laid political plot. When Pourtales (German diplomat) urged "monarchical solidarity" against such dangerous anarchists and murderers, he found that Sazonov responded to this ancient theme with less warmth than usual, and concluded that Sazonov, like nearly everyone else in Russia, was blinded by his hatred of Austria- Hungary. He noticed also everywhere in Russia a boundless contempt for the condition of affairs in the Dual Monarchy.

The Italian Ambassador had told the Secretary, Baron Schilling, of his impression that Austria was about to take an irreparable step against Serbia, and that it would be well to serve a warning at Vienna. ³ To the Austrian and German Ambassadors Sazonov therefore reiterated his views, that it was unjust to make the whole Serbian people responsible for the crime of a single individual, as the Austrian newspapers were doing. "Russia," he said to the Austrian Ambassador, "would not be indifferent to any effort to humiliate Serbia. Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing language or military measures against Serbia. Sazonov had feared that some sudden stroke might be attempted by Austria, which would humiliate Serbia directly, and thereby Russia indirectly. He was always very much afraid that Germany or Austria would do something to diminish Russia's prestige in the Balkans and in Europe. It was a point on which he was very sensitive, particularly in view of the strong Pan-Slav sentiment of the Russian Press and the militarists, who were not wholly friendly to him, and who might drive him from office if he suffered a diplomatic defeat.

Poincare's Visit to Russia

In January, 1914, at the height of the Liman von Sanders crisis, the French had asked Sazonov when it would be convenient for President Poincare to repeat the summer visit to Russia, which he had made in August, 1912, shortly before the outbreak of the Balkan War. It was finally arranged that he should arrive at Kronstadt at 2 P. M. on July 20, and leave at 11 P. M. on July 23.⁶ When the Sarajevo assassination occurred the French Cabinet raised the question whether it was desirable for him to leave France, but decided, as did the Kaiser in going on his northern cruise, that it would seriously alarm public opinion as to the European situation, if important arrangements long announced should be abandoned.

The French President and his Prime Minister embarked from Dunkirk on the cruiser, *France*, on July 15, and were welcomed five days later off Peterhof by Sazonov, Paleo-

logue, and Izvol'ski, and then by the Tsar. Poincaré and Paleologue in their memoirs have left elaborate and picturesque accounts of all the ceremonial occasions with which the three following days were filled, but they say very little of private conversations which were exchanged.

One of Poincaré's aims was to reduce Anglo-Russian friction over Persia, in order to secure closer cooperation between the ally and the friend of France, and so perhaps pave the way for a renewal of the negotiations for an Anglo-Russian Naval Convention; these had been interrupted owing to the rumors of it which had leaked out, and to Sir Edward Grey's unwillingness to continue negotiations in secret which he had publicly denied in Parliament.

Poincaré in a longer reply, recalled that the Franco-Russian Alliance had existed nearly twenty-five years, and added:

"Founded upon community of interests, consecrated by the peaceful desires of the two Governments, supported by armed forces on land and sea which know and value each other and have become accustomed to act as brothers, strengthened by long experience and augmented by valuable friendships, the Alliance to which the sublime Tsar Alexander III and the lamented President Carnot gave the initiative has ever since constantly afforded proof of its beneficial activity and its unshakable strength. Your Majesty can be assured that France in the future, as always in the past, will, in sincere and daily co-operation with her ally, pursue the work of peace and civilization for which both the Governments and both the peoples have never ceased to labour."

Next morning, July 21, Poincaré and the Tsar talked over the general European situation, and especially the Persian Question. The Tsar assured him that "he would not allow Persia to cause division between England and Russia." Poincaré also warned the Austria ambassador:

"With a little good-will, this Serbian affair is easy to settle. But it is easy also for it to become envenomed. Serbia has very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an Ally, France. What complications are to be feared here?"

Poincaré's visit also greatly strengthened the militarist group in Russia, headed by the Grand Duke, who wanted Sazonov to take a more aggressive attitude and who were continually trying to exert pressure on the peace-loving Tsar. The war spirit and "champagne mood" which was stirred by the presence of the French guests is well described by Paleologue (French diplomat) in his account of the banquet which Grand Duke Nicholas gave in Poincaré's honor on the evening of July 22, after a military review at Krasnoe Selo. Paleologue arrived a few minutes early and found the Montenegrin Princesses, Anastasia and Melitza, wives of Grand Duke Nicholas and Grand Duke Peter respectively, decorating the tables; they both began to talk to him excitedly:

"Do you know that we are passing through historic days, blessed days! Tomorrow, at the review, the bands will play nothing but the Marche Lorraine and Sambre et Meuse.

Today, I had a telegram from my father in the proper style; he tells me we shall have war before the month is out. What a hero, my father! He is worthy of the Iliad. Here, look at this little box—it never leaves me; it has Lorraine soil in it, yes, Lorraine soil, which I collected beyond the frontier when I was in France two years ago with my husband. And now look at that table of honor! It is decorated entirely with thistles; I would not have any other flowers put on it. Now then! They are thistles from Lorraine! I picked a few stalks on the territory annexed [by Germany] ; I brought them here and had the seeds sown in my garden. Melitza, talk to the Ambassador some more; tell him all this day means to us, while I go and receive the Tsar.” During the meal I sat next the Grand Duchess Anastasia and the dithyrambics continued, mixed with prophecies: “War is going to break out. Nothing will be left of Austria. You will get Alsace-Lorraine back. Our armies will meet in Berlin. Germany will be annihilated.” Then suddenly—“I must control myself, the Tsar is looking at me.”

This was the situation for France and Russia six days before war broke out and it shows precisely how the people in France and Russia felt.

Late that same night, at 4 A. M., Sazonov sent off to the Russian Charge d’Affaires at Vienna the warning telegram which before Poincare’s visit he had told Schilling was unnecessary:

“Please point out in a friendly but firm manner the dangerous consequences of any Austrian action of a character unacceptable to the dignity of Serbia. The French and English Ambassadors are trusted to give councils of moderation.”

Poincare completely approved of this, and the French Ambassador at Vienna was instructed accordingly. But the British Foreign Office realized the danger of a veiled threat of this kind. Sir Eyre Crowe noted: “Any such communication at Vienna would be likely to produce intense irritation, without any beneficial other effect.” Sir Arthur Nicolson was “afraid that it is not a judicious move.” And Sir Edward Grey decided to postpone any action until next day. This Franco-Russian move to head off Austria from making demands on Serbia, however, came to nothing, because the Russian Charge d’Affaires in Vienna did not receive his instructions until 3 P. M. on July 23. He went at once to the Ballplatz, but was told that Berchtold was very busy and could not see him until next morning. In the meantime the ultimatum was presented at Belgrade at 6 P. M. on July 23. Even had the instructions arrived earlier, they would almost certainly have failed to deter Berchtold, especially in view of England’s do-nothing attitude and of the Vienna Cabinet’s firm determination.

Meanwhile in Russia the final festivities of the Poincare visit took place in blissful ignorance of the fact that Austria had already presented her demands at Belgrade, and that the Franco-Russian move to prevent it would prove abortive. In the farewell toast on board the France, the President thanked the Tsar for the warmth of his reception, which afforded “an emphatic affirmation of the indissoluble alliance which unites Russia and my native France”. The words were acclaimed with tumultuous enthusiasm, and made on

all present a vivid and lasting impression of Poincaré's complete determination to stand firmly behind Russia. A few days later Paleologue cited them to the Under-Secretary, as an evidence of such perfect Franco-Russian accord that they would bluff Germany out of making war in support of Austria.

The result of Poincaré's visit, as the English Ambassador was confidentially informed by Sazonov and Paleologue next morning, had been to establish the following points:

1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.

2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia which the latter would be justified in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

3. Solemn affirmation of obligations imposed by the alliance of the two countries.

The second of these points, as we have just seen, had already been frustrated by Austria's prompt action at Belgrade before the Russian and French Ambassadors were able to carry out their instructions. The first and third points find their interpretation in the events which followed. By the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg they were treated as a blank check by which France promised full support to Russia in whatever measures she should take to prevent Austria from carrying out the plans which Berchtold had decided to carry out, but which were not yet fully known to the rest of Europe. This is seen in the assurances which Paleologue repeatedly gave to Sazonov as the latter took progressive steps toward secret Russian military measures preparatory to mobilization and to a general European War.

Sazonov's Plan for Partial Mobilization, July 24

On the morning of Friday, July 24, the Austrian Ambassadors everywhere notified the Governments to which they were accredited of the ultimatum which had been presented at Belgrade the preceding evening. Everywhere, except at Berlin, its severe demands and intransigent tone made a painful impression and caused the most serious misgivings. Sir Edward Grey called it "the most formidable document he had ever seen addressed by one State to another that was independent." But he did not care to discuss the merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia; that was not England's concern. It was solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe that he would concern himself with the matter, and he would wait to hear the views of the other Powers.

After hearing about the Ultimatum for Serbia, Viviani (French Prime Minister) had at once sent wireless messages to St. Petersburg, London, and Paris, "that, in his opinion, (1) Serbia should immediately offer all the satisfaction compatible with her honor and

independence; (2) that she should request an extension of the twenty-four hour [sic] time-limit within which Austria demanded a reply; (3) that England, Russia and France should agree to support this request; and (4) that the Triple Entente should see whether it would be possible to substitute an international investigation in place of an Austro-Serbian investigation." Bienvenu-Martin proceeded to take some steps accordingly, but they came too late to produce any positive results. It was in St. Petersburg, however, that the ultimatum caused the greatest excitement and alarm. The Russian Ministers and Entente Ambassadors did not get to bed until long past midnight, after the France had steamed away under the stars carrying Poincare down the Gulf of Finland. They had not yet recovered from the fatiguing festivities and bountiful banquets, when they were rudely awakened toward 7 A. M., after very few hours of sleep, by the news of a telegram from Belgrade telling of the ultimatum.

During the succeeding fortnight of almost sleepless days and nights, the fatigue and mental demands were far greater than during Poincare's visit. Not only in St. Petersburg, but everywhere in the Foreign Offices of Europe, responsible officials now began to fall under a terrible physical and mental strain of overwork, worry, and lack of sleep, whose inevitable psychological consequences are too often* overlooked in assessing the blame for the events which followed. But if one is to understand how it was that experienced and trained men occasionally failed to grasp fully the sheaves of telegrams put into their hands at frequent intervals, how their proposals were sometimes confused and misunderstood, how they quickly came to be obsessed with pessimistic fears and suspicions, and how in some cases they finally broke down and wept, one must remember the nerve-racking psychological effects of continued work and loss of sleep, combined with the consciousness of the responsibility for the safety of their country and the fate of millions of lives.

A few minutes later Szapary arrived to read the full text of the ultimatum and to explain and justify Austria's action. Sazonov, who had not yet had time to consult with the other Russian Ministers or to learn how far England would back him up, received Szapary by saying that he knew what brought him, but could not state what Russia's attitude would be. Szapary then read aloud the ultimatum, but was frequently interrupted by Sazonov's questions and objections to its statements. At the mention of the dossier, which was to place the full Austrian evidence against Serbia before the Powers, Sazonov asked why Austria bothered with it, when she had already sent an ultimatum, showing she wanted war and not an impartial investigation; as things were, after the ultimatum, he said, he was not at all curious to see the dossier. "The fact is, you want war, and have burned your bridges." When Szapary protested that Austria was peace-loving, and merely wanted security for her territory against foreign revolutionary agitation and for her dynasty against bombs, Sazonov remarked sarcastically, "One sees how pacific you are, now that you are setting Europe on fire."

Sazonov, however, was more excited and disturbed than Szapary appeared to think. Of a naturally mercurial temperament, he was now particularly indignant at Berchtold's methods. The short time-limit, the withholding of the dossier, and the humiliating

demands on Serbia, all seemed to him to indicate that Austria was determined on war at once with Serbia. It was particularly deceitful on Austria's part to have pretended for three weeks that the demands would be mild, such as Serbia could surely accept, and then to face the little kingdom with an ultimatum which seemed to indicate that Austria wanted war and would soon cross the frontier into Serbian territory. And Sazonov suspected that much that Szapary said was not true. Therefore Russia must be prepared for war, or at least a strong diplomatic bluff, and he must make sure • of British and Rumanian support. Accordingly, while he had been talking with Szapary, he had Baron Schilling notify the Ministers of War, Navy, and Finance of the course of events and summon them to a Council of Ministers at 3 P. M. Schilling warned Izvolski and Shebeko to return to their posts at Paris and Vienna, and recalled Neratov, Prince Trubetzkoï and other Foreign Office advisers from their leaves of absence. He also pointed out to the Finance Minister the necessity of withdrawing without delay as far as possible all State deposits in Germany.³⁷ Sazonov himself consulted with General Ianushkevich, the Chief of the General Staff, and proposed preparations for a partial mobilization of the Russian army, directed exclusively against Austria, the announcement of which might serve as a warning to Germany and an effectual bluff to stop Austria from attacking Serbia.

This at any rate seems to be the conclusion to be drawn from the following narrative of General Dobrorolski. Dobrorolski was Chief of the Mobilization Section of the General Staff in 1914, and therefore in a position to know authoritatively all the technical details and preparations of Russia's mobilization measures. Driven into exile by the Bolshevik revolution and writing his narrative in Belgrade in 1921 without access to his notes and papers, he made a few minor slips of memory. But his remarkable frankness, authoritative information, and general accuracy is confirmed by all the documents which have since come to light, as well as by talks which the present writer was privileged to have with him in 1923. Dobrorolski writes:

On July 11 [N. S., 24], St. Olga's Day, between 11 o'clock and noon, the Chief of the General Staff, General Ianushkevich, called me on the service telephone and told me to come immediately to his office.

"The situation is very serious," he said as I entered. "Austria has delivered a wholly unacceptable ultimatum to the Serbian Government and we cannot remain indifferent. It has been decided to announce this publicly and decisively. Tomorrow there will appear in the *Russkii Invalid* a short official warning, saying that all Russia is following with close attention the course of the negotiations between the Austro-Hungarian and the Serbian Governments, and will not remain inactive if the dignity and the integrity of the Serbian people, our blood brothers, are threatened with danger.³⁹ Have you everything ready for the proclamation of the mobilization of our army?" Upon my replying in the affirmative, the Chief of the General Staff said to me, "In an hour bring to me all the documents relative to preparing of our troops for war, which provide, in case of necessity, for proclaiming partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary only. This mobilization must give no occasion to Germany to find any grounds of hostility to herself." I pointed out

that a partial mobilization was out of the question. But General Ianushkevich ordered me anew to make a detailed report to him after an hour in accordance with his decision already made. . . . The absolute impossibility of a partial mobilization of the army was evident. By what motives was our strategy to be guided? By political considerations. [Dobrorolski then explains that on account of the system of alliances Russia was convinced that a war between Austria and Russia would inevitably involve Germany, and therefore no mobilization plan had been worked out for war against Austria alone.] What then could be the purpose of any partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary alone? A threat which was not supported by a convincing evidence of one's own power would give rise to an attempt to despise this threat. A partial mobilization of our forces would have had exactly the opposite consequences of those which we reckoned upon. From a strategic point of view the partial mobilization was simply folly. It was the intention to mobilize four Military Districts: Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. In the territory covered by these military districts thirteen army corps had their standing peace quarters.

Dobrorolski goes on to explain all the technical dangers and difficulties of any such partial mobilization as was proposed. After mobilization the troops of these four districts would necessarily advance to the frontier, but to strike at Austria effectively from the East and North, it was necessary for some of them to advance through the Warsaw District. Yet in order not to alarm Germany the Warsaw District was to remain untouched! And if no preparations were made in the Warsaw District, the part of it which bordered on Austria would remain uncovered and unprotected. Moreover, if a general mobilization should follow the partial mobilization, the utmost confusion would take place, because the reservists for the Warsaw District were drawn partly from the Moscow and Kazan Districts, where partial mobilization would already have taken place. These dangers and difficulties were not apparently, however, at first fully grasped by Sazonov, or even by Ianushkevich, who had been in office only a few months, and, as we shall see, this plan of partial mobilization was proceeded with, to the utter dismay of the military technicians like Dobrorolski and General Danilov.

Sazonov said that "the step taken by Austria meant war," and he hoped that England would proclaim her solidarity with France and Russia. He said that Austria's conduct was "immoral and provocative," that some of her demands were absolutely unacceptable, and that she never would have acted as she had done without first having consulted Germany. Paleologue added, "France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, if necessary, fulfil all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance." Buchanan replied that he could not speak for England, but would telegraph Grey all that they had said; he personally could hold out no hope that England would make any declaration of solidarity that would entail armed support of France and Russia. Buchanan concluded from Paleologue's language that "it almost looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand even if we declined to join them."

On leaving the luncheon conference at the French Embassy about 3 P. M., Sazonov proceeded to the meeting of the Ministerial Council. Here he set forth the diplomatic

situation and probably argued at length to persuade the reluctant military authorities to accept his partial mobilization plan. We have no precise and satisfactory record of the discussion, but after several hours the Council adopted the following resolutions: (1) to get into touch with the other Powers to request Austria to extend the time-limit, and so give them time to become acquainted with and to investigate the dossier of Sarajevo documents which Austria had declared she would communicate; (2) to advise Serbia not to offer armed resistance, if Austria should invade her territory but to announce that she was yielding to force and entrusting her fate to the judgment of the Great Powers; (3) to authorize the Ministers of War and Marine to ask the Tsar's consent to announce, depending on the course of events, mobilization in the four Military Districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, and of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets; (4) to fill up immediately the stocks of war-supplies, and (5) to recall instantly state funds in Germany and Austria.

Thus, an effort was to be made to have the Great Powers examine the merits of the Austro-Serbian question—to “Europeanize” it, instead of “localizing” it, as Austria and Germany wished; and, if this was unsuccessful, to arrange that much of the Austrian army would be tied up in Serbia at the moment Russia should finally have to take up arms. Sazonov accordingly telegraphed to Belgrade that “if the helpless situation of Serbia is indeed such as to leave no doubt as to the outcome of an armed conflict with Austria,” it would be better not to make resistance, but retreating, let Austria occupy territory without a fight and appeal to the Powers to intervene. He also sent a circular telegram to the Powers urging an extension of the time-limit, so that, if Austria enabled the Powers to acquaint themselves with the results of the Sarajevo investigation, they would be in a position to give Serbia corresponding advice.

As these efforts might not be successful, the Council had also decided “in principle” in favor of Sazonov’s “partial mobilization” plan, that is, the mobilization of 1,100,000 men—thirteen army corps in the four southern districts near Austria; this was only to be announced, however, when Sazonov should decide it was necessary, and this decision of the Council was not final until approved by the Tsar next day. All these arrangements were made by Sazonov before he received Pourtales and heard Germany’s views on the ultimatum and policy of “localization.” Pourtales attempted, in accordance with the instructions given to him and the other German Ambassadors, to justify Austria’s action and to urge that the Austro-Serbian conflict should remain “localized,” Sazonov, “who was very much excited and gave vent to boundless reproaches against Austria-Hungary, stated in the most determined manner that it would be impossible for Russia to admit that the Austro-Serbian quarrel could be settled between the two parties concerned.”

Pourtales urged “monarchical solidarity” and the danger of countenancing regicides, but Sazonov quickly shifted the conversation to the broader political ground that a whole Government and Nation could not be held responsible for the act of an individual, and that Austria’s charges were by no means convincing. He launched into such unrestrained accusations against Austria that Pourtales expressed the fear that he was blinded by his

hatred of Austria. "Hate," replied Sazonov, "is foreign to my nature. I do not hate Austria; I despise her." Finally he exclaimed: "Austria is seeking a pretext to gobble up Serbia; but in that case Russia will make war on Austria." Pourtales sought to calm him by expressing his conviction that, at most, Austria was only intending to inflict a deserved chastisement on Serbia, and was far from thinking of making territorial gains. But Sazonov shook his head doubtfully: "First Serbia would be gobbled up; then will come Bulgaria's turn; and then we shall have her on the Black Sea."

The interview was a tense one, and served only to accentuate more sharply the conflict between two views which were now coming into dangerous conflict—should the Austro-Serbian question remain "localized," or be "Europeanized."

Warlike Portents at Krasnoe Selo, July 25

On Saturday, July 25, the wave of midsummer heat which had been hanging over St. Petersburg for a month seemed to reach its climax. The trains were crowded with peace-loving people pouring out for the summer holidays. Out on the sun-baked plain at Krasnoe Selo, the Tsar and all St. Petersburg's high society were gathered to witness the summer review of the Russian troops. Late in the forenoon an 'important Ministerial Council was held at which the Tsar presided. It lasted so long that the maneuvers had to be postponed an hour. Even when they finally took place, they were cut short, and an unusual military excitement pervaded all the officers. The foreign Military Attaches got the impression that the Ministerial Council had considered mobilizing the Russian army, and perhaps had even decided to order it, at least in the four Southern Military Districts facing Austria.

General Adlerberg, the Governor of St. Petersburg, by a slip of the tongue, in talking with the German General Chelius, actually spoke of measures "for mobilization." Baron Griinwald, the Tsar's chief equerry, sitting next to Chelius at the banquet that evening, said to him, "The situation is very serious. What was decided this noon, I am not permitted to tell you. You yourself will soon learn it. But take it from me, it looks very serious." He touched glasses with Chelius and drank his health with the words, "Let us hope we shall see each other again in better times!" After the military review had been held, in an unusually curtailed form, it was announced that the maneuvers at Krasnoe Selo and in the whole Empire were to be broken off, and that the troops were to return at once to their standing quarters, as they would have to do in case of war.

The idea that mobilization and war were imminent was increased by the immediate promotion that same evening of the St. Petersburg Military Academy cadets to the position of regular officers in the army, instead of later in the year as customary. At the banquet following the Tsar's address to these new appointees, says the German Military Attache, "young officers openly expressed their joy to me that now at last they were starting something 'against Austria.' Others aired their rage against 'Austrian presumption.' Even Prince Peter of Montenegro, who was present just at this time,

thought lie had to tell me that in his country there reigned a distinct enthusiasm for war, and that mobilization was in full progress. Not a man seemed to recollect that we [Germans] were in alliance with Austria;'

Following the banquet there was a theatrical performance, which, under the leadership of the Grand Duke Nicholas, was made the occasion of a great demonstration for war. On this same evening St. Petersburg was startled out of its stillness by the unexpected sound of the hoofbeats of the Imperial Guards hurrying back through the mist to the capital, although they were to have been quartered out at Krasnoe Selo for another month. "At seven o'clock," writes Paleologue, "I go to the Warsaw Railway Station to say good-bye to Izvolski, who is returning to his post in haste. On the platforms, there is lively animation: the trains are crowded with officers and soldiers. This already looks like mobilization. We exchange rapidly our impressions, and come to same conclusion, 'Cette fois, c'est la guerre.'" Next day Princess Paley, who was in close touch with the Grand Dukes, sent an urgent telegram to her mother and daughter who were at Bad Kissingen in Germany to leave immediately for Switzerland or Italy; and General Danilov, who had been hurriedly recalled from a tour in the Caucasus, telegraphed to his family in, Podolia near the Austrian frontier begging them to return at once to St. Petersburg.

The Russian "Period Preparatory to War"

In any event the military leaders of Russia felt that a war between Austria and Serbia was necessarily a war between Austria and Russia, and therefore between Russia and Germany. They had no doubt that Austria was about to begin the invasion of Serbia as soon as the time-limit expired. In fact, later in the day, a Russian officer looking at his watch at six o'clock, remarked to General Chelius, "The cannon on the Danube will have begun to fire by now, for one doesn't send such an ultimatum except when the cannon are loaded." They were probably convinced that war was "inevitable." and that here was Russia's heaven-sent opportunity to have her final reckoning with Germany, and to acquire that control of Constantinople and the Straits, which had been so seriously considered at the secret conference on February 8/21, 1914, and for which preparations had been ordered, in order that, when a crisis should break out, Russia should be able to secure her historic aims at the Bosphorus. Therefore the sooner general mobilization was declared the better.

By a strange irony of fate, at the same moment when the Russian military bands, in the camp at Krasnoe Selo, had been welcoming Poincare with the Marseillaise, the Cossacks in the suburbs of St. Petersburg had been striking down working-men for singing this same martial anthem. An apparently well-informed Russian sympathizer, writing at length in the Gazette de Lausanne of September 7 and 8, 1917, in comment upon the Sukhomlinov trial, asserts that in 1914 general mobilization was strongly urged as a salutary measure against this internal industrial and revolutionary danger (Marxism), rather than as a necessary military precaution against German attack; it would also counteract, it was

urged, the feared autonomous and separatist agitation among the non-Slavic elements in the Russian Empire. The idea of a foreign war to avert domestic troubles is, of course, a very familiar one in the history of many countries. The militarists may quite probably have believed that the leading forth of the specter of threatening internal revolution and anarchy would serve as a good bogey with which to persuade the peace-loving Tsar to consent to a general mobilization, and they were ready to assure him that, in case of mobilization and war, the strikes would offer no serious obstacle,⁰⁸ as in fact proved to be the case.

At any rate, whatever the arguments used at this Council, Sazonov prevailed in maintaining his plan for "partial mobilization." But a concession was made to the militarists in the adoption of a series of preparatory military measures which would facilitate a "general mobilization" when the Tsar should finally be persuaded to consent to it. In all, five decisions were taken by the Ministerial Council.

1. The Tsar's approval of the decision "in principle" for contingent "partial mobilization" against Austria. This decision in favor of partial mobilization, in case of need, to bluff Austria, is confirmed by the testimony of Ianushkevich at the Sukhomlinov trial in 1917: "At first it had been decided to proclaim a partial mobilization, the four districts—to frighten off Austria-Hungary." It avoided the danger of the "general mobilization," (Mobilization means War) which was desired by the military leaders, but which would probably lead Germany to retaliate with a countermobilization, and so bring on a general European war. If the announcement of partial mobilization should not after all succeed in checking Austria, it could at least be used conveniently to explain and screen the measures of the "Period Preparatory to War," which it was decided were to take place over the whole empire and which would therefore greatly facilitate the general mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria. Sazonov believed that he now had the trump cards in his hand. He could continue to negotiate, and he held in his hand the threat of force to strengthen his bluff; but at the same time military preparations would be going on preparatory to a general mobilization if his bluff of partial mobilization was called. Also the militarists in Russia could not get out of control, because a decision as to mobilization was dependent on the course of the diplomatic negotiations, which were also in his hands. Sazonov was highly delighted with this arrangement, He was also agreeably surprised to find that Austria did not attack Serbia at once after the expiration of the time-limit and the rupture of Austro-Serbian diplomatic relations on this same Saturday afternoon.

During the next three days (July 26-28) of "direct conversations" with Vienna, he appeared to be much more conciliatory and optimistic, so much so, in fact, that it was specially remarked by a number of persons. But this optimism was not shared by the Russian military authorities, and came to a sudden end with the news of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28.

2. The second of the decisions taken by the Ministerial Council of July 25 was the recall of the troops to their Standing quarters. At the moment of the Sarajevo murder and during the following weeks, the Russian troops throughout the empire were dispersed

in camps for maneuvers and summer training, often at a considerable distance from their regular standing quarters. It was in these standing quarters that was kept the full equipment, which was necessary for war, and which the soldiers must have before they could start for the front. It was necessary therefore that they should be recalled as quickly as possible to the point at which they would be given their full equipment and be ready for transportation to the designated area of concentration on the frontier. At 4: 10 P.M. Ianushkevich (Russian General) had the General Staff send out secret cipher telegram No. 1547:

“St. Petersburg, July 12 [25], 1914, 4:10 P.M. Prepare quickly transport plans and provisions for the return of all troops to their standing quarters. Time for the completion of the work: twenty-four Hours. 1547. [Signed] General Dobrorolski.”

This breaking off of maneuvers and return of the troops to their standing quarters was not, however, in any way equivalent to mobilization. It was, to be sure, a necessary preliminary to mobilization, but was not in any way a menacing or hostile act. Similar orders for the return of troops to their standing quarters were given in France as early as July 27, but in Germany not until July 28 for the nine corps to be “hastily” mobilized. The Russian and French preparations considerably antedated the German preparations for war by a few days. Nevertheless, the execution of the unexpected order which began on Sunday, July 26, involved the movement of more than a million men throughout the empire, and gave rise to military excitement among Russian officers everywhere similar to that which had prevailed at Krasnoe Selo on the preceding evening. It also naturally led to disturbing reports being sent to Berlin and Vienna from German and Austrian agents in Russia.

3. The promotion of cadets to be officers. The Russian army lacked in 1914, even on a peace footing, some 3000 younger officers. These were being trained in the St. Petersburg Military Academy and similar schools, but the cadets would normally not be graduated and made officer until later in the year. To fill this deficiency as far as possible at once, it was decided to make the promotion immediately. The cadets of the St. Petersburg Academy were advanced to the rank of officer at Krasnoe Selo just before the banquet on Saturday evening; the Tsar himself made them an address, saying, “Believe in God, as well as in the greatness and glory of our country. Seek to serve Him and Me with all your strength.” The promotions in the other military schools followed almost immediately. Also the organizations in which officers were receiving practical training were dissolved so that they should be free to take active command. These measures not only created a large number of much-needed subaltern officers, but also freed for active service in the field many mature officers who had hitherto been detailed on educational work. But in spite of these efforts, one of the most serious defects in the Russian army, as the War was soon to show, was the inadequacy of the officers, both as to quality and quantity.

4. The proclamation of the “state of war” in towns containing fortresses and in the frontier sectors facing Germany and Austria. The order for this was sent out by Gen.

Ianushkevich still later this same night, i.e., at 1 A.M. on July 26. 80 That the order was speedily obeyed on the frontier toward Germany is indicated by the proclamation of the Commander of the fortress of Kovno: "In accordance with the command of the Tsar and of General Rennenkampf's order No. 13,482, July 26, I declare the fortress and district of Kovno placed in a 'state of war.'"

One incident which grew out of the order shows the desire for peace and friendly relations between Russia and Germany which was sincerely held by the Tsar and by Pourtalcs, the German Ambassador. The Prinz Eitel Friedrich, a German merchant ship lying in the harbor near the fortress of Kronstadt, aroused the suspicions of the commander of the fortress, because she had a wireless outfit and was observed to be sending radiograms. As a "state of war" had been proclaimed in the fortress sector and the wireless outfit might be used for espionage purposes, the commander of the fortress reported the case to the Grand Duke Nicholas who commanded the whole Petrograd Military District, including Kronstadt. The Grand Duke at once ordered the German captain to be arrested, the wireless apparatus to be seized, and the ship forbidden to leave the harbor. As Germany and Russia were still at peace, this arbitrary action led Pourtales to make a vigorous protest to Neratov at the Foreign Office. As a result, the Tsar, the same day, sent an autograph letter to the Grand Duke ordering him to set the captain free and not detain the ship, and expressing condemnation of the measures taken against the ship of a friendly state. Sazonov also telephoned in a friendly way, and apologized for the Grand Duke's action. Pourtales then said that he considered the incident closed, and would say nothing of it to the Government at Berlin.

5. The secret orders for the "Period Preparatory to War." Though the decision for contingent partial mobilization may have been regarded by Sazonov and the Tsar seriously, as a satisfactory military measure in case of need, it was by no means so regarded by the militarists and the General Staff. Besides the technical and political difficulties and the total lack of perfected plans, what would Russia's ally think of such a measure? In the negotiations for the Franco-Russian alliance in 1892, General Obruchev, the Russian Chief of Staff at the time, had energetically denied the possibility of a partial mobilization against Austria; Russia must and would order general mobilization, even in case of a war with Austria alone. For all these reasons the Russian General Staff regarded this partial mobilization project as the height of folly; nevertheless, since the Ministerial Council and the Tsar had decided in favor of it, they hurriedly began to work out plans for it, secretly hoping, however, that it would never be carried out. But at the same time, as a measure of far greater importance and safety, they persuaded the Tsar to approve the putting into operation of the wide-reaching measures preparatory to general mobilization comprised in the very secret "Regulation Concerning the Period Preparatory to War."

One of Russia's greatest handicaps to the successful beginning of war had been the relative slowness of mobilization. Owing to her vast areas, inadequate railway systems, and somewhat inefficient local military authorities (these problems were also later faced by the USSR, especially a lack of support vehicles for transportation), the Russian mobilization

machine had not been able in the past to work with anything like the speed of the German, or even the Austrian, military machine. To remedy this defect as far as possible had been the aim of one of Sukhomlinov's reforms. It had been discussed as early as the spring of 1912, and was finally solved at a secret conference in February, 1913, sitting under the presidency of General Lukomski, and containing representatives of the Navy and Interior Departments as well as of the War Department. This conference drafted, and the Tsar approved on March 2, 1913, a very secret "Regulation Concerning the Period Preparatory to War." According to this Regulation,

"Period Preparatory to War" means the period of diplomatic complications preceding the opening of hostilities, in the course of which all Boards must take the necessary measures of preparation for security and success at the mobilization of the Army, the Fleet, and the Fortresses, as well as for the march of the Army to the threatened frontier. Under cover of "trial mobilizations" and the "Period Preparatory to War," military measures could be ordered by the Minister of War, which did not require the approval of the Tsar or a public announcement of mobilization, but which nevertheless were almost equivalent to mobilization in the frontier districts. Such a "trial mobilization" had been undertaken on a wide scale in the fall of 1912 close to the German frontier, and had called forth a strong protest from the German Chief of Staff, Moltke, a protest which Sazonov, at that time, appeared to admit was well founded. Highly significant is Dobrorolski's own admission that the militarists and the General Staff, at least, on July 25, already regarded war as a settled matter; and also that the local authorities on the frontier, in their zeal or nervousness, may have even gone further than the Regulation properly permitted.

There was thus the danger that the Russian military authorities would take such wide-reaching "preparatory measures" that Germany would become alarmed and resort to counter-measures, which in turn would lead to a general European war. The German Foreign Office in fact received, as the Kautsky Documents show, between the morning of July 26 and the evening of July 30 twenty-eight reports of Russian military preparations, no less than sixteen of which related to the Russian frontier against Germany; and the German General Staff and Navy Department received many more such reports. But in spite of this, Germany refrained from corresponding preparatory measures (*Drohender Kriegsgefahrzustand*) until she received on July 31 official news that Russia had taken the final military step of openly announcing by placards throughout the streets of St. Petersburg a general mobilization of the whole Russian army and navy. These secret "preparatory measures," which had been decided on at the Ministerial Council on the afternoon of the 25th, and ordered before dawn of the 26th, enabled Russia, when war came, to surprise the world by the rapidity with which she poured her troops into East Prussia and Galicia.

Diplomatic Negotiations and Military Preparations

Though the military authorities had objected very strenuously to “partial mobilization,” to be undertaken only “in the four southern districts toward Austria,” they found it a very convenient form of camouflage by which to attempt to mislead the Germans as to the secret “preparatory measures,” which General Ianushkevich had ordered “in the whole territory of European Russia” on July 26 at 3:26 A.M., and which were taking place while Sazonov was carrying on his diplomatic negotiations. There seems little doubt, as indicated above, that the partial mobilization plan was seriously regarded by Sazonov and the Tsar, if not by the General Staff, as a good means of checking Austria without provoking Germany. And if it provoked Germany, Russia would wait for Germany to declare war or attack first, and thus be branded before the world as the aggressor. There seems equally little doubt that between July 26 and 28 Sazonov honestly carried on diplomatic negotiations with (he optimistic hope, not shared by the Russian military authorities, of securing a peaceful solution satisfactory to Russia.

Pourtales, however, like Buchanan, had become very apprehensive as to the danger of even a partial mobilization against Austria. He was clear-minded enough to realize that it would be an exceedingly dangerous means of exerting diplomatic pressure. If Russia should attempt a bluff of this kind, he feared that the militarists everywhere would gain an increased influence, and soon take the question beyond the control of the diplomatists, by the purely technical and strategic arguments which they knew so well how to urge. He had also received from Bethmann-Hollweg the following telegram:

“After Count Berchtold has declared to Russia that Austria does not aim at any territorial acquisitions in Serbia, but only wishes to secure repose, the maintenance of the peace of Europe depends on Russia alone. We trust in Russia's love of peace and in our traditional friendly relations with her, that she will take no step which would seriously endanger the peace of Europe.”

Sazonov evidently felt that he had been rather vague in his assurance that the mobilization order “would be delayed until Austria-Hungary adopted a hostile attitude toward Russia.” Did he mean partial or general mobilization? Did “hostile attitude toward Russia” mean an Austrian invasion of Serbia, or an Austrian mobilization in Galicia facing against Russia? He must have realized that his admission about “certain military measures in order not to be taken by surprise” was hardly calculated to have a very reassuring effect upon the German Ambassador. He may also well have had a somewhat uneasy conscience in view of what we know about the wide-reaching measures of the “Period Preparatory to War” which were already in full swing on the western frontier toward Germany as well as toward Austria.

He therefore decided it would be well to have a more definite statement made, and telephoned to the Minister of War. He asked Sukhomlinov to make it plain to the German Military Attache, as one military man speaking to another, that nothing was contemplated except measures preparatory to a contingent partial mobilization against

Austria. Accordingly, late on Sunday evening, Eggeling was invited to an interview with Sukhomlinov, which Eggeling thus reports, with his own shrewd conclusions:

“Not a horse had been recruited, not a reservist called in. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such Military Districts as are directed against Austria, viz. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany, he said, was earnestly desired... I got the impression of great nervousness and anxiety. I consider the wish for peace genuine; military statements in so far correct, that complete mobilization has probably not been ordered, but preparatory measures are very far-reaching. They are evidently striving to gain time for new negotiations and for continuing their armaments. Also the internal situation is unmistakably causing serious anxiety. The general feeling is: hope from Germany and for the mediation of His Majesty [the Kaiser].

Pourtales also communicated these dubious assurances of Sazonov and Sukhomlinov to his Austrian colleague. Szapary reported them in turn to Vienna, with conclusions which well sum up the situation:

“Although the direct informing of the German Military Attache [by Sukhomlinov] indicates nervousness on Sazonov’s part, and although mobilization against Austria only in case the Serbian frontier is crossed appears rather to reveal the purpose of exerting diplomatic pressure, it must not be left out of account that, in addition to the lack of veracity in the assurances here, there is a lack of harmony between the doings of the diplomats and the militarists, as well as the importance of gaining time for Russian mobilization. The character of the military preparations now in progress seems specially suited to the mentality of the Tsar, Nicholas, since, though avoiding regular war measures, which to him particularly are repugnant, a certain preparedness is nevertheless arrived at.”

Summary of the Russian Danger

The Russian danger lay in the fact that Sazonov naturally felt bound to protect Serbia, whose hopes and aspirations Russia had encouraged in the past, and whom she could not abandon now without loss of prestige to herself and the Triple Entente. Still more, he was determined to prevent Austria from gobbling up Serbian territory and upsetting the status quo in the Balkans. He was strongly encouraged by the French Ambassador to stand firm in protecting Serbia and in checking Austria. Therefore on July 24, even before hearing the German Ambassador’s justification of Austria and plea for “localization,” Sazonov had decided to take the side of Serbia, if necessary, even if it should involve war. He adopted the plan of “partial mobilization,” which was a dangerous method of exerting diplomatic pressure.

Then, on July 25, even before Austria had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia, Sazonov and the Tsar conceded to the Russian militarists the putting into effect of various military measures, including those of the “Period Preparatory to War.” which roused

anticipations of war among the Russian officers, and gave an impression, as Dobrorolski puts it, that “war was already a settled matter.” Henceforth the army leaders, recognizing that partial mobilization was folly on account of the technical and political difficulties involved in it, exerted steadily increasing pressure for general mobilization; and the danger was that Sazonov would accept their views, and add the weight of his pressure to that of the General Staff in persuading the Tsar to consent to the final military step which would probably make a general war inevitable.

Meeting again with Paleologue and Buchanan, Sazonov told them of his partial mobilization plan, and again received active encouragement from Paleologue, as we now know from the interesting parts of Buchanan’s dispatch which were suppressed or altered when published in 1914:

“French Ambassador said he had received a number of telegrams from the Minister in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that no one of them displayed the slightest sign of hesitation, and that he was in a position to give his Excellency [Sazonov] formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia’s side. [After thanking Paleologue, Sazonov turned to the British Ambassador with the question, “And your Government?” Buchanan replied that Sir Edward Grey did not yet despair of the situation, and that the great thing was to gain time. He repeated that] England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia’s ally at once. Sazonov said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our [British] neutrality. ... He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war. French Ambassador remarked that French Government would want to know at once whether our fleet was prepared to play part assigned to it by Anglo-French Naval Convention. He could not believe that England would not stand by her two friends, who were acting as one in this matter. [Buchanan urged prudence on Sazonov and warned him, if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. Sazonov repeated that] he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but unless Germany can restrain Austria, I can regard the situation as desperate. Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become predominant Power in Balkans, and, secure of support of France, she will face all the risks of war.

This information is very revealing. It shows that Sazonov and Buchanan both knew that Britain could prevent the war by uttering a few words. Why didn’t they do so? (Note: We know why from the previous chapter “British foreign policy”)

At the close of this meeting between the representatives of the Triple Entente, Sazonov threatened England with a point on which Sir Edward Grey and his advisers were very sensitive. “For ourselves,” Buchanan reported, “the position is a most perilous one, and we shall have to choose between giving Russia our active support, or renouncing her

friendship. If we fail her now, we cannot hope to maintain that friendly cooperation with her in Asia, that is of such vital importance to us." (Thus, giving full support to Russia would have secured their friendship and most likely avoided war.) Sazonov's fears as to Austrian intentions were partly owing to Szapary's failure to make at once the declaration, which had been promised to Tisza should be made, that Austria intended no territorial gains at Serbia's expense. It was not until after he had been assured of Austria's territorial disinterestedness by Pourtales and later by Szapary, and until after he had been agreeably surprised to find that the expiration of the time-limit was not immediately followed by an Austrian attack on Serbia, that Sazonov was visibly eased in his mind and became again somewhat optimistic.

Thereupon, from July 26 to 28, he carried on conciliatory diplomatic negotiations, while at the same time the Russian military authorities were secretly making wide-reaching military preparations which would facilitate an eventual "general," as well as a "partial," mobilization. Rumors of these preparations began to cause alarm in Germany. This situation continued until the news of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia on July 28 put an abrupt end to Sazonov's optimism and gave a new and fatal turn to the Russian danger.

7.20 The Serbian Reply

The first reports of the Sarajevo assassination which reached Belgrade caused the gravest consternation among Government officials. Mr. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, went to bed to give undisturbed thought to the problem, and remarked to his first visitor, "It is very bad. It will mean war." Mr. Ljuba Jovanovitch, the Minister of Education, "overwhelmed with grave anxiety," did not doubt for a moment that Austria-Hungary would make this the occasion for war on Serbia. Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade, is said to have exclaimed, "In Heaven's name! Let us hope that it was not a Serbian."

The Serbian Government at once realized that in view of all the anti-Austrian propaganda in the past and of the fact that the plot had been prepared in Belgrade, the Austrian Government would be likely to hold the Serbian agitation, if not the Serbian Government, responsible, and use it as a pretext for war. The Serbian Government therefore sought to preserve as correct an attitude as possible. It cancelled the festivities which were celebrating Vidov Dan, published in the official paper a severe condemnation of the crime, expressed proper condolences, and declared its readiness to hand over to justice any subjects who might be shown to have been guilty of complicity. It did not, however, take any proper steps to make an inquiry of its own as to the origins of the plot in Belgrade; on the contrary Dr. Grouitch, the Secretary General of the Serbian Foreign Office, told the Austrian Charge d'Affaires on July 1 "that up to the present nothing had been done, and that the matter did not concern the Serbian Government." It waited to see how much Austria would be able to discover and what accusations she would bring

forward.

Nor did the Serbian Government take any effective steps to curb the violent attacks on Austria in the Belgrade Press, whose comments on the Sarajevo assassination, according to the British Ambassador in Vienna, contained "expressions amounting almost to condonation and even approval of the dastardly outrage." The Serbian attacks, to be sure, were in part provoked by the equally bitter and insulting attacks of the Austro-Hungarian Press, which now took special pains to reprint selections from the more outrageous Serbian newspaper articles, with the aim of circulating them in Europe and turning public opinion against the Belgrade Government. There thus developed during the three weeks after the Archduke's murder an intensely bitter press campaign of vilification between Austria and Serbia, which whipped up the war spirit among the masses on both sides of the frontier. It was the psychological preparation for war. The propaganda of the Austrian newspapers, which enjoyed a wider circulation, was on the whole much more successful at first than that of Serbia in influencing public opinion in Europe, especially in England.

Pashitch finally became seriously alarmed at the attitude of the Austrian, German and British Press, at the ominous silence of Vienna, and perhaps also at the news of Berchtold's intentions which had leaked out through Count Liitzow to the British authorities on July 16.⁹ This news had been at once passed on to the British resident in Belgrade, 10 and may have been hinted to the Serbian Minister in London, who telegraphed to Pashitch on July 17: "The Austrian Embassy is making great efforts to win over the English Press against us, and to induce it to favor the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. ... No reliance should be placed in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack."

On July 18, when the British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade alluded to the Times article that the wisest course for Serbia would be to undertake herself an enquiry into the conspiracy on Serbian soil, Dr. Grouitch of the Serbian Foreign Office replied that, when the Sarajevo investigation was completed, Serbia would be ready to comply with any requests, compatible with international usage, for a further investigation. But until then she could not act. He then tried to deceive the British as to the Serbian Government's knowledge of the assassins. "Of Princip the Serbian Government knew nothing," he said, a statement manifestly untrue in view of the admission of the Serbian Minister of Education that he was personally acquainted with Princip and had twice examined him.

Framing the Serbian Reply

Berchtold had taken care that Serbia should not evade giving a reply punctually within the 48 hours required. The Serbian Ministers began to go through the fateful document. Their emotion grew as its tenor and object became clear. Nobody cared to be the first to speak. At last Ljuba Jovanovitch got up, and said, "Well, there is nothing to do but

die fighting.”

Obviously the first thing to do was to telegraph the news of Giesl's action to the Serbian Ministers in foreign countries, stating that “the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety.” The representatives of the Powers at Belgrade were similarly notified at once. A special appeal for help was instantly dispatched to Russia, reaching Sazonov and Paleologue, as we have seen, very early next morning before they had slept off the fatigue of the Franco-Russian festivities. This was followed by a moving plea from the Prince Regent of Serbia to the Tsar: “We are unable to defend ourselves and beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much-appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown toward us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.” The King of Italy also was invoked, to use his good offices to induce his Austrian ally to prolong the time-limit and moderate the demands.

Unfortunately for Serbia, it happened that these three Great Powers were not represented at Belgrade at this moment by regular Ministers. Hartwig, the energetic Russian Minister and strong champion of Serbia, had dropped dead a few days previously when talking with Giesl, and his successor had not arrived. No British Minister was on the spot, though Mr. des Graz was on his way from London to Belgrade. The French Minister was suffering from a nervous breakdown and was invisible; his successor, M. Boppe, was only just arriving from Constantinople and was unacquainted with his new post. So the Charges d'Affaires of the Entente Powers could do little for Serbia except report home the news of Austria's unacceptable demands, and await instructions. These were slow in coming, so slow, in fact, that they were probably too late to have had any decisive influence on Serbia's decision.

Sazonov talked with the Serbian Minister on Friday evening about 7 o'clock, and is said to have “advised extreme moderation in respect to the Serbian reply.” But no such advice appears in the Serbian Minister's account of this conversation. On the contrary, as he was leaving Sazonov, he met the German Ambassador, and told him “he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question.”²⁵ Later in the evening, Sazonov telegraphed to his Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade that if the Serbians felt helpless in case of an Austrian invasion, they had better offer no resistance, but retire without fighting and appeal to the Powers for protection. But whatever advice Sazonov gave is said not to have reached Belgrade until after the Serbian reply had been handed to Giesl at 6 o'clock on July 25.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed on Friday at 9:30 P.M. that “Serbia ought certainly to express concern and regret that any officials, however subordinate, should have been accomplices in murder of the Archduke, and promise, if this is proved, to give fullest satisfaction;” for the rest, “to reply as they consider the interests of Serbia require;” and, in order to avert military action by Austria, “to give a favorable reply on as many points as possible within the limit of time, and not to meet Austria with a blank negative.” He added, with an eye to preserving Entente solidarity, “Consult with your Russian and French colleagues as to

saying this to Serbian Government.

In any case, however, Pashitch and his colleagues, rather than any of the Great Powers, must be given the main credit for the cleverness with which they met a difficult situation. They framed a reply which not only won the approval and sympathy of all the Powers except Austria, but which also commanded the admiration of the man who framed the Austrian ultimatum itself, "as the most brilliant example of diplomatic skill which I have ever known." They had instantly decided that "no Serbian Government could accept the Austrian demands in their entirety." Such being the case, they now concluded that Austria would treat any reply they could make as unsatisfactory, and make war. Therefore they "would appeal to the Governments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, Serbia would carry it on."

Since Austria would evidently reject any reply which did not yield on all points, they could afford to give their reply a very conciliatory form, apparently yielding on many points, and even suggesting submitting the question to the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal. This kind of a conciliatory reply would help gain the sympathy and protection of the Powers, and tend to place Austria in the wrong when she rejected it. It was, however, more yielding in form than in substance, and it is significant that two or three hours before they handed it to Giesl at the expiration of the time-limit, they had already ordered the general mobilization of the whole Serbian army. In fact they had at once begun to make such frantic military preparations for defence and for the transport of the Government archives, treasure and officials from an exposed position in Belgrade to the interior, that the German Minister was misled into telegraphing his Government at 11:50 P.M. on Friday night, "Mobilization is already in full swing." Thus, Russia was already preparing to mobilize and Serbia started to fully mobilize first.

This ordering of Serbian mobilization before handing, in the conciliatory reply, which was regarded more as a diplomatic gesture than a serious effort to satisfy Austria, had another advantage. Serbian hatred against Austria had been so stimulated by the newspaper campaign, and Serbian military officers of the "Black Hand" group were so eager for war and ready to overthrow Pashitch, that if he had made his conciliatory reply involving some humiliating concessions, there might have been danger of a military revolt against the civil Government.

The final Serbian text, as handed over to Grouitch for translation into French and typing, was so full of erasures and corrections that only one who had been working on it could decipher the sense. As he was dictating the translation to the typist and the minutes were flying by, the only remaining typewriter broke down, and in the end the text was copied out in a rather shaky hand by a secretary. It was then given to Pashitch, who started off a little before six o'clock to deliver it in person to the Austrian Minister.

The Substance of the Serbian Reply

The Serbian reply was more conciliatory in form than in substance. To make this clear the Austrian authorities delayed making it public until they had time to make comments upon it. These they published in parallel columns with the Serbian reply, showing that the concessions at many points were so guarded with limitations and conditions as to be virtually worthless as guarantees of security for the future, as well as failing to be the complete assent which they had demanded. But they were not able to publish this annotated edition of the Serbian reply until July 28, and it then came too late to have the effect in Europe for which they had hoped. Meanwhile Serbia had circulated her reply and the advance summary of it, and created the good impression which she had hoped for. A summary of the Serbian reply, and of the Austrian parallel comments which are here indicated by brackets, follows.

“Convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations“ between the two countries, the Serbian Government protest that at no time since their promises of 1909 have they or their agents attempted to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. [This was trying to shift the argument, since the ultimatum did not maintain that the Serbian Government or their official agents had attempted to change the situation created in 1909, but that in failing to suppress the movement directed against Austria, they had not lived up to their promise to adopt a friendly and neighborly attitude]. The Serbian Government “cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies. . . . They are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the Sarajevo crime proofs shall be forthcoming.”

Coming to the ten Austrian demands, the Serbian Government then undertook:

1. “To introduce at the first regular meeting of the Skupshtina a provision into the Press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,” and also proposing a modification of the Constitution which would permit the confiscation of newspapers. [This was unsatisfactory— it did not assure a definite result within a given time, and if the bills were rejected by the Skupshtina everything would be as it was before].
2. “To dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria- Hungary,” although the Serbian Government possesses no proof, and Austria furnishes none, that the members of these societies have committed criminal acts. [Austria could not admit the reservation in the last clause ; nor did Serbia comply with Austria’s further demands that the means of propaganda possessed by these societies should be confiscated, and that their reestablishment under other names be prevented].
3. “To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever facts and

proofs are furnished." [Serbia asks proofs when she must know that the school books contain objectionable matter, and that many of the teachers are enrolled in the Narodna Odbrana].

4. To remove from the military service all persons proved by a judicial inquiry to be guilty of acts directed against Austria-Hungary, after information had been furnished by the latter. [This confined removals to officers convicted by a judicial inquiry of crimes punishable by law, but Austria demanded removal of officers who fomented propaganda, a proceeding which was not generally punishable by law in Serbia].

5. As to the demand to accept the collaboration in Serbia of Austrian representatives for the suppression of subversive propaganda, the Serbian Government "do not clearly grasp the meaning and scope of the demand . . . but will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principles of international law, criminal procedure, and good neighborly relations." [The reservation is vague and calculated to lead to insurmountable difficulties in reaching an arrangement].

6. The Serbian Government "consider it their duty to open an inquiry [enquete], against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot"; but "as regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents, cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure." [Serbia has misinterpreted Austria's clearly expressed demand which was for two distinct things: (1) the opening of a judicial inquiry [enquete judiciaire], in which, of course, no Austrian collaboration was expected: and (2) Austrian collaboration in the preliminary police investigations [recherches] for the collection and verification of evidence, for which numberless precedents exist].

7. The Serbian Government arrested Tankositch the very evening the ultimatum was delivered, but has not been able to arrest Ciganovitch. [The Prefect of Police at Belgrade contrived the departure of Ciganovitch, and then declared that no man of the name existed in Belgrade].

8. The Serbian Government will take measures to prevent the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier, and will severely punish the frontier officials who allowed the Sarajevo assassins to cross over.

9. The Serbian Government will gladly give explanations as to the remarks in interviews made by their officials in Serbia or abroad, alleged to be hostile to Austria, as soon as Austria specifies the passages and it is shown they were actually made. [The interviews in question must be well known to the Serbian Government ; their request for details and proof indicate unwillingness to comply seriously with this demand].

10. The Serbian Government will inform Austria of the execution of the above measures as soon as each has been carried out.

If Austria is not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government "are ready, as always, to accept a peaceful agreement, by referring this question either to the decision of the

International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in drawing up the declaration made by the Serbian Government on March 31, 1909."

Though some of the Austrian comments are pettifogging in character, they show that it is by no means true, as often stated, that Serbia virtually yielded to all the Austrian demands except one. Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were accepted to a very reasonable extent, and Nos. 8 and 10 completely. But Nos. 4, 5, and 9 were answered evasively or with serious reservations. No. 7 contained an implication concerning Ciganovitch which was untrue. No. 6 concerned the collaboration in Serbia of Austrian officials in searching out (though not in trying and judging) Serbian accomplices in the assassination plot; this was refused, though most important, either because Pashitch and his colleagues misunderstood it, deliberately or unconsciously; or because it seemed to infringe upon Serbia's sovereignty; or because they feared it would lead to inconvenient discoveries concerning the complicity of the "Black Hand" and other Serbian officials, as well as concerning the Serbian Government's cognizance of a plot which they had failed to prevent.

The general impression, however, made upon contemporaries by the Serbian reply was favorable. At the British Foreign Office Sir Eyre Crowe noted: "The answer is reasonable. If Austria demands absolute compliance with her ultimatum, it can only mean that she wants war." 4 « The German Emperor, after reading it on the morning of July 28, jotted down at the end of it, "A brilliant performance for a time-limit of only 48 hours. This is more than one could have expected ! A great moral success for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away, and Giesl ought to have remained quietly in Belgrade! After such a thing, I should never have ordered mobilization !—W."

The Diplomatic Break Between Austria and Serbia

The time-limit was to expire at 6 P. M. on Saturday afternoon, July 25. A few minutes before six, Pashitch arrived at the Austrian Legation and handed in the Serbian reply. Giesl said he would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As he knew that Serbia had already ordered mobilization, he had little expectation that the reply would be wholly satisfactory, and had probably written his answer to it before he saw it. He now hurriedly glanced at it to make sure that Serbia had not completely yielded on every point, and that, as Berchtold desired, he could reject it as unsatisfactory and break off diplomatic relations.

Pashitch had hardly returned to his office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when he received a note from Giesl, that as the time-limit "has now expired and as I have not received a reply which is satisfactory, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade tonight together with the Staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation; . . . that from the moment this letter reaches your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austro-Hungary will have the character of a *fait accompli*". So great was Giesl's speed that he and his whole staff were able to catch the 6:30 P.

M. train from Belgrade. Pie certainly established the speed record for the rupture of diplomatic relations.

In order that the measures for Austrian partial mobilization against Serbia might follow the diplomatic break as quickly as possible, Berchtold had made elaborate preparations to get the news from Giesl with the utmost promptness. After leaving Belgrade at 6:30 P. M., Giesl was to arrive at Semlin across the frontier at 6:40 P. M., and there to use the railway telephone which would be held open for him to inform Tisza at Budapest, who in turn would forward the message at once to Vienna. Berchtold said to the Russian diplomat that even after diplomatic relations with Serbia should have been broken off, a peaceful settlement could be brought about afterwards by Serbia's complete acceptance of the Austrian demands. But in such a case Austria would expect to be indemnified by Serbia for the expenses incurred in military preparations.

In the evening Berchtold sat impatiently in the Emperor's Cabinet at Ischl waiting for the expected message, and finally went out to take a turn in the air. At quarter to eight the telephone rang. Count Kinsky took the message at Vienna and repeated it to Ischl:

Minister Giesl telephones from Semlin to Budapest: two minutes before six P.M. answering note delivered; since unsatisfactory on several points, Baron Giesl has broken off relations and left. At 3 P.M. general mobilization was ordered in Serbia. The Government and Diplomatic Corps left for Kragujevatch.

Baron Margutti jotted down the message on a slip of paper and ran with it to Francis Joseph. The old man took the paper in trembling hands, and sank into his chair, muttering in a choked unaccustomed voice, "Also docki" ["So it has come after all], as if he had hoped and believed to the last that a rupture might be avoided. Then, after staring at the paper for a while, lost in thought, he remarked, half to himself, "Well, the rupture of diplomatic relations still does not mean war." Meanwhile Berchtold had been quickly called in, and was closeted with the Emperor. He had been urged by Tisza, by Conrad, and by the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, that Austria ought to order mobilization against Serbia at once; any delay or hesitation would be regarded as a sign of weakness and increase the likelihood of Russian intervention. Using these arguments, it did not take him long to persuade his aged Emperor of the necessity of ordering immediately the partial mobilization contemplated in case of war against Serbia and Montenegro alone. The Kaiser's assent reached the Chief of Staff at 9:53 P. M., and was at once put into execution: July 27 was ordered as the "alarm" day, and July 28 as the first day of actual mobilization.

As Austria and Serbia had now broken off diplomatic relations and were mobilizing against one another, the Great Powers began to put forward a variety of proposals for preserving peace.

7.21 Proposals for Preserving Peace

Everywhere it was anticipated that the Sarajevo assassination would tighten dangerously the long-standing tension between Austria and Serbia. Numerous proposals were therefore made by all the Great Powers to prevent this tension from developing into an armed conflict between the two exasperated countries, and, if this did break out, to prevent it from involving the other Powers in a general European conflagration. Some of these proposals—such as Sir Edward Grey's suggestion for "direct conversations" between Austria and Russia, Germany's plan of "localization," and the Poincare-Sazonov move to head off an Austrian ultimatum—were made prior to the publication of Berchtold's demands on Serbia. After the stiff ultimatum became known, and especially after the diplomatic break and commencement of mobilizations in Serbia and Austria, the proposals for preserving peace came in a flood, sometimes running parallel and sometimes counter to one another. They were often confused, and not always kept perfectly clear and distinct even in the minds of their authors.

Sir Edward Grey, for instance, both in writing his memoirs and in July, 1914, did not grasp clearly the importance of the distinction between mediation between Austria and Russia and between Austria and Serbia. Sazonov also, in his nervousness, put forth in rapid succession so many suggestions that they became bewildering: a suggestion to head off an Austrian ultimatum, to extend the time-limit, to have Serbia appeal to the Great Powers, to have England and Italy collaborate with Austria to end the tension, to have Austria modify her ultimatum, even after it had been presented and answered, to have the Great Powers institute a kind of informal international supervision over Serbia to prevent anti-Austrian plots in the future,⁶ and above all to have England restrain Austria and Germany by proclaiming unmistakably her solidarity with France and Russia.⁷ No wonder that at the British Foreign Office Sir Arthur Nicolson complained on July 27 : "This is confusing. In three consecutive days M. Sazonov has made one suggestion and two proposals all differing from each other. . . . One really does not know where one is with M. Sazonov, and I told Count Benckendorff so this afternoon."

Germany's main solution, until she read the conciliatory Serbian reply and began seriously to realize that Russia would not remain quiet, was the "localization" of the conflict which she had been urging for a week. Italy, embarrassed by her obligations to both groups of Allied Powers, and therefore especially desirous of preventing a European war, hoped to work with England to this end. On July 27 and 28 she made an excellent proposal. If the Powers would give the advice, even after the diplomatic break of July 25, Serbia might be induced even still to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety; Austria would then be satisfied; Serbia would save her face by yielding to Europe and not to Austria alone; and the Powers could adjust the details by which Serbia would carry out the demands of Austria. The proposal seemed to be substantially acceptable to the Serbian Minister in Rome. But in the end it came to nothing, largely because it was not taken very seriously by the Entente Powers and was crowded aside by their other proposals, and because

Austria quickly complicated the situation by declaring war on Serbia.

To attempt to give an account of all these numerous proposals for preserving peace in July, 1914, would be tedious and futile. But it will be useful to review briefly at this point a few of those which were made before July 28, and which were of special significance, or seemed to have the greatest prospect of being successful, or have often been not clearly understood. They are the various proposals of Sir Edward Grey, and the so-called "Direct Conversations" between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Englands Key Position

In most of the peace proposals, England was generally recognized as holding the key to the situation, for several reasons. Her direct interests in the Balkans were less than those of the other Great Powers, and, as Grey reiterated, the merits of the Austro-Serbian dispute were not his concern; it was only from the point of view of the peace of Europe that he would concern himself with the matter, and about this he felt great apprehension. Now, just as during the Balkan Wars, he was looked to as the man most impartial and best able to take steps toward calling an international conference or providing some other means of preventing the two groups of Great Powers from coming into conflict. Moreover, England was not bound by any formal alliance with either group.

Grey was unwilling, early in the crisis, to warn Germany energetically, because his Cabinet was divided on the question of England's eventual intervention; he could not make a threat which he might not be able to carry out; and he was fearful of saying anything which might encourage France and Russia to let themselves in for war, counting on support which the British Cabinet and Parliament might not be willing to render when the ordeal came. It was only very gradually that he acceded to the urgings of Russia and France, seconded by his own Secretaries, Crowe and Nicolson, and gave warning hints to Germany in the shape of announcements concerning the British Fleet, and later in plainer terms to the German Ambassador. Nor, on the other hand, was he willing to put restraint upon Russia, for fear it might break down the solidarity of the Triple Entente, cause "misunderstandings," and possibly wreck the Anglo-Russian Entente concerning the Middle East.

In the early summer of 1914, before the Sarajevo tragedy, and even during the days immediately following it, English minds were far more absorbed as to what might happen in Ireland than in the Balkans. The eternal Irish question threatened at last to reach a tragic culmination (Ireland stood on the precipice of civil war in 1914. The contentious issue of Home Rule was a divisive matter that saw Nationalist and Unionist militias arm themselves in preparation for seemingly imminent bloodshed.).

Ulster was arming, and openly defying the Asquith Government to apply force through Sir John French's army. The Irish Nationalist Volunteers had also begun to arm. Ireland seemed on the verge of civil war. Hardly anyone in England appeared to realize how the

European situation might be seriously menaced by a double murder in faraway Bosnia. Only a few men who had closely followed Continental politics, like Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir Eyre Crowe, and perhaps Sir Edward Grey, at the Foreign Office, or who were responsible for the safety of the British Empire, like Lord Haldane at the War Office and Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, became somewhat apprehensive. Yet Lord Haldane had created a little standing army ready to be sent across the Channel at a moment's notice, and had been organizing a larger territorial force for the protection of England herself. And Winston Churchill had assembled for maneuvers at Portsmouth what he proudly but justly calls "incomparably the greatest assemblage of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world. The King himself was present and inspected ships of every class. On the morning of the 19th [July] the whole Fleet put to sea for exercises of various kinds. It took more than six hours for this armada, every ship decked with flags and crowded with bluejackets and marines, to pass, with bands playing and at 15 knots, before the Royal Yacht, while overhead the naval seaplanes and aeroplanes circled continuously.

Aside from the fact that Sir Edward Grey's time and attention were largely absorbed at this time in Parliamentary affairs and the acute Irish situation, there were many reasons why he at first felt no serious alarm for the peace of Europe. In spite of the persistent and fundamental undercurrent of friction caused by Germany's naval policy, his relations with Germany were on the whole better than they had been for many months. The treaties concerning the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese colonies had been completed and initialed; they awaited only the final signature. Another happy augury for more cordial relations was the visit of the British Fleet at Kiel. Though it was unfortunately interrupted by the tragic news of Sarajevo, this Kiel visit, according to the British Naval Attache, was a great success, all the more so because of its non-political character. The Germans were honestly glad to see their guests and were looking forward eagerly to a return visit to an English port, being sick to death of the sight of Heligoland, round which their monotonous naval work centered. One surprise for the British was the fact that they were beaten in football and the other sports, in which they had always supposed they had a monopoly of superiority. Altogether the utmost good fellowship prevailed between officers and men on both sides, and the comments of the Press were less acrid and irritating than usual.

Grey believed that he could successfully continue the main aims of his foreign policy: the cultivation of more intimate relations with France and Russia as a protection against Germany; the smoothing out of causes of friction with Germany; and at the same time the preservation of the peace of Europe by preventing any questions which arose from throwing the two systems of alliance into opposition. It has often been said that war could have been avoided in 1914 if a Conference of the Powers could have met and discussed the Austro-Serbian quarrel. This is quite probable. As none of the responsible statesmen wanted a European war, it is possible, even probable, that a way out of even this most difficult Balkan conflict might have been found in a Conference, as it had

been found during the crises of the Balkan Wars. The Conference which Sir Edward Grey proposed in 1914, however, it may be noted, was of four Powers—England, France, Germany and Italy —while the Conference which had succeeded in averting a general European conflagration during the Balkan Wars was of the six Great Powers, Russia and Austria being also included.

It is also commonly asserted by Entente writers that Sir Edward Grey did his utmost to bring about a Conference, but that Germany vetoed it, and that her veto places on her shoulders a further responsibility for the World War. This is the impression which Viscount Grey gives in his memoirs. But this is far from being wholly true.

(1) An early suggestion for “direct conversations“ between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which was vetoed by President Poincare. The “direct conversations“ which did take place between Austria and Russia, July 26-28, which Grey and Nicolson regarded as “the best method,“ and which the Russian and German Governments both thought preferable to a Conference, were the consequence of a suggestion, not by Grey, but by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(2) A proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia by the four less directly interested Powers, “accepted in principle“ by Germany, but disliked by Russia and France.

(3) A proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia in a Conference of Ambassadors, made under the influence of Russia and M. Paul Cambon, at first rejected by Germany and Austria, but later accepted in modified form and bona fide by Germany, though not by Austria.

Grey’s Proposal for “Direct Conversations“

In the intervals of the Irish trouble Sir Edward Grey had conversations with Prince Lichnowsky on July 9, 15, and 20. 10 The German Ambassador urged England to exercise restraint upon Russia. But Sir Edward Grey became more cautious and more regardful of Russia’s point of view. It would all depend, he told Lichnowsky, on what kind of measures Austria might take. Grey hoped that the quarrel might be settled and localized, for the idea of a war between the Great Powers of Europe must be repelled under all circumstances.“

The suggestion of Sir Edward Grey’s of Conversations between Russia and Austria was an excellent one, but it met with instant and emphatic condemnation—from President Poincare, when Buchanan proposed it to him during the visit to St. Petersburg:

“His Excellency [President Poincare] expressed opinion that a conversation a deux between Austria and Russia would be very dangerous at the present moment, and seemed favorable to moderating counsels by France and England at Vienna.“

“Very dangerous“ to have Austria and Russia converse with a view to coming to a friendly and peaceful solution of the Austro-Serbian conflict? One rubs one eyes to see if one has

read aright. Very dangerous to what? Certainly not to the peace of Europe. But perhaps to M. Poincaré's policy of having the Triple Entente stand as a solid block in opposition to Germany and Austria, refusing conciliatory arrangements with either of them, and preparing to force them to accept diplomatic defeat or fight against superior forces. For more than two years he had sought to tighten the Triple Entente in every way possible, and to prevent separate understandings by any one of its members with Germany or Austria. He had repudiated M. René's efforts at conciliation by greater autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine.

When M. Crozier, the French Ambassador at Vienna, sought to establish better relations between Austria and Russia and France, and the listing of Austrian securities on the Paris Bourse, M. Poincaré thwarted his efforts; then he recalled him and replaced him by M. Dumaine, a less capable man, but a more docile instrument of his own policies. And in his memoirs he seeks to discredit M. Crozier by heaping ridicule upon his "Olympian thoughts," "vague suggestions which he mistook for ideas," and "cloudy vapourings." According to Izvolski, M. Poincaré claimed also to have prevented the success of the Haldane Mission and the Anglo-German negotiations for a naval understanding. During the Balkan Wars he never wanted Sazonov to enter upon any separate negotiations without first concerting a policy with the two other members of the Triple Entente.

After Poincaré's decisive disapproval of "direct conversations" it is doubtful whether Buchanan even mentioned the idea to Sazonov, since his telegram to Grey, quoted above, does not speak of it, but continues:

"I also spoke to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom I met later in the day. His Excellency said that if Austria could prove plot had been hatched in Serbia there was no objection to her asking Serbian Government to institute judicial inquiry, and this, he believed, Serbia was ready to do. He thought, however, it would be advisable for three Governments [Russia, France and England] to counsel moderation at Vienna."

These telegrams from Sir George Buchanan show that both Poincaré and Sazonov wanted to have Russia, France and England put pressure on Austria, which would force her to abandon her plans at the behest of the Triple Entente. And in fact, before President Poincaré's departure from Russia, Sazonov told Buchanan that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna was being instructed to concert with his French and British colleagues "with a view to giving friendly counsels of moderation," and hoped that Grey would give similar instructions. But the British Foreign Office Secretaries disapproved the suggestion and Grey decided not to act on it until next day.³⁵ Next morning he was informed of the text of the ultimatum which had already been presented at Belgrade the night before. Since England had delayed to fall in with the Poincaré-Sazonov plan and the ultimatum had already been presented, the French and Russian Ambassadors at Vienna made no use of their instructions to have the Triple Entente give Austria the intended warning.

In short, Grey said: mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, but only "after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia." Cambon said: intervene with

mediation at Vienna between Austria and Serbia at once, and get Germany to propose it. Cambon's account of this interview with Grey, however, supposing it is correctly given in the French Yellow Book, never mentioned Grey's mediation proposal in the form Grey really made it to him. On Friday afternoon, after his interview with Cambon, and after a long and wearisome Cabinet on the Irish question, Sir Edward Grey saw Prince Lichnowsky. After the latter had given him the German communique defending Austria's action and urging a "localization" of the conflict, Sir Edward Grey replied that if the ultimatum did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, he "had no concern with it."

Next day, having heard from Buchanan that M. Sazonov "thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilize," Sir Edward Grey made to Russia his proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia by the four less directly interested Powers. In view of the sweeping statement often made that Germany blocked all Sir Edward Grey's peace proposals, it is interesting to note the attitude of Germany, and compare it with that of Russia and France. Germany at once expressed approval.

On Saturday morning, July 25, when the British Charge at Berlin presented it, the German Foreign Office was still optimistic that the conflict could be localized. It had been informed that Berchtold had told the Russian Ambassador in Vienna that "Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Serbian territory." It thought that this assurance might exercise a calming effect at St. Petersburg, but if not—if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening then Germany "was quite ready to fall in with your [Grey's] suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg."

Meanwhile, in London, before the arrival of this, Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador again discussed the proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia. Prince Lichnowsky said "he thought Austria might with dignity accept it, and expressed himself personally favorable." Grey endorsed this, and said that "between Serbia and Austria I [Grey] felt no title to intervene, but as soon as it was a question between Austria and Russia, it was a question of the peace of Europe, in which we must all take a hand. . . . The participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace."

What was the attitude of Russia and France toward the British mediation proposal? The Russian Ambassador objected to it, as we learn from a despatch of Grey to Buchanan which was suppressed from the British Blue Book of 1914. France also, like Russia, took a negative attitude toward Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia. As has been indicated above, it was made to Cambon around mid-day on Friday, July 24; but it made little or no impression on him, owing perhaps to his eagerness to impress upon Grey the plan for mediation between Austria and Serbia, which he and Count Benckendorff had agreed upon together. Nor did Cambon report it to his Government. Sir Edward waited in vain for any reply from the French. He had to admit next day to Lichnowsky that "he did not yet know whether France would participate. He had talked with Cambon, but had so far received no reply. He counted firmly on the assent of

France, although he did not know how far she was already committed to Russia.”

Thus, it was not so much Germany, as Russia and France, who failed to give approval to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation by the four Powers if Austria and Russia should mobilize.

Thus Sir Edward Grey's peace proposal for “direct conversations“ between Vienna and St. Petersburg fell to the ground, owing to Poincare's decisive disapproval and desire to substitute in its place Triple Entente pressure at Vienna. The direct conversations which Sazonov consented to undertake later, July 26-28, after Poincare had left Russia and no longer exercised such an immediate influence on the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, were owing to the initiative, not of Sir Edward Grey, but of the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

Grey's Proposal for a Conference of Ambassadors, July 26

On Saturday evening, July 25, the European situation had taken a decided turn for the worse. Austria had broken off diplomatic relations at Belgrade, and Austria and Serbia had ordered mobilization against each other. In Russia war excitement and the military party were in the ascendant, the Tsar had sanctioned provisionally the mobilization of 1,100,000 men, and measures of the “Period Preparatory to War“ were about to be put into effect. But the news of these ominous events had not yet reached London.

Germany had expressed approval of mediation by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg, if “localization“ failed and the situation between Austria and Russia became threatening. As the situation seemed more hopeful, some of the British Cabinet left London for Sunday in the country. Winston Churchill, who had arranged to spend the day with his family at Cromer, decided not to alter his plan, and went peacefully to bed with a feeling that things might blow over. Sunday morning he went down to the beach and played with his children, damming up the little rivulets which trickled down to the sea as the tide went out. Sir Edward Grey, for his part, went down for Sunday rest to Itchen Abbas and his beloved birds and woods. Sir Arthur Nicolson was left in charge at the Foreign Office.

From Buchanan in St. Petersburg came a telegram:

“Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become predominant Power in the Balkans, and, secure of support of France, she will face all the risks of war. For ourselves position is a most perilous one, and we shall have to choose between giving Russia our active support or renouncing her friendship. If we fail her now we cannot hope to maintain that friendly cooperation with her in Asia that is of such vital importance to us.”

This telegram, indicating that “Russia, secure of support of France, will face all the risks of war,” might well have prompted Sir Edward Grey to the conclusion that it was high time to attempt to exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg. The British Foreign

Office took the stand expressed in a minute by Sir E. Crowe on July 25:

“The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia. It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them... Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Serbia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom.”

England expected Germany to exercise restraint upon Austria not to move against Serbia, but unless Germany did so England was unwilling to exercise any restraint upon her Entente friends. Here was the evil of the system of alliances. On neither side was a Power willing to put out a restraining hand upon its ally or friend for fear of destroying the alliance or friendship. Instead, therefore, of dispatching a moderating telegram to St. Petersburg, England now merely decided to make a new peace proposal. Sir Arthur Nicolson, noting Sazonov's suggestion to Buchanan quoted above, wrote to Sir Edward Grey at Itchen Abbas:

“I think that the only hope of avoiding a general conflict would be . . . that you should telegraph to Berlin, Paris, Rome, asking that they shall authorise their Ambassadors here to join you in a Conference to endeavour to find an issue to prevent complications and that abstention on all sides from active military operations should be requested of Vienna, Serbia, and St. Petersburg pending results of conference.”

Grey at once approved, and on July 26, at 3 P. M., this proposal for a Conference of Ambassadors of the four Powers was dispatched to Paris, Berlin and Rome. It was also repeated to the British representatives at St. Petersburg, Nish and Vienna with instructions to endeavor to prevent active military operations pending the results of a Conference, as soon as they had received similar instructions from their Italian, French and German colleagues. A similar Conference of Ambassadors at London under Sir Edward Grey's leadership had functioned successfully during the Balkan Wars to prevent that cancerous trouble from spreading to the rest of Europe. Conference of 1912-13 had been composed of the Ambassadors of all the Great Powers of Europe, who represented the two opposing groups into which Europe was divided, instead of four only, as Grey had proposed. All the members of the London Conference, except perhaps Austria, had at that time, been genuinely anxious to preserve the peace of Europe. In 1912-13, Russia was not ready for war; France did not want a war over Balkan questions; and Germany did not want to be dragged into a war because of Austria's difficulties.

ut in 1914 these Powers were, for various reasons, less disinclined for war than in 1912-13. Now in 1914, Grey was proposing the far more delicate task of attempting to decide a question which involved the prestige of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. He was virtually proposing a tribunal which was ostensibly fair and possible, being composed of two allies of Austria (Germany, Italy), and two friends of Russia (England and France). But, in view of Italy's nationalist hostility to Austria, of her ambitions in the Balkans

which conflicted with those of Austria, and of her secret agreements with France (in 1900 and 1902) and with Russia (at Racconigi in 1909), it was likely that Italy would be more inclined to side with the Entente than with her ally.

In the proposed Conference, therefore, the “four less directly interested Powers” would be likely to stand three to one against Austria and Germany, instead of being evenly balanced two to two. This fact probably explains in large part Germany’s ultimate rejection of this European “Areopagus.” To Germany, the proposal had the additional objection that, though “active military operations” were to be suspended pending the result of the Conference, Russia could still continue her “preparatory measures,” and so deprive Germany of her advantage of being able to mobilize much more quickly than Russia. When the proposal was made at Berlin, Bethmann telegraphed to Lichnowsky:

“We could not take part in such a conference, as we should not be able to summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia. Sir Edward Grey makes a sharp distinction, as Your Excellency has expressly reported, between Austro-Serbian and Austro-Russian conflict, and is concerned about the former just as little as ourselves. Our mediation activities must be confined to a possible Austro-Russian clash. In regard to the Austro-Serbian conflict, the method of a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna . . . appears to me to be feasible. I therefore request you most urgently to advocate in London the necessity and the possibility of localization.”

Germany rejected Grey’s conference proposal for several reasons. She had not quite yet abandoned her hope, though she was to do so in a few hours, that the Austro-Serbian conflict could be treated as one to be “localized.” She hoped, that the “direct conversations” which were being opened between St. Petersburg and Vienna, might prove a more satisfactory method of averting trouble between these two countries. She knew also that a Conference would not be palatable to her ally, for Austria retained bitter memories of the decisions of the London Conference during the Balkan Wars, and of its impotency in enforcing its decisions against Serbia. Bethmann naturally feared that in such a Conference of four Powers as Grey proposed, Germany would inevitably be in a minority of one to three; Italy would side with the Triple Entente rather than with her own nominal allies and so Germany at the Conference would stand alone in representing Austria’s point of view against England, France and Italy. Furthermore, from a military point of view, a conference of ambassadors might work to Germany’s disadvantage; its decisions would be likely to drag out for days or weeks; but meanwhile Russia was making active military preparations; if the Conference should break down and war come eventually, Germany would be deprived of much of the military advantage which she enjoyed in being able to mobilize more rapidly than Russia, an advantage which she counted on partly to offset the superior numbers of the French and Russian armies. A final, and probably decisive, reason for the rejection of Grey’s conference proposal was the fact that the German Foreign Office had . . . received simultaneously a strongly worded annotation from Emperor William emphatically rejecting Grey’s earlier proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia.

Though there are thus many reasons which made it natural for Germany to reject Grey's conference proposal it strengthened the suspicion among the Entente Powers that Germany was not sincere in protesting that she desired to maintain the peace of Europe. It unfortunately made them doubt her sincerity, when, a little later, she genuinely tried to restrain Austria and induce her to accept mediation. As Sir Eyre Crowe noted, on hearing Jagow's negative reply to the conference proposal: "So far as we know, the German Government has up to now said not a single word at Vienna in the direction of restraint or moderation. If a word had been said, we may be certain that the German Government would claim credit for having spoken at all. The inference is not reassuring as to Germany's goodwill." It was suspicion of this kind which largely contributed to the ultimate catastrophe.

France is also generally stated by Entente writers to have "sent in at once a completely favorable answer." But as a matter of fact France appears to have hesitated. On the following day, July 27, the French Charge d'Affaires in London twice called attention to the proposal, adding that it "ought, I think, to be supported." On July 26, the German Ambassador, at Paris, Baron von Schoen, had stated to Bienvenu-Martin, that "Austria has declared to Russia that she does not desire territorial acquisitions ... but only to secure peace and quiet and exercise police supervision, and consequently it rests with Russia to prevent war. Germany is at one with France in her ardent desire to preserve peace, and she sincerely hopes that France will exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg."

France in fact had no more desire to exert pressure for peace on her Russian ally, than did Germany on her Austrian ally. Such pressure might have tended to sow distrust between two allies just at the moment when they most needed to stand together, and would not have been welcome in the capital where it was exerted. When Grey's proposal was presented at St. Petersburg, Russia did not favor it. Sazonov had already entered upon "direct conversations" with Vienna, by which he hoped to induce Austria to accept modifications in her demands on Serbia. If Sazonov could accomplish this by conciliatory negotiations conducted at the same time that extensive military preparations were taking place in case they failed, he would have secured a great diplomatic triumph by his own efforts directly for Russia, without having to accept a solution of the crisis brought about by a conference of the Powers or by moderating counsels from France. So he at first preferred to pursue his "direct conversations," rather than have Sir Edward Grey take the initiative in calling a conference of Ambassadors. If the former failed, he could always fall back on the latter. This explains his negative answer to Sir Edward's proposal:

"If our direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet lead to no result, I should be ready to accept the English proposal, or any other, which would bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict. I wish, however, from this day forth, to put an end to a misunderstanding which slipped into the answer [of Bienvenu-Martin to Schoen]. In case it is a question of exercising a moderating influence at St. Petersburg, we reject it in advance, because we have from the beginning taken a stand which we cannot at all alter, since we have

already met all the demands of Austria-Hungary which are acceptable.”

To this Izvolski replied reassuringly:

“According to my conversation yesterday at the Quai d’Orsay, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs does not for a minute admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence in St. Petersburg, but only replied to the German Ambassador that it was not Russia, but Austria, that was menacing the peace of Europe; and that, in any case, if there was a question of any moderating influence, this should be exercised not only in St. Petersburg, but first of all in Vienna. As a result of his conversation with Baron Schoen, the Minister declined to accept the German proposal.” The last paragraph of Sazonov’s telegram and the whole of Izvolski’s reply, both of which were suppressed from the Russian Orange Book along with other passages which did not square with the Russian thesis that Germany was to blame and that Russia had done everything possible to avert war, throw a new light on Russian diplomacy in the July crisis. Russia and her French ally were insisting that Berlin exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, while Russia herself refused from the outset to accept any such influence, and was supported in this by France. In this respect Russia was pursuing an uncompromising attitude, threatening to the peace of Europe, exactly analogous to that of Germany from July 5 to 28, who had been insisting that France and England should exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg, while she herself refused to do likewise at Vienna. But there was soon a difference: by July 28 Germany had abandoned her hitherto uncompromising attitude, as we shall see later, and really began to attempt to exercise an increasingly strong moderating influence at Vienna; but France and England continued to refrain from restraining Russia, and Russia proceeded to the general mobilization, which she had been warned would make a European War inevitable.

Since none of the Powers, except Italy, gave an immediate and unconditional acceptance to his conference proposal, and since Russia and Germany decidedly preferred to await first the success of the “direct negotiations,” Grey willingly put his own proposal aside for the moment. “I entirely agree,” he telegraphed to Goschen, “that direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia is the most preferable method of all, and as long as there is a prospect of that taking place I would suspend every other suggestion. ... It will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.” What were these “direct conversations” between Sazonov and Szapary at St. Petersburg which originated simultaneously and moved parallel with Grey’s conference proposal, and were partly responsible for its being dropped?

Direct Conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, July 26-28

It is said by most writers that it was Sazonov who originated the attempt to find a peaceful solution of the crisis by direct negotiations between St. Petersburg and Vienna. As a matter of fact, the idea had occurred to Sir Edward Grey at the outset, but had been put aside and lost to sight. It was the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg,

Count Pourtales, who was really responsible for bringing this peace proposal into practical operation.

On Sunday morning, July 26, after the break-up of the maneuvers at Krasnoe Selo and the other military decisions on the preceding afternoon, Count Pourtales and M. Sazonov happened to meet on the platform of the railway station at Krasnoe Selo. They entered the same carriage and traveled up to St. Petersburg together. Pourtales, finding Sazonov much less excited than the day before, took advantage of this informal opportunity again to urge that Austria had no hostile intentions toward Russia, and was only seeking measures of safety to protect herself from the Serbian danger on her borders. Sazonov replied that Russia likewise had no desire for war; a bridge must therefore be found, on the one hand, to satisfy the demands of Austria, the legitimacy of which he recognized so far as they related directly to the instigators of the crime; and, on the other hand, to make their acceptance possible to Serbia; some of the demands would have to be toned down, and he urged joint action by all the Powers, including Germany, to bring this about. Pourtales then urgently advised him to have a frank and friendly talk with Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, with whom Sazonov had had no words since the excited interview of Friday, when first confronted with the Austrian ultimatum. On arriving at St. Petersburg, Pourtales then went to see Szapary, told him of Sazonov's calm and conciliatory state of mind, and gave him the same good advice to seek a frank and friendly direct conversation with the Russian Minister.

Acting on the German Ambassador's suggestion, Szapary at once went to see Sazonov and had the friendly conversation for which Pourtales had thus prepared the way. Without going too much into detail, Sazonov proposed to Austria: "Take back your ultimatum; modify its form; and I will guarantee you the result." Unfortunately, however, all these hopes were misplaced, owing to Berchtold's obstinacy and determination to proceed with his plan of military action against Serbia. Proposals for preserving peace, instead of being accepted by him, decided him to forestall them by presenting Europe with the fait accompli of an Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia.

Summary

Such were a few of the more important proposals for preserving peace, prior to July 28; they all came to nothing. Grey's original suggestion for "direct conversations," vetoed by Poincare as "very dangerous," was quickly dropped and completely lost to sight. The Entente efforts to have Austria extend the timelimit were either directly rejected by Vienna, or rendered impossible by the shortness of the time within which the Powers had to act.

Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia, accepted in principle by Germany, was not immediately accepted by France, who wanted mediation between Austria and Serbia, nor by the Russian Ambassador in London who was "very apprehensive" that it would encourage Germany in the impression that the Triple Entente was lack-

ing in solidarity. Grey's proposal for a conference of the Ambassadors of four Powers, rejected for various reasons by Germany, not accepted immediately by France, and put aside by Russia in favor of "direct conversations," was quickly suspended by its author, who also agreed that "the direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg is the most preferable of all." But these "direct conversations," suggested by the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and taken up by Sazonov, were thwarted by Berchtold's refusal to consent to any modification of his demands, and by his declaration of war on Serbia with the deliberate purpose of forestalling any kind of mediation which might prevent Austrian military action against Serbia.

As it took many hours for telegrams to come and go, and as the situation changed rapidly from day to day, it was essential for the success of these various peace proposals that they should be accepted immediately. But they were not so accepted. With the exception of England and Italy, the different Powers, for one reason or another, in the case of each proposal, either preferred other methods, or delayed immediate acceptance, or gave a negative reply. So the proposals for preserving peace made prior to the Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia fell to the ground. After Austria had faced Europe with the *fait accompli*, it was more difficult than ever to get satisfactory peace proposals, accepted.

7.22 Germany's belated Peace Efforts

Until Monday, July 27. Bethmann and his colleagues at Berlin had adhered consistently to their policy of hoping and insisting that the Austro-Serbian conflict could and should be localized. Early on Sunday afternoon, July 26, having heard of some of the Russian military decisions at Krasnoe Selo and that "all preparations are being made for mobilization against Austria," Bethmann again stated Germany's attitude and sought to dissuade Russia from taking mobilization measures which might endanger the peace of Europe. At the same time, in similar telegrams to London and Paris, Bethmann urged England and France to exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg. But these failed completely of their desired effect.

Similarly on Monday morning, July 27, after rejecting Grey's conference proposal in favor of "direct negotiations," Bethmann telegraphed to Paris: "We cannot mediate in the conflict between Austria and Serbia, but possibly later between Austria and Russia." This suggestion of mediation between Austria and Russia hints at the beginning of a change in his attitude—the first sign of an eventual abandonment of "localization," and the possible adoption of some mediatory role to secure an agreement between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

German doubts as to "Localization"

An important factor in Germany's immediate decisions was the hurried return of the Kaiser to Potsdam on the afternoon of July 27. "The Foreign Office," Jagow was reported to have said, "regret this step which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's return may cause speculation and excitement." During his northern cruise he had been furnished by Bethmann with scanty but fairly optimistic reports, calculated to keep the Kaiser calm and deter him from giving any orders to the German Fleet which might cause alarm. But Bethmann had been unsuccessful. Hearing from the Admiralty that the Kaiser, on the strength of a Wolff telegram, had directed the Fleet to make preparations to return home, Bethmann "ventured most humbly to advise that Your Majesty order no premature return of the Fleet." Upon this the Kaiser made the characteristic annotation:

"Unbelievable assumption! Unheard of! It never entered my mind!! I This was done on report of my Minister about the mobilization at Belgrade! This very cause mobilization of Russia; will cause mobilization of Austria. In this case I must keep my fighting forces by land and sea collected."

The Kaiser had also been irritated while still at sea, because it was through a newspaper agency, and not officially through Bethmann, that he had first learned the terms of Austria's demands on Serbia. The Kaiser and his officials, who were now back in Berlin, were all vexed at the way in which the Chancellor had kept them absent from the capital and insufficiently informed. They were seriously alarmed at the way Bethmann had allowed Berchtold to draw so heavily upon the blank check of July 5. They saw that a serious crisis was very rapidly developing for which no special military preparations had been made, and for which the diplomatic situation began to look unfavorable. Russia, drawing encouragement from France and England, was making louder objections and more wide-reaching military preparations than had been anticipated.

The localization of the conflict as hoped for in Berlin was wholly impossible, and must be dropped from the calculations of practical policies. The Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, had declared that, since Austria had not consulted her ally "before entering upon a move so portentously aggressive, . . . Italy could not consider herself bound in connection with the further consequences. . . . The Austrian Note was worded so aggressively and so ineptly, that the public opinion both of Europe and of Italy would be against Austria—no Italian Government could stand against it. . . . The Triple Alliance compact was an obligation in connection with a defensive war; Austria was now proceeding aggressively; and Italy, therefore, even in the event of Russian intervention, would not be further obligated." So it began to look as if Bethmann's optimism and "localization" policy might prove a frightful blunder.

At a conference at Potsdam late on Monday afternoon, July 27, between the Kaiser, Bethmann, Jagow, Moltke, and some other officials, in spite of the irritation at the Chancellor, there still seems to have been substantial solidarity of opinion that he was

correct in his view that a peaceful solution for the crisis could be found; and no important military orders were issued. "Localization" apparently still remained the German program.

German Advice to Austria

and Jagow found a handful of new telegrams which showed that the situation was becoming more serious, and which indicated the doubtful wisdom of continuing to adhere rigidly to the policy of strict "localization." Germany must pay more heed to mediation proposals and advise Berchtold to give them consideration. She must attempt, but without giving Austria offense or doubt as to her continued support, to take back into her own hands that freedom of action in the Serbian question which she had so unwisely abandoned on July 5.

Germany must assume the role of mediator, and advise Austria to consider the English and Russian peace proposals. Otherwise, there would be an increase in the suspicion which was being circulated by the French Ambassadors that Germany was egging Austria on, knew the text of the ultimatum from the beginning, wanted war, and was acting mala fide in pretending to desire peace. Moreover, England would be dangerously antagonized and might not, in case of a continental war, preserve the neutral attitude, for which Germany hoped and which she believed had just been promised by King George to Prince Henry of Prussia.

Though Bethmann had already been given to understand that it "agreed to nearly all the points," the reading of the text showed him definitely how conciliatory it was, and how far Serbia had yielded to the demands. He may well have been irritated at Berchtold for not having even yet sent a copy of it to Berlin. There were four new telegrams telling of Russian military preparations along the German frontier: Kovno put in a state of war; the mouth of the Diina barred with mines; and troop movements at several points. A telegram from Vienna announced Austria's sudden decision "to issue the official declaration of war tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest, primarily in order to cut the ground from every attempt at intervention," instead of adhering to the plan, already notified to Berlin, of waiting until about August 12, when the concentration of the troops would be completed.

A telegram from Lichnowsky indicated the disturbing fact that Sir Edward Grey was losing patience with Germany. Grey had just read the text of the Serbian reply, and found that "Serbia had agreed to the Austrian demands to an extent he would never have believed possible." Should Austria reject it as a foundation for negotiations, or occupy Belgrade, "Russia could not regard such action with equanimity, and would have to accept it as a direct challenge. The result would be the most frightful war Europe had ever seen, and no one could tell to what such a war would lead." He was convinced that it lay in Germany's hands to settle the matter by proper representations. (And yet did not think about how he himself could influence Russia to stop the saber rattling.)

In view of all this serious news, Bethmann decided that the time had come to accede to Grey's request to act as mediator. He telegraphed to Tschirschky at Vienna the text of Lichnowsky's telegram with its warning and its proposal from Grey that the Serbian Note be accepted as a basis for a settlement: "Our situation is all the more difficult, inasmuch as Serbia has apparently yielded to a very great degree. Therefore we cannot refuse the mediator's role, and must submit the English proposal to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet, especially as London and Paris continue to make their influences felt in St. Petersburg. I request Count Berchtold's opinion on the English suggestion, as likewise his views on M. Sazonov's desire to negotiate directly with Vienna."

But by the time Tschirschky presented this communication to Berchtold, the Austrian Minister replied that "now, since the opening of hostilities on the part of Serbia and the ensuing [Austrian] declaration of war, England's move was made too late." Berchtold had faced his ally, as well as Europe, with the *fait accompli* of war with Serbia, and so "cut the ground from any attempt at intervention."

The Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia, July 28

There had been a general fear in Europe that Austria would quickly follow her diplomatic break with Serbia by a declaration of war or an opening of hostilities. This also had at first been the expectation and advice of Germany, in order to secure "localization" and by quick action reduce the likelihood of Russian intervention. When this did not take place, there was some feeling of relief, and the prospects for the success of "direct conversations" seemed good. The reason that military action did not follow the diplomatic break at once was that the first day of Austria's partial mobilization was not to be until July 28, and the armies would not be concentrated for action until about two weeks later. Conrad did not want war until his armies were concentrated. Tschirschky was informed of this about noon on July 26. Berlin learned of it on the morning of July 27, and was therefore not expecting a declaration of war or the opening of hostilities until about August 12.

But when Pashitch's advance summary of the Serbian reply began to make a favorable impression, and when Berlin transmitted Grey's hope that Vienna would take a favorable view of it, Berchtold began to doubt the wisdom of so long a delay. "When do you want a declaration of war?" he asked Conrad toward noon on July 26. "About August 12," the Chief of Staff replied. "The diplomatic situation will not last as long as that," said Berchtold. However, no change in Conrad's plans was made at the moment. The Vienna authorities still believed that Russia would not move, and that there was no need for haste in dealing with Serbia. But on July 27, when the news of the Krasnoe Selo military preparations and demonstrations came in, they "decided to issue the declaration of war tomorrow, or at latest day after tomorrow, in order to cut the ground from every attempt at intervention." Thus, Austria made great haste due to Russia's military activities on the border.

Such an intervention seemed even more likely, in the course of the evening, with the

arrival of Szdpany's despatch proposing "direct conversations" and news of Grey's proposal for a Conference. Berchtold therefore instructed Szapary that he might converse with Sazonov, but "without entering into any kind of a binding engagement." At the same time a declaration of war against Serbia was drawn up, together with a memorandum to persuade Emperor Francis Joseph to authorize its being sent "early tomorrow morning." It contained two main arguments. First, since the Serbian reply was cleverly worded and conciliatory in form but wholly worthless in substance, the Entente Powers might make an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement, "unless a clear situation is brought about by a declaration of war." And second, the Serbians had opened hostilities by firing on Austrian troops at Temes- Kubin on the Danube. Berchtold then went to Ischl. By using these two arguments he won the Emperor's assent, telephoned the news to Vienna, and the Austrian declaration of war was then dispatched to Nish a little before noon on July 28, in an uncoded telegram in French.

Berchtold had now "brought about a clear situation" by his *fait accompli*. When the Russian Ambassador came to propose "direct conversations," Berchtold told him that he could not accept the Serbian reply as a basis for discussion, "because war on Serbia has been declared today." Similarly Berchtold informed Germany and England that Grey's proposal for a conference came "too late," and, "in view of the state of war already existing, has been outstripped by events"; and also that Austria "would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Serbian reply. Prestige of the Dual Monarchy was now engaged, and nothing could prevent conflict."

The precipitate declaration of war by Austria thus forestalled the English and Russian proposals for taking the Serbian reply as a basis for negotiations. It created a new situation. To meet this new situation, several new proposals for preserving the peace of Europe, and at the same time satisfying Austria and Serbia, were quickly forthcoming from Germany and England (but no longer from Russia). One of these in fact was outlined by the Kaiser several hours before he was aware that Austria had declared war. It is commonly known as the "pledge plan" or "Halt in Belgrade" proposal.

The Kaiser's "Pledge Plan"

When the Kaiser awoke on Tuesday morning July 28 he had before him the text of the Serbian reply and many of the other documents which had led Bethmann the night before to ask Berchtold to consider the British and Russian peace proposals. The Kaiser was greatly impressed with the conciliatory and yielding character of the Serbian reply and the diplomatic success which Austria had achieved. He therefore wrote at once to Jagow: "I am convinced that on the whole the wishes of the Danubian Monarchy have been acceded to. The few reservations that Serbia makes could be settled by negotiation.

Nevertheless, the piece of paper, like its contents, is of little value so long as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbians are Orientals, therefore lying deceitful, and masters in evasion. In order that these beautiful promises may be converted into reality and

deeds “ and “in order to give the army, now mobilized to no purpose for the third time, the external satisfaction d’honneur of an ostensible success,” Austria should be given temporary military occupation of Belgrade as a pledge. “I propose that we say to Austria: Serbia has been forced to retreat in a very humiliating manner, and we offer our congratulations naturally, as a result, no more cause for war exists; but a guarantee that the promises will be carried out, is probably necessary; that could probably be secured by a temporary military occupation of a portion of Serbia, similar to the way we left troops in France in 1871 until the billions were paid. On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace with Austria. . . . Submit a proposal to me, along the lines sketched out, to be communicated to Vienna.”

Thus the Kaiser was ready at last to yield to England’s request that he act as a mediator and advise Vienna to abandon the idea of war with Serbia. But while Sir Edward Grey had urged that Austria be dissuaded from any military action, the Kaiser was ready to permit it to the extent of having Austria secure a tangible pledge that the Serbian promises would be really carried out. Before the Kaiser’s proposal could be embodied in a despatch and communicated to Austria, the latter, as we have seen, had already declared war on Serbia. It then remained to be seen whether Austria, and especially Russia, would be willing to accept the Kaiser’s mediation proposal, which was sincerely calculated to avert a European war.

Before the Kaiser’s autograph letter to Jagow had been Q brought from Potsdam to Berlin and put in the form of a concrete proposal to Vienna, Bethmann had received irritating news concerning Berchtold’s attempt to rattle the German sword, his persistent neglect of Germany’s advice to satisfy Italy, and his secret intention to partition Serbia. Bethmann had understood on July 5 that he was agreeing to support Austria in her vital interest of putting an end to the dangerous Greater Serbia propaganda; that danger was now taken care of by the Serbian reply, if its promises were duly carried out. He did not understand, and he did not intend, that Germany should be forced to follow Berchtold in secret plans which Austria had withheld from her ally, and which might involve the rupture of the Triple Alliance by Italy’s withdrawal from it, and even the rupture of the peace of Europe in such a way that Germany and Austria would seem to be responsible. He would not permit that Russia and the Pan-Slav Press should back up Serbia in a continuance of the Greater Serbia menace, but on the other hand, he thought Austria ought to satisfy the Russian desire that Serbia be not subjected to a partition.

Bethmann therefore refused to allow Berchtold to rattle the German sword. Berchtold and Conrad had asked Tschirschky that Berlin warn St. Petersburg that the military preparations against Austria were so threatening that counter-measures would have to be taken. Instead of acceding to this suggestion, Bethmann tried to calm and restrain the Vienna authorities by telling them: “Military reports concerning Russia, so far as known here, are only rumors, and are not yet confirmed. Even according to General Moltke’s view, a categorical declaration at St. Petersburg would seem today to be premature.” And at the same time, in reply to Sazonov’s admission that “a way must be found of giving

Serbia her deserved lesson while sparing her sovereign rights," he instructed Pourtales: "Please tell Sazonov that I am grateful for his communication and for its conciliatory spirit, and further hope that Austria's declaration of disinterestedness will satisfy Russia and serve as a basis for further agreement."

Bethmann also heard that Berchtold was persisting in his neglect to follow German advice in regard to satisfying Italy's hopes for compensation. The German Ambassador in Rome had reported San Giuliano as insisting that "the existence of Serbia is an unconditional necessity for Italy. This barrier against Austria cannot be allowed to disappear." Instructions had therefore been sent from Berlin to Vienna that the Kaiser "considers it absolutely necessary that Austria should come to an understanding in time with Italy about Art. VII and the compensation question"; an immediate conference between Berchtold and the Italian Ambassador is "urgently necessary."

Most irritating of all was the news from London concerning Austria's doings. Though Berchtold had disclaimed any intention to annex Serbian territory and had declared Austria's "territorial disinterestedness," the Austrian Ambassador in London had confided to Lichnowsky that Serbia was to be "beaten to the earth," and "it was the intention to present portions of Serbia to Bulgaria and presumably also to Albania." These were secret intentions which had been expressed at the Austrian Ministerial Council of July 19, but which were contrary to Bethmann's expectations and contrary to what he had been sincerely stating to the Powers. He therefore noted indignantly: "This duplicity of Austria's is intolerable. They refuse to give us information as to their program, and state expressly that Count Hoyos's statements which suggested a partition of Serbia were purely personal; at St. Petersburg they are lambs with not a wicked thought in their hearts, and in London their Embassy talks of giving away portions of Serbian territory to Bulgaria and Albania."

It was thus with some justifiable irritation at Austria that Bethmann took up the Kaiser's offer to mediate on the basis of the "pledge plan". It was aimed to make the Austrian armies "halt in Belgrade." But its language was not sufficiently vigorous to compel immediate assent from Berchtold. Nor did it correspond precisely with the Kaiser's more decisive instructions that Vienna was to be told that "no more cause for war exists." Bethmann was too much afraid of offending Austria. He was too much concerned with preventing the odium of responsibility for a war from falling on Germany and Austria, rather than with preventing such a war altogether. However, he also at once informed Russia that he was striving to persuade Vienna to have a frank discussion with St. Petersburg and to make plain in an unobjectionable and satisfactory manner the purpose and extent of Austria's procedure.⁷⁰ He likewise told the British Ambassador that "he was doing his very best both at Vienna and at St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussion would take place and lead to a satisfactory result." He reiterated his desire to cooperate with England, and his intention to do his utmost to maintain the general peace. His last words to Goschen were: "A war between the Great Powers must

be avoided."

The "Willy-Nicky" Telegrams

Besides informing Sazonov through the usual diplomatic channels that Germany was mediating at Vienna to bring Austria to a direct and satisfactory agreement with Russia, Bethmann decided on this same evening of July 28 to have recourse to a direct exchange of telegrams between the Kaiser and the Tsar. In times past this "Willy-Nicky" correspondence had often done much to cement the traditional friendship and good relations between Prussia and Russia. It might be a help in the present time of trouble. Accordingly, a draft telegram was drawn up in the Foreign Office, submitted to the Kaiser, who made several changes in it, and sent from Berlin at 1:45 A. M. on July 29:

"It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime, to which archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Servians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest as well as all Sovereigns to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics play no part at all. On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin Willy.

The same idea had occurred almost simultaneously to the Tsar and the little group of advisers around him who were sincerely anxious to prevent the Austro-Serbian conflict from developing into a Russo-German war. Prince Trubetzkoi told Chelius, the Kaiser's personal representative at the side of the Tsar, that Serbia's answer and readiness to submit the question to arbitration ought to make it possible to avoid a European war. "We do not love the Serbs at all," he told Chelius, "but they are our Slavic bloodbrothers, and we cannot leave our brothers in the lurch when they are in trouble. Austria can annihilate them, and that we could not permit." He hoped that the Kaiser would advise Austria not to over-stretch the bow, but to recognize Serbia's conciliatory promises and accept the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal. "The return of your Kaiser has made us all feel easier, for we trust in His Majesty and want no war, nor does Tsar Nicholas. It would be a good thing if the two Monarchs should come to an understanding by telegraph."

The suggestion that the Austro-Serbian conflict be submitted to arbitration at the Hague, which Pashitch had already appended to the Serbian reply, possibly at Russian suggestion,

was a favorite one with the Tsar. The Hague Tribunal owed its origin to him. On July 27 he had written to Sazonov:

"I will receive you tomorrow at six o'clock. An idea has come to me and, not to lose time which is golden, I am communicating it to you. Why do we not try, after coming to an understanding with France and England, and afterwards with Germany and Italy, to propose to Austria that she submit her conflict with Serbia to the examination of the Hague Tribunal? Perhaps the moment is not yet lost before irreparable events occur. Try to take this step today, before your report [to me tomorrow] in order to gain time. In me hope for peace is not yet extinct."

This letter of the Tsar's is one of many evidences of his sincere desire to use every means for preserving peace. But Sazonov paid no attention to it. Instead, he was counting on bluffing Austria into a diplomatic retreat by the threat of partial mobilization, and at the same time carrying on the extensive measures of the "Period Preparatory to War" which would facilitate a more speedy general mobilization.

The Tsar also pinned hopes on a direct exchange of telegrams with the Kaiser. At 1 A. M. on July 29, he sent an appeal to Potsdam. It crossed on the wires with that sent by the Kaiser. It was cordial, but it revealed his own weakness in the face of the pressure which was being put upon him by the Russian militarists to order a general mobilization:

"Am glad you are back. In this most serious moment, I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far."

Replying to this, the Kaiser stated that he shared the Tsar's wish to preserve peace. He pointed out, however, as Bethmann had already done, that Austria aimed at no territorial gains at Serbia's expense, but ought nevertheless to have a guarantee that the Serbian promises would be carried out. This peace effort on the Kaiser's part made a deep impression on the Tsar. It was successful, as will appear later, to the extent of causing him to suspend the order for Russian general mobilization which had been pressed from him by the Chief of Staff and which was on the point of being dispatched over the wires. The Tsar had taken new hope and telegraphed back:

"Thank you heartily for your quick answer. Am sending Tatishchev this evening with instructions. The military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria's preparations. I hope from all my heart that these measures won't in any way interfere with your part as mediator which I greatly value. We heed your strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us."

But the news of Russia's wide-reaching military preparations and partial mobilization

against Austria, now admitted by the Tsar to have been “decided five days ago for reasons of defence on account of Austria’s preparations,” when Austria had carefully avoided preparations against Russia, roused the Kaiser’s indignation. He had been sincerely trying to mediate and bring Austria to accept the “pledge plan” and satisfy Russia by direct negotiations; but meanwhile Russia had been getting a five days’ start in military preparations. “I cannot agree to any more mediation,” he noted, “since the Tsar who requested it has at the same time secretly mobilized behind my back. It is only a manoeuvre, in order to hold us back and increase the start they have already got. My work is at an end;”. Germany now knew that Russia was mobilizing and “mobilization means war”, as it was seen by all of the Great Powers back then.

So the German effort to preserve peace by the old means of direct telegrams between the two monarchs came to nothing, owing to Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia and to the consequent Russian partial mobilization, as well as to the other secret military measures of the “Period Preparatory to War” which the Tsar had ordered at Krasnoe Selo on July 25. Several more telegrams were exchanged between “Willy” and “Nicky,” but they had no chance of success, because Russia’s general mobilization, ordered about 6 P. M. on July 30, had made a general European war virtually inevitable.

7.23 The Russian Mobilization

At the Council of Ministers, held at Krasnoe Selo on the afternoon of July 25, as we have seen above in the chapter on “The Russian Danger,” the Tsar’s ministers had decided on a number of preparatory military measures. They included the wide-reaching preparations of the “Period Preparatory to War” which were intended to facilitate a Russian general mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria; they had been ordered before dawn on July 26, had been going on actively ever since, and had caused increasing alarm at Berlin in spite of the beguiling assurances of Sazonov and Sukhomlinov that no mobilization measures against Germany were intended.

The decisions of July 25 also included a contingent partial mobilization against Austria, to be put into operation when Sazonov should decide that the diplomatic situation required it. It was hoped that the knowledge of this decision would prove a successful diplomatic bluff in frightening Vienna out of military action against Serbia. In the meantime, from July 25 to 28, while these military preparations had been going on to enable Russia to overcome her relative slowness in mobilization in case war became inevitable, Sazonov had appeared optimistic and been ready to carry on “direct conversations” with Vienna, with a view to finding a compromise settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian reply. But on Tuesday, July 28, Sazonov’s optimism received several rude shocks. He was disappointed and indignant that his proposal for “direct conversations,” made two days previously, had as yet met with no response from Berchtold. He was also unfavorably impressed by the fact that Szapary could not give him the dossier which Austria had

promised. His optimism began to change to pessimism. He began to conclude that Austria was fully determined on war with Serbia, and was therefore unlikely to listen to mediation proposals until punishment had been inflicted on her.

Finally, he was thrown into great excitement late in the afternoon of July 28 by the arrival of the news that Austria had just declared war on Serbia. His optimism evaporated completely. He became thoroughly pessimistic, jumped nervously to the conclusion that a European conflict was probably inevitable, and that Russia should order mobilization; the only question was, should it be partial or general mobilization? Sazonov insisted in front of Sir George Buchanan (British diplomat) that the only way to avert war was for England to let it be clearly known that she would join France and Russia. Buchanan got the impression that Russia "was thoroughly in earnest," and that Russia would fight if Austria attacked Serbia.

After talking with Buchanan, Sazonov saw Pourtales, and tried to convince him that Serbia's reply was satisfactory, and that Germany therefore should join in urging mediation at Vienna. But he met with little encouragement from the German Ambassador, who still adhered to his Government's "localization" policy, and did not yet know of the pressure which Bethmann was about to put on Vienna to accept the "pledge plan." On the contrary, Pourtales complained of the hostile tone of the Russian Press and of the fact that reliable reports made it clear to Germany that Russia's military preparations were extending far beyond what Sukhomlinov had stated to the German Military Attache on the evening of July 26. He had also learned that the military authorities had put out of commission the wireless apparatus on a German merchant ship, the Eitel Friedrich, in the harbor of St. Petersburg in defiance of international law. He therefore warned Sazonov of the very serious danger which might arise in the existing critical situation from wide-reaching Russian military preparations.

Sazonov later talked with the Austrian Ambassador but without any positive result. He later also talked with the French diplomat Paleologue, and communicated with the Chief of Staff concerning the ordering of mobilization in Russia in view of the news of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia which had just arrived.

Paleologue's Declaration of French Support

Paleologue, who says he had purposely waited until Sazonov had talked with the other ambassadors, was then closeted with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in an interview. Baron Schilling, who usually noted accurately every evening the substance of Sazonov's most important interviews, says:

"The French Ambassador, upon instructions of his Government, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the complete readiness of France to fulfil her obligations as an ally in case of necessity."

This declaration of Paleologue's was of such extreme importance to Russia just at this

junction that it evidently overshadowed everything else in Baron Schilling's mind on July 28, because it is the only entry made in his diary for that day, aside from his usual summary of telegrams. That Paleologue did make such a declaration, and that it gave further encouragement to Sazonov to stand firm and presently to approve Russian mobilization is confirmed by the fact that next day, Sazonov, in notifying Izvol'ski of his decision "to hasten our armaments and to assume that war is probably inevitable," added:

"Please express to the French Government our sincere gratitude for the declaration, which has been officially made to me in its name by the French Ambassador, that we can count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, this declaration is especially valuable to us."

Now Russia had the again confirmed support of France, no matter what Russia's decision would be.

The News of the Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia

In the course of the afternoon of July 28, news reached Russia of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. It may have arrived while Sazonov was in conversation with Paleologue and been partly the reason for the latter's declaration of French support. The news dissipated any remnants of optimism in Sazonov's mind. It made him fear that Austria would soon invade Serbia, and confirmed his growing conviction that Germany was standing behind Austria and would continue to do so, unless he made it clear that Russia was determined to threaten Austria with force in order to protect Serbia. He came to the conclusion that the time had come to order the partial mobilization which had been approved "in principle" on July 25. He therefore announced in the various European capitals: "In view of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, my direct conversations with the Austrian Ambassador are obviously useless;" In other words, he abandoned "direct conversations" as a peaceful solution many hours before he heard of Austria's "categorical refusal," which he did not learn until the following afternoon. He also instructed his ambassadors abroad to inform the Governments that, in consequence of Austria's declaration of war, Russia had decided to order next day partial mobilization in the four Southern Military Districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan.

Sazonov was aware that any precipitate general mobilization on Russia's part, directed against Germany as well as against Austria, might have a bad effect upon public opinion in France and England if it should become known ; but, on the other hand, he had just received from Paleologue the renewed declaration of French support, and there was the encouraging news from Sir Edward Grey that the British fleet had been ordered to remain concentrated instead of dispersing to its normal peace-time positions. Sazonov also knew that a Russian general mobilization would almost certainly lead to a German general mobilization, and so to a European war. A partial mobilization, on the contrary, was less likely to call forth immediate counter-measures from Germany. But even this would probably lead to Austrian general mobilization and so place European peace in

serious jeopardy.

After his conversations with the Ambassadors and his decision for partial mobilization in any event, Sazonov went out to Peterhof and reported to the Tsar on the Austrian declaration of war and the general situation. We have no record of what he said to the Tsar. Presumably he gave a gloomy picture of the situation. The only evident consequence of his visit was the telegram which the Tsar sent to the Kaiser late that same night: “. . . An ignoble war has been declared to a weak country. The indignation in Russia, fully shared by me, is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me, and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war. . . .” » Was this “pressure” which the Tsar feared would overwhelm him, exerted only by the military leaders, or by his entourage, or perhaps by Sazonov himself?

The Tsar’s Assent to Russian General Mobilization

The views of Dobrorolski and the military leaders as to the folly of a partial mobilization were strengthened by the return of Quartermaster-General Danilov. He had been on a tour of inspection in the Caucasus, but had been hastily recalled to St. Petersburg on July 26. He now used all his influence to have general mobilization ordered in place of partial mobilization. General Ianushkevich was also convinced that every effort must be made to persuade the Tsar to approve general mobilization. When therefore he heard from Sazonov that mobilization ought no longer to be delayed, he prepared two imperial ukases, one for the partial, and the other for the general, mobilization. With these two draft orders in his portfolio, Ianushkevich went out to Peterhof on the morning of July 29. Apparently without much difficulty, he certainly secured the Tsar’s signature to the ukase for general mobilization, and probably also to that for partial mobilization; the latter to be used in case there might come a turn for the better in the diplomatic situation.

It was one of the greatest weaknesses of Nicholas II of which all his ministers complained from time to time, that he was too apt to assent to the minister who last happened to have his ear. This weakness was all the more disastrous because of the unfortunate Russian system of lack of Cabinet solidarity, and of the practice of separate ministerial reports to the Tsar for his supreme approval or disapproval. Ianushkevich was so confident in this weak trait in his Monarch’s character, and of his own ability to win him over, that even before going out to Peterhof, he sent secret word to Zhilmski, the commander of the Warsaw Military District, and presumably to all the Military Districts, stating that “general mobilization” was imminent:

“July 17 [30] will be announced as the first day of our general mobilization. The announcement will follow upon the agreed telegram. 1785. [Signed] Lieutenant-General Ianushkevich.”

Some hours earlier Danilov had also asked the Warsaw Military Commander about arrangements for unloading cavalry divisions which were being pushed forward toward the

German frontier. One can imagine how the receipt of these telegrams would lead the Russian commanders at Warsaw and at other posts along the German frontier to strain every nerve toward preparing for war, short of a public announcement of mobilization. Aware of this fact, Danilov was also conscious that Russian troops, expecting at any moment the publication of the imminent general mobilization, might commit some act of hostility on the frontier which would give Germany grounds for ordering mobilization, and which also might compromise Russia with her allies, by making Russia seem to be the aggressor. He therefore quickly telegraphed explicitly that, upon the announcement of mobilization, the opening of actual hostilities was not to take place except upon a special telegram, and the frontier troops were to be warned, "in order that no irremediable mistakes shall occur." These telegrams make it clear that the military authorities confidently expected general mobilization would be approved by the Tsar and ordered on July 29, but wished to avoid as far as possible having Russia seem the aggressor.

Returning from Peterhof with the ukase for general mobilization signed by the Tsar in his pocket, Ianushkevich summoned Eggeling, the German Military Attache. He told him that he had just come from the Tsar, but that everything was just as Sukhomlinov had said it was a couple of days before. "He gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner and offered me written confirmation that up to that moment, 3:00 P.M., nowhere had there been mobilization, i.e., the calling up of a single man or horse. He could give no guarantee for the future, he said, but would assure me most emphatically that His Majesty, now as before, did not desire mobilization on the fronts along our borders." Thus, they tried to deceive Germany in order to further mobilize in secret.

In view of the many reports concerning the calling of reservists, including the Warsaw and Vilna districts toward Germany, Eggeling said that this statement puzzled him. "Ianushkevich replied that, on the word of an officer, such reports were mistaken; it was simply a case of a false alarm here and there." Eggeling was forced to conclude that Ianushkevich was attempting to mislead him, and the historian can hardly escape the same conclusion.'

Going on to the Ministry of the Interior, Dobrorolski found alarm at the danger of internal revolution (Marxism). "With us," said Maklakov, "the war cannot be popular deep down among the masses of the people, among whom revolutionary ideas mean more than a victory over Germany. But one cannot escape one's fate . . ."; and crossing himself, Maklakov signed the mobilization order. Sazonov sought to put the responsibility for the mobilization order wholly on the military authorities. When Szapary mentioned that he had heard Russia was alarmed because Austria had mobilized eight corps against Serbia, "Sazonov confirmed to me that it was not he, who knew nothing of this, but Tsar Nicholas who, upon the information of the Chief of Staff, had expressed this alarm." Szapary pointed out that even a child in military matters ought to see the mobilization of Austria toward the south could not threaten Russia, and urged that if peace were to be preserved, a quick end should be put to the machinations of the military authorities who on the basis of false news were in danger of taking matters into their own hands. "Sazonov remarked very characteristically that he could say this to the Chief of Staff,

because the latter was seeing His Majesty every day. He himself, however, on a time like the present, only went for his usual Tuesday audience, and then learned for the first time from His Majesty what the militarists had been urging upon him."

"While we were thus engaged in a confidential exchange of views," Szapary continued, "Sazonov heard by telephone that we had bombarded Belgrade. He became like a changed man [wie ausgewechselt]. He sought to take up again all his previous arguments in a way which flew in the face of all logic, and said he saw now that the Tsar was right. 'You only wish to gain time by negotiations, but you go ahead and bombard an unprotected city!' " He went on to denounce Austria in the most excited fashion. Whereupon Szapary took his leave.

A little later, between six and seven o'clock, while Sazonov was still in a very excited state, Pourtales called again at the Russian Foreign Office to carry out instructions just received from Berlin. Alarmed by the rumors of wide-reaching Russian military preparations—but not of the decision for Russian partial mobilization of which he did not hear until a little later, Bethmann had telegraphed to Pourtales: "Kindly call M. Sazonov's serious attention to the fact that further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would force us to mobilize, and in that case a European war could scarcely be prevented." In stating this to Sazonov, Pourtales said "it did not imply a threat, but simply a friendly opinion." But Sazonov received it "in a state of great excitement" and said he would report it to the Tsar. Sazonov, however, appears to have interpreted it as a threat, and replied sharply: "Now I have no further doubt as to the true cause of Austria's intransigence." Pourtales jumped up from his seat in protest, and the two parted coolly.

Sazonov then informed the Tsar by telephone of the communication just made by Pourtales. The Tsar directed him to discuss with Ianushkevich and Sukhomlinov the question of general mobilization at once, while he himself telegraphed to the Kaiser: "Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly, whereas official message presented today by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship." The news of the bombardment of Belgrade, followed by Pourtales's warning that the further continuation of Russian mobilization measures would lead to German mobilization and war, removed any last doubts which Sazonov may have had as to need of immediate general mobilization. In the discussion with Ianushkevich, he agreed that, as war with Germany was probably unavoidable, it would be a mistake to postpone longer the general mobilization or to interfere with its successful execution by first ordering a partial mobilization.

Dobrorolski, who had meanwhile collected the three necessary signatures, started for the Central Telegraph Office to send out the general mobilization order. And Sazonov dispatched a telegram to the Russian Ambassadors in Paris and London, which hardly stated fully and frankly either the communication of Pourtales or the momentous step which Russia was on the point of taking:

“The German Ambassador informed me today of the decision of the German Government to mobilize its armed forces, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilization of eight army corps already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own armaments and to assume that war is probably inevitable.”

If we put confidence in the complete sincerity of the telegram just quoted, and in the accuracy of Schilling's Diary as to the crowded events of July 29, as some writers are inclined to do, it would appear that it was the warning from Pourtales which caused the Russian decision to order general mobilization instead of partial mobilization. But it was naturally Sazonov's aim, in order to secure British aid, to make it appear that it was a German menace, and not Austria's upsetting of the balance in the Balkans, which caused Russia to “hasten her armaments,” as Sazonov's euphemistically referred to Russia's imminent general mobilization. And as to Schilling's Diary, it is clearly inaccurate. From the somewhat divergent accounts of Schilling's Diary and Dobrorolski's narrative, and from the summary of the activities of the Russian diplomatic and military officials given above, one may conclude that the Tsar in signing the ukases for general and partial mobilization was still hesitating in his mind between the two, and expected Ianushkevich to confer with Sazonov before sending out the order for either. Ianushkevich, however, took the Tsar's assent to general mobilization as an authorization to proceed with it directly.

It was mainly the pressure of the Russian militarists, not the warning of Pourtales, that almost started the general mobilization order over the wires. Then the Tsar changed his mind.

The Tsar's Cancellation of General Mobilization

At 9:40 P.M. Nicholas II received at Peterhof a second telegram from the Kaiser. In it William II insisted that “Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable,” and, in the dominating tone which he had so often found successful in the past with the Tsar, told him warningly:

“It would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable, and as I already telegraphed you, my Government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course, military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked upon by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid, and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help.”

The Kaiser apparently judged correctly the effect of this tone on the weak and changeable "Nicky," for the Tsar, ruminating on the situation, began to think he had made a mistake in signing the ukase for general mobilization. He now decided immediately and on his own initiative to cancel the order for general mobilization, and to substitute in its place the apparently less dangerous partial mobilization. The Tsar therefore called up Ianushkevich, and there followed a three-cornered telephone conversation between the Tsar, Sukhomlinov, and Ianushkevich, in which the two military men tried to convince the Tsar that he was making a terrible mistake; that there was no guarantee that the Kaiser's mediation at Vienna would be successful; that it was clear from Germany's and Austria's conduct that a general war had become inevitable; and that to suspend the general mobilization would only give the enemy a chance to mobilize more quickly than Russia. But for once the Tsar remained firm. Ianushkevich in despair found himself compelled to recall Dobrorolski from the telegraph office where he was on the point of sending out the order for general mobilization. In its place, toward midnight of July 29, the order for partial mobilization was dispatched over the wires.

Sazonov was at once informed by Ianushkevich of the Tsar's change of mind and of the substitution of partial for general mobilization. He had already sent one of the Secretaries, M. Basili, to inform Paleologue that it had been decided to issue orders that very night for partial mobilization, but to commence general mobilization in secret. Paleologue says he was quite taken aback: "Would it not be possible, for the moment, to be content with partial mobilization?" "No," said Basili, "the question has just been thoroughly examined by our highest military authorities." Basili then suggested that, as the Germans might decipher a French telegram, it would be better for Paleologue to notify his Government of this very secret information by a telegram sent in Russian cipher via the Russian Foreign Office to Izvolski. Paleologue accepted the suggestion. But before the telegram had been put into cipher he and Basili received word of the Tsar's change of mind. So Paleologue said nothing to his Government of the momentous decision for general mobilization which Russia had been about to order.

After midnight Sazonov again had a long interview with Pourtales, in which the difference between the Russian and German point of view became more clearly defined. Sazonov wanted Germany to press Austria to drop those demands of the ultimatum which infringed the sovereignty of Serbia: Russia's vital interests could not allow that Serbia should sink to a vassal state of Austria—Become a Bokhara"— by the acceptance of demands which infringed her sovereign rights. Pourtales, on the other hand, wanted Russia to accept Austria's declaration of willingness to respect the territorial integrity of Serbia as sufficient. Neither man would yield to the other. Pourtales pointed out that Germany had already gone far in putting pressure on Vienna, and that the situation now had been made very much more difficult by the fact that Russia had decided to order partial mobilization. But Sazonov flatly refused to be satisfied merely with an Austrian declaration of territorial disinterestedness in regard to Serbia.

An additional written statement was sent to Austria by Sazonov, saying that certain

changes in Austria's demands would lead to Russia stopping her military preparations. But there was no chance for success. The statement was overtaken by the very rapid course of events arising from the pressure of the militarists and especially by the fact that a few hours after proposing his formula, Sazonov secured from the Tsar a second change of mind and final consent to general mobilization.

Russian General Mobilization Ordered

It was with dismay and despair that the Russian Chief of Staff and Minister of War had been forced by the Tsar to cancel general mobilization on the night of July 29. But they were determined not to rest until they had persuaded him to change his mind a second time and again to consent to the general mobilization which they considered indispensable. On the morning of July 30 they conferred again with Sazonov and found that he was wholly in agreement with them. They called the Tsar on the telephone and tried to persuade him to return to his resolution of the day before, and allow general mobilization to begin.

The Tsar at first resolutely rejected their request, and finally announced curtly that he was breaking off the conversation. Ianushkevich, who held the telephone, could only inform him that Sazonov was there also, and begged permission to say a word to him. A certain silence followed, after which the Tsar expressed his consent to listen. Sazonov requested His Majesty to receive him immediately for a report which could not be delayed. After another silence the Tsar asked, "Is it all the same to you if I receive you at the same time with Tatishchev at 3 o'clock, because otherwise I have not a minute of free time today?" Sazonov thanked the Tsar, and said that he would arrive at the appointed hour.

Ianushkevich then adjured Sazonov not to fail to get from the Tsar a renewed assent to general mobilization. He reiterated the technical arguments of the great danger that Russia would not be ready for war with Germany, which he believed inevitable, if there was further delay; because later general mobilization would be very seriously dislocated by the partial mobilization already ordered; this dislocation could only be avoided by an immediate general mobilization. As a further means of putting pressure on the Tsar he suggested that Sazonov use a political argument: Russia's French ally would be displeased and would regard Russia as failing to live up to the obligations of her alliance; the Kaiser would coax out of the French a promise of neutrality; and he would then fall upon Russia when she was entangled in the midst of her partial mobilization. Finally, he begged Sazonov, the moment he was successful in persuading the Tsar, to inform him at once by telephone from Peterhof, so that he could take immediately the necessary measures, and, before it was too late, convert the partial into a general mobilization. "After this," added the Chief of Staff, "I will retire from sight, smash my telephone, and generally take all measures so that I cannot, be found to give any contrary orders for a new postponement of general mobilization."

Sazonov then talked with Buchanan and Paleologue, telling them of an interview with

Pourtales, at which the German Ambassador, "seeing that war was inevitable, broke down completely and appealed to Sazonov to hold out a last straw and to make some suggestion which Pourtales could telegraph to his Government." Sazonov then said in substance to the two Ambassadors: "If Austria rejects this proposal (Austria should change their demands to Serbia), preparations for a general mobilization will be proceeded with, and European war will be inevitable. For strategical reasons Russia can hardly postpone converting partial into general mobilization, now that she knows Germany is preparing, and excitement in the country has reached such a pitch that she cannot hold back if Austria refuses to make concession." Buchanan evidently made no effort to deter Sazonov from his purpose of converting partial into general mobilization ; his failure to do so must have been an encouragement to the Russian Minister.

Izvol'ski had telegraphed to Sazonov that Margerie, an official in the French Foreign Office, had said that the French Government, without wishing to interfere in Russian military preparations, thought they should be carried on in the least open and provocative manner ; and that the French Minister of War advised Russia to strengthen her military preparations, but to avoid as much as possible the appearance of doing so. Sazonov then lunched with Basili and Krivoshein, the Minister of Agriculture, who also besought him to wring from the Tsar a consent to general mobilization. After lunch Sazonov went out to Peterhof with Tatishchev at 2:00 P.M. He found the Tsar pale and nervous, now fully conscious of the awful seriousness of the responsibility resting upon him. "Think of the responsibility which you are advising me to take," said the Tsar. "Think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their death." In reply Sazonov tried to prove to him that he would have nothing with which to reproach his conscience, if war broke out, because it had clearly become inevitable. Diplomacy had finished its work. It was time for His Majesty to think of the safety of his Empire. To fail to order general mobilization would only dislocate the whole Russian military organization, and disconcert Russia's allies.

For almost an hour the Tsar's firm desire to avoid war at all costs made him hesitate to adopt measures which, however indispensable from a military point, were calculated, as he clearly saw, to hasten the catastrophe. The tenseness of feeling which he lived through in these minutes expressed itself among other ways in the irritability, unusual for him, with which he snubbed General Tatishchev. The latter, who had taken no part in the conversation, remarked in a moment of silence: "Yes, it is hard to decide." The Tsar replied in a sharp and displeased tone: "I will decide," and gave his decision for an immediate general mobilization. Sazonov thereupon hurried to the telephone on the ground floor of the palace, notified Ianushkevich, who was waiting impatiently for the news, and added: "Now you can smash the telephone. Give your orders, General, and then—disappear for the rest of the day."

In the Warsaw Military District, for instance, bordering on Germany, various Russian commanding officers received the mobilization telegrams at 7:55 P.M., 8:02 P.M., 8:15 P.M., and acted upon them at once. In a remote Siberian village an English traveller

was awakened a few hours later, at 4:00 A.M. July 31, by a great commotion outside his window, and was asked by an excited peasant: "Have you heard the news? There is war." During the night the red mobilization placards, calling men to the colors, had been posted up everywhere on the street corners. No further change of mind on the part of the Tsar was now possible. Russia was committed to the step which military men everywhere, just as the Siberian peasant, understood meant war. What were the reasons for this fatal decision to order general mobilization? The Entente Powers, in their efforts to excuse and justify it, have often alleged various reasons—which are false.

One story is that the Russian decision was brought about by a telegram from Sverbeev, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, stating: "The order for the mobilization of the German army and navy has just been issued." It was occasioned by the publication of news to this effect soon after one o'clock by an "extra" of a Berlin newspaper, the Lokal- Anzeiger. This, it is said, was a trick on the part of the Germans to precipitate general mobilization in Russia and so make her seem to be the aggressor. But the news had been immediately contradicted by the German Foreign Office and the "extra" had been suppressed. The Russian Ambassador had thereupon quickly sent a second telegram, unciphered, cancelling the first, and followed it by a third, ciphered, explaining the circumstances. It has now been conclusively established that none of these three telegrams reached St. Petersburg until after the Tsar had given his decision. They could therefore have had no influence in causing it. Nor did Sazonov or any of the Russian authorities at the time, in July, 1914, allege this Lokal-Anzeiger episode as an excuse for the Russian general mobilization. It was a later invention, first given notoriety by Sir Edward Grey in 1916.

Another reason, alleged by the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg in his somewhat untrustworthy memoirs, is that the decision was caused by a menacing telegram from the Kaiser. According to this legend, Sazonov, on arriving at Peterhof, found that the Tsar "had received a very bad impression from a telegram sent him the night before in an almost menacing tone: 'If Russia mobilizes against Austria, my role as mediator, which I accepted at your express prayer, will be endangered, if not ruined. The whole weight of the decision lies on your shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for peace or war.' Having read and reread this telegram, Sazonov made a gesture of despair," and proceeded to urge general mobilization upon the Tsar, on the grounds that war was already inevitable and Germany was only pretending to mediate in order to gain time to complete secretly her preparations for attack. After hesitation, continues Paleologue, the Tsar reluctantly yielded and gave his decision. "The clock marked exactly 4:00 P.M." 68 But this telegram from the Kaiser was not sent until 3:30 P.M., and was not received at Peterhof until 6:30 P.M. Being received more than two hours after the Tsar's decision, and half an hour after Dobrorolski had actually begun to send the general mobilization order over the wires, it can no more have been the cause of Russia's general mobilization than the Lokal- Anzeiger "extra." Either Sazonov gave Paleologue an untrue account of his audience with the Tsar; or, more probably, the French Ambassador was again drawing upon his lively imagination.

Still another reason alleged for the Russian general mobilization is that it was caused by Austria's general mobilization and by mobilization measures taken secretly but continuously by Germany for the past six days. This legend was perpetuated by the falsified form in which the French Yellow Book published the belated telegram in which Paleologue finally notified his Government of Russia's fatal step. As the greater part of this document in the French Yellow Book is now admitted by the French authorities to be a pure fabrication, it is hardly necessary to note that the Austrian general mobilization was not ordered until eighteen hours after that of Russia, and that there is no truth in the statement that Germany had for six days been taking secret mobilization measures. That the officials of the French Foreign Office who edited the Yellow Book in 1914 should have thought it necessary to resort to such a deliberate distortion of the truth, suggests that they were conscious of how fatal Russia's action was, and how largely Paleologue and France were responsible for it, and therefore sought to excuse and justify it even by falsifying documents.

Thus it is not the *Lokal-Anzeiger* "extra," nor the Kaiser's telegram, nor Austrian mobilization which can explain or excuse the Russian general mobilization. What influence Buchanan and Paleologue had upon Sazonov on July 30 is uncertain. The Russian general mobilization was caused by the fact that Sazonov and the military officers on July 30 simply held the same views as on the evening of July 29, when they would have sent out the order for general mobilization had not the Tsar changed his mind. The situation had not changed essentially in the meantime, except that the partial mobilization, already ordered on the night of July 29, made the military authorities demand even more insistently an immediate general mobilization, because of technical military considerations.

Mobilization means War

By ordering general mobilization about 6:00 P.M. on July 30, Russia had now taken the step which military men everywhere clearly understood almost certainly meant war. This was also clearly understood by Sazonov and the Tsar, as appears from Schilling's account of their conversation at Peterhof and the Tsar's long hesitation to assume the terrible responsibility. Partial mobilization might be undertaken by a Great Power without leading to war, as had happened on several occasions in Russia and Austria in the preceding years. But general mobilization by a Great Power was generally understood to mean that it had only resorted to this final step of putting the great military machine in motion, with the automatic movement of the troops to the frontier with the greatest despatch, when it had finally concluded that war could no longer be avoided.

"Mobilization means war." This was a political maxim which for years had been widely accepted by military men on the Continent everywhere. It had been plainly hinted at by Pourtales to Sazonov during the July crisis. It was stated by the French and Russian Chiefs of Staff, and accepted by the Tsar, as far back as 1892, as is seen from the records of the negotiations for the Franco-Russian Alliance:

“General Obruchev emphasized finally the necessity of the immediate and simultaneous mobilization of the Russian and French armies at the first news received by either of the two countries of a mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance. He understands further that this mobilization of France and Russia would be followed immediately by positive results, by acts of war, in a word would be inseparable from an 'aggression.’”

Similarly, General Boisdeffre, in talking with the Tsar the day after the Military Convention had been approved, remarked:

“The mobilization is the declaration of war. To mobilize is to oblige one's neighbor to do the same. Mobilization involves the carrying out of strategic transportation and concentration. Otherwise, to leave a million men on one's frontier, without doing the same simultaneously, is to deprive oneself of all possibility of moving later; it is placing oneself in the situation of an individual who, with a pistol in his pocket, should let his neighbor put a weapon to his forehead without drawing his own.” [To which Alexander III replied], “That is exactly the way I understand it.”

In a Russian secret order approved by the Tsar on March 12, 1912, at the moment Russia helped to secure the signing of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty which was to lead to the Balkan Wars, it was expressly stated that “the telegram announcing mobilization is also at the same time to be effective as the Tsar's order for the opening of hostilities against Germany and Austria.”⁷⁹ Though this order, for technical and political reasons, was later cancelled, and the telegrams for mobilization and the opening of hostilities were to be issued separately, it still represented the conception of military men that general mobilization means war. Dobrorolski, for instance, speaking of the Russian mobilization of 1914, says explicitly: “The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its end in all its details. When the moment has been chosen, one only has to press the button, and the whole state begins to function automatically with the precision of a clock's mechanism. . . . The choice of the moment is influenced by a complex of varied political causes. But once the moment has been fixed, everything is settled; there is no going back; it determines mechanically the beginning of war.”

7.24 Other Mobilizations and Declarations of War

In following the Russian diplomatic and military steps to the point where general mobilization was ordered on the afternoon of July 30, we have outrun the narrative of events in the other capitals of Europe. In Paris, London, and Berlin also, hopes of peace and fears of imminent war had brought into opposition the activity of the diplomats and the pressure of the military authorities. The former still worked to save the situation, or at least, if that proved impossible, to make it appear that they and their allies were not responsible for the impending catastrophe. The latter pressed for military measures which they regarded as imperative to secure strategic advantages in the war which they were increasingly convinced was inevitable.

France and the 10 Kilometer Withdrawal

President Poincare and M. Viviani, who landed at Dunkirk on the morning of July 29, reached Paris about noon. They were quickly informed of the precautionary military measures in anticipation of war which the Cabinet and M. Messimy, the Minister of War, had been taking in their absence since the evening of July 25. The measures included the return to their standing quarters of troops in training, the recall of officers on leave, and provision for the transportation from Morocco of all possible troops.

These were all approved. They also learned of Austria's persistently intransigent attitude and of her declaration of war; of Germany's apparent complete support of Austria; of various visits which the German Ambassador had made to the French Foreign Office which did not inspire confidence as to Germany's desire for peace; of Sir Edward Grey's unwillingness definitely to commit himself as to England's future course; and of Sazonov's announcement that Russia was about to order partial mobilization.² At a Cabinet meeting in the afternoon Poincare says he found all the ministers "closely united in the resolution to do the impossible to avoid war and also to neglect no preparations for defense."

France kept in telegraph contact with Russia, giving them full support, as already described in earlier chapters. From these telegrams from Paris to St. Petersburg, it appears that the French Government was anxious that Russia should not precipitate a European war, but should still continue measures in preparation for it, since it appeared inevitable. Poincare must also have been aware that his renewal of the promise of full French support was likely to encourage Russia to defy Germany, and so lead to war. He did not wish to seem to interfere in Russian mobilization measures. Nevertheless, for diplomatic reasons, he did not want France or her ally to take any open and provocative military measures, which might seem aggressive, or might give Germany a pretext for mobilizing or—most important of all—which might make an undesirable impression on England and Italy. Apparently convinced that war was now inevitable, and remembering the French mistake of being the formal aggressor in 1870, he did not intend to have any similar mistake made in 1914; Russia and France should wait for Germany to take the initiative and thereby incur the odium of responsibility.⁹ Events were to prove his shrewdness, for Bethmann soon made the formal mistake of declaring war, which Ollivier had made in 1870. Therefore, for the present, while diplomatic negotiations were still pending, Russia should conceal as far as possible "the precautionary and defensive measures which she considered it necessary to adopt."

If President Poincare had expressed himself with his usual vigor and clarity—if he had said unmistakably to Russia: "Do not order general mobilization for the present while diplomatic negotiations are going on"—if he had even spoken as vigorously as Bethmann was speaking to Vienna—there is a possibility that war might still have been avoided. But Poincare was by now more concerned in securing England's aid and in taking military precautions in France, than in holding back Russia. "It would be extremely desirable that England also, without losing time, should join France and Russia, for only in this way

can she prevent a dangerous rupture of the European balance of power," Sazonov had telegraphed. Poincare agreed. Several steps which he took on July 30, and page after page of his memoirs, indicate that henceforth his great aim was to get England definitely to announce that she would give France armed support.

Early on the morning of July 30 Paul Cambon in London was informed of Sazonov's telegram indicating war as imminent and of the French reply to it. Cambon was instructed to tell Grey, and remind him of the letters exchanged in 1912, by which each had agreed, if peace was threatened, immediately to discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. But when M. Cambon reminded Sir Edward Grey of the 1912 exchange of letters, and "said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than now," he met with disappointment. Though he acted with extreme caution and tact, not asking Grey to say directly that England would intervene, but only what he would do in certain circumstances, such as an aggression by Germany on France, Sir Edward would only say he would see him again next day after the Cabinet had met. Cambon also talked with Sir Arthur Nicolson, but found little encouragement. English public opinion, said Nicolson, was indifferent to the Austro-Russian Balkan rivalry; it was not yet time to consider British intervention; German financial interests were influential in the "City" and with some of the Cabinet; Asquith did not at present dare take a resolute attitude; but Nicolson himself was "personally a partisan of intervention."

On the evening of July 30 Poincare himself spoke more bluntly and pressingly to Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris. He argued very urgently that if England would make an immediate declaration of her intention to support France, "there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. Bertie replied that the doubtful attitude of the House of Commons made it difficult to make any such declaration, and that anyway the orders to the British fleet not to disperse must be a pretty clear indication to Germany of England's attitude. But in his private comment to Grey, Bertie observed: "The French, instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal, expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war breaks out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake."

Since Sazonov's telegram had said that he was hastening Russia's military measures and considered war imminent, Poincare, and especially the French Minister of War, wanted to take measures for increasing the frontier troops as fully and quickly as possible, and yet avoid the appearance of making military preparations which might lead to frontier encounters or which might make an unfavorable impression on England. This conflict between efforts to satisfy strategic and diplomatic interests was the origin of the famous "10-kilometer withdrawal." At the meeting of the French Cabinet on the morning of July 30, after the arrival of Sazonov's telegram, the French Minister of War urged that *couverture* should be adopted at once. This meant that the covering troops should take up their places on the frontier, and involved the mobilization of five army corps and

all the French cavalry. But there was the diplomatic objection that this might seem to give France the role of aggressor and endanger the hopedfor British support and Italian neutrality. To reconcile the conflicting interests of strategy and diplomacy it was decided in principle to adopt a compromise. *Couvertures* was to take place, but with restrictions. The covering troops were to move up toward the frontier, so far as was possible by moving on foot and horse; reservists were not to be summoned; horses were to be bought instead of requisitioned; and the troops were to keep back a short distance from the actual frontier.

This would lessen the danger of unfortunate incidents, which at this time of excitement and suspicion might be exaggerated into “aggressions” and “acts of war.” As Viviani said in the Chamber of Deputies in 1919, replying to his critics who charged that the 10-kilometer order had enabled Germany to get an initial advantage and seize the French iron-ore districts: “We realized that everything might turn on some chance incident. A patrol might get on the wrong road and run up against an enemy patrol, a sergeant or a corporal might lose his head, a soldier might think himself in danger and fire off his rifle.” In the French Yellow Book Viviani is represented as telegraphing to Paul Cambon in London on July 30: “We have held back our troops 10 kilometers from the frontier, forbidding them to approach nearer. ... In thus delivering a strip of territory undefended to the sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.” As a matter of fact, however, no limit of precisely 10 kilometers was fixed at all. Neither in the telegram which Viviani really sent to Paul Cambon on July 30, nor in the order which Messimy issued to five corps commanders at 4:45 P.M., is there any mention of “10-kilometers.”

Viviani’s telegram to Paul Cambon instructed him to call Sir Edward Grey’s attention to the French and German military preparations. “England will see from them that, though France is resolute, it is not she who is taking aggressive measures. Draw Sir Edward Grey’s attention to the decision taken by the Cabinet this morning. Although Germany has taken up covering positions some hundreds of meters or some kilometers from the frontier, on the whole frontier from Luxembourg to the Vosges, and placed her covering troops in their war positions, we have not done so—although our plan of campaign, conceived for the offensive, contemplates that the war positions of our covering troops shall be as near the frontier as those of the Germans. We have thus left a strip of national territory without defense open to sudden attack. We have not done this for any other reason than to show the British Government and public opinion that France, like Russia, will not be the first to fire.” Then follows a list of German frontier and other military preparations. Messimy’s order to the corps commanders instructed them to carry out the order of 1909 concerning mobilization of the frontier troops.

Thus, there was no line drawn exactly ten kilometers from the frontier everywhere. At numerous points it was only four or five kilometers from the frontier, as Messimy stated to the Briey Committee in 1920.²⁰ General Joffre even “asked that he should not feel

obliged to carry out the order in absolute strictness," and the Government granted his request. Nevertheless, the fact that the French Government did hold back its covering troops a few kilometers from the frontier was a wise measure. It did tend to prevent unfortunate "incidents" which might have precipitated a war. But it would be a mistake to regard it mainly as a proof of Poincaré's love of peace. Rather it was a measure primarily calculated to win British approval and military support, and to minimize the fact that France was taking an important military measure preparatory to war.

The British Fleet and Warnings to Germany

In England the strategic problem was different from that of the military authorities on the Continent. By arrangements made many weeks earlier, England was fortunate in having her fleet already concentrated in the most powerful naval force which the world had ever seen. There was therefore no question of feverish haste to prepare it as quickly as possible to meet the enemy, but merely of whether orders should be given to keep it concentrated, instead of allowing it to disperse again to its normal positions as in time of peace.

On Saturday, July 25, Grey and his advisers learned from Buchanan that Sazonov "thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilize," and that Poincaré's visit had established between France and Russia a "perfect community of views" and a "solemn affirmation of the obligations imposed by the alliance." Upon this Sir Eyre Crowe commented: "We should decide now to mobilize the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilizes, and we should announce this decision without delay to the French and Russian Governments." Even at this early date he believed: "The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia." The mobilization of the fleet might also, he thought, serve as a warning to Germany. But Sir Edward Grey, who had just been told by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that the fleet could be mobilized in twenty-four hours, thought it premature to make any statement as yet to France and Russia. He still preferred to keep a non-committal attitude, neither encouraging the Russians and French, nor threatening the Germans.

But next day, after the arrival of more alarming news from Austria and Serbia, Winston Churchill and the First Sea Lord, on their own authority, decided that the fleet should not disperse. Grey approved, and a public announcement of the fact that the fleet was to remain concentrated appeared in the British papers on the morning of July 27. Grey intended this as a warning to dispel the current impression in Germany and Austria that England would remain neutral. The announcement did help to dispel the anxieties of the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, and was received "with great satisfaction" by his colleague, Paul Cambon. But in Austria and Germany it did not make as effective an impression as the British Foreign Office appears to have expected. And in Germany it was at first regarded as less important than the assurance which Prince Henry of Prussia had just brought from King George that England would remain neutral.

On July 28 the feeling at the British Foreign Office became more pessimistic. The officials were puzzled by the fresh proposals which Sazonov kept making almost daily. Finally on July 29, after the news of the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, which made Sazonov regard "direct conversations" as illusory and state that partial mobilization would soon take place in Russia, officials in the inner circle in England came to regard a European war as almost inevitable. "What is the use of exchanging views at this juncture?" asked Sir Arthur Nicolson. "I am of the opinion that the resources of diplomacy are, for the present, exhausted." Four of Sir Edward Grey's despatches, dated July 29, though published in the British Blue Book of 1914 as if sent, are now revealed in the archives marked, "Not sent—War." Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons that the situation was one "of extreme gravity."

In fact, on the previous afternoon, July 28, at 5 P.M., Winston Churchill had ordered that the fleet was to proceed during the night at high speed and without lights through the Straits of Dover from Portland to its fighting base at Scapa Flow. Fearing to bring this order before the Cabinet, lest it should be considered a provocative action likely to damage the chances of peace, Mr. Churchill had only informed Mr. Asquith, who at once gave his approval. On July 29, the official "warning telegram" was dispatched from the Admiralty. The British Fleet was now ready, whatever happened, to meet and control the situation. On the morning, July 29, Sir Edward Grey at last decided to give Germany a more definite warning, as Russia and France had been continually urging. Quite characteristically he first told Cambon of what he was going to say to Lichnowsky, but at the same time reiterated that his warning to Germany would not mean that England had yet made up her mind what she would do if France and Germany became involved.

Grey then gave to Lichnowsky, in the form of a friendly and private communication, the warning that, as long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia, England could stand aside; but if Germany and France should be involved, then the situation would be immediately altered and the British Government would be forced to rapid decisions. But before Grey's warning was deciphered and known in Berlin, Bethmann took a step which caused the British Foreign Office to believe that Germany had practically determined to go to war, violate Belgium, and crush France.

Bethmann and Moltke

In Berlin, as in Paris and London, the situation was regarded as very critical on Wednesday, July 29. Bethmann had urged Austria to accept the "Halt in Belgrade" mediation plan, but had received no answer from Vienna. Such silence on the part of his ally was extremely irritating and embarrassing to the German Chancellor. Because of it, he was unable to show the Entente Powers that his pressure at Vienna was meeting with success and would bring a satisfactory solution of the crisis. Furthermore, the German military authorities, like the General Staffs everywhere, were pressing for early military measures to insure the

safety of their country and the success of their strategic plans, in case the diplomatists could not preserve peace.

Helmuth von Moltke, who bore the name but lacked the genius of his more famous uncle, was now Chief of the German General Staff, having accepted that difficult office reluctantly in 1906 in succession to Count Schlieffen. In a long summary of the political situation on July 29, Moltke now pointed out the dangerous sequence of mobilizations which would probably take place, in case Russia carried out her announced intention of ordering partial mobilization in her southern districts if Austria advanced into Serbia, Russia, he said, had been making military preparations on the frontier against Germany, as well as against Austria, so that she would be able to move her armies forward in a very few days when she actually issued her mobilization orders. France also, according to his information, appeared to be taking measures preparatory to general mobilization. The situation thus was becoming daily more unfavorable to Germany, and might lead to fateful consequences if Germany, by a collision between Austria and Russia, should be forced to mobilize and fight on two fronts. Therefore, he concluded, "it is of the greatest importance to ascertain as soon as possible whether Russia and France intend to let it come to a war with Germany."

Bethmann, however, was still hoping that the "pledge plan" of "Halt in Belgrade" might bring a satisfactory solution. He therefore insisted on waiting for a reply from Vienna. He was vigorously opposed to taking any decisive military measures which might jeopardize his diplomatic efforts. According to the information or rumors gathered by the Bavarian Military Attache in Berlin on this day, Moltke "is exerting all his influence in favor of taking advantage of the exceptionally favorable opportunity for striking a decisive blow," pointing out the momentary military embarrassment of France, the over-confidence of Russia, and the good time of year with the harvests mostly gathered and the annual training period of recruits completed. Bethmann, on the other hand, "is putting on the brakes with all his might, and is anxious to avoid everything which might lead to similar measures in France and England and start the ball rolling."

These opposing views were set forth to the Kaiser at Potsdam on the afternoon and early evening of July 29 in separate reports by the military and civilian authorities. But there was no "Potsdam Council," nor any decision in favor of German mobilization, such as was incorrectly reported next day by the suspicious French Ambassador and has been commonly assumed by later writers. 30 Bethmann was successful in "putting on the brakes," as is seen from his summary of the situation at the Prussian Council of Ministers at noon next day: "The military authorities had expressed the desire that a 'state of threatening danger of war' be proclaimed, but he had successfully defended before His Majesty the objections." The only precautionary military measures ordered by the evening of July 29 were the protection of railways and valuable buildings, the recall of officers and men on leave, the reinforcement of frontier fortresses, and other minor measures similar to, but less extensive than, those which had been going on in Russia since July 26 and which had already been ordered in France. While Bethmann thus succeeded in holding

back the military authorities from any decisive and irreparable step, he made a number of important diplomatic moves on July 29, some with a view to averting war, others with a view to securing advantages if war proved inevitable.

Bethmann's optimism had been strengthened by news that the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry, on a visit to England, had been assured by King George on July 26: "We shall try all we can to keep out of this, and shall remain neutral." But meanwhile the announcement on the 27th that the British fleet was not to be dispersed made it doubtful whether King George's statement could still be relied on. Prince Henry, who came to Potsdam on the afternoon of July 29, was "convinced that this statement was made in all seriousness," and that England would remain neutral at the start, but whether she would do so permanently he doubted, "on account of her relations with France." It was about 10:30 P.M. that Bethmann sent for Goschen and "made the following strong bid for British neutrality in the event of war." Provided Great Britain remained neutral, Germany was ready to give every assurance that she aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France in Europe, though she could give no such assurance concerning the French colonies. Germany would respect the neutrality of Holland, but as regards Belgium. Bethmann "could not tell to what operations Germany might be forced by the action of France, but he could state that, provided that Belgium did not take sides against Germany, her integrity would be respected at the conclusion of the war."

Bethmann's bid for British neutrality was a most unfortunate and foolish blunder. It made the worst possible impression in London. Sir Eyre Crowe noted: "The only comment that need be made on these astounding proposals is that they reflect discredit on the statesman who makes them." He concluded that "Germany practically admits the intention to violate Belgian neutrality," and "is practically determined to go to war." Sir Edward Grey, after securing the approval of Mr. Asquith, but without waiting to lay his answer before the Cabinet, replied to Goschen that the Chancellor's proposals "cannot be entertained for a moment." England's material interests made it impossible to allow France to be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, even though Germany should not take territory from France as distinct from her colonies. "But apart from that, for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover." Nor could England bargain away her obligation and interest as regards the neutrality of Belgium.

Another step taken on July 29, probably as a result of the conferences at Potsdam, was Jagow's despatch of a message in a sealed envelope to the German Minister at Brussels. It was carried by a messenger, instead of being telegraphed in cipher, because there was no immediate haste, and because it was not desirable to reveal even to the Minister himself a demand on Belgium which after all it might never be necessary to make. On opening the envelope, the Minister merely found instructions to keep safely locked up another sealed document which he would find enclosed, but which he was to open only if subsequently instructed by telegram from Berlin. The inner envelope contained an ultimatum to Belgium, based on a draft which Moltke had written with his own hand

on July 26. It stated the German intention to march through Belgium, if possible with the friendly consent of Belgium; but if Belgium offered opposition, "Germany would be obliged, to her regret, to regard the Kingdom as an enemy."

These two steps—the bid for British neutrality and the forwarding of the sealed ultimatum to Brussels—indicate how seriously the German authorities contemplated on the evening of July 29 the probability of war. They show that Bethmann had found himself forced to yield to Moltke's view of strategic necessity and to the violation of Belgium, if war should come. But they do not prove that Bethmann had yet yielded to the view that war was already inevitable, or that any decision for war had been reached.

Meanwhile Lichnowsky's later telegram had been deciphered, telling of Grey's suggestion of mediation on the basis of an Austrian occupation of Belgrade, and also of Grey's private and friendly warning that England might find it impossible to stand aside. As Grey's suggestion was very similar to Bethmann's own "Halt in Belgrade" plan, and as the warning put an end to all illusions as to the possibility of British neutrality, Bethmann welcomed Grey's suggestion as supporting his own efforts, and forwarded it to Vienna. In commenting on it, he pointed out in strong terms how dangerous it would be for Austria to refuse all negotiations, and added: "Under these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically urge upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation in accordance with the above honorable conditions."

Then, finally, before catching a little sleep, he sent telegrams to St. Petersburg and London which he hoped would help to prevent war and secure mediation. To Pourtales he telegraphed: "Please tell Sazonov that we are continuing to mediate; condition, however, would be the suspension for the time being of all hostilities against Austria on the part of Russia"; and to Lichnowsky: "Kindly thank Sir E. Grey for his frank explanation and tell him that we are continuing to mediate in Vienna and are urgently advising the acceptance of his proposal." Accordingly, in his summary of the situation to the Prussian Ministry of State about noon, Bethmann gave an account of his efforts to bring about an understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, seconded by Grey's proposal of mediation based on the Austrian occupation of Belgrade, but had to admit that the result of his efforts was still uncertain. The Kaiser had consented, however, that no decisive steps toward mobilization should be taken until the move at Vienna had been brought to a conclusion. Nor would he himself give up his hope and efforts to maintain peace, as long as it had not been repelled.

Austria again explained to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna that Austria had no idea of making any territorial acquisitions in Serbia, and that, after the conclusion of peace, the occupation of Serbian territory would be merely temporary to secure the fulfilment of Austrian demands; to the extent that Serbia fulfilled the conditions of peace, evacuation would follow. But as to accepting Grey's suggestion for a mediation by a conference of the Powers, involving the cessation of hostilities, he could not give an answer until next day after an audience with Emperor Francis Joseph. While Bethmann had thus been trying in vain to get an answer from Vienna, Moltke had become increasingly nervous over

the situation. On the morning of July 30 he was still willing to abide by the decision of Bethmann and the Kaiser, that Russia's partial mobilization did not necessitate Germany's mobilization, for he wrote out for Captain Fleischmann, whom Conrad had sent to Berlin as liaison officer, the following telegram for the Austrian Chief of Staff:

"Russia's mobilization is not yet a cause for mobilization. [Moltke meant for Germany's mobilization, but Conrad seems to have understood for Austria's mobilization. Not until state of war exists between Austria and Russia. In contrast to the mobilizations and demobilizations which have been customary in Russia, Germany's mobilization would unconditionally lead to war. Do not declare war on Russia, but await Russia's attack."

Moltke seemed to be convinced that Russia was forcing Europe into war, and, in order to make it clear that Russia was the aggressor, he believed that the initiative in the declaration of war should come, not from Austria or from Germany, but from Russia—a point of view exactly analogous to that of Poincare, Paleologue and Jules Cambon, who were convinced that Germany was forcing Europe into war and that the odium of the initiative must be carefully left to her. In the afternoon, however, after hearing that Sazonov had said that it was impossible to stop the Russian mobilization, and that the Tsar admitted that the preparatory measures had been going on for five days, Moltke became much excited and believed that the danger to Germany and Austria was critical. In the course of the evening of July 30, probably about 11:00 P.M., Moltke talked again with Bethmann. A little later—shortly after midnight—Moltke told Major Haeften that he had received "two reliable reports from independent sources, stating that mobilization of all Russia's armed forces had already been ordered." This was altogether likely, as Russian general mobilization had been ordered at 6 P.M., and the orders had been quickly transmitted to the Warsaw District on the German frontier. This caused Bethmann to waver momentarily in his hope to avoid war and his determination to keep "putting the brakes" on the military authorities.

It was then when the Chancellor learned of the following telegram from the King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia:

"So pleased to hear of William's efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. . . . My Government is doing its utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Serbian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William that I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of Europe."

This telegram gave Bethmann new hope. Instead of sending the draft telegram, with Moltke's alarming news which would have tended to make Austria decide for general mobilization, Bethmann sent on to Vienna King George's friendly message. He directed

Tschirschky to communicate King George's telegram to Berchtold "without delay," and again added: "A definite decision in Vienna during the course of the day is urgently desired."

About 7 A.M., July 31, Moltke received a telephone message from a Staff Officer at Allenstein in East Prussia, stating that the frontier had been completely closed by the Russians and that the red placards ordering mobilization had already been posted up. Moltke replied: "It is necessary that you procure one of these posted orders. I must have certainty as to whether they are really mobilizing against us. Before having that certainty, I am not able to elicit a mobilization order." In other words, Moltke himself admits that Bethmann was unwilling to agree to a decision until Germany had conclusive and absolute evidence of the Russian general mobilization which was suspected and which in fact had been ordered some twelve hours earlier. This evidence was finally supplied in the telegram from Pour- , tales at 11:40 A.M. Had Bethmann not received it—had the Tsar not yielded to Sazonov and the Russian militarists - it is probable that Bethmann would still have held out against Moltke and Falkenhayn, and a further breathing space been given for consideration of the "Halt in Belgrade" proposal, or for Sazonov's "formula," or for other negotiations toward a peaceful solution.

However, as the events actually took place, it was the precipitate Russian general mobilization, and not any "military convention" between Moltke and Conrad which determined Germany's decision for "Threatening Danger of War," followed by her ultimatums and mobilization, in view of the European War which even Bethmann recognized was made inevitable by Russia's step.

Austrian General Mobilization July 31

In Vienna Berchtold and Conrad were dominated more by a determination to carry out a campaign against Serbia than by a fear of war with Russia. Hence the Austrian ultimatum, the partial mobilization exclusively against Serbia with careful avoidance of provocative measures in Galicia, and the declaration of war on Serbia, all of which have already been described. Even after moving against Serbia and bombarding Belgrade, Conrad had still assumed that Russia would not resort to armed intervention. He had therefore sent no troops to the Galician front. But upon Sazonov's announcement that Russia would mobilize in her southern districts if Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, Conrad began to realize

that the Galician front was in danger. He regarded as grotesque Sazonov's assurance that Russian troops once mobilized would stand idle on the frontier with arms stacked. He at once resolved that Austria ought to mobilize as a defensive measure of safety against superior Russian forces. Early on July 30, the German Ambassador in Vienna noted: "Here they are resolved to mobilize, as soon as Germany approves; firmly resolved to permit no further Russian mobilization. Proposal: say to St. Petersburg and eventually to Paris, that if the mobilization continues, general mobilization will begin in Austria and

Germany." That is, Berchtold and Conrad proposed to rattle the German sword, by having Bethmann threaten Russia and France with general mobilization by the Central Powers, unless Russian mobilization measures ceased. But when the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin tried to persuade Germany to take such a step, Germany refused.

Germany advised Austria to make representations at St. Petersburg on her own account. But Conrad did not wait for the arrival of the discouraging German answer. Nor did he and Berchtold give serious heed to Bethmann's renewed urgent advice to accept Grey's peace proposal, which Tschirschky says he presented "most impressively" after lunch on July 30. Conrad was also about to submit to Francis Joseph the order for Austrian general mobilization as the reply to the measures already taken by Russia. In spite of Bethmann's advice which had just been urged by Tschirschky, Berchtold and Conrad, at their audience with Emperor Francis Joseph later in the afternoon, persuaded the aged monarch to approve the following decisions. War against Serbia was to be carried out; Grey's proposal was to be answered very politely in form but without accepting it in substance. General mobilization in Austria was to be ordered on August 1, with August 4 as the first day of mobilization; but this question would be discussed again next day.

The final reservation, providing for discussion again next day of the date of mobilization, was probably mainly owing to the necessity of getting Count Tisza's approval. It may have also been partly owing to the arrival of Fleischmann's telegram from Moltke: "Russia's mobilization is not yet a cause for mobilization," and to Bethmann's continued urgent advice to accept Grey's mediation proposal. In fact, says Conrad: "While Emperor Francis Joseph, at this hardest moment of his life, was taking with deep solemnity and calm resolution the step whose heavy consequences were as clear to him as its inevitability, it seemed as if Emperor William was thinking of retreat, and as if the feeling in Berlin had changed on account of Italy's jumping out."

Meanwhile, in the course of the night of July 31, had come Bienerth's telegram, and at 7:45 A.M. Moltke's own telegram urging Austria to mobilization at once.⁸⁹ These telegrams did not cause Austrian mobilization, except in the sense that they removed any hesitation on Conrad's part concerning the order he had written the previous evening, and confirmed Berchtold in the decision taken in the audience with the Emperor the day before to reject the substance of Grey's proposal. When Conrad took Moltke's telegram to Berchtold and the other Ministers, Berchtold exclaimed: "Who is in charge? Moltke or Bethmann?" After reading aloud Emperor William's telegram to Francis Joseph, urging the "Halt in Belgrade" proposal, Berchtold turned to the others and said: "I called you together because I had the impression that Germany was drawing back; now I have the most satisfactory assurances from the highest military authority." Francis Joseph's final assent was thereupon secured to an order for general mobilization, fixing August 4 as the first day of mobilization. The order reached the Ministry of War on July 31 at 12:23 P.M., and was immediately published. It did not, however, immediately remove all misunderstandings between Conrad and Moltke in the course of the afternoon. Conrad, in ordering general mobilization, did not at first expect war with Russia. He had not yet

heard of Russian general mobilization and believed he could still carry through the war against Serbia.

The Austrian general mobilization was not a decisive factor in the final chain of events causing the war. It was not ordered until eighteen hours after the Russian general mobilization had been ordered, and did not contribute to the steps which Germany took in answer to the Russian mobilization. After securing Francis Joseph's final approval of Austrian general mobilization, Berchtold now deceived Europe by the pretense of adopting a more conciliatory attitude, which is contradicted by his real intentions as revealed in the minutes of the secret Ministerial Council held about noon. With the Russian Ambassador in Vienna he took up conversations again in a most friendly manner, and to all the Powers he pretended that Austria was ready to "approach nearer" Grey's proposal.

There is therefore no substantial truth in the widely accepted Entente version that Austria was at last ready to yield, when Germany intervened with her ultimatum and declaration of war, and so precipitated the general European War. Germany did intervene because of the Russian general mobilization. But Austria had no genuine intention of yielding to Grey's idea, or of abandoning the campaign against Serbia and being content with the occupation of Belgrade or even neighboring territory. One reason that Austria refused to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade was military necessity. Her plan of campaign did not make possible an immediate occupation of Belgrade, but provided that her main attack on Serbia should come from Bosnia from the southwest, and not directly upon Belgrade from the north across the Danube.

Threatening Danger of War in Germany July 31

Bethmann had restrained Moltke from taking any irremediable military steps until a decision should be made at noon on July 31 at a meeting between themselves and the Kaiser." By that time it was hoped that an answer would at last have come from Vienna as to the "Halt in Belgrade" plan, and that there would be definite information as to the military situation in Russia. A favorable answer from Vienna might open the way for peace. A confirmation of the reports of general mobilization in Russia would force Germany to take steps to protect herself against the danger of a war on two fronts.

While in the midst of this, the Kaiser received a telephone message from Berlin announcing beyond the slightest doubt that general mobilization was in progress in Russia. Without waiting to consult his Foreign Office, he telegraphed to King George:

"Many thanks for your kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that official notification has reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for ensuring safety of my eastern frontiers where strong Russian

troops are already posted."

The definite news of the Russian general mobilization, ordered about 6:00 P.M. on July 30, was surprisingly late in reaching Berlin. In St. Petersburg neither Pourtales nor the German Military Attache, Eggeling, knew anything of it until the morning of July 31, after the news had already been printed in the newspapers and been posted up in the streets for hours. Bethmann telephoned the news to Potsdam. The Kaiser motored at once to Berlin. A conference took place with Bethmann, Moltke and other officials. About 1:00 P.M. it was decided to proclaim "Threatening Danger of War" [drohende Kriegsgefahr]. This proclamation set in motion a number of precautionary measures preparatory to actual mobilization, and was somewhat similar to the Russian "Period Preparatory to War." It did not necessarily and inevitably involve mobilization, but it meant that the German Government expected it would be followed by mobilization within at least forty-eight hours, and mobilization would mean war. As Bethmann telegraphed to Vienna, in order to persuade Austria to divert her main effort against Russia instead of against Serbia:

"After the Russian total mobilization we have proclaimed "Threatening Danger of War," which will presumably be followed within forty-eight hours by mobilization. The latter inevitably means war. We expect from Austria an immediate active participation in the war against Russia."

It is often said that had the German Government really wanted peace, even after learning of the Russian general mobilization, it should have contented itself with declaring German mobilization and then standing on the defensive; that Sazonov would have lived up to his promises that the Russian army would make no attack but stand with arms grounded; and that this would have again given the diplomatists a chance to find a peaceful solution. It is said, in a word, that the proper answer to mobilization is countermobilization and not war. But this argument leaves out of view the fact that in St. Petersburg and Paris, as well as in Berlin, the maxim had long been accepted by military men, and by the highest political authorities like Tsar Alexander III, that "mobilization means war." It had been clearly hinted by Pourtales to Sazonov on the afternoon of July 29 before Russia ordered general mobilization. It was obviously clear to the Tsar on July 30 in view of his hesitation to yield to Sazonov's arguments and to accept the solemn responsibility which he realized would send thousands and thousands of men to their death. And it was explicitly stated by Bethmann to the Prussian Council of Ministers on July 30: "The declaration of 'Threatening Danger of War' meant mobilization, and this under our conditions—mobilization toward both sides - meant war."

The argument also leaves out of view the fact that in the plans of the General Staffs everywhere on the Continent mobilization was inextricably bound up with the "plan of campaign," which provided not only for the march to the frontier but in most cases the crossing of the frontier in order to get the advantage of the offensive and the waging of war in the enemy's country. Mobilization started the military machine in motion, and once in motion, for technical reasons, it was virtually impossible to halt it without

dislocation of the long-prepared and minutely worked out plan of campaign. Though the civilian authorities might want to stop the machine at the frontier, and might promise that they would do so, as the Tsar promised the Kaiser, it was doubtful whether they would be able to do so, owing to the insistent arguments of the military authorities that any interference with the carefully prearranged schedule would be disastrous. Even the Kaiser, whose authority in civil and military authorities was not least among monarchs, on understanding from Lichnowsky that England might guarantee the neutrality of France, for a moment on August 1, thought he could halt the German army, once in motion, from crossing the frontier into Luxemburg. But even he was quickly overborne by Moltke and by the news that Lichnowsky had made a "mistake," and made to realize that it was impossible. And, as a matter of fact, at this very moment, a detachment of German soldiers appeared already to have crossed the frontier and violated the neutrality of Luxemburg.

Furthermore, the argument leaves out of view the fact, just suggested, that when mobilizations have taken place, "military necessity" tends to prevail over the diplomatic considerations of the civilians. This was particularly true in Germany. It was perfectly recognized in St. Petersburg and Paris, as well as in Berlin, that as Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts, and as she was threatened by the superior number of troops which Russia and France could bring against her, she would have to strike her main blow first at one and then at the other. She could not divide her main forces and face both fronts at once. Taking advantage of the fact that she could mobilize more rapidly than Russia, she would have to make her first attack on France, in the West, while the Russian forces were slowly gathering in the East. She must equalize her inferiority in numbers by the greater speed of her military machine. For Germany merely to have answered mobilization by countermobilization, and to have stood on the defensive while diplomatic negotiations (probably futile) proceeded, would have meant that she would lose all her advantage in speed. The Russian armies would have had time gradually to mobilize and to concentrate on the East Prussian frontier, in overwhelming numbers, thus compelling Germany either to divide her forces and face superior numbers, simultaneously East and West, or to open her eastern territory to Russian invasion while she made her main effort against France in the West. These were military considerations, convincing to the German civilian as well as military authorities, and recognized by the military authorities in Russia and France, which made it obviously impossible for Germany merely to answer Russian general mobilization by countermobilization. It was not Germany's lack of desire for peace, but her "plan of campaign," arising from her inferior numbers and her double frontier, which compelled her, after proclaiming "Threatening Danger of War," followed by mobilization, to move at once beyond her frontier. Thus, Russia and France knew that when Russia would order general mobilization, it would lead to a German attack on Russia and France the moment they noticed said mobilization.

Germany's plan of campaign also contemplated going through the relatively flat and less strongly fortified territory of Belgium, in defiance of international law and of Prussia's

guarantee of Belgian neutrality. Only in so doing, the militarists believed, could Germany strike and crush the French forces quickly, so that she could then turn against Russia. By going through Belgium it was calculated that a decisive victory—a “Cannae”—could be won within six weeks. On the other hand, to attempt to reach the French armies by striking straight west, without touching the neutralized territories of Luxemburg and Belgium, would take months, on account of the hilly country, the rising escarpments, and the strong lines of defensive forts which France had built since 1870.

Bethmann, with his juristic training and upon the advice of a legal expert in the Foreign Office, wished to keep within the requirements of the Hague Convention of 1907, which declared that hostilities must not commence without previous warning, either in the form of a reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war. Compelled to accept the German plan of campaign which provided for an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding passage across her territory, he desired to regularize it by a previous formal declaration of a state of war between Germany and Russia, in case Russia did not accede to an ultimatum to demobilize at once. Falkenhayn, and especially Tirpitz, were opposed to such a declaration of war against Russia. They thought it an unnecessary, foolish and clumsy mistake in diplomatic technique, which would make an unfortunate impression on public opinion and brand Germany before the world as the aggressor. Pourtales also was of this opinion. The course of events showed that he was right. But, at the moment, Bethmann and Jagow seemed to have believed that a violation of Belgian neutrality prior to Germany's being formally at war with Russia would affect world opinion more adversely than a German initiative in declaring war. So Bethmann decided at once to send an ultimatum to Russia and another to Russia's ally.

Pourtales was therefore informed that Russia's mobilization of her entire army and navy, undertaken while negotiations were still pending, and before Germany had taken any mobilization measures, had compelled Germany to proclaim Threatening Danger of War. “Mobilization must follow in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria-Hungary and ourselves within twelve hours and make us a distinct declaration to that effect. Please inform Sazonov of this, and telegraph the hour of your communication.” Pourtales received this message shortly after 11:00 P.M., deciphered it, and delivered it to Sazonov at midnight. Sazonov replied to him, as the Tsar had done, that for technical reasons it was impossible to suspend the mobilization measures.

The proclamation of “Threatening Danger of War” had been urged by Moltke and Falkenhayn since the evening of July 29. But Bethmann had held out against it until receiving definite news that Russia had ordered general mobilization. As the Russian order had been given because Sazonov and Lanushkevich had persuaded the Tsar that war was inevitable, so now the Russian mobilization was the decisive fact which at last convinced the civil as well as the military authorities in Germany that war was inevitable. News of the Russian step caused military considerations everywhere (except in England) to take precedence over political considerations, and rendered futile and illusory all the later diplomatic efforts. Some of these efforts were made sincerely but without serious expect-

tation of success; some were only diplomatic gestures calculated to give an appearance of pacific intentions and to throw the odium of responsibility upon the opposing side. Thus, neither the Russian "formula" which Sazonov had proposed to Pourtales, nor the personal appeal which Pourtales made in a visit on his own initiative to the Tsar at Peterhof, nor the final exchange of telegrams between "Willy" and "Nicky," nor Berchtold's pretense of being at last ready to make some concessions, could have any chance of success. As these last diplomatic efforts were futile and illusory, they need not be set forth in detail.

Mobilization in France and Germany, August 1

Shortly after Schoen had made his first communication concerning the Russian mobilization and the steps that Germany was forced to take in consequence, the French Government finally received, on July 31, at 8:30 P.M., Paleologue's belated telegram announcing it. This left no doubt that the news of it, which had already come from German sources through Jules Cambon, Schoen, and a telegraph agency, was correct. This news, coupled with that of the German "Threatening Danger of War" received from Cambon, left little doubt in the minds of the French Cabinet that a European War was inevitable. General Joffre demanded the complete mobilization of the eastern army corps. "Every delay of twenty-four hours in calling up reservists and sending the telegram for *couverture* means a retardation of the concentration forces, that is, the initial abandonment of fifteen to twenty kilometers of territory for every day of delay." At 5:00 P.M., therefore, before Schoen came to ask Viviani about French neutrality, the Cabinet decided to order that *couverture*, which had been already ordered with limitations on July 30 in connection with the "10-kilometer withdrawal," should now take place in its fullest extent. A little later at 1:00 A.M., the Russian Military Attache at Paris reported to St. Petersburg:

"The French Minister of War has declared to me in a tone of hearty enthusiasm the firm decision of the French Government for War, and begged me to confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany, and that Austria will be treated as a *quantite negligeable*."

There came also the secret assurance from Rome that the Italian Government considered itself freed by Austria's conduct from its Triple Alliance obligations. But Sir Edward Grey continued in a non-committal attitude which was most distressing to Paul Cambon in London and to the French Cabinet in Paris.

The telegram from Pourtales reporting that Sazonov had replied that it was impossible for technical reasons to suspend Russian mobilization had been received in Berlin on August 1 at 12:30 A.M. The time-limit for any further reply expired at noon. Schoen's telegram giving Viviani's final answer, "France will act in accordance with her interests," did not reach Berlin until 6:10 P.M. But his earlier telegrams made it seem almost certain, as Germany expected, that France would not remain neutral, and certainly not hand over Toul and Verdun to German occupation. Germany therefore ordered mobilization August 1 at 5:00 P.M., quarter of an hour later than France. Germany was the last of the Great

Powers to take this final and supreme military measure.

Expecting that Sazonov would maintain his view that Russia could not suspend mobilization and would fail to] comply with the ultimatum, Bethmann forwarded to Pourtales a declaration of war. The Ambassador, receiving it about 6:00 P.M. went at once with it to Sazonov. Three times, with increasing signs of emotion at his painful duty, he asked the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs whether he could not give him a favorable answer to his request of the day before. Three times Sazonov answered in the negative. "In that case, Sir," said Pourtales, drawing from his pocket a folded paper, "I am instructed to hand you this note," and gave him the declaration of war. 133 Then losing selfcontrol, the Ambassador went to the window and wept, saying: "I never could have believed that I should quit St. Petersburg under these conditions." He then embraced Sazonov and went away, asking that he be informed at the Embassy concerning his passports and arrangements for his departure, as he was not capable at the moment of talking about anything.

The German declaration of war on France was not made until 6:15 P.M. on August 3. It alleged several hostile French acts: French troops had crossed the frontier in the Vosges. "A French aviator, who must have flown across Belgium territory, was shot down yesterday in an attempt to wreck the railroad at Wesel. . . . Yesterday, French airmen dropped bombs on the railroads near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. Thus France has forced us into war." Schoen was therefore instructed to communicate the foregoing to the French Government, ask for his passports, and turn over the Embassy to the charge of the American Ambassador. The alleged hostile acts were based on false information which the German Government, in its haste, had taken no care to verify. Furthermore, the despatch to Schoen reached him in a very mutilated form, so that much of it was unintelligible. Though the declaration of war and the grounds for it were such a very serious matter, Schoen did not feel justified in taking the necessary time to get from Berlin a complete and exact text of the mutilated document. He had been told to deliver the declaration at 6:00 P.M. Bethmann again wished to be formally correct in notifying a state of war before the German forces crossed the frontier into France, as they were about to do in accordance with the pre-arranged and all-important plan of campaign. Schoen therefore put together, as best he could, a declaration of war based on his mutilated telegram, and handed it in to Viviani. It contained the untrue allegations as to the French aviators over Wesel, Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

England and Belgium

In spite of Paul Cambon's appeal to Grey on July 30, recalling their exchange of notes in 1912, 137 and in spite of a personal entreaty which President Poincare sent by special messenger to King George on the afternoon of July 31, the British Foreign Secretary still remained unwilling to give any pledge to France. As Grey notified the British Ambassador in Paris:

"I went on to say to M. Cambon that though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. M. Cambon expressed great disappointment at my reply. He repeated his question of whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilization of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilization was being forced by Russia."

Sir Edward Grey knew that the Cabinet was still sharply divided on the question of British participation in a European War. He was therefore taking care to be extremely cautious in avoiding any commitments to France until opinion in the Cabinet and in Parliament should be brought more decisively to the side of France by some new fact, such as a German ultimatum to France or a refusal to respect the neutrality of Belgium. On Friday, July 31, the day after receiving Bethmann's "bid," Grey decided to clarify the Belgian question by addressing to the French and German Governments a request asking each for an assurance that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violated it. France at once gave an unqualified assurance in the affirmative. But at Berlin Jagow told the British Ambassador that he could not possibly reply without consulting Bethmann and the Kaiser.

Already, however, on this same Friday, before hearing the dubious German reply in regard to Belgium, Sir Edward Grey determined in his own mind, in agreement with Nicolson and Crowe, that England's obligation of honor to France and her own material interests made it imperative for her to intervene on the Franco-Russian side. In the morning he had told the German Ambassador that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, he would support it and go to the length of saying that, if France and Russia would not accept it, he would have nothing more to do with the consequences. "But, otherwise," he warned Lichnowsky, "if France became involved, we should be drawn in."

On August 1, Cambon, knowing of Germany's ultimatums and of the French intention to order mobilization, renewed his appeals to Grey. He urged very strongly the British obligation to help France, both on account of the withdrawal of the French fleet to the Mediterranean, leaving the northern coast undefended except for British assistance, and on account of British interest. "If we [English] do not help France," Cambon said, "the Entente would disappear; and, whether victory came to Germany, or to France and Russia, our situation at the end of the war would be very uncomfortable." But Grey replied there was no obligation. That if France were forced into a war against her wish, it was because of her alliance with Russia. England had purposely kept clear of alliances in order not to be involved in this way. "This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise." Cambon

answered in dismay that he could not transmit this reply to his Government, and asked to be authorized to answer that the British Cabinet had not yet come to any decision.

August 2 was the "Sunday of Resolve" for England. The Cabinet sat almost continuously all day. In the morning it was still too uncertain as to British opinion and too divided against itself to come to a decision. Until luncheontime the danger that a considerable minority would resign from the Cabinet and thereby greatly weaken the Government at a critical moment, still caused the majority to hesitate, in spite of the arrival of news that German troops had entered Luxemburg. The neutrality of Belgium, as Grey told Cambon in the afternoon, "was a much more important matter" than the neutrality of Luxemburg. The violation of the latter did not of itself bring a decisive change in the attitude of the Cabinet. The decisive fact was that about noon a letter was brought from Mr. Bonar Law, the leader of the Unionist Party, assuring the Cabinet of support of his followers in Parliament. Such support had already been intimated unofficially to Winston Churchill in a letter three days earlier from another prominent Unionist, Mr. F. E. Smith, later Lord Birkenhead. But Mr. Bonar Law's letter might be regarded as official, and represented the expressed view of a number of most important Unionist leaders, including Lord Lansdowne, who had hurried up to London to make his influence felt. Mr. Bonar Law's letter was as follows:

"Dear Mr. Asquith—Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that, in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures that they may consider necessary for that object."

Upon the receipt of this promise of support Grey and the Cabinet determined to give Cambon the assurance concerning the north coast of France about which he had asked the day before. So, about 3 P.M., Grey informed the French Ambassador that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." 155 This assurance was still subject to approval by Parliament, Grey added, and did not mean that England would send troops to France. It was merely a promise to make war against Germany, contingent upon a hypothetical action by the German fleet. It looked, however, like war, and led Lord Morley and Mr. John Burns to resign from the Cabinet. It gave also much comfort to the French, even though it did not go as far as they had hoped. The assurance was given before Germany presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of which did not reach London until the morning of August 3. Thus, even two members of Parliament saw it as if war against Germany was already decided on.

About 7 P.M. on August 2 the German Minister at Brussels had handed to Mr. Davignon, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the German demands drawn up by Moltke on July 26 and forwarded from Berlin on July 29 in a sealed envelope within a sealed envelope. It stated that Germany "is in receipt of reliable information relating to the proposed advance of French armed forces along the Mouse, route Givet-Namur. They leave no

doubt as to France's intention to advance against Germany through Belgian territory." As it was to be feared that Belgium would be unable, unaided, to resist the French advance, and as "it is for Germany a dictate of self-preservation that she anticipate the hostile attack," Germany regretted that she would be forced to enter upon Belgian soil. She contemplated no hostile activities against Belgium. If the Kingdom adopted "a benevolent neutrality toward Germany," the German Government promised at the conclusion of peace to guarantee Belgium's sovereign rights and independence, to evacuate the territory, to buy for cash all the necessities required by her troops, and to make good every damage which they might cause. But should Belgium oppose German troops, or destroy railroads and tunnels, "Germany would be obliged, to her regret, to regard the Kingdom as an enemy." An unequivocal reply was demanded within twelve hours. Mr. Davignon on the morning of August 3 at once notified the Powers of Germany's ultimatum and its rejection, but did not immediately appeal to the Guaranteeing Powers for support.

The news of the German ultimatum to Belgium and its categorical rejection reached Sir Edward Grey toward noon on Monday, August 3, shortly before he was to make his speech in Parliament announcing the British decision to oppose by force any German attack on the north coast of France. Sir Edward Grey began his speech with the question of Britain's obligations to France, sketching the development of the system of alliances from the time of the first Morocco Crisis, and giving the House its first knowledge of the Anglo-French military and naval conversations and the exchange of notes in 1912. He came to the question of Belgian neutrality. He referred very effectively to Germany's refusal to give an unequivocal promise to respect it, to the German ultimatum to Belgium and its rejection, and to the appeal of King Albert for "diplomatic intervention." If Belgium lost her independence, then Holland and Denmark would lose theirs; and if France were beaten to her knees and lost her position as a Great Power, England would be faced by the "unmeasured aggrandizement" of Germany.

Grey did not ask the House of Commons for definite endorsement of any precise measures. He was merely skilfully informing them of what he had done so far, assuring them that his hands were still free and that it was for Parliament to decide; but at the same time he persuasively placed before them his own conviction that England ought not to stand aside. The applause with which his speech was greeted left no doubt that Parliament would support him. After the speech and the Cabinet meeting in the evening, Grey confided to Cambon that the Cabinet had decided next morning to send instructions to the British Ambassador in Berlin to demand that the German ultimatum to Belgium be withdrawn. "If they refuse," added Grey, "there will be war."

The Cabinet's decision was strengthened next day, August 4, by news that the Germans had actually violated Belgian territory. At 2 P.M. Sir Edward Grey sent the ultimatum to Berlin. He mentioned Germany's ultimatum to Belgium and the report that "Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich." Sir Edward Goschen took the ultimatum to the German Foreign Office about 7 P.M. Jagow told him that no such assurance as requested could be given. He had already explained to Goschen earlier in the day that

Germany had been compelled by strategic necessity to go through Belgium to reach France in the quickest and easiest way—that it was a matter of life and death for her. Goschen then said he should like to go and see the Chancellor as it might be his last opportunity. Goschen's narrative continues:

"I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree, just for a word "neutrality" a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office, had tumbled down like a house of cards....I said that in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate her neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia I admitted that that had been the case, and said that it was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years."

As the clock struck midnight and no satisfactory answer had been given to Goschen, Germany and England were at war. The Sarajevo spark had started the fire which had now spread over Europe. Serbia and the Great Powers were involved in a life and death struggle.

7.25 Conclusion

For many of the Powers, to be sure, a European War might seem to hold out the possibility of achieving various desired advantages: for Serbia, the achievement of national unity for all Serbs; for Austria, the revival of her waning prestige as a Great Power, and the checking of nationalistic tendencies which threatened her very existence ; for Russia,

the accomplishment of her historic mission of controlling Constantinople and the Straits; for Germany, new economic advantages and the restoration of the European balance which had changed with the weakening of the Triple Alliance and the tightening of the Triple Entente; for France, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and the ending of the German menace; and for England, the destruction of the German naval danger and of Prussian militarism. All these advantages, and many others, were feverishly striven and intrigued for, on all sides, the moment the War actually broke out, but this is no good proof that any of the statesmen mentioned deliberately aimed to bring about a war to secure these advantages.

Nevertheless, a European War broke out. Why? Because in each country political and military leaders did certain things, which led to mobilizations and declarations of war, or failed to do certain things which might have prevented them. In this sense, all the European countries, in a greater or less degree, were responsible. One must abandon the dictum of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were solely responsible. It was a dictum exacted by victors from vanquished, under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propagandist misconceptions to which war had given rise. It was based on evidence which was incomplete and not always sound.¹ It is generally recognized by the best historical scholars in all countries to be no longer tenable or defensible. They are agreed that the responsibility for the War is a divided responsibility. But they still disagree very much as to the relative part of this responsibility that falls on each country and on each individual political or military leader.

Serbia felt a natural and justifiable impulse to do what so many other countries had done in the nineteenth century—to bring under one national Government all the discontented Serb people. She had liberated those under Turkish rule; the next step was to liberate those under Hapsburg rule. She looked to Russia for assistance and had been encouraged to expect that she would receive it. After the assassination, Mr. Pashitch took no steps to discover and bring to justice Serbians in Belgrade who had been implicated in the plot. One of them, Ciganovitch was even assisted to disappear. Mr. Pashitch waited to see what evidence the Austrian authorities could find. When Austria demanded co-operation of Austrian officials in discovering, though not in trying, implicated Serbians the Serbian Government made a very conciliatory but negative reply. They expected that the reply would not be regarded as satisfactory, and, even before it was given ordered the mobilization of the Serbian army. Serbia did not want war, but believed it would be forced upon her. That Mr. Pashitch was aware of the plot three weeks before it was executed, failed to take effective steps to prevent the assassins from crossing over from Serbia to Bosnia, and then failed to give Austria any warning or information which might have averted the fatal crime, were facts unknown to Austria in July, 1914; they cannot therefore be regarded as in any way justifying Austria's conduct; but they are part of Serbia's responsibility, and a very serious part.

Austria was more responsible for the immediate origin of the war than any other Power. Yet from her own point of view she was acting in self-defence—not against an immediate

military attack, but against the corroding Greater Serbia and Yugoslav agitation which her leaders believed threatened her very existence. No State can be expected to sit with folded arms and await dismemberment at the hands of its neighbors. Russia was believed to be intriguing with Serbia and Rumania against the Dual Monarchy. The assassination of the heir to the throne, as a result of a plot prepared in Belgrade, demanded severe retribution; otherwise Austria would be regarded as incapable of action, "worm-eaten" as the Serbian Press expressed it, would sink in prestige, and hasten her own downfall. To avert this Berchtold determined to crush Serbia with war. Berchtold gambled on a "local" war with Serbia only, believing that he could rattle the German sword; but rather than abandon his war with Serbia, he was ready to drag the rest of Europe into war.

It is very questionable whether Berchtold's obstinate determination to diminish Serbia and destroy her as a Balkan factor was, after all, the right method, even if he had succeeded in keeping the war "localized" and in temporarily strengthening the Dual Monarchy. Supposing that Russia in 1914, because of military unpreparedness or lack of support, had been ready to tolerate the execution of Berchtold's designs, it is quite certain that she would have aimed within the next two or three years at wiping out this second humiliation, which was so much more damaging to her prestige than that of 1905-09. In two or three years, when her great program of military reform was finally completed, Russia would certainly have found a pretext to reverse the balance in the Balkans in her own favor again. A further consequence of Berchtold's policy, even if successful, would have been the still closer consolidation of the Triple Entente, with the possible addition of Italy. And, finally, a partially dismembered Serbia would have become a still greater source of unrest and danger to the peace of Europe than heretofore. Franz Ferdinand and many others recognized this, and so long as he lived, no step in this fatal direction had been taken. It was the tragic fate of Austria that the only man who might have had the power and ability to develop Austria along sound lines became the innocent victim of the crime which was the occasion of the World War and so of her ultimate disruption.

Germany did not plot a European War, did not want one, and made genuine, though too belated efforts, to avert one. She was the victim of her alliance with Austria and of her own folly. Austria was her only dependable ally, Italy and Rumania having become nothing but allies in name. She could not throw her over, as otherwise she would stand isolated between Russia, where Pan Slavism and armaments were growing stronger every year, and France, where Alsace-Lorraine, Delcasse's fall, and Agadir were not forgotten. Therefore, Bethmann felt bound to accede to Berchtold's request for support and gave him a free hand to deal with Serbia; he also hoped and expected to "localize" the Austro-Serbian conflict. Germany then gave grounds to the Entente for suspecting the sincerity of her peaceful intentions by her denial of any foreknowledge of the ultimatum, by her support and justification of it when it was published, and by her refusal of Sir Edward Grey's conference proposal. However, Germany by no means had Austria so completely under her thumb as the Entente Powers and many writers have assumed. It is true that Berchtold would hardly have embarked on his gambler's policy unless he had been assured

that Germany would fulfil the obligations of the alliance, and to this extent Germany must share the great responsibility of Austria. But when Bethmann realized that Russia was likely to intervene, that England might not remain neutral, and that there was danger of a world war of which Germany and Austria would appear to be the instigators, he tried to call a halt on Austria, but it was too late. He pressed mediation proposals on Vienna, but Berchtold was insensible to the pressure, and the Entente Powers did not believe in the sincerity of his pressure, especially as they produced no results.

Germany's geographical position between France and Russia, and her inferiority in number of troops, had made necessary the plan of crushing the French army quickly at first and then turning against Russia. This was only possible in the opinion of her strategists, by marching through Belgium, as it was generally anticipated by military men that she would do in case of a European War. On July 29 after Austria had declared war on Serbia and after the Tsar had assented to general mobilization in Russia (though this was not known in Berlin and was later postponed for a day owing to the Kaiser's telegram to the Tsar), Bethmann took the precaution of sending to the German Minister in Brussels a sealed envelope. The Minister was not to open it except on further instructions. It contained the latter demand for the passage of the German army through Belgium. This does not mean, however, that Germany had decided for war. In fact, Bethmann was one of the last of the statesmen to abandon hope of peace and to consent to the mobilization of his country's army. General mobilization of the continental armies took place in the following order: Serbia, Russia, Austria, France and Germany. General mobilization by a Great Power was commonly interpreted by military men in every country, though perhaps not by Sir Edward Grey, the Tsar, and some civilian officials, as meaning that the country was on the point of making war,—that the military machine had begun to move and would not be stopped. Hence, when Germany learned of the Russian general mobilization, she sent ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris, warning that German mobilization would follow unless Russia suspended hers within twelve hours, and asking what would be the attitude of France. The answers being unsatisfactory, Germany then mobilized and declared war. It was the hasty Russian general mobilization, assented to on July 29 and ordered on July 30, while Germany was still trying to bring Austria to accept mediation proposals, which finally rendered the European War inevitable.

Russia was partly responsible for the Austro-Serbian conflict because of the frequent encouragement which she had given at Belgrade—that Serbian national unity would be ultimately achieved with Russian assistance at Austrian expense. This had led the Belgrade Cabinet to hope for Russian support in case of a war with Austria, and the hope did not prove vain in July, 1914. Before this, to be sure in the Bosnian Crisis and during the Balkan Wars, Russia had put restraint upon Serbia, because Russia, exhausted by the effects of the Russo-Japanese War, was not yet ready for a European struggle with the Teutonic Powers. But in 1914 her armaments, though not yet completed, had made such progress that the militarists were confident of success, if they had French and British support. In the spring of 1914, the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, had

published an article in a Russian newspaper, though without signing his name, to the effect, "Russia is ready, France must be ready also." Austria was convinced that Russia would ultimately aid Serbia, unless the Serbian danger were dealt with energetically after the Archduke's murder; she knew that Russia was growing stronger every year; but she doubted whether the Tsar's armaments had yet reached the point at which Russia would dare to intervene; she would therefore run less risk of Russian intervention and a European War if she used the Archduke's assassination as an excuse for weakening Serbia, than if she should postpone action until the future. Russia's responsibility lay also in the secret preparatory military measures which she was making at the same time that she was carrying on diplomatic negotiations. These alarmed Germany and Austria. But it was primarily Russia's general mobilization, made when Germany was trying to bring Austria to a settlement, which precipitated the final catastrophe, causing Germany to mobilize and declare war.

The part of France is less clear than that of the other Great Powers, because she has not yet made a full publication of her documents (in 1928). To be sure, M. Poincaré, in the fourth volume of his memoirs, has made a skilful and elaborate plea to prove "La France innocente" But he is not convincing. It is quite clear that on his visit to Russia he assured the Tsar's Government that France would support her as an ally in preventing Austria from humiliating or crushing Serbia. Paleologue renewed these assurances in a way to encourage Russia to take a strong hand. He did not attempt to restrain Russia from military measures which he knew would call forth German counter-measures and cause war. Nor did he keep his Government promptly and fully informed of the military steps which were being taken at St. Petersburg. President Poincaré, upon his return to France, made efforts for peace, but his great preoccupation was to minimize French and Russian preparatory measures and emphasize those of Germany, in order to secure the certainty of British support in a struggle which he now regarded as inevitable.

Sir Edward Grey made many sincere proposals for preserving peace; they all failed owing partly, but not exclusively, to Germany's attitude. Sir Edward could probably have prevented war if he had done either of two things. It, early in the crisis, he had acceded to the urging of France and Russia and given a strong warning to Germany that in a European War, England would take the side of the Franco-Russian Alliance, this would probably have led Bethmann to exert an earlier and more effective pressure on Austria; and it would perhaps thereby have prevented the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and brought to a successful issue the "direct conversations" between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Or, if Sir Edward Grey had listened to German urging, and warned France and Russia early in the crisis, that if they became involved in war, England would remain neutral probably Russia would have hesitated with her mobilizations, and France would probably have exerted a restraining influence at St. Petersburg. But Sir Edward Grey could not say that England would take the side of France and Russia, because he had a Cabinet nearly evenly divided, and he was not sure, early in the crisis, that public opinion in England would back him up in war against Germany. On the other hand, he

was unwilling to heed the German pleadings that he exercise restraint at Paris and St. Petersburg, because he did not wish to endanger the Anglo-Russian Entente and the solidarity of the Triple Entente, because he felt a moral obligation to France, growing out of the Anglo-French military and naval conversations of the past years, and because he suspected that Germany was backing Austria up in an unjustifiable course and that Prussian militarists had taken the direction of affairs at Berlin out of the hands of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and the civilian authorities. Italy exerted relatively little influence on the crisis in either direction.

Belgium had done nothing in any way to justify the demand which Germany made upon her. With commendable prudence, at the very first news of the ominous Austrian ultimatum, she had foreseen the danger to which she might be exposed. She had accordingly instructed her representatives abroad as to the statements which they were to make in case Belgium should decide very suddenly to mobilize to protect her neutrality. On July 29, she placed her army upon "a strengthened war footing," but did not order complete mobilization until two days later, when Austria, Russia, and Germany had already done so, and war appeared inevitable. Even after being confronted with the terrible German ultimatum, at 7 P.M. on August 2, she did not at once invite the assistance of English and French troops to aid her in the defense of her soil and her neutrality against a certain German assault; it was not until German troops had actually violated her territory, on August 4, that she appealed for the assistance of the Powers which had guaranteed her neutrality. Belgium was the innocent victim of German strategic necessity. Though the German violation of Belgium was of enormous influence in forming public opinion as to the responsibility of the War after hostilities began, it was not a cause of the War except in so far as it made it easier for Sir Edward Grey to bring England into it.

In the forty years following the Franco-Prussian War, as we have seen, there developed a system of alliances which divided Europe into two hostile groups. This hostility was accentuated by the increase of armaments, economic rivalry, nationalist ambitions and antagonisms, and newspaper incitement. But it is very doubtful whether all these dangerous tendencies would have actually led to war, had it not been for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. That was the factor which consolidated the elements of hostility and started the rapid and complicated succession of events which culminated in a World War, and for that factor Serbian nationalism was primarily responsible.

But the verdict of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were responsible for the War, in view of the evidence now available, is historically unsound. It should therefore be revised. However, because of the popular feeling widespread in some of the Entente countries, it is doubtful whether a formal and legal revision is as yet practicable. There must first come a further revision by historical scholars, and through them of public opinion.

8. World War 1

8.1 A Short Overview

World War I took place between 1914 and 1918. Although the conflict began in Europe, it ultimately involved countries as far away as the United States and Japan. At the time, the English-speaking world knew it as the “Great War”—the term “World War I” was applied decades later. Historians still actively disagree over the fundamental causes of the war. The period leading up to the war was a complex tangle of diplomacy and political maneuvering—many countries debated over strategies and alliances until nearly the last minute—and the first few weeks of the conflict were similarly chaotic and confusing. However, historians agree nearly unanimously about the war’s consequences: World War I led almost directly to World War II and set the stage for many other important events in the twentieth century.

By conservative estimates, around 9 million soldiers died in battle—many of them defending entrenched front lines that were so stalemated that they rarely moved even a few yards in either direction. Civilian loss of life totaled an additional 13 million. Epidemics of influenza and other diseases, either induced or exacerbated by the war, raised the death toll by at least an additional 20 million. In total, counting battle casualties, civilian deaths, and victims of disease, the loss of life worldwide surpassed 40 million.

Political tensions ran high in early twentieth-century Europe. Abroad, Europe’s great powers were increasingly coming to impasses over the acquisition of new colonies. As the unclaimed lands of the earth ran short, the race to claim them became fiercely competitive. At the same time, the Turkish-ruled Ottoman Empire, which had existed for hundreds of years, was slowly decaying. Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and other southern European nations that had been under Ottoman rule became independent, changing the balance of power in Europe. The many ethnic groups of Austria-Hungary, inspired by these new southern European nations, began to agitate for their own independence. Furthermore, Serbia wanted back the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, lost to Austria in a previous war.

At the same time, technological and industrial developments in Europe were advancing with unprecedented speed. Military technology was at the forefront of this trend, and a horrible war using these new weapons was both feared and seen as inevitable. Indeed, World War I turned out to be a showcase of new technologies that would change the nature, speed, and efficiency of warfare in the century to come. Tanks, airplanes, and submarines changed the way wars were fought. Other types of motorized vehicles, such as trucks, cars, and especially trains, vastly improved the speed with which troops and supplies could be deployed and increased the distance over which they could be trans-

ported. Guns in all categories, ranging from pistols to major artillery, greatly improved in accuracy and range of fire, enabling armies to fire upon each other across long distances and in some cases without even having to see each other. The machine gun made it possible for a single soldier to effectively take on multiple opponents at once. Chemical warfare was seen on a large scale for the first time, with results so gruesome that most countries vowed never to use such weapons again.

By war's end, the map of Europe began to resemble the one we know today. The German and Austro-Hungarian empires ceased to exist. Much of eastern Europe, in particular, was redivided along ethno-linguistic lines, and Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland all became independent countries. Several other nations were awkwardly combined into the countries of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. A major reorganization of the Near and Middle East also took place following the war, establishing the forerunners of the countries we know today as Armenia, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

The aftermath of World War I also marked the practical end of monarchy on the continent and of European colonialism throughout the rest of the world. Most European nations began to rely increasingly upon parliamentary systems of government, and socialism gained increasing popularity. The brutality of the conflict and the enormous loss of human life inspired a renewed determination among nations to rely upon diplomacy to resolve conflicts in the future. This resolve directly inspired the birth of the League of Nations.

The Eastern Front

The Russian Army of World War One has become notorious for its reputation as a large, ill-equipped force, yet in 1914, Russia's Imperial Troops were actually well trained and equipped. The real problem with the Russian Army lay in its inadequate transportation infrastructure, which was not able to supply and maintain Russian field formations at wartime establishments. As far as equipment was concerned, the average Russian soldier in the 1st and 2nd Line had sidearms, rifles and machine guns equal to his German counterparts, and probably superior to the Austrians. The standard Russian Field Guns, the 76.2 mm and 122 mm, were robust enough to be used in World War Two and still be in reserve units in the 1980's.

Because of the many logistical disadvantages under which they labored, the Russian Army High Command had maintained a lively pre-war debate over what action would be taken in case of war with Germany. By 1910 it was decided to launch major offensive operations immediately upon the outbreak of any war. This decision clearly catered to the "spirit of the offensive" which then pervaded European military thought, and in pursuit of this doctrine, most Russian fortress units were deactivated. The age-old Russian strategy of defense-in-depth supported by counteroffensives was cast aside in favor of the latest trends. This was to exact a brutal toll in Russian lives, which in turn helped to spur later

unrest.

The Austro-Hungarian Army of 1914 had been starved of proper equipment and resources throughout the pre-war period. It was also composed of an increasingly nationalistic soldiery, three-quarters of whom were from Slavic recruiting districts. The reluctance of these troops to follow Austrian officers into combat against their Russian brethren became a major liability, especially after the enormous losses suffered during the first year of war. The main German armies in the East operated with characteristic Teutonic efficiency. Indeed it was here that their troops enjoyed the luxury of fighting the battles of maneuver for which they had been trained. The Russian front also saw the rise of the great German “artillery virtuosos” of the war, men such as Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchmüller. Lieutenant Colonel Bruchmüller was capable of orchestrating artillery firepower with ferocious efficiency, but more importantly he undertook aggressive training measures to assure near perfect coordination between the artillery and infantry branches of the army.

The Eastern half of the Great War began on August 17, 1914, when Russian General Pavel Rennenkampf’s First Army invaded Eastern Prussia in a full scale offensive. Two days later, General Alexander Samsonov’s Second Army attacked around the right flank of the German Eighth Army commanded by General Friedrich von Prittwitz. This was achieved despite the fact that Second Army was fighting at two-thirds strength due to the slow Russian mobilization. Prittwitz, who was certain that he could not hold against the two armies facing him, informed high command that he intended to withdraw to the Vistula River, abandoning most of East Prussia including Königsberg. He was immediately relieved of duty and replaced by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his new Chief-of-Staff, Erich Ludendorf. Along with the staff at East Prussian Army Headquarters, they planned a counteroffensive against the Russians. By August 27 they had already laid the plans and fallen on Samsonov’s weak Army, taking it in both flanks in a near perfect double envelopment. The Battle of Tannenberg ended by August 30 when Samsonov’s entire command disintegrated at a cost of 92,000 captured and tens of thousands of other casualties. Within a week, German forces under General August Mackensen defeated Rennenkampf at the Battle of Masurian Lakes, where the Russians lost another 100,000 casualties. As in previous wars, inadequate logistic support hampered Russian movement and supply. Now, against an industrialized opponent, these shortcomings quickly assumed catastrophic proportions.

In the south of Poland, Austrian Chief-of-Staff Conrad von Hoetzendorf launched his own attack northward toward Warsaw. The Russians however, had concentrated four fully supplied armies opposite the 39 Divisions of Austrian troops, and on August 30 they opened their offensive. By the third week in September, Hoetzendorf ordered a general retreat. and the province of Galicia was abandoned by the Austrians at a cost of over 130,000 casualties! The year ended with limited attacks toward Warsaw by Mackensen and Russian probing assaults into the Carpathian passes.

While the winter of 1914-15 still had its grip on Europe, von Hoetzendorf appealed to

the Germans to support an offensive which he hoped would force the Russians away from the crests of the Carpathian Mountains. After some debate, the German senior command agreed on a thrust deep into Russian lines out of East Prussia. The resulting "winter war" inflicted another 190,000 casualties on the Russians, but petered out when the Austrian forces to the south utterly failed to dislodge the Russians. They instead suffered another embarrassing defeat, and even lost control of Dukla Pass, a prime route onto the Hungarian plains. Only severe weather and their unfortunate supply situation prevented the Russians from cracking into the core of the Dual Monarchy's empire.

By May of 1915, the Germans took over command of the Eastern Front and used many of their units to support the increasingly fragmented Austrian formations. Their next offensive came on May 1, with a sharp attack on the Russian lines at Gorlice. This offensive penetrated more than two-hundred miles in two weeks and triggered the collapse of the entire Russian Southern Front. German and Austrian formations pushed northward in another thrust toward Warsaw, capturing it in August. In September, General Max von Gallwitz' new Twelfth Army attacked into the Courland toward Riga. As the entire Russian front line fell apart, the Russian strongholds of Novo-Georgiesk and Brest-Litovsk both fell to the Germans. Only at the end of September did Russian resolve harden enough to allow a new line to form. Shortly after this, Russian Tsar Nicholas intervened and assumed personal command of the army, a decision which would have grave consequences. The territory captured by the Central Powers to date (shaded light yellow) included all of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Two million Russian troops were lost during the course of the year, half of them prisoners. The Central powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary lost a total of nearly one-million, another grim highlight of this theater's impact on the war.

The next major offensive was undertaken by Russian General Alexi Brusilov. His preparations were far superior to those undertaken by previous senior officers, and for the first time during the war Russian units were trained to employ shock troops followed up by mutually supporting open order formations. Western Allied aid and Russian production had also replaced all of the equipment losses from the previous year, although the competing egos of fellow commanders and the still inefficient supply system placed a dead hand on any spectacular successes. By June of 1916, Brusilov's four armies, the Eighth, Eleventh, Seventh and Ninth, were poised along the Galician border facing the Austrian Army. On the 4th the Russians attacked and immediately penetrated deep into Austrian positions, capturing 13,000 prisoners on the first day. By the time the offensive was two months old, the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire was in danger of falling. Romania then entered the war on the side of the allies, but greedily invaded Transylvania instead of preparing an adequate defense. This mistake gave the Germans the opening they needed, and the ensuing counter-offensive achieved the total collapse of Romania to the Central Powers. Germany and Austria gained control of vast coal and wheat fields, although they also added over 200 miles of front to their lines.

Brusilov was urged by St. Petersburg to continue his summer gains even though the Rus-

sians had suffered horrible casualties in the process of attaining their goals. In September the offensive was continued, but without the same elegance as earlier, causing casualties to again climb toward the one-million mark. The offensive finally wound down after the seizure of Bukovina and Galicia (shaded in yellow). These accomplishments brought Russia just as many casualties as their defeats of the previous year, and discipline began to slide downward. To make matters worse, Russian industry proved unable to continue manufacturing new equipment in sufficient quantities to replace such staggering losses, especially in small arms and ammunition. All of this may have been inevitable given the trend of the war at that point. In late 1916, several nations across Europe began to suffer from mutinies and revolts as troops became disillusioned with the profligate loss of life. As the bad news at home mounted, Russia slowly edged toward open revolt and the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary edged toward complete dissolution.

By 1917, the Russian Army's officer corps was increasingly demoralized by the poor progress of the fighting. Though grossly outnumbered, the Germans had proven to be dangerous and cunning opponents, and the Russian royal family's unfortunate intervention in affairs did not improve anything. The repeated catastrophes suffered by Russian field armies squelched what patriotism had existed three years earlier, slowly allowing the entire governing system to fall apart. By March of that year, some Army units began ignoring their orders, a situation made worse as growing Communist rebel groups exaggerated reports of minor events such as the revolt of a Russian Guard depot formation at Petrograd (this famous mutiny was carried out by trainees and depot troops, not by fully trained Imperial Guardsmen). After the Tsar abdicated his throne that same month, a provisional government was formed with Alexander Kerensky at its head. He made a short-lived attempt to uphold Allied obligations by putting General Brusilov in command of another offensive against the German Southern Army in Galicia. But despite his best efforts, Brusilov's 1917 offensive only cleared a few mutinous Austrian formations out of the way before running into the brick wall of German general's Hoffman and Hutier, who first held off, then counter-attacked the hesitant Russian troops. This was the last straw for the Imperial Russian Army, which virtually disintegrated as open civil war swept like a wave across Russia.

As the Communist revolt accelerated, both sides of the civil war continued sporadic negotiations with Germany. The Germans, who continued making territorial gains, eventually began aiding the pro-Tsarist White Russian forces, attempting to stem the very revolt they had helped to foster. However the damage to the Russian infrastructure was too great, and the "White" Russians were eventually forced from power by the "Red" Communists. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk was finally concluded with the new Bolshevik government on March 3, 1918, stripping their country of all provinces west of the Ukraine. That treaty was annulled by the Armistice of November 11, and the new government in Moscow eventually re-established its presence in all of the previously held lands. Ironically, one of the lasting actions by the Bolsheviks was the attempted indoctrination of German prisoners-of-war. Many of these troops were eventually transferred to the Western Front

which was still raging in 1918, but some of them were virtually useless as soldiers. When the war ended, they returned to Germany, where many threw themselves into the post-war revolution then tearing at Germany's social fabric. The opposing fascists eventually gained control of the country and added further tragic chapters to the history of Russia and Eastern Europe.

The Western Front

Late during the summer of 1914, train stations all over Europe echoed with the sound of leather boots and the clattering of weapons as millions of enthusiastic young soldiers mobilized for the most glorious conflict since the Napoleonic Wars. In the eyes of many men, pride and honor glowed in competition with the excitement of a wonderful adventure and the knowledge of righting some perceived infringement on the interests of their respective nation. Within weeks however, the excitement and glory gave way to horror and anonymous death, brought on by dangerous new machines of war which took control of the old fields of honor and turned them into desolate moonscapes littered with corpses and wreckage. This new great war, called World War One, began as a local disturbance in Southern Europe but eventually spread into a worldwide struggle which produced two of the greatest bloodlettings in history; the battles of the Somme and Verdun. The western portion of this conflict took place mostly in Belgium and France, and started as a war of "grand maneuvers" as had been theorized before the fighting began. But when more troops were poured into an increasingly cramped area, there came a time when the antagonists could no longer maneuver against each other in any operational sense. When this occurred, the forces involved began entrenching in the face of more and more lethal concentrations of firepower, and the war of the machines and trenches had begun.

These conditions triggered a complex and difficult to trace series of evolutions in both battlefield tactics and technology. The Germans responded by creating what amounted to modern combined arms squad tactics, something their French and British opponents initially brushed off as infiltration tactics. After a long period of grim failure, the British managed the mass deployment of a new weapon called the tank, which also changed the nature of warfare and helped break the brutal deadlock of position warfare. The French adopted both of these methods and weapons, applying them in a combined form which appealed to the French leadership. It was however, Germany which finally succumbed to the drain of economic warfare, and by October of 1918, German field commanders declared that the war was militarily lost, and that a truce must be sought. From that point on, it was only a matter of time, and the end came on November 11, 1918. The Great War ended, having caused millions of deaths on the Western Front alone. Europe and the world would never be the same.

Militarily the war in the west began on August 4, 1914, when German troops from seven Armies swept into Luxembourg and Belgium as part of the "Schlieffen plan," which required a sweeping move through neutral Belgium and down to Paris from the North.

Fortunately for the Allies, the plan did not work as expected, due both to its own limitations and German High Command's weakening of the crucial right attack wing. The result was a partial German success which failed in its ultimate goal of knocking the French army out of the war early. The German Armies swept into Belgium as planned, but the Belgian Army did not oblige by quickly losing. They instead put up a stiff fight, which delayed the rigid German campaign schedule. After overcoming the Belgians, the northern German armies marched into northern France, where they were again stiffly rebuffed in several places, both by the newly arrived British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the French Third and Fourth Armies in the Ardennes region. The Fifth Army under French General Lanrezac, was caught outnumbered and nearly outflanked, thanks to French high command's refusal to acknowledge a German thrust from the north. Only at the last moment did Lanrezac receive permission to reposition part of his army to face the oncoming juggernaut. His freshly repositioned troops were hit with the full force of the German Second Army, and sent reeling back to the south. Soon after, as the BEF also withdrew south after their own travails, the entire front broke open as troops on both sides raced southward to the Marne, and the prize: Paris.

The German offensive was only blunted when German General Alexander von Kluck re-faced his First Army in order to turn the flank of the now exhausted French Fifth Army. French General Joseph Gallieni quickly assembled the newly formed Sixth Army and, coordinating with Fifth Army's commander, assaulted Kluck's exposed flank. In the process of defending himself, Kluck redirected his corps westward, allowing yet another dangerous gap to open between him and Bulow. These errors (which were sanctioned by General Headquarters) cost the Germans any further progress and they withdrew back to safe positions north of the Marne River, where they resisted attempts by the French to dislodge them. The fault lay not only with Kluck, but with the German Commander-in-Chief, Count Helmut von Moltke and probably with the Schlieffen plan itself, which failed to account for the limitations of infantry formations operating at such rapid tempos.

For months after the failure of the German offensive, both sides made various local attempts at achieving breakthroughs. Most of these attempts failed miserably in the face of the unexpected effects of modern weapons. As each side attempted to outflank the other, the front expanded. Troops spontaneously began to dig in for better protection, and within a few months, a solid front stretched from the Swiss border to the English Channel. In November of 1914, the Kaiser personally ordered the commitment of the Imperial Foot Guards in order to guarantee a breakthrough. They attacked at Ypres and conducted a close-order frontal assault on new British trenches, losing hundreds of men and officers without securing an inch of ground. The failure of the Guards at the First Battle of Ypres marked the beginning of a major reassessment of battlefield tactics by the Germans. Despite this however, they began another series of offensives in February of 1915 in the Soissons region north of Paris, which secured little ground. The British then attacked in the Artois region and broke through at Neuve Chapelle, but were unable to exploit their fleeting advantage. The Germans quickly closed the gap and in April,

successfully used gas for the first time on the Western Front at Ypres. This gas attack was not accompanied by any major breakthrough attempt, so its element of surprise was partially wasted. It did however, disrupt the plans for the second Allied campaign at Artois, which was a joint British/French operation. These assaults also failed at a cost of 300,000 Allied casualties. The French made one more attempt against the German lines in the Champagne region, preceded by a lengthy artillery bombardment and a simultaneous British attack at Artois. After 250,000 casualties, the French commander Joffre called off the assaults. In one year of fighting, the lines changed very little, and neither side was yet learning how to fight in this new, dangerous environment.

By early 1916, German units in the field had accumulated enough experience with position warfare to allow a few aggressive young officers to begin asserting their new ideas. This was accomplished because of the German policy of "directive control," by which officers were given broad instructions which they executed according to their own discretion. While this freedom of action resulted in a lack of standardized training, it also allowed men in the field to experiment with tactics in ways not allowed by their allied counterparts. By the time that the German offensive at Verdun was begun, many units in the field had spontaneously formed assault units which specialized in squad-level operations. The early proponents of these nascent combined arms tactics eventually ran a series of training centers immediately behind the lines. These centers assured that draftees arriving from Germany were trained in the methods of real war instead of the methods still being taught by people in Germany who had no idea of the changes occurring at the front.

The German Commander-in-Chief, Erich von Falkenhayn, now put into action his plan to "bleed white" the French Army. He intended to isolate a section of the front-line which the French would not allow to fall, and then assure that the area was ringed by the heaviest artillery coverage available. His target was the ancient French fortress of Verdun, which his troops first assaulted on February 21 after the most concentrated bombardment of the war. Falkenhayn however, correctly divined that his subordinates would not likely agree with such a "bleeding white" plan, and so he did not share with them his intent to purposefully avoid capturing Verdun itself. He thought that he could control the pace of the German advance, and hence the advance on Verdun itself, by withholding the vital reserves upon which his subordinates relied. Because of this appalling policy of calculated ignorance, attacking German field commanders launched wave upon wave of stop-at-nothing assaults against the Verdun fortresses without knowing that their attacks would not be followed up. The campaign carried on for five terrible months, during which 300,000 Germans and 460,000 French became casualties. This series of battles, one of the greatest slaughters in history until that time, did not achieve Falkenhayn's goals, because his men, who had been trained to attack, continued attacking against all odds in the mistaken belief that their efforts would be followed up. The French were indeed "bled white," but not as severely as hoped, and the Germans ultimately lost many of their best troops.

On July 1, 1916, the British and French launched the Somme Offensive. This offensive,

which put an end to any German thoughts of continuing the Verdun Offensive, was launched against some of the heaviest German fortifications on the entire Western Front. The British commander, Field-Marshal Douglas Haig, protested the idea, but the French commander Joffre won the debate and the campaign was begun. This campaign saw the first use of tanks, and was preceded by the war's greatest artillery barrage. Despite these advantages, the general slaughter of allied troops which occurred is famous, with the British suffering 65,000 casualties on the first day alone. When the October rains finally put an end to the prolonged carnage, 400,000 British, 200,000 French and 450,000 Germans had become casualties! The Allies only captured a few miles of ground, and the Germans soon withdrew to their new Hindenburg Line in early 1917.

The general retreat which the Germans carried out between February and April of 1917 did not prevent the Allies from renewing a series of attacks that summer. The British commander Haig thought he had the formula for achieving a breakthrough: more artillery! The ensuing attack at Arras on April 9, cost 84,000 casualties and achieved no breakthrough. Before this battle had ended, the new French Commander, Marshal Robert-George Nivelle, launched his own ill-advised offensive from Soissons to Reims. This attack ground to a halt on its first day, and by the time the assault was called off one month later, 220,000 more casualties had been added to the already overlong list of French losses for the war. This last failure helped to finally trigger long brewing discontent into open mutinies. This was not the first time during the war that such things had occurred. As the failure at Verdun became apparent, whole German units had also surrendered or mutinied. Nivelle was dismissed and the hero of Verdun, Marshal Petain, assumed command of the French Army. Slowly control was restored, but resentment continued to run high among combat troops headed for the front lines. Some units had developed the macabre habit of bleating like sheep when senior officers passed their road columns. This, and other equally disturbing behavior continued to put commanders on notice that the tolerance for their lavish expenditure of human life was running extremely thin.

The British, who enjoyed more freedom of action after Nivelle's dismissal, opened yet another assault at Ypres with a series of great mine explosions which totally disrupted the German lines. For once, the British inflicted more casualties than they received and pushed forward. But Haig's previous bloody commitments had made others wary of him and he was no longer given the great numbers of troops he had enjoyed previously. By the time he convinced his superiors that a breakthrough really had occurred, the Germans had patched up the lines and so yet another round of bloody fighting resumed. By the time Haig received his extra troops, the time for exploiting the breakthrough was long past, but the third battle of Ypres was launched anyway, causing one of the greatest slaughters of the war. The Germans used a new chemical called mustard gas to hold off the British, whose losses approached 400,000. Finally, in November, a new method was used against the German lines. The British launched an attack toward Cambrai using hundreds of "tanks," new machines of war which held great promise. All three lines of

the Hindenburg Line complex were penetrated, yet even this success did not last. The conservative high command had not been convinced of the tank's possibilities, so reserves had not been allocated for the attack. Within days, German counterattacks drove the British back to their starting positions.

So 1917 ended with little change in the bloody stalemate. The Allies had spent the year bludgeoning themselves on the German defenses with little to show for it. The Germans spent the winter of 1917/1918 retraining their Army in what was now widely accepted as the best new way to conduct positional warfare. The small assault groups needed early in the war spurred a complete reevaluation of unit behavior. The basic battlefield unit was no longer to be the company or battalion, but the squad. Each squad was no longer just a group of riflemen, but a combined arms formation of machine gunners, grenadiers and flamethrower troops supported by a few riflemen. This new way of thinking was only vaguely recognized by the Allies, who had also equipped their troops with more automatic weapons, but who did not re-train their men in a way which extracted the greatest advantage from these new weapons. The Allied failure to see the real change behind the German actions was to curse them for the rest of the war.

The last great German offensive was launched on March 21, 1918, with Operation "Michel". It was opened with an unprecedented 6,000 gun barrage which delivered a lethal gas attack deep into Allied lines. At one point, the Germans advanced 14 miles in one day, more than at any other time during the fighting in the West. During the first six weeks of fighting, the Allies lost 350,000 casualties, but more troops were rushed in from across the channel, and American units began arriving for the first time. The attack was quickly followed by a second offensive at Ypres, but this was halted after a brief threat against the channel ports. Another German blow to Allied lines fell with the twin operations "Blucher" and "Yorck," whose combined might drove south toward Paris, occupying Soissons and nearly cutting off Reims. The spearhead of their advance penetrated as far as Chateau-Thierry, only 56 miles from Paris. This operation however, suffered from the same flaw as many which had preceded it. Ludendorf had not planned for this offensive to succeed. It had been intended as a feint in order to draw French troops away from the main offensive to the north, and so the astounding achievements were not exploited because inadequate reserves were available. Still, the Allied situation was very grim, and the Allies were forced to issue a "backs to the wall" order.

The German troops however, were quickly tiring from the prolonged effort, as well as giving in to periods of looting. The economic blockade of Germany had cut off many vital supplies and back home, many people were literally starving. Many German troops were chronically undernourished, and whenever they encountered Allied food stocks, much time was lost as these desperately famished troops gorged themselves. So the last German offensive, an attempted pincer operation around Rheims, was finally stopped with concentrated artillery and aircraft attacks. By late June, German strength on the Western Front fell below that of the Allies, and the final Allied assault was not long in coming.

The first attacks were, amazingly, made in July by the French west of Rheims. This was followed by a British offensive at the Amiens Bulge and a general offensive toward the Hindenburg Line. The Americans under General John Pershing attacked the St. Mihiel Salient south of Verdun and then attacked through the Argonne west of Verdun as part of a general advance. The Germans were now steadily pulling back, and even though the Allies continued to suffer tremendous losses (The Americans lost 100,000 casualties just fighting through the Argonne region), they were now inspired by the continued German retreat. The final position of the yellow line shows the approximate front at the time the Armistice was signed on November 11. The only German to keep fighting after this was Field Marshal Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa, who was beginning his tiny invasion of Rhodesia. He surrendered on November 23, immediately upon hearing of the surrender.

Trench Warfare

Military tactics developed before World War I failed to keep pace with advances in technology and had become obsolete. These advances had allowed the creation of strong defensive systems, which out-of-date military tactics could not break through for most of the war. Barbed wire was a significant hindrance to massed infantry advances, while artillery, vastly more lethal than in the 1870s, coupled with machine guns, made crossing open ground extremely difficult. Commanders on both sides failed to develop tactics for breaching entrenched positions without heavy casualties. In time, however, technology began to produce new offensive weapons, such as gas warfare and the tank. Just after the First Battle of the Marne (5–12 September 1914), Entente and German forces repeatedly attempted manoeuvring to the north in an effort to outflank each other: this series of manoeuvres became known as the “Race to the Sea“. When these outflanking efforts failed, the opposing forces soon found themselves facing an uninterrupted line of entrenched positions from Lorraine to Belgium’s coast. Britain and France sought to take the offensive, while Germany defended the occupied territories. Consequently, German trenches were much better constructed than those of their enemy; Anglo-French trenches were only intended to be “temporary“ before their forces broke through the German defences.

Both sides tried to break the stalemate using scientific and technological advances. On 22 April 1915, at the Second Battle of Ypres, the Germans (violating the Hague Convention) used chlorine gas for the first time on the Western Front. Several types of gas soon became widely used by both sides, and though it never proved a decisive, battle-winning weapon, poison gas became one of the most-feared and best-remembered horrors of the war. Tanks were developed by Britain and France, and were first used in combat by the British during the Battle of Flers–Courcelette (part of the Battle of the Somme) on 15 September 1916, with only partial success. However, their effectiveness would grow as the war progressed; the Allies built tanks in large numbers, whilst the Germans employed

only a few of their own design, supplemented by captured Allied tanks.

Neither side proved able to deliver a decisive blow for the next two years. Throughout 1915–17, the British Empire and France suffered more casualties than Germany, because of both the strategic and tactical stances chosen by the sides. Strategically, while the Germans only mounted one major offensive, the Allies made several attempts to break through the German lines. In February 1916 the Germans attacked the French defensive positions at Verdun. Lasting until December 1916, the battle saw initial German gains, before French counter-attacks returned matters to near their starting point. Casualties were greater for the French, but the Germans bled heavily as well, with anywhere from 700,000 to 975,000 casualties suffered between the two combatants. Verdun became a symbol of French determination and self-sacrifice.

The Battle of the Somme was an Anglo-French offensive of July to November 1916. The opening of this offensive (1 July 1916) saw the British Army endure the bloodiest day in its history, suffering 57,470 casualties, including 19,240 dead, on the first day alone. The entire Somme offensive cost the British Army some 420,000 casualties. The French suffered another estimated 200,000 casualties and the Germans an estimated 500,000. Protracted action at Verdun throughout 1916, combined with the bloodletting at the Somme, brought the exhausted French army to the brink of collapse. Futile attempts using frontal assault came at a high price for both the British and the French and led to the widespread French Army Mutinies, after the failure of the costly Nivelle Offensive of April–May 1917. The concurrent British Battle of Arras was more limited in scope, and more successful, although ultimately of little strategic value. A smaller part of the Arras offensive, the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps, became highly significant to that country: the idea that Canada's national identity was born out of the battle is an opinion widely held in military and general histories of Canada.

The last large-scale offensive of this period was a British attack (with French support) at Passchendaele (July–November 1917). This offensive opened with great promise for the Allies, before bogging down in the October mud. Casualties, though disputed, were roughly equal, at some 200,000–400,000 per side. These years of trench warfare in the West saw no major exchanges of territory and, as a result, are often thought of as static and unchanging. However, throughout this period, British, French, and German tactics constantly evolved to meet new battlefield challenges.

Naval War

At the start of the war, the German Empire had cruisers scattered across the globe, some of which were subsequently used to attack Allied merchant shipping. The British Royal Navy systematically hunted them down, though not without some embarrassment from its inability to protect Allied shipping. For example, the German detached light cruiser SMS Emden, part of the East-Asia squadron stationed at Qingdao, seized or destroyed 15 merchantmen, as well as sinking a Russian cruiser and a French destroyer. However,

most of the German East-Asia squadron—consisting of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, light cruisers *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* and two transport ships—did not have orders to raid shipping and was instead underway to Germany when it met British warships. The German flotilla and *Dresden* sank two armoured cruisers at the Battle of Coronel, but was virtually destroyed at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914, with only *Dresden* and a few auxiliaries escaping, but after the Battle of Más a Tierra these too had been destroyed or interned.

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, Britain began a naval blockade of Germany. The strategy proved effective, cutting off vital military and civilian supplies, although this blockade violated accepted international law codified by several international agreements of the past two centuries. Britain mined international waters to prevent any ships from entering entire sections of ocean, causing danger to even neutral ships. Since there was limited response to this tactic of the British, Germany expected a similar response to its unrestricted submarine warfare. The Battle of Jutland (German: *Skagerrakschlacht*, or “Battle of the Skagerrak”) developed into the largest naval battle of the war. It was the only full-scale clash of battleships during the war, and one of the largest in history. The Kaiserliche Marine’s High Seas Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer, fought the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet, led by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. The engagement was a stand off, as the Germans were outmanoeuvred by the larger British fleet, but managed to escape and inflicted more damage to the British fleet than they received. Strategically, however, the British asserted their control of the sea, and the bulk of the German surface fleet remained confined to port for the duration of the war.

German U-boats attempted to cut the supply lines between North America and Britain. The nature of submarine warfare meant that attacks often came without warning, giving the crews of the merchant ships little hope of survival. The United States launched a protest, and Germany changed its rules of engagement. After the sinking of the passenger ship *RMS Lusitania* in 1915, Germany promised not to target passenger liners, while Britain armed its merchant ships, placing them beyond the protection of the “cruiser rules”, which demanded warning and movement of crews to “a place of safety” (a standard that lifeboats did not meet). Finally, in early 1917, Germany adopted a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, realising that the Americans would eventually enter the war. Germany sought to strangle Allied sea lanes before the United States could transport a large army overseas, but could maintain only five long-range U-boats on station, to limited effect.

The U-boat threat lessened in 1917, when merchant ships began travelling in convoys, escorted by destroyers. This tactic made it difficult for U-boats to find targets, which significantly lessened losses; after the hydrophone and depth charges were introduced, accompanying destroyers could attack a submerged submarine with some hope of success. Convoys slowed the flow of supplies, since ships had to wait as convoys were assembled. The solution to the delays was an extensive program of building new freighters. Troop-ships were too fast for the submarines and did not travel the North Atlantic in convoys.

The U-boats had sunk more than 5,000 Allied ships, at a cost of 199 submarines. World War I also saw the first use of aircraft carriers in combat, with HMS Furious launching Sopwith Camels in a successful raid against the Zeppelin hangars at Tondern in July 1918, as well as blimps for antisubmarine patrol.

World War I casualties

The total number of military and civilian casualties in World War I was more than 38 million: there were over 17 million deaths and 20 million wounded, ranking it among the deadliest conflicts in human history. The total number of deaths includes about 11 million military personnel and about 7 million civilians. The Triple Entente (also known as the Allies) lost about 6 million military personnel while the Central Powers lost about 4 million. At least 2 million died from diseases and 6 million went missing, presumed dead. This article lists the casualties of the belligerent powers based on official published sources. About two-thirds of military deaths in World War I were in battle, unlike the conflicts that took place in the 19th century when the majority of deaths were due to disease. Nevertheless, disease, including the 1918 flu pandemic and deaths while held as prisoners of war, still caused about one third of total military deaths for all belligerents.

8.2 Media and Wartime Propaganda, Fomenting Hatred

The House of Rothschild purchased the London-based Reuters International News Agency in the late 1800s, in time to propagandize the masses for World War I. They also owned the controlling interest of Havas of France, and Wolff in Germany. 1204 Propaganda includes deliberate distortions, exaggerations or outright fabrications in order to manipulate our emotions and/or prejudices or intentionally mislead the uninformed. Among other types of propaganda, there is political, economic, literary, drama and entertainment, all perpetuated during peaceful times but especially disseminated during wartime against a purported enemy. Even before Germany declared war, the hate-mongers began targeting the German people. They dehumanized them by portraying them as a “tribe of cannibals.” Charles Maurras, a French politician, denounced “the innate savagery of the instincts of flesh and blood” of the Germans. Henri Bergson, the prominent philosopher, proclaimed “the brutality and cynicism of Germany, a regression to the savage state.” Georges Clemenceau, a French diplomat, wrote, “I wish to believe that civilization will carry the day against savagery, and that is sufficient for me to rule out the German from a life of common dignity.”

Georges Clemenceau, in describing the Germans, implied that they were a bunch of drunkards who worshipped in the beer-gardens, including the men, women, and children. He said they were “just a conglomeration of buffoons, gluttons, and drunkards capable only of the eternal violence of fundamentally savage tribes for purposes of depredation

by every means of barbarism.” When the war began, officials characterized the Germans as heinous and cruel to convince their armies that they were fighting against extreme evil. Those officials spread their hatred abroad, to win support and arouse the wrath of the world. The Allied media accused the German soldiers of slaughtering citizens as they marched through Belgium on their way to France in August 1914. Many villagers fired at them and the soldiers retaliated in kind and often burned down the homes of the Belgian aggressors. They reacted no differently than the British, the French, or the Americans in the same situation. Sometimes the villagers used sniper fire, provoking bloody reprisals. To conceal Belgian culpability, the media denied civilian participation while claiming the unmitigated massacre of innocents.

Baron Oscar von der Lancken, the German Political Minister in Brussels, consulted the official reports of the soldiers who the Belgian civilians had wounded. He thoroughly investigated the hospital records wherein every man wounded in Belgium received medical care in August 1914. They revealed that buckshot or shotgun pellets, not bullets or shrapnel injured hundreds of soldiers. The Hague Convention explicitly allows only recognizable soldiers, not civilians, to bear arms and engage in combat. The civilian use of a weapon was and is justification for execution. The international conventions do not allow unauthorized combatants such as civil guards or town militias. On August 4, 1914, authorities warned the Belgians not to organize such groups. Those who refused to comply created a newspaper, *Le Franc-Tireur* (The Sniper).

The same situation occurred in World War II, when citizens in Belgium, Holland, and France killed German soldiers. They were members of the civilian “resistance.” Often, in such circumstances, the perpetrators, outside of international law, retreat as soon as they have attacked, and the enemy soldiers retaliate against ordinary citizens. In Belgium in 1914, the citizens and the media fabricated stories to create hatred against the Germans. The French even accused the Germans of cutting down their apple orchards. Such a campaign would take an enormous effort. Following the armistice, the Allies confiscated foodstuffs, cattle, and milk in Germany, where people were already starving, due to the British blockade during the entire four-year war. The Times published “Marching Songs” to escalate the outrage of the populace. The stanza of one song had the following lines,

He shot the wives and children,
The wives and little children;
He shot the wives and children,
And laughed to see them die.

Reportedly, thirty to thirty-five German soldiers forcefully entered David Tordens’ home in Sempst, Belgium. They bound Tordens, then five or six of them gang raped his thirteen-year old daughter in his presence, and then slaughtered her with their bayonets. They then bayoneted his nine-year-old boy, and murdered his wife. Some Belgian soldiers arrived just in the nick of time and saved his life. German soldiers reportedly ravished

every young female in Sempst. Paul van Boeckpourt, the commune's secretary and Peter van Asbroeck, the mayor and his son Louis, testified on April 4, 1915, at Sempst, that no one by the name of David Tordens, or his family ever lived there. They also testified, under oath, that during the war, German soldiers had not killed any woman or child under the age of fourteen in Sempst. Given their position in the commune, they would certainly have been aware of such events.

War itself is an atrocity, with numerous individual acts of cruelty and barbaric violence. Exaggeration and blatant deceptions are a component of propaganda. Agents widely distributed tales of German brutality, to furnish sufficient evidence of the horrendous cruelty of their army, in order to foment outrage against them. James Bryce, a former US Ambassador and Member of Parliament, chaired a commission created to collect witness affidavits regarding atrocities, ostensibly conclusive proof. He used these to shape opinions. Gullible Americans accepted the heart-rending stories in those affidavits. On May 12, 1915, he issued his official Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages. Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith commissioned it, suspiciously early in the war, but the purpose, to outrage American sensibilities, worked quite effectively. Emile Vandervelde, a Belgian diplomat, based on hearsay, claimed that Germans cut off the hands of thousands of Belgian children. Allied propagandists continued the enormous slander to poison the minds of entire populations. Establishment historians, among the Allies, repeated the dreadful tale for several decades, as if Vandervelde had conducted a scientific examination. Yet, no one ever found a single Belgian child, or other nationality, without hands. In 1915, shops in Italy sold statues of a little "Belgian girl with her hands cut off, holding out her bloody arms to Mary, the Holy Virgin, begging her to make them grow again."

In the spring of 1915, Vandervelde, head of Belgium's socialist party and the president of the Second International, visited Benito Mussolini, on behalf of the Allies, to persuade Italy to fight on their side. Mussolini admitted that his story about the children convinced him to commit his country to battle. Yet, there must have been other motives as Mussolini doubted the story and asked him if he had actually seen any of these pitiful children, or if he knew of any reliable man who had seen any of these children. He soon recanted his story. In the occupied areas, individuals observed that the Germans were generally kind and courteous to children. Despite the lack of physical evidence, the sinister story, traveled throughout the world and contributed to America's entry into the war. Following Germany's defeat, the allies could not find even one mutilated child who had experienced maiming by the Germans.

Britain did not have an official propaganda program at the beginning of the war, as it was theoretically antithetical to British values. In 1917, they established the Department of Information and on February 10, 1918, they created the Ministry of Information, headed by William M. Aitken. By the war's end, Britain had a highly developed propaganda apparatus, superior to any of their opponents. Their press played an integral role in the diffusion of misinformation before, during and after the war. Reuters was a key compo-

ment of Britain's media operations, especially in the overseas distribution of propaganda masquerading as news. H. G. Wells, a key spokesman of internationalism, intended to demoralize society by destroying the concept of God. An intelligence agent, he insisted that the elite should kill "the less worthy." During the war, he directed the propaganda operation of the British intelligence service and advised the British on the creation of military equipment in both world wars.

On April 13, 1917, Wilson, the so-called peace candidate, as directed by Colonel House, created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) to acquire support for the war. He appointed publisher George Creel as its director. He had a staff of persuasive wordsmiths, journalists, writers, intellectuals and advertisers, who later admitted they were quite willing to lie, use emotional appeal and enemy demonization to generate hate and fear to elicit support for the government's war. They used popular phrases like, "Bleeding Belgium," "The Criminal Kaiser," and the always-useful slogan, "Make the World Safe for Democracy." They filled propaganda posters and CPI pamphlets with fictitious atrocity stories, which proved useful in recruiting troops.

The CPI staff distributed 6,000 "news releases," emotionally charged propaganda, disguised as "news." It was so successful that the majority of citizens responded with inordinately self-righteous nationalistic enthusiasm, the kind of nationalism that avoids self-evaluation while glaring at government-targeted "evil-doers." Austrian-born Edward Bernays, master manipulator, headed the CPI's Export Section and co-headed the Latin American Section of the Foreign Press Bureau. Bernays, a close friend of H. G. Wells and Sigmund Freud's nephew, employed his uncle's views on behavior to manage people in the marketplace. Freud, a member of B'nai B'rith, when working on his psychoanalysis theory (1880-1890), used cocaine daily and freely gave it to his friends. Bernays, the "Father of Public Relations," contacted Ford, International Harvester and other US firms in order to distribute pro-war literature to foreign contacts. He concocted atrocity stories in Germany to engender dissent and affect morale. He organized rallies and printed propaganda in other languages for insertion into export journals. His tenacious persuasion skills changed America's views toward a very unpopular war. Bernays said, "If we understand the mechanisms and motives of the group mind, it is now possible to control and regiment the masses according to our will without their knowing it Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government, which is the true ruling power of our country It is they who pull the wires which control the public mind."

He apparently agreed with Benjamin Disraeli's *Coningsby* because he wrote, "We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized." To give the right spin on the war, a CPI press team, including Bernays, attended the Paris Peace Conference. In 1920, Creel wrote *How We Advertised America*, in which he described how "he and his committee used the principles of advertising to convince Americans to go to war with Germany." Hollywood portrayed the Germans in

the same way that atheist Ilya Ehrenburg, the Soviet Minister of Propaganda, would in the next war when he told the Russian soldiers, "The Germans are not human beings."

In 1922, Walter Lippmann, argued that the "so-called omni competent citizen making rational, objective judgments based simply on facts is a myth ... A democratic polity demands definers, people who give shape to our feelings and impressions, people who give meanings for our facts."

Obviously, there were occasional Germans who committed unnecessary acts of violence. Just as the French, the Belgians, the British, and the Americans engaged in war crimes. Actually, the Allies committed more war crimes, and on a greater scale than the defeated Germans. However, the victors write the history, seize the glory, medals, and they collect the pensions. They attribute the most horrendous acts to the defeated nations. Decades after World War I, the Allies repeat the accusations of mutilation of children, civilian massacres, and the apple orchard destruction. These acts pale in comparison to the later terrorist bombings of Hamburg, Dresden, and dozens of other German cities, in addition to Tokyo, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after Japan offered to surrender.

The Allies' propaganda was so flagrant as to be wholly unbelievable under normal conditions but in wartime, even reasonable men accepted the falsehoods. Millions of naïve individuals fell for the deceptions and felt utter contempt and outrage. Children heard their parents discussing "the terrible Germans" which influenced them. It seemed that everyone believed that Germany was responsible for World War I, which made it easier to believe that they caused World War II. The media characterized the real warmongers as peace-loving heroes merely responding to the aggressive, savage Germans. The deceptive propaganda was so pervasive that naïve people simply accepted it. Because of popular perceptions, people thought Germans were totally evil and capable of any despicable act. History books in most nations repeat the atrocity stories. During and after World War II, people readily accepted lies because of the foundation cemented in the Great War. People, conditioned by false history, expected them to behave like murdering brutes.

8.3 Belgian Relief, a Platform for War, Profits and Position

In early 1914, Mansfield Smith-Cumming, the director of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), created in 1909, as a joint initiative of the Admiralty and the War Office, sent Sir William Wiseman, a future partner (1929-1960) of Kuhn, Loeb & Company to America to establish a branch. He enjoyed any-time access to Edward M. House, Wilson's handler, and to President Wilson himself. House and Wiseman correlated British and US intelligence operations before and during the war. Max Warburg, Paul's (mastermind behind the Federal Reserve) brother, directed the German espionage system. Jacob H. Schiff's two brothers financed the war efforts in Germany. The bankers wanted to delay warfare until their agents could create America's central bank, the Federal Reserve, in

order to guarantee a permanent, healthy fiscal return for financing continuous warfare thereafter.

Armies need food as much, or maybe even more, than they need ammunition. Germany had a bumper grain crop in 1914, but the nation had 67,000,000 people to feed which necessitated the importation of at least one-fifth of all of their food during normal times, requiring access to available ports. England, using one of its usual populationstarving strategies, blockaded all of those ports. British warmongers anticipated that Germany would go through neutral Belgium to attack France. On August 3-4, 1914, German troops did just that. British oligarchs, like David Lloyd George, expressed pious indignation. German soldiers lived off the land while they occupied Belgium. They rationed Belgian citizens and shipped the nation's produce to Germany. 1239 Belgium was a rich agricultural country that produced far more than her citizens consumed.

By March 1915, Germany, short of money, energy, and food, attempted to declare peace. However, absent Germany's participation, Britain's ambition to control oil, and exercise power in the Middle East following a certain victory at the war's end would not materialize. Britain had to crush Germany, so that Germany's ally, the Ottoman Empire would fall. Politicians planned to bring America into the war to subtly transfer its gold to Europe. Paul Warburg, Vice Governor of the Federal Reserve, rescued Germany monetarily, with credit arranged through his brother, Max Warburg, director of M. M. Warburg and Company. To resolve Germany's food problem and continue the war, they would resort to greater assistance from the banker-financed a front group, the profit-producing Belgium Relief Commission (BRC).

The German newspaper, *Nordeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of March 4, 1915, reported the quantities of food arriving from Belgium, and applauded the German authority's efforts there for solving the food shortages through their relationship with the United States. Further, the newspaper reported, "The German government was therefore glad to help in obtaining provisions from neutral countries of the needy inhabitants in order to save German home supplies, and insure its own troops against going short." Schollers Yearbook for Legislation, for 1916, reported the amounts of food shipped to Germany, just during the first four months of the war—963,600,000 pounds of meat, 1,445,400,000 pounds each of potatoes and bread, 400,000 tons of fl our, and 121,000,000 pounds of butter, and other fats, and 1,000,000 tons of other provisions. Hoover's BRC shipped about 600,000 tons of US grain into Belgium, sustaining the German occupiers, and keeping them fighting.

While Germany had economically and militarily prepared for war, its military leaders apparently underestimated its length, and miscalculated the quantity of materials essential to fight a modern war. After Britain entered the war, Dr. Walther Rathenau, a top official in the Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry, in conjunction with the German War Office, revised their calculations for a longer war. Yet, as early as mid-1915, they experienced a munitions shortage. Germany, the most industrialized country in Europe, depended on imported raw materials. The nation's prosperity emanated from

the diligence and technical ability of its people, who utilized the imported raw materials to manufacture products. They relied on the importation of industrial raw materials and semi-manufactured items and imported fabrics, cotton, wool, silk, flax, hemp and jute. By the fall of 1915, due to war shortages, Germans were wearing clothing constructed from paper-woven fabrics and used clothing. They were able, through these alternatives, to clothe the army. Germany also suffered a shortage of leather, furs, and rubber, despite the claims that they had discovered artificial rubber. They lacked shoe and boot leather, an absolute necessity for the army, especially when fighting in the Flanders mud. Ultimately, the German War Office requisitioned church bells and other articles, public or domestic, to melt down for military use.

In December, 1915, Dr. Rathenau, stated, "On the fourth of August of last year, when England declared war, a terrible and unprecedented thing happened—our country became a besieged fortress." Germany was isolated. On August 8, 1914, he had met with Colonel Heinrich Scheuch, the head of the War Department and explained to him that Germany, with limited materials, could only sustain a war for a few months. He asked him what measures they had taken "to avert the danger of the throttling of Germany." The Chief of the General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn sent Rathenau a telegram inviting him to meet the next morning, during which they organized a department to procure sufficient raw materials. With this organization, Germany acquired the necessary supplies to execute the war, "at the expense of the civilian population," until December 1915. Regarding the BRC, Lewis L. Strauss of Kuhn, Loeb, Hoover's assistant managed the operation. Strauss was married to Alice Hanauer, daughter of Kuhn Loeb partner, Jerome J. Hanauer. Wiseman worked closely with Edward M. House who vowed to get the United States into the war ten months before the country reelected Wilson. The president had promised to keep America out of the war, yet he sanctioned our entry into the foreign war on March 9, 1916, while he was still campaigning.

On December 12, 1916, German officials approached US officials to see if President Wilson would persuade the Allies to meet together. Edward M. House ruled out the possibility of peace negotiations. December 18, 1916, US Ambassador to Britain Walter H. Page relayed a peace offer from Germany, and the other Central Powers, to British officials. On January 9, 1917, Prime Minister David Lloyd George repudiated the offering and declared that Britain would fight to the victory, which possibly prompted the Germans to re-initiate submarine warfare. Given Britain's collapsing financial situation, the United States should have remained neutral. America's promised entry into the war would allow Britain to avoid financial disaster and continue the war. Winston Churchill had ignored every effort to avoid a war and refused to consider negotiating a quick end once it started. He obstinately opposed all of Germany's attempts to end the war. In 1916, David Lloyd George considered negotiations, but Churchill erupted in anger when he heard about Lloyd George's intentions. He argued, "Not to win decisively is to have all this misery over again after an uneasy truce and to fight it over again, probably under less favorable circumstances and, perhaps, alone." However, Germany wanted to compromise, especially

after America had entered the conflict. Russia withdrew at the end of 1917.

Hoover, continuing the profitable food fraud, appealed to the governments of Britain and France for relief for Belgium, which actually needed no relief. It was, like now, a major shift of taxpayer funds, to well-connected scam artists. Britain granted £500,000 per month and France pledged 12,500,000 francs each month. French institutions also promised 25,000,000 francs per month, for the relief of the inhabitants in German-occupied Northern France. On June 1, 1917, the United States took responsibility for the contributions for the Belgian and Northern France relief efforts. The BRC received £89,500,000 from Britain and \$66,000,000 from the French, for Belgium and \$108,000,000 for use in the occupied territory. Private organizations and individuals in England donated \$16,000,000 in cash and clothing. US citizens donated \$11,500,000 while donations from the rest of the world totaled \$3,000,000. On June 1, 1917, the United States loaned \$75,000,000, payable in six monthly installments of \$12,500,000, of which \$7,500,000 was to go to Belgium, and \$5,000,000 to France.

Hoover and Francqui, both Rothschild front men, designed the BRC as a profitable commercial endeavor to enrich themselves. This sham kept the war going for two additional years, which enriched the banks that funded the war. By then, America had entered the war. This was very significant in that the United States had abandoned any semblance of isolationism and came to Britain's rescue. Britain, now economically drained, passed the warfare baton to the United States, the banker's new global enforcer for confiscating and controlling the world's resources. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, a friend of Paul M. Warburg, Colonel House, Lord Arthur J. Balfour, Louis Marshall, and Baron Edmond de Rothschild, lauded praise on Hoover. In early February 1917, Brandeis had arranged for Senator William G. McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law, to help to secure Hoover's appointment as US Food Administrator. After America entered the war, Wilson issued Executive Order 2679-A, on August 10, 1917, to create the US Food Administration, operational in each state, actually part of the elaborate government expansion. Hoover became the agency's administrator, the food dictator.

Although Germany conquered Belgium, Poland, Serbia, Lithuania, Courland and Friuli, the Allies held a stronger economic weapon, as they controlled cotton, wool, jute, leather, copper, and food. German diplomats recognized that the Allies, including the United States, with their control of the sea and a ready supply of goods, maintained economic leverage. The Allies' powerful economic weapon ultimately made them victorious. During war and peace, those who control the resources and the finances, control everything else, including who wins and who loses, deciding factors in every war before any soldier fires the first shot. On November 13, 1918, Hoover asked President Wilson to appoint his associate, Edgar Rickard, to function in his place while Hoover was in Europe, for the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference. Per the president's Executive Order, officials divided the US Food Administration into four factions—the Sugar Equalization Board, Belgian Relief, the US Grain Corporation, and the US Shipping Board. On December 16, 1918, Wilson directed the State Department to the US Food Administration's Grain

Corp. \$5 million from his fund for National Security and Defense. Hoover insisted on directing the agency without oversight. He had Lewis L. Strauss, and two assistants, Prentiss N. Gray, and Julius H. Barnes, President of the Grain Corporation (1917-1918). Gray had collaborated with Hoover in the BRC swindle, which he adopted as a food relief model. Gray would become the president of J. Henry Schröder Banking in New York in 1923. Sullivan and Cromwell, where the Dulles brothers worked, represented Schröder. Barnes also had a post-war position with the bank. They both amassed huge fortunes, principally in grain and sugar.

Hoover told Americans to, "Go back to simple food, simple clothes, simple pleasures. Pray hard, work hard, sleep hard and play hard. Do it all courageously and cheerfully." The Lever Act, enacted August 10, 1917, authorized him to regulate the distribution, export, import, purchase, and storage of food. He called for patriotism and selfsacrifice. He set wheat prices, bought and distributed wheat, and supervised the federal corporations, and national trade associations. The Council of Defense exhorted all homeowners to sign pledge cards to verify their efforts to conserve food. Personal sacrifice psychologically binds people to the cause they are making the sacrifices for; in this case the government and its war. The Belgian National Committee reported that as of December 31, 1918, the BRC had spent \$260 million. During a 1921 audit, there was a \$182 million discrepancy between the amount collected and the amount expended. Francqui revised the figure. In December 1918, after the war, he submitted expenditures of \$40 million. On January 13, 1932, The New York Times revealed the extensive attacks made against Hoover in the Belgian media; it accused him of being part of the BRC scheme to make huge wartime profits. Barnes, Gray, and Hoover invested "their" funds in numerous US corporations. Gray had connections to the Prudential Investors, and International Holdings and Investment Corporation, two companies that Francqui's Société Générale de Belgique controlled.

Some researchers maintain that freemasons (many were actually involved) instigated World War I, causing millions of deaths, while 20,000,000 soldiers received serious wounds and 3,000,000 were permanently disabled. In addition to the deaths, disease, and disabilities, the war cost \$100 million a day. The freemasons, along with the profit seekers, Hoover and others, sold food to Germany, just to prolong the war, at a time when Germany attempted to halt the war due to its inability to feed the nation.

Atrocity Propaganda

Atrocity propaganda, which aimed to mobilise hatred of the German enemy by spreading details of their atrocities, real or alleged, was used extensively by Britain in the First World War. It reached its peak in 1915, with much of the atrocities related to Germany's invasion of Belgium. Newspaper accounts of "Terrible Vengeance" first used the word "Hun" to describe the Germans in view of atrocities in Belgium. A continuous stream of stories ensued, painting the Germans as destructive barbarians, and many of the atrocities

being reported were entirely fictitious.

One of the most widely disseminated documents of atrocity propaganda during the war was the Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, or Bryce Report, of May 1915. This report, based on 1,200 witness depositions, depicted the systematic murder and violation of Belgians by German soldiers during their invasion of Belgium, including details of rape and the slaughter of children. Published by a committee of lawyers and historians, headed by the respected former ambassador Lord Bryce, the Report had a significant impact both in Britain and in America, making front-page headlines in major newspapers. It was also translated into 30 languages for distribution into allied and neutral countries. Its impact in America was heightened by the fact that it was published soon after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. In response to the Bryce Report, Germany published its own atrocity counter-propaganda, in the form of the 'White Book' (*Die völkerrechtswidrige Führung des belgischen Volkskriegs/The illegal leadership of the Belgian People's War*) which detailed atrocities committed by Belgian civilians against German soldiers. However, its impact was limited outside of a few German-language publications; indeed, some interpreted it as an admission of guilt. Other publications referring to the violation of Belgian neutrality were subsequently distributed in neutral countries. For example, Wellington House disseminated a pamphlet entitled *Belgium and Germany: Texts and Documents in 1915*, which was written by the Belgian Foreign Minister Davignon and featured details of alleged atrocities.

The Corpse Conversion Factory

On April 17, 1917, a report appeared in the British press, allegedly sourced in Belgium, concerning a "Corpse Exploitation Establishment" (*Kadaververwertungsanstalt*) near Coblenz, at which the bodies of German soldiers were allegedly converted into various products, such as lubricating oils and pig food. One source was the Belgian newspaper published in London, *l'Indépendance belge*, which attributed the story to an undated, unverifiable newspaper, *La Belgique*, supposedly published in Leiden, the Netherlands. (There was a newspaper of that name published in Brussels, but it carried no such report.) The story is a vivid eyewitness description of German corpses being boiled down in a secret factory, with no explanation as to how the eyewitness gained entry. It gained credibility in the Northcliffe Press (notably the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*, April 17, 1917) by their juxtaposing to the Belgian account an excerpt from the official German newspaper, the *Lokal-Anzeiger*, in which a reporter, Karl Rosner reported experiencing the dull smell of boiling glue on his travels near the front.

This was a *Kadaververwertungsanstalt*, he explains, where carcasses (dead horses were in abundance) were boiled down. The German word for glue (*Leim*) was mistranslated as "lime," leading readers to think of quicklime used to disinfect corpses. The idea that this and the other mistranslation of "Kadaver" as "corpse" instead of "carcass" were innocent mistakes is hardly credible given that the *Daily Mail* correspondent who acknowledged

making the translation along with a colleague in the Times, were both seasoned correspondents from Germany and would have known the language well. Though this bit of propaganda gained credibility through the Northcliffe Press, the critical role of that press in disseminating the story in a credible way appears to have escaped proper historical appreciation. The story was used as propaganda in neutral and allied countries, and the Department of Information published a four-page pamphlet about the incident, entitled *The 'Corpse Conversion' Factory: A peep behind the German lines.*

8.4 Sykes-Picot Agreement

Bankers in Britain and France benefited through extending their financial influence into Turkish territory. They devised massive projects such as railroads, and the Suez Canal, which kept the Arab countries deeply in debt, allowing Britain and France to usurp authority over the Middle East. By 1900, Britain ruled Egypt, the Sudan, and parts of the Persian Gulf. France controlled Lebanon and Syria, where there was a significant Christian minority. The bankers behind the British government divided Iran between the British and Russians. The dismemberment of the Ottoman territories (from Turkey to the Arabian Peninsula), was the top priority of the imperialist powers.

In 1900, Theodor Herzl began negotiating with Abdülhamid, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, for either a charter or an outright purchase of land in Palestine for the Zionists. The sultan rejected Herzl's request. Dr. Chaim Weizmann later headed the Zionist Movement. At the beginning of World War I, Edmond Rothschild told Weizmann that the coming war would spread to the Middle East, where things of great significance to political Zionism would occur. Apparently, if the Zionists could not obtain a charter or buy land in Palestine, they would simply go to war and seize it. Politicians, provoked by influential Jews in England and America, used World War I as a political catalyst to gain Palestine as a Jewish homeland. Author Hasia R. Diner wrote, "The Jews of Palestine, regardless of whether they were yeshiva students in Jerusalem, halutzim (pioneers) in the Jordan River valley, or dwellers in the new Jewish cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, like the Jews of central and eastern Europe, stood trapped among the great powers fighting for control of land, waterways, and resources of the crucial region. The direct clash between the British forces and those of the Ottoman Empire under whom the Jews of Palestine lived often put them in harm's way."

In the event of a World War I victory, per the Constantinople Agreement, of March 18, 1915, France and Britain officially promised the port city of Constantinople and the Dardanelles (occupied by the Ottoman Empire) to Russia, as supported in documents between Russia, France, and Britain. The other Allies, for their warfare efforts, would receive compensation elsewhere in Turkey, and Britain would maintain the neutral zone in oil-rich Persia. Later, when the Bolsheviks seized Russia, they relinquished the booty promised in the treaty. During the Peace Conference, Balfour described the Treaty of

London, signed on April 26, 1915, as “unmatched in the annals of friendly international negotiations.” Italy, for joining the Allies, received territory in the Austrian Empire, the finest port in Albania, territorial extensions in Africa, the Dodecanese Islands, and territory in Turkey. Italy also insisted on a share of the German reimbursement, and a £50 million loan from Britain. In the Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne, on April 26, 1917, the Allies promised Italy, represented by Sidney C. Sonnino, a Jew, an even larger area in Anatolia and Smyrna. They never executed the agreement but rescinded it because of the Bolshevik Revolution, financially and logistically supported by United States and British bankers. Lenin later discovered a copy of the agreement, the actual justification for the war, among Russia’s state papers and made it public.

Given that Britain was engaged in war with Turkey, Sykes and Lord Herbert H. Kitchener saw fit to alter British policies, and develop new alliances. Many British leaders favored the Arabs over the Turks when considering the postwar settlements, because of the location of those states along the coast, adjacent to the sea route to India and in the Persian Gulf. Other diplomats wanted to retain their relationship to Turkey to avert any Russian influence in Constantinople, and in the Straits. Additionally, France wanted to acquire lands in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, which had a Christian minority. Italy wanted possession of the Aegean Islands to protect Christian minorities in Asia Minor. Russia wanted control of the Straits leading from the Black Sea to the Aegean to protect the Christians of Turkish Armenia and the Black Sea coast. Greece wanted to claim the historic Byzantine territories of Asia, Minor and Thrace, which conflicted with the claims of Russia, Italy, and Turkey. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1916-1922) preferred to ally with Greece. There were also the Zionists who wanted to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Mark Sykes had the position of negotiating an agreement with Britain’s most important ally, France, a country that was carrying a disparate responsibility in the war efforts against Germany. In July 1915, Sykes and François Georges-Picot worked on the secret agreement, which people later referred to as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, officially signed on May 16, 1916. Sykes was sympathetic toward the Armenians, Arabs, Turks, and Jews. As an officer, Sykes worked at the War Office as a protégé of Lord Herbert H. Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War. After negotiating the agreement, the British promised Sherif Hussein bin Ali that they would support Arab independence as a single unified state if the Arabs would join the British, under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), against the Ottoman Empire, Germany’s ally. Sir Arthur H. McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt (1915-1917) and a British administrator to India, clarified this promise in a letter dated October 24, 1915 to India, to the Sherif, who thought that the promise included Palestine.

Sherif was the sultan’s regent in Mecca. Sherif’s objective was the establishment of a single, independent, unified Arab state, stretching from Aleppo (Syria) to Aden (Yemen), including Palestine. Based on this understanding, the Arabs supplied the British with thousands of men, considered invaluable military assistance, during which their opponents

slaughtered 100,000 of them. The Sykes-Picot Agreement deceptively internationalized the bulk of Palestine, and divided the land into protectorates, vehicles for resource exploitation by the victors. British politicians predictably reneged on every single promise. Sir Mark Sykes, a budding Zionist and co-author of the agreement, was good friends with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the head Zionist. The Sykes-Picot Agreement conformed to the Rothschild agenda. Britain intended to seize control of all of the undeveloped oil-rich Arabian Gulf after the war. Ultimately, Britain gained Jordan, southern Iraq, part of Haifa and direct access to the Mediterranean Sea. France gained control of Syria, Lebanon, southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq and Mosul. Russia was supposed to get Constantinople, the Turkish Straits and the Armenian vilayets, the unique subdivisions within the Ottoman Empire. Leaders initially designated Palestine as an area for international administration after discussion with Russia and others, including the Sherif.

On November 7, 1918, even after the exposure of the double dealing duplicity of inducing Sherif's men to fight against the Ottoman Empire, France and Britain (both bankrupt), issued statements claiming that they were fighting for the freedom of those who the Turks had allegedly oppressed for such a long time. The predetermined divisions closely correspond to the current Middle East borders. Those partitions created the countries of Syria and Lebanon, designated as French protectorates, a status they held until 1946 for Syria, and 1943, for Lebanon, when they finally gained their freedom. Britain predictably betrayed Sherif Hussein bin Ali, and allotted him control only over Iraq, along with Trans-Jordan, and Kuwait, which were effectively British entities. The British ultimately handed Palestine over to the Zionists in 1948.

8.5 Britain's Middle East Objectives

British Prime Minister, Herbert H. Asquith and Herbert H. Kitchener, the War Minister, were not interested in fracturing Europe in order to help British bankers develop commercial interests or political influence in the Middle East. Lord Alfred Milner, an Anglophile, had alternative plans. On November 22, 1915, his Round Table placed a notice in the Manchester Guardian, which intimated, "The whole future of the British Empire as a Sea Empire" hinged on taking control of Palestine, a buffer state and peopling it with "an intensely patriotic race." They also claimed that Palestine was the missing link that would complete the boundaries of the empire, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 1362 The war's major function was the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, to free Palestine in order to create the state of Israel. The dismemberment of that empire would include genocide and ethnic cleansing.

The Milner faction had to manipulate the United States into fighting against Germany. Given the growing influence of America's Jewish population, chances of dragging them into the war were good. Asquith and Kitchener opposed that plan. On June 6, 1916, Kitchener died on his way to Russia when his ship went down, apparently due to an

explosion. Reginald B. Brett, who orchestrated many lethal reforms during World War I, as a member of the monarch's Privy Council, helped replace Asquith with a more willing pawn. Brett, a founding member of the Pilgrims Society, was close to the Rothschilds 1363 and a leading member of the Rhodes-Milner group. 1364 On December 7, 1916, David Lloyd George became Britain's Prime Minister. Before long, the Round Table had positioned several of their most effective members into government posts. Milner became the chief strategist of the War Cabinet. Soon British troops left for the Middle East to fight the Turks. Prime Minister Lloyd George's astute legal skills immeasurably enhanced his career in behalf of the World Zionist Organization. Sir Philip Sassoon, whose mother was a Rothschild, was his secretary. 1365 Winston Churchill and Arthur J. Balfour, of Milner's Round Table, were also elevated in power. Lord Rothschild, James de Rothschild, the son of Edmund de Rothschild of Paris, former owner of the Rothschild colonies in Palestine, and Sir Mark Sykes attended the first official meeting of the Political Committee, where they discussed the future mandates of Palestine, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

The Grand Chessboard, a major globalist blueprint by the audacious globalist, Zbigniew Brzezinski, describes the United States Geostrategic Imperatives in the Middle East. One key premise of the book is the control of the world's resources. Naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, long ago proposed that whoever secured Egypt would obtain all the coasts, and the islands in the Indian Ocean. Egypt, he felt, held the key to the East. 1367 Total control of all resources includes the protection and control of oil pipelines, and transportation routes such as the Suez Canal. This apparently necessitates a permanent US military presence, with dozens of bases, since the US military is currently the banker's global enforcers. Immediately after World War I, and every major conflict since, the elites shuffle territory and people, which generates turmoil, often requiring military control and occupation.

While thousands of ordinary French and German soldiers were slaughtering each other in Europe, British politicians, ostensibly concerned about the Suez Canal's security, removed 1,400,000 British soldiers and scarce war materials to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The French were irate over this maneuver. They had already lost almost 1,500,000 soldiers while another 2,600,000 were severely injured. About a million British troops remained in the Middle East until after the end of hostilities, even in the French area, protecting petroleum resources. France's leader, Georges Clemenceau, agreed to the Prime Minister's request to allow the British to have complete control of the Mosul Wilayet (Iraq), and Palestine, from Dan to Beersheba. France would control Greater Syria and receive half of the Mosul oil, along with the guarantee of British post-war support if Germany ever challenged France regarding the Rhine area.

By the last quarter of 1916, the allies depended wholly on American supplies, and Federal Reserve financing. By 1917, Britain was bankrupt, and ready to relinquish her imperialistic role to the United States, to transfer the wealth from America, as warfare requires huge amounts of cash and credit. They consummated the power transfer with the clear

understanding that British officials would retain the exclusive right to command the current struggle. The United States would commit troops to prevent Britain from losing the war. Britain had a superior navy, and America was not yet ready to assume naval power. Britain owed money to the Federal Reserve, and had to win to pay the war debts, and keep the banks from losing the money they had loaned.

Colonel Edward M. House had managed Woodrow Wilson's political campaign, including his deceptive promise to keep the United States out of the war. However, he opted to comply with his handlers, which included appointing Louis D. Brandeis, a leading Zionist, to the Supreme Court. Warfare necessitated the removal of Zionist headquarters from Berlin to New York. Then, Wilson, House, J. Pierpont Morgan, Churchill, and others collaborated to provoke Germany into sinking the Lusitania, a passenger ship. Wilson, the man of peace, largely relying on Brandeis' opinions and encouragement, addressed Congress on April 2, 1917, where he poignantly pleaded for a declaration of war against Germany, which it granted on April 6, 1917. Brandeis was Felix Frankfurter's uncle. Later, Frankfurter dominated the Supreme Court. Wilson told Congress, "The world must be safe for democracy." The United States entered the war when Britain was close to defeat. The real reasons included the division of the oil-rich Ottoman Empire, and the seizure of Palestine for the creation of Israel, a prospective military presence in the oil-rich gulf. 1369 J. Pierpont Morgan was the US financial agent for all the Allied countries. He also funded France's participation in the war. 1370 Britain owed millions to US banks and businesses who sold war-related components, some shipped on the fated Lusitania. Aiding Britain, our debtor nation, protected the banker's loans and business profits. 1371 US citizens died for the bankers and the businessmen.

Vladimir Lenin, Russia's Bolshevik leader, announced an armistice, and sent Trotsky to Brest-Litovsk in November 1917, to negotiate a peace deal with Germany and Austria. They were unable to reach an agreement after nine weeks. As a result, on March 3, 1918, German troops moved toward Petrograd to encourage Russia to accept the terms of the Central Power's (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Because of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Allies could not impose the Treaty of Versailles upon the new Bolshevik government in Russia, a great benefit. The Bolsheviks now controlled a huge quantity of untapped oil, which would not fall under the control of Standard Oil, British Petroleum, or Royal Dutch Shell, the world's first oil cartel. The Bolsheviks relinquished most of their oil rights in Iran, and forgave all Iranian indebtedness owed to czarist Russia. With Russia out of the way in Iran, Britain and their Anglo-Persian Oil Company seized control of oil exploration and development. Britain extracted massive amounts of Iranian oil. Churchill called it "a prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams."

8.6 Alexander Parvus and his German Accomplices

Alexander Parvus, who wanted to establish revolutionary fifth columns among the allies, befriended Baron Hans von Wangenheim, Germany's Ambassador in Constantinople. Parvus presented a proposal to Germany via Wangenheim. He suggested that Germany finance Russia's destabilization through a general strike during its war with Russia and its allies. On January 9, 1915, Wangenheim sent a telegram to Arthur Zimmermann, the Under State Secretary to the State Secretary. The ambassador told him that Parvus, who wanted to meet with them, was one of the main leaders of the last Russian Revolution, an exile from Russia, and that officials had, on several occasions, expelled him from Germany. Von Wangenheim sent Parvus to Berlin where he arrived on March 6, 1915. He met with certain officials and proposed a twenty-page strategy describing the implementation of massive political strikes in Russia. Parvus advised the division of Russia by supporting the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Labor Party, by urging ethnic exclusivity in various Russian regions, and by championing writers who criticized the czar during the war. Considering his experience in 1905, he imagined that class division in Russia, following a devastating war defeat, would be the most effective method of instituting a socialist revolution. Alexander Parvus, after influencing and contributing to the fomenting of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, would become an adviser to the Weimar Republic in postwar Germany. He joined the German Social Democratic Party, and he developed close relationships with Karl Kautsky, Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Karl Radek. Parvus quickly became one of the best theoreticians of the party. Others regarded him, and Luxembourg, as hotheads. In the 1890s, and early 1900s, he participated in the politics surrounding German and Russian Marxism.

The German Foreign Ministry, controlled by Lenin assets, transferred the first five million marks to the Bolsheviks for revolutionary propaganda on June 7, 1915, via Aleksander Keskula, the Estonian agent who began his association with the Germans on September 12, 1914. He initially met Lenin on October 6, 1914.

Henry Morgenthau Sr., the US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1913-1916), in his memoirs, and elsewhere, criticized Wangenheim and painted him as a villain. He claimed that Kaiser Wilhelm, who he claimed sought "world domination," personally chose Wangenheim to try to subjugate Turkey, and transform its army, and its territory into "instruments of Germany." He wrote, "Wangenheim worshipped the Prussian military system." He claimed that Germany's "ambitions had transformed the world into a place of horror," and "Wangenheim's every act and every word typified this new and dreadful portent among the nations." He claimed that Wangenheim "divided mankind into two classes, the governing and the governed" and believed that "Germany was inevitably destined to rule the world." Morgenthau claimed, "For twenty years the German Government had been cultivating the Turkish Empire. All this time the Kaiser had been preparing for a world war and in this war it was destined that Turkey should play an almost decisive part." 1386 He said of Wangenheim, "Like the government which he served so loyally, he

was fundamentally ruthless, shameless, and cruel . . . with the realism and logic that are so characteristically German, (he) would brush aside all feelings of humanity and decency that might interfere with success.” The name Morgenthau seems to be affiliated with lies and propaganda as will also be seen when discussing world war 2.

A State Department document, dated February 15, 1916, discusses the czar’s overthrow and mentions Max Breitung and Isaac Seligman, both freemasons, as participating in that event. Max Warburg, a Zionist, a banker and a freemason, also worked for German intelligence, helped fund the communist propaganda in Russia. Warburg, one of the most powerful men in Germany, and other wealthy Jews supported Communism. Parvus planned for the Bolshevik seizure in 1916, and made certain that Lenin had sufficient money, as much as six million dollars in gold. Karl Kautsky, a German Jew, said that “the Jews in Russia had only one true friend—the revolutionary movement.” They comprised about thirty to fifty percent of the party.

The American International Corporation, headed by J. Pierpont Morgan Jr. also assisted the revolutionaries. Jacob H. and Mortimer Schiff, Felix Warburg, Otto H. Kahn, Max Warburg, Jerome J. Hanauer, Alfred Milner and the Guggenheim family also financed the Bolsheviks. Most of these people were Jews and freemasons. Max Warburg established a Russian publishing house, along with German industrialist, Hugo Stinnes, who, on August 12, 1916, agreed to contribute two million rubles for the financing of that publishing house. In April 1917, the German General Staff, and the German Supreme Command, unknown to the Kaiser, facilitated and financed Lenin and his revolutionaries on their train journey from Switzerland through Germany and Sweden, to Petrograd, Russia, with money funneled from Parvus through Jakob Fürstenberg (Yakov Ganetsky), both Jews. There, they would meet Leon Trotsky to complete the revolution, to destroy the Russian Army, and to eliminate it from World War I. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who, in 1917, lost the Reichstag’s support, directed State Secretary Arthur Zimmermann to approve of the passage of the Bolsheviks.

Lenin was not a German agent, despite the help that Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg awarded him, because his objectives were then compatible with certain people in the Foreign Ministry. Additionally, each entity had alternative motives—Germany sought access to postwar markets in Russia, and Lenin sought to establish a Marxist dictatorship. 1394 Lenin and Parvus, who worked with German intelligence, privately collaborated but carefully avoided meeting in public. German intelligence established Parvus’ financial network via offshore operations in Copenhagen, to shift money to Russia between front organizations. The majority of the transactions were genuine, yet still helped to conceal Bolshevik funds. Scandinavian fiscal and customs offices were overburdened, and inadequate for the booming black market during the war. There is no conclusive evidence showing that the Germans supplied the money for this financial network. Historians recently examined the records from Alexander Kerensky’s Government and found them to be inconclusive or utter forgeries.

On October 27, 1917, Edgar Sisson, a former Chicago Tribune reporter, former manag-

ing editor of *Collier's Weekly* and past editor of *Cosmopolitan*, left the United States to become the Petrograd-based representative of the government's propaganda apparatus, the Committee on Public Information (CPI) or the Creel Committee, and a special envoy of President Woodrow Wilson. In early 1918, after the Bolsheviks had seized power, he acquired a set of 68 Russian-language documents. These papers appeared to provide evidence of a German-Bolshevik conspiracy during World War I, claiming that Trotsky, Lenin, and other Bolshevik leaders were agents of the German government. Sisson recruited Russians to disseminate US propaganda in Germany, in addition to distributing a million Russian-language prints of President Wilson's war message to the US Congress. Sisson returned to the United States in May, to head the CPI's Foreign Section. On May 9, 1918, President Wilson had Sisson's report on the Russian documents, which the CPI released to the media on September 15. The press dutifully and unquestioning reported that the German General Staff had hired Lenin and Trotsky. On September 21, 1918, *The New York Evening Post* questioned the validity of the Sisson Documents, and claimed that Santeri Nuorteva, member of the Finnish Socialist Federation, and a former Soviet propagandist, actually wrote them. *The New York Times*, certainly a biased opinion-making newspaper, reported that the Sisson Documents, in possession of the CPI, verified that Lenin and Trotsky, heads of the Bolshevik government, were German agents. Further, that the German Great General Staff arranged for the German Imperial Bank, and other financial institutions, to fund the revolution. Moreover, German agents Lenin and Trotsky betrayed the Russian people by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Germany allegedly selected a commander to defend Petrograd against the German Army, and provided German officers to advise the Bolshevik government, command its armies, spy on the embassies of Russia, and to direct Bolshevik foreign and domestic policy. *The New York Times* claimed that the Bolshevik government was in fact German, representing the best interests of Germany. The CPI published a pamphlet, based on the Sisson Documents, *The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy*, of which it distributed 137,000 copies. John F. Jameson, a gatekeeper historian, associated with the Carnegie Institution, and the American Historical Association, founded by Andrew D. White (S&B), and Professor Samuel N. Harper, validated the authenticity of most of the documents. 1398 Not surprisingly, after World War II, the Allies discovered documents in the German Foreign Office that purportedly confirmed that Imperial Germany had financed the Bolsheviks.

In 1956, George F. Kennan examined and scientifically evaluated the Sisson Documents, and categorically stated that they were forgeries. He wrote a very persuasive technical article but, by then, the public paid very little attention to a decades-old controversy. Some academics appreciated his scholarship but, for the most part, the entertainment and news media, the schools, and typical government officials raised on propaganda pabulum, continue to compare every totalitarian institution, or government, to Nazism or Communism, as if each shared the same characteristics, but with different names.

8.7 The Armenian Genocide, Relocation and Extermination

The Jews took power during their Young Turk Revolution, a movement entirely overshadowed by the Chinese Revolution (1911), and the Russian Revolutions (1905, 1917). Young Turk leaders then organized and executed the Armenian Genocide wherein between 600,000 and 1,500,000 perished. Henry Morgenthau Sr., a member of both the Pilgrims Society, and B'nai B'rith, was a Harlem real estate mogul and a leader in New York City's Reform Jewish community. His money helped to install Woodrow Wilson into the White House, and the new president asked him to accept the ambassadorship to Turkey. Though lacking experience, Morgenthau reluctantly accepted the position (1913-1916), with the encouragement of his good friend, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, a founder, and leading member of the Zionist Organization of America, founded in 1897, to do everything necessary to secure a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Not only do the United States and other industrialized countries send ambassadors, they also send intelligence agents, such as the CIA, to engage in terrorist activities. In March 1915, Eitan Belkind, Aharon and Sarah Aharonson, his sister, and Avshalom Feinberg founded Nili, a Jewish espionage network that provided information to the allied forces during World War I. Sir Mark Sykes assisted Belkind infiltrated the Ottoman army, and became an officer assigned to the headquarters of Ahmed Djemal, Minister of the Navy. Belkind, the British agent, relates that, in early 1915, a few Circassian soldiers ordered some Armenians to gather sufficient thorns and thistles to create a tall pyramid. Thereafter, the soldiers tied almost 5,000 Armenians together around the pyramid and then torched it. He fled in order to escape the tortuous screams but returned two days later to find the charred bodies. Belkind was a cousin to the Chief Rabbi of Turkey, Chaim Nahum, who "rejected any involvement or contact" in the Armenian issue.

Belkind also wrote, "On Friday in late March 1915, about 10,000 Jewish were exiled from Israel. They were taken to Jaffa and forced to board ships belonging to neutral states such as Italy, USA, etc. The deportation was carried out with great cruelty. The deportees left all their property behind, women and children were hurled into the ships. It was a tragic and oppressing sight. Feinberg, a witness to the deportations, went to Jerusalem to the Anti-Locust Department, and urged Aharonson to start an uprising; because the Jewish settlements were on the brink of annihilation. Avshalom insisted that, in his opinion, that it had been the Germans that advised Turkey to deport the Jews."

On April 24, 1915, Mehmed Talaat Pasha, a freemason, while posing as an orthodox Moslem, was actually descended from a Spanish- Jewish family. He had collaborated with the Young Turks, also Jews. He ordered the closure of all Armenian political organizations within the Ottoman Empire, and the arrest of all Armenians associated with those organizations. On the night of April 24/25, 1915, Young Turk authorities arrested between 235 and 270 Armenian leaders in Constantinople, including politicians, clergymen, physicians, authors, journalists, lawyers, and teachers. Several weeks earlier, the government allegedly organized the mass killings of Armenian civilians in the Van vilayet.

On May 27, 1915, Talaat Pasha, CUP Minister of the Interior issued the Tehcir Law or Temporary Law of Deportation authorizing the government to deport anyone that it “sensed” was a threat to national security. The order covered the period from June 1, 1915 to February 8, 1916. It legalized the mass deportation of Armenians from the empire’s eastern provinces to Syria. Many historians maintain that Ismail Enver Pasha should share equal responsibility for the “extermination” of the Armenians. Reportedly, Ismail Enver Pasha told Ambassador Morgenthau, “I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian problem in three months than Abdülhamid accomplished in thirty years!” Ismail Enver Pasha, because the Armenians were plotting against the government, introduced repressive measures against them, and implemented the deportation of about 2,000,000 Armenians, which culminated in a massacre. Ethnic Turks and Kurds attacked their villages and murdered vulnerable refugees. Many Armenians relocated in Iran, now the residence of about 100,000 of them.

The German Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Baron Hans von Wangenheim stated that a systematic genocide of the Armenians would have obstructed the war effort. It would have withdrawn troops and military supplies, needed by the Central powers, and weakened the army. He did not want to insult the Young Turk rulers and their efforts to win the war. On May 31, 1915, he notified officials in Berlin to block Armenian espionage and their extensive risings. Ismail Enver Pasha intended to close many Armenian schools, suppress their correspondence and newspapers as well as relocate uninvolved Armenian families to Mesopotamia. He requested that Germany not interfere. Governments hostile to Germany, would exploit anything that Turkish officials did. He said that he thought that Germany should try to modify its methods, but not hinder the Turkish government on its principles.

On June 17, 1915, Wangenheim changed his opinions. He wrote, “It is obvious that the banishment of the Armenians is not due solely to military considerations.” Talaat Bey (born Mehmed Talaat), the minister of the interior, told Dr. Johannes Mordtmann of the embassy that “the Porte intended to make use of the world war to deal thoroughly with its internal enemies, the Christians in Turkey, and that it meant not to be disturbed in this by diplomatic intervention from abroad.” Wangenheim sent a memo to the grand vizier telling him that Germany would not hide the consequences “created by these harsh measures and mass deportations, which include guilty and innocent without distinction, especially when they accompany these measures by acts of violence, such as massacres and pillages.” Young Turk officials subjected the Armenian Christians, as part of the deportation, to forced marches, massacres, starvation and rape.

Wangenheim said that it was imperative that the provincial authorities take measures to protect the life and property of evacuated Armenians, during their deportation and in their new location. He reminded the Turkish authorities that their activities could damage German interests, and asked that the deportees be given a grace period before they were actually deported. The Turkish government rejected the Austrian or German appeals. On July 12, 1915, Wangenheim again wrote to Talaat Pasha demanding that he take

measures against Reshid Bey, who was organizing large-scale massacres. Wangenheim also wrote to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg telling him that diplomatic pressure failed to influence the government and therefore, "Turkey must accept full responsibility for her actions." Wangenheim soon left for Berlin and his successor, Paul Wolff Metternich, reiterated Germany's opposition to the Ottoman's treatment of the Armenians. The Young Turk government allegedly did not provide the deportees with shelter, food, water or supplies during the march. The Turkish guards accompanying them reportedly robbed, raped, and killed many of them and allowed bystanders to participate. On August 18, 1915, The New York Times, published by Adolph S. Ochs, reported, "The refugees will have to traverse on foot a distance, requiring marches of from one to two months . . . the roads and the Euphrates are strewn with corpses of exiles, and those who survive are doomed to certain death. It is a plan to exterminate the whole Armenian people." The Times reported, "Hundreds of women and young girls . . . have been pillaged, defiled and destroyed. At the beginning of this month all the inhabitants of Karahissar were pitilessly massacred, with the exception of a few children." Bahaeddin Şakir said, "We are in war, there is no threat of intervention by Europe and the Great Powers, and the world press either will not be able to voice a protest. Even if we do not succeed, the problem will become an accomplished fact, the voices will calm down, and no one will dare to express a protest. We should make use of this exceptional situation as much as possible. This kind of opportunity is not always available . . ."

Samuel S. McClure wrote, "The shortest method for disposing of the women and children concentrated in the various camps was to burn them. Fire was set to large wooden sheds in Alidjan, Megrakon, Khaskegh, and other Armenian villages, and these absolutely helpless women and children were roasted to death . . . And the executioners, who seem to have been unmoved by this unparalleled savagery, grasped infants by one leg and hurled them into the fire . . . the stench of the burning human flesh permeated the air for many days after." In the Baibourt area, "The worst and most unimaginable horrors were reserved for us at the banks of the Euphrates and in the Erzindjan plain. The mutilated bodies of women, girls, and little children made everybody shudder." The Young Turks also allegedly used cattle cars to transport the Armenians, at least 20,000 by August 1, 1915. Peter Balakian, an author on The New York Times Best Seller's List, relates that there was a twenty-five mile stretch between Urfa and Arab Pournar, where "the beaten paths are lined with corpses of the victims."

After deportation, the government could legally confiscate the abandoned properties, livestock, and land and assets, as sanctioned by the new Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation, enacted on September 13, 1915. 1414 On September 29, 1915, Jesse B. Jackson, American Consul in Aleppo, sent Morgenthau many charts and tables enumerating the railway deportations by city, town, and Armenian religious sect . . . giving the numbers of children and adults." Jackson wrote, "The deportation of Armenians from their homes by the Turkish government has continued with a persistence and perfection of plan." Almost all of the Armenians, Catholics, Caldeans and Protestants, from the

provinces of "Van, Erzaerum, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Mamouret ul-Aziz, Angora and Sivas . . . have already been practically exterminated." The death toll was reportedly already over 500,000 by August 15, 1915. The survival rate of the forced marches was about fifteen percent; about one million Armenians were missing. 1418 Military personnel who refused to kill defenseless Armenians were relieved of duty and court-martialed or murdered.

On October 6, 1915, Lord James Bryce, former Member of Parliament, a former Ambassador to the United States (1907-1913), a friend of President Woodrow Wilson, and a popular figure in America, told Parliament about the premeditated murder of "around 800,000" Armenians. He said that officials in Constantinople ordered the massacres, which carried a penalty for non-compliance. Aneurin Williams, of the British Parliament, presented a similar account on November 16. Denys Cochin, a French writer, wrote about the massacres. He was the Minister of State (1915-1916) under Aristide Briand, a leader of the French Socialist Party. Cochin was then undersecretary for foreign policy matters responsible for dealing with the blockade of Germany. Other writers disseminated Cochin's material. One such individual wrote, "Germany's ally was committing the vilest atrocities," and compared the fate of the Armenians to that of the Belgians.

Ambassador Morgenthau gave a speech at the Wise Center Forum in Cincinnati on May 21, 1916, regarding the sale of Palestine, after the war. As ambassador, he said he broached the subject of the Armenians with Turkish officials who were very receptive, even eager. He said, "Turkish officials will do anything if they have no fear of punishment or censure. The Turks gladly would have made a bargain with me that they would protect the Jews and do what they desired with the Christians." He went on to say, "It is utterly impossible to place several millions of people in Palestine. There would be grave danger from the Arabs. It is a good idea to have a model colony here. If Jews continue there as at present, at the end of the war there will be no friction. I believe the Zionists will not provoke the Government. Turkey needs the Jews. They have lost the Armenians and must fill the gap."

While Morgenthau was US Ambassador, though he claimed otherwise, he remained relatively silent during what people refer to as the systematic Armenian Genocide. In June 1917, he and Felix Frankfurter, representing the War Department, traveled to Turkey on a secret mission to convince its leaders to abandon the Central Powers. After the war, Morgenthau attended the Paris Peace Conference as an advisor regarding Eastern Europe and the Middle East issues. Perhaps Morgenthau's statements in Cincinnati were an attempt to push the British to accept the Zionist goals.

In 1919, Morgenthau wrote an incredibly anti-Muslim book detailing the genocidal horrors of the Armenian genocide, actually carried out by the Dönmes, which, at the time, the United States and Britain apparently ignored. He described Sheik-ul-Islam's alleged appeal for a total Jihad or Holy War against all infidels. The Sheik's proclamation purportedly summoned the complete Muslim world to arise and annihilate their Christian oppressors, except for the Germans and Austrians. Interestingly, certain parties, attempting to ignite hatred, republished his book in 2003, perhaps to provoke US sensibilities

against the Muslims.

8.8 Making Money the Old Fashioned Way, War Profiteering

Evidently, the financial cost of World War I amounted to almost \$38 billion for Germany alone; Britain spent \$35 billion, France \$24 billion, Russia \$22 billion, USA \$22 billion and Austria-Hungary \$20 billion. In total, the war cost the Allies around \$125 billion and it cost the Central Powers about \$60 billion.

On November 23, 1913, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Mellon, Andrew Carnegie, and J. Pierpont Morgan, Frank A. Vanderlip and other bankers, financiers, and industrialists created the American International Corporation (AIC), capitalized with \$50 million specifically to assist the Bolsheviks in their revolution. AIC's objectives were to develop and promote US foreign trade. AIC soon acquired interests in the Panic Mail Steamship Company, the International Mercantile Marine Company, United Fruit Company, and the New York Shipbuilding Company. It owned all of the stock in the Allied Machinery Company of America, invested in other companies and had controlling interest in many others. AIC created, controlled, owned, or purchased the following companies to fulfill their objectives,

Allied Machinery Company of America; American International Shipbuilding Corporation; American International Steel Corporation; American Balsa Company; Allied Construction Machinery Corporation; Allied Sugar Machinery Corporation; American International Terminals Company; Carter Macey & Company; F. W. Horne & Company; The China Corporation; The Latin American Corporation; Ulen Contracting Company; Grace Russian Company; Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corporation; International Merchant Marine; International Products Company; New York Shipbuilding Corporation; Pacific Mail Steamship Company; Rosin & Turpentine Export Company; Siems Carry Railroad and Canal Company; United Fruit Company; United States Rubber Company; United States Industrial Alcohol Company; Jones Laughlin Steel Corporation; Midvale Steel Corporation; G. Amsinck & Company; Symington Forge Corporation; Remington Arms; and the Robert Dollar Company. Many companies that focused on military efforts and food.

Individuals associated with the Federal Reserve and Wall Street assumed control of AIC, all attempting to profit from imminent war. The AIC Directors, all powerful bankers, politicians or industrialists. By 1915, AIC was doing business in Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, India, Ceylon, Italy, Switzerland, France, Spain, Cuba, Mexico, and other Central American countries. By 1917, AIC's foreign investments totaled over \$27 million and it had agents in London, Paris, Buenos Aires, Peking, and Petrograd, Russia. AIC's United Fruit Company played a role in various Central American Marxist revolutions in the 1920s. By November 1917, AIC owned Amsinck and Company, also located at 120 Broadway. Amsinck funded German wartime espionage in the United States and supported the Bolshevik Revolution.

Churchill's US counterpart, Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt claimed that US industry had been preparing for war for about a year. The Army and Navy Departments started purchasing supplies by early 1916. In 1916, AIC purchased New York Shipbuilding, a navy contractor that, by 1918, owned the world's biggest shipyard. President Woodrow Wilson placed the nation's monetary system into the hands of the international bankers through the Federal Reserve System. When the United States entered into World War I against Germany, on April 6, 1917, Wilson relinquished further economic control of the government to three of his financial backers, all Jews, Eugene I. Meyer, Paul Warburg, and Bernard Baruch. In 1890, Bernard Baruch had worked on Wall Street for A.A. Housman & Co. In 1896, he merged the six top US tobacco companies into the Consolidated Tobacco Company, which forced James Duke and the American Tobacco Trust into another trust. He delivered the copper industry to the Guggenheim family, and collaborated with Edward H. Harriman, Jacob H. Schiff's agent in managing America's railway system for the Rothschild family. Baruch and Harriman seized control of the New York City transit system. Baruch Brothers of New York changed their name to Hentz Brothers in 1917 when Bernard became Chairman of the US War Industries Board, established on July 28, 1917. Baruch wrote, "... in the view of many, I became a virtual dictator."

On February 8, 1918, some senators convened a committee to hear the views of Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo regarding Senate bill No. 3714, providing for the establishment of a War Finance Corporation. Other attendees who favored the bill's passage were banker, William Proctor Gould Harding, Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1916-1922) and Paul M. Warburg, Vice Governor Federal Reserve Board. Warburg relinquished his \$500,000 a year job at Kuhn, Loeb to accept the paltry \$12,000 a year job as governor of the Federal Reserve. On March 7, 1918, the Senate passed the bill, which authorized the extension of \$4 billion in credit to firms and corporations engaged in war-related industries. Eugene I. Meyer directed the War Finance Corporation. The President would later propose his name as the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board. Congress created the US Government agency on April 5, 1918 in order to give financial support to industries deemed essential for World War I, and to the banks that financed them. It functioned in that capacity, between the wars, until Congress abolished it on July 1, 1939.

Regarding his personal interests, Baruch admitted, "I carried through the war three major investments, Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Company, Texas Gulf Sulphur, and Atolia Mining Company (tungsten)." On February 21, 1921, Representative Mason told the House of Representatives that Baruch made over \$50 million just in copper during the war. Baruch, as chairman of the War Industries Board, directed the affairs of all US factories. He chose Clarence Dillon, a Wall Street lawyer as his assistant. William P. G. Harding, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, was the Managing Director of the War Finance Corporation under Meyer. George R. James, member of the Federal Reserve Board (1923-1924) had been Chief of the Cotton Section of the War Industries Board.

On September 13, 1937, in a congressional investigation, Baruch testified before Congress and admitted that all wars are economic in nature, despite the political or religious reasons

repeatedly used to justify war. He made \$750,000 in just one day during World War I when he headed the purchasing agency for the Allies. In that capacity, he spent \$10 billion per year and was the primary member of the Munitions Price-Fixing Committee, and as such, he determined how much money the US government spent and the companies from which they would purchase. President Wilson also gave him a letter authorizing him to seize any US industry or plant. During Congress' investigation, officials asked him about the specific skills that qualified him for the job. He responded that he was a speculator.

There were at least two Congressional investigations, in 1925 and 1930-The Select Committee to Investigate the Destruction of Government Bonds. On March 2, 1925, it was reported, "Duplicate bonds amounting to 2,314 pairs and duplicate coupons amounting to 4,698 pairs ranging in denominations from \$50 to \$10,000 had been redeemed to July 1, 1924. Some of these duplications have resulted from error and some from fraud." This chicanery enabled Meyer to purchase control of Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation and The Washington Post. The duplication of bonds, "one for the government, one for me" in denominations as high as \$10,000 each, amounted to a fortune. Meyer's daughter Katharine Graham later became publisher of the Washington Post. President Herbert Hoover appointed Meyer as Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1930-1933). In 1920 Meyer and William H. Nichols, owner of General Chemical, merged five smaller chemical companies to create the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation later known as the Allied Chemical Corp. After World War II, President Harry S. Truman, a freemason, appointed Meyer as the first head of the World Bank in June 1946.

Samuel P. Bush, father of Prescott Buch (father of George H. W. Bush, Grandfather of George W. Bush) was president of Buckeye Steel Castings (1908-1927), a railroad equipment-manufacturing firm that had supplied the Morgans, Harrimans, and Rockefellers and the railroads they controlled. Frank Rockefeller, brother of John D. and William, was Buckeye's former president. Bush, who helped co-found Columbus Academy, a private prep school, made certain that his own children had superior educations at private schools. He was a director of the Pennsylvania Railroad's Ohio subsidiaries, of the Hocking Valley Railway, the Norfolk & Western Railway, and the Huntington National Bank. He was also a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Bush was associated with the US Chamber of Commerce and was the first president of the National Association of Manufacturers. He worked with Baruch on the War Industries Board where he was the national chief of the Ordnance, Small Arms, and Ammunition Section. He negotiated with the nation's munitions companies, including Remington Arms, in securing weaponry. The War Industries Board directed the militarization of the country's civilian industry. The National Archives destroyed most of the War Industries Board records relating to his activities. Bush knew top executives at Du Pont, Remington, Winchester and Colt Arms. Between the wars, he was an advisor to President Herbert Hoover. Unlike the Spanish American War, World War I brought together the nation's industrial, military and business components. These connections grew even stronger with the next war and helped to further militarize America.

It was AIC then; now it is Carlyle and other such groups. On May 16, 2008, Booz, Allen & Hamilton, a privately held corporation owned by about 300 senior executives announced the sale of the majority of its US government business division to the Carlyle Group (established 1987), a multibillion dollar private equity firm for \$2.54 billion. Carlyle Group invested in the Bin Laden family's extensive construction projects in Saudi Arabia and other areas in the Middle East. In September 2007, the Mubadala Development Company, a sovereign wealth fund of the Abu Dhabi government specializing in acquisitions, paid 1.35 billion for a 7.5 percent ownership stake in Carlyle. The politically connected, bi-partisan, buyout firm, Carlyle Group, is stacked with war profiteers, numerous former politicians, and has massive assets. George H. W. Bush, a profiteer like his progenitor, joined Carlyle in 1993, and was the Senior Advisor to their Asia Advisory Board (April 1998-October 2003). He reluctantly resigned, under pressure due to the company's massive Iraqi war profits. He retained his Carlyle stock, and gave speeches in Carlyle's behalf, for a \$500,000 fee. Carlyle is notorious for buying defense companies and "doubling or tripling their value" due to abundant, frequently no-bid, defense contracts. In 2002, Carlyle got at least \$677 million in government contracts, and by Bush's 2003 Iraqi invasion, Carlyle contracts were worth \$2.1 billion, netting sizeable profits for the investors—friends and family.

Notable people associated with Carlyle include James Baker III, former US Secretary of State under George H. W. Bush. Baker was also a staff member under George W. Bush. Others associated with Carlyle include Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of the CIA under Carter; Richard Darman, former Director of the US Office of Management and Budget under George H. W. Bush; Randal K. Quarles, former Under Secretary of the US Treasury under George W. Bush; Allan Gotlieb, Canadian ambassador to the United States; William Kennard, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under Clinton; Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Clinton; Mack McLarty, White House Chief of Staff under Clinton, President of Kissinger McLarty Associates and many others. After 9/11, no-bid contracts and privatization, accelerated. The war on terror, the creation of numerous new agencies and bureaucracies was never about freedom or security. All of it, the programs, and the Iraq reconstruction are all a colossal assault on the federal budget, facilitated by the politically connected, selectively efficient contractors who collect up-front then frequently, sub-contract projects to unskilled workers who often never complete the work.

8.9 The Sinking of the Lusitania

The sinking of the Cunard ocean liner RMS Lusitania occurred on Friday, 7 May 1915 during the First World War, as Germany waged submarine warfare against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The ship was identified and torpedoed by the German U-boat U-20 and sank in 18 minutes. The vessel went down 11 miles (18 km) off the Old Head of Kinsale, Ireland, killing 1,198 and leaving 761 survivors. The sinking

turned public opinion in many countries against Germany, contributed to the American entry into World War I and became an iconic symbol in military recruiting campaigns of why the war was being fought.

The next step in the maneuvering of the United States into the war came when the Cunard Lines, owner of the ocean liner, the Lusitania, turned the ship over to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. It now became a ship of the English Navy and was under the control of the English government. The ship was sent to New York City where it was loaded with six million rounds of ammunition, owned by J.P. Morgan & Co., to be sold to England and France to aid in their war against Germany. It was known that the very wealthy were interested in involving the American government in that war, and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan was one who made note of this. "As Secretary [Bryan] had anticipated, the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits. On August 3, 1914, even before the actual clash of arms, the French firm of Rothschild Freres cabled to Morgan and Company in New York suggesting the flotation of a loan of \$100,000,000, a substantial part of which was to be left in the United States, to pay for French purchases of American goods."

England broke the German war code on December 14, 1914, so that "By the end of January, 1915, [British Intelligence was] able to advise the Admiralty of the departure of each U-boat as it left for patrol..." This meant that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, knew where every U-boat was in the vicinity of the English Channel that separated England and France. The fact that the Lusitania was a passenger ship is misleading. Although she was built as a luxury liner, her construction specifications were drawn up by the British Admiralty so that she could be converted, if necessary, into a ship of war. Everything from the horsepower of her engines and the shape of her hull to the placement of ammunition storage areas were, in fact, military designs. She was build specifically to carry twelve six-inch guns. The construction costs of these features were paid for by the British government. Even in times of peace, it was required that her crew include officers and seamen from the royal Navy Reserve. In May of 1913, she was brought back into dry dock and outfitted with extra armor, revolving gun rings on her decks, and shell racks in the hold for ammunition. Handling elevators to lift the shells to the guns were also installed. Twelve high-explosive cannons were delivered to the dry dock. All this is a matter of public record at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England, but whether the guns were actually installed at that time is still hotly debated. There is no evidence that they were. In any event, on September 17, the Lusitania returned to sea ready for the rigors of war, and she was entered into the Admiralty fleet register, not as a passenger liner, but an armed auxiliary cruiser] From then on, she was listed in Jane's Fighting Ships as an auxiliary cruiser and in the British publication, The Naval Annual, as an armed merchant man.

Part of the dry dock modification was to remove all the passenger accommodations in the lower deck to make room for more military cargo. Thus, the Lusitania became

one of the most important carriers of war materials — including munitions — from the United States to England. On March 8, 1915, after several close calls with German submarines, the captain of the Lusitania turned in his resignation. He was willing to face the U-boats, he said, but he was no longer willing “to carry the responsibility of mixing passengers with munitions or contraband.”

Churchill set a Trap

From England’s point of view, the handwriting on the wall was clear. Unless the United States could be brought into the war as her ally, she soon would have to sue for peace. The challenge was how to push Americans off their position of stubborn neutrality. How that was accomplished is one of the more controversial aspects of the war. It is inconceivable to many that English leaders might have deliberately plotted the destruction of one of their own vessels with American citizens aboard as a means of drawing the United States into the war as an ally. Surely, any such idea is merely German propaganda. Robert Ballard, writing in *National Geographic*, says: “Within days of the sinking, German sympathizers in New York came up with a conspiracy theory. The British Admiralty, they said, had deliberately exposed Lusitania to harm, hoping she would be attacked and thus draw the U.S. into the war.” Let’s take a closer look at this conspiracy theory. Winston Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at that time, said:

“There are many kinds of maneuvers in war. There are maneuvers in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it.... The maneuver which brings an ally into the field is as serviceable as that which wins a great battle. The maneuver which gains an important strategic point may be less valuable than that which placates or overawes a dangerous neutral. “

The maneuver chosen by Churchill was particularly ruthless. Under what was called the Cruiser Rules, warships of both England and Germany gave the crews of unarmed enemy merchant ships a chance to take to the lifeboats before sinking them. But, in October of 1914, Churchill issued orders that British merchant ships must no longer obey a U-boat order to halt and be searched. If they had armament, they were to engage the enemy. If they did not, they were to attempt to ram the sub. The immediate result of this change was to force German U-boats to remain submerged for protection and to simply sink the ships without warning. Why would the British want to do such a stupid thing that would cost the lives of thousands of their own seamen? The answer is that it was not an act of stupidity. It was cold blooded strategy. Churchill boasted:

“The first British countermove, made on my responsibility... was to deter the Germans from surface attack. The submerged U-boat had to rely increasingly on underwater attack and thus ran the greater risk of mistaking neutral for British ships and of drowning neutral crews and thus embroiling Germany with other Great Powers.”

To increase the likelihood of accidentally sinking a ship from a neutral 'Great Power,' Churchill ordered British ships to remove their names from their hulls and, when in port, to fly the flag of a neutral power, preferably that of the United States. As further provocation, the British navy was ordered to treat captured U-boat crew members not as prisoners of war but as felons. "Survivors," wrote Churchill, "should be taken prisoner or shot— whichever is the most convenient." ² Other orders, which now are an embarrassing part of official navy archives, were even more ruthless: "In all actions, white flags should be fired upon with promptitude." The trap was carefully laid. The German navy was goaded into a position of shoot-first and ask questions later and, under those conditions, it was inevitable that American lives would be lost.

After many years of investigation, it is now possible to identify the cargo that was loaded aboard the Lusitania on her last voyage. It included 600 tons of pyroxyline (commonly called gun cotton), six-million rounds of ammunition, 1,248 cases of shrapnel shells (which may not have included explosive charges), plus an unknown quantity of munitions that completely filled the holds on the lowest deck and the trunkways and passageways of F deck. In addition, there were many tons of "cheese," "lard," "furs" and other items which were shown later to be falsely labelled. What they were is not now known, but it is certain they were at least contraband if not outright weapons of war. They were all consigned through the J.P. Morgan Company. But none of this was suspected by the public, least of all those hapless Americans who unknowingly booked a passage to death for themselves and their families as human decoys in a global game of high finance and low politics.

The German embassy in Washington was well aware of the nature of the cargo being loaded aboard the Lusitania and filed a formal complaint to the United States government, because almost all of it was in direct violation of international neutrality treaties. The response was a flat denial of any knowledge of such cargo. Seeing that the Wilson Administration was tacitly approving the shipment, the German embassy made one final effort to avert disaster. It placed an ad in fifty East Coast newspapers, including those in New York City, warning Americans not to take passage on the Lusitania. The ad was prepaid and requested to be placed on the paper's travel page a full week before the sailing date. It read as follows:

"NOTICE!

TRAVELERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY

Washington, D.C., April 22, 1915. "

Although the ad was in the hands of newspapers in time for the requested deadline, the

State Department intervened and, raising the specter of possible libel suits, frightened the publishers into not printing it without prior clearance from State Department attorneys. Of the fifty newspapers, only the Des Moines Register carried the ad on the requested date. What happened next is described by Simpson:

George Viereck [who was the editor of a German-owned newspaper at that time and who had placed the ads on behalf of the embassy] spent April 26 asking the State Department why his advertisement had not been published. Eventually he managed to obtain an interview with [Secretary of State, William Jennings] Bryan and pointed out to him that on all but one of her wartime voyages the *Lusitania* had carried munitions. He produced copies of her supplementary manifests, which were open to public inspection at the collector's office. More important, he informed Bryan, no fewer than six million rounds of ammunition were due to be shipped on the *Lusitania* the following Friday and could be seen at that moment being loaded on pier 54. Bryan picked up the telephone and cleared the publication of the advertisement. He promised Viereck that he would endeavor to persuade the President publicly to warn Americans not to travel. No such warning was issued by the President, but there can be no doubt that President Wilson was told of the character of the cargo destined for the *Lusitania*. He did nothing, but was to concede on the day he was told of her sinking that his foreknowledge had given him many sleepless hours.

The Final Voyage

While Morgan and Wilson were setting the deadly stage on the American side of the Atlantic, Churchill was playing his part on the European side. When the *Lusitania* left New York Harbor on May 1, her orders were to rendezvous with a British destroyer, the *Juno*, just off the coast of Ireland so she would have naval protection as she entered hostile waters. When the *Lusitania* reached the rendezvous point, however, she was alone, and the captain assumed they had missed each other in the fog. In truth, the *Juno* had been called out of the area at the last minute and ordered to return to Queenstown. And this was done with the full knowledge that the *Lusitania* was on a direct course into an area where a German submarine was known to be operating. To make matters worse, the *Lusitania* had been ordered to cut back on the use of coal, not because of shortages, but because it would be less expensive. Slow targets, of course, are much easier to hit. Yet, she was required to shut down one of her four boilers and, consequently, was now entering submarine-infested waters at only 75% of her potential speed.

As the *Lusitania* drew closer to hostile waters, almost everyone knew she was in grave danger. Newspapers in London were alive with the story of German warnings and recent sinkings. In the map room of the British Admiralty, Churchill watched the play unfold and coldly called the shots. Small disks marked the places where two ships had been torpedoed the day before. A circle indicated the area within which the U-boat must still be operating. A larger disk represented the *Lusitania* travelling at nineteen knots directly

into the circle. Yet, nothing was done to help her. Admiral Coke at Queenstown was given perfunctory instructions to protect her as best he could, but he had no means to do so and, in fact, no one even bothered to notify the captain of the Lusitania that the rendezvous with the Juno had been canceled.

One of the officers present in the high-command map room on that fateful day was Commander Joseph Kenworthy, who previously had been called upon by Churchill to submit a paper on what would be the political results of an ocean liner being sunk with American passengers aboard. He left the room in disgust at the cynicism of his superiors. In 1927, in his book, *The Freedom of the Seas*, he wrote without further comment: "The Lusitania was sent at considerably reduced speed into an area where a U-boat was known to be waiting and with her escorts withdrawn." Further comment is not needed. Colonel House was in England at that time and, on the day of the sinking, was scheduled to have an audience with King George V. He was accompanied by Sir Edward Grey and, on the way, Sir Grey asked him: "What will America do if the Germans sink an ocean liner with American passengers on board?" As recorded in House's diaries, he replied: "I told him if this were done, a flame of indignation would sweep America, which would in itself probably carry us into the war." 2 Once at Buckingham Palace, King George also brought up the subject and was even more specific about the possible target. He asked, "Suppose they should sink the Lusitania with American passengers on board..."

Even though Wilson proclaimed America's neutrality in the European War, in accordance with the prior admonitions of George Washington, his government was secretly plotting to involve the American people by having the Lusitania sunk. This was made public in the book *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, written by a supporter of the Colonel, who recorded a conversation between Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey of England, the Foreign Secretary of England:

Grey: What will America do if the Germans sink an ocean liner with American passengers on board?

House: I believe that a flame of indignation would sweep the United States and that by itself would be sufficient to carry us into the war.

On May 7, 1915, the Lusitania was sunk off the coast of County Cork, Ireland by a U-boat after it had slowed to await the arrival of the English escort vessel, the Juno, which was intended to escort it into the English port. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, issued orders that the Juno was to return to port, and the Lusitania sat alone in the channel. Because Churchill knew of the presence of three U-boats in the vicinity, it is reasonable to presume that he had planned for the Lusitania to be sunk, and it was. 1201 people lost their lives in the sinking. This sinking has been described by Colin Simpson, the author of a book entitled *The Lusitania*, as "the foulest act of wilful murder ever committed on the seas."

But the event was not enough to enable President Wilson to declare war against the German government, and the conspirators changed tactics. They would use other means

to get the American people involved in the war, as the “flame of indignation” did not sweep the United States as had been planned. Robert Lansing, the Assistant Secretary of State, is on record as stating: “We must educate the public gradually — draw it along to the point where it will be willing to go into the war.” After the sinking of the Lusitania, two inquiries were held, one by the English government, in June, 1915, and one by the American government in 1918. Mr. Simpson has written that “Both sets of archives... contain meager information. There are substantial differences of fact in the two sets of papers and in many cases it is difficult to accept that the files relate to the same vessel.” But in both inquiries, the conclusions were the same: torpedoes and not exploding ammunition sank the Lusitania, because there was no ammunition aboard. The cover-up was now official. But there have been critics of these inquiries. One was, of course, the book written by Colin Simpson, who did the research necessary to write his book in the original minutes of the two inquiries. The Los Angeles Times reviewed Mr. Simpson’s book and concluded: “The Lusitania proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the British government connived at the sinking of the passenger ship in order to lure America into World War I. The Germans, whose torpedo struck the liner, were the unwitting accomplices or victims of a plot probably concocted by Winston Churchill.” President Wilson was seeking re-election in 1916. He campaigned on his record of “keeping us out of the War” during his first term of office from 1912 to 1916.

8.10 The Bankers of World War I

The City of London, the financial core within London, financed America’s trade before World War I, which made the United States a debtor nation, a country that had invested fewer resources in other countries than they had invested in America. With the advent of World War I, and the creation of the Federal Reserve, the bankers transformed the United States into a net creditor nation of \$3.7 billion. American banks established foreign branches and made foreign loans. Europe shifted their investments from the United States while the US government and banks extended loans to the Allies, France and Britain. With the war, J. P. Morgan, National City Bank and others exploited the new federal legislation to enlarge their foreign operations.

Cordell Hull, House of Representatives (1907-1921; 1923-1931), who authored the federal income tax laws of 1913 and 1916, remarked in his memoirs, that the enactment of the income tax law and the Federal Reserve System had to be rushed through, “just in the nick of time,” to meet the economic demands of the war. Further, administrators had to train bank staffs to meet the demand of their services. The drafters of the Federal Reserve Act decided that Federal Reserve Banks would function as fiscal agents of the government.

Beginning in July 1913, a steady exportation of gold concerned US bankers, some of which had fallen below their required gold reserves. This was serious because drafts,

payable in gold, were due on railway and industrial securities sold abroad starting on July 31, 1914. The bankers and the US Treasury created a gold fund of \$100 million to protect the country's foreign credit. The warring nations were purchasing huge amounts of American products, which normalized the inequitable exchange rate. Then gold started flowing into the United States. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson informed the banks, "The government sees no objection in opening banking credits to all belligerents." While that might have sounded neutral, the international bankers made 95 percent of their loans to the Allies and only 5 percent to Germany. Professor Pierre Renouvin admitted, "American economic and financial relations were almost exclusively tied to Great Britain and France. How could such a situation not have political consequences? The neutrality of the United States is no longer impartial." Colonel Edward M. House said, "We will act not only to save civilization but also for our own benefit." In September 1915, New York bankers loaned England and France a combined amount of \$500 million, payable on April 15, 1917. Then, between September 1, 1915 and April 17, 1917, they loaned England and France over \$1,650 billion dollars. The net balance of gold imports into the United States in that same period was \$1,075 billion. Our entry into the war required funding the US military, either through taxation or the sale of a series of four "liberty" bonds, a voluntary contribution which functioned as a loan to the government. The Treasury Secretary, William G. McAdoo, a former New York lawyer, the first Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, issued Liberty Loan bonds. They had varying maturation dates, some as long as thirty years.

German loans generated within the United States included \$400,000, from Kuhn, Loeb & Company in September 1914, backed by the collateral of twenty-five million marks deposited with Max M. Warburg, Kuhn, Loeb's German affiliate. Chase National Bank, part of the Morgan group, loaned Germany \$3 million. Mechanics and Metals National Bank loaned \$1 million dollars. These loans funded Germany's espionage activities in Mexico and the United States Felix A. Sommerfeld, a German agent, had an account with the Guaranty Trust Company, which made direct payments to Western Cartridge Co. of Alton, Illinois, for ammunition used in Mexico by Pancho Villa's bandits.

The Central Liberty Loan, within each of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts Committees, aggressively marketed the bonds to the American public. Benjamin Strong, head of J.P Morgan's Bankers Trust Company and governor of the Second Reserve Bank (1914-1928) headed the Committee in his district, assisted by J. P. Morgan, Jacob H. Schiff, and Frank A. Vanderlip and others. Trusted men directed the bond sales in each Federal Reserve District. The nationwide National Woman's Liberty Loan Committee enrolled about 800,000 women.

People competed against each other and got on the patriotic bandwagon to support the war by selling and buying bonds. Loyalty typically follows one's money. Every man, woman and child was encouraged to do their part for the war effort. There were bands, parades, processions, and airplanes dropping leaflets. They used every imaginable selling device, including the use of endorsements from movie stars, Douglas Fairbanks and Mary

Pickford, with phrases like “Your money must win the war.” They filled newspapers and magazines with full-page ads to “Buy a Bond.” It was the cultural slogan of the day, in every public place—restaurants, theaters, clubs and schools. Purchasing a bond was not about earning the promised interest but about “helping” the country in its patriotic fight for freedom. Purchasers without available funds could borrow money—“Borrow, buy and save.” One could even buy bonds on the installment plan using coupon books. After the Armistice, prices for all commodities increased and merchants required more cash to increase their inventories. People redeemed their bonds below par.

On October 1, 1895, Paul Warburg had married Nina Loeb, the daughter of Solomon Loeb of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, an international banking firm. Felix M. Warburg, a senior partner at Kuhn, Loeb, married Frieda Schiff, the daughter of Jacob H. Schiff, also of Kuhn, Loeb. The Schiffs and the Rothschilds were neighbors in Frankfurt. Schiff used Rothschild money to secure a partnership with Kuhn, Loeb and Company. After frequent trips to the United States, Paul Warburg, along with his brother Felix, immigrated to the United States from Germany in 1902.

American citizens, in 1915 and 1916, were anti-British and pro-German. Paul Warburg, a naturalized citizen (1911), and Kuhn, Loeb Company were prominent United States fixtures. Max, Paul’s brother stayed at home in Frankfurt to manage the family business, M.M. Warburg & Company, which their great-grandfather founded in 1798. Paul was a partner in the family firm in 1895. Max supervised the German Secret Service during the war. He was working in Switzerland for German Intelligence. 1531 From the proceeds of the First Liberty Loan, J. P. Morgan advanced Britain \$400 million at the beginning of the war. By 1917, the Morgans and Kuhn, Loeb Company had loaned the Allies \$1.5 billion in addition to financing numerous front organizations designed to embroil America into warfare. Morgan also offered to give the Allies credit. On October 13, 1917 Woodrow Wilson gave an address, “It is manifestly imperative that there should be a complete mobilization of the banking reserves of the United States. The burden and the privilege (of the Allied loans) must be shared by every banking institution in the country. I believe that cooperation on the part of the banks is a patriotic duty at this time, and that membership in the Federal Reserve System is a distinct and significant evidence of patriotism.”

On December 12, 1918, after they signed the armistice, the US Naval Secret Service presented a report detailing Paul Warburg’s questionable connections while we were at war with Germany. The report noted that he had resigned from the Federal Reserve in May 1918. In June 1918, he wrote to Wilson, “I have two brothers in Germany who are bankers. They naturally now serve their country to their utmost ability, as I serve mine.” According to the New York Times, dated August 10, 1918, he resigned because his term expired, not because of his brother’s position. He assumed Morgan’s position on the Federal Advisory Council and continued to administer the Federal Reserve for the next ten years. Paul Warburg was a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Director since its founding in 1921, until his death and was trustee of the Institute of Economics (1922),

which merged with the Brookings Institution (1927), for which he was a trustee until his death. He promoted German-American relations and helped found the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation in 1930. James Warburg, Paul Warburg's son, was one of Franklin D. Roosevelt's financial advisers. Kuhn, Loeb Company was the country's biggest owner of railroad properties in the United States and Mexico and had controlling interest in The New York Times. They instructed President Wilson to establish the US Railroad Administration, under the jurisdiction of McAdoo, Comptroller of the Currency in order to protect their interests during the war. In 1918, the Federal Transportation Council replaced this agency. These agencies prevented railroad workers from earning suitable wages, a travesty, given the increased profits that Kuhn, Loeb was making from the US government as a result of the war.

On May 1, 1918, Sir William Wiseman sent a cable to Colonel House from London suggesting Allied assistance to help organize the Bolshevik forces. During the years 1917-1920, Lt. Col. Norman Thwaites often consulted with Otto H. Kahn on political and economic issues. He also sought advice from Wiseman, the advisor on United States issues to the British delegation at the Peace Conference. He functioned in Britain in the same capacity as House did in this country. Wilson appointed House to head the American War Mission to the Inter-Allied War Conference in the summer of 1917. Gordon Auchincloss, House's son-in-law, was his assistant. Paul Cravath, a Kuhn, Loeb Co. lawyer accompanied House and Auchincloss on a European tour, guided by Wiseman. He was a protégé of Canadian Round Table founder Lord Beaverbrook, and was prominent in the Zionist movement."

Representative Charles A. Lindbergh, of the House Banking and Currency Committee, impeached five members of the Federal Reserve Board. Lindbergh said that Paul M. Warburg, of the Federal Reserve Board, the National City Bank and other banking firms conspired to enact currency legislation in the interest of big business in order to make industrial slaves of the population. However, the House did not act on the impeachment resolution.

G.B. Shaw has reduced the First World War to this nullity: "The present destruction of the German military power is [...] a completely regular operation of British foreign policy, which was executed according to plan with all the resolve, patience, cunning and power which we in England are accustomed to use, and with overwhelming success. But likewise also, however, with the amazing English talent of veiling from oneself what one is doing. The Englishman never knows what the 'Foreign Office' is up to; [...] An instinct tells him that it is better for him [...] not to know." According to all that is known today, the First World War of 1914 would not have happened. Germany would have been able to calmly put up with the parade from Russia toward its borders!

After the First World War, a foreign diplomat expressed to Churchill: "In the twenty years of my residency there, I was witness to a profound and total revolution in England, even as the French Revolution was. The ruling classes in your country have been almost completely robbed of their political power and, to a large extent, their prosperity and

property as well; and all this [...] without the loss of a single human life.”

8.11 The Balfour Declaration

Decades before World War I, the Zionist movement was predisposed to be pro-German. Theodor Herzl, formerly an assimilated Jewish journalist in Vienna, was part of the German-speaking world, whose first supporters resided in Germany and Austria. There were, in Germany, approximately 600,000 Jewish citizens who were better educated, a bit more assimilated, and enjoyed superior social standing compared to Jews living in Eastern Europe. Germany was the prominent power in Europe and Jews in Germany viewed themselves as the natural leaders of Jewry. Additionally, the Jewish aristocrats in America originally came from Germany and maintained cultural loyalties to that country and when war erupted, they naturally allied with Germany.

Prior to 1914, Berlin had been the foundation of Zionist activity. The Israel Institute of Technology, located in Haifa, looked to Germany for support and protection. Arthur Zimmermann, who became Under Secretary of State in 1911 in the German Empire, was in China during the Boxer Rebellion, and as acting secretary, he participated in the deliberations in 1914, with Kaiser Wilhelm and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909-1917), to support Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Hollweg, Max Warburg, and Albert Ballin advised Wilhelm to declare war. Zimmermann, famous for the Zimmermann telegram, later helped the communists to undermine czarist Russia and appreciated his close connections to the German Zionists.

Jews living in America and Britain, including Baron Walter Rothschild, favored Germany in 1914 and 1915, even to the point that Rothschild sent the Kaiser an encouraging cable when the war broke out. At the beginning of the war, most Jews favored Germany because it had attacked Russia, their mortal enemy. They viewed Kaiser Wilhelm, who treated them with deference, as the man who might potentially deliver Palestine to them. Despite minor altercations against them in Germany, they still felt more at ease there than anywhere else in Europe. They had acquired substantial influence in finance, business, and the news media and in the universities. Their language, Yiddish, was similar to German and they were culturally comfortable. The most influential members of the Reichstag were Jews.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann understood that the British government would relinquish the organization of the Jewish commonwealth in Palestine to the management of the Jews, but first a powerful government must militarily conquer Palestine. Thereafter, the Zionists would require the protection of the armies of that same powerful government to protect them from the indigenous population. In 1915, Dr. Weizmann already knew what would occur in the next twenty years following the war. The British would establish a protectorate and the Jews would take over the country.

On June 1, 1916, Louis D. Brandeis joined the US Supreme Court as an Associate

Judge. By October 1916, the war-torn British were exhausted and unable to expel the German Army from France. Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith (1908-1916), was ready to negotiate to end the war. However, the Zionists, via Weizmann and Arthur J. Balfour, offered British officials another possibility. If Britain would establish a secret alliance with the Zionists, in order to transfer Palestine to them for the establishment of a Jewish state, the Zionists would maneuver America into the European war in behalf of the Allies, which would guarantee an Allied victory, an arrangement that probably occurred in October 1916. This agreement would necessitate changes in the political and military personnel in Britain and Germany, so that specific people would be in place to facilitate the necessary circumstances. 1652 In November 1916, the American citizens reelected Woodrow Wilson who campaigned on the deceptive slogan—He kept us out of war.

In early December 1916, Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith resigned under pressure. On December 6, 1916, King George V gathered numerous politicians, including Balfour and David Lloyd George, to a special meeting at Buckingham Palace. That night, a delegation approached Balfour to see if he would accept the office of Foreign Minister under a new Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Dr. Weizmann wrote a memorandum to the British Government in which he demanded that it officially recognize “The Jewish population of Palestine” as the Jewish Nation.” A committee composed of nine Zionist leaders, and Sykes, the government’s representative, convened privately to draft an official document, later known as the Balfour Declaration. Balfour immediately scheduled a trip to America to promote an Anglo-American protectorate but he never spoke directly to President Wilson.

The new Prime Minister David Lloyd George, under the strong influence of the Zionists, wanted war, not negotiations. On December 10, 1916, Lord Balfour replaced Sir Edward Grey as the British Foreign Minister. Baron Sidney C. Sonnino became the Foreign Minister in Italy. Bernard Baruch enlarged his influence within President Woodrow Wilson’s Administration. Georges Mandel’s real name was Jeroboam Rothschild. Though reportedly unrelated to the infamous banking family, he was prosperous and Jewish. 1660 He was Georges Clemenceau’s handler, just as Edward M. House managed Woodrow Wilson. Louis-Lucien Klotz, a radical Jewish socialist, became French Minister of Finance, and was later responsible for negotiating reparations from Germany. House was elated with all of these changes. Balfour visited the United States in 1916, to establish the foundation among financial and media connections. 1661 Balfour was very impressed with the strength of the US Jewish lobby and their powerful influence in financial circles.

Financial networks were already set up as well as the media that used every propaganda slogan imaginable. Colonel House, supported by American Jews, informed the British government of President Wilson’s every move. House literally controlled the United States; Wilson was just a figurehead and everyone but the public knew it. On December 12, 1916, German officials stated that they were anxious for peace and wished to talk with their adversaries and hoped Wilson would persuade the Allies to meet together. House ruled out the possibility of peace negotiations. On December 18, 1916, US Ambassador

to Britain, Walter H. Page, relayed a peace offer to the Allies from Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria. On January 9, 1917, Prime Minister Lloyd George quickly repudiated the offering, and declared that Britain would fight to the victory, which possibly prompted the Germans to re-initiate submarine warfare. Ambassador Page, in touch with President Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing, defended British policies. This was after William Jennings Bryan's resignation, after he described Britain's collapsing financial situation, and the need for American neutrality. America's entry into the war would allow Britain to avoid financial disaster.

Arthur Zimmermann, the German foreign minister, informed the German ambassador in Washington, Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff that Germany was going to engage in submarine warfare so that the ambassador could alert US officials. On January 19, 1917, Zimmermann sent a second telegram to the German Embassy in Mexico City. The British intercepted and de-coded it. The Kaiser and Chancellor Hollweg were unaware of Zimmermann's telegram, as he had acted on his own authority. Later, officials called him to testify about his behavior before the Reichstag. Bernstorff advised the German government to reconsider their decision to start unrestricted submarine warfare, which it refused to do. On February 1, 1917, Bernstorff told the US government that Germany was beginning submarine warfare the next day. On February 14, 1917, the US government suspended all diplomatic relations with Germany and demanded that Bernstorff leave the country, which he did.

In early 1917, three obstacles prohibited Zionist efforts from acquiring a promise from the British government to support their objectives in Palestine—1) the 1915 agreement made with Sharif Husain of Arabia regarding an independent Arab state, including Palestine; 2) the Sykes-Picot agreement; 3) an influential faction of British Jews opposed political Zionism. However, Prime Minister Lloyd George directed Sykes to negotiate with the Zionists which resulted in the British Government issuing the Balfour Declaration. Additionally, the Jews allegedly used their substantial influence to maneuver the United States into the war. The secretive details of the Balfour-Weizmann agreement of October 1916 remain a mystery. On April 8, 1917, Dr. Weizmann wrote and requested Judge Brandeis to counsel Wilson to oppose a joint protectorate but to confirm America's support of Balfour. Brandeis, author of *The Jewish Problem* (1915), no longer directed the American Zionist movement but functioned as Wilson's advisor on all Jewish issues. Weizmann requested Brandeis to counsel Wilson to favor a British protectorate. Although Balfour did not meet with Wilson, the president talked with Rabbi Stephen S. Wise who had also informed Edward M. House of their wishes. The Zionists had already recruited House to their cause.

Balfour, Brandeis, House, and Weizmann were all dedicated to establishing a British administration in Palestine. Balfour, now the British Foreign Secretary, despite a conflict of interests, personally supported Zionism. Brandeis, also in an official position, had self-interests that countered his official obligations. Brandeis and House, on behalf of Wilson, and in accordance with Weizmann's request, issued a statement denouncing secret

treaties. Americans, upon hearing their announcement, assumed that their government was transparent and trustworthy, exactly the illusion that the Zionists sought. The British and the French had to defeat Turkey and win the Arabs to their side, using the deceptive Sykes-Picot agreement, a contract that would create an independent confederation of Arab States. Unfortunately, for the Zionists, that agreement would also facilitate the establishment of an international administration for Palestine rather than an exclusive British protectorate. However, Weizmann made certain that President Wilson, despite his denunciation of secret treaties, would insist that England assume the protectorate of Palestine, which targeted the Arab inhabitants.

The British government sent Sir William Wiseman to Washington to advise Edward M. House about Britain's desires. He informed House, "It is impossible to negotiate with the Germans since they did not specify any conditions," the very purpose of negotiations, to define the conditions. US Ambassador Walter H. Page told British officials that President Wilson was not interested in negotiating, which was a blatant lie. Wilson had written letters to British and German officials, behind House's back saying, "The belligerents each insist on certain conditions. They are not incompatible, contrary to the fear of certain persons. An exchange of views would clear the air." This was just the circumstances that the German officials wanted, but the Allies rejected this suggestion. House was not pleased when he read Wilson's note and disassociated himself from Wilson's correspondence because "the Allies were obviously not in a mood to welcome it."

After the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, Russia capitulated. The Kaiser's Turkish allies probably would have delivered Palestine to the Zionists. Then, the Zionists no longer needed Germany, especially since they had an alliance with Britain. Thus, Balfour viewed Germany as expendable. The Zionists were now looking at Britain as their total benefactor, to get Palestine as a Jewish homeland, especially after House and Balfour brought America into the war to guarantee an Allied victory. Balfour's only challenge was to sway the US Jews to support Britain and relinquish their longtime loyalties to Germany.

They were going to take Palestine, no matter who won the war, Britain or Germany. However, the Zionists played both sides of the war to guarantee their own objectives, despite the costs to anyone else. On November 12, 1917, The New York Times reported that the Germans recognized that Morgenthau, Walter Rothschild, Frankfurter and President Wilson had conspired to get the United States to enter the war in exchange for the Balfour Declaration. In August 1919, Woodrow Wilson sent General James Harbord on a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to investigate the feasibility of the Balfour Declaration, in support of a Jewish state.

Morgenthau explained how the Turkish government instigated the massacre, and reiterated how officials "enthusiastically approved this treatment of the detested race." They had "even delved into the records of the Spanish Inquisition and other historic institutions of torture and adopted all the suggestions found there." He claimed that the atrocities "were merely the preparatory steps in the destruction of the race." The Turks preferred

to use death through deportation instead of wholesale slaughter by announcing their intentions “of gathering the two million or more Armenians living in the several sections of the empire and transporting them to this desolate and inhospitable region,” to the desert of what is now Syria. They understood that “the great majority would never reach their destination and that those who did would either die of thirst and starvation.” He wrote, “When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well.”

The Balfour Deportation Declaration

Negotiations between the British politicians and the Zionists began as early as 1903, when Arthur J. Balfour was British Prime Minister (1902-1905). The Zionists retained the London law firm of Lloyd George, Roberts and Company, as David Lloyd George, a partner at the firm, was a Member of Parliament (1890-1945), allowing them influence in the Foreign Office. Politicians and moneyed individuals frequently form symbiotic relationships.

Theodor Herzl's successor, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a freemason, recognized that Zionism could only succeed with the support of a world power. Weizmann, born in Belarus (then part of the Russian Empire), moved to England in 1905, developed an interest in Palestine and was the professed leader of a pro-Zionist faction. He was a member of the General Zionist Council. Weizmann, Chairman of the Zionist Administrative Commission in Palestine, and a chemist, offered his services to the Ministry of Munitions when war erupted. According to Lloyd George's memoirs, the Balfour Declaration was Weizmann's reward for his expertise in producing acetone. British officials told the citizens that they supported Zionism to show gratitude to Weizmann (Israel's first president). As the war became imminent, numerous politicians espoused Zionism and became co-conspirators while failing to inform the public about their intentions regarding Palestine. Weizmann advocated a British-Zionist alliance in October 1914. He lobbied every influential figure in the Anglo-Jewish hierarchy of the Rothschild-dominated British government, primarily Balfour, Baron James de Rothschild, Sir Herbert Samuel, and Sir David Lloyd George. Weizmann and Samuel persuaded a majority of sympathetic British citizens to create a British protectorate.

The plot that the Jews developed in Russia, could not get support there, or in Germany, but it took root in Britain. Weizmann and Balfour met again on December 14, 1914, right after war erupted. During the first few months of the war, many British and French soldiers lost their lives and by the end of the war, 3,000,000 of the youth of France and Britain would die thinking they were overthrowing Prussian militarism, or liberating small nations, and restoring freedom and democracy. Balfour told Weizmann, regarding Zionism and Palestine, “I was thinking about that conversation of ours (in 1906) and I believe that when the guns stop firing you may get your Jerusalem.” In referring to the protectorate, Dr. Weizmann repeatedly resorted to the phrase, “the Bible is our

Mandate” which of course meant the utter destruction, of the indigenous population, a fact that western politicians acknowledged, yet they continued to support the Zionists. 1738 Weizmann wanted to “make Palestine as Jewish as England is English.”

The Zionists assumed that Britain, France, Russia, Serbia, and Belgium would prevail in World War I and that they would dismantle the Ottoman Empire. In May 1917, Nahum Sokolow helped negotiate for the Balfour Declaration when he met with French officials who formally agreed to support the Zionists. They secured a promise from Britain that Palestine would be a national home for the Jews. In return, the World Zionist Organization would network and pressure Jews in Austria, Germany, France, and the United States to support the Allied war effort. America entered the war on April 6, 1917, a year before the war ended. That year, Lord Balfour, a crucially important Zionist patron and the British Foreign Minister, sent a letter, drafted by Leopold M. Amery, to Lord Rothschild, which ultimately grew into the Balfour Declaration, “the key which unlocks the doors of Palestine.” Lord Balfour wrote, “Zionism . . . is of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”

On June 27, 1917, Lord Edmund Allenby, took over as commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to conquer Palestine and Syria. He decided that it was inappropriate to publish the Balfour Declaration in Palestine, as his military forces had not yet subdued the area. He reorganized his troops, won the Third Battle of Gaza, October 31 to November 7, 1917, and captured Jerusalem on December 9, 1917 where he established martial law. Although the Zionists presumptuously drafted the Balfour Declaration before the end of the war, it did not become official until the San Remo Resolution on April 24, 1920, after the British Mandate established the Civil Administration.

People might be more accurate if they called the Balfour Declaration, the Lord Alfred Milner Declaration because he also helped draft the document, a fact that they concealed until July 21, 1936. Nathan M. Rothschild appointed him to chair the Round Table group to implement world government, and to promote the draft in the War Cabinet. The initial Zionist draft, of July 1917, was simple. It mandated that Britain would reconstitute Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish People. Further, Britain would use its power to reach that objective, in consultation with the Zionist Organization. Balfour wrote the contract between Britain and World Jewry as a letter to Baron Walter Rothschild who was a key figure in England’s Jewish community, and he would then transmit it to the Zionist Federation of Britain and Ireland, established in 1899, as a Zionist lobby. The actual final draft of the declaration had to be issued in the name of the Foreign Secretary, but the actual draftsman was Lord Milner.”

On December 23, 1917, at least 15,000 American Jews gathered at Carnegie Hall to celebrate the signing of the momentous Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917. Another 25,000 American Jews paraded down the main streets of Newark, New Jersey. Anti-Zionist Jews did not celebrate but the majority of American Jews did and they, most especially Colonel Edward M. House, had been influential in persuading President

Woodrow Wilson to champion the Declaration. It was pompous, pretentious, generosity to promise a well-represented, well-connected ethnic group, land that another closely related ethnic group already inhabited, and had for decades. It was sure to cause chaos, death, and destruction that would certainly require a longterm military presence in the area.

8.12 The Brest-Litovsk Treaty

On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war on Germany obligating that country to fight a two-front war, which was even more formidable after America joined the battle. There was no way that Germany could possibly win. However, her defeat would end the war, the profit stream, the ongoing Marxist infiltration, and the subsequent destabilization of Europe. Vladimir Lenin, in order to prolong the war, had to somehow remove Russia from the equation. Thereafter, Germany and Austria-Hungary and its allies would exhaust themselves fighting France, Britain and the United States, the remaining allies. Meanwhile, Russia, on the sidelines, would add fuel to the fiery battle.

By 1917, provocateurs were busily engaged in Berlin where they infiltrated various organizations, including the government. On July 6, 1917, in the Reichstag, Matthias Erzberger passionately called for peace. In the fall of 1917, using seventy-five newspapers, the militaristic Bolsheviks began an "unprecedented campaign" for peace. On October 26, 1917, after they had seized St. Petersburg and gained control of the government, Lenin presented their first official document to the Second Congress of the Soviet, the Decree on Peace. The next day, he had it published in the *Izvestia*, which called for an abrupt end of Russia's war with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

A continued war with Germany might cost Lenin the more important revolution in Russia. On November 23, 1917, in as much as their political survival was at stake, Lenin and Trotsky decided to negotiate with Germany at Brest-Litovsk, a city in Belarus. Germany finally persuaded Lenin to negotiate. Yet, for political expediency, he procrastinated for over four months. Lenin and Trotsky, implementing the total capitulation of Russia to Germany, directed the Russian army to abandon their trenches, leaving their guns, mortars, machine guns, millions of small arms, ammunition, uniforms, and other essential war supplies and return home. Lenin and Trotsky, two internationalists devoid of national loyalties to any country, with their Peace Decree betrayed Russia's allies, allowed Germany to focus its attention on the western front while at the same time wreaking havoc within Germany and Austria-Hungary beginning in earnest in early 1918, through well-positioned agitators. Lenin and Trotsky then came to Germany's assistance with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

The Bolsheviks stalled, from December 28, 1917 to January 7, 1918. Lenin faced massive opposition at home. The propagandized working classes had elected only 175 Bolsheviks out of 717 total seats in the Constituent Assembly. On January 18, 1918, Bolsheviks

placed police armed with machine guns at the Taurid Palace to displace new assembly members as they arrived. They dissolved the Assembly the next morning. A few hours later, some workers organized a march to show their support for the people they had elected. The Bolsheviks machine-gunned twenty-one of them, the consequences of opposing Lenin. The Germans recognized that less than ten percent of the population had forced a dictatorship on Russia. Trotsky wanted to use those same tactics at Brest-Litovsk but that would not achieve their goals. On January 22, 1918, Trotsky, of the central committee, proposed that the Soviets should refuse to sign a peace treaty but have both sides demobilize.

On February 9, 1918, Ukrainians declared independence and soon negotiated the German-Austrian-Ukrainian treaty and then shipped a million tons of wheat to Austria. When Trotsky heard about it, he flew into a rage. He had hoped to leverage the Germans into a treaty more beneficial to the Soviets, using food, a desperate need of Germany and Austria. Germany then ordered troops to St. Petersburg, about a two-week march and they met no resistance along the way.

The Bolshevik arbitrators were Adolph A. Joffe, Lev Rozenfeld (Lev B. Kamenev) and Lev D. Bronstein (Leon Trotsky). 1724 When General Erich Ludendorff met them, he asked, "How can we negotiate with such people?" He would rather have taken his troops to St. Petersburg and Moscow and eradicated their stronghold. Yet, that would mean retaining a large German force in Russia and he could not spare the forces when he needed his greatest strength on the Western front. Erich Ludendorff wanted better territorial guarantees on the eastern border and the creation of a German protectorate in the Baltic States to halt the spread of Bolshevism. On March 3, 1918, they signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Lenin agreed to recognize the anti-communist areas that were once part of the Russian Empire, mentioned above, and Rumania (including Bessarabia), the Crimea, the Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Urals, and all of Siberia. He agreed to limit his rule to Moscow and the adjacent area, in addition to the city of Leningrad. However, despite his promises, he intended to expand Communism as quickly as possible. Surrounded by anti-communist countries, if the west had really wanted to crush communism, they could have at this point.

Lenin's plans fell apart and he was about to have the anti-communist Germans too close to home. They would stop his revolution so he was ready to sign anything as long as he could retain part of Russia as a base. France, his ally, through their embassy, wanted Russia to stay in the war and even offered men and millions in gold which they accepted. However, the German Army was about 100 miles from his headquarters in St. Petersburg. Trotsky wanted to fight but finally agreed with Lenin that they should sign the treaties. Lenin viewed this as a defeat but had no choice. It was either peace with Germany or extinction.

With the treaty, Lenin betrayed his allies, members of the Triple Entente, Britain, France,

Belgium, Serbia, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Romania by signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers, the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria (the Triple Alliance). Lenin relinquished Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and over half of Ukraine. The treaty put Russia at a disadvantage but he focused on initiating a world revolution even if it meant sacrificing Russia's national interests. Lenin was quick to admit that establishing Communism in Russia and other countries was foremost and that it was above all national sacrifices. They also signed the Treaty of Bucharest with Austria-Hungary on May 7, 1918. In the treaty, the Soviets relinquished the Baltic countries, Poland, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Crimea and Tiflis to Germany, who now had access to food and other raw materials. According to author, Leon Degrelle, Germany might have won the war if the United States had not intervened. General Ludendorff, Marshal Paul von Hindenburg's best general, brought back 600,000 soldiers from the Eastern front to reinforce Germany's war efforts on the Western front.

Germany immediately acquired massive amounts of food to feed its starving population. In as much as they now occupied Russian land, Germans displaced Russians. Lenin and Trotsky had not consulted anyone about the forfeiture of their land and homes. Without the industrial and agricultural regions, millions of people in the remaining territory experienced severe famine. Lenin, to prolong the war, willingly sacrificed them. The stipulations of the treaty provided food and resources to Germans while it deprived Russians who adamantly opposed communism. Moreover, in as much as Germans were taking lands and homes, the fleeing Russians would develop resentment and be anxious and willing to fight Germans in another war, already planned by the communist cabal.

The French and British had blockaded Germany and her allies, cutting off all food and weapon supplies. Russia, with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, like manna from heaven, relinquished about 387,000 square miles, about 25 percent of Russia's cultivated land to Germany. At least fifty-six million people inhabited the area, which also contained 26 percent of the nation's railways, 73 percent of their iron and steel industry and 89 percent of their coal. On August 27, 1918, Lenin and Trotsky also agreed to pay Germany war reparations in the amount of six billion marks, without which, Germany might not have lasted until November 1918.

On November 5, 1918, because of Soviet revolutionary propaganda, Germany renounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and terminated diplomatic relations with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) which came to power on November 7, 1917. The Bolsheviks then voided the treaty on November 13, 1918, as reported in Pravda the next day. Following the armistice, the German Army totally withdrew from the territories obtained through the treaty. On April 16, 1922, via the Treaty of Rapallo, the two countries, with Georgi Chicherin, Soviet Foreign Minister and Walther Rathenau of Germany agreed to invalidate all territorial and financial claims against each other. On June 29, 1926, officials reaffirmed that agreement with the Treaty of Berlin.

8.13 Treaty of Versailles

Governments that are almost certain to be victorious during a war must justify their warfare intentions to the citizens. Governments do everything possible to subvert anti-war sentiments including formulating a sub-culture of problematic pacifists, like the anti-war drug culture of the 1960s, so that the majority of the population would predictably marginalize authentic pacifists who resist war for moral reasons. Victorious nations must prove that the conquered nation was the aggressor in order to impose a punitive, even revengeful peace on the vanquished. Raymond Poincaré, later the Prime Minister of France, said regarding reparations, "If the Germans are proved innocent, why should they want to pay war damages?"

Following World War I, numerous scholars in the triumphant countries, as well as the conquered nations, otherwise accurate and credible in many of their historical interpretations, falsely claimed that Germany bore the sole responsibility for the war. Fabre Luce, the French historian, apparently more honest than his colleagues, admitted, "France isolated herself in a lie."

Delegates were gearing up for the Paris Peace Conference, January 18, 1919-January 21, 1920, with the inauguration of the League of Nations. On January 4, 1919, Dr. Chaim Weizmann arrived in Paris as part of the Zionist Delegation. Nahum Sokolow would join him. The Zionists, who after years of negotiations with Middle East officials and the capitals of Western Europe, appeared to be gaining cooperation between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine. On behalf of the Zionist Organization of America, Julian W. Mack, Stephen S. Wise, Harry Friedenwald, Jacob De Haas, Mary Fels, Louis Robison and Bernard Flexner attended. Israel Rosoff attended in behalf of the Russian Zionist Organization.

The Zionist Organization submitted their draft resolutions for consideration by the Peace Conference on February 3, 1919. Their demands, officially submitted by Lord Walter Rothschild, included:

- (1) Officials would formally recognize the Jewish people's historic title to Palestine and their right to reconstitute their National Home there.
- (2) The boundaries of Palestine were to be declared as set out in the attached Schedule.
- (3) Officials would place the sovereign possession of Palestine in the League of Nations and entrust the Government to Britain as Mandatory of the League.
- (4) The High Contracting Parties would insert other provisions relating to the application of any general conditions attached to mandates, which are suitable to the case in Palestine.
- (5) The mandate shall be subject to several noted special conditions, including a provision to be inserted relating to the control of the Holy Places.

A few powerful individuals, including the Rothschilds and their allied bankers, instructed their agents on the terms they sought to impose upon Germany. One important aspect of the Versailles Treaty was the allocation of Germany's railway rights within Palestine to the Rothschilds which would then allow them to dictate policy for Palestine because they had loaned Turkey almost £100 million. Since Turkey lost the war and its government had collapsed, they were unable to pay the debt, allowing the Rothschilds to claim Palestine with its strategic location and Christian and Islam significance. The British government, habitually subservient Rothschild puppets, maneuvered the circumstances to ultimately gain political control of Palestine. As a result, the Rothschilds began to direct the formation of the Israelization via their power over the British politicians.

The US Delegation, headed by Herbert Hoover, Wilson's Advisor on Relief, included Bernard Baruch and Paul Warburg, as economic advisors, Colonel House, Walter Lippmann, and brothers Allen W. and John Foster Dulles. Just before the conference, Baruch accompanied Hoover to Belgium, the location of his profitable food swindle. Hoover was in Paris for another reason—to meet with several other individuals to discuss the need for a continuing council of "private bodies" to resolve international problems. On May 30, 1919, he met with Colonel House, Whitney H. Shepardson, General Tasker H. Bliss, George L. Beer, Professor Archibald C. Coolidge and Dr. James T. Shotwell and their British counterparts Lord Robert Cecil (a Jewish family), Sir Valentine Chirol, Lionel G. Curtis, Lord Eustace Percy and Professor Harold Temperley.

Hoover and Thomas W. Lamont were among twenty-one other Americans, including twelve scholars, members of The Inquiry, from Harvard, Yale and Columbia who attended the organizational meeting, at Hotel Majestic, of the Anglo-American Royal Institute of International Affairs of London which is allegedly Illuminati-based. 1794 Charles Seymour (S&B), historian and later President of Yale University (1937-1951), was a CFR (Council of Foreign Relations) founding member. The CFR initially functioned as a J. P. Morgan front in association with the American Round Table Group. 1795 The institute devises domestic and foreign policies. Scholarly members promote open borders and internationalism and curtail nationalism. J.P. Morgan, Baruch, John D. Rockefeller, Otto H. Kahn, Jacob H. Schiff and Paul Warburg provided financing for its creation. Others in the US Peace Treaty Delegation included President Wilson, a few others including J. P. Morgan lawyers. Albert Strauss (Federal Reserve Board) and Thomas W. Lamont, a Morgan partner and owner of the New York Evening Post were also part of the US Delegation.

The Peace Conference served as a social, familial gathering. Felix Frankfurter and Justice Louis D. Brandeis met with friends in Paris, Arthur J. Balfour, Louis Marshall, and Edmond de Rothschild who hosted the most prominent delegates at his Paris mansion. Minor delegates stayed at the Hotel Crillon. Paul Warburg socialized with his brother Max, who represented Germany. Dr. Carl Melchior, also of M.M. Warburg Company, and William G. von Strauss, Franz Urbig, and Mathias Erzberger, accompanied him. 1797 Baruch, head of the Reparations Commission negotiated with Max Warburg on behalf of Germany, who accepted the reparations terms. Paul Warburg, Thomas W. Lamont,

John Foster and Allen W. Dulles, of Sullivan & Cromwell, and other Wall Street bankers counseled Wilson on US diplomatic policies in conjunction with this conference. The Allies accomplished three major objectives, all in conjunction with devising the retributive treaties that had little to do with justice but led to further destabilization. Those goals were 1) implement the League of Nations, the entity favoring global governance over nationalism, located in Geneva; 2) officially recognize the Soviet regime; 3) reconfigure European countries to maximize ethnic and political discontent, a foundation for further warfare. The Versailles Treaty terms, imposed on Germany without any negotiation, included debilitating territorial changes and excessive reparations, which created the perfect environment for an anti-Soviet regime, an inevitable situation. The treaty formalized the circumstances that would ignite the next world war.

President Wilson's famous words had the vision of a great plan to solve the post-war problems. This plan delighted liberal circles and gave the war against Germany a moral justification. Wilson's speeches were based on the thought that peace can only be achieved through equity. International equity meant self-determination of the peoples and meant that borders need to be drawn by the will of the respective population. When this happens, when the people no longer want to change their borders then the main cause for war is nullified. One begins to wonder why they gave huge German populations to foreign nations, creating the exact opposite situation of what they said they wanted to achieve. The new eastern borders of Germany created the most problems in the end. No other part of the Treaty of Versailles created more resentment than losing millions of Germans to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

British Prime Minister Lloyd George invested effort in the German cause. On March 27th 1919 he said: "I believe that the Germans will accept everything else, including the heavy financial burden; but the thought of delivering millions of Germans to Polish rule will hit them hard." Wilson wanted equity and for him this meant the creating of a Polish sovereign state economically strong enough that it can be properly defended. To achieve this one has to go beyond the ethnic boundaries of Poland: "It is therefore necessary to not only look at the economic requirements but also at the strategic requirements, because the eastern part of Germany is highly aggressive.... Since I am against the Germans, I am on the side of Poland." When Lloyd George said that British troops would not fight to give this land to Poland without a national referendum, Wilson answered that American troops would support any nation against the Germans.

The Versailles Treaty, Economic Warfare against Germany

In 1918, Sir Alfred E. Zimmern, of Alfred Milner's Round Table, wrote a plan for Germany, *The Economic Weapon against Germany*, in which he said, "The Central Powers are being besieged by practically the entire world and they have no means at their disposal for bringing the siege to an end." 1800 He indicated that systematic, large-scale economic warfare was yet untried and that Germany would not anticipate its effectiveness. He

and his cohorts had post-war plans, devised at the peace conference. While the physical blockade would ultimately end, they would make certain that Germany would lack access to raw materials, making industrial employment impossible. Without manufacturing, the returning soldiers would not find employment. The Allies, by confiscating and managing essential supplies, they would incapacitate Germany and make it impossible for her to recover from warfare. This would cause food shortages and famine, which would affect all of civilized Europe, if not the whole world for as long as three years. He wrote, "Who more naturally than Germany? It is not as if the boycott had to be organized. It will come about almost of itself unless special provision is made in the peace."

The Allies included Britain, France, and the United States, and also Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and many others. Regardless, the countries that benefitted from the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty were Britain and France, both of which the United States supported. On January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson delivered his Fourteen Points to Congress, authored by Walter Lippmann. They functioned as a platform for a new world order, calling for transparent democracy, unilateral disarmament, free trade and self-determination. He implied the restoration of invaded territories, no annexations, no contributions, and no punitive damages. Germany would sign the Armistice based on Wilson's ideals. On November 5, 1918, six days before the signing of the Armistice, Secretary of State Robert Lansing notified the German government that they would have to compensate the Allies for all damages, including civilian property which obviously contradicted Wilson's words.

On February 6, 1919, Germany's National Assembly had selected Friedrich Ebert as its first president during the Weimar period and soon the reparations rhetoric began. The armistice disarmed Germany and they allegedly devised the document to keep a Bolshevik onslaught at bay. However, Germany sent a few units to fend off the invaders at Frankfurt on the Oder and at Breslau. On February 16, 1919, Georges Clemenceau sent in the military and forced the German units to retreat behind a provisional line, which would later function as the border between Poland and Germany, awaiting the Allied Supreme Council's final decision. They obviously favored Warsaw. If Poland wanted to annex Silesia, all they had to do was issue a statement making the provisional border permanent.

Despite the humanitarian slogans like save the children and the massive funds that charities raised to allegedly alleviate starvation in Germany, the ships could not penetrate the blockade. In February 1919, George E. R. Gedye traveled to inspect the situation in Germany. He reported, "Hospital conditions were appalling. A steady average of ten percent of the patients had died during the war years from lack of fats, milk and good flour . . . We saw some terrible sights in the children's hospital, such as the 'starvation babies' with ugly swollen heads . . . Our report naturally urged the immediate opening of the frontiers for fats, milk and flour . . . but the terrible blockade was maintained as a result of French insistence." Norman H. Davis, President Wilson's Assistant Secretary of Treasury, and later Undersecretary of State, and John Foster Dulles, a wellconnected New

York lawyer, part of the US team, wrote the War Guilt Clause (Kriegsschuld Klausel), article 231, created on April 7, 1919. It compelled Germany to accept the responsibility, essentially a blank check, for causing all of the loss and destruction suffered by the allies. Article 231 reads, "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

Germany's political and economic structure, though incredibly bruised, remained a factor despite their defeat in the war. Warfare caused by external forces had not totally destroyed those responsible for Germany's strong industrial foundation or the country's resilient internal framework. The Allies' maneuvering at Versailles initiated Britain's second onslaught against Germany with the intention of bringing about the country's total obliteration. The Allies excluded the officials of the defeated nations of Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary from the negotiations. Russia did not participate because it had already signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany. The Allies arranged Germany's economic future. They apportioned German spoils as follows, 50 percent to France, 30 percent to Britain and they divided 20 percent between the smaller allies. The Allies abandoned Wilson's Fourteen Points, a deceptive decoy; it had served its misleading purpose of getting the Germans to surrender. They arrived in Paris at the end of April 1919. Prime Minister David Lloyd George read the text of the Versailles Treaty on May 7, 1919. They completed it in secret, the day before.

Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau submitted the potential treaty to the German delegation, which ordered the transfer of Silesia to Poland. An unauthorized group of Polish soldiers had invaded Silesia; therefore Germany had to relinquish nearly two million ethnic Germans, and its resource-rich province to the invaders. Clemenceau legalized the invasion, barred the Germans from protecting themselves and forced them back behind the Oder River. Wilson supported his conclusions because, Winston Churchill explained, "Polish voters constituted a real factor in American politics." According to *The New York Times*, May 14, 1919, Hugo Haase and those who controlled the Weimar government fought to gain approval of the Versailles Treaty. Although officials signed the armistice, it did not end the British blockade of Germany (August 1914-1919). For months following the war's end, unknown to American and British citizens, the British government prohibited food shipments to the starving Germans in several cities and towns until they acquiesced to the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. According to official documents in the National Archives, 763,000 German civilians died from starvation caused by the blockade with another 150,000 deaths due to the 1918 flu pandemic. While the British and US public knew about the desperate situation, no one informed them about the atrocious policies that generated it.

The Germans were flabbergasted. Their spokesperson, Foreign Minister Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who remained seated as an insult to the others, pointed out

the violations of the 'pre-armistice commitments. German officials prepared a 443-page counter proposal and the German government offered \$25 billion dollars and rejected the proposed territorial changes. Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian) wrote the rejection to Germany's counter proposals. Kerr, of Milner's Kindergarten, also helped co-author the treaty. The Allies refused to budge and gave Germany an ultimatum. On June 20, 1919, Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson told the Germans that unless they signed the treaty by the evening of June 23, they would direct Ferdinand Foch, who commanded the Allied forces as of March 1918, to advance on Germany. German advisors included Max M. Warburg, Oscar Oppenheimer, and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, a great-great-grandson of philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, and grandson of the composer Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy. 1815 Bartholdy, of the Politics Law Consortium, was part of the German delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva, beginning in 1931. He left Germany in 1933.

Philipp Scheidemann, Germany's Chancellor (February 13-June 20, 1919), rather than sign the document resigned. After Scheidemann's resignation, President Friedrich Ebert formed a new coalition government under Chancellor Gustav Bauer, former chairman of the General Commission of Trade Unions for all of Germany (1908-1918). On June 22, the Reichstag ratified the treaty. On June 28, 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, exactly five years after assassins killed Franz Ferdinand, the delegates, except for the Chinese, signed the Treaty of Versailles.

Georges Clemenceau and his assistant, André Tardieu encouraged Polish officials to demand chunks of East Prussia, in addition to Danzig and the corridor. British officials wanted to put this issue to a vote, which irked the Poles and Tardieu, their advocate. The vote would be in the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder, accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign and overt intimidation. However, the Prussians voted almost unanimously, 98.73 percent, to remain German, a figure rarely mentioned in Allied history books. Next, they considered the annexation of Upper Silesia, a rich and highly industrialized province. Its loss would dramatically reduce Germany's power. Greedy Polish politicians had sent in armed groups by February 1919 to grab their legally sanctioned war booty.

The Allies forced Germany to relinquish a sizeable amount of territory, including vital mineral areas and the Polish Corridor, which would isolate Prussia from the rest of the county. The Allies deprived Germany of its merchant fleet. 1822 She had to terminate all military drafts and reduce her troops to 100,000 for internal peace keeping only. She had to drastically decrease her naval fleet and disband the submarine fleet. She had to destroy all military fortifications and give up the right to have heavy artillery, tanks, submarines, and all aviation. The Allies prohibited Germany's military industry from designing or owning chemical weapons and they had to destroy their stock of poisonous biological warfare weapons. International officials would have to supervise any German arms production. The Allies forced Hungary, a quickly developing country who supported Germany, according to the Treaty of Trianon, to relinquish over two-thirds of its territory.

This shifted 3.3 million ethnic Hungarians into Romania and Czechoslovakia. The newly configured Hungary also had to pay war reparations to its neighbors. Ethnic Hungarians would be living in a foreign land where local residents subjected them to discrimination and difficulty in assimilating. Hungarians and non-Hungarian historians justifiably claim that the real objective of the treaty stipulations was an attempt to dismantle a major power in Central Europe. The Ally's priority was to prevent Germany's resurgence. Therefore, they surrounded Germany's allies, Austria and Hungary, with more powerful, bigger states friendly to the Allies.

The Treaty of St. Germain amputated Austria from all of its industrial areas and natural resources, which were located in the German populated areas of Austrian Silesia and the Sudetenland. Austria was nothing but a skeleton of a state with a decreased population of just seven million. The Allies reduced the multinational Austria-Hungary into numerous pieces lacking the cohesiveness they once enjoyed. This partition spawned the state of Czechoslovakia whose population consisted of Czechs (46%), Slovaks (13%), Poles (2%), Ukrainians (3%), Hungarians (8%), and 3.5 million Germans (28%). This unproductive dissection, administered by Archibald C. Coolidge, part of Edward M. House's Inquiry but under the auspices of the American Expert Commission, placed several thousand Germans under Czech domination, and placed German industrial areas from northern Bohemia into Saxony. The Austrians, who had no voice in the matter, contested this arbitrary fracturing. Nearly 1.5 million Germans, now considered minorities, remained in Romania, Yugoslavia, Banar, Syrmia, Czechoslovakia, Batschka, and Slovenia. The provisions of the Treaty of Trianon placed 550,000 Germans into what remained of Hungary.

Commercially, Germany lost all of her African colonies; the Allies placed them under the League of Nations' jurisdiction. France received Alsace-Lorraine and all the coal resources in the Saar district, 991.8 square miles, on the border between France and Germany, with the League of Nations administering the area. Poland got the key industrialized area of Upper Silesia, most of Posen Province and West Prussia, which created what people referred to as the Polish Corridor, with access to the sea. This separated East Prussia from the rest of the country. This would cut Prussia in half and the so-called Polish Corridor and amputate the city of Danzig from Germany. Poland would receive Upper Silesia, one of Germany's richest regions (producing 20% of its coal, 57% of its lead, and 72% of its zinc). They forced Germany to relinquish Posen, another rich German province. Yet, Danzig was almost completely German in composition. Churchill wrote, "German science and capital had created a vigorous industry in this territory. German culture, imposed by the power of an energetic empire, had left its mark everywhere." He later admitted, "The commission first proposed to place Danzig entirely under Polish sovereignty, which would subject Danzigers to Polish laws and mandatory conscription in the Polish army." For centuries, there were few Poles in Danzig. Yet they gifted Poland control of the city's customs, taxes, port facilities and the city's diplomatic representation. This required that any German Danziger traveling from the area had to get a passport or visa from the Polish embassies and consulates, a group of "hateful and arrogant alien

bureaucrats.”

When the Danzigers finally voted, just before the Second World War, they chose Germany by a margin of 99%. Wilson had guaranteed Poland “free and secure access to the sea,” not “access to the sea,” as dozens of biased historians and journalists have reported thus accrediting the creation of the corridor, a piece of land 20 to 70 miles wide, right across Germany. No one would have proposed such an incursion on France but thought nothing of imposing it on Germany. For 20 years, Germans were compelled to travel from one part of Germany to the other part locked in sealed trains where they were humiliated at the two Polish borders while entering and leaving the corridor.

The Allies seized Germany’s merchant navy and unethically confiscated private property from many countries throughout the world that belonged to German citizens. The amoral Allied powers usurped the right, by virtue of the treaty, to retain or dispose of privately held companies or other assets. This occurred without any compensation to the victims of this wholesale plunder. Furthermore, the Allies held German citizens responsible for the liabilities or indebtedness on those confiscated items. Additionally, the Allies and their lawyers stipulated that Germany could not make capital investments in other countries and had to relinquish the title of any possessions in neighboring countries. The lawyers designed the agreement to force Germany to allow the Allies full access to all of their markets without paying a tariff. Conversely, Germany had to pay an outrageously high tariff for foreign goods. Germans, already starving, were required to surrender their remaining livestock—they had to deliver their cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and even their dairy cows to France and Belgium. They left the starving children, the most vulnerable victims in any war, without milk to drink. The confiscation of Germany’s coal resources caused the deaths of German children who were not only starving but would now freeze to death without a source of heat.

The Allies forced Germany to surrender 67,273 square kilometers, comprising one-eighth of its territory, which had a population of 5,138,000 people. The Allies appropriated all merchant ships over a certain size, a quarter of the fishing fleet and a fifth of the river fleet and half of all German paints and non-military chemicals as well as their production of those items for the next five years. Over the next five years, Germany had to construct merchant ships for the allies. Further, she was to supply 140 million tons of coal to France, eighty million tons to Belgium and seventy-seven million to Italy. The allies gained the right to use all German railways, ports, waterways for a very small remuneration, all in addition to huge reparations. They designed these unrealistic and inequitable provisions, not to promote peace but to instill resentment, to set the stage for more warfare.

Political leaders, banker’s agents, advisors and lawyers from the victorious nations had arrived and were ensconced in luxurious Paris hotels and enjoying sumptuous meals. They were prepared to spend almost a year to resolve, negotiate, and make decisions. Meanwhile, an entire population, because of a hellish war, was starving in Central Europe. The British maintained the blockade against the Germans until July 12, 1919, eight long months after the armistice. 1816 Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau addressed the

Versailles assembly. “The hundreds of thousands of noncombatants who have perished since November 11, 1918, as a result of the blockade, were killed with cold deliberation, after our enemies had been assured of their complete victory.” Jan Smuts, one of Milner’s associates, discovered a loophole in Robert Lansing’s letter regarding the damages against the civilians. Smuts skewed the issues in Britain’s favor and persuaded Wilson to include a pension for the soldiers’ widows and orphans in the reparations package. John Maynard Keynes, representing the British Treasury, argued that those additions violated Wilson’s Fourteen Points and would increase the reparations by at least two and half times. Still, the Allies expected Germany to remit a preliminary payment by May 1921. These additions totaled almost \$40 billion dollars, far beyond their capacity to pay.

The war planners, those who won the war, made financial demands in the billions of dollars. Prime Minister Lloyd George (He added his uncle’s surname to become Lloyd George) suggested \$120 billion; Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wanted \$220 billion. Lloyd George delegated the task of calculating the final reparation figures to a panel of experts with a target date of May 1921. To lighten the suffering of war-weary Europeans, they finally made the reparations demands—the British got the equivalent of \$90 billion in addition to a portion of Germany’s foreign colonies and their European industries; the French got \$200 billion; the United States wanted \$25 to \$30 billion. The treaties signed during the conference in Paris were 1) the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919 for the disposition of the German Empire; 2) the Treaty of Saint-Germain, September 10, 1919 for the disposition of Austria; 3) the Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919 for the disposition of Bulgaria; 4) the Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920 for the disposition of Hungary; 5) the Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920, later revised by the Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923 for the disposition and partition of the Ottoman Empire.

On October 15, 1920, Vladimir Lenin declared, “The order held by the Versailles Peace Treaty lies over a volcano, since the seventy percent of the world’s people who are enslaved are anxiously awaiting someone to come and start a struggle for their liberation, and to rock the foundation of their countries.”¹⁸³³ He said, “The war is waged by slave traders haggling over cattle.” In fact, the Allies were wrangling over the Rhineland, Tyrol, Sudetenland, Prussia, Carpathia, Dalmatia, Smyrna, Armenia, Mosul, Baghdad and Jerusalem.¹⁸³⁴ He surmised that the turmoil caused by the Allied remapping of the world would open the door to Communism.

German Reparations and Recovery

The Allies, according to the Versailles Treaty, specifically the “warguilt clause” (Article 231 of the treaty), set up a schedule of reparations for Germany covering the years, 1919-1932 which one may subdivide into six periods.

1. The preliminary payments, 1919-1921

2. The London Schedule, May 1921-September 1924
3. The Dawes Plan, September 1924-January 1930
4. The Young Plan, January 1930-June 1931
5. The Hoover Moratorium, June 1931-July 1932
6. The Lausanne Convention, July 1932

By May 1921, Germany was to pay 20,000 million marks. The Allies, Britain, France, America and Italy contended that Germany had only paid 8,000 million marks of the required preliminary payments. They threatened to occupy the Ruhr in order to enforce payment. In May, dismissing the previous threat, the Allies presented Germany with a 132,000 million marks bill. To avoid another ultimatum, Germany capitulated and gave them bonds for the new amount. The Allies forgave 82 million but required Germany to pay the other 50 million in yearly installments plus interest.

Given its economic circumstances, Germany was hard-pressed to pay reparations. The international bankers refused payment in the form of German goods and services. Therefore, Germany was unable to fulfill the reparation schedule. British bankers viewed this as evidence of Germany's inability while French bankers regarded this as Germany's unwillingness to pay. The Anglo-Americans rejected Germany's offer to pay in goods to compensate for money Germany could not pay. In 1921, Britain imposed a 26% tariff on imports. They could have paid the required reparations if the bankers had agreed to accept goods and services. On May 26, 1922, per the Allies suggestion, German officials released the Reichsbank from government regulation, meaning it becomes a private organization, just like the Federal Reserve. The absence of regulation led to horrific hyperinflation (1922-1923). Bankers deceptively used this example of hyperinflation to persuade people not to trust governments to print money; rather private bankers should manage the task. The League of Nations then delegated "experts" to monitor Germany's economic recovery.

These experts wanted Germany's central bank to adopt free market policies. Germany's currency predictably lost its value, causing immense suffering especially in urban and industrial areas. Berlin was especially hard hit—people were scavenging the trashcans behind the hotels looking for something to eat. A cup of coffee cost one million marks one day only to rise to a million and a half the next day. On January 9, 1923, the Reparations Commission declared that Germany had defaulted on her payments. Consequently, France, Belgium, and Italy immediately occupied the Ruhr with 70,000 soldiers, supposedly to protect engineers seizing telegraph poles and timber, but really to secure "the economic edge that France and Belgium had failed to secure under the Versailles Treaty." Germany stopped all reparations payments and supported those who had gone on strike in the Ruhr. The government also printed more currency. The Ruhr, 60 miles long and 30 miles wide, had 10 percent of Germany's population and generated 80 percent of Germany's coal, iron, and steel. The occupation forces seized the Ruhr's complex railway system. Armed conflict erupted and soldiers killed at least 400 people and wounded over

2,100 people.

Because of their “passive resistance,” French authorities expelled or detained 46,200 uncooperative civil servants, railroad workers, and police, along with 100,000 members of their families. The residents responded by committing acts of sabotage and “low-level acts of terrorism.” The occupying forces countered these actions by taking hostages, massive fines, hostile house searches, identity examinations and executions. 1847 Walther Kadow, a communist, betrayed Albert L. Schlageter, who blew up a rail line near Düsseldorf. 1848 On May 26, 1923, after a quick trial, French authorities executed Schlageter. Rudolf Höss and Martin Bormann then assassinated Kadow for which the authorities imprisoned them. Karl Radek attempted to exploit the situation in the Ruhr, especially to the German communists, and claimed that the strike was part of the revolt against German capitalism. Radek and other communists, like Clara Zetkin, feared that the general destruction in Europe would cause a “regrouping of forces into a united front against Russia.” He felt it was necessary to cooperate with the German nationalists to protect Soviet Russia. Zetkin and Radek feared fascism. Radek decided to make Schlageter a nationalist hero and depicted him as “a courageous soldier of the counter revolution.” 1849 It is possible that the Bolsheviks were hoping for a fascist overthrow of the Weimar Republic, and then they would take over. Radek, in a speech on June 20, 1923, in Moscow, adopted the national hero and lavished praise on Schlageter. The communist press accorded wide publicity to Radek’s speech, designed to “appeal to disgruntled Germans who had been flocking to Hitler’s NSDAP. The communists even used some of the same phrases, like “Down with the government of national shame and betrayal of the people.” Ruth Fischer, a half Jewish leftist, exhorted communists to “trample the Jewish capitalists down, hang them from the lampposts.”

The German government continued, year after year, to maintain an unbalanced budget. To pay their deficit, they borrowed from the Reichsbank, which continued to cause severe inflation, ruinous to the middle class but it barely touched the wealthy living in Germany. This situation predictably encouraged middle class dissent while it benefited people who owned actual wealth in the form of property. Inflation hiked up property and land values, which allowed certain people to eliminate their debts. The German mark collapsed in value from 305 to the pound in August 1921 to 1,020 in November 1921. It dropped to 80,000 by January 1923, to 20 million by August 1923, and to 20 billion by December 1923. 1851 The hyperinflation peaked during the summer of 1923. A wave of strikes began in August 1923 and Cuno and his cabinet resigned on August 12, 1923.

In 1923, the League of Nations asked Charles G. Dawes, owner of Chicago’s Central Republic Bank and Trust to lead a committee to address Germany’s financial condition. He, along with Austen Chamberlain, received the 1925 Nobel Peace Prize. In 1932, his bank would fail, costing the US taxpayers \$90 million. 1852 In April 1924, his committee followed some of John Foster Dulles’ suggestions. Dulles, a lawyer with Sullivan and Cromwell, was a member of the Reparations Commission. The Inter-Allied Reparations Committee sent Dawes and Young to Europe with Dulles as their special counsel. J. P.

Morgan bank initiated the entire process with a \$200 million private loan. The Dawes Plan relied on private loans, not government aid. While it was ostensibly a government program, it allowed private bankers to make a financial killing in Europe. Sullivan and Cromwell, who later represented Hamburg-Amerika Line, also handled a bond for the Krupp steel company, issued through J. & W. Seligman & Company. Dulles, knowing the State Department would not interfere with his transactions, made considerable money for himself and his firm which dominated a major portion of the private loans and investments in Germany.

The Dawes Plan called for long-term, high interest loans, and a restructuring of the Reichsbank including revenue sharing, followed up, in 1924, by loans from foreign banks, based on their confidence in Hjalmar Schacht. In December 1923, he had become the bank president after a meeting with Montagu Norman, president of the Rothschild's Bank of England. Schacht initially opposed the loans but acquiesced only if they used the money to fund production, not luxury or consumption. The foreign troops in the Ruhr forced Germany to accept the Dawes Plan for reparations; then the troops left the Ruhr. Dawes, Vice President under President Calvin Coolidge (1925-1929), directed a committee of financial experts under the jurisdiction of the international bankers, to devise the plan under which Germany owed more in 1929 than before. It artificially protected the German mark in the international market. It encouraged Germany to over borrow and spend without experiencing immediate consequences, which would have occurred with a system of accurate international exchange. Germany was unable to repay the loans. US bankers loaned money to German industrialists for their recovery. The bankers also insisted that Germans build unnecessary and nonproductive equipment.

Adolf Hitler and others were certain that Germany was rushing headlong into severe inflation because of the collaboration of the black-red coalition. Hitler opposed the Dawes Pact, a devious method for the bankers to plunder all of Germany's resources. The Young Plan, with the objective of enslaving Germany, facilitated it. Hitler, while incarcerated in 1924, attempted to have his associates oppose the Dawes Pact and the Centre Party who claimed that the foreign loans associated with the plan would increase Germany's prosperity, create jobs, raise wages and benefit agriculture. He claimed that the Dawes Pact would do nothing but increase poverty. 1858 International bankers have always worked with local complicit politicians to enslave nations with excessive, usury-heavy loans. When this occurs, the bankers control the national resources and soon, a once resource-rich country is a dependent third world nation, relying on other countries for manufactured goods, food, and fuel.

Former UK Prime Minister David Lloyd George reveals:

"The international bankers dictated the Dawes reparations settlement. The protocol, which was signed between the allies and Germany, is the triumph of the international financier. Agreement would never have been reached without the brutal intervention of the international bankers. They swept statesman, politicians, and journalists aside, and issued their orders with the imperiousness of absolute Monarchs, who knew there was

no appeal from their ruthless decrees. The Dawes report was fashioned by the Money Kings.”

John Perkins, in *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*, explains that highly paid professionals, lawyers like Dulles, cheat countries out of trillions of dollars by loaning them money through government programs but it actually goes into the “coffers of huge corporations and the pockets of a few wealthy families who control the planet’s natural resources.” These agents use “fraudulent financial reports, rigged elections, payoffs, extortion, sex, and murder.” It is a “game as old as empire, but one that has taken on new and terrifying dimensions during this time of globalization.”

Owen D. Young chaired the committee that conceived, between February and June 1929, the Young Plan that mandated German reparations over a period of fifty-nine years, until 1988. Hjalmar Schacht, Emile Francqui, John Foster Dulles, later referred to as the “most dangerous man in America” established the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), chartered on January 20, 1930. The officials who designed the Hague Treaty created it to receive German reparations payments. Germany would pay these funds to the BIS in Basel, owned by the world’s central banks. It functioned as a “Central Bankers’ Bank” which shifted payments among national accounts. The 1929 crash ended the Dawes Plan and created an environment for another world war. By 1931, US banks terminated their loans to Germany whose gold reserve they had greatly reduced. 1860 The BIS gradually assumed control of coordinating banking and economic policy across the world.

Germany paid their war debts but did not balance their budget or pursue a trade balance. Two things would be sure to occur with this easy money, 1) when the US bankers stopped lending, Germany would collapse and, 2) they transferred debts from account to account without building real solvency. Germany borrowed 18.6 billion marks while paying 10.5 billion marks in reparations (1924-1931). The international bankers were the only benefactors, with their numerous commissions and fees. In January 1930, the equally nefarious Young Plan replaced the Dawes Plan because Germany’s payments under that plan did not satisfy the London Schedule. This change also voided the German foreign-exchange rate, which forced Germany to experience the results of her extravagant borrowing. In addition, France demanded payment for their war reconstruction. In April 1931, Germany and Austria united their customs while remaining separate countries, a move opposed by the French. On May 11, 1931, Rothschild’s Austrian bank, the Creditanstalt that controlled 70 percent of Austria’s industry, declared its insolvency. The Rothschilds and the Austrian government bailed out the bank. However, there was still a run on the bank. To accommodate this run, Austrian banks pulled all their funds from the German banks, which then began to fail. The German banks called for their funds in London, which began to fail. Europe’s gold disappeared. On September 21, 1931, Churchill removed England from the gold standard. The Reichsbank lost a huge percentage of their gold reserve, which almost destroyed German industry.

F. William Engdahl refers to Attorney George L. Harrison (S&B, CFR) as a “Germanophile.” As president of the Federal Reserve Bank, he worked with the Bank of England’s

Montagu Norman and Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht to collapse and bankrupt the Vienna-based Creditanstalt, a Rothschild bank. It had connections to the French bankers, which in turn led to “the flight of capital out of Germany” and the ultimate failure of the Danat-Bank of Germany, the second largest bank of Germany, chaired by Jakob Goldschmidt. 1864 That was obviously the objective; the Rothschilds ultimately benefitted.

On July 7, 1931, German citizens tried to pull their funds from the Reichsbank. German industry and the four largest banks suffered losses. By November 1931, the European Powers, except France, were willing to end reparations via the Lausanne Conference of June 1932. Germany was then responsible to pay three billion marks. The US Congress refused to cut the debt so the Germans never ratified the Lausanne agreement so the Young Plan was still legally in force.

However, in 1933, Hitler renounced all reparations. The Germans had already paid about 10.5 billion marks under the Dawes Plan (1924-1931). Before 1924, they had paid 56,577 billion marks. The Allies claimed that Germany had only paid 10,426 billion. In truth, Germany probably paid, before 1924, about 40 billion marks. 1866 Though reparation ended in 1933, the Allies reinstated them after World War II.

8.14 Versailles 1919 and the Question of War Guilt

In contradiction of the 14-point programme drafted in the course of the negotiations leading to the armistice in 1918, France and Great Britain imposed conditions upon the German people that violated the fundamental principles of international law. In the terms of the Versailles victor's diktat, Germany bore full and exclusive responsibility for the war; subsequently, was liable for reparation of all damage done. The Versailles diktat became the “foundation of law”, the “law of nations” providing the rule of order amongst the states of Europe. Lies, economic exploitation for an indefinite period, annexation, forced assimilation and the oppression of ethnic minorities, the expropriation of other nations' colonies, compulsory demilitarization, submission to foreign governments, military occupation and numerous other instances of wrongful and arbitrary treatment were thus legitimated by the victors. Thus also the very ideas of “law”, “democracy”, “agreement”, “truth”, “self-determination”, “freedom” etc. were subverted. Anyone who called into question these acts of the “civilized nations” was accused of “violation of law”, “revisionism”, “revanchism” and considered a war-monger. The authority of this “ruling” is derived from the “war guilt paragraph” (§231) of the Versailles “treaty” and, furthermore, from the Allies' explanatory letter of 16 June 1919 to the German representatives (Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German delegations on the conditions of peace), published as a preface to the treaty. It reads, in part:

“...In the view of the Allied and Associate Powers the war which began on August 1 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity and the freedom of peoples that any

nation, calling itself civilized, has ever consciously committed. For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence to which Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were willing to accord her, in the society of free and equal peoples. They required that they should be able to dictate to and tyrannize a subservient Europe, as they dictated and tyrannized over a subservient Germany. In order to attain their ends they used every channel in their power through which to educate their own subjects in the doctrine that might was right in international affairs... As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a subservient ally to declare war against Serbia... In order to make doubly sure, they refused every attempt at conciliation and conference until it was too late, and the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for which alone among the nations they were fully equipped and prepared. Germany's responsibility, however, is not confined to having planned and started the war. She is no less responsible for the savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted. They were the first to use poisonous gas... They commenced the submarine campaign ... They drove thousands of men and women and children with brutal savagery into slavery in foreign lands. They allowed barbarities to be practised against their prisoners of war from which the most uncivilized peoples would have recoiled. The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human history. The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen in the fact that not less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe, while more than twenty million others carry upon them the evidence of wounds and sufferings, because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war. That is why the Allied and Associated Powers have insisted as a cardinal feature of the treaty that Germany must undertake to make reparation to the very uttermost of her power; for reparations for wrongs inflicted is of the essence of justice... The Allied and Associated Powers therefore believe that the peace they have proposed is fundamentally a peace of justice. They are no less certain that it is a peace of right fulfilling the terms agreed upon at the time of the armistice."

The victorious powers have been frustrating all serious attempts of clarifying the causes and the motives, along with their practical application to politics, of the First World War. Since the 1920s no serious historian has defended the argument of Germany's exclusive responsibility for the war. Yet the repeated protests and requests by successive Weimar governments seeking rehabilitation of their country through a revision of the "official" version invariably met with outright rejection, effectively justified by nothing but "Power". None of the victors of Versailles based any of their charges against Germany on specialists' reports, let alone did they reduce or retract the charges with the emergence of later historical research findings. In this regard, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George declared at a meeting of the Reparations Commission in London on 3 March 1921:

"German responsibility for the war is fundamental to the Allies. It is the basis on which the Treaty has been established and if this basis breaks down, or should be abandoned,

the Treaty would be destroyed ... Therefore, we wish to make clear, once and for all, that German responsibility for the war has definitely been established and must accordingly be dealt with by the Allies.”

This label of culpability was necessary so as not to be indicted of one's own immoral actions. Only in this way was it possible to continue to consider as valid, “legitimate” and irrevocable all of the “punishment” put upon Germany in the form of territorial cessions, discriminations, reparations, confiscations, control rights etc.

“The future is in your hands!” With those words Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, greeted the representatives of 27 nations at the opening of the Versailles Peace conference on 18 January 1919. These words were to take on historical significance. The reason for the disastrous outcome of this Peace conference was not due to the “harsh” conditions laid upon the German nation, but rather because an unjust ruling in international law was created in the shape of the Versailles “treaty” – signed by a German government under threat of military occupation. There were politicians both in Germany and abroad who could already foresee the inevitable consequences of the “Peace Treaty”. Phillip Scheidemann (SPD), Chancellor of the Reich, in May 1919:

“ I come straight to the point: This thick volume in which hundreds of paragraphs begin with: ‘Germany renounces’, ‘renounces’, ‘renounces’ ! – this terrible, deadly weapon is being used to extort from a great nation an admission of its own unworthiness, an agreement to a pitiless dismemberment, the acceptance of enslavement, this text must not be allowed to become a statute book for the future ... What hand should not wither, binding us with these chains, yet still they want us to work like slaves for international finance, to do socage (labour for the feudal lord) for the whole world. The government of the Reich considers this treaty unacceptable. Unacceptable to such a degree that, still today, I cannot believe that the world could tolerate a text such as this without the sound of millions upon millions of voices echoing throughout every land and every party: Away with this murderous plot!”

Many notable politicians from France, Britain, Italy and other countries, in 1919 and in the years soon afterwards, were already stating with urgent insistence that the “Versailles arrangement”, particularly as concerned the borders between Germany and Poland, could only lead to a new war. The former American Secretary of State (Foreign Minister), Robert Lansing, as quoted by Francesco Nitti, head of the Italian government: “The victors intend to impose their combined objectives on the vanquished, and to subordinate all other interests to their own. European politics, as established today, are prey to every sort of greed and intrigue, only called upon to declare just what is unjust. We have a peace treaty, but it will not bring lasting peace, because it is founded on the shifting sands of individual interests. ‘In this judgment’, Lansing added, ‘I was not alone. A few days after, I found myself in London, where I was discussing the treaty with some of the leading men in Britain. They all agreed that the treaty was absurd and unworkable, that it was born of intrigue and shaped by greed and, therefore, was more apt to cause wars than to prevent them.’”

Nitti himself, at the same period, said:

“A serious and durable peace has never been built on the plunder, the torture and the ruin of a defeated nation, let alone a defeated great nation. And it is precisely this what the Treaty of Versailles represents.”

The British Labour Member of Parliament, J.W. Kneeshaw, at the Party's conference of 1920 in Scarborough, commented:

“Should we have been the defeated nation and should such conditions have been imposed upon us, we would, instead of a calm engagement, begin in the schools and homes to prepare our children for a retaliatory war to shake off the intolerable, unbearable victors' yoke. These conditions have amounted to a plot not only against Germany, against Austria and the other defeated nations, but also against the whole of civilization.”

The Dutch Ambassador to London, René van Swinderen, stated to the British diplomat, E. Howard:

“The Versailles peace conditions contain all the germs for a just and lasting war.”

President Wilson in 1919 stated:

“How can, for instance, a power like the United States of America – since I cannot speak for any other – 3,000 miles across the ocean, sign this Treaty, withdraw from Europe, and tell the people in America that a peace treaty has been created for the world, while its content cannot be viewed as lasting. I have felt it incumbent upon me to withhold my signature.”

All governments during the Weimar Republic, irrespective of political orientation, denied the legitimacy of the Versailles diktat's grave accusations and of its consequences for their country, calling time and time again for a fair judgment to be made by an impartial Court of Justice. Always in vain! The great powers simply made no response. Trust amongst nations thus remained impaired. Versailles was the irresponsible provocation that summoned a nation to gather all of its defensive forces available and mould them into a united front, the better to fight this injustice not only with words but also with deeds. An Englishman, Lord Buckmaster, admitted that

“to induce any nation, however evil and abominable they might be, to lay down their arms on one set of terms and then, when they were defenceless, to impose another set, is an act of dishonour which can never be effaced.”

But, this was not the only thing that took place. Lloyd George conceded, on 7 October 1928, in a speech at the Guild Hall in London:

“The entire documentation which certain people among our Allies have placed before us, was made up of lies and is a swindle. We have ruled [in Versailles*] on the basis of forgeries.”

The Allied delegates confessed, at the session of 8 May 1919 at the Peace conference

at Trianon palace, that they had not the slightest notion of the problems of central Europe.¹⁰) Yet none of these shocking facts led to any change in the situation. The governments of those countries had given their word to the world and to Germany, and they broke it time and time again. Germany had laid down her arms in November 1918, trusting that the conditions of the Fourteen Points would be honoured, since Lloyd George for Britain and Clemenceau for France (as well as the United States of America) had committed themselves in a pre-armistice agreement. The Allies completely ignored their obligation. The armistice agreement was violated at the very outset with the continuation of the blockade against Germany. The Allies repeatedly breached their "Peace Treaty" thereafter, in the absence of any provocation by the German government, and at a time when Adolf Hitler was just entering the political arena.

The violations of the Versailles "Treaty" were:

1. Failure to respect the Reich's sovereignty and right to self-determination.
2. Annexation of parts of Upper Silesia by Poland in spite of a plebiscite in favour of remaining German.
3. Poland's violations of the borders drawn up at Versailles.
4. Annexation of the Memel territory by Lithuania, without plebiscite.
5. Misappropriation of Germany's colonies contrary to article 5 of Wilson's Fourteen Points as the one confirming "impartial regulations".
6. Non-observance of the minority rights of the separated ethnic Germans, despite contractual assurances.
7. Military occupation of the Ruhrort, Duisburg, of Düsseldorf, Mühlheim, Oberhausen and other West German cities in March 1921, and the relocation of the customs border; military occupation of the Ruhr area in January 1923 by France.
8. Prohibition of a Customs Union between Germany and Austria (to say nothing of the prohibition of unification of the two countries).
9. Non-compliance with the disarmament – guarantee.
10. Additional resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations for further restricting the "freedom" of Danzig.¹¹)
11. Expulsion of ethnic Germans, who were compulsory separated from the territories detached from the German Reich; by 1922 their numbers had already reached one million, not counting those interned by the Allies:
200,000 Expatriate – and colonial Germans;
120,000 Germans of Alsace-Lorraine;
500,000 Germans, refugees and exiles from West Prussia,
Posen and Eastern Upper Silesia;
100,000 Germans from Russia and the Baltics.

The countries in question never took stock of the grave consequences of these facts. Brave voices raised here and there were stifled by the wave of blinding hatred of anything German. In those lands the showing of hatred for Germany seemed to have become a way to demonstrate character and good citizenship, in keeping with the international or

rather “European” political standard. Not troubled in the least by the various critics, the victorious powers continued to regard their “treaty” as a means by which to conduct their general anti-German policy. Germany remained weak, dismembered, strife-torn, isolated from foreign affairs, economically ruined and under constant military threat from her neighbours. Danzig, Posen-West Prussia, Upper Silesia and Eastern Silesia, Memel, the Saarland, Sudetenland, Hultschin, Eupen-Malmedy, North-Schleswig, South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine*) – the “treaty” had stripped Germany of all these territories, turning them into detonators of conflict along her borders that made a reconciliation between the German nation and her neighbours still more difficult, if not impossible.

Indeed, a coalition of hostile European states could be mustered against Germany at any given moment. Adolf Hitler declared in a speech to the Reichstag on 17 May 1933:

“The hopes of restoring an international conception of justice have been dashed by the [Versailles] Treaty for, in order to justify all the measures of this diktat, the Allies had to brand Germany with the mark of guilt [for the war]. This procedure is both simplistic and impracticable. In future, the guilt for a conflict will always be borne by the defeated since the winners are always able to impose their own diagnosis. This practice leads thus to a dreadful result, because it gave them a reason for changing a balance of power as existing at the end of that war into a permanent legal fixture. Thus the concept of victor and vanquished became officially the foundation of a new international legal and social order.”

It took until the year 1958 before Europeans learned of the, hitherto solitary, appearance of some form of self-criticism emanating from official Paris:

“The full burden of the [Versailles] Treaty fell on Britain and France and the newly created states in Eastern Europe that could scarcely manage their own problems. The victors were neither strong enough to impose their will upon the vanquished, nor magnanimous enough to seek reconciliation with them. In spite of the idealistic internationalism of Geneva, no constructive European policy came about and so constant use was made of stopgap measures in order to maintain a dubious balance of power. The entire tragic nature of the period between the two World Wars is expressed in the failure of the League of Nations. Germany above all had cause to assume a suspicious attitude towards an organization that was based on the coalition of the victors. France had attempted to impose coercive measures on a vanquished Germany. By such means, Germany was driven to despair but France gained nothing... .. the creation of ‘successor-states’ that relied upon the ‘right to selfdetermination’, provided no satisfactory solution, for in practice that right was accorded only to certain majority nations...The creation of thousands of kilometres of new borderlines in Central and Eastern Europe solved none of the region’s economic problems. On the contrary...”

Let us repeat these thoughts with all urgency:

1. The States in Eastern Europe, newly created by Versailles, could scarcely manage their own problems.

2. The winners of Versailles were not magnanimous enough to attempt reconciliation with the defeated nations.
3. The League of Nations was unable to establish a constructive European policy.
4. Versailles created a new and precarious balance of power.
5. This doubtful balance of power was to be preserved according to the will of the League of Nations.
6. Germany was driven to despair by France's forcible measures.
7. The right to self-determination was reserved for only certain nations.

However, such an admission was too late and in any case, had no effect. Those statesmen, who had led the big battle against Imperial Germany in order to stamp out "the tyranny and the international anarchy", would not lift a finger to give a worthy democratic government in Germany an honest chance, once they had defeated Germany. Violence and international anarchy were thus the prospects for the future – at a time when nobody spoke of Hitler. And so Versailles has become the birthplace of National-Socialism. An American historian, who admits to "heartily disliking this Hitler", wrote:

"It is obvious that the revelations in the Nuremberg documents concerning Hitler's design for aggression are merely the last chapter in a long and a depressing book that began at Versailles."

8.15 Concealing the History of World War I

Long before World War I, revolutionaries led an assault against the Russian Empire. The czar responded but instead of exile to Siberia, Russian authorities deported at least 5,000 revolutionaries and terrorists, many of which fled to Paris. These dissidents, who may have included people like Avetis Nazarbekian and Mariam Vardanian, had more freedom in the West to carry out their subversive revolutionary actions against Imperial Russia. In 1883, to counter this activity, the Russian Imperial Police opened an office in Paris known as the Okhranka or Agentura. Okhranka's foreign bureau was composed of agents, double agents, and agent provocateurs who gathered information on the revolutionaries.

In March 1917, after the Bolsheviks overthrew the regime, they concentrated on their enemies within the Okhranka, and organized a committee to investigate czarist officials in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw, and Paris in order to prosecute them. Basil Maklakov, the last Russian Ambassador to France, closed his Paris office and boxed up its contents and placed the Okhranka files in sixteen 500-pound packing crates. The Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government in November. France repudiated Moscow's new government until 1924. In 1925, the Bolsheviks sought these vital, very revealing records. Maklakov claimed to have burnt them. Christian A. Herter, an associate of Hoover's American Relief Administration (1919-1923) had a house in Paris. Maklakov coaxed Herter to stash the records there until they could get them to America. Once in the US

officials transferred them to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Maklakov, justifiably fearful of retaliation from the Cheka, asked that the officials conceal the records until after his death which occurred in 1957, in Switzerland. He maintained contact with the Hoover Institution which would finally open the packing crates on October 28, 1957. A team would spend five years organizing and cataloguing a vast collection containing 206 boxes, 26 scrapbooks, 164,000 cards, and thousands of photographs, all available on 509 reels of microfilm. This collection includes files and photos of Stalin, Molotov, and Trotsky.

The winners write the history according to the unspoken but understood policies of the American Historical Association. Many influential tax-exempt foundations fund that association. Court historians regularly overlook historical facts in favor of the official version. These official guidelines for reporting history have been in place for over a century. The Eastern Establishment governs what is acceptable—in textbooks, magazines, or any other major publications targeted for libraries. The same provisions apply to the American Economic Association, the American Chemical Society, the American Psychological Association, and other prominent institutions which successfully control and manipulate society. In mid-1918, Hoover acquired the assistance of General John J. Pershing, the commanding general of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in his food distribution organization. Beginning in 1919, Hoover, with General Pershing's help, recruited at least 1,500 trusted officers from the US Army and the Supreme Economic Council and sent them throughout Europe to gather documents, in addition to the Okhranka records mentioned above. All of these records would comprise, by 1922, the Hoover War Collection. On February 5, 1921, *The New York Times* reported that Hoover, from Stanford University's first graduating class and one of its Trustees, presented the school with a collection of secret Bolshevik documents with descriptions of their initial organizational plans, along with records from other European countries. One agent acquired many Bolshevik records for \$200. These items joined a collection of 375,000 volumes and data already deposited in the university's library. The library already had more than 6,000 volumes "of court documents covering the complete official and secret proceedings of the Kaiser's war preparations and his wartime conduct of the German Empire, every record, in fact, except those of the Grand Military Headquarters itself." When Hoover began his "relief" efforts in Europe, he recognized the value of "original documents" to future historians and had agents scouring Europe for them. They evidently knew exactly what they were seeking and had been given ample funds to purchase documents.

The CFR formalized a historical blackout to circumvent any conscientious journalists who challenged the government's cover story, the official version, after World War II, and actually write about the realities of the war as many had done after World War I. The tax-exempt Rockefeller Foundation would later allot \$139,000 for a three-volume set of the history of World War II. Harry Elmer Barnes wrote, "The readjustment of historical writing to historical facts relative to the background and causes of the First World War, what is popularly known in the historical craft as 'Revisionism' was the most important

development in historiography during the decade of the 1920s." The cowardly writers who wished to remain in "the profession remained true to the mythology of the war decade."

In 1924, Bernard Baruch reportedly financed Maxwell L. Schuster and Dick Simon to form Simon and Schuster. Following World War II, just before the huge media and Hollywood emphasis on the Holocaust, William L. Shirer, worked for Edward R. Murrow, the European manager of Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). Shirer, a corporate journalist and a Jew, provided the news coverage, or the official version, during and immediately after the war. Similarly, Hoover, with the help of leading military leaders had subsequently collected and camouflaged the real history of World War I. Simon and Schuster published Shirer's 1,200-page tome, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, a History of Nazi Germany*, the source of much of the later rhetoric regarding Hitler and Germany. The concealment of historical events, in addition to the printed word, also applies to other media. When broadcast radio began in November 1920, the airwave spectrum, according to official theories, was in short supply. Consequently, they licensed and regulated this public commodity. People who had a political or religious message, or those with a product or service to sell, wanted airtime. By 1922, there were 576 stations licensed by the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover (1921-1928). By 1925, churches or religious groups owned sixty-three stations. The Commerce Department sponsored a series of conferences for major broadcasters. At the first meeting, a Westinghouse representative complained to Hoover that certain inferior stations, according to him, lacked substance and recommended that only preferred people be allowed to broadcast with a limit of 12-15 stations.

Hoover, as Commerce Secretary, was responsible for The Radio Act of 1927, which placed the responsibility of licensing and regulating (censoring) all the nation's radio stations in the hands of the federal government. That 1927 act established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), which, in 1929, issued a set of guidelines. Accordingly, a station was to accommodate the "tastes, needs and desires of all substantial groups among the listening public . . . in some fair proportion, by a well-rounded program, in which entertainment, consisting of music of both classical and lighter grades, religion, education and instruction, important public events, discussions of public questions, weather, market reports, and news, and matters of interest to all members of the family." Broadcasters began acting as public trustees and evidently people naïvely assumed that broadcasters would never violate that trust. The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that began operating on July 11, 1934 with seven commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Officials changed this to five in 1983.

British and American publishers and broadcasters who receive the most press coverage, airtime, and accolades consistently suppress the truth. Skeptical authors, in both countries, rarely, if ever, get a manuscript published if it is contrary to official opinions. Despite the number of schools, libraries and books, there is a huge decline in the population's knowledge and understanding. The literacy statistics in America and Britain substan-

tiate the fact that, with the increase of technology and laborsaving gadgets, allowing more discretionary time, people are more prone to believe trendy popularized, personable talking heads sponsored by multinational media corporations than their own perceptions, derived from personal examination of authentic alternative sources.

According to the official version of any event, a political assassination, a terrorist act, an airplane crash, or any other extraordinary occurrence, it can never be the result of a premeditated conspiracy. To avoid speculative questions and popular dissent, the talking heads at the government-licensed network news shows immediately and authoritatively report, within minutes of any tragedy, that the event was not the result of a conspiracy. Typically, the government sanctions an investigative commission stacked with individuals who always support the government's version of any event. Writers, who perpetuate the government's official story, are in essence, participants in a vile conspiracy, which is by definition an agreement between persons to deceive, mislead, or defraud others. Fabricating fraudulent reasons to send individuals into wars where they kill total strangers at the government's behest, while risking their lives and emotional well-being is the epitome of deception. The government creates and maintains more conspiracies than any other entity while deceiving and plundering millions of taxpayers. The government and their media cohorts have the power to consistently control and sustain the cover story of every event and all circumstances. The rewriting of history and the dissemination of disinformation is rampant.

In 1946, the Rockefeller Foundation, a huge sponsor of the CFR, functioning like a government agency, issued a report. It included the following statement, "The Committee on Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations is concerned that the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I should not be repeated and believes that the American public deserves a clear and competent statement of our basic aims and activities during the second World War."

Just exactly who creates some of these false histories? One such group might be the Carnegie Endowment. According to their Annual Report of the Secretary, the Trustees at the Carnegie Endowment, on the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, following their precedent from 1917, offered its services, equipment and personnel to the US Government. Since then, it devotes its efforts and assistance, in large part, to various government agencies in dealing with international business incident to warfare and in preparing useful materials for the post-war reconstruction of peace. It also offers such services to agents of other UN-associated governments with offices located in Washington. The Endowment's Washington offices are located close to the White House and the State Department and are a busy center of information, guidance, and advice by personal visits and interviews, by telephone, and by mail. It also assisted organizations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the American Society of International Law, the Inter-American Bar Association and the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association.

CBS Corporation owns Showtime, formerly known as Viacom, which it reorganized on

December 31, 2005 to create a mega media trust. Sumner Murray Redstone (born Sumner Murray Rothstein) owns seventy percent of its voting stock. He obtained an exclusive contract with the Smithsonian Institute, an educational and research institute. Taxpayers fund the institution with about \$800 million a year. Effective January 1, 2006, the Smithsonian restricted access to its archives and its scientists to Redstone's Showtime Network. Prior to this exclusive contract, all filmmakers relied on the vast holdings of the archives to produce accurate historical pieces. Millions of viewers now view history according to Showtime's version of history. Showtime has full access to millions of historical documents, films, photographs and thousands of hours of recordings unavailable anywhere else in the world. One has to obtain permission from Showtime, the Smithsonian's new collaborator, to access these resources.

9. Post War Era

9.1 The International Socialist Movement

The international Socialist movement was both a product of the nineteenth century and a revulsion against it. It was rooted in some of the characteristics of the century, such as its industrialism, its optimism, its belief in progress, its humanitarianism, its scientific materialism, and its democracy, but it was in revolt against its *laissez faire*, its middleclass domination, its nationalism, its urban slums, and its emphasis on the price-profit system as the dominant factor in all human values. This does not mean that all Socialists had the same beliefs or that these beliefs did not change with the passing years. On the contrary, there were almost as many different kinds of Socialism as there were Socialists, and the beliefs categorized under this term changed from year to year and from country to country. Industrialism, especially in its early years, brought with it social and economic conditions which were admittedly horrible. Human beings were brought together around factories to form great new cities which were sordid and unsanitary. In many cases, these persons were reduced to conditions of animality which shock the imagination. Crowded together in want and disease, with no leisure and no security, completely dependent on a weekly wage which was less than a pittance, they worked twelve to fifteen hours a day for six days in the week among dusty and dangerous machines with no protection against inevitable accidents, disease, or old age, and returned at night to crowded rooms without adequate food and lacking light, fresh air, heat, pure water, or sanitation.

These conditions have been described for us in the writings of novelists such as Dickens in England, Hugo or Zola in France, in the reports of parliamentary committees such as the Sadler Committee of 1832 or Lord Ashley's Committee in 1842, and in numerous private studies like *In Darkest England* by General William Booth of the Salvation Army. Just at the end of the century, private scientific studies of these conditions began to appear in England, led by Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People in London* or B. Seebohm Rowntree's *Poverty, a Study of I own Life*. The Socialist movement was a reaction against these deplorable conditions of the working masses. It has been customary to divide this movement into two parts at the year 1848, the earlier part being called "the period of the Utopian Socialists" while the later part has been called "the period of scientific Socialism." The dividing line between the two parts is marked by the publication in 1848 of *The Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. This work, which began with the ominous sentence, "A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism," and ended with the trumpet blast, "Workers of the world, unite!" is generally regarded as the seed from which developed, in the twentieth century, Russian Bolshevism and Stalinism. Such a view is undoubtedly an oversimplification, for the development of Socialist ideology is full of twists and turns and might well have grown

along quite different paths if the history of the movement itself had been different.

The history of the Socialist movement may be divided into three periods associated with the three Socialist Internationals. The First International lasted from 1864 to 1876 and was as much anarchistic as Socialistic. It was finally disrupted by the controversies of these two groups. The Second International was the Socialist International, founded in 1889. This became increasingly conservative and was disrupted by the Communists during World War I. The Third, or Communist, International was organized in 1919 by dissident elements from the Second International. As a result of the controversies of these three movements, the whole anticapitalist ideology, which began as a confused revolt against the economic and social conditions of industrialism in 1848, became sorted out into four chief schools. These schools became increasingly doctrinaire and increasingly bitter in their relationships. The basic division within the Socialist movement after 1848 was between those who wished to abolish or reduce the functions of the state and those who wished to increase these functions by giving economic activities to the state. The former division came in time to include the anarchists and the syndicalists, while the latter division came to include the Socialists and the Communists. In general the former division believed that man was innately good and that all coercive power was bad, with public authority the worst form of such coercive power. All of the world's evil, according to the anarchists, arose because man's innate goodness was corrupted and distorted by coercive power. The remedy, they felt, was to destroy the state. This would lead to the disappearance of all other forms of coercive power and to the liberation of the innate goodness of man. The simplest way to destroy the state, they felt, would be to assassinate the chief of the state; this would act as a spark to ignite a wholesale uprising of oppressed humanity against all forms of coercive power. These views led to numerous assassinations of various political leaders, including a king of Italy and a president of the United States, in the period 1895- 1905.

Syndicalism was a somewhat more realistic and later version of anarchism. It was equally determined to abolish all public authority, but did not rely on the innate goodness of individuals for the continuance of social life. Rather it aimed to replace public authority by voluntary associations of individuals to supply the companionship and management of social life which, according to these thinkers, the state had so signally failed to provide. The chief of such voluntary associations replacing the state would be labor unions. According to the syndicalists, the state was to be destroyed, not by the assassination of individual heads of states, but by a general strike of the workers organized in labor unions. Such a strike would give the workers a powerful esprit de corps based on a sense of their power and solidarity. By making all forms of coercion impossible, the general strike would destroy the state and replace it by a flexible federation of free associations of workers (syndicates). Anarchism's most vigorous proponent was the Russian exile Michael Bakunin (1814-1876). His doctrines had considerable appeal in Russia itself, but in western Europe they were widely accepted only in Spain, especially Barcelona, and in parts of Italy where economic and psychological conditions were somewhat similar to

those in Russia. Syndicalism flourished in the same areas at a later date, although its chief theorists were French, led by Georges Sorel (1847-1922).

The second group of radical social theorists was fundamentally opposed to the anarcho-syndicalists, although this fact was recognized only gradually. This second group wished to widen the power and scope of governments by giving them a dominant role in economic life. In the course of time, the confusions within this second group began to sort themselves out, and the group divided into two chief schools: the Socialists and the Communists. These two schools were further apart in organization and in their activities than they were in their theories, because the Socialists became increasingly moderate and even conservative in their activities, while remaining relatively revolutionary in their theories. However, as their theories gradually followed their activities in the direction of moderation, in the period of the Second International (1889-1919), violent controversies arose between those who pretended to remain loyal to the revolutionary ideas of Karl Marx and those who wished to revise these ideas in a more moderate direction to adapt them to what they considered to be changing social and economic conditions. The strict interpreters of Karl Marx came to be known as Communists, while the more moderate revisionist group came to be known as Socialists. The rivalries of the two groups ultimately disrupted the Second International as well as the labor movement as a whole, so that anti-labor regimes were able to come to power in much of Europe in the period 1918-1939. This disruption and failure of the working-class movement is one of the chief factors in European history in the twentieth century and, accordingly, requires at least a brief survey of its nature and background.

The ideas of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and of his associate Friedrich Engels (1820- 1895) were published in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 and in their three-volume opus, *Das Kapital* (1867-1894). Although they were aroused by the deplorable conditions of the European working classes under industrialism, the chief sources of the ideas themselves were to be found in the idealism of Hegel, the materialism of the ancient Greek atomists (especially Democritus), and the theories of the English classical economists (especially Ricardo). Marx derived from Hegel what has come to be known as the "historical dialectic." This theory maintained that all historical events were the result of a struggle between opposing forces which ultimately merged to create a situation which was different from either. Any existing organization of society or of ideas (thesis) calls forth, in time, an opposition (anti-thesis). These two struggle with each other and give rise to the events of history, until finally the two fuse into a new organization (synthesis). This synthesis in turn becomes established as a new thesis to a new opposition or antithesis, and the struggle continues, as history continues. A chief element in Marxist theory was the economic interpretation of history. According to this view, the economic organization of any society was the basic aspect of that society, since all other aspects, such as political, social, intellectual, or religious, reflected the organization and powers of the economic level.

From Ricardo, Marx derived the theory that the value of economic goods was based on

the amount of labor put into them. Applying this idea to industrial society where labor obtains wages which reflect only part of the value of the product they are making, Marx decided that labor was being exploited. Such exploitation was possible, he believed, because the working classes did not own the "instruments of production" (that is, factories, land, and tools) but had allowed these, by legal chicanery, to fall into the hands of the possessing classes. In this way, the capitalistic system of production had divided society into two antithetical classes: the bourgeoisie who owned the instruments of production and the proletariat who lived from selling their labor. The proletariat, however, were robbed of part of their product by the fact that their wages represented only a portion of the value of their labor, the "surplus value" of which they were deprived going to the bourgeoisie as profits. The bourgeoisie were able to maintain this exploitative system because the economic, social, intellectual, and religious portions of society reflected the exploitative nature of the economic system. The money which the bourgeoisie took from the proletariat in the economic system made it possible for them to dominate the political system (including the police and the army), the social system (including family life and education), as well as the religious system and the intellectual aspects of society (including the arts, literature, philosophy, and all the avenues of publicity for these). From these three concepts of the historical dialectic, economic determinism, and the labor theory of value, Marx built up a complicated theory of past and future history. He believed that "all history is the history of class struggles." Just as in antiquity, history was concerned with the struggles of free men and slaves or of plebians and patricians, so, in the Middle Ages, it was concerned with the struggles of serfs and lords, and, in modern times, with the struggles of proletariat and bourgeoisie. Each privileged group arises from opposition to an earlier privileged group, plays its necessary role in historical progress, and is, in time, successfully challenged by those it has been exploiting. Thus the bourgeoisie rose from exploited serfs to challenge successfully the older privileged group of feudal lords and moved into a period of bourgeois supremacy in which it contributed to history a fully capitalized industrial society but will be challenged, in its turn, by the rising power of the laboring masses.

To Marx, the revolution of the proletariat was not only inevitable but would inevitably be successful, and would give rise to an entirely new society with a proletariat system of government, social life, intellectual patterns, and religious organization. The "inevitable revolution" must lead to an "inevitable victory of the proletariat" because the privileged position of the bourgeoisie allowed them to practice a merciless exploitation of the proletariat, pressing these laboring masses downward to a level of bare subsistence, because labor, having become nothing but a commodity for sale for wages in the competitive market, would naturally fall to the level which would just allow the necessary supply of labor to survive. From such exploitation, the bourgeoisie would become richer and richer and fewer and fewer in numbers, and acquire ownership of all property in the society while the proletariat would become poorer and poorer and more and more numerous and be driven closer and closer to desperation. Eventually, the bourgeoisie would become so few and the proletariat would become so numerous that the latter could rise up in their

wrath and take over the instruments of production and thus control of the whole society. According to this theory, the “inevitable revolution” would occur in the most advanced industrial country because only after a long period of industrialism would the revolutionary situation become acute and would the society itself be equipped with factories able to support a Socialist system. Once the revolution has taken place, there will be established a “dictatorship of the proletariat” during which the political, social, military, intellectual, and religious aspects of society will be transformed in a Socialist fashion. At the end of this period, full Socialism will be established, the state will disappear, and a “classless society” will come into existence. At this point history will end. This rather surprising conclusion to the historical process would occur because Marx had defined history as the process of class struggle and had defined the state as the instrument of class exploitation. Since, in the Socialist state, there will be no exploitation and thus no classes, there will be no class struggles and no need for a state.

In 1889, after the First International had been disrupted by the controversies between anarchists and Socialists, a Second International had been formed by the Socialists. This group retained its allegiance to Marxist theory for a considerable period, but even from the beginning Socialist actions did not follow Marxist theory. This divergence arose from the fact that Marxist theory did not provide a realistic or workable picture of social and economic developments. It had no real provision for labor unions, for workers' political parties, for bourgeois reformers, for rising standards of living, or for nationalism, yet these became, after Marx's death, the dominant concerns of the working class. Accordingly, the labor unions and the Social-Democratic political parties which they dominated became reformist rather than revolutionary groups. They were supported by upper-class groups with humanitarian or religious motivations, with the result that the conditions of life and of work among the laboring classes were raised to a higher level, at first slowly and reluctantly, but, in time, with increasing rapidity. So long as industry itself remained competitive, the struggle between industrialists and labor remained intense, because any success which the workers in one factory might achieve in improving their wage levels or their working conditions would raise the costs of their employer and injure his competitive position with respect to other employers. But as industrialists combined together after 1890 to reduce competition among themselves by regulating their prices and production, and as labor unions combined together into associations covering many factories and even whole industries, the struggle between capital and labor became less intense because any concessions made to labor would affect all capitalists in the same activity equally and could be covered simply by raising the price of the product of all factories to the final consumers.

In fact, the picture which Marx had drawn of more and more numerous workers reduced to lower and lower standards of living by fewer and fewer exploitative capitalists proved to be completely erroneous in the more advanced industrial countries in the twentieth century. Instead, what occurred could be pictured as a cooperative effort by unionized workers and monopolized industry to exploit unorganized consumers by raising prices

higher and higher to provide both higher wages and higher profits. This whole process was advanced by the actions of governments which imposed such reforms as eight-hour days, minimum-wage laws, or compulsory accident, old age, and retirement insurance on whole industries at once. As a consequence, the workers did not become worse off but became much better off with the advance of industrialism in the twentieth century. This tendency toward rising standards of living also revealed another Marxist error. Marx had missed the real essence of the Industrial Revolution. He tended to find this in the complete separation of labor from ownership of tools and the reduction of labor to nothing but a commodity in the market. The real essence of industrialism was to be found in the application of nonhuman energy, such as that from coal, oil, or waterpower, to production. This process increased man's ability to make goods, and did so to an amazing degree. But mass production could exist only if it were followed by mass consumption and rising standards of living. Moreover, it must lead, in the long run, to a decreasing demand for hand labor and an increasing demand for highly trained technicians who are managers rather than laborers. And, in the longer run, this process would give rise to a productive system of such a high level of technical complexity that it could no longer be run by the owners but would have to be run by technically trained managers. Moreover, the use of the corporate form of industrial organization as a means for bringing the savings of the many into the control of a few by sales of securities to wider and wider groups of investors (including both managerial and laboring groups) would lead to a separation of management from ownership and to a great increase in the number of owners.

All these developments were quite contrary to the expectations of Karl Marx. Where he had expected impoverishment of the masses and concentration of ownership, with a great increase in the number of workers and a great decrease in the number of owners, with a gradual elimination of the middle class, there occurred instead (in highly industrialized countries) rising standards of living, dispersal of ownership, a relative decrease in the numbers of laborers, and a great increase in the middle classes. In the long run, under the impact of graduated income taxes and inheritance taxes, ... the great problem of advanced industrial societies became ... the exploitation of unorganized consumers (of the professional and lower-middle-class levels) by unionized labor and monopolized managers acting in concert. The influence of these last two groups on the state in an advanced industrial country also served to increase their ability to obtain what they wished from society as a whole. As a consequence of all these influences, the revolutionary spirit did not continue to advance with the advance of industrialism, as Marx had expected, but began to decrease, with the result that the more advanced industrial countries became less and less revolutionary. Moreover, what revolutionary spirit did exist in advanced industrial countries was not to be found, as Marx had expected, among the laboring population but among the lower middle class (so-called "petty bourgeoisie"). The average bank clerk, architect's draftsman, or schoolteacher was unorganized, found himself oppressed by organized labor, monopolized industry, and the growing power of the state, and found himself caught in the spiral of rising costs resulting from the efforts of his three oppressors to push the costs of social welfare and steady profits on to the unorganized

consumer. The petty bourgeois found that he wore a white collar, had a better education, was expected to maintain more expensive standards of personal appearance and living conditions, but received a lower income than unionized labor. As a consequence of all this, the revolutionary feeling existing in advanced industrial countries appeared among the petty bourgeoisie rather than among the proletariat, and was accompanied by psychopathic overtones arising from the suppressed resentments and social insecurities of this group. But these dangerous and even explosive feelings among the petty bourgeoisie took an anti-revolutionary rather than a revolutionary form and appeared as nationalistic, anti-Semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-labor-union movements rather than as antibourgeois or anticapitalist movements such as Marx had expected.

Unfortunately, as economic and social developments in advanced industrial countries moved in the un-Marxian directions we have mentioned, the unionized laborers and their Social Democratic political parties continued to accept the Marxist ideology or at least to utter the old Marxist war cries of "Down with the capitalists!" or "Long live the revolution!" or "Workers of the world, unite!" Since the Marxist ideology and the Marxist war cries were more easily observed than the social realities they served to conceal, especially when labor leaders sought all publicity for what they said and profound secrecy for what they did, many capitalists, some workers, and almost all outsiders missed the new developments completely and continued to believe that a workers' revolution was just around the corner. All this served to distort and to confuse people's minds and people's actions in much of the twentieth century. The areas in which such confusions became of great significance were in regard to the class struggle and to nationalism. We have pointed out that the class struggles between capitalists and the laboring masses were of great importance in the early stages of industrialism. In these early stages the productive process was more dependent on hand labor and less dependent on elaborate equipment than it became later. Moreover, in these early stages, labor was unorganized (and thus competitive), while capitalists were un-monopolized (and thus competitive). As the process of industrialization advanced, however, wages became a decreasing portion of productive costs, and other costs, especially the costs of equipment for mass production, for the technical management required by such equipment, and for the advertising and merchandising costs required for mass consumption, became more and more important. All of these things made planning of increasing significance in the productive process. Such planning made it necessary to reduce the number of uncontrolled factors in the productive process to a minimum while seeking to control as many of these factors as possible. An industry which had hundreds of millions of dollars (or even billions) in equipment and plant, as did the steel industry, automobiles, chemicals, or electrical utilities, had to be able to plan, in advance, the rate and the amount of usage that equipment would receive. This need led to monopoly, which was, essentially, an effort to control both prices and sales by removing competition from the market. Once such competition had been removed from the market, or substantially reduced, it became both possible and helpful for labor to be unionized.

Unionized labor helped planning by providing fixed wages for a fixed period into the future and by providing a better trained as well as a more highly disciplined labor force. Moreover, unionized labor helped planning by establishing the same wages, conditions, hours (and thus costs) on an industry-wide basis. In this way unionized labor and monopolized industry ceased to be enemies, and became partners in a planning project centered on a very expensive and complex technological plant. The class struggle in Marxian terms largely disappeared. The one exception was that, in a planned industry, the managerial staff could compare wage costs with fixed capital costs and might decide, to the resentment of labor, to replace a certain amount of labor by a certain amount of new machinery. Labor tended to resent this and to oppose it unless consulted on the problem. The net result was that rationalization of production continued, and advanced industrialized countries continued to advance in spite of the contrary influence of the monopolization of industry which made it possible, to some extent, for obsolete factories to survive because of decreased market competition. The effects of nationalism on the Socialist movement was of even greater significance. Indeed, it was so important that it disrupted the Second International in 1914-1919. Marx had insisted that all the proletariat had common interests and should form a common front and not fall victim to nationalism, which he tended to regard as capitalistic propaganda, seeking, like religion, to divert the workers from their legitimate aims of opposition to capitalism. The Socialist movement generally accepted Marx's analysis of this situation for a long time, arguing that workers of all countries were brothers and should join together in opposition to the capitalist class and the capitalist state. The Marxian slogans calling on the workers of the world to form a common front continued to be shouted even when modern nationalism had made deep inroads on the outlook of all workers. The spread of universal education in advanced industrial countries tended to spread the nationalist point of view among the working classes. The international Socialist movements could do little to reverse or hamper this development. These movements continued to propagate the internationalist ideology of international Socialism, but it became more and more remote from the lives of the average worker. The Social Democratic parties in most countries continued to embrace the international point of view and to insist that the workers would oppose any war between capitalist states by refusing to pay taxes to support such wars or to bear arms themselves against their "brother workers" in foreign countries.

How unrealistic all this talk was became quite clear in 1914 when the workers of all countries, with a few exceptions, supported their own governments in the First World War. In most countries only a small minority of the Socialists continued to resist the war, to refuse to pay taxes, or to serve in the armed forces, or continued to agitate for social revolution rather than for victory. This minority, chiefly among the Germans and Russians, became the nucleus of the Third, or Communist, International which was formed under Russian leadership in 1919. The Left-wing minority who became the Communists refused to support the war efforts of their various countries, not because they were pacifists as the Socialists were but because they were anti-nationalist. They were not eager to stop the war as the Socialists were, but wished it to continue in the hope that it would destroy

existing economic, social, and political life and provide an opportunity for the rise of revolutionary regimes. Moreover, they did not care who won the war, as the Socialists did, but were willing to see their own countries defeated if such a defeat would serve to bring a Communist regime to power. The leader of this radical group of violent dissident Socialists was a Russian conspirator, Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin (1870-1924). Although he expressed his point of view frequently and loudly during the war, it must be confessed that his support, even among extremely violent Socialists, was microscopic. Nevertheless, the fortunes of war served to bring this man to power in Russia in November 1917, as the leader of a Communist regime.

9.2 The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917

Friedrich Adler, who assassinated Austrian Prime Minister Karl von Sturgkh, on October 21, 1916, maintained contact "with the masonic leader Rothschild." Austrian Viktor Adler, father of Friedrich, warned Leon Trotsky, who was then exiled in Vienna that the authorities were going to capture him the next day, so he fled to Switzerland. Lenin stayed in Switzerland until March 1917. Ultimately, Trotsky arrived in New York City in January 1917, where he collaborated with Jacob H. Schiff, who ensconced him in an apartment and provided him with a chauffeur-driven limousine. After Trotsky had gathered a group of 300 Marxist revolutionaries from Manhattan's Lower East Side, Rockefeller allowed them to train in the Standard Oil compound in New Jersey. Then, they sailed from New York on the S.S. Kristianiafjord, chartered by Schiff, who also supplied Trotsky with \$20 million in gold. It was a paltry sum to acquire control of Russia and her vast natural resources. Rockefeller gave Trotsky \$10,000 for traveling expenses and arranged a special passport for him with President Woodrow Wilson.

Trotsky joined Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich, and Maxim Litvinov (Meyer H. Wallakh) for a strategy meeting in Switzerland before going to Russia. At the Congress of Vienna, officials guaranteed perpetual neutrality, to Switzerland, in the heart of Europe, due to the Rothschild's meticulous long-range planning. Industrialists, bankers, and politicians supported the Bolsheviks. On April 2, 1917, President Wilson said ". . . Assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening in the last few weeks in Russia . . . Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor." US State Department records document that National City Bank, controlled by Stillman and Rockefeller interests, and the Guaranty Trust, controlled by Morgan interests, both provided substantial loans to belligerent Russia before America entered World War I on April 6, 1917. The State Department told the banks that the loans were contrary to international law. However, they conducted the loan negotiations through official US government communications facilities, and the State Department allowed the message transference.

On April 13, 1917, officials waylaid the ship in Halifax and they arrested Trotsky. People

had warned Canadian officials that Trotsky would halt Russia's participation in the war, which would free up the German armies who would then attack Canadian troops on the Western Front. Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1916-1922) cabled them and ordered the immediate release of Trotsky. They ignored him. John D. Rockefeller then directed Canadian Minister Mackenzie King to intervene, and he maneuvered Trotsky's release. In April 1917, after nine years, Lenin was returning to Russia to join Trotsky, the person with the connections to the bankers. Germany did not anticipate that Lenin, with perhaps 200 followers, could challenge their enemy, Russia. Lenin arrived at the Russian frontier in a sealed train from Switzerland. Trotsky arrived from the United States a while later. Kurt Riezler was the conduit for German subsidies to the Bolsheviks and negotiated with Lenin's agents, Karl Radek, and Alexander Parvus. Riezler later claimed that it was his idea to transport Lenin in the sealed train from Zurich, through Germany to Russia. A few Germans considered supporting Stalin, as they believed they could influence him more than Lenin could. They wanted to destroy both Lenin and Stalin without destroying Russia. The Germans had two objectives, 1) get Lenin to end Russia's participation in the war, and 2) eliminate Lenin and his revolutionary goals. However, Lenin was incredibly deceptive. While he played along with them, he implemented his revolution, and he intended to manipulate them and then turn against them.

To allay the fears of his colleagues, Alexander Kerensky claimed that Lenin was a German agent to discredit him. The patriots in the Duma said, "The very fact that Lenin came back via Germany will harm his prestige to such an extent that there will be nothing more to fear from him." Lenin expected such an indictment and so, before boarding the German train, he asked others to attest to his credentials. Paul Levi, a Jewish political leader, a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), along with Rosa Luxemburg, who kept kosher, and Karl Liebknecht verified Lenin's legitimacy as a Marxist. One person wrote, "The Russian internationalists who are now leaving for Russia to serve the revolution will be helping us by fostering uprisings among the proletarians of other countries, particularly those of Germany and Austria, against their own governments." Lenin requested the writer of that endorsement to add the reference to Germany and Austria to refute the claim that he was a German agent.

German bankers, through their agents, gave Lenin money before he boarded the train. Lenin exploited everyone for his own objectives, one of which was to destroy imperial Germany, after he had seized power in Russia. In September 1917, Schiff gave Trotsky funds through the Warburg Bank, his correspondent in Stockholm, which managed Trotsky's account. While the bankers invested in Lenin and Trotsky's revolutionary activities, they did not anticipate getting revolutions in their own countries. If certain German and Jewish bankers had not given Lenin millions of dollars, his revolution and plans for world subversion would have failed. With Lenin, it was always the ends justify the means. Max Warburg, the head of the German Secret Service, allowed Lenin's train with \$20 million in gold to cross the border on its way to Russia. The bankers and industrialists did not espouse the Marxist ideology but recognized that it is the ultimate monopoly

for controlling the government, the monetary system and all property. Less than ten percent of the population had imposed a dictatorship on the rest of the country. The occupants of Lenin's train, of the 165 names published, twenty-three were Russian, three were Georgian, four were Armenian, one was a German, and 128 were Jewish.

Henry P. Davison, as Chairman of the War Council of the American Red Cross, assisted the Bolsheviks by sending food. Davison, who helped found the Bankers Trust Company, was a senior partner at J.P. Morgan & Company, and participated in the meeting on Jekyll Island in 1910, where plotters devised the creation of the Federal Reserve. The contrived reason for the revolution was that starving Russian workers revolted against the oppressive czarist regime. However, the Bolsheviks manipulated the workers just as revolutionaries in France, exploited the destitute workers during the French Revolution. Prior to the Bolshevik revolt, Russia had become a producer in the world's oil market. Thomas D. Thacher (S&B), whose brother worked for Henry L. Stimson (S&B), was a partner in the Wall Street law firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett. He represented the Soviet State Bank and assisted the Soviets to circumvent the law with the government's full cooperation. People at the Equitable Trust Building, 120 Broadway, in New York City, home of numerous firms, including the American International Corporation, developed the plan to participate in the brewing revolution. Thacher's 1917 memorandum, in consultation with Alfred Harmsworth, Lord Northcliffe, in London, called for assistance to the Bolsheviks. Thacher, who had visited Russia with William B. Thompson's Red Cross Mission, called for official recognition of the Soviet government. Because the Bolsheviks only controlled a small portion of the huge country, they required military and financial assistance to conquer the rest of the country.

Thacher thought that the United States should keep Japan out of Siberia, while giving assistance to the Soviets to build an army. He suggested that the Allied forces supply moral support to the Russian people in their political choices. Further, they should make every effort to maintain peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, until the inevitable conflict, in order to allow the Soviets to expand technologically and commercially. The Soviets would be unable to develop their natural resources without western assistance. The czar had rejected Rockefeller's help in developing the country's vast oil resources after Alphonse Rothschild died. President Woodrow Wilson sent US troops, under General William S. Graves to secure the Tran-Siberian Railroad for which the Soviets were grateful. Guaranty Trust and Brown Brothers saw a profitable opportunity with the Bolshevik Revolution, for which they supplied cash, guns, ammunition, and discreet political support from London, Washington, DC, and Paris, which gave minimal support. International bankers often finance both sides to incur major indebtedness. By their lending policies, the bankers decide which nation will be victorious. They loan the predetermined loser nation(s) enough money to participate but insufficient funds for a victory. Meanwhile, the banks lend the inevitable victor plenty of money with the understanding that the winner will honor the debts of the defeated countries, via the victor's seizure of the vanquished nation's natural and manufactured assets. The bankers invariably win while nations, even

victorious nations, mount up unpayable debt and squander their people in warfare.

Catherine Breshkovsky, the so-called Grandmother of the Russian Revolution, wrote to President Wilson, "A widespread education is necessary to make Russia an orderly democracy. We plan to bring this education to the soldier in the camp, to the workman in the factory, to the peasant in the village." Further, they could only maintain a democracy in Russia by militarily defeating and overthrowing Germany. She maintained that a free Russia could not survive if the people were untrained, unprepared and uneducated for governmental responsibilities, especially with Germany as "her next door neighbor." Thompson reiterated, "Russia would become speedily the greatest war prize the world has even known." In March 1918, President Wilson sent a telegram addressed to the Soviet Congress which read, "Let me take the opportunity on the occasion of this Soviet gathering to express the sincere sympathy felt by the American people for the Russian People. The American people are heartily with the Russian people in its determination to be forever free of autocratic government and to be master of its own destiny." Wilson sent Elihu Root to Russia with \$100 million from his Special Emergency War Fund to prop up the faltering Bolshevik regime. The evidence of Kuhn, Loeb and Company's support in the establishment of Communism is extensive. After their victory, the Bolsheviks transferred 600 million rubles in gold between the years 1918 and 1922, to Kuhn, Loeb.

American Jews such as the Warburg family funded Lenin and Trotsky. Armand Hammer, son of Russian-born Jewish immigrants, Julius and Rose (Lipshitz) Hammer, whose parents named him after the arm and hammer symbol of the Socialist Labor Party of America (SLP), was a Bolshevik agent. He later assisted in the formation of the American Communist Party, and advocated support for the Bolsheviks. In 1921, Armand Hammer went to the Soviet Union and stayed until late 1930. Jews were deeply involved in the revolution to destroy the czar and Christian Russia. Some individuals claim that British freemasons directed the B'nai B'rith in their installation of the Bolsheviks to destroy the possibility of a Eurasian alliance among France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and China, which would jeopardize British economic and geopolitical objectives. Germany, in the late 1800s, won a concession to build the Baghdad to Berlin railway, which would decrease Britain's importance as the dominate power.

On November 30, 1918, Trotsky addressed the Petrograd Soviet during which he spoke of two Americans with close connections to Wall Street, probably Thompson and Raymond Robins, a mining promoter. New York Federal Reserve Bank director (1914-1919), Thompson, left Petrograd on December 4, 1918, two days after he cabled a request for \$1 million to Morgan. The three key Soviet financiers were Thompson, Thomas W. Lamont, and Charles R. Crane (King Crane Commission). Without the help of J. Pierpont Morgan, and the Guaranty Trust Company, the Bolshevik Revolution would have failed as it did in 1905. Jacques Attali, the Jewish historian, academician and freemason, author of *The Jews, the World, and the Money*, confirmed in the magazine *L'Express* that the Jews invented capitalism. The Jews also developed state capitalism, which is communism, two diabolical systems that have caused the death of millions. Elizabeth Dilling

wrote, "Marxism, Socialism, or Communism in practice are nothing but state-capitalism and rule by a privileged minority, exercising despotic and total control over a majority having virtually no property or legal rights."

As long as currency creation, with its inherent debt structure, remains in the hands of the families that funded communism, the United States will never escape from the tyranny of the international money cabal. Experts say this about every country in which a central bank controls the currency and credit. The control of a nation's currency must be in the hands of the people who labor, not by those who seize the products of their labors. Communism, under other names, exists in every country, particularly the United States, and has been since the secretive, private Federal Reserve was established.

From the Book "The Creature of Jekyll Island" we learn:

The top Communist leaders have never been as hostile to their counterparts in the West, as the rhetoric suggests. They are quite friendly to the world's leading financiers and have worked closely with them, when it suits their purposes. As we shall see in the following section, the Bolshevik revolution actually was financed by wealthy financiers in London and New York. Lenin and Trotsky were on the closest of terms with these moneyed interests both before and after the Revolution. Those hidden liaisons have continued to this day and occasionally pop to the surface, when we discover a David Rockefeller holding confidential meetings with a Mikhail Gorbachev in the absence of government sponsorship or diplomatic purpose.

Masquerade in Moscow

One of the greatest myths of contemporary history is that the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was a popular uprising of the downtrodden masses against the hated ruling class of the Tsars. As we shall see, however, the planning, the leadership and especially the financing came entirely from outside Russia, mostly from financiers in Germany, Britain and the United States. Furthermore we shall see, that the Rothschild Formula played a major role in shaping these events. This amazing story begins with the war between Russia and Japan in 1904. Jacob Schiff, who was head of the New York investment firm Kuhn, Loeb and Company, had raised the capital for large war loans to Japan. It was due to this funding that the Japanese were able to launch a stunning attack against the Russians at Port Arthur and the following year to virtually decimate the Russian fleet. In 1905 the Mikado awarded Jacob Schiff a medal, the Second Order of the Treasure of Japan, in recognition of his important role in that campaign.

During the two years of hostilities thousands of Russian soldiers and sailors were taken as prisoners. Sources outside of Russia, which were hostile to the Tsarist regime, paid for the printing of Marxist propaganda and had it delivered to the prison camps. Russian-speaking revolutionaries were trained in New York and sent to distribute the pamphlets among the prisoners and to indoctrinate them into rebellion against their own government. When

the war was ended, these officers and enlisted men returned home to become virtual seeds of treason against the Tsar. They were to play a major role a few years later in creating mutiny among the military during the Communist takeover of Russia.

Trotsky was a multiple Agent

One of the best known Russian revolutionaries at that time was Leon Trotsky. In January of 1916 Trotsky was expelled from France and came to the United States. It has been claimed that his expenses were paid by Jacob Schiff. There is no documentation to substantiate that claim, but the circumstantial evidence does point to a wealthy donor in New York. He remained for several months, while writing for a Russian socialist paper, the *Novy Mir* (New World) and giving revolutionary speeches at mass meetings in New York City. According to Trotsky himself, on many occasions a chauffeured limousine was placed at his service by a wealthy friend, identified as Dr. M. In his book, *My Life*, Trotsky wrote:

The doctor's wife took my wife and the boys out driving and was very kind to them. But she was a mere mortal, whereas the chauffeur was a magician, a titan, a superman! With the wave of his hand he made the machine obey his slightest command. To sit beside him was the supreme delight. When they went into a tea room, the boys would anxiously demand of their mother, 'Why doesn't the chauffeur come in?' (Leon Trotsky: *My Life*, New York publisher: Scribner's, 1930, p. 277)

It must have been a curious sight to see the family of the great socialist radical, defender of the working class, enemy of capitalism, enjoying the pleasures of tea rooms and chauffeurs, the very symbols of capitalist luxury. On March 23, 1917 a mass meeting was held at Carnegie Hall to celebrate the abdication of Nicolas II, which meant the overthrow of Tsarist rule in Russia. Thousands of socialists, Marxists, nihilists and anarchists attended to cheer the event. The following day there was published on page two of the *New York Times* a telegram from Jacob Schiff, which had been read to this audience. He expressed regrets, that he could not attend and then described the successful Russian revolution as "...what we had hoped and striven for these long years". (Mayor Calls Pacifists Traitors, *The New York Times*, March 24, 1917, p. 2)

In the February 3, 1949 issue of the *New York Journal America* Schiff's grandson, John, was quoted by columnist Cholly Knickerbocker as saying that his grandfather had given about \$20 million for the triumph of Communism in Russia. (To appraise Schiff's motives for supporting the Bolsheviks, we must remember, that he was a Jew and that Russian Jews had been persecuted under the Tsarist regime. Consequently the Jewish community in America was inclined to support any movement, which sought to topple the Russian government and the Bolsheviks were excellent candidates for the task. As we shall see further along, however, there were also strong financial incentives for Wall Street firms, such as Kuhn, Loeb and Company, of which Schiff was a senior partner, to see the old regime fall into the hands of revolutionaries, who would agree to grant lucrative business

concessions in the future in return for financial support today.)

When Trotsky returned to Petrograd in May of 1917 to organize the Bolshevik phase of the Russian Revolution, he carried \$10,000 for travel expenses, a generously ample fund considering the value of the dollar at that time. Trotsky was arrested by Canadian and British naval personnel, when the ship, on which he was traveling, the S.S. Kristianiafjord, put in at Halifax. The money in his possession is now a matter of official record. The source of that money has been the focus of much speculation, but the evidence strongly suggests, that its origin was the German government. It was a sound investment.

Trotsky was not arrested on a whim. He was recognized as a threat to the best interests of England, Canada's mother country in the British Commonwealth. Russia was an ally of England in the First World War, which then was raging in Europe. Anything, that would weaken Russia - and that certainly included internal revolution - would be, in effect, to strengthen Germany and weaken England. In New York on the night before his departure Trotsky had given a speech, in which he said: "I am going back to Russia to overthrow the provisional government and stop the war with Germany." (A full report on this meeting had been submitted to the U.S. Military Intelligence. See Senate Document No. 62, 66th Congress, Report and Hearings of the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 1919, Vol. II, p. 2680.) Trotsky therefore represented a real threat to England's war effort. He was arrested as a German agent and taken as a prisoner of war.

With this in mind we can appreciate the great strength of those mysterious forces both in England and the United States, that intervened on Trotsky's behalf. Immediately telegrams began to come into Halifax from such divergent sources, as an obscure attorney in New York City, from the Canadian Deputy Postmaster-General and even from a high-ranking British military officer, all inquiring into Trotsky's situation and urging his immediate release. The head of the British Secret Service in America at the time was Sir William Wiseman, who, as fate would have it, occupied the apartment directly above the apartment of Edward Mandell House and who had become fast friends with him. House advised Wiseman, that President Wilson wished to have Trotsky released. Wiseman advised his government and the British Admiralty issued orders on April 21st, that Trotsky was to be sent on his way. ("Why Did We Let Trotsky Go? How Canada Lost an Opportunity to Shorten the War", MacLeans magazine, Canada, June 1919. Also see Martin, pp. 163-164.) It was a fateful decision, that would affect not only the outcome of the war, but the future of the entire world.

It would be a mistake to conclude, that Jacob Schiff and Germany were the only players in this drama. Trotsky could not have gone even as far as Halifax without having been granted an American passport and this was accomplished by the personal intervention of President Wilson. Professor Antony Sutton says:

President Woodrow Wilson was the fairy godmother, who provided Trotsky with a passport to return to Russia to "carry forward" the revolution... At the same time careful

State Department bureaucrats, concerned about such revolutionaries entering Russia, were unilaterally attempting to tighten up passport procedures. (Antony C. Sutton, Ph. D.: *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*, published by Arlington House in New Rochelle, NY, 1974, p. 25)

And there were others, as well. In 1911 the St. Louis Dispatch published a cartoon by a Bolshevik named Robert Minor. Minor was later to be arrested in Tsarist Russia for revolutionary activities and in fact was himself bankrolled by famous Wall Street financiers. Since we may safely assume, that he knew his topic well, his cartoon is of great historical importance. It portrays Karl Marx with a book entitled *Socialism* under his arm, standing amid a cheering crowd on Wall Street. Gathered around and greeting him with enthusiastic handshakes are characters in silk hats identified as John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, John D. Ryan of National City Bank, Morgan partner George W. Perkins and Teddy Roosevelt, leader of the Progressive Party.

What emerges from this sampling of events is a clear pattern of strong support for Bolshevism coming from the highest financial and political power centers in the United States; from men, who supposedly were "capitalists" and who according to conventional wisdom should have been the mortal enemies of socialism and communism. Nor was this phenomenon confined to the United States. Trotsky in his book *My Life* tells of a British financier, who in 1907 gave him a "large loan" to be repaid after the overthrow of the Tsar. Arsene de Goulevitch, who witnessed the Bolshevik Revolution firsthand, has identified both the name of the financier and the amount of the loan. "In private interviews", he said, "I have been told that over 21 million rubles were spent by Lord [Alfred] Milner in financing the Russian Revolution... The financier just mentioned was by no means alone among the British to support the Russian revolution with large financial donations." Another name specifically mentioned by de Goulevitch was that of Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia at the time. (See *Arsene de Goulevitch: Czarism and Revolution*, published by Omni Publications in Hawthorne, California, no date; rpt. from 1962 French edition, pp. 224, 230) It was one thing for Americans to undermine Tsarist Russia and thus indirectly help Germany in the war, because American were not then into it, but for British citizens to do so was tantamount to treason. To understand, what higher loyalty compelled these men to betray their battlefield ally and to sacrifice the blood of their own countrymen, we must take a look at the unique organization, to which they belonged.

Round Table Agents in Russia

In Russia prior to and during the revolution there were many local observers, tourists and newsmen, who reported, that British and American agents were everywhere, particularly in Petrograd, providing money for insurrection. On report said, for example, that British agents were seen handing out 25-rouble notes to the men at the Pavlovski regiment just a few hours, before it mutinied against its officers and sided with the revolution.

The subsequent publication of various memoirs and documents made it clear, that this funding was provided by Milner and channeled through Sir George Buchanan, who was the British Ambassador to Russia at the time. (See de Goulevitch, p. 230) It was a repeat of the ploy, that had worked so well for the cabal many times in the past. Round Table members were once again working both sides of the conflict to weaken and topple a target government. Tsar Nicholas had every reason to believe, that since the British were Russia's allies in the war against Germany, British officials would be the last persons on Earth to conspire against him. Yet the British Ambassador himself represented the hidden group, which was financing the regime's downfall.

The Round Table Agents from America did not have the advantage of using the diplomatic service as cover and therefore had to be considerably more ingenious. They came not as diplomats or even as interested businessmen, but disguised as Red Cross officials on a humanitarian mission. The group consisted almost entirely of financiers, lawyers and accountants from New York banks and investment houses. They simply had overpowered the American Red Cross organization with large contributions and in effect purchased a franchise to operate in its name. Professor Sutton tells us:

The 1910 [Red Cross] fund-raising campaign for \$2 million, for example, was successful only, because it was supported by these wealthy residents of New York City. J.P. Morgan himself contributed \$100,000... Henry P. Davison [a Morgan partner] was chairman of the 1910 New York Fund-Raising Committee and later became chairman of the War Council of the American Red Cross... The Red Cross was unable to cope with the demands of World War I. and in effect was taken over by these New York bankers. (Sutton: Revolution, p. 72)

For the duration of the war the Red Cross had been made nominally a part of the armed forces and subject to orders from the proper military authorities. It was not clear, who these authorities were and in fact there were never any orders, but the arrangement made it possible for the participants to receive military commissions and wear the uniform of American army officers. The entire expense of the Red Cross Mission in Russia, including the purchase of uniforms, was paid for by the man, who was appointed by President Wilson to become its head, "Colonel" William Boyce Thompson. Thompson was a classical specimen of the Round Table network. Having begun his career as a speculator in copper mines, he soon moved into the world of high finance. He

- refinanced the American Woolen Company and the Tobacco Products Company;
- launched the Cuban Cane Sugar Company;
- purchased controlling interest in the Pierce Arrow Motor Car Company;
- organized the Submarine Boat Corporation and the Wright-Martin Aeroplane Company;
- became a director of the Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway, the Magma Arizona Railroad and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company;
- was one of the heaviest stockholders in the Chase National Bank;
- was the agent for J.P. Morgan's British securities operation;
- became the first full-time director of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the most

important bank in the Federal Reserve System;
-and of course contributed a quarter-million dollars to the Red Cross.

When Thompson arrived in Russia, he made it clear, that he was not your typical Red Cross representative. According to Hermann Hagedorn, Thompson's biographer:

He deliberately created the kind of setting, which would be expected of an American magnate: established himself in a suite in the Hotel de l'Europe, bought a French limousine, went dutifully to receptions and teas and evinced an interest in objects of art. Society and the diplomats, noting that here was a man of parts and power, began to flock about him. He was entertained at the embassies, at the houses of Kerensky's ministers. It was discovered, that he was a collector and those with antiques to sell fluttered around him offering him miniatures, Dresden china, tapestries, even a palace or two. (Hermann Hagedorn: *The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson and His Time*, published by Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1935, pp. 192-93)

When Thompson attended the opera, he was given the imperial box. People on the street called him the American Tsar. And it is not surprising, that according to George Kennan, "He was viewed by the Kerensky authorities as the 'real' ambassador of the United States." (George F. Kennan: *Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920* published by Princeton University Press in Princeton, NJ, 1956, p. 60) It is now a matter of record, that Thompson syndicated the purchase on Wall Street of Russian bonds in the amount of ten million roubles. (Hagedorn, p. 192) In addition, he gave over two million roubles to Aleksandr Kerensky for propaganda purposes inside Russia and with J.P. Morgan gave the rouble equivalent of one million dollars to the Bolsheviks for the spreading of revolutionary propaganda outside of Russia, particularly in Germany and Austria. (Sutton: *Revolution*, pp. 83, 91.) It was the agitation made possible by this funding, that led to the abortive German Spartacus Revolt of 1918. (See article "W.B. Thompson, Red Cross Donor, Believes Party Misrepresented" in the *Washington Post* of Feb. 2, 1918) A photograph of the cablegram from Morgan to Thompson advising, that the money had been transferred to the National City Bank branch in Petrograd, is included in this book.

An Object Lesson in South Africa

At first it may seem incongruous, that the Morgan group would provide funding for both Kerensky and Lenin. These men may have both been socialist revolutionaries, but they were miles apart in their plans for the future and in fact were bitter competitors for control of the new government. But the tactic of funding both sides in a political contest by then had been refined by members of the Round Table into a fine art. A stunning example of this occurred in South Africa during the outset of the Boer War in 1899.

9.3 Marxist Subversion throughout Europe

By November 1918, every country in Europe was experiencing economic chaos, and the destabilization associated with warfare, just as the Bolshevik criminals intended. On November 24, 1918, Béla Kuhn, a former journalist, a communist politician, and a Bolshevik revolutionary founded the Communist Party of Hungary (KMP) in Budapest. There was rampant inflation, mass unemployment, housing shortages, food and energy shortages, and widespread protests, a highly suitable environment in which to establish socialism. In his early travels, including to Petrograd and Moscow, Kuhn met Vladimir Lenin, who was more to the right than Kuhn. He created an ultraradical left-wing faction in opposition to Lenin, and the conventional Bolsheviks. They endorsed revolutionary offensive by any means possible.

The Bolsheviks declared Bremen, Germany, as a Soviet Republic, which existed from November 1918 to February 1919. On April 6, 1919, they declared a Bavarian Soviet Republic, which lasted until May 3, 1919. They created a Red Army, and established secret police squads to commit terrorist activities against every citizen and to liberate neighboring countries. The Soviet Ukraine waged war on Romania and prepared to march west to meet Soviet Hungary.

Anarchy, hunger, and hardships made every European country vulnerable to communist infiltration as numerous governments collapsed, including the German Empire. As quickly as the Soviets had declared peace, they now declared war, and sent the Red Army to take over the governments of Estonia (November 29, 1918), Latvia (December 4), Lithuania (December 8). The revolution in Germany would begin at the end of World War I. On December 17, 1918, the Marxists published a manifesto in Riga describing the war-weary vulnerable German Empire as the main target of their immediate assault. Lenin said, "We are at the doorstep of world revolution." Lenin and Trotsky began to construct a World Soviet Socialist Republic, their ultimate goal, by creating communist factions on each continent. They funded this from Russia's gold reserves. The communist ideology stated—the old world must be destroyed and replaced by a new one; this destruction requires gaining political control through any means possible—peaceful, violent, open or secret; the struggle for this new world must unfold on a world scale rather than a national one. Their stated philosophy is, "The interests of the World Revolution are more important than the interests of individual countries."

After World War I, Jewish-led revolutionary movements peopled by the propagandized poverty-stricken working classes swept across war-torn Europe. On March 4, 1919, at a Congress in Moscow, Lenin and Trotsky devised the Communist International, or Comintern, with the objective of creating a World Soviet Socialist Republic. According to official Hungarian documents, Bolshevism in Hungary was a Judaea-Masonic movement. On March 21, 1919, communists established the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The new government had numerous freemasons headed by Hungarian Béla Kuhn. The Hungarian Commissariat consisted of twenty-six, eighteen of who were Jewish. Kuhn's new Hun-

garian Soviet Republic promised equality and social justice. It only lasted until August 6, 1919, collapsing when Romanian forces occupied Budapest during the Hungarian-Romanian War. Officials created the Kingdom of Hungary after the Romanian Army withdrew.

On March 24, 1919, the communist infiltrators seized control of the government buildings in Hamburg. In other industrialized cities in central Germany, they sequestered court buildings, municipal buildings, banks, and police headquarters. Their official newspaper, *Die Rote Fahne* advocated a general revolution. Despite their success and their propaganda efforts, their revolution failed to achieve their objectives. On June 20, 1919, members of the Hungarian Red Army entered Slovakia and declared the Slovak Soviet Republic. The Communist Party of Russia, with all of the confiscated gold reserves of Russia, financed the activities of the Marxist regimes in other countries. Comintern officials at the Kremlin made the decisions, and the Soviet secret police enforced them. They eliminated those who opposed the tyrannical central control. On August 5, 1919, Trotsky issued a memo stating, "The road to Paris and London lies through the cities of Afghanistan, Punjab, and Bengal." On March 6, 1920, Lenin said, "Victory will be ensured in the not-too distant future." Lenin prepared to invade India. Trotsky thought it essential to have an Asian command center from which to conduct a revolution in India, in conjunction with, and support of local revolutionaries. While the Bolsheviks wanted to immediately initiate another world war, the Russians were engaged in a civil war (1918-1919). Because they were expending the nation's resources on fighting against dissident Russians, they were unable to initiate another world war. Moreover, Trotsky and Lenin could not send financing to the communist leaders they had installed in Central European countries nor could they send the Red Army to Germany.

On July 23, 1920, Lenin cabled Stalin, who was at the Polish front, "Situation in Comintern is outstanding. Zinoviev (Grigory), Bukharin (Nikolai), and I think that it would be proper to encourage a revolution in Italy. My personal opinion is that to do so, Hungary has to be sovietized, possibly along with Czechoslovakia and Rumania." Lenin told some French delegates in the Comintern congress, "Yes, the Soviet troops are in Warsaw. Soon, Germany will be ours. We will conquer Hungary again; the Balkans will rise against capitalism. Italy will tremble. Bourgeois Europe is crackling at the seams in the storm." While the Bolshevik slaughter in Russia horrified the Christian world, others, especially in Europe, viewed it as heroic.

In 1920, hundreds of communist agitators entered a disheartened, economically ruined Germany, the perfect crisis environment to emphasize class struggle, and provoke a revolution against the status quo. In March 1920, about twelve million workers participated in a strike. On December 6, 1920, Lenin said that in order to have soviet communist world dominion or "victory of socialism all over the world," that they would have to incite the conflicts and contradictions between the capitalist states, to let them exhaust themselves fighting each other. On December 30, 1922, in Moscow, the Bolsheviks created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the implications that there were

no geographic limitations but rather worldwide with global image on its coat of arms. Their first target was Germany. They had a regular commission just to concentrate on Germany composed of the top leadership—Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Nikolai Bukharin (Moshe Pinkhus-Dolgolevsky), and Karl Radek. Stalin, who had taken over the party from Lenin, felt that it was imperative that they conceal the fact that the Bolsheviks in the USSR had instigated and dictated the circumstances of the revolution in Germany which they planned for November 9, 1923.

In almost every nation, the Comintern helped to establish communist parties, all dictated by policies from Moscow. For the most part, delegates from the various nations representing communist parties were trade union members, members of legislative bodies, and other government officials. communists engaged in open terrorism, and assassinations, followed by coup d'état and infiltration of existing governments. Their ideology advocates the following:

- 1) They must destroy the old world and build a new one in its place.
- 2) To do that, it is necessary to gain political power which requires using all measures, ranging from the most peaceful to the most violent, from the most open to the most secretive.
- 3) They must impose a new world on a world scale. "The interests of the World Revolution are more important than the interests of individual countries."

Marxist Infiltration in Germany

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the strongest party in Germany, steadily increased in membership, from 384,327 in 1906 to 1,085,905 by 1914. In 1912, it had 110 seats in the Reichstag, the German parliament. Trade unions were also very strong. In 1892, at least 237,000 workers belonged to a union. The number grew to 2,600,000 by 1912. When Russia declared war on Germany, needing funds for defense, Germany attempted to borrow money from Wall Street, but found that the international financial markets excluded her. However, they funded France and Britain's warfare. Germany resorted to domestic borrowing, mainly from institutions and large corporations. Thus the Reichstag passed a series of war credits (bonds). On August 4, 1914, Friedrich Ebert, August Bebel's successor as SPD co-chairman, and other party members, like Karl Liebknecht, supported these bonds to finance Germany in World War I, despite the party's supposed anti-war position. These bonds only covered two-thirds of the costs and carried interest, a growing expense which required further resources to pay.

In 1915, the SPD advocated German participation in World War I. The avid Marxists who dominated the SPD tried to legitimize their support of the war in the Reichstag. Heinrich Cunow, Paul Lensch, and Konrad Haenisch led this group, individuals who were close to Alexander Parvus, a wealthy Jewish revolutionary, who had joined the SPD by 1886. In early 1915, Franz Mehring, sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, and their October

Revolution, and Rosa Luxemburg, a Polish Jew, edited and published the magazine *Die Internationale*. She, Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, and others, officially founded the anti-war Spartacus League on January 1, 1915. They quietly funded a conference in Berlin to attract a growing number of like-minded people. Meanwhile, they worked to instigate strikes. There had been none between August and December 1914. However, in 1915, about 13,000 workers participated in 140 strikes. On May 1, 1916 (a communist holiday), Luxemburg and Liebknecht organized an anti-war demonstration, with 10,000 workers in Berlin. In June, in Berlin, 55,000 munitions workers went on strike. Concurrently, strikes erupted in Bremen and Braunschweig. In 1916, there were 125,000 workers who participated in 240 strikes.

In January 1917, given their success instigating strikes and demonstrations, Luxemburg, Liebknecht and Haase left the SPD and founded the anti-war Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD). Kautsky, whose wife was close to Luxemburg, soon left the SPD and joined them. After the November revolution in Germany, Kautsky would become the under-secretary of State in the Foreign Office where he would attempt to find documents proving Germany's war guilt. Author Fritz Fischer purportedly discovered secret archival documents long after the war. He described the September Plan in two books, claiming that Germany had expansionary goals, its alleged goals for going to war, the claim that Kautsky had made in 1915. Over the winter, the food situation worsened and by March 1917, the government had to decrease bread rations. From January through April of 1917, more than 400,000 workers were involved in more strikes than had taken place in the previous year. In April 1917, decreased bread rations ignited another wave of strikes. In Berlin, over 300,000 workers refused to work, demanded peace, the release of all political prisoners, and more food. As a result of the strikes of April 1917, and January 1918, the USPD instituted the office of Revolutionary Shop Stewards whose stewards would maintain regular connections to the USPD and play a big part in the strikes. By mid-1917, Matthias Erzberger, of the Centre Party, began opposing the war which, with the concurrent strikes, seriously undermined military morale. He authored the Peace Resolutions that the Reichstag adopted on July 17, 1917, seeking a negotiated peace. In October 1918, he would become Secretary of State after he helped oust Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.

The German army was slowly losing ground, not because of Allied strength but to the undermining actions of officials. General Erich Ludendorff blamed the government and certain civilians for the military surrender and the subsequent armistice, claiming they withheld support. Additionally, Vladimir Lenin's Marxist agitators had infiltrated the unions and had waged a relentless drive of subversion and sabotage. Officials arrested some of them and found incriminating documents. Jewish managers provided considerable funds to Liebknecht and Luxemburg to conduct espionage activities in order to instigate an insurrection. Over 70,010 Jews were among Russia's communist leadership and they made certain to disseminate a majority of Jewish agents throughout Europe.

While they were negotiating for peace in Brest-Litovsk, February- March 1918, the Bol-

sheviks in St. Petersburg published 500,000 inflammatory copies of *Die Fackel* (The Torch) for distribution in German. This subversion facilitated instability while German soldiers were fighting a bloody battle in the West. 1629 The Bolsheviks may have procrastinated signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty to allow their agents more organizational time. Liebknecht, along with Luxemburg, a dedicated Marxist, and a naturalized German citizen, influenced some of the German negotiators to agree with Trotsky. The Marxists sent agitators among the steel workers unions; they were able to organize at least 500,000 workers to go on strike. General Erich Ludendorff, exasperated with this obvious foreign subversion, persuaded the workers to return to work within a week. 1630 Despite the peace treaty, the unethical Marxists still published German-language propaganda, and set up additional groups in Germany to exploit war-related political and economic instabilities.

On September 29, 1918, the Supreme Army Command informed Kaiser Wilhelm, at the Imperial Army headquarters in Spa, Belgium, about the military situation with decreased armaments and the numerous uprisings in Berlin and other places. Ludendorff asked for an immediate cease fire and suggested that Germany accept President Wilson's peace terms, which would place the nation on an equal basis with the Allies. On that same day, the Prussian Kingdom assumed its pre-war authority, which lasted until Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication. Henry Cabot Lodge had attacked Wilson's Fourteen Points as unrealistic and too weak, maintaining that they should militarily and economically demolish Germany, and then burden it with severe penalties to remove all possible future threats to Europe's stability. This sounds strangely similar to the vindictive Morgenthau Plan after World War II. The German Revolution soon erupted, lasting from November 4, 1918 to August 11, 1919.

On November 7, 1918, Kurt Eisner, a Jew living in Munich, attended a peace rally in Munich. In front of approximately 60,000 people he demanded the end of the war, the institution of an eight-hour work day, and assistance for the poor and unemployed. He demanded that King Ludwig III, of the Wittelsbach monarchy in Bavaria, and Emperor Wilhelm II relinquish their positions. Eisner wanted to replace them with councils, composed of workers and soldiers. The crowd, swayed by his fervency, marched to the army barracks where they persuaded many of the soldiers to join the revolution. That evening, Ludwig went into exile. On November 8, Eisner proclaimed Bavaria a free state and he became Minister-President of Bavaria. He quickly dissociated himself from the Bolsheviks and other communists. One can only imagine how the German soldiers must have felt, just returning home from war and seeing their country in a Jewish-led communist revolution trying to repeat the Bolshevik-Revolution.

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posed of workers and soldiers. The crowd, swayed by his fervency, marched to the army barracks where they persuaded many of the soldiers to join the revolution. That evening, Ludwig went into exile. On November 8, Eisner proclaimed Bavaria a free state and he became Minister-President of Bavaria. He quickly dissociated himself from the Bolsheviks and other communists. On November 9, 1918, Luxemburg founded the *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Flag), the central organ of the Spartacist League, which would evolve into the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), during a founding congress, December 30, 1918 to January 1, 1919, part of the Comintern. The expertly-trained agents, such as Luxemburg, fomented strikes in vital industries, particularly those related to the war effort. They emboldened civil disorder with rhetoric that challenged people's faith. They promoted contempt and ridicule for political and military leaders. They used rational arguments and emotional slogans that encouraged people to question traditional moral values such as honesty, sobriety, integrity and commitment.

The Kaiser appointed Prince Maximilian of Baden as the new Imperial Chancellor who then announced the abdication of the Kaiser. On November 7, 1918, the prince formed a new government, which included Friedrich Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann, and other top SPD members. The French masonic lodge "Art et Travail in Paris", was a study center for Scheidemann, Lenin, Trotsky, and Béla Kuhn. Recall, that in August 1914, Ebert had led the SPD to unanimously vote for war loans to fight a necessary patriotic war. On November 9, 1918, after the German Revolution erupted, Maximilian relinquished his office to Ebert, the head of the provisional government for the next several months. Maximilian appointed Secretary of State, Matthias Erzberger to represent Germany in the negotiations in the Forest of Compiègne. Scheidemann, who had also been pro-war, proclaimed the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) to replace the imperial form of government, following the Kaiser's abdication. He did this to ostensibly counter Liebknecht's declaration of a Free Socialist Republic. German nationalists referred to Ebert, Erzberger, and Walter Rathenau as November Criminals. Many Germans blamed the civilian government who they say failed to support the army who were undefeated in the field and that Marxists sabotaged and now ruled the country.

Britain and France were war-weary, and had not penetrated Germany's western frontier and had no will to do so. Those nations were ready to capitulate even though the United States had re-supplied them. In the east, Germany had prevailed against Russia and they had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Germany was close to winning the war in the West, with the Spring Offensive, which began on March 21, 1918, when they advanced further into enemy territory, before fresh US troops entered the war. The German armies were in France and Belgium in November 1918, when German officials surrendered. Thereafter, the armies withdrew. One of the biggest contributing factors for the surrender was the strikes occurring in the arms industry, which left the military with an insufficient supply of armaments. Further, the West's industrialization of warfare, in addition to the blockades, initiated a radical dehumanizing war that helped to defeat Germany.

German soldiers relinquished their weapons with the understanding that the government arbitrators would devise the peace treaty according to Wilson's Fourteen Points. They felt that the politicians had pressured them into putting down their arms without a legitimate military defeat. The relative ease of a deceptive unconditional surrender strengthened the conspiratorial relationship of the three major Allies. In addition to a military loss, the Treaty of Versailles would impose further territorial and financial losses. When the new government forced Kaiser Wilhelm to abdicate, the military, under General Paul von Hindenburg, commander-in-chief, relinquished its executive power to the temporary civilian government. Ebert, telegraphed Erzberger, a civilian, authorizing him to sign the Armistice which he did on November 11, 1918, which officially ended the war and led to the Treaty of Versailles. Then, starting in August 1919, as Finance Minister, Erzberger encouraged the parliament to honor the ratification of the Versailles Treaty. He then began making plans toward accruing funds to start reparations payments by forcing through the new measures of taxation. 1635 People would force Erzberger from office in March 1920, and members of the nationalistic Organization Consul murdered him on August 26, 1921, in Bad Griesbach, a spa in the Black Forest. That group also assassinated Rathenau, the Foreign Minister, from February to June 24, 1922.

When the German monarchy fell, influential Jews seized control of the Bavarian government. Hugo Haase was in charge of Foreign affairs. Otto Landsberg, a member of the Weimar National Assembly, was the German Ambassador in Belgium (1920-1923), and was deputy to the Reichstag (1924-1933). Karl Kautsky was the state under-secretary in the Foreign Office under Haase. Oskar Cohn and Joseph Herzfeld were both Haase assistants. The Finance Minister, Eugen Schiffer, was also Jewish, as was Eduard Bernstein, his assistant. Dr. Ludwig Freund, an associate of Sigmund Freud assisted the Minister of the Interior, Hugo Preuß, the main author of the Weimar constitution. 1636 Fritz M. Cohen was the government's publicity agent.

The desperate middle class Germans blamed their economic troubles on the Jews, easily identified with communism because so many of them embraced Marxism. After all, Eisner helped instigate the Bolshevik revolution in Munich. Other Jews collaborated with him—Liebknecht, Luxemburg, who the Bolsheviks had sent to Germany, and Max Lowenberg, Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, Caspar Wollheim, Max Rothschild, Carl Arnold, Hermann Kranold, Rosenhek, Birnbaum, Reis and Kaiser. Eleven of the most active revolutionaries were freemasons who belonged to a secret lodge located in Munich at No. 51 Briennerstrasse. 1637 De Poncins wrote, "The Jewish preponderance in the German revolutions of 1918 is not less irrefutable; there as elsewhere, they are directors and strategists of the movement. The Soviet Republic of Munich was Jewish; it is sufficient to mention some of the names of leaders: Liebknecht, Rosa Luxembourg, Kurt Eisner and many others." Hugh R. Wilson wrote, "In these conditions anti-Semitism reared its ugly head. Millions of returning soldiers out of a job and desperately searching for one, found the stage, the press, medicine and law crowded with Jews. They saw among the few who had money to splurge, a high proportion of Jews. A number of the leaders of the Demokratische

Partei, that fraction of the Reichstag most closely identified with the type of government in power, were Jews. The leaders of the Bolshevik movement in Russia, a movement desperately feared in Germany, were Jews. One could sense the spreading resentment and hatred." 1639 He further wrote, "I remember writing home at the time that if there ever came a reactionary movement, whether military or monarchist, I didn't dream of a Nazi Party, that movement would be anti-Semitic in character. It has been widely assumed that Adolf Hitler and his followers invented anti-Semitism in Germany. The facts of the case do not bear this out. When Hitler inserted an anti-Semitic plank in his platform, he doubtless was acting in accordance with his own hatred and prejudice. Nevertheless, adroit politician that he is, he was inserting a plank to catch the votes."

The government and the Freikorps, captured Luxemburg and Liebknecht and some of their supporters. On January 15, 1919, they drowned Luxemburg in the Landwehr Canal in Berlin, thereby making them Marxist martyrs. Violence was pandemic in Munich in the first six months of 1919. On March 7, 1919, Johannes Hoffmann, the leader of the SPD, unsuccessfully attempted to form a coalition government in Bavaria. Then he set up and headed a Social Democratic government, which would only last until April 6, 1919. On that day, Marxists officially proclaimed a Soviet Republic, ruled by USPD members such as Ernst Toller, from a Prussian Jewish family, Gustav Landauer, a Jewish anarchist (grandfather of the television and film director, Mike Nichols), Silvio Gesell, and Erich Mühsam, influenced by Bela Kuhn's communist regime in Hungary.

On April 12, 1919, the communists seized power and Eugen Leviné, a Russian-born Jew, was the leader of the Bavarian Soviet Republic. He began imposing reforms, organizing a Red Army and confiscating money, food, and expensive apartments. They requisitioned factories and assigned workers to control them. Leviné intended to reform the education system. Lenin directed Leviné to capture and execute certain individuals, but his men refused to kill the hostages. On April 30, Russian soldiers, sent by Lenin, murdered eight men, including Prince Gustav of Thurn and Taxis, and Countess Hella von Westarp. German soldiers returned home following their inexplicable defeat and many joined one of several paramilitary organizations that had sprung up to in an attempt to suppress the communist uprisings. Minister of Defense Gustav Noske, of the SPD, gave considerable support to these military groups. He used them to crush the German Revolution and the Marxist Spartacist League. Leviné's communist government lasted less than a month. On May 3, 1919, a combined 39,000-member force of loyal members of the German army and the Freikorps arrived in Munich where they engaged in brutal street fighting and finally defeated the communists. During the battle, they killed over 1,000 people who supported the communist government. They arrested and summarily executed approximately 700 men and women. The court also condemned Leviné for treason. The civil conflict resulted in the replacement of Germany's imperial government with the Weimar Republic on August 11, 1919, when they officially adopted the Weimar Constitution. Following the war and the abolition of the monarchy, Ebert was the first president of Germany (1919-1925). After he assumed office, the government, the army, and the Freikorps

together battled the leftist uprisings, where they killed several leftwing politicians which culminated in the affiliation of the SPD and the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD).

Nationalists and former military leaders criticized the unconditional peace stipulations and the Weimar politicians, socialists, communists, and Jews, who they accused of betraying Germany by withdrawing support for the military, criticizing nationalism, instigating unrest and strikes, and finally relinquishing Germany to its enemies. People refer to those responsible as the treasonous November Criminals, many of whom were now functioning in the newly formed Weimar Republic. The newly-established government attempted to address the death and destruction and other chaotic consequences of the war, the lack of infrastructure, the loss of thousands of homes, the absence of food and the starvation afflicting the entire population. It tried to provide unemployment benefits and other assistance to the soldiers who returned home to high unemployment and very little opportunity. The SPD, now part of the struggling republic, and the new Communist Party of Germany (KPD), consisting of former SPD members, became bitter enemies.

In November 1919, the Weimar National Assembly appointed a committee to investigate the causes of the war and Germany's defeat. On November 18, 1919, Paul von Hindenburg testified and referred to an article that appeared in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on December 17, 1918, which cited two other articles, wherein British General Frederick B. Maurice said the civilians betrayed the German army. Communists entered a disheartened, economically ruined Germany, the perfect environment to emphasize class struggle and provoke a further revolution against the status quo. In March 1920, at least 12,000,000 workers initiated a general strike in Germany, a nation about to explode in revolution. The Red Army, now on the move through Poland, in the Polish-Soviet War, February 1919-March 1921, was to expedite that explosive event. General Mikhail Tukhachevsky began an aggressive campaign westward with his forces toward the goal of brutalizing Europe. Later, he became the commander in chief of the Red Army (1925-1928). According to excerpts from order #1423, dated July 2, 1920, regarding the western front, it said, "Fighters of the Workers' Revolution! The fate of the World Revolution will be decided in the West. The path to the world fire lies over the dead body of White (anti-communist) Poland. We will carry happiness and peace on our bayonets to the working people of the world. To the West! To decisive battles and thundering victories."

Tukhachevsky, leading the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920, failed to understand military strategy, and his opponents, led by Józef Piłsudski, defeated his army outside Warsaw. Tukhachevsky and Stalin blamed each other for their inability to capture Warsaw. Because of this, they had to postpone their revolution in Europe. Tukhachevsky later said, "There can be no doubt that if we had been victorious on the Vistula, the revolutionary fires would have reached the entire continent." On April 16, 1922, Walther Rathenau, Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, negotiated and signed the Treaty of Rapallo, with Georgi Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, which officials reaffirmed with the Treaty of Berlin, April 24, 1926. The Weimar Republic and Soviet Russia each renounced all

territorial and financial claims against each other following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and World War I. This new treaty recognized the secret German-Soviet collaboration, starting in 1921, which allowed for Germany's rearmament. Hitler and his associates saw Rathenau as part of the communist conspiracy for his actions.

In 1923, Jews living in Germany acquired financial power through the receipt of funds for investment from rich friends in other countries, including the United States. There was also a huge migration of Jews from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Germans viewed all of the Jews coming from the East as invaders, all looking for food and shelter that were unavailable. Some Eastern European Jews participated in the rampant speculation, always a factor with an unstable currency, and a decreased supply of commodities. The Germans resented the Jews, who with their increased power, now benefited from Germany's misfortunes. This Jewish influx resurrected the earlier feelings of Germans who viewed them as trespassers who were not interested in assimilating but remained exclusively separate.

9.4 Communist Infiltration in China

In addition to infiltrating America, the Bolsheviks quickly established a presence in almost every country — England, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, and in Asia.

By 1920, Shanghai, the focus of western economic interest, contained the majority of the country's industrial workers and the biggest base of communist support in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in July 1921, dominated Shanghai's municipal government. In 1921, in an attempt to unify China, Dr. Sun, president and generalissimo, met with Henk Sneevliet, of the Comintern, with the objective of establishing a military government in the Guangzhou, Guangdong Province in southern China. To hasten the conquest of the warlords in northern China, he accepted Soviet help and cooperated with local communists after the western powers rejected his requests. The Soviets and the Comintern supervised and, to an extent, financed the Chinese revolutionary movement. In March 1923, the Soviet leaders concluded that they would assist Sun Yat-sen with at least three million rubles channeled through Mikhail Borodin (born Mikhail Gruzenberg), a freemason, another Bolshevik agent in China (1923-1927), to provide the initial funding and operating expenses of the Whampoa Military Academy, according to Louis Fischer, a Borodin confidante. Bliukher's diary indicates that the monthly subsidy totaled 100,000 rubles in November 1924. Additionally, the Soviets sent a valuable shipment of arms, aboard the Vorovsky, in October 1924 for which they charged the Canton government.

In January 1924, the NP (Nationalist Party) devised an anti-imperialist policy with an emphasis on workers and peasants. At the same time, technical and financial assistance arrived from the Soviet Union. This linked the Chinese NP to the Communist Party. 1935 The NP and the Communist Parties, encouraged and financed by Moscow, worked

together in the Kwangtung province, until mid-1926, to create a national revolution. The Soviet Union also assisted Feng Yu-hsiang in building a large military organization in North China beginning in the spring of 1925. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party also collaborated and participated in labor movements among the students in numerous cities such as Shanghai, Hankow, Peking and others. All of these factions joined in the Northern Expedition, which they initiated in July 1926. Investigators, during a raid of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, found a document in the papers of Jay C. Huston, a US Foreign Service Officer in Peking and Canton in the 1920s. In September 1925, General Vasily K. Bliukher, using the pseudonym "Galen" wrote a report and military plan later discovered in the Central Archives of the Party, Institute of Marxism and Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Bliukher was a Soviet military adviser in China (1924-1927), using the name Galen, while he worked at Chiang Kai-Shek's military headquarters where he facilitated the military planning of the Northern Expedition. This inaugurated the Kuomintang unification of China. Chiang permitted Bliukher to "escape" following his anticommunist purge beginning on April 12, 1927. Bliukher taught Lin Biao, pivotal in the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and later a key figure in the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The intermittent Chinese Civil War, 1927-1936, 1941-1945, 1946-1950, was between the Kuomintang (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party, the governing party of the Republic of China, and the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the control of China. This war culminated with the division of the nation into the Republic of China (ROC) and People's Republic of China (PRC). The war began in April 1927, with the Northern Expedition, ending in 1949-1950.

In 1925, Rockefeller founded the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in ten Asian countries. The Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations financed it while an alliance of Morgan and Rockefeller interests on Wall Street controlled it. Other financing came from Standard Oil, IT&T, Vacuum Oil, Shell Oil, International Business Machines, International General Electric, Time Magazine, J. P. Morgan, National City Bank and Chase National Bank, as well as individuals with Wall Street connections.

The Soviets working in China, despite the growth of the Chinese Communist Party and the Socialist Youth Corps, grew frustrated with the progress of the overall movement. The Party did organize some successful strikes in late 1925 among workers in Hong Kong and Kwangtung farmers. On April 12, 1927, William J. Keswick, a Director of Jardine Matheson and Company (drug smugglers during the Opium Wars), and a principle of the Extraterritorial International Settlements ordered the Green Gang and Chiang, head of the Nationalist Army, to begin a reign of terror. They purged the leftists and labor activists from Shanghai in what people call the Shanghai Massacre. 1945 They quickly executed 5,000 to 6,000 captives and drove the CCP underground. 1946 Within six months they halted the Chinese communist movement. As many as 25,000 people perished in Shanghai, Nanking, Wusih, Soochow, Changchow, Hangchow, and Canton. 1947 In the 1920s, Chiang, a professional soldier, used the Kuomintang, or NP, a paramilitary

organization to implement the Northern Expedition which forcefully integrated southern and central China and created an alliance with the bankers of Shanghai.

On December 1, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek married Soong Mei-Ling although her mother vehemently objected because he was a Buddhist and her American-educated daughter was Christian. Therefore, Chiang converted. Mei-Ling was the daughter of China's wealthiest family and the sister of a Rothschild agent, Soong Tse-ven. On October 10, 1928, the bankers installed Chiang as president of China. After the marriage, Soong presented his sister with his personal mansion. 1950 Chiang would very subtly reveal his new alliances when he inexplicably abandoned Nanking, then the capital of the Republic of China, leaving its vulnerable citizens to endure six weeks of savagery by the invading Japanese in December 1937. Soong Tse-ven had resigned as Finance Minister (1928-1931, 1932-1933) after failing to raise sufficient money to fight Communism. However, in early June 1932, he agreed to return only if China's government, now desperate, would resort to putting even more effort to growing opium, a profitable cash crop that became the backbone of the Chinese economy, which might resolve China's financial crisis. Consequently, they removed millions of acres from food production. China, short of food, was already struggling to feed its people. Choosing opium over food production caused a genocidal famine that led to the deaths of at least 6,000,000 peasants in four provinces, killing a third of the population in the Shaanxi Province between 1928 and 1933.

9.5 Europe and the World Economy

The structure of world trade prior to 1914 was done by the export of finished goods from Europe in exchange for basic resources from non-European countries (including food). Investments of European Nations in countries which produced basic resources further led to economic growth in Europe, i.e. industrialization. The First World War had also major impact on non-European countries. Europe could no longer export finished goods as well and they also focused on agriculture more to satisfy their needs. The level of export of finished goods did not reach pre-war levels after the war, further damaging the economy of other countries. This also meant that the level of import of basic resources declined. As a result, other countries started to rely on their own finished goods which further reduced European exports. The following table shows the import of finished products of Argentina, Brazil and India in millions of Dollars (value from 1955):

Year	1899	1913	1929	1937
Argentina	218	744	1064	725
Brazil	174	429	489	372
India	704	1219	1159	796

Another reason for the weakening of Europe's position in world trade was the growing

competition of other countries, mostly the United States and Japan. The next table shows the share (in %) of world trade of five countries:

Year	1913	1929	1937
USA	12	21	21
Great Britain	32	22	21
Germany	26	20	16
France	12	12	6
Japan	2	3	10

The growing competition by the US and Japan happened during the war when Europe could not longer deliver finished goods to other countries. After the war Japan continued to export cheap textiles while the US could dominate with fast production of goods, especially automobiles (the US exported three times the amount of England, Germany, France and Italy combined in 1929). All this was crippled by the great depression of 1929 which will be mentioned in another chapter. The following table shows the amount of finished goods (in % of total world production) for the world economy. The great powers produced around 80% of all finished goods on the planet at that time.

Year	USA	USSR	Germany	Great Britain	France	Japan	Italy
1929	43.3	5.0	11.1	9.4	6.6	2.5	3.3
1932	31.8	11.5	10.6	10.9	6.9	3.5	3.1
1937	35.1	14.1	11.4	9.2	4.5	3.8	2.9
1938	28.7	17.6	13.2	9.2	4.5	3.8	2.9

One can already see how the US and the USSR became the biggest producers of goods. Had the allies known about the capabilities of the USSR in detail, they might have picked them as a target for war instead of Germany.

9.6 England

The time between the wars was a time of mass unemployment for Britain and the government had to deal with this to great extent. The following table shows the amount of unemployed people in %.

Year	%	Year	%	Year	%
1921	16.6	1927	9.6	1933	19.8
1922	14.1	1928	10.7	1934	16.6
1923	11.6	1929	10.3	1935	15.3
1924	10.2	1930	15.8	1936	12.2
1925	11.0	1931	21.1	1937	10.6
1926	12.3	1932	21.9	1938	12.6

The reason for this scenario was to continued decline in exports after 1920. The mining of coal reduced from 270 million tons in 1914 to 230 million tons in 1939 and the amount of workers in that sector was reduced from over 1 million to around 700.000. The export of steel was at 2.750.000 tons before the war and just 750.000 tons in 1929, having 38% of all steel-product exports before the war down to 25% in 1936. The areas of economy suffered too due to several reasons. Especially the textile industry shrunk drastically, exporting 576 tons in 1913 and just 135 tons in 1938, while Japan exported 3 tons in 1913 and 234 tons in 1938. At the same time, textile exports from India shrung by a factor of 4, and China exported 181 tons in 1913 and just 2 tons in 1938.

Britain thought that in order to get the economic problems under control they had to increase their world trade again. The biggest obstacle for that were, in their view, instabilities of the currencies and the resulting distrust between trader and producer. Because of this, Britain pressured France into easing the French demands for reparations from Germany. Britain needed to make sure to keep Germany as a potential export markets, otherwise their economy would decline further. In 1937, British exports only were 60% of what they were in 1929 and the huge unemployment was only handled with the beginning of the war. Similar economic problems could be found in the US, which were also solved with the start of World War 2.

Since Britain won World War 1, they situation was not as bad as in Germany. Still extremist movements were to be found. The Communists had over 40.000 members and a fascist movement started to form under the leadership of Sir Oswald Mosley(a bit more about this later). Several workers unions were created which satisfied the needs of the lower classes and stopped the extremist movements to from becoming a relevant threat. The British union movement was the biggest in the world in the beginning of the 20th Century. Unemployment was easier to handle in Britain compared to the US or Germany.

British Naval Policy

At the end of the First World War Britain had the largest navy in the world. In 1919, Lloyd George's cabinet placed stringent limits on defence expenditure on the planning assumptions that a major war involving UK forces would not occur within ten years. As it required the greatest industrial infrastructure, the ten-year rule hit the Royal Navy

particularly hard. With orders for warships at a low level it had an impact on a wide variety of industries - shipbuilding, steel and engineering, as well as specialised manufacturers of guns, ammunition and naval equipment. The political decision to pursue a policy of disarmament by international agreement only made the problems faced by the armed forces, and especially the Navy, even worse.

During the 1920s the limited funds for defence, coupled with the resentment felt by the Army and the Royal Navy in thinking the Royal Air Force had more than its fair share of funds, caused inter-service bureaucratic infighting. The Navy in particular took the loss of its own air service very badly and continually attempted to regain control of naval aviation. The deep cuts in defence spending and the resulting contraction of defence industries had a long-term effect on rearmament. The legacy of limited finance and concentration on the barest of essentials in material and defence thinking would reverberate through the 1930s and into the Second World War.

The goal of international disarmament was preserved in Woodrow Wilson's 14 points and implicit within the League of Nations framework. The first act of international disarmament was the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. The Washington Conference of 1921-1922 set ratios for the number of capital ships of the major powers. For the first time it was agreed that the British Royal Navy and the US Navy have the same number of battleships and battle cruisers. The conference agreed parity between the British and American navies, setting a lower quota of battleships for the Japanese, French and Italian navies. The conference also agreed a ten-year building holiday for major warships and set down the maximum size of battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers as well as the size of the gun armament. The conference was supposed to be the first of a series of treaties limiting not just navies, but land and air forces too. However, the subsequent conferences never took place so Britain, as the world's predominant naval power, suffered more than a land power such as France. (It should be noted that Germany was the only country which fulfilled their part of the Treaty of Versailles regarding disarmament to the fullest)

With no need to plan for a major global or European conflict for ten years, the armed forces concentrated on imperial policing roles. For the Royal Navy, cruisers were vital for this role, as well as for the defence of trade. In 1927 a further conference in Geneva failed, the difficulty being agreement on the number and size of cruisers needed by Britain for trade defence. Until the early 1930s Anglo-American naval tension continued to simmer. In 1930 the London Naval Conference extended the terms of the Washington conference to 1936 and Britain agreed to reduce the number of cruisers to 50 - against the wishes of the Admiralty, which had a long-established requirement for 70. Finally, the British took the lead in the wide-ranging Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932-1934) that sought land, sea and air reductions. It too was a failure, and its collapse was a spur to Britain's rearmament. The Labour Government in 1930 came to an agreement with other Powers on limitation of cruisers, under which Britain was able to map out and to lay down since 1929 a regular replacement program so that, in comparison with the other cruiser fleets in

the world, the British Fleet was not only the largest but the most efficient. Some of those ships were rapidly approaching the over-age position by the mid-1930s, but there was nothing that could not have been met by the ordinary, annual replacement program [but there had not been one]. His Majesty's Fleet, with one brief exception of Invergordon, had been manned by perfectly loyal seamen, marines and stokers for a century. There had been one or two isolated cases of insubordination, but in the 20th Century there had been no concerted attempt to mutiny in the Fleet. Attempts were made by agitators to seduce the seamen of the Royal Navy during the Great War, and without success. It was not in the British Fleet that there was any trouble. The trouble came in the German Navy, and there was a very serious outbreak in the Austrian Navy as well. The British Navy, its members drawn from a nation that was used to liberty, came through without one concerted case of serious insubordination, much less of mutiny, during the whole of the four years of war.

From 1918 to 1931, nine battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" and "Royal Sovereign" classes, and the battle cruisers "Renown" and "Repulse," had been modernised and the "Barham" was in hand in 1931. The main alterations comprised addition of bulges, increase in anti-aircraft armament in some cases, improvements to bridges and tops, and improvements to ventilation and accommodation. Additional armor protection had been fitted in "Renown" and "Repulse." As late as 1936 the British Fleet was said to be the largest, the most powerful, the most efficient Fleet in the whole world. That remark applied not to this or that category of vessels but to all the categories of vessels in the British Fleet. It applied to the category of capital ships. There were no other two capital ships afloat in the whole world which could match the "Nelson" and the "Rodney." Taking the actual age and the equipment of the rest of the capital ships, there was nothing in the whole world really comparable with them, outside the United States of America, and the United States had of late years always been ruled out of account as a possible enemy. It is the same with regard to aircraft carriers and their equipment.

In 1936 the British rearmament program began in earnest with increases in budgets. The weapons and equipment developed were to form the backbone of British military capability during the first three years of the Second World War. Naval rearmament was limited from the outset by the disarmament process. Expansion only got underway after 1936. Winston Churchill, the member from Epping, told the Commons on 16 March 1936 "The foundation of British naval policy is the acceptance of the principle of parity with the United States of America, not only in battleships but over the whole range of the Fleet. We are all agreed upon that, and that decision once taken ought to exclude the idea of naval rivalry between the two countries. It certainly ought not to be followed by a meticulous measuring of swords, as it were, at recurring conference tables. The British view is, and has long been, that the, United States Navy, whatever it rely become, is no cause of anxiety to us. On the contrary, many people will feel, and it is no exaggeration to say so, that the stronger the United States Navy becomes, the surer are the foundations of peace throughout the world. I trust, therefore, that the principle of parity which is

really the principle of non-competition, will be interpreted in the most liberal and flexible manner on both sides of the Atlantic, and that the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples will not seek to hamper one another in making whatever may be the best possible arrangements for their respective naval defence."

By 1937 shipbuilding was at full capacity following the acceleration of the Navy's programs. Any new standard of naval strength was of academic interest only, as it would not be achieved for some years. Even the gain of the Fleet Air arm from RAF control to the Navy was too late to ensure wholesale re-equipment with modern aircraft before the outbreak of war. Adding the new 1939 program to the previous programs, British dockyards and shipyards in the course of the year were engaged in constructing some 200 vessels, or a total of 870,000 tons. An achievement like this had never been approached before in peace-time. The British were building, in the course of the year 1939, nine battleships, six aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 43 destroyers, 19 submarines, and a large number of small vessels.

Fascist Movement in Britain

The British Union of Fascists, or BUF, was a Fascist political party in the United Kingdom formed in 1932 by Oswald Mosley. It changed its name to the "British Union of Fascists and National Socialists" in 1936 and, in 1937, to "British Union." It was finally disbanded in 1940 after it was proscribed by the British government, following the start of the Second World War. The BUF emerged in 1932 from the British far-right, following the electoral defeat of its antecedent, the New Party, in the 1931 general election. The BUF's foundation was initially met with popular support and developed a sizeable following. The press baron Lord Rothermere was a notable early supporter. As the party became increasingly radical, however, support declined. The Olympia Rally of 1934, in which a number of anti-Fascist protestors were attacked, isolated the party from much of its following. The party's embrace of Nazi-style anti-semitism in 1936 led to increasingly violent clashes with opponents, notably the 1936 Battle of Cable Street in London's East End. The Public Order Act 1936, which banned political uniforms and responded to increasing political violence, had a particularly strong effect on the BUF whose supporters were known as "Blackshirts" after the uniforms they wore. Growing British hostility towards Nazi Germany, with which the British press persistently associated the BUF, further contributed to the decline of the movement's membership. It was finally banned by the British government in 1940 after the start of the Second World War, amid suspicion that its remaining supporters might form a pro-Nazi "fifth column". A number of prominent BUF members were arrested and interned under Defence Regulation 18B.

The BUF claimed 50,000 members at one point, and the Daily Mail, running the headline "Hurrah for the Blackshirts!," was an early supporter. Towards the middle of the 1930s, the BUF's violent clashes with opponents began to alienate some middle-class supporters, and membership decreased. At the Olympia rally in London, in 1934, BUF stewards

violently ejected anti-fascist disrupters, with one protester claiming to have lost an eye, and this led the Daily Mail to withdraw its support for the movement. Mosley, known to his followers as The Leader, modelled his leadership style on Benito Mussolini and the BUF on Mussolini's National Fascist Party in Italy, including an imitation of the Italian Fascists' black uniforms for members, earning them the nickname "Blackshirts". The BUF was anti-communist and protectionist, and proposed replacing parliamentary democracy with executives elected to represent specific industries, trades or other professional interest groups—a system similar to the corporatism of the Italian fascists. Unlike the Italian system, British fascist corporatism planned to replace the House of Lords with elected executives drawn from major industries, the clergy, and colonies. The House of Commons was to be reduced to allow for a faster, "less factionist" democracy. His movement advocated to end the war with the 3rd Reich by accepting their peace offers.

Just like the National Socialist Movement, they addressed the Jewish-Question within their own borders. Mosley said: "The Jews have been treated in Britain with a fairness and generosity unparalleled elsewhere, and have banded together against us, despite the conventional opinion that it was very wrong to combine against them. And now this organised alien minority, who have enriched themselves at our expense, repay our generosity by political terrorism carried out at the point of the economic gun. It is a strange thing that a great country should allow both the economic and the political freedom of an organised minority who owe allegiance, and who admit they owe it, not primarily to Britain, but to their kinsmen beyond our borders, and whose capacity for mischief is exceeded only by their desire to do it."

9.7 France

During the 1920s, France was relatively well off economically. This was achieved by the very thing everybody tried to prevent, the devaluation of the Franc. The economic history of France stays in contrast to that of Britain until 1929. People with a steady income were well off in Britain, while workers and producers suffered after the pre-war value of the British Pound was reinstated. In France, pensioners and people with a steady income were ruined when inflation devalued the currency until its value was reduced by a factor of five. During the war, the Franc was artificially stabilized at a value of 25:1 compared to the British Pound, when in 1926, this changed to 200:1. By 1928, retail prices increased by a factor of 5.5. Industry production increased by 48% in 1929 compared to 1913. Unemployment was not a critical factor. What saved the economy was the devaluation of the Franc because thanks to this, French products were able to compete on the world market, unlike those of Britain, which tried to keep the value of their currency.

The economic situation declined after 1930, mostly due to the great economic crisis. French exports were reduced by 25%. Britain devalued their currency in 1931 and the US did the same in 1933, which further reduced French exports of finished goods by 42%.

In the end, France was hit by the economic crisis later than Britain, the US or Germany but when it finally happened, it led to a long period of stagnation. France's economic strength from 1932 till 1936 was around 75% of the value from 1929 and unemployment never reached critical stages like in England or Germany, only going up to 5%. Britain and France lost some market shares to Germany. The following chart shows the production of raw steel in 1000 tonnes:

	France	Great Britain	Germany (without Saar area)
1929	9711	9790	16210
1938	6221	10564	20099

At the end of the 1920s, the French Republic was politically strong and it was rather quiet within the country, while they seemed to be on the brink of a civil war during the 1930s. Two events are prominent: The unrests from Februar 6. 1034 in Paris and the electoral-win of the People's Front in 1936, which lead to fear of a communist revolution, where the Socialists and Communists started to work together. They did this of fear of the NSDAP in Germany, which gained power when the Communists worked together with the NSDAP (ordered by Stalin). Everyone started seeing a threat to the socialist state, even a threat to the USSR, already in 1934, and they proclaimed that all of Hitler's plans need to be destroyed. Big demonstrations were started in July 1934 also supported by the Soviet government. The French-Soviet pact was proclaimed on Mai 15th 1935. The Socialists under Leon Blum became the strongest party in the elections of 1936 and for the first time, France had a party which campaigned for the needs of the worker. But similar to all other countries in Europe, the Jewish roots of Leon Blum created a big wave of anti-semitism. The people back then associated Socialism and Communism with the Jews and they were not wrong (as can be seen in the course of this book). In 1938, Blum had to step down and the government was ruled by the party of Daladier, conservatism was back in France.

During the Civil War in Spain, the French right-wingers supported the the revolt of the Spanish military against the People's Front, while the Left used demonstrations and stikes to force the French government to intervene on the side of the Spanish republic government. The French Right concluded that the Communists in France worked under the order of Stalin (they were correct) and were hell-bent to start another European War and they were right. Some of the French right-wingers thought that they should ally with Germany to keep the Communist manace in check and let the National Socialists deal with the USSR, while the other part still held pre-WW1 views that a strong Germany just has to attack France at some point and that any ally against Hitler is welcome, even the Soviet Union. Politics in France was devided on the question regarding Hitler. They were inclined to ally with him as long as he keeps his anti-Communist stance. But this idea was crushed when he allied with the USSR and they split Poland.

The preparations for war in France began already in 1934 when General Denain made the plan to build 1200 aircrafts, which was later increased to 2400.

9.8 Italy

For many Italians it seemed that the gains won on the battlefield in WW1 at such great cost had been thrown away at the peace table, and a sense of frustration and disillusionment—and of betrayal—permeated the country in the years immediately after the war. Italy was saddled with an enormous war debt. Inflation and shortages of basic goods triggered strikes that paralyzed large segments of the economy. Demobilized troops swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Profiteering, often involving public officials, took its toll on public confidence in the government. Socialist gains in local elections inspired fears of expropriation—especially among small landholders—and outbreaks of violence and counterviolence. The government admitted its inability to maintain public order, and amnesties granted to striking workers confirmed the middle class in its belief that the parliamentary government was not only corrupt but weak.

This was the atmosphere that spawned Benito Mussolini's fascist movement, which for nearly one-quarter of a century demeaned and demoralized Italy's national life. Mussolini had always been a political maverick. Imprisoned and exiled for his political activities, the schoolteacher-turned-journalist from Romagna had begun his activist career as a pacifist and anarchist, later joining the militant wing of the PSI—at one time being the editor of the party's official newspaper. Mussolini broke with the party on the issue of entry into World War I and abandoned Marxism for nationalism. Mussolini was a manipulative orator; his showmanship was not mere buffoonery but struck a responsive chord in his listeners. He had attracted a personal following as early as 1917. In 1919 he assembled the paramilitary Combat Groups (Fasci di Combattimento), called the Blackshirts, from among army veterans and youths, modeled after the *arditi* (commandos), the shock troops of the Italian army. Organized in more than 2,000 squads, the Blackshirts were used as strikebreakers (subsidized by industrialists for the purpose), attacked Socialists and Communists, whom they claimed the government was too timid to deal with, terrorized left-wing town governments, and set up local dictatorships while the police and the army looked on—often in sympathy. Mussolini profited from the anxieties of the middle class—their businesses threatened and their savings wiped out by inflation—and from the smallholders' fears of expropriation by the Socialists.

In 1921 Mussolini, seeking a broader following than among the fascist squads, formed a parliamentary party, the National Fascist Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista), which captured thirty-five seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The party, running on a bloc list with Giolitti's Liberals, was admitted to the coalition government. The party program called in vague terms for social reform, financial stability, assertion of Italy's prestige abroad, and order at home. The Fascists considered themselves a revolutionary party in opposition to nineteenth-century liberalism, middle-class humanistic values, and capitalism, but Mussolini advanced no guiding ideology. Fascism, Mussolini insisted, represented a mood in the country, not ideas, and he wrote, "Fascism . . . was a form of a need for action, and in itself was action."

Despite their relatively minor representation in Parliament, no government could survive without the support of the National Fascist Party, and in October 1922 Mussolini was summoned by Victor Emmanuel III to form a government as prime minister. The much-heralded March on Rome by 300,000 armed Fascists, usually credited with bringing Mussolini to power by a coup, was in fact the result rather than the cause of his appointment to office, a brilliant bluff intended to impress the nation and Europe with the strength and determination of his following. Mussolini governed constitutionally, heading a national government comprising the Fascists, some Social Democrats, Liberals, and members of the Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, known as Popolari). The Popolari were a center-left reformist group founded in 1919 by a Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo. Formation of the party marked the entry of an organized, mass-based Catholic party into parliamentary politics, although without the approval of the Italian hierarchy or the Vatican. In 1919 Sturzo's party won 101 seats in Parliament, second in strength only to the PSI. Mussolini considered the Popolari, parent party to the postwar Christian Democratic Party (Partito Democrazia Cristiana—DC), the toughest obstacle in his rise to power. The Popolari withdrew their support from the Mussolini government in 1923.

The Fascists, under a revised electoral law, polled two-thirds of the votes cast in the 1924 elections. Seemingly secure in his parliamentary majority, Mussolini's confidence was shaken and his regime endangered by the public reaction to the murder of a socialist politician, Giacomo Matteotti, by fascist toughs. The opposition withdrew from the Chamber of Deputies in protest. Without resistance Mussolini assumed dictatorial powers in January 1925, ruling thereafter by decree, and replacing elected local government officials with fascist operatives. Although a rump chamber of deputies continued to sit, advisory functions passed to a party organ, the Fascist Grand Council, which Mussolini integrated into the state apparatus.

Controlling all the organs of government, Mussolini set about constructing a totalitarian state in Italy that would dominate every aspect of national life. Il Duce, as Mussolini was styled, proclaimed the doctrine of "everything within the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state," including professional and labor associations, youth groups, and sports organizations. Political parties other than the Fascists were suppressed. The press and court system were cowed. Strikes were made illegal and, although the free trade unions were not abolished, they were gradually throttled. Mussolini was less successful in imposing economic control, and the corporate state, which remained part of the myth of the fascist regime, was never more than its facade. In some respects the Italian character, especially its spirit of individualism, mitigated the worst effects of Mussolini's totalitarianism, which was, as a critic noted, "a tyranny tempered by the complete disobedience of all laws." In addition totalitarianism in the strictest sense was not possible where an independent church, claiming the spiritual allegiance of a large part of the population, existed. Mussolini's political background was anticlerical, but he understood the importance of the church to Italian life and realized that he could not expect to consolidate political support behind the regime until an accommodation was

made with the Vatican—which had not recognized the legality of the Italian state.

The Lateran Pacts of 1929 consisted of a treaty between Italy and the Holy See and concordat regulating relations between the Italian state and the Catholic church. The treaty created the independent state of Vatican City and recognized the sovereignty of the pope there. In the concordat the church was assured of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, and canon law was recognized as superseding the civil code in such areas as marriage. The church was restored to its role in education and allowed unencumbered operation of its press and communication facilities. The clergy were prohibited from membership in political organizations. The solution of the Roman Question, which had vexed Italian politicians since 1860, marked the peak of Mussolini's political leadership and has been considered by some observers the singular positive achievement of an otherwise execrable regime. The provisions of the Lateran Pacts were included in the 1948 Constitution.

Imperialism was always a facet of fascism but was not explicit until 1935. The need to provide space for Italian emigration was emphasized by the occupation of Ethiopia in the 1935-36 period. The action might well have been passed over except for Ethiopia's protest in the League of Nations, but to the league's condemnation Italy responded that it had done no more in Africa than other powers had done earlier. France and Great Britain were unwilling to risk war for the sake of Ethiopia, but league members agreed to impose economic sanctions on Italy. The sanctions were halfheartedly enforced and subsequently withdrawn. They provoked bitterness in Italy, especially against Great Britain, and rallied theretofore lukewarm Italians to Mussolini. The sanctions also spurred the drive for economic self-sufficiency, an uneconomic project better suited to propaganda than to feeding the Italian people. Cut off from other sources, Italy relied on Germany as a supplier of raw materials and was drawn within its political orbit. Mussolini was frankly impressed by German efficiency, overlooking outstanding conflicts of interests in Austria and the Balkans that might otherwise have kept the two dictators at odds. In 1936 Mussolini agreed to the Rome-Berlin Axis, pledging cooperation in central Europe. The next year Italy joined with Germany and Japan in the Anticomintern Pact, directed against the Soviet Union. By the time that Italy had formalized its military ties with Germany in the so-called Pact of Steel in 1939, Mussolini had so identified his country's interests with those of Hitler that Italy had become a virtual German satellite.

Italy aided Franco's forces during the 1936-39 Spanish civil war, contributing supplies, naval and air support, and more than 50,000 men. Mussolini participated at Munich in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938, but his foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, had tried to dissuade Germany from attacking Poland. Cut off from advanced notice of its ally's plans, Mussolini's government was acutely embarrassed by the Soviet Pact in 1939 that opened the door for invasion of Poland. Mussolini had pompously bragged about the "8 million bayonets" at his disposal but, as was the case so often during his regime, propaganda had taken the place of actual preparation, and Italy was no more ready for a major war than it had been in 1915. Confident of German strength, Mussolini

believed that the war would be short and remarked that it would be humiliating “to sit with our hands folded while others write history.”

9.9 The Weimar Republic

From “Tragedy and Hope“ we learn:

The essence of German history from 1918 to 1933 can be found in the statement There was no revolution in 1918. For there to have been a revolution it would have been necessary to liquidate the Quartet or, at least, subject them to democratic control. The Quartet represented the real power in Germany society because they represented the forces of public order (army and bureaucracy) and of economic production (landlords and industrialists). Even without a liquidation of this Quartet, it might have been possible for democracy to function in the interstices between them if they had quarreled among themselves. They did not quarrel, because they had an esprit de corps bred by years of service to a common system (the monarchy) and because, in many cases, the same individuals were to be found in two or even more of the four groups. Franz von Papen, for example, was a Westphalian noble, a colonel in the army, an ambassador, and a man with extensive industrial holdings, derived from his wife, in the Saarland.

Although there was no revolution—that is, no real shift in the control of power in Germany in 1919—there was a legal change. In law, a democratic system was set up. As a result, by the late 1920’s there had appeared an obvious discrepancy between law and fact—the regime, according to the law, being controlled by the people, while in fact it was controlled by the Quartet. The reasons for this situation are important. The Quartet, with the monarchy, made the war of 1914-1918, and were incapable of winning it. As a result, they were completely discredited and deserted by the soldiers and workers. Thus, the masses of the people completely renounced the old system in November 1918. The Quartet, however, was not liquidated, for several reasons:

1. They were able to place the blame for the disaster on the monarchy, and jettisoned this to save themselves;
2. most Germans accepted this as an adequate revolution;
3. the Germans hesitated to make a real revolution for fear it would lead to an invasion of Germany by the French, the Poles, or others;
4. many Germans were satisfied with the creation of a government which was democratic in form and made little effort to examine the underlying reality;
5. the only political party capable of directing a real revolution was the Social Democrats, who had opposed the Quartet system and the war itself, at least in theory; but this party was incapable of doing anything in the crisis of 1918 because it was hopelessly divided into doctrinaire cliques, was horrified at the danger of Soviet Bolshevism, and was satisfied that order, trade-unionism, and a “democratic“ regime were more important than Socialism, humanitarian welfare, or consistency between theory and action.

Before 1914 there were two parties which stood outside the Quartet system: the Social Democrats and the Center (Catholic) Party. The former was doctrinaire in its attitude, being anticapitalist, pledged to the international brotherhood of labor, pacifist, democratic, and Marxist in an evolutionary, but not revolutionary, sense. The Center Party, like the Catholics who made it up' came from all levels of society and all the Catholics who made it up, came from all levels of society and all shades of ideology, but in practice were frequently opposed to the Quartet on specific issues.

These two opposition parties underwent considerable change during the war. The Social Democrats always opposed the war in theory, but supported it on patriotic grounds by voting for credits to finance the war. Its minute Left wing refused to support the war even in this fashion as early as 1914. This extremist group, under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, became known as the Spartacist Union and (after 1919) as the Communists. These extremists wanted an immediate and complete Socialist revolution with a soviet form of government. More moderate than the Spartacists was another group calling itself Independent Socialists. These voted war credits until 1917 when they refused to continue to do so and broke from the Social Democratic Party. The rest of the Social Democrats supported the war and the old monarchical system until November 1918 in fact, but in theory embraced an extreme type of evolutionary Socialism. The Center Party was aggressive and nationalist until 1917 when it became pacifist. Under Matthias Erzberger it allied with the Social Democrats to push through the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 1917. The position of these various groups on the issue of aggressive nationalism was sharply revealed in the voting to ratify the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk imposed by the militarists, Junkers, and industrialists on a prostrate Russia. The Center Party voted to ratify; the Social Democrats abstained from voting; the Independents voted No.

The "revolution" of November 1918 would have been a real revolution except for the opposition of the Social Democrats and the Center Party, for the Quartet in the crucial days of November and December 1918 were discouraged, discredited, and helpless. Outside the Quartet itself there was, at that time and even later, only two small groups which could possibly have been used by the Quartet as rallying points about which could have been formed some mass support for the Quartet. These two small groups were the "indiscriminate nationalists" and the "mercenaries." The indiscriminate nationalists were those men, like Hitler, who were not able to distinguish between the German nation and the old monarchical system. These persons, because of their loyalty to the nation, were eager to rally to the support of the Quartet, which they regarded as identical with the nation. The mercenaries were a larger group who had no particular loyalty to anyone or to any idea but were willing to serve any group which could pay for such service. The only groups able to pay were two of the Quartet—the Officers' Corps and the industrialists—who organized many mercenaries into reactionary armed bands or "Free Corps" in 1918-1923.

Instead of working for a revolution in 1918-1919, the two parties which dominated the

situation—the Social Democrats and the Centrists— did all they could to prevent a revolution. They not only left the Quartet in their positions of responsibility and power—the landlords on their estates, the officers in their commands, the industrialists in control of their factories, and the bureaucracy in control of the police, the courts, and the administration—but they increased the influence of these groups because the actions of the Quartet were not restrained under the republic by that sense of honor or loyalty to the system which had restrained the use of their power under the monarchy. As early as November 10, 1918, Friedrich Ebert, chief figure of the Social Democratic Party, made an agreement with the Officers' Corps in which he promised not to use the power of the new government to democratize the army if the officers would support the new government against the threat of the Independents and the Spartacists to establish a soviet system. As a consequence of this agreement Ebert kept a private telephone line from his office in the Chancellery to General Wilhelm Groener's office at the army's headquarters and consulted with the army on many critical political issues. As another consequence, Ebert and his Minister of War Gustav Noske, also a Social Democrat, used the army under its old monarchist officers to destroy the workers and radicals who sought to challenge the existing situation. This was done in Berlin in December 1918, in January 1919, and again in March 1919, and in other cities at other times. In these assaults the army had the pleasure of killing several thousand of the detested radicals..

A somewhat similar anti-revolutionary agreement was made between heavy industry and the Socialist trade unions on November 11, 1918. On that day Hugo Stinnes, Albert Vögler, and Alfred Hugenberg, representing industry, and Carl Legien, Otto Hue, and Hermann Müller representing the unions, signed an agreement to support each other in order to keep the factories functioning. Although this agreement was justified on opportunist grounds, it clearly showed that the so-called Socialists were not interested in economic or social reform but were merely interested in the narrow trade-union objectives of wages, hours, and working conditions. It was this narrow range of interests which ultimately destroyed the average German's faith in the Socialists or their unions.

Germany had twenty major Cabinet changes from 1919 to 1933. Generally these Cabinets were constructed about the Center and Democratic parties with the addition of representatives from either the Social Democrats or the People's Party. On only two occasions (Gustav Stresemann in 1923 and Hermann Müller in 1928-1930) was it possible to obtain a Cabinet broad enough to include all four of these parties. Moreover, the second of these broad-front Cabinets was the only Cabinet after 1923 to include the Socialists and the only Cabinet after 1925 which did not include the Nationalists. This indicates clearly the drift to the Right in the German government after the resignation of Joseph Wirth in November 1922. This drift, as we shall see, was delayed by only two influences: the need for foreign loans and political concessions from the Western Powers and the recognition that both of these could be obtained better by a government which seemed to be republican and democratic in inclination than by a government which was obviously hand in glove with the Quartet. At the end of the war in 1918 the Socialists

were in control, not because the Germans were Socialistic (for the party was not really Socialist) but because this was the only party which had been traditionally in opposition to the imperial system. A committee of six men was set up: three from the Social Democrats (Ebert, Philip Scheidemann, and Otto Landsberg) and three from the Independent Socialists (Hugo Haase, Wilhelm Dittman, and Emil Barth). This group ruled as a sort of combined emperor and chancellor and had the regular secretaries of state as their subordinates. These men did nothing to consolidate the republic or democracy and were opposed to any effort to take any steps toward Socialism. They even refused to nationalize the coal industry, something which was generally expected. Instead they wasted the opportunity by busying themselves with typical trade-union problems such as the eight-hour day (November 12, 1918) and collective bargaining methods (December 23, 1918).

The critical problem was the form of government, with the choice resting between workers' and peasants' councils (soviets), already widely established, and a national assembly to set up an ordinary parliamentary system. The Socialist group preferred the latter, and were willing to use the regular army to enforce this choice. On this basis a counterrevolutionary agreement was made between Ebert and the General Staff. As a consequence of this agreement, the army attacked a Spartacist parade in Berlin on December 6, 1918, and liquidated the rebellious People's Naval Division on December 24, 1918. In protest at this violence the three Independent members of the government resigned. Their example was followed by other Independents throughout Germany, with the exception of Kurt Eisner in Munich. The next day the Spartacists formed the German Communist Party with a non-revolutionary program. Their declaration read, in part: "The Spartacist Union will never assume governmental power except in response to the plain and unmistakable wish of the great majority of the proletarian masses in Germany; and only as a result of a definite agreement of these masses with the aims and methods of the Spartacist Union."

This pious expression, however, was the program of the leaders; the masses of the new party, and possibly the members of the Independent Socialist group as well, were enraged at the conservatism of the Social Democrats and began to get out of hand. The issue was joined on the question of councils versus National Assembly. The government, under Noske's direction, used regular troops in a bloody suppression of the Left (January 5-15), ending up with the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the Communist leaders. The result was exactly as the Quartet wanted: the Communists and many non-Communist workers were permanently alienated from the Socialists and from the parliamentary republic. The Communist Party, deprived of leaders of its own, became a tool of Russian Communism. As a result of this repression, the army was able to disarm the workers at the very moment when it was beginning to arm reactionary private bands (Free Corps) of the Right. Both of these developments were encouraged by Ebert and Noske. Only in Bavaria was the alienation of Communist and Socialist and the disarmament of the former not carried out; Kurt Eisner, the Independent Socialist minister-president in Munich, prevented it. Accordingly, Eisner was murdered by Count

Anton von Arco-Valley on February 21, 1919. When the workers of Munich revolted, they were crushed by a combination of regular army and Free Corps amid scenes of horrible violence from both sides. Eisner was replaced as premier by a Social Democrat, Adolph Hoffman. Hoffman, on the night of March 13, 1920, was thrown out by a military coup which replaced him by a government of the Right under Gustav von Kahr.

The German Cabinets from 1923 to 1930, under Wilhelm Marx, Hans Luther, Marx again, and finally Hermann Müller, were chiefly concerned with questions of foreign policy, with reparations, evacuation of the occupied areas, disarmament agitation, Locarno, and the League of Nations. On the domestic front, just as significant events were going on but with much less fanfare. Much of the industrial system, as well as many public buildings, was reconstructed by foreign loans. The Quartet were secretly strengthened and consolidated by reorganization of the tax structure, by utilization of governmental subsidies, and by the training and rearrangement of personnel. Alfred Hugenberg, the most violent and irreconcilable member of the Nationalist Party, built up a propaganda system through his ownership of scores of newspapers and a controlling interest in Ufa, the great motion-picture corporation. By such avenues as this, a pervasive propaganda campaign, based on existing German prejudices and intolerances, was put on to prepare the way for a counterrevolution by the Quartet. This campaign sought to show that all Germany's problems and misfortunes were caused by the democratic and laboring groups, by the internationalists, and by the Jews.

The Center and Left shared this nationalist poison sufficiently to abstain from any effort to give the German people the true story of Germany's responsibility for the war and for her own hardships. Thus the Right was able to spread its own story of the war, that Germany had been overcome by "a stab in the back" from "the three Internationals": the "Gold" International of the Jews, the "Red" International of the Socialists, and the "Black" International of the Catholics, an unholy triple alliance which was symbolized in the gold, red, and black flag of the Weimar Republic. In this fashion every effort was made, and with considerable success, to divert popular animosity at the defeat of 1918 and the Versailles settlement from those who were really responsible to the democratic and republican groups. At the same time, German animosity against economic exploitation was directed away from the landlords and industrialists by racist doctrines which blamed all such problems on bad Jewish international bankers and department store owners.

When the economic crisis began in 1929, Germany had a democratic government of the Center and Social Democratic parties. The crisis resulted in a decrease in tax receipts and a parallel increase in demands for government welfare services. This brought to a head the latent dispute over orthodox and unorthodox financing of a depression. Big business and big finance were determined to place the burden of the depression on the working classes by forcing the government to adopt a policy of deflation—that is, by wage reductions and curtailment of government expenditures. The Social Democrats wavered in their attitude, but in general were opposed to this policy. Schacht, as president of the Reichsbank, was able to force the Socialist Rudolf Hilferding out of the position of

minister of finance by refusing bank credit to the government until this was done. In March 1930, the Center broke the coalition on the issue of reduction of unemployment benefits, the Socialists were thrown out of the government, and Heinrich Brüning, leader of the Center Party, came in as chancellor. Because he did not have a majority in the Reichstag, he had to put the deflationary policy into effect by the use of presidential decree under Article 48. This marked the end of the Weimar Republic, for it had never been intended that this "emergency clause" should be used in the ordinary process of government, although it had been used by Ebert in 1923 to abolish the eight-hour day. When the Reichstag condemned Brüning's method by a vote of 236 to 221 on July 18, 1930, the chancellor dissolved it and called for new elections. The results of these were contrary to his hopes, since he lost seats both to the Right and to the Left. On his Right were 148 seats (107 Nazis and 41 Nationalists); on his Left were 220 seats (77 Communists and 143 Socialists). The Socialists permitted Brüning to remain in office by refusing to vote on a motion of no confidence. Left in office, Brüning continued the deflationary policy by decrees which Hindenburg signed. Thus, in effect, Hindenburg was the ruler of Germany, since he could dismiss or name any chancellor, or could permit one to govern by his own power of decree.

In the crisis of 1929-1933, the bourgeois parties tended to dissolve to the profit of the extreme Left and the extreme Right. In this the Nazi Party profited more than the Communists for several reasons: (1) it had the financial support of the industrialists and landlords; (2) it was not internationalist, but nationalist, as any German party had to be; (3) it had never compromised itself by accepting the republic even temporarily, an advantage when most Germans tended to blame the republic for their troubles; (4) it was prepared to use violence, while the parties of the Left, even the Communists, were legalistic and relatively peaceful, because the police and judges were of the Right. The reasons why the Nazis, rather than the Nationalists, profited by the turn from moderation could be explained by the fact that (1) the Nationalists had compromised themselves and vacillated on every issue from 1924 to 1929, and (2) the Nazis had an advantage in that they were not clearly a party of the Right but were ambiguous; in fact, a large group of Germans considered the Nazis a revolutionary Left party differing from the Communists only in being patriotic.

The whole of 1932 was filled with a series of intrigues and distrustful, shifting alliances among the various groups which sought to get into a position to use the presidential power of decree. On October 11, 1931, a great reactionary alliance was made of the Nazis, the Nationalists, the Stahlhelm (a militaristic veterans' organization), and the Junker Landbund. This so-called "Harzburg Front" pretended to be a unified opposition to Communism, but really represented part of the intrigue of these various groups to come to power. Of the real rulers of Germany, only the Westphalian industrialists and the army were absent. The industrialists were taken into camp by Hitler during a three-hour speech which he made at the Industrial Club of Dusseldorf at the invitation of Fritz Thyssen (January 27, 1932). The army could not be brought into line, since it

was controlled by the presidential coterie, especially Schleicher and Hindenburg himself. Schleicher had political ambitions of his own, and the army traditionally would not commit itself in any open or formal fashion.

Germany suffered two major crisis between 1920 and 1933, the first would be the hyper-inflation of 1923 and the great depression from 1930 till 1933. The reason for the hyper-inflation will be discussed later. Germany was "flourishing" directly after the war. Until 1923, Industry grew and had only 77.000 recorded unemployed. The occupation of the Ruhr area happend by France and Belgium in 1923 happened partly because of the hyper-inflation. At that point, production declined and unemployment skyrocketed. This lead to a shift of wealth. People who had their wealth in cash were ruined and the entire middle class became impoverished while people owning the means of production were rather well off. This lead to huge amount of stikes, further destroying the economy. The inflation was stopped by the creation of a new currency, the "Mark", and the currency was stabilized in a difficult transition period until 1926. Unemployment rose to 25% at the end of 1923.

The French occupation of the Ruhr

In 1921 the Allied Reparations Commission presented the government with a bill for reparations of £6.6 Billion. The Germans could not pay the amount owed and over the Christmas and New Year, 1922-3, they defaulted on their payments. Seventy thousand French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr. They intended to use the produce of Germany's industrial heartland as payment in kind for reparations. The German government began a policy of passive resistance and called a general strike. Some began a low level terrorist campaign. The French reacted brutally with aggressive house searches, hostage taking and shooting over a hundred Germans. The economic effects of the occupation were catastrophic. The loss of production in the Ruhr caused a fall in production elsewhere and unemployment rose from 2% to 23%. Prices rose out of control as tax revenues collapsed and the government financed its activities through the printing of money. By November prices were a billion times their pre-war levels.

The Locarno Pact

In 1925 he took the initiative that led to the Locarno Pact. Under this agreement Germany recognised her Western frontiers as final and agreed to use peaceful means to ensure revision of her frontiers in the east. Stresemann was a German nationalist and was not prepared to give up what he saw as legitimate demands for the return of Danzig and the northern half of the Polish Corridor. In September 1926 Germany joined the League of Nations with a permanent seat on the Council in recognition of her status as a great power. As part of this policy of co-operation, the first of the three Rhineland zones which had been placed under Allied military occupation by the Treaty of Versailles were

evacuated in 1926. In 1927 the Inter-Allied Control Commission to supervise German disarmament was withdrawn. The Young Plan agreed in 1929 greatly reduced German reparations to a figure of £2 billion and Repayments were to be made over a period of 59 years. Stresemann also won complete allied evacuation of the Rhineland by June 1930 (five years ahead of schedule). It is hardly surprising that when he died of a stroke in October 1929 at the early age of fifty-one Stresemann's reputation stood very high. He had also become a focus for hopes of European peace. Hitler is reported to have remarked that in Stresemann's position "he could not have achieved more".

The Collapse of Weimar

Stresemann's death could not have come at a worse time for the young republic. The onset of the Great Depression was to have dramatic effects on Germany. The German economy's recovery after the inflation of 1923 had been financed by loans from the United States. Many of these short term loans had been used to finance capital projects such as road building. State governments financed their activities with the help of these loans. German interest rates were high, and capital flowed in. Large firms borrowed money and depended heavily on American loans. German banks took out American loans to invest in German businesses. The German economic recovery was based on shaky foundations. The German economy was in decline prior to the Wall Street Crash. There was no growth in German industrial production in 1928-9 and unemployment rose to two and a half million.

On the 24th October, "Black Thursday", there was panic selling on the New York Stock Exchange reacting to a business crisis in America. Early the following week, "Black Tuesday", 29th of October, panic selling set in again. 16.4 million shares were sold, a record not surpassed for forty years. Share prices went into freefall. Ten billion dollars was wiped off the value of share prices in one day. Effects on Germany As a result American demand for imports collapsed. American banks saw their losses mount and they started calling in their short term loans with which so much of German economy had been financing itself for the past five years. Firms began to cut back drastically. Industrial production fell quickly and by 1932 it was 40% of its 1929 level. To make matters worse in 1931 a number of Austrian and German banks went out of business. Unemployment rose from 1.6 million in October 1929 to 6.12 million in February 1932. 33% percent of the workforce were now unemployed. By 1932 roughly one worker in three was registered as unemployed with rates even higher in industrial areas of Germany. Matters were made worse by the fact that the drastic fall in people's income caused a collapse in tax revenues. Many soon were not in receipt of unemployment benefits as state governments could not afford to pay it. Industry production was reduced to 58%, Agriculture was down to 65%.

Political Turmoil

The Republic was soon under attack from both left- and right-wing sources. The radical left accused the ruling Social Democrats of having betrayed the ideals of the workers' movement by preventing a communist revolution and sought to overthrow the Republic and do so themselves. Various right-wing sources opposed any democratic system, preferring an authoritarian, autocratic state like the 1871 Empire. To further undermine the Republic's credibility, some right-wingers (especially certain members of the former officer corps) also blamed an alleged conspiracy of Socialists and Jews for Germany's defeat in World War I. In the next five years, the central government, assured of the support of the Reichswehr, dealt severely with the occasional outbreaks of violence in Germany's large cities. The left claimed that the Social Democrats had betrayed the ideals of the revolution, while the army and the government-financed Freikorps committed hundreds of acts of gratuitous violence against striking workers. The first challenge to the Weimar Republic came when a group of communists and anarchists took over the Bavarian government in Munich and declared the creation of the Bavarian Soviet Republic. The uprising was brutally attacked by Freikorps, which consisted mainly of ex-soldiers dismissed from the army and who were well-paid to put down forces of the Far Left. The Freikorps was an army outside the control of the government, but they were in close contact with their allies in the Reichswehr.

On 13 March 1920, 12,000 Freikorps soldiers occupied Berlin and installed Wolfgang Kapp (a right-wing journalist) as chancellor (Kapp Putsch). The national government fled to Stuttgart and called for a general strike against the putsch. The strike meant that no "official" pronouncements could be published, and with the civil service out on strike, the Kapp government collapsed after only four days on 17 March. Inspired by the general strikes, a workers' uprising began in the Ruhr region when 50,000 people formed a "Red Army" and took control of the province. The regular army and the Freikorps ended the uprising on their own authority. The rebels were campaigning for an extension of the plans to nationalise major industries and supported the national government, but the SPD leaders did not want to lend support to the growing USPD, who favoured the establishment of a socialist regime. The repression of an uprising of SPD supporters by the reactionary forces in the Freikorps on the instructions of the SPD ministers was to become a major source of conflict within the socialist movement and thus contributed to the weakening of the only group that could have withstood the National Socialist movement. Other rebellions were put down in March 1921 in Saxony and Hamburg.

In 1922, Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union, which allowed Germany to train military personnel in exchange for giving Russia military technology. This was against the Treaty of Versailles, which limited Germany to 100,000 soldiers and no conscription, naval forces of 15,000 men, twelve destroyers, six battleships, and six cruisers, no submarines or aircraft. However, Russia had pulled out of World War I against the Germans as a result of the 1917 Russian Revolution, and was excluded from the

League of Nations. Thus, Germany seized the chance to make an ally. Walther Rathenau, the Jewish Foreign Minister who signed the treaty, was assassinated two months later by two ultra-nationalist army officers. Further pressure from the political right came in 1923 with the Beer Hall Putsch, also called the Munich Putsch, staged by the Nazi Party under Adolf Hitler in Munich. In 1920, the German Workers' Party had become the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), or Nazi party, and would become a driving force in the collapse of Weimar. Hitler named himself as chairman of the party in July 1921. On 8 November 1923, the Kampfbund, in a pact with Erich Ludendorff, took over a meeting by Bavarian prime minister Gustav von Kahr at a beer hall in Munich.

Ludendorff and Hitler declared that the Weimar government was deposed and that they were planning to take control of Munich the following day. The 3,000 rebels were thwarted by the Bavarian authorities. Hitler was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison for high treason, a minimum sentence for the charge. Hitler served less than eight months in a comfortable cell, receiving a daily stream of visitors before his release on 20 December 1924. While in jail, Hitler dictated *Mein Kampf*, which laid out his ideas and future policies. Hitler now decided to focus on legal methods of gaining power.

Suffering, Degeneracy and the Jews

At the end of the First World War, Germany was essentially tricked into paying massive reparations to France and other economic competitors and former belligerent countries in terms of the so-called Treaty of Versailles, thanks to the liberal American President Woodrow Wilson. Germany was declared to be solely responsible for the war, in spite of the fact that "Germany did not plot a European war, did not want one, and made genuine efforts, though too belated, to avert one." As a result of these massive forced financial reparations, by 1923 the situation in Germany became desperate and inflation on an astronomical scale became the only way out for the government. Printing presses were engaged to print money around the clock. In 1921 the exchange rate was 75 marks to the dollar. By 1924 this had become about 5 trillion marks to the dollar. This At the end of the First World War, Germany was essentially tricked. As a result of these massive enforced financial reparations, by 1923 the situation in Germany became desperate and inflation on an astronomical scale became the only way out for the government. Printing presses were engaged to print money around the clock. In 1921 the exchange rate was 75 marks to the dollar. By 1924 this had become about 5 trillion marks to the dollar. This virtually destroyed the German middle class (reducing any bank savings to a virtual zero.

According to Sir Arthur Bryant the British historian: "It was the Jews with their international affiliations and their hereditary flair for finance who were best able to seize such opportunities... They did so with such effect that, even in November 1938, after five years of anti-Semitic legislation and persecution, they still owned, according to the Times correspondent in Berlin, something like a third of the real property in the Reich. Most

of it came into their hands during the inflation... But to those who had lost their all this bewildering transfer seemed a monstrous injustice. After prolonged sufferings they had now been deprived of their last possessions. They saw them pass into the hands of strangers, many of whom had not shared their sacrifices and who cared little or nothing for their national standards and traditions... The Jews obtained a wonderful ascendancy in politics, business and the learned professions (in spite of constituting) less than one percent of the population... The banks, including the Reichsbank and the big private banks, were practically controlled by them. So were the publishing trade, the cinema, the theatres and a large part of the press – all the normal means, in fact, by which public opinion in a civilized country is formed... The largest newspaper combine in the country with a daily circulation of four millions was a Jewish monopoly... Every year it became harder and harder for a gentile to gain or keep a foothold in any privileged occupation... At this time it was not the 'Aryans' who exercised racial discrimination. It was a discrimination that operated without violence. It was exercised by a minority against a majority. There was no persecution, only elimination... It was the contrast between the wealth enjoyed – and lavishly displayed – by aliens of cosmopolitan tastes, and the poverty and misery of native Germans, that has made anti-Semitism so dangerous and ugly a force in the new Europe.

Strangely enough, a book unexpectedly published by Princeton University Press in 1984, Sarah Gordon (*Hitler, Germans and the "Jewish Question"*) essentially confirms what Bryant says. According to her, "Jews were never a large percentage of the total German population; at no time did they exceed 1% of the population during the years 1871-1933." But she adds "Jews were over-represented in business, commerce, and public and private service... They were especially visible in private banking in Berlin, which in 1923 had 150 private Jewish banks, as opposed to only 11 private non-Jewish banks... They owned 41% of iron and scrap iron firms and 57% of other metal businesses... Jews were very active in the stock market, particularly in Berlin, where in 1928 they comprised 80% of the leading members of the stock exchange. By 1933, when the Nazis began eliminating Jews from prominent positions, 85% of the brokers on the Berlin Stock exchange were dismissed because of their "race"... At least a quarter of full professors and instructors (at German universities) had Jewish origins... In 1905-6 Jewish students comprised 25% of the law and medical students... In 1931, 50% of the 234 theatre directors in Germany were Jewish, and in Berlin the number was 80%... In 1929 it was estimated that the per capita income of Jews in Berlin was twice that of other Berlin residents..."

Arthur Koestler confirms the Jewish over-involvement in German publishing. "Ullstein's was a kind of super-trust; the largest organization of its kind in Europe, and probably in the world. They published four daily papers in Berlin alone, among these the venerable *Vossische Zeitung*, founded in the eighteenth century, and the *B.Z. am Mittag*, an evening paper... Apart from these, Ullstein's published more than a dozen weekly and monthly periodicals, ran their own news service, their own travel agency, etc., and were one of the leading book publishers. The firm was owned by the brothers Ullstein - they were five,

like the original Rothschild brothers, and like them also, they were Jews.” Edgar Mowrer, Berlin correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, wrote an anti-German tract called *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (published as a Penguin Special and reprinted five times between December 1937 and April 1938). He nevertheless notes, “In the all-important administration of Prussia, any number of strategic positions came into the hands of Hebrews... A telephone conversation between three Jews in Ministerial offices could result in the suspension of any periodical or newspaper in the state... The Jews came in Germany to play in politics and administration that same considerable part that they had previously won by open competition in business, trade, banking, the Press, the arts, the sciences and the intellectual and cultural life of the country. And thereby the impression was strengthened that Germany, a country with a mission of its own, had fallen into the hands of foreigners.”

Mowrer says, “No one who lived through the period from 1919 to 1926 is likely to forget the sexual promiscuity that prevailed... Throughout a town like Berlin, hotels and pensions made vast fortunes by letting rooms by the hour or day to baggageless, unregistered guests. Hundreds of cabarets, pleasure resorts and the like served for purposes of getting acquainted and acquiring the proper mood...” . Bryant describes throngs of child prostitutes outside the doors of the great Berlin hotels and restaurants. He adds “Most of them (the night clubs and vice-resorts) were owned and managed by Jews. And it was the Jews... among the promoters of this trade who were remembered in after years.”

Douglas Reed, Chief Central European correspondent before WWII for the London Times, was profoundly anti-German and anti-Hitler. But nevertheless he reported: “I watched the Brown Shirts going from shop to shop with paint pots and daubing on the window panes the word “Jew“, in dripping red letters. The Kurfürstendamm was to me a revelation. I knew that Jews were prominent in business life, but I did not know that they almost monopolized important branches of it. Germany had one Jew to one hundred gentiles, said the statistics; but the fashionable Kurfürstendamm, according to the dripping red legends, had about one gentile shop to ninety-nine Jewish ones.”. In Reed’s book *Disgrace Abounding* of the following year he notes, “In the Berlin (of pre-Hitler years) most of the theatres were Jewish-owned or Jewish-leased, most of the leading film and stage actors were Jews, the plays performed were often by German, Austrian or Hungarian Jews and were staged by Jewish film producers, applauded by Jewish dramatic critics in Jewish newspapers... The Jews are not cleverer than the Gentiles, if by clever you mean good at their jobs. They ruthlessly exploit the common feeling of Jews, first to get a foothold in a particular trade or calling, then to squeeze the non-Jews out of it... It is not true that Jews are better journalists than Gentiles. They held all the posts on those Berlin papers because the proprietors and editors were Jewish.” The Jewish writer Edwin Black notes, “For example, in Berlin alone, about 75% of the attorneys and nearly as many of the doctors were Jewish.”

Another Look at the Weimar Hyperinflation

The Weimar financial crisis began with the crushing reparations payments imposed at the Treaty of Versailles. Hjalmar Schacht, who was currency commissioner for the Republic, complained:

“The Treaty of Versailles is a model of ingenious measures for the economic destruction of Germany. . . . [T]he Reich could not find any way of holding its head above the water other than by the inflationary expedient of printing bank notes.”

That is what he said at first; but Zarlenga writes that Schacht proceeded in his 1967 book *The Magic of Money* “to let the cat out of the bag, writing in German, with some truly remarkable admissions that shatter the ‘accepted wisdom’ the financial community has promulgated on the German hyperinflation.”⁸ Schacht revealed that it was the privately-owned Reichsbank, not the German government, that was pumping new currency into the economy. Like the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Reichsbank was overseen by appointed government officials but was operated for private gain. The mark’s dramatic devaluation began soon after the Reichsbank was “privatized,” or delivered to private investors. What drove the wartime inflation into hyperinflation, said Schacht, was speculation by foreign investors, who would sell the mark short, betting on its decreasing value. Recall that in the short sale, speculators borrow something they don’t own, sell it, then “cover” by buying it back at the lower price. Speculation in the German mark was made possible because the Reichsbank made massive amounts of currency available for borrowing, marks that were created on demand and lent at a profitable interest to the bank. When the Reichsbank could not keep up with the voracious demand for marks, other private banks were allowed to create them out of nothing and lend them at interest as well.

According to Schacht, not only was the government not the cause of the Weimar hyperinflation, but it was the government that got the disaster under control. The Reichsbank was put under strict regulation, and prompt corrective measures were taken to eliminate foreign speculation by eliminating easy access to loans of bank-created money. Hitler then got the country back on its feet with his MEFO bills issued by the government.

Schacht actually disapproved of the new government-issued money and wound up getting fired as head of the Reichsbank when he refused to issue it, something that may have saved him at the Nuremberg trials. But he acknowledged in his later memoirs that Feder’s theories had worked. Allowing the government to issue the money it needed had not produced the price inflation predicted by classical economic theory. Schacht surmised that this was because factories were sitting idle and people were unemployed. In this he agreed with Keynes: when the resources were available to increase productivity, adding money to the economy did not increase prices; it increased goods and services. Supply and demand increased together, leaving prices unaffected. These revelations put the notorious hyperinflations of modern history in a different light.

9.10 Soviet Union

World War I ended on November 11, 1918. Within forty-eight hours, on the morning of November 13, an attempt was made to bring about a second world war. At that time the concepts and names “World War I” and “World War II” did not yet exist. The war of 1914–18, because it was a collision of gigantic empires, was called the Imperialist War. It was also called the Great War, because it surpassed all previously known wars in magnitude, expenditure, and number of participants. No previous wars had known such extended fronts, such intense battles, such massive losses, or such great social and economic consequences. The barbarity of a global slaughterhouse was so obvious that an overwhelming majority of people considered a repeated occurrence of such madness impossible. For this reason, the war of 1914–18 had another name, which is now forever forgotten, the Last War. Many thought that the gory absurdity of the Great War would sober all its participants, and eternally eradicate the desire to fight. Nevertheless, a small group of people existed in Russia, who dreamed that a second world war would be crueler, that the bloodshed would encompass not only Europe and part of Asia but all the other continents as well. These people called themselves Bolsheviks, or Communists. Vladimir Lenin headed the group, and called their organization a political party. However, the infrastructure, tactics, and strategies of Lenin’s group did not resemble those of a political party, but of a small, well-organized, conspiratorial cult. Lenin’s party had a perceptible structure, parallel to which ran a secret, invisible organization. Just like a mafia organization, Lenin’s party had open and entirely legal associations and undertakings, along with a secret unifying force that always remained in the shadows.

The leaders of this cult concealed their real names. Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Molotov, and Kirov: these are all aliases. They all had serious reasons for not revealing their true names. For example, under the alias of “Stalin” hid a bank robber whose real name was Dzhugashvili. He was in charge of filling the party’s cashbox. Lenin and his gang worked hard to draw out World War I as much as possible. As early as September 1916, during the peak of the war, Lenin declared that one world war might be insufficient, and humanity might need another one of the same or even greater destructive scale. He reasoned that war is the mother of revolution, and world war is the mother of world revolution. The longer the war lasts, the more bloodshed and destruction it brings, the sooner revolution takes place. If a world revolution did not arise as a result of the first world war, a second world war becomes necessary.

Lenin’s party was not only the most militaristic in the world, but also the most peaceloving. In 1914, almost all political parties of the nations at war voted in unison in the parliaments of their countries to create war credits. Lenin’s party counted among the very few exceptions. Together with another branch of Russian Social Democrats, the Mensheviks, Lenin’s party voted against increasing military expenditures, despite the obvious understanding that during wartime military expenditures cannot be the same as during peacetime. On July 26, 1914, during an emergency session of the Duma, the Bolsheviks

and Mensheviks left the meeting hall “as a protest against the current military insanity.” Lenin’s party began an unprecedented campaign for peace. By September–October of 1917, the Bolshevik party had seventy-five newspapers and magazines, with a total daily run estimated as high as 600,000 copies. All these publications advocated for immediate peace. The Communists distributed their publications free of charge in city streets, in factories, in military barracks, and in the trenches at the front. On top of the newspapers and magazines, Lenin’s party printed millions of books, brochures, pamphlets, and proclamations. Soldiers were told to try to establish friendly relations with the enemy, instead of shooting at them. Communist slogans urged the troops: “Put down your rifles!” “Go home!” “Let’s transform the Imperialist War into a Civil War!”

In the fall of 1917, under the leadership of Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin, the Communists carried out a coup and seized control of the capital of the Russian empire, Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg). For the first time in world history, a group of people living and working under fake names gained control of the capital of such a vast country. Most nations of the world did not recognize the new authorities as legitimate. The only exceptions were countries with which Russia was at war, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Only the enemy recognized Lenin’s command. Moments after the new power came into being, the first official document—the Peace Decree - was created and signed. The army and navy immediately ceased all military activity. Every regiment elected committees of soldiers. Delegates from each regiment began conducting their own peace talks with the enemy. They paid no attention to their regimental or division commanders, or higher authorities. At first every regiment, and later on every battalion, independently designed the conditions for peace, without taking into consideration the demands of the other battalions. The Russian army crumbled into hundreds of uncontrollable regiments and thousands of battalions, ceasing to exist as a single unified organism. The front collapsed. Nobody was left to defend Russia. Following the decree to stop fighting, Lenin and his cohorts immediately instituted committees to demobilize and take apart the Russian army. No major power had ever voluntarily dismantled its army during peacetime. Yet Lenin and Trotsky demolished the Russian army during the peak of World War I.

The Russian army, acting under Lenin and Trotsky’s orders, abandoned its trenches and went home. Thousands of guns, mortars, machine guns, millions of small arms, and huge stores of ammunition, uniforms, and supplies were left behind on the frontlines. Lenin’s “Peace Decree” was an act of Russia’s utter capitulation before Germany. From this moment the Eastern Front ceased to exist. Germany received the chance to concentrate its efforts on the Western Front against Russia’s former allies. In adopting the “Peace Decree” Russia betrayed her allies. Lenin and Trotsky singlehandedly brought Russia out of the war and made their country subject to Germany’s mercy. Despite Russia’s withdrawal, the situation in Germany and Austria-Hungary continued to worsen. A general strike broke out in Austria-Hungary in January 1918. During the same month, a general strike was called in Germany. Both countries stood on the verge of chaos. Russian Communists saved their day. To be capable of fighting in the war as long as possible,

Germany needed strategic resources in large quantities. Lenin and Trotsky again came to Kaiser Wilhelm's aid. They signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918. The Russian Communists, without battle, handed over approximately a million square kilometers of their territory to the Germans. Fifty-six million people, about a third of the Russian empire's population, inhabited this territory. The occupied area encompassed more than a quarter of the nation's cultivated lands; it housed 26 percent of the railways, and major industrial capabilities. Seventy-three percent of Russia's iron and steel was cast in these territories, and 89 percent of Russia's coal was mined there.

Communists are proud of their love of peace. However, the stubbornness with which they fought for peace far surpasses common sense, to the point of suspicion. For the sake of peace, Lenin and Trotsky sacrificed 56 million of their subjects, without considering their wishes and needs. What good was peace for these people, if their homes were taken over by foreign occupants? For the sake of peace, Lenin and Trotsky handed Russia's most fertile lands over to Germany, causing widespread famine in the remaining territories. Without bread, meat, gold, steel, iron, and coal, Russia could not exist. What good is peace if it brings the death of the nation? It was clear that Germany could not successfully continue to fight on two fronts, but the defeat of Germany would mean the end of the war. Consequently, Lenin's task, to prolong the war, was to create a situation in which Germany fought on only one front. For this purpose, he took Russia out of the war. Lenin's plot was simple: let Germany and Austria-Hungary fight against Great Britain, France, and the United States. Let them wear out each other's strengths. Most importantly, do not allow the flames of war to be extinguished. Russia would remain on the side and add fuel to the fire. While "peace" was being made on Lenin's orders in Brest-Litovsk, intensive preparations for a revolt against the German government were underway in Petrograd. The revolutionaries published half a million copies of a Communist newspaper in German, *Die Fackel* (the Torch). Even before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was signed, in January 1918 a German Communist organization, Spartakus, was formed in Petrograd. The newspapers *Die Weltrevolution* (the World Revolution) and *Die Rote Fahne* (the Red Banner) were also born, not in Germany but in Russia under Lenin's orders, while he made peace with Germany's government. Communism would become deeply rooted in Germany in the 1920s. Part of the credit for this goes to Lenin, who fueled the instability of German politics precisely at the time when he had a peace treaty with the German government. While Germany was conducting a hopeless and devastating military campaign in the West, Lenin was subverting its political system.

Finally, World War I ended. In November 1918 Europe's condition was exactly what the Kremlin leaders had hoped it would be. The economic hardships caused by war had reached their limits in all the nations. Europe was facing an unprecedented crisis that encompassed all spheres of life, including the economy, politics, and ideology. Germany admitted her defeat. The monarchy crumbled. Anarchy and famine ruled the land. Just then, Lenin and Trotsky's love for peace vanished. The government of Soviet Russia issued, on November 13, 1918, an order for the Red Army to begin offensive

operations against Europe. A review of the protocols of any of the countless meetings and congresses of that period reveals that the only question on the agenda was the World Revolution. The aim of the Soviet advance narrowed down to installing Communism on the European continent. In a few days, the Red Army crossed into the Baltic countries. The Communist government of Estonia was formed on November 29, that of Latvia on December 4. Lithuania followed on December 8, 1918. On December 17, a manifesto published in Riga named Germany as the imminent objective of the offensive. The most important goal of the operation: fuel a new world war.

Lenin's calculations were precise: Worn out by World War I, the German empire is unable to bear the pressures of another war. The war ends with the crushing of the empire and is followed by a revolution. In war-torn Europe, on the remaining fragments of the old empires, Communist countries arise, remarkably similar to Lenin's Bolshevik regime. Lenin was ecstatic: "We are at the doorstep of world revolution!"

First Attempts to Unleash a Second World War

As a result of World War I, Europe found itself in a situation which the Communists called revolutionary. In 1918 Communist parties formed in many European countries. In Kiel, German navy seamen called a strike on November 3, 1918. Two days later, the strike spread to all of northern Germany, and on November 7–8 it reached the main industrial regions and the capital city, Berlin. The strikes were suppressed, or subsided on their own. But in January 1919, a Soviet republic was declared in Bremen. The Hungarian Soviet Republic formed in March. In April, the Bavarian Soviet Republic followed. Following the Soviet example, these Communist nations formed Red Armies and secret police squads, which called themselves "extraordinary commissions in the struggle against counterrevolution." These extraordinary commissions immediately instigated a reign of terror against all layers of society, and the Red Armies threw themselves into revolutionary wars to "liberate" the neighboring nations. A part of the Hungarian Red Army marched into Slovakia and, on June 20, 1919, proclaimed the Slovak Soviet Republic. A Communist government formed immediately and declared a policy of nationalization of all private lands and annulment of private property. It nationalized all commercial enterprises, banks, and transportation systems. For silencing the voices of discontent, they formed the Slovak Red Army and Extraordinary Commission. At the same time Soviet Ukraine declared war on Romania, and began preparations to advance west, to connect with Soviet Hungary.

Lenin and Trotsky prepared to establish Communism in Asia as well as in Europe. On August 5, 1919, Trotsky wrote a secret memorandum arguing that "the road to Paris and London lies through the cities of Afghanistan, Punjab, and Bengal." He proposed "preparations for a march on India, to help the Indian revolution." To achieve this goal Trotsky said it was necessary to form "a political and military command center of Asian revolution, and a revolution academy" in the Urals or in Turkestan, to form a special

corps of 30,000 to 40,000 horsemen and “unleash them on India” to help the “native revolutionaries.” Civil war raged in Russia and distracted the efforts to ignite a second world war in 1918 and 1919. The main resources of the Red Army were tied up on internal fronts fighting against those who opposed Communism. Lenin and Trotsky were not able to send aid to the Communist nations that sprouted in Central Europe, nor could the Red Army reach Germany.

In 1919 in Moscow, Lenin and Trotsky created the Communist International, abbreviated as Comintern. This organization defined itself as “the Headquarters of World Revolution.” The goal of the Comintern was the creation of a “World Soviet Socialist Republic.” It began the process of creating and strengthening Communist parties on all continents. These parties constituted sections of the Comintern and were subordinate to its leadership. Allegedly, all Communist parties in the world, including the Russian party, had an equal status. They all contributed to the communal bank of the Comintern. Delegates from all Communist parties of the world held congresses, developed strategies and tactics, and elected a common leadership—the Executive Committee of the Comintern. This organ oversaw all the Communists of the world. The Communist Party of Russia officially was a section of the Comintern, on equal footing with all the other parties, and bound to abide by commonly developed decisions. In practice, however, the reality was an entirely different story. All the funds in the Comintern budget came from the gold reserves of Soviet Russia. All the Communist parties of the world were paid for by Moscow and existed only through financing from the Kremlin. The Comintern itself was also created with Kremlin funds. The leaders of the Comintern lived and worked in Moscow, under tight control of the Soviet secret police. All their directives came from the Kremlin. Only those who were agreeable to the Kremlin leaders, and who carried out all their orders without dissent, were chosen.

Communists conducted not only an open struggle, but also a secret one. Stated briefly, their ideology narrowed down to advocating: “The old world must be destroyed, and a new one built in its place.” To destroy the old world and build a new one, it is necessary to gain political power. Gaining political power requires using all measures, ranging from the most peaceful to the most violent, from the most open to the most secretive. “The struggle for a new world must unfold not on a national scale, but on a world scale. The interests of the World Revolution are more important than the interests of individual countries.”

Every person joining the Communist Party accepted this ideology, meaning he or she agreed to fight against the interests of their own nation, if it became necessary, and to use all methods, including covert and violent action. Suddenly the intelligence services of the Soviet Union received legions of volunteers from practically every nation in the world. All that remained was to select the most competent ones, train them, finance them, and assign them to missions in the fight against their own countries and governments. In the 1920s Soviet intelligence suddenly became the most powerful intelligence organization in the world. Thousands of Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, Americans, English, Japanese,

and French selflessly worked in the name of a bright future for all humanity. In actuality, they worked for the interests of the Kremlin.

Lenin was the first to understand that World War I left a rocky legacy. The victorious allied nations, especially France, were carried away in demanding reparations from Germany. Forced into making huge payments to the victors, Germany faced a sharp economic crisis, and the German people experienced hunger, poverty, and constant misfortune. Lenin was the first to understand that the Versailles Treaty was a bomb waiting to explode under Europe. Germany would never make peace due to the unfairness of the pact; there would always be those who opposed the treaty, who would call out for revenge and act to get it. On October 15, 1920, Lenin declared: "The order held by the Versailles peace treaty lies over a volcano, since the seventy percent of the world's people who are enslaved are anxiously awaiting someone to come and start a struggle for their liberation, and to rock the foundation of their countries." Just who could that man be?

In 1920 Russian Communists undertook a new attempt to spark a second world war by ripping through Poland into Germany. Although the most favorable conditions for revolution had already lessened, Germany in 1920 was still an acceptable place for class struggles. Germany was ruined and dishonored. All her ideals were besmirched and mocked. The country was enveloped in a harsh economic crisis; in March 1920 Germany experienced a general strike, estimated to have had more than 12 million participants. Germany resembled a powder keg, waiting for just one spark. The Red Army was supposed to bring this spark to Germany. In the summer of 1920, the western front of the Red Army, under the leadership of the ruthless General Mikhail Tukhachevski, began to advance with the objective of crushing Europe. Excerpts from order #1423 given to the western front on July 2, 1920, announced: "Fighters of the Workers' Revolution! The fate of the World Revolution will be decided in the West. The path to the world fire lies over the dead body of White (anti-Communist) Poland. We will carry happiness and peace on our bayonets to the working people of the world. To the West! To decisive battles and thundering victories!"

In the days when the Red Army was advancing toward the Polish cities of Warsaw and Lvov, a second congress of the Comintern was taking place in Russia. The Headquarters of the World Revolution then issued a call:

"Brothers—Red Army Fighters, you should know your fight against the Polish slave drivers is the most just war in history. You are fighting not only for the interests of Soviet Russia, but for the interests of the whole of working mankind, for the interest of the Communist International. . . . Soviet Germany, united with Soviet Russia, will immediately become more powerful than all the capitalist powers combined! The Communist International declared that Soviet Russia's goal is its own goal too. The international proletariat will not sheath its sword until Soviet Russia joins the Federation of the Soviet Republics of the World as an integral link."

On July 23, 1920, directly from the Comintern congress, Lenin telegraphed Stalin at the

Polish front: "Situation in Comintern is outstanding. Zinoviev, Bukharin, and I think that it would be proper to encourage a revolution in Italy. My personal opinion is that, to do so, Hungary has to be sovietized, possibly along with Czechoslovakia and Rumania."⁵ In a conversation with the French delegates to the congress, Lenin was even blunter: "Yes, the Soviet troops are in Warsaw. Soon, Germany will be ours. We will conquer Hungary again; the Balkans will rise against capitalism. Italy will tremble. Bourgeois Europe is cracking at the seams in the storm."

The Red Army stepped onto Polish territory and immediately in the first occupied city declared the creation of the PSSR—the Polish Soviet Socialist Republic.⁷ Felix Dzerzhinski, the head of the Soviet secret police and an ethnic Pole, led the PSSR. By the end of the second congress of the Comintern, Warsaw was half surrounded by the units of the Red Army. Prior to the Polish counterattack, the Red Army crossed the Vistula River in the vicinity of the town of Wloclawek—360 kilometers, or ten marching days, from Berlin.⁸ There was no common border between Soviet Russia and Germany. In order to spark the fires of revolution, it was necessary to tear down the dividing barrier—Poland. On September 22, 1920, Lenin spoke to the Ninth Conference of the Russian Communist Party and bluntly described the logic guiding the Bolsheviks in their drive: "e defensive war against capitalism is over, we have won. . . . We are now going to try to attack them, to help the sovietization of Poland. . . . We have set ourselves a task: to seize Warsaw. . . . It turned out that not just the fate of Warsaw is being decided, but the fate of the whole Versailles Treaty."

To the Communists' misfortune, Tukhachevski, who did not understand strategy, was in command of Soviet troops. Tukhachevski's armies were crushed near Warsaw and fled in disgrace. In the critical moment, Tukhachevski lacked strategic reserves, and this decided the outcome of the grandiose battle. This time, Europe was fortunate. The Soviet Communists had to postpone the revolution in Europe until 1923.

The First Contact

After the failed first try of further revolution the Russian people demanded peace, not world domination. St. Petersburg, the "cradle of the revolution," experienced one workers' strike after another. The workers demanded bread and freedom. The Bolsheviks crushed the workers' demonstrations, but in March 1921 all of a sudden the Baltic fleet intervened on the workers' behalf. The sailors of the seaport city of Kronstadt (a naval base), the same ones who gave power to Lenin and Trotsky, now sought their freedom from Communist rule. They demanded that the Soviets (the workers' and peasants' councils, the basic organizing units of society created by the Communists) be purged of Communists. In addition, the nation experienced a wave of peasant uprisings.

The peasants' and sailors' uprisings and the workers' demonstrations were crushed by the same man who lost the Polish war, Mikhail Tukhachevski. He showed inhuman cruelty, and disregarded all international rules of law and human rights. Under his leadership

thousands of hostages were executed by firing squad, peasants were shelled with poison gas, and villages were burned. Villagers were drowned in swamps; sailors were drowned, pushed into holes cut in the ice. Communist leaders were desperately looking for a way out of the crisis. The Comintern, finding itself in this desperate situation, made a decision that the only thing that could save Bolshevism was a revolution in Germany. The head of the Comintern, Grigorii Zinoviev, sent his loyal follower, the Hungarian revolutionary Bela Kun, to Berlin. Kun, who in 1919 had been the actual head of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, arrived in Berlin in March 1921 with an order from Zinoviev and the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the Central Committee of the German Communist Party to seize power. For this the German Communists had to organize an immediate uprising and abolish the Weimar Republic.

On March 22 a general strike was declared in the industrial regions of central Germany. On March 24 the Communists took control of government buildings in Hamburg. In Leipzig, Dresden, Chemnitz, and other cities of central Germany, the Communists organized a takeover of courts, municipal buildings, banks, and police headquarters. The official organ of German Communists, *Die Rote Fahne*, openly called for revolution." Although the attempt to take control of Germany in 1921 suffered defeat, in Moscow preparations immediately began for a new seizure of power in Germany and the world. On December 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was born. In this name there are no national or geographical limits. According to the plans of the founders of the USSR, the Union was meant to spread throughout the world. The "Declaration of the Founding of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics" proclaimed that the USSR is only the first decisive step in a creation of the World Soviet Socialist Republic. The number of republics was planned to expand until the entire world formed one giant Communist state. The Founding Declaration of the USSR was an open and direct declaration of war to the rest of the world. It was an official document that stated the main purpose of the existence of the giant state: to destroy and subordinate all remaining states of the world.

Attempts to unleash a war and revolution were repeated by the Soviet Communists many times over. There was an attempt to start a "Balkan revolution," and obtain, in Trotsky's words, a direct route from the Balkan region to the ports of France and Britain.⁶ An assassination attempt was made against the Bulgarian Tsar Boris, but miraculously he survived. In September 1923 armed uprisings began in Bulgaria, started on the Comintern's orders. On September 27, 1923, the Soviet Politburo ordered ten Bulgarian Communists (officers and pilots) to the navy base in Sevastopol. If a nearby Bulgarian city close to the shore was in rebel hands, the pilots would establish a connection by airplane between the south of Russia and Bulgaria. Then, "upon the establishment of the connection, to send out arms that have been in Sevastopol since last year, prepared for the Bulgarian revolution . . . and . . . send Bulgarian Communists currently in Moscow and other Russian cities to Bulgaria with arms." The leader of the uprisings was Georgy Dimitrov—future head of the Comintern. Attempts were also made to spark revolutions in South America, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, China, India, and many other countries.

However, Germany remained the ultimate objective. One of the several attempts to take power in Germany is especially interesting. This attempt was undertaken in the fall of 1923 when Lenin no longer participated in the leadership. The reins of power were almost completely in Stalin's hands, although neither the country, nor the world, not even his rivals within the party, had come to understand this. Stalin's personal secretary, Boris Bazhanov, described the preparations for seizure of power in Germany: "At the end of September an emergency meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (the former name of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the CPSU, as it was renamed in October 1952) was held, so secret that it was attended only by the members of the Politburo and myself. No regular member of the Central Committee was permitted to be present. This meeting was called in order to fix a date for a coup in Germany. It was decided on November 9, 1923."

Bazhanov wrote that the funds earmarked to support the German revolution were tremendous, and a decision was made to support the effort without limits. Inside the Soviet Union, all Communists of German origin and all Communists who knew the German language were mobilized. They were trained and sent to Germany for underground work. Not only regular Soviet Communists were sent to Germany, but leaders of higher rank as well, among them the People's Commissar (member of the cabinet of ministers of the Soviet government) Vasily Schmidt, the members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Karl Radek and Grigory Piatakov, the candidate for membership to the Politburo of the Communist party of the USSR Nikolai Bukharin, and many others. In 1923 many others, also under aliases, arrived in Germany: Tukhachevski, Unshlikht, Vatsetis, Menzhinskii, Trillisser, Yagoda, and many others. The Soviet ambassador to Germany, Nikolai Krestinski, formed a powerful web of secret intelligence. The Soviet embassy transformed itself into the headquarters of the revolution. Through its orders were passed from Moscow, along with a flow of funds, which were immediately transformed into a storm of subversive propaganda, arms, and war supplies.

The Comintern commission dealing with German affairs consisted of the entire Soviet leadership: Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Radek. Stalin thought that it was necessary to avoid at all cost anything that might reveal that the revolution was "dictated" or "instigated" by the USSR. The plan was simple: November 7—the anniversary of the Communist takeover in Russia—would be the day for workers' demonstrations of solidarity in Germany. Special units, trained in Moscow by Communist secret police and military intelligence under the supervision of Joseph Unshlikht, would act as provocateurs and incite conflicts with police. Their goal was to cause violent clashes and arrests thus inflaming the anger of the workers. On November 8, the clashes were to grow from street fights into more serious threats. On the night of November 9, Unshlikht's units were to seize the most important government establishments, making it appear to be a spontaneous reaction of the masses against police brutality. The script was simple, yet reliable. The so-called "Great October Socialist Revolution" followed the same script; so did the "proletarian revolutions" in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in 1918 and in 1940.

Following this blueprint, Communists took control of many states after World War II: a “spontaneous demonstration” of workers, the wrath of the people—and small units of cunning professionals.

Let’s examine the dates. In August of 1923, Stalin decided that “German Communists, by themselves, will have to seize power in Germany.” After this, in October, high-ranking Soviet officials were sent to Germany, and one of Stalin’s agents conducted talks with the Nazis and discussed cooperative actions. In other words, the Soviets were saying on the one hand, “Dear Nazis, please help the Communists take power in Germany.” On the other hand, they were saying “Let the Communists rule Germany by themselves.” This is a familiar Communist maneuver, and it was Stalin’s personal trademark. Communists took power in Russia in alliance with other parties. Then they destroyed their allies after they became useless. Stalin personally acted in the same fashion. He eliminated his political adversaries by using his allies, and then eliminated the allies.

Stalin’s Role in the Rebirth of German War Power

The Kremlin leaders should have used all the powers of the Soviet diplomacy and intelligence services to uncover and root out all attempts to revive the German military machine. Let Germany stay weak! If Germany does not have tanks, aviation, heavy artillery, poison gases, submarines, if Germany has no trained panzer corps, pilots, navigators, if the German generals are banned from developing new tactics and methods of conducting operations, if German engineers do not have the ability to create new models of weapons, and factories do not produce these weapons—then Germany would never start a new war. But the Kremlin leaders did not order their intelligence services to undertake a mission for the strict execution of and adherence to the Versailles Treaty. They did the opposite. A secret reorganization of the German army began with the help of the Soviet government. Moscow gave the German commanders all that they were forbidden to possess: tanks, heavy artillery, war planes, training classes, and weapons testing and shooting ranges. Germany was also provided with access to the Soviet factories that produced tanks and airplanes that were the most advanced in the world so the Germans would be able to look, to memorize, to copy. Stalin allowed the German government to create secret design bureaus and training centers on Soviet territory.

On November 26, 1922, an agreement about the production of metal airplanes and plane engines was signed with the German aviation firm Junkers Flugzeugwerke. It was this agreement with Junkers that paved the way for large-scale Soviet-German military cooperation. In July 1923 two new agreements were set out: one was about the production of munitions and military equipment and the other about the construction of a chemical plant. On April 15, 1925, an agreement was signed about the creation of a secret air force center in the Russian city of Lipetsk for training German military pilots. By the end of 1933, the school had prepared 450 fighter pilots, air reconnaissance observers, and members of bomber squads. Many of them later entered the core of Reichsmarschall

Hermann Goering's command staff. It is safe to say that the Luftwaffe (the German air force) was born in the Soviet town of Lipetsk. Nobody was supposed to know that Stalin was preparing Germany for a new world war. Planes, designed for training and testing, arrived by non-stop flights at high altitude. All those Germans who headed to the German aviation school in Lipetsk were formally discharged from the Reichswehr. Their names were changed. The return of bodies of those who perished during the frequent training accidents was quite a challenge. They were sent by sea through Leningrad, in containers labeled "Mechanical Parts." Their relatives were not told of the true causes of death.

Stalin understood that the new war would not only be an air war, but a tank war as well. Therefore, he gave particular attention to preparing German Panzer corps. In 1926, near the Soviet city of Kazan, a tank school for the Reichswehr was created. German tankers wore Soviet uniforms there. Stalin fully equipped future German Panzer generals: he gave them tanks, fuel, ammunition, transport, housing, repair facilities, and a gigantic well-guarded weapons range—to create, to invent, to test. Kazan became the birthplace and alma mater of German armored divisions. Fifteen years separate the end of World War I and Hitler's coming to power. Stalin's merit before Hitler's Germany lies in that he did not allow Germany to fall behind its enemies in technological and scientific advancement. Stalin bridged the gap between the retiring generation of engineers from the Kaiser era and the newly ascending generation of the Third Reich. Stalin's efforts secured the transfer of all amassed scientific and technological potential, knowledge, and experience from the retiring designers to the newly starting creators of military equipment and weapons. It was not enough to train personnel and perfect models of weapons. One also needs military factories that will produce these weapons. Here as well the Kremlin leaders already, at the end of the 1920s, showed full understanding, and came to the aid of the German war industry. An agreement was worked out about the creation in Russia of production facilities for the German war industry, masked as Soviet-German enterprises. The Junkers deal was the first such enterprise. In 1922 the firm began constructing metal planes and plane motors. Beginning in 1924, the factory already had begun to produce several hundred planes per year. Following Junkers were Friedrich Krupp (cannons, shells, and tanks), BMW (tank motors and plane motors), Bersol (poisonous gases), Karl Walther (rifles), and others. Stalin prepared Germany for a second world war. Without Stalin's help, Germany could not arm itself and destroy Europe. Obviously, when arming Germany, Stalin was not planning that all this would be used against him. The idea was that Germany could still get under communist control and become part of the USSR.

Why Did Stalin Like Hitler's Book So Much?

A study of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union should start with the question: Why did Hitler invade? In 1924 Hitler wrote in his book *Mein Kampf*: "We want to return to that point, where our previous development halted six hundred years ago. We want

to halt Germany's constant efforts to expand to the south and west, and have our sights set towards the territories situated to the east." is phrase became famous and has been quoted time after time. Politicians, diplomats, generals, historians, and journalists have tirelessly repeated these words. Even in the 1920s this quote was cited in the essays and public speeches of Soviet leaders. Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev repeated it. In the 1930s, especially after the Nazis came to power, Hitler's frankness resounded with new authority. Any public speaker on the impending war began with this proclamation by Hitler. After Stalin's death in 1953, hordes of historians quoted Hitler and accused Stalin of short-sightedness. The Fuehrer openly declared his intentions. Stalin should have read *Mein Kampf* and taken appropriate measures. From the moment that *Mein Kampf* first appeared in 1925 until the moment Hitler invaded in 1941, this quote was repeated from every loudspeaker. It was shouted at factory meetings, it was used to scare the people. It was repeated by the Comintern and printed in schoolbooks. After all this, how could the German invasion have been a surprise for Stalin? Did Stalin himself read *Mein Kampf*?

Yes, he read it. Moreover, Stalin was the first foreign reader. He was its greatest scholar and fan. The first translation of *Mein Kampf* was into Russian, under Stalin's personal orders. The book was published for the leadership of the party and the army. Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky wrote: "In our time we all read Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*."¹ The translation was completed without obtaining the author's permission. But his royalties were paid, though not right away. At the moment *Mein Kampf* was published, Stalin was not the only leader—there was a whole crowd of leaders in the Kremlin. Not all of them understood the meaning of Hitler's creation. Comrade Stalin, however, immediately grasped, weighed, and evaluated everything. After having strangled his competition, Stalin paid his due to the author of *Mein Kampf*. The number of copies printed in Russian at that time is unknown to me. One thing is clear: the circulation was minimal. For those few copies of the precious book, Stalin paid generously. How much did he pay? Stalin gave Hitler power over Germany. "Without Stalin, there would have been no Hitler, there would have been no Gestapo"—so said Trotsky in October 1936 as he evaluated Stalin's aid to Hitler.

On November 8, 1923, a socialist revolution hit Germany. The revolution was organized by the Comintern, and carefully directed behind the scenes by Soviet intelligence officers and envoys from Moscow. Although the revolution failed, Hitler's socialist workers' party showed itself as a unified, though small, formation of German workers. Hitler personally led his comrades into police fire. Some of his followers perished; Hitler himself was wounded and landed in jail. It is where he fell into heresy. Hitler wrote a book, in which he uttered those famous words about lands in the east. Lenin and Trotsky decided that for the sake of the happiness of people everywhere they needed to sacrifice the people of their own country, whereas Hitler decided that the opposite had to be done: for the sake of the happiness of his people, he was willing to sacrifice people of other nations. For example, conquer lands to the east for Germany, regardless of the consequences for the

people inhabiting those lands. Hitlerism could have been eliminated from the moment of its conception. Sending an idealistic murderer to Munich would not have been a difficult feat for Stalin. Nobody would have paid any attention to one socialist breaking the skull of another, a very common occurrence. How many people did Stalin eradicate? Why did he not touch Hitler?

Stalin read *Mein Kampf* from cover to cover and figured out that the main goal Hitler set for Germany's future was not lands in the east, mentioned in only one phrase in the book, but in liberating Germany from the chains of the Versailles Treaty. Hitler made enemies within and outside Germany. Internal enemies were the Jews. Outside enemies were the French, and the Jews. Stalin's tactic relied on doing everything with someone else's hands, eliminating one enemy with the hands of the other. "Stalin always found monkeys, who brought him nuts from the hottest fire." is was said by Robert Conquest.³ "Nobody could make his competitors knock heads like Stalin, always staying on the side and coming out superior to all." is was noted by A. Antonov-Ovseenko.⁴ To this, one must add that Stalin was the most ardent perpetrator of Lenin's mission: to "create a Communist society with the hands of our enemies." Stalin understood that if Hitler tried to free Germany from France's economic slavery and from the Versailles Treaty, Britain would immediately interfere, because France imposed the treaty in alliance with Britain. If Germany entered into war with Britain and France, other countries would be pulled into the conflict as well. is was just what Stalin needed. It did not at all follow from *Mein Kampf* that Hitler would advance to the east. In *Mein Kampf* there is a mention of lands in the east, but no indication of when Germany needs to conquer those lands. Hitler simply "pointed his finger" in the direction. He even said (in Part 1, Chapter III): "e effort would have to be envisaged in terms of centuries; just as in all problems of colonization, steady perseverance is a far more important element than the output of energetic effort at the moment." Hitler was planning to build a thousand-year Reich. Even in the famous, repeatedly quoted passage, he speaks of centuries: "We want to return to that point, at which our previous development stopped six hundred years ago."

The book *Mein Kampf* clearly demonstrated the arrival of a man who was going to fight against the world, the man whom the world was going to hate, the man against whom all people would rise up, the man the whole world would declare war upon. The entire world's hatred would concentrate against Hitler and his followers. If Hitler unleashed a war, first and foremost this war would be against anyone but the Soviet Union. If Hitler unleashed a war, logic would demand the dissipation of German strength along the entire European continent, and beyond. ose who fought against Hitler would be considered saviors and liberators. is is exactly what Stalin needed. Stalin knew: if Hitler went to war against France and Britain, the question of lands in the east would fade on its own.

Industrialization and Collectivization

In 1927, a Five Year Plan for developing industry was adopted in the Soviet Union. It began the industrialization, over-industrialization, super-industrialization. After the first, the second Five Year Plan followed, and then a third one. We can judge the purpose of the Five Year Plans from the following fact. At the beginning of the first Plan, the Red Army had seventy-nine tanks; at the end it had over 4,538.¹ Nevertheless, the military accent was not so noticeable in the first five years. The main focus then was not on the production of arms, but on the creation of an industrial base, which later was to produce armaments. The second Five Year Plan was a continuation of the development of the industrial base. It meant the creation of furnaces, giant electricity plants and oxygen plants, and coal ore mines. The production of arms was not yet the main objective although Stalin does not forget about it either; in the first two five-year intervals, 21,573 warplanes were produced.² But it was the third Five Year Plan, which was scheduled to end in 1942, that had as its goal the output of hoped-for military production, in enormous quantities and of very high quality. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union truly attained grandiose achievements.

The first secret of the success: terror. Communists shut down the borders of the country; it was impossible to run away. Secret police unleashed a fight against "saboteurs." Any accident in a production line, any breakage, any lack of success was declared a result of an evil plot. The guilty (and the innocent) were imprisoned; the terms were quite lavish. Those who were named "malevolent saboteurs" were shot. The terror had a dual effect. On the one hand, discipline improved, and any opposition was crushed. Millions of people ended up in the concentration camps. It was a slave workforce. Inmates do not have to be paid at all. They can be sent anywhere. They do not need housing—a torn tent, wooden barrack that they build for themselves, or a hole in the ground that they will dig will suffice. Inmates can be almost never fed or clothed. Their lives cost nothing. They can be forced to work any number of hours in a day, without holidays. They can be executed for unfulfilled production quotas. The development of the remote regions of Siberia and the Far East would have been impossible without the multi-million-strong armies of the inmates (and the "special settlers," in other words, those deported by force and exiled to those remote regions). The government planned in advance the number of prisoners that would be needed for the next year, and would place an advance order for the arrests with the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

The second secret of Stalin's industrialization success: vast resources available in the USSR. Over a thousand years of its history, Russia had amassed an enormous treasure. The country had huge gold reserves. In churches, monasteries, museums, tsarist palaces, and the homes of rich people, mind-boggling valuables were collected: icons, paintings, statues, medals, books, antique furniture, furs, and jewelry. All this was mercilessly confiscated and sold abroad. Stalin sold enormous reserves of gold, platinum, and diamonds to the outside world. In just a few years, Stalin sold all that the nation had been gath-

ering for centuries. Stalin robbed churches and monasteries, the imperial vaults, and museums. Icons and precious books, paintings by great Renaissance masters, collections of diamonds, and the treasures of museums and libraries were all exported. On top of all this, Russia has every sort of natural resource and in almost inexhaustible quantities. Millions of people were cutting down forests and transporting the timber to the northern ports. The timber was the base of exports. Stalin also organized gold mining on a never-before-seen scale. Among others, a group of concentration camps was formed under the name "Dal'stroy" (the Russian abbreviation for "Far Eastern Construction Trust"). Jacques Rossi, a Frenchman, spent almost half of his life in Soviet concentration camps.

Starting in the late 1930s and all the way into the beginning of the 1950s, several hundred thousand inmates were mining up to 100 tons of gold a year for Stalin.⁴ In 1939, just Dal'stroy by itself mined 66.7 tons of gold on Kolyma. The plan for 1940 was for 80 tons of gold. And the production of gold kept on growing. For comparison's sake: In tsarist Russia, the maximum production of gold was 64 tons, in 1913; average annual gold production in the world in 1930–39 was 803 tons. Therefore, just the Kolyma camps were providing Stalin with 12 percent of the world's gold production. Siberian and Far East gold was the golden key to the success of industrialization. But Dal'stroy was not the only place where gold was mined. Stalin also paid for foreign technology with coal, nickel, manganese, petroleum, cotton, and also with lumber, caviar, and furs. In 1930, the main Soviet export became grain. They managed to get 883 million gold rubles for the exported grain. The sales of oil and oil products and also timber and timber products produced another 430 million gold rubles. Capitalists paid almost 500 million gold rubles for flax and furs. Later on, because of grain overproduction in the United States, world grain prices dropped. In 1932–33, the overall revenue from grain sales, at very low "dumping" prices, was only 369 million gold rubles. In 1933, the revenue from grain sales was only 8 percent of overall export revenues. Even half of the grain sold during 1932–33 would have been enough to save all of the country's regions from starvation.

Millions of slaves of communism fulfilled the first Five Year Plan, while at the same time the United States experienced an unprecedented economic crisis, which spread to Europe. The crisis gave additional impulse to Stalin's buildup. Finding themselves in the midst of the Great Depression, inventors and businessmen in America, Germany, Great Britain, and France sold technology at low prices. Fortunately, Stalin had plenty of gold in reserve. Western technology was the main key to success. In the beginning of the 1930s, the USSR became the world's biggest importer of machinery and equipment. The People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, declared with satisfaction: "Our plants, our mines, our factories are now equipped with such outstanding technology that no other country has. . . . Where did we get it from? We bought from the Americans, from the Germans, from the French, from the British the most advanced technological achievement and then outfitted our enterprises."

American engineers traveled to the Soviet Union and designed factories, while Stalin's slaves dug pits, poured concrete roads, and erected walls. Right away, cranes, tools,

and equipment came from abroad, and the foreign engineers mounted, set, and tested all this. In the early 1930s, to the amazement of the entire world, in the city of Nizhny Tagil sprang up the most powerful industrial enterprise in the world—Uralvagonzavod (the Ural Railroad Car Factory). Americans talk with deserved pride of the giant factory which they designed and built not in America, but in the Soviet Union. During the course of six decades, until the very crumbling of the Soviet Union, Uralvagonzavod remained the largest enterprise in the world (the Guinness book of world records confirms this). Uralvagonzavod was built in such a manner that it could at any moment switch from producing railroad cars to producing tanks. In 1941, an order was issued to produce tanks, and Uralvagonzavod without any delays began mass production. During four years of war, Uralvagonzavod produced 35,000 T-34 tanks. It also produced other weapons. The Chelyabinsk tractor factory was also built in the Urals at the same time. It also was built according to American designs and fully outfitted with American equipment, and it also was built in such a way that at any moment it could stop producing tractors and instead begin producing tanks. During the course of the war, this factory was called Tankograd. They build up the biggest industry in the world at that time.

Modern factories were built in the Soviet Union, but the lives of the people were not at all improving as a result. The most ordinary pots and pans, rubber boots, plates, the simplest furniture, cheapest clothing, nails, and matches—all these became scarce. Huge lines formed outside the stores. Stalin was paying for industrialization with his people's standard of living, letting it drop very low. Stalin had one more ace: spies. The West supplied Stalin with the most contemporary industrial equipment, and sold licenses for production of the newest models of weapons and military technology. But all that could not be obtained by legal means was stolen by Stalin's spies. Stalin was generous with his gold when it came to spying. In order to raise the productivity of his scientists and engineers, Stalin imprisoned entire collectives of engineers, accusing them of being spies. Prominent aviation, tank, and artillery engineers found themselves behind bars. The task set before them was simple: create the best bomber (tank, cannon, engine, and submarine) in the world and you will receive freedom; fail and you will go to Dal'stroy to extract gold; the inmates there do not live too long. Imprisoned engineers did not have to be paid millions for their work, they did not need good houses or apartments, and there was no need to send them to resorts by the warm sea: without all this, they were still very interested in creating the best weapons in the world on very short deadlines. These were talented people; on top of talent, Stalin's spies supplied everything that was created by the best minds in the world. Every imprisoned engineer had before him the best American, German, British, and other designs in the given field. He could choose the best, and based on it create something even more remarkable.

Immediately after the Communists seized power, the land was divided among the peasants. Land was divided rather fairly—according to the number of mouths to feed, meaning the size of area a family received depended on the number of its members. Millions of Russian peasants dreamed for centuries of receiving land. Now their dreams had finally

come true, but resulted in a widespread famine across the land. The cause for this was that the Communists gave people the land, but demanded everything the peasants could grow to be given back to the government. The land is yours, but all that you can grow on it is not yours. It is understandable that nobody wanted to voluntarily give up the fruits of his labor. In answer to this, Communists created “food regulation” brigades and entire armies—units of armed men who took away from the peasants all their reserves. The peasants answered with armed resistance, but they failed.

In the struggle for bread the Communists won, but they celebrated their victory too soon. It is possible to take away from the peasant all his bread, his potatoes, to lead away his cows and to slaughter his pigs; however, it is impossible to force a man to continue working hard. The Russian peasants stopped growing agricultural products since the Communists were taking away what they produced. This resulted in the horrible famine of 1920–21. Lenin was forced to retreat from his rigid politics. Free trade of foodstuffs was allowed; the gold ruble was introduced. All this was called by the term NEP—New Economic Policy. There was nothing new in it. It was good old capitalism. The country was revived almost immediately. By 1923, there was so much produce that Russia was once again able to export grain. Then, in 1927, Stalin began his industrialization. This process brought on consequences that were not foreseen by the Communists. The country had huge reserves of produce, but peasants were in no rush to sell them. The reason was simple: over several years, hardworking peasants had hoarded significant reserves of gold rubles. They went to the shops in search of manufactured products, but there was nothing to buy. Practically all industrial production in the Soviet Union focused on the military. There were tanks, airplanes, parachutes, cannons, shells, cartridges, and machine guns, but no home appliances. What does a man need cash for, if there is nothing to buy? The peasants once again either stopped selling products or stopped producing them.

The Communists now faced a dilemma: either direct a part of production to producing goods for the wealthy peasants to consume or get rid of the wealthiest, meaning the most hardworking, the smartest. Rather than return to normal human existence and end communism, Stalin chose to enslave the peasants on collective farms and eliminate private ownership. In 1928, Stalin began the bloody war against peasants, which was called collectivization. Units of the Red Army encircled entire regions. Those peasants who produced more than others were, in the middle of winter, herded together with their families into railroad cattle cars and transported across thousands of kilometers to Siberia, the Urals, or Kazakhstan, where they were thrown out into the cold on the bare steppes. This grandiose operation was initiated on Stalin's orders and executed by his rising deputy Molotov. Many years later, Molotov was asked how many people were transported to the wild, uninhabited regions during collectivization. He answered: “Stalin said that we relocated ten million. In reality, we relocated twenty million.” Historical literature and documentary sources offer different numbers of the demographic losses resulting from the collectivization and starvation of 1932–33. Presently, the following figures look most justified: 3.5 to 5 million people perished from famine, and about 3 to 4 million people

died at the places of exile as a result of intolerable conditions of repression and unbearable life. Cannibalism flourished in the country. Stalin, meanwhile, during these horrible times was selling millions of tons of grain each year to accumulate currency in order to produce weapons in mass quantities.

Stalin's Role in Elevating Hitler

The year 1927 was when Stalin finally secured and firmly established his place atop the power structure. From this moment, Stalin's attention was concentrated not only on fortifying his dictatorship, but on issues of the Communist movement and the World Revolution. Stalin needed victory in Europe, especially in Germany. For this, he needed to eliminate three obstacles that were preventing the German revolution. Stalin had to bring order to the German Communist Party and force it to execute orders coming from Moscow, establish common borders with Germany, and destroy the German Social Democrats. Stalin understood better than anyone else that revolution comes as a result of war. War heightens tensions, ruins economies, and brings nations closer to the fateful limits, beyond which their ordinary existence ceases to be. In matters of war and peace, he adhered to this principle: if the Social Democrats, with their pacifism, divert the proletariat's attention from revolution and from war that gives birth to revolution, then merciless war must be waged against the Social Democrats. On November 6, 1927, Stalin sounded the slogan: "It is impossible to finish off capitalism without finishing off the Social Democrats."

In 1927 Stalin foresaw the Nazi takeover in Germany, and considered this development desirable: "Precisely the fact that the capitalist government is turning fascist is leading to a heightening of tensions within the capitalist countries, and to revolutionary actions by workers," Stalin told the Central Committee in 1927.³ Stalin gave Hitler's regime the name "terrorist dictatorship" and stressed that "the revolutionary crisis will increase faster [since] the more the bourgeoisie gets confused in its combinations and tactics, the more it employs terrorist methods." In his report to the Seventeenth Party Congress, he stressed: "I speak not about fascism in general, but about fascism of the German type."

In 1925, Stalin declared that World War II was inevitable, as was the Soviet Union's entrance into that war. "There can be no doubt that a war in Europe will start and they will all fight in it."⁴ But Stalin did not want to start the war himself, or to be its participant from the first day: "We will have to enter, but we will enter last, we will enter in order to throw in our weight and tip the scale."⁵ The more crimes Hitler committed in Europe, the better for Stalin, the more reasons Stalin had to send the Red Army to liberate Europe. Stalin saw that Hitler's party was not strong enough in Germany and in the elections in 1932, the NSDAP lost to the combined force of the Social Democrats and the Communists.

Hitler's party (NSDAP)—11,705,000

Social Democrats—7,231,000

Communist Party—5,971,000

Hitler's National Socialist Workers' Party faced a crisis. At first glance, Hitler seemed to be the winner and the most popular politician in Germany, and therefore should have taken power. However, he did not have an absolute majority, and could not take power. But combined, the Social Democrats and the Communists had more votes. Hitler's National Socialist Workers' Party was in a deep financial crisis as well, its funds diminishing fast. Goebbels wrote in his diary: "All hope has disappeared.... There is not a pfennig in our cash boxes...."

Nobody gives us any credit. . . . We are on our last breath." Goebbels's entry on December 23, 1932, said: "I am overwhelmed by a terrible feeling of loneliness, which borders on a sense of total loss! The year 1932 was a sequence of one misfortune after another. It should be erased completely. . . . We have no prospects, no hopes left." The terrible position the Nazis found themselves in was no secret to outside observers. By New Year's Eve, the powerful newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung* was already rejoicing at the "disintegration of the NSDAP myth." Harold Laski, one of the leading intellectuals of the English left, was assured that: "e day when the National Socialists presented a lethal danger has passed. . . . If we discount chance, it is not so improbable that Hitler will finish his career as an old man in some Bavarian village, telling tales to his friends in the evenings in some beer hall, about how he once almost orchestrated a takeover in the German Reich." Facing bankruptcy, Hitler, as recorded in Goebbels's diary, considered two options: the first was flight, the other was suicide. Ten years after the crisis, Hitler himself told his inner circle: "e situation was at its worst in 1932, when we were forced to sign many debt obligations in order to fund our press and election campaigns, and keep the party running. . . . In the name of the NSDAP, I signed for these obligations, knowing that if the NSDAP stopped functioning, everything was lost."

German National Socialism faced doom until Hitler was saved by Stalin. Comrade Stalin did not just save Hitler; he handed him the keys to power. Democracy is structured in such a way that, during the turning points of history, minority groups play the key roles. is occurs because history has innumerable possible courses and outcomes. When everything goes well, people agree with the leaders' course of action, but during times of crisis alternative ideas and plans arise. Policy alternatives split the nation almost evenly between two diametrically opposed views. In such a situation, a third party—a minority—becomes the kingmaker, and its role can be decisive. In 1932 Germany experienced precisely this situation: Hitler was in first place, the Social Democrats second, and the Communists third. But none of the three could control the absolute majority needed to come to power. In this case, Germany's fate, and the fate of Europe, was in the hands of the German Communists. If the Communists sided with the Social Democrats, Nazism would perish and never again resurface. If the Communists turned against the Social Democrats, Social Democracy would crumble. For the Communists, forming a coalition with the Social Democrats meant defeating Hitler. After this victory, the Communists

would automatically rise from third place to second, and share power with the first-place party, the Social Democrats—a very appealing option. The Communists had a second option: to go against the Social Democrats, thereby opening the way for Hitler to take power. The consequences of such a move were very predictable: Hitler, having come to power, would throw both Social Democrats and Communists into concentration camps. If the German Communists went against the Social Democrats, they would be sentencing to death both themselves and the Social Democrats.

Acting on Stalin's orders, the German Communist leaders chose the second option—they did not wish to form a block with the Social Democrats. Publicly, for regular Communists and workers, the Communist Party policy against the Social Democrats was explained with twisted reasoning: there is no radical difference between a regime of parliamentary democracy and a fascist dictatorship. Both are forms of dictatorship by the bourgeoisie, which was growing more and more reactionary. The German Communist leaders kept repeating, after their Moscow masters, that a fascist-like turn taken by the bourgeois parties and their Social Democrat supporters was even more dangerous than the Nazis because the Social Democrats hid their true motives. German Communist leaders told the workers: We are Communists, struggling against capitalism and fascism, while the Social Democrats are acting as protectors of capitalism, and are becoming de facto allies of the fascists. Therefore, the Social Democrats are really nothing more than a “left wing” of fascism, or they are “social fascists,” a party which conducts a policy of “hidden fascism” that is more dangerous than Nazi policy. The peace-loving policy of the Social Democrats prevents war; therefore it prevents revolution and, ultimately, prevents the victory of the Working Class, while the Nazi policy enhances the chances for war and revolution and, ultimately, the victory of the Working Class. From this bizarre dialectic, they concluded that Hitler's party must carry out the main attack on the Social Democrats, since they were the most dangerous enemy, which still retained some influence over the worker class and hindered an effective war on capitalism.

Hitler came to power as a result of this perverted ideological mind game. German Communists, out of instincts for self-preservation, should have joined a coalition with the Social Democrats. But Stalin intervened and opened the way for Hitler. The first time there was open cooperation between the Nazis and Communists was in August 1931 in Eastern Prussia, where the Social Democrats were in power. The Nazis initiated a referendum to oust the Social Democrats. At first the Communists were opposed to the referendum. However, after instructions from Moscow, they changed their minds. The Nazis and Communists joined forces under a common red flag, on which the swastika and the hammer and sickle were intertwined. Despite the Communists' calling the plebiscite a “Red Referendum” and the Nazis “working people's comrades,” the referendum failed to gain a majority. A year later, several days before the November 1932 elections for the Reichstag, a public transportation strike began in Berlin. The Communists and Nazis jointly coordinated the strike. Storm troopers and rotfronters (Communist paramilitary) paralyzed public transportation for five days, dug up tram tracks, picketed, beat up those

who came to work, and used force to stop the cars that the authorities managed to put to work.

Once the Nazis came to power, Stalin used all his might to push them toward war. When Germany attacked Poland, and France and Britain entered the war against Germany, Stalin ordered the Communists of the Western democracies to oppose the war. The Western democracies were branded as capitalist imperialists, and the Comintern ordered its members to weaken the armies of the Western democracies through strikes in armament and airplane factories. The Communist Parties were to demand an end to the “imperialist war.” Hitler was portrayed as a fighter for the working classes. But by pushing Hitler into conflict with democratic Europe, Stalin had issued Hitler a death sentence. By offering to divide Poland with Hitler, Stalin had dragged him into a larger scale war with no end in sight. Stalin expected that the Western allies and Germany would exhaust their strength by fighting against each other as they did in World War I. The struggle between Hitler and the Western democracies would create the moment for a “mighty strike” from the East and bring forth world revolution on the bayonets of the Red Army. Five years prior to the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany, Stalin had already planned their annihilation: “[We will] crush fascism, destroy capitalism, establish Soviet power, and liberate the colonies from slavery.”

9.11 Changing Economic Patterns

Introduction

An economic system does not have to be expansive—that is, constantly increasing its production of wealth—and it might well be possible for people to be completely happy in a non-expansive economic system if they were accustomed to it. In the twentieth century, however, the people of our culture have been living under expansive conditions for generations. Their minds are psychologically adjusted to expansion, and they feel deeply frustrated unless they are better off each year than they were the preceding year. The economic system itself has become organized for expansion, and if it does not expand it tends to collapse. The basic reason for this maladjustment is that investment has become an essential part of the system, and if investment falls off, consumers have insufficient incomes to buy the consumers’ goods which are being produced in another part of the system because part of the flow of purchasing power created by the production of goods was diverted from purchasing the goods it had produced into savings, and all the goods produced could not be sold until those savings came back into the market by being invested. In the system as a whole, everyone sought to improve his own position in the short run, but this jeopardized the functioning of the system in the long run. The contrast here is not merely between the individual and the system, but also between the long run and the short run.

The Harmony of Interests

The nineteenth century had accepted as one of its basic faiths the theory of “the harmony of interests.” This held that what was good for the individual was good for society as a whole and that the general advancement of society could be achieved best if individuals were left free to seek their own individual advantages. This harmony was assumed to exist between one individual and another, between the individual and the group, and between the short run and the long run. In the nineteenth century, such a theory was perfectly tenable, but in the twentieth century it could be accepted only with considerable modification. As a result of persons seeking their individual advantages, the economic organization of society was so modified that the actions of one such person were very likely to injure his fellows, the society as a whole, and his own long-range advantage. This situation led to such a conflict between theory and practice, between aims and accomplishments, between individuals and groups that a return to fundamentals in economics became necessary. Unfortunately, such a return was made difficult because of the conflict between interests and principles and because of the difficulty of finding principles in the extraordinary complexity of twentieth-century economic life.

The Factors of Economic Progress

The factors necessary to achieve economic progress are supplementary to the factors necessary for production. Production requires the organization of knowledge, time, energy, materials, land, labor, and so on. Economic progress requires three additional factors. These are: innovation, savings, and investment. Unless a society is organized to provide these three, it will not expand economically. “Innovation” means devising new and better ways of performing the tasks of production; “saving” means refraining from consumption of resources so that they can be mobilized for different purposes; and “investment” means the mobilization of resources into the new, better ways of production. The absence of the third factor (investment) is the most frequent cause of a failure of economic progress. It may be absent even when both of the other factors are working well. In such a case, the savings accumulated are not applied to inventions but are spent on consumption, on ostentatious social prestige, on war, on religion, on other nonproductive purposes, or even left unspent.

Powerful Groups Seek to Maintain Status Quo

Economic progress has always involved shifts in productive resources from old methods to new ones. Such shifts, however beneficial to certain groups and however welcome to people as a whole, were bound to be resisted and resented by other groups who had vested interests in the old ways of doing things and in the old ways of utilizing resources. In a progressive period, these vested interests are unable to defend their vested interests to the point of preventing progress; but, obviously, if the groups in a society who control

the savings which are necessary for progress are the same vested interests who benefit by the existing way of doing things, they are in a position to defend these vested interests and prevent progress merely by preventing the use of surpluses to finance new inventions. Such a situation is bound to give rise to an economic crisis. From one narrow point of view, the twentieth century's economic crisis was a situation of this type. To understand how such a situation could arise, we must examine the development in the chief capitalist countries and discover the causes of the crisis.

Great Britain

In Britain, throughout the nineteenth century, the supply of capital was so plentiful from private savings that industry was able to finance itself with little recourse to the banking system. The corporate form was adopted relatively slowly, and because of the benefits to be derived from limited liability rather than because it made it possible to appeal to a widespread public for equity capital. Savings were so plentiful that the surplus had to be exported, and interest rates fell steadily. Promoters and investment bankers were not much interested in domestic industrial securities (except railroads), and for most of the century concentrated their attention on government bonds (both foreign and domestic) and on foreign economic enterprises. Financial capitalism first appeared in foreign securities, and found a fruitful field of operations. The corporation law (as codified in 1862) was very lenient. There were few restrictions on formations of companies, and none on false prospectuses or false financial reports. Holding companies were not legally recognized until 1928, and no consolidated balance sheet was required then. As late as 1933, of 111 British investment trusts only 52 published a record of their holdings. Secrecy Is One of the Elements of the English

This element of secrecy is one of the outstanding features of English business and financial life. The weakest "right" an Englishman has is the "right to know," which is about as narrow as it is in American nuclear operations. Most duties, powers, and actions in business are controlled by customary procedures and conventions, not by explicit rules and regulations, and are often carried out by casual remarks between old friends. No record perpetuates such remarks, and they are generally regarded as private affairs which are no concern of others, even when they involve millions of pounds of the public's money. Although this situation is changing slowly, the inner circle of English financial life remains a matter of "whom one knows," rather than "what one knows." Jobs are still obtained by family, marriage, or school connections; character is considered far more important than knowledge or skill; and important positions, on this basis, are given to men who have no training, experience, or knowledge to qualify them.

As part of this system and at the core of English financial life have been seventeen private firms of "merchant bankers" who find money for established and wealthy enterprises on either a long-term (investment) or a short-term ("acceptances") basis. These merchant bankers, with a total of less than a hundred active partners, include the firms of Baring

Brothers, N. M. Rothschild, J. Henry Schroder, Morgan Grenfell, Hambros, and Lazard Brothers. These merchant bankers in the period of financial capitalism had a dominant position with the Bank of England and, strangely enough, still have retained some of this, despite the nationalization of the Bank by the Labour government in 1946. As late as 1961 a Baring (Lord Cromer) was named governor of the bank, and his board of directors, called the "Court" of the bank, included representatives of Lazard, of Hambros, and of Morgan Grenfell, as well as of an industrial firm (English Electric) controlled by these.

The heyday of English financial capitalism is associated with the governorship of Montagu Norman from 1920 to 1944, but it began about a century after the advent of industrial capitalism, with the promotion of Guinness, Ltd., by Barings in 1886, and continued with the creation of Allsopps, Ltd., by the Westminster Bank in 1887. In the latter year, only 10,000 companies were in existence although the creation of companies had been about 1,000 a year in the 1870's and about 1,000 a year in the 1880's. Of the companies registered, about a third fell bankrupt in their first year. This is a very large fraction when we consider that about one-half the companies created were private companies which did not offer securities to the public and presumably already were engaged in a flourishing business.... In two years (1894-1896) E. T. Hooley promoted twenty-six corporations with various noble lords as the directors of each. The total capital of this group was £18.6 million, of which Hooley took £5 million for himself.

From this date onward, financial capitalism grew rapidly in Britain, without ever achieving the heights it did in the United States or Germany. Domestic concerns remained small, owner-managed, and relatively unprogressive (especially in the older lines like textiles, iron, coal, shipbuilding). One chief field of exploitation for British financial capitalism continued to be in foreign countries until the crash of 1931. Financial capitalism in Britain, as elsewhere, was marked not only by a growing financial control of industry but also by an increasing concentration of this control and by an increasing banking control of government. As we have seen, this influence of the Bank of England over the government was an almost unmitigated disaster for Britain. The power of the bank in business circles was never as complete as it was in government, because British businesses remained self-financing to a greater extent than those of other countries. This self-financing power of business in Britain depended on the advantage which it held because of the early arrival of industrialism in England. As other countries became industrialized, reducing Britain's advantage and her extraordinary profits, British business was forced to seek outside financial aid or reduce its creation of capital plant. Both methods were used, with the result that financial capitalism grew at the same time as considerable sections of Britain's capital plant became obsolete.

The control of the Bank of England over business was exercised indirectly through the joint-stock banks. These banks became increasingly concentrated and increasingly powerful in the twentieth century. The number of such banks decreased through amalgamation from 109 in 1866 to 35 in 1919 and to 33 in 1933. This growth of a "money trust" in

Britain led to an investigation by a Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations. In its report (Colwyn Report, 1919) this committee admitted the danger and called for government action. A bill was drawn up to prevent further concentration but was withdrawn when the bankers made a "gentlemen's agreement" to ask Treasury permission for future amalgamations. The net result was to protect the influence of the Bank of England, since this might have been reduced by complete monopolization of joint-stock banking, and the bank was always in a position to influence the Treasury's attitude on all questions. Of the 33 joint-stock banks existing in 1933, 9 were in Ireland and 8 in Scotland, leaving only 16 for England and Wales. The 33 together had over £2,500 million in deposits in April 1933, of which £1,773 million were in the so-called "Big Five" (Midland, Lloyds, Barclays, Westminster, and National Provincial). The Big Five controlled at least 7 of the other 28 (in one case by ownership of 98 percent of the stock). Although competition among the Big Five was usually keen, all were subject to the powerful influence of the Bank of England, as exercised through the discount rate, interlocking directorships, and above all through the intangible influences of tradition, ambition, and prestige.

In Britain, as elsewhere, the influence of financial capitalism served to create the conditions of monopoly capitalism not only by creating monopoly conditions (which permitted industry to free itself from financial dependency on banks) but also by insisting on those deflationary, orthodox financial policies which eventually alienated industrialists from financiers. Although monopoly capitalism began to grow in Britain as far back as the British Salt Union of 1888 (which controlled 91 percent of the British supply), the victory of monopoly capitalism over financial capitalism did not arrive until 1931. The year 1931 represented for Britain the turning point from financial to monopoly capitalism. In that year financial capitalism, which had held the British economy in semidepression for a decade, achieved its last great victory when the financiers led by Montagu Norman and J. P. Morgan forced the resignation of the British Labour government. But the handwriting was already on the wall. Monopoly had already grown to such a degree that it aspired to make the banking system its ... [ally] instead of its master. The deflationary financial policy of the bankers had alienated politicians and industrialists and driven monopolist trade unions to form a united front against the bankers.

This was clearly evident in the Conference on Industrial Reorganization and Relationships of April 1928. This meeting contained representatives of the Trade Union Congress and the Employers' Federation and issued a Memorandum to the chancellor of the Exchequer signed by Sir Alfred Mond of Imperial Chemicals and Ben Turner of the trade unions. Similar declarations were issued by other monopolist groups, but the split of monopolist capitalists and of financial capitalists could not become overt until the latter were able to get rid of the Labour government. Once that was achieved, labor and industry were united in opposition to the continuance of the bankers' economic policy with its low prices and high unemployment. The decisive event which caused the end of financial capitalism in Britain was the revolt of the British fleet at Invergordon on September 15, 1931, and not the abandonment of gold six days later. [Actually the powers of financial capitalism

and monopoly capitalism have been cooperating to build and sustain the international financial system and the international economic system.]The mutiny made it clear that the policy of deflation must be ended. As a result, no real effort was made to defend the gold standard.

With the abandonment of gold and the adoption of a protective tariff, monopolist capital and labor joined in an effort to raise both wages and profits by a program of higher prices and restrictions on production. The old monopolies and cartels increased in strength and new ones were formed, usually with the blessing of the government. In 1942 a capable observer, Hermann Levy, wrote, "Today Britain is the only highly industrialized country in the world where no attempt has yet been made to restrict the domination of quasi-monopolist associations in industry and trade."

Germany

While Britain passed through the stages of capitalism in this fashion, Germany was passing through the same stages in a different way. In Germany, capital was scarce when industrialism arrived. Because savings from commerce, overseas trade, or small artisan shops were much less than in Britain, the stage of owner-management was relatively short. Industry found itself dependent upon banks almost at once. These banks were quite different from those in England, since they were "mixed" and not divided into separate establishments for different banking functions. The chief German credit banks, founded in the period 1848-1881, were at the same time savings banks, commercial banks, promotion and investment banks, stockbrokers, safety deposits, and so on. Their relationship to industry was close and intimate from the creation of the Darmstädter Bank in 1853. These banks floated securities for industry by granting credit to the firm, taking securities in return. These securities were then slowly sold to the investing public as the opportunity offered, the bank retaining enough stock to give it control and appointing its men as directors of the enterprise to give that control final form.

The importance of the holding of securities by banks can be seen from the fact that in 1908 the Dresdner Bank was holding 2 billion marks' worth. The importance of interlocking directorates can be seen from the fact that the same bank had its directors on the boards of over two hundred industrial concerns in 1913. In 1929, at the time of the amalgamation of the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto Gesellschaft, the two together had directorships in 660 industrial firms and held the chairmanship of the board in 192 of these. Before 1914, examples of individuals with thirty or even forty directorships were not uncommon.

This banking control of industry was made even closer by the use which the banks made of their positions as brokers and depositories for securities. The German credit banks acted as stockbrokers, and most investors left their securities on deposit with the banks so that they could be available for quick sale if needed. The banks voted all this stock for directorships and other control measures, unless the owners of the stock expressly forbade

it (which was very rare). In 1929 a law was passed preventing the banks from voting stocks deposited with them unless this had been expressly permitted by the owners. The change was of little significance, since by 1929 financial capitalism was on the wane in Germany. Moreover, permission to vote deposited stock was rarely refused. The banks also voted as a right all stock left as collateral for loans and all stock bought on margin. Unlike the situation in America, stocks bought on margin were considered to be the property of the bank (acting as stockbrokers) until the whole price has been paid. The importance of the stock-brokerage business to German banks may be seen in the fact that in the twenty-four years 1885-1908 one-quarter of the gross profits of the large credit banks came from commissions. This is all the more remarkable when we consider that the brokerage commissions charged by German banks were very small (sometimes as low as one-half per thousand).

By methods such as these, a highly centralized financial capitalism was built up in Germany. The period begins with the founding of the Darmstädter Bank in 1853. This was the first bank to establish a permanent, systematic control of the corporations it floated. It also was the first to use promotion syndicates (in 1859). Other banks followed this example, and the outburst of promotion reached a peak of activity and corruption in the four years 1870-1874. In these four years, 857 stock companies with 3,306,810,000 marks of assets were floated, compared to 295 companies with 2,405,000,000 in assets in the preceding nineteen years (1851-1870). Of these 857 companies founded in 1870-1874, 123 were in the process of liquidation and 37 were bankrupt as early as September 1874. These excesses of financial capitalist promotion led to a governmental investigation which resulted in a strict law regulating promotion in 1883. This law made it impossible for German bankers to make fortunes out of promotion and made it necessary for them to seek the same ends by consolidating their control of industrial corporations on a long-term basis. This was quite different from the United States, where the absence of any legal regulation of promotion previous to the SEC Act of 1933 made it more likely that investment bankers would seek to make short-term "killings" from promotions rather than long-term gains from the control of industrial companies. Another result is to be seen in the relatively sounder financing of German corporations through equity capital rather than through the more burdensome (but promoter-favored) method of fixed interest bonds.

The financial capitalism of Germany was at its peak in the years just before 1914. It was controlled by a highly centralized oligarchy. At the center was the Reichsbank whose control over the other banks was relatively weak at all times. This was welcomed by the financial oligarchy, for the Reichsbank, although privately owned, was controlled by the government to a considerable degree. The weakness of the Reichsbank's influence over the banking system arose from the weakness of its influence over the two usual instruments of central-banking control—the re-discount rate and open-market operations. The weakness of the former was based on the fact that the other banks rarely came to the Reichsbank for re-discounts, and usually had a discount rate below that of the Reichsbank. A law of 1899 tried to overcome this weakness by forcing the other banks to adjust their

discount rates to that of the Reichsbank, but it was never a very effective instrument of control. Open-market control was also weak because of an official German reluctance "to speculate" in government securities and because the other banks were more responsive to the condition of their portfolios of commercial paper and securities than they were to the size of their gold reserves. In this they were like French rather than British banks. Only in 1909 did the Reichsbank begin a deliberate policy of control through open-market operations, and it was never effective. It was ended completely from 1914 to 1929 by the war, the inflation, and the restrictions of the Dawes Plan.

Because of these weaknesses of the Reichsbank, the control of German financial capitalism rested in the credit banks. This is equivalent to saying that it was largely beyond the control of the government, and rested in private hands. Of the hundreds of German credit banks, the overwhelming preponderance of power was in the hands of the eight so-called "Great Banks." These were the masters of the German economy from 1865 to 1915. Their overwhelming position can be seen from the fact that of 421 German credit banks in 1907 with 13,204,220,000 marks capital, the eight Great Banks held 44 percent of the total capital of the group. Moreover, the position of the Great Banks was better than this because the Great Banks controlled numerous other banks. In consequence, Robert Franz, editor of *Der Deutsche Oekonomist*, estimated in 1907 that the eight Great Banks controlled 74 percent of the capital assets of all 421 banks.

German Oligarchy Uses Direct Financial Pressure and Interlocking

The beginnings of monopoly capitalism in Germany goes back at least a generation before the First World War. As early as 1870, the financial capitalists, using direct financial pressure as well as their system of interlocking directors, were working to integrate enterprises and reduce competition. In the older lines of activity, such as coal, iron, and steel, they tended to use cartels. In the newer lines, like electrical supplies and chemicals, they tended to use great monopolistic firms for this purpose. There are no official figures on cartels before 1905 but it is believed that there were 250 cartels in 1896, of which 80 were in iron and steel. The official investigation of cartels made by the Reichstag in 1905 revealed 385, of which 92 were in coal and metals. Shortly after this, the government began to help these cartels, the most famous example of this being a law of 1910 which forced potash manufacturers to become members of the potash cartel.

In 1923 there were 1,500 cartels, according to the Federation of German Industrialists. They were, as we have seen, given a special legal status and a special court the following year. By the time of the financial collapse of 1931 there were 2,500 cartels, and monopoly capitalism had grown to such an extent that it was prepared to take over complete control of the German economic system. As the banks fell under government control, private control of the economic system was assured by releasing it from its subservience to the banks. This was achieved by legislation such as that curtailing interlocking directorates and the new corporation law of 1937, but above all by the economic fact that the growth of large enterprises and of cartels had put industry in a position where it was able to finance itself without seeking help from the banks.

This new privately managed monopoly capitalism was organized in an intricate hierarchy whose details could be unraveled only by a lifetime of study. The size of enterprises had grown so big that in most fields a relatively small number were able to dominate the field. In addition, there was a very considerable amount of interlocking directorates and ownership by one corporation of the capital stock of another. Finally, cartels working between corporations fixed prices, markets, and output quotas for all important industrial products. An example of this—not by any means the worst—could be found in the German coal industry in 1937. There were 260 mining companies. Of the total output, 21 companies had 90 percent, 5 had 50 percent, and 1 had 14 percent. These mines were organized into five cartels of which 1 controlled 81 percent of the output, and 2 controlled 94 percent. And finally, most coal mines (69 percent of total output) were owned subsidiaries of other corporations which used coal, producers either of metals (54 percent of total coal output) or of chemicals (10 percent of total output).

Similar concentration existed in most other lines of economic activity. In ferrous metals in 1929, 3 firms out of 26 accounted for 68.8 percent of all German pig-iron production; 4 out of 49 produced 68.3 percent of all crude steel; 3 out of 59 produced 55.8 percent of all rolling mill products. In 1943, one firm (United Steel Works) produced 40 percent of all German steel production, while 12 firms produced over 90 percent. Competition could never exist with concentration as complete as this, but in addition the steel industry was organized into a series of steel cartels (one for each product). These cartels, which began about 1890, by 1930 had control of 100 percent of the German output of ferrous metal products. Member firm had achieved this figure by buying up the nonmembers in the years before 1930. These cartels managed prices, production, and markets within Germany, enforcing their decisions by means of fines or boycotts. They were also members of the International Steel Cartel, modeled on Germany's steel cartel and dominated by it. The International Cartel controlled two-fifths of the world's steel production and five-sixths of the total foreign trade in steel.

It is also very likely that the steel industry of Germany in 1937 was controlled by no more than five men of whom Flick was the most important.

These examples of the growth of monopoly capitalism in Germany are merely picked at random and are by no means exceptional. Another famous example can be found in the growth of I. G. Farbenindustrie, the German chemical organization. This was formed in 1904 of three chief firms, and grew steadily until after its last reorganization in 1926 it controlled about two-thirds of Germany's output of chemicals. It spread into every branch of industry, concentrating chiefly on dyes (in which it had 100 percent monopoly), drugs, plastics, explosives, and light metals. It had been said that Germany could not have fought either of the world wars without I. G. Farben. In the first war, by the Haber process for extracting nitrogen from the air, it provided supplies of explosives and fertilizers when the natural sources in Chile were cut off. In the second war, it provided numerous absolute necessities, of which artificial rubber and synthetic motor fuels were the most important. This company by the Second World War was the largest enterprise in Germany. It had

over 2,332.8 million reichsmarks in assets and 1,165 million in capitalization in 1942. It had about 100 important subsidiaries in Germany, and employed 350,000 persons in those in which it was directly concerned. It had interests in about 700 corporations outside Germany and had entered into over 500 restrictive agreements with foreign concerns.

The Entire German Industrial System Controlled by the Elite through Personal Friendships and Secret Agreements

While I. G. Farben was the greatest example of concentrated control in German monopoly capitalism, it was by no means untypical. The process of concentration by 1939 had been carried to a degree which can hardly be overemphasized. The Kilgore Committee of the United States Senate in 1945 decided, after a study of captured German records, that I. G. Farben and United Steel Works together could dominate the whole German industrial system. Since so much of this domination was based on personal friendships and relationships, on secret agreements and contracts, on economic pressures and duress as well as on property and other obvious control rights, it is not something which can be demonstrated by statistics. But even the statistics give evidence of a concentration of economic power. In Germany in 1936 there were about 40,000 limitedliability companies, with total nominal capitalization of about 20,000 million reichsmarks. I. G. Farben and United Steel Works had 1,344 million reichsmarks of this capital. A mere 18 companies out of the 40,000 had one-sixth of the total working capital of all companies. While monopolistic organization of economic life reached its peak in Germany, the differences in this respect between Germany and other countries have been overemphasized. It was a difference of degree only, and, even in degree, Britain, Japan, and a number of smaller countries were not so far behind the German development as one might believe at first glance. The error arose from two causes. On the one hand, German cartels and monopolies were well publicized, while similar organizations in other countries remained in hiding. As the British Committee on Trusts reported in 1929, "What is notable among British consolidations and associations is not their rarity or weakness so much as their unobtrusiveness." It is possible that the British vegetable-oil monopoly around Unilever was as powerful as the German chemical monopoly around I. G. Farben, but, while much has been heard about the latter, very little is heard about the former. After an effort to study the former, Fortune magazine wrote, "No other industry, perhaps, is quite so exasperatingly secretive as the soap and shortening industries."

This difference in attitude between German and other capitalists became increasingly evident in the 1930's. In that decade the German found his economic and his patriotic motives impelling him in the same direction (to build up the power and wealth of Germany against Russia and the West). The capitalists of France, Britain, and the United States, on the other hand, frequently experienced conflicting motives. Bolshevism presented itself as an economic threat ... at the same time that Nazism presented itself as a political threat to their countries. Many persons were willing to neglect or even increase the latter threat in order to use it against the former danger. This difference in attitude between German and other capitalists arose from many causes. Among these were (a) the

contrast between the German tradition of a national economy and the Western tradition of laissez-faire, (b) the fact that world depression caused the threat of social revolution to appear before Nazism rose as a political danger to the West, (c) the fact that cosmopolitan financial capitalism was replaced more rapidly by nationalist monopoly capitalism in Germany than in the West, and (d) the fact that many wealthy and influential persons like Montagu Norman, Ivar Kreuger, Basil Zaharoff, and Henri Deterding directed public attention to the danger of Bolshevism while maintaining a neutral, or favorable, attitude toward Nazism.

France

Financial capitalism lasted longer in France than in any other major country. The roots of financial capitalism there, like Holland but unlike Germany, go back to the period of commercial capitalism which preceded the Industrial Revolution. These roots grew rapidly in the last half of the eighteenth century and were well established with the founding of the Bank of France in 1800. At that date, financial power was in the hands of about ten or fifteen private banking houses whose founders, in most cases, had come from Switzerland in the second half of the eighteenth century. These bankers, all Protestant, were deeply involved in the agitations leading up to the French Revolution. When the revolutionary violence got out of hand, they were the chief forces behind the rise of Napoleon, whom they regarded as the restorer of order. As a reward for this support, Napoleon in 1800 gave these bankers a monopoly over French financial life by ... [allowing] them [to] control of the new Bank of France.

By 1811 most of these bankers had gone over to the opposition to Napoleon because they objected to his continuation of a warlike policy. France at that time was still in the stage of commercial capitalism, and constant war was injurious to commercial activity. As a result, this group shifted its allegiance from Bonaparte to Bourbon, and survived the change in regime in 1815. This established a pattern of political agility which was repeated with varying success in subsequent changes of regime. As a result, the Protestant bankers, who had controlled financial life under the First Empire, were still the main figures on the board of regents of the Bank of France until the reform of 1936. Among these figures the chief bore the names Mirabaud, Mallet, Neuflyze, and Hottinguer. In the course of the nineteenth century, a second group was added to French banking circles. This second group, largely Jewish, was also of non-French origin, the majority Germanic (like Rothschild, Heine, Fould, Stern, and Worms) and the minority of Iberian origin (like Pereire and Mires). A rivalry soon grew up between the older Protestant bankers and the newer Jewish bankers. This rivalry was largely political rather than religious in its basis, and the lines were confused by the fact that some of the Jewish group gave up their religion and moved over to the Protestant group (such as Pereire and Heine).

The rivalry between these two groups steadily increased because of their differing political

attitudes toward the July Monarchy (1830-1848), the Second Empire (1852- 1870), and the Third Republic 1871-1940). In this rivalry the Protestant group was more conservative than the Jewish group, the former being lukewarm toward the July Monarchy, enthusiastic toward the Second Empire, and opposed to the Third Republic. The Jewish group, on the other hand, warmly supported the July Monarchy and the Third Republic but opposed the Second Empire. In this rivalry the leadership of each group was centered in the richest and more moderate banking family. The leadership of the Protestant group was exercised by Mirabaud, which was on the left wing of the group. The leadership of the Jewish group was held by Rothschild, which was on the right wing of that group. These two wings were so close that Mirabaud and Rothschild (who together dominated the whole financial system, being richer and more powerful than all other private banks combined) frequently cooperated together even when their groups as a whole were in competition. This simple picture was complicated, after 1838, by the slow rise of a third group of bankers who were Catholics. This group (including such names as Demachy, Seillière, Davillier, de Germiny, Pillet-Will, Gouïn, and de Lubersac) rose slowly and late. It soon split into two halves. One half formed an alliance with the Rothschild group and accepted the Third Republic. The other half formed an alliance with the rising power of heavy industry (largely Catholic) and rose with it, forming under the Second Empire and early Third Republic a powerful industrial-banking group whose chief overt manifestation was the Comité des Forges (the French steel "trust").

Thus there were, in the period 1871-1900, three great groups in France: (a) the alliance of Jews and Catholics dominated by Rothschild; (b) the alliance of Catholic industrialists and Catholic bankers dominated by Schneider, the steel manufacturer; and (c) the group of Protestant bankers dominated by Mirabaud. The first of these accepted the Third Republic, the other two rejected the Third Republic. The first waxed wealthy in the period 1871-1900, chiefly through its control of the greatest French investment bank, the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (Paribas). This Paribas bloc by 1906 had a dominant position in French economic and political life. In opposition to Paribas the Protestant bankers established an investment bank of their own, the Union Parisienne, in 1904. In the course of the period 1904-1919 the Union Parisienne group and the Comité des Forges group formed an alliance based on their common opposition to the Third Republic and the Paribas bloc. This new combination we might call the Union-Comité bloc. The rivalry of these two great powers, the Paribas bloc and the Union-Comité bloc, fills the pages of French history in the period 1884-1940. It paralyzed the French political system, reaching the crisis stage in the Dreyfus case and again in 1934-1938. It also partially paralyzed the French economic system, delaying the development from financial capitalism to monopoly capitalism, and preventing economic recovery from the depression in the period 1935-1940. It contributed much to the French defeat in 1940. At present, we are concerned only with the economic aspects of this struggle.

In France the stage of commercial capitalism continued much longer than in Britain, and did not begin to be followed by industrial capitalism until after 1830. The stage

of financial capitalism in turn did not really begin until about 1880, and the stage of monopoly capitalism became evident only about 1925. During all this period the private bankers continued to exist and grow in power. Founded in commercial capitalism, they were at first chiefly interested in governmental obligations both domestic and foreign. As a result, the greatest private bankers, like the Rothschilds or Mallets, had intimate connections with governments and relatively weak connections with the economic life of the country. It was the advent of the railroad in the period 1830-1870 which changed this situation. The railroads required capital far beyond the ability of any private banker to supply from his own resources. The difficulty was met by establishing investment banks, deposit banks, saving banks, and insurance companies which gathered the small savings of a multitude of persons and made these available for the private banker to direct wherever he thought fitting. Thus, the private banker became a manager of other persons' funds rather than a lender of his own. In the second place, the private banker now became much more influential and must less noticeable. He now controlled billions where formerly he had controlled millions, and he did it unobtrusively, no longer in the open in his own name, but acting from the background, concealed from public view by the plethora of financial and credit institutions which had been set up to tap private savings. The public did not notice that the names of private bankers and their agents still graced the list of directors of the new financial enterprises. In the third place, the advent of the railroad brought into existence new economic powers, especially in iron-making and coal mining. These new powers, the first powerful economic influences in the state free from private banking control, arose in France from an activity very susceptible to governmental favor and disfavor: the armaments industry.

The industry grew, receiving its greatest boost from the advent of the railroad, with its increased demand for steel and coal, and from the government of Napoleon III (1852-1870), which added a new demand for armaments to the industrial market. Napoleon showed special favor to one firm of iron and armaments makers, the firm of Schneider at Le Creusot. Eugene Schneider obtained a monopoly in supplying arms to the French government, sold materials to government-encouraged railway construction, became president of the Chamber of Deputies, and minister of agriculture and commerce. It is hardly surprising that the industrialists looked back on the period of the Second Empire as a kind of golden age. The loss of political influence by the heavy industrialists after 1871 reduced their profits, and drove them to ally with the Catholic bankers. Thus, the struggle between financial capitalism and monopoly capitalism which appeared in most countries was replaced in France by a clash between two economic blocs, both of which were interested in both industry and banking and neither of which was prepared to accept the unorthodox banking procedures which became one of the chief goals of monopoly capitalism. As a result, monopoly capitalism appeared late in France and, when it did, arose between the two great blocs, with ramifications in both, but largely autonomous from the central control of either. This new autonomous and rather amorphous group which reflected the rise of monopoly capitalism may be called the Lille-Lyons Axis. It rose slowly after 1924, and took over the control of France after the defeat of 1940.

Once begun, financial capitalism in France displayed the same excesses as elsewhere. In France these were worse than those in Britain or Germany (after the reforms of 1884), although they were not to be compared with the excesses of frenzy and fraud displayed in the United States.

The center of the French economic system in the twentieth century was not to be found, as some have believed, in the Bank of France, but, instead, resided in a group of almost unknown institutions—the private banks. There were over a hundred of these private banks, but only about a score were of significance, and even in this restricted group two (Rothschild and Mirabaud) were more powerful than all the others combined. These private banks were known as the Haute Banque, and acted as the High Command of the French economic system. Their stock was closely held in the hands of about forty families, and they issued no reports on their financial activities. They were, with a few exceptions, the same private banks which had set up the Bank of France. They were divided into a group of seven Jewish banks (Rothschild, Stern, Cahen d'Anvers, Propper, Lazard, Spitzer, and Worms), a group of seven Protestant banks (Mallet, Mirabaud, Heine, Neuflyze, Hottinguer, Odier, and Vernes), and a group of five Catholic banks (Davillier, Lubersac, Lehideux, Goudchaux, and Demachy). By the twentieth century the basic fissure to which we have referred had appeared between the Jews and the Protestants, and the Catholic group had split to ally itself either with the Jews or with the forces of monopolistic heavy industry. None the less, the various groups continued to cooperate in the management of the Bank of France.

The Bank of France was not the center of French financial capitalism except nominally, and possessed no autonomous power of its own. It was controlled until 1936, as it had been in 1813, by the handful of private banks which created it, except that in the twentieth century some of these were closely allied with an equally small but more amorphous group of industrialists. In spite of the fissure, the two blocs cooperated with each other in their management of this important instrument of their power. The Bank of France was controlled by the forty families (not two hundred, as frequently stated) because of the provision in the bank's charter that only the 200 largest stockholders were entitled to vote for the members of the board of regents (the governing board of the bank). Of the 200 who could vote for the twelve elected regents, 78 were corporations or foundations and 122 were individuals. Both classes were dominated by the private banks, and had been for so long that the regents' seats had become practically hereditary. The chief changes in the names of regents were caused by the growth of heavy industry and the transfer of seats through female lines. Three seats were held by the same families for well over a century. In the twentieth century the names of Rothschild, Mallet, Mirabaud, Neuflyze, Davillier, Vernes, Hottinguer, and their relatives were consistently on the board of regents.

The Bank of France acted as a kind of general staff for the forty families which controlled the nineteen chief private banks. Little effort was made to influence affairs by the re-discount rate, and open-market operations were not used until 1938. The state was

influenced by the Treasury's need for funds from the Bank of France. Other banks were influenced by methods more exclusively French: by marriage alliances, by indirect bribery (that is, by control of well-paying sinecures in banking and industry), and by the complete dependence of French banks on the Bank of France in any crisis. This last arose from the fact that French banks did not emphasize gold reserves but instead regarded commercial paper as their chief reserve. In any crisis where this paper could not be liquidated fast enough, the banks resorted to the unlimited note-issuing power of the Bank of France. In the third line of control of the French economy were the investment banks called "barques d'affaires." These were dominated by two banks: the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas set up by the Rothschild group in 1872 and the Banque de l'Union Parisienne founded by the rival bloc in 1904. These investment banks supplied long-term capital to industry, and took stock and directorships in return. Much of the stock was resold to the public, but the directorships were held indefinitely for control purposes.

The investment bank of the non-Jewish private banks and their industrial allies was the Union Parisienne. Among its sixteen directors were to be found such names as Mirabaud, Hottinguer, Neuflyze, Vernes, Wendel, Lubersac, and Schneider in the period before 1934. The two largest stock-holders in 1935-1937 were Lubersac and Mallet. The directors of this bank held 124 other directorships on 90 important corporations in 1933. At the same time it held stock in 338 corporations. The value of the stock held by the Union Parisienne in 1932 was 482.1 million francs and of that held by Paribas was 548.8 million francs, giving a total for both of 1,030.9 million francs. In the fourth line of control were five chief commercial banks with 4,416 branches in 1932. At the beginning of the century these had all been within the "Paribas Consortium," but after the founding of the Union Parisienne in 1904 they slowly drifted over to the new bloc, the Comptoir National d'Escompte going over almost at once, with the others following more slowly. As a result, the control of the two great blocs over the great deposit banks was rather mixed during the twentieth century, with the old Jewish group of private bankers losing ground rather steadily. The decline of this group was closely related to the decline of international financial capitalism, and received its worse blow in the losses in foreign bonds resulting from the First World War. Regional deposit banks were controlled in varying degrees by one or the other of the two blocs, the Paribas control being stronger in the north, west, and south, while the Union-Comité bloc was stronger in the northeast, east, and southeast. Control of savings banks and insurance companies was also shared, especially where they had been founded before the two blocs achieved their modern form. For example, the largest insurance company in France, with capital and reserves of 2,463 million francs in 1931, had as directors such names as Mallet, Rothschild, Neuflyze, Hottinguer, and so on.

Banking Families Divide Up Their Spheres of Interest in Various

This cooperation between the two blocs in regard to the lower levels of the banking system (and the Bank of France itself) did not usually extend to industrial or commercial activity. There, competition outside the market was severe, and became a struggle to the death

in 1932-1940. In some activities, spheres of interest were drawn between the two groups, and thus competition was reduced. Inside France, there was the basic division between east and west, the Jewish group emphasizing shipbuilding, transatlantic communications and transportation, and public utilities in the west, while the Protestant-Catholic group emphasized iron, steel, and armaments in the east. Outside France, the former group dominated the colonies, North Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean, while the latter group emphasized central and eastern Europe.

In some fields the rivalry of the two groups had worldwide ramifications. In petroleum products, for example, the Jewish bankers, through the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, controlled the Compagnie française des pétroles, which was allied to Standard Oil and Rockefeller, while the Catholic-Protestant bankers, through the Union Parisienne, controlled Petrofina, which was allied to Royal Dutch Shell and Deterding. Jules Exbrayat, partner of Demachy et Cie. (in which François de Wendel was majority owner) was a director of Union Parisienne and of Petrofina, and Alexandre Bungener, partner of Lubersac et Cie., was also a director of Union Parisienne and of Petrofina. Charles Sergeant, once undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance and sub-governor of the Bank of France, was for years chairman of the Union Parisienne, and played a role in one bloc similar to that played by Horace Finaly in the other bloc. He was a director of Petrofina and of the Union européenne industrielle et financière. When he retired for reasons of health in 1938 he was replaced in several positions (including Petrofina and Union Parisienne) by Jean Tannery, honorary governor of the Bank of France.

Outside the banking system which we have sketched, the French economy was organized in a series of trade associations, industrial monopolies, and cartels. These were usually controlled by the Catholic-Protestant bloc of private bankers, since the Jewish group continued to use the older methods of financial capitalism while their rivals moved forward to the more obvious methods of monopoly capitalism. In such cases, individual companies controlled by the Jewish group frequently jointed the cartels and associations set up by the rival bloc.

The United States of America

... From the beginning, the United States had a shortage of labor in the face of an unprecedented richness of resources. As a result, it sought labor-saving devices and high output per man-day of work, even in agriculture. This means that the amount of capital equipment per man was unusually high throughout American history, even in the earliest period, and this undoubtedly presented a problem in an undeveloped country where private savings were, for many generations, scarce. The accumulation of such savings for investment in labor-saving mechanisms brought an opportunity to financial capitalism at an early date. Accordingly, the United States had financial capitalism over a longer period and in a more extreme form than any other country. Moreover, the size of the country made the problem of transportation so acute that the capital necessary for

the early canals, railroads, and iron industry was large and had to be found from sources other than local private persons. Much of it came from government subsidies or from foreign investors. It was observable as early as 1850 and had overseas connections which were still in existence in the 1930's.

By the 1880's the techniques of financial capitalism were well developed in New York and northern New Jersey, and reached levels of corruption which were never approached in any European country. This corruption sought to cheat the ordinary investor by flotations and manipulations of securities for the benefit of "insiders." Success in this was its own justification, and the practitioners of these dishonesties were as socially acceptable as their wealth entitled them to be, without any animadversions on how that wealth had been obtained. Corrupt techniques, associated with the names of Daniel Drew or Jay Gould in the wildest days of railroad financial juggling, were also practiced by Morgan and others who became respectable from longer sustained success which allowed them to build up established firms.

Any reform of Wall Street practices came from pressure from the hinterlands, especially from the farming West, and was long delayed by the close alliance of Wall Street with the two major political parties, which grew up in 1880-1900. In this alliance, by 1900, the influence of Morgan in the Republican Party was dominant, his chief rivalry coming from the influence of a monopoly capitalist, Rockefeller of Ohio. By 1900 Wall Street had largely abandoned the Democratic Party, a shift indicated by the passage of the Whitney family from the Democrats to the Republican inner circles, shortly after they established a family alliance with Morgan. In the same period, the Rockefeller family reversed the ordinary direction of development by shifting from the monopoly fields of petroleum to New York banking circles by way of the Chase National Bank. Soon family as well as financial alliances grew up among the Morgans, Whitneys, and Rockefellers, chiefly through Payne and Aldrich family connections.

For almost fifty years, from 1880 to 1930, financial capitalism approximated a feudal structure in which two great powers, centered in New York, dominated a number of lesser powers, both in New York and in provincial cities. No description of this structure as it existed in the 1920's can be given in a brief compass, since it infiltrated all aspects of American life and especially all branches of economic life. At the center were a group of less than a dozen investment banks, which were, at the height of their powers, still unincorporated private partnerships. These included J. P. Morgan; the Rockefeller family; Kuhn, Loeb and Company; Dillon, Read and Company; Brown Brothers and Harriman; and others. Each of these was linked in organizational or personal relationships with various banks, insurance companies, railroads, utilities, and industrial firms. The result was to form a number of webs of economic power of which the more important centered in New York, while other provincial groups allied with these were to be found in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, and Boston.

J. P. Morgan worked in close relationship to a group of banks and insurance companies, including the First National Bank of New York, the Guaranty Trust Company, the Bankers

Trust, the New York Trust Company, and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The whole nexus dominated a network of business firms which included at least one-sixth of the two hundred largest nonfinancial corporations in American business. Among these were twelve utility companies, five or more railroad systems, thirteen industrial firms, and at least five of the fifty largest banks in the country. The combined assets of these firms were more than \$30 billion. They included American Telephone and Telegraph Company, International Telephone and Telegraph, Consolidated Gas of New York, the groups of electrical utilities known as Electric Bond and Share and as the United Corporation Group (which included Commonwealth and Southern, Public Service of New Jersey, and Columbia Gas and Electric), the New York Central railway system, the Van Sweringen railway system (Allegheny) of nine lines (including Chesapeake and Ohio; Erie; Missouri Pacific; the Nickel Plate; and Pere Marquette); the Santa Fe; the Northern system of five great lines (Great Northern; Northern Pacific; Burlington; and others); the Southern Railway; General Electric Company; United States Steel; Phelps Dodge; Montgomery Ward; National Biscuit; Kennecott Copper; American Radiator and Standard Sanitary; Continental Oil; Reading Coal and Iron; Baldwin Locomotive; and others.

The Rockefeller group, which was really a monopoly capitalist organization investing only its own profits, functioned as a financial capitalist unit in close cooperation with Morgan. Allied with the country's largest bank, the Chase National, it was involved as an industrial power in the various Standard Oil firms and the Atlantic Refining Company, but it controlled over half the assets of the oil industry, plus the \$2 1/3 billion assets in Chase National Bank. Kuhn, Loeb was chiefly interested in railroads, where it dominated the Pennsylvania, the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific, the Milwaukee, the Chicago Northwestern, the Katy (Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company), and the Delaware and Hudson. It also dominated the Bank of Manhattan and the Western Union Telegraph Company for a total of almost \$11 billion in assets. The Mellon group centered in Pittsburgh dominated Gulf Oil, Koppers, Alcoa, Westinghouse Electric, Union Trust Company, the Mellon National Bank, Jones and Laughlin Steel, American Rolling Mill, Crucible Steel, and other firms for total assets of about \$3.3 billion.

It has been calculated that the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations in the United States, plus the fifty largest banks, in the mid-1930's, owned 34 percent of the assets of all industrial corporations, 48 percent of the assets of all commercial banks, 75 percent of the assets of all public utilities, and 95 percent of the assets of all railroads. The total assets of all four classes were almost \$100 billion, divided almost equally among the four classes. The four economic power blocs which we have mentioned (Morgan; Rockefeller; Kuhn, Loeb and Company; and Mellon) plus du Pont, and three local groups allied with these in Boston, Cleveland, and Chicago, together dominated the following percentages of the 250 corporations considered here: of industrial firms 58 percent of their total assets, of railroads 82 percent, and utilities 58 percent. The aggregate value of the assets controlled by the eight power groups was about \$61,205 million of the total assets of \$198,351 million in these 250 largest corporations at the end of 1935.

The economic power represented by these figures is almost beyond imagination to grasp, and was increased by the active role which these financial titans took in politics. Morgan and Rockefeller together frequently dominated the national Republican Party, while Morgan occasionally had extensive influence in the national Democratic Party (three of the Morgan partners were usually Democrats). These two were also powerful on the state level, especially Morgan in New York and Rockefeller in Ohio. Mellon was a power in Pennsylvania and du Pont was obviously a political power in Delaware. In the 1920's this system of economic and political power formed a hierarchy headed by the Morgan interests and played a principal role both in political and business life. Morgan, operating on the international level in cooperation with his allies abroad, especially in England, influenced the events of history to a degree which cannot be specified in detail but which certainly was tremendous....

In the United States, however, the ... [system] of financial capitalism was much more protracted than in most foreign countries, and was not followed by a clearly established system of monopoly capitalism. This blurring of the stages was caused by a number of events of which three should be mentioned: (1) the continued personal influence of many financiers and bankers ... ; (2) the decentralized condition of the United States itself, especially the federal political system; and (3) the long-sustained political and legal tradition of antimonopoly going back at least to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. As a consequence, the United States did not reach a clearly monopolistic economy, and was unable to adopt a fully unorthodox financial policy capable of providing full use of resources. Unemployment, which had reached 13 million persons in 1933, was still at 10 million in 1940.

Of the diverse groups in the American economy, the financiers were most closely related to heavy industry because of the latter's great need for capital for its heavy equipment. The deflationary policies of the bankers were acceptable to heavy industry chiefly because the mass labor of heavy industry in the United States, notably in steel and automobile manufacturing, was not unionized, and the slowly declining prices of the products of heavy industry could continue to be produced profitably if costs could be reduced by large-scale elimination of labor by installing more heavy equipment. Much of this new equipment, which led to assembly-line techniques such as the continuous-strip steel mill, were financed by the bankers. With unorganized labor, the employers of mass labor could rearrange, curtail, or terminate labor without notice on a daily basis and could thus reduce labor costs to meet falls in prices from bankers' deflation. The fact that reductions in wages or large layoffs in mass-employment industries also reduced the volume of purchasing power in the economy as a whole, to the injury of other groups selling consumers' goods, was ignored by the makers of heavy producers' goods. In this way, farmers, light industry, real estate, commercial groups, and other segments of the society were injured by the deflationary policies of the bankers and by the employment policies of heavy industry, closely allied to the bankers. When these policies became unbearable in the depression of 1929-1933, these other interest blocs, who had been traditionally

Republican (or at least, like the western farmers, had refused to vote Democratic and had engaged in largely futile third-party movements), deserted the Republican Party, which remained subservient to high finance and heavy industry.

This shift of the farm bloc, light industry, commercial interests (notably department stores), real estate, professional people, and mass, unskilled, labor to the Democratic Party in 1932 resulted in the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. The new administration sought to ... reward and help the groups which had elected it. The farmers were helped by subsidies; labor was helped by government spending to make jobs and provide purchasing power and by encouragement of unionization; while real estate, professional people, and commercial groups were helped by the increasing demand from the increased purchasing power of farmers and labor.

The New Deal's actions against finance and heavy industry were chiefly aimed at preventing these two from ever repeating their actions of the 1920-1933 period. The SEC Act sought to supervise securities issues and stock-exchange practices to protect investors. Railroad legislation sought to reduce the financial exploitation and even the deliberate bankruptcy of railroads by financial interests (as William Rockefeller had done to the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul or as Morgan had done to the New York, New Haven and Hartford). The Banking Act of 1933 separated investment banking from deposit banking. The wholesale manipulation of labor by heavy industry was curtailed by the National Labor Relations Act of 1933, which sought to protect labor's rights of collective bargaining. At the same time, with the blessings of the new administration, a drive was made by labor groups allied with it to unionize the masses of unskilled labor employed by heavy industry to prevent the latter from adopting any policy of mass layoffs or sharp and sudden wage reductions in any future period of decreasing demand. To this end a Committee for Industrial Organization was set up under the leadership of the one head of a mass labor union in the country, John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, and a drive was put on to organize the workers of the steel, automobile, electrical, and other industries which had no unions.

All this served to create more highly organized and more self-conscious interest blocs in American life, especially among farmers and labor, but it did not represent any victory for unorthodox financing, the real key to either monopoly capitalism or to a managed pluralist economy. The reason for this was that the New Deal, because of President Roosevelt, was fundamentally orthodox in its ideas on the nature of money. Roosevelt was quite willing to unbalance the budget and to spend in a depression in an unorthodox fashion because he had grasped the idea that lack of purchasing power was the cause of the lack of demand which made unsold goods and unemployment, ... and had quite orthodox ideas on the nature of money. As a result, his administration treated the symptoms rather than the causes of the depression and, while spending unorthodoxly to treat these symptoms, did so with money borrowed from the banks in the accepted fashion. The New Deal allowed the bankers to create the money, borrowed it from the banks, and spent it. This meant that the New Deal ran up the national debt to the credit of the banks, and

spent money in such a limited fashion that no drastic re-employment of idle resources was possible. One of the most significant facts about the New Deal was its orthodoxy on money. For the whole twelve years he was in the White House, Roosevelt had statutory power to issue fiat money in the form of greenbacks printed by the government without recourse to the banks. This authority was never used. As a result of such orthodoxy, the depression's symptoms of idle resources were overcome only when the emergency of the war in 1942 made it possible to justify a limitless increase in the national debt by limitless borrowing from private persons and the banks. But the whole episode showed a failure to grasp the nature of money and the function of the monetary system, of which considerable traces remained in the postwar period.

The Economic Factors

From an analytical point of view there are a number of important elements in the economic situation of the twentieth century. These elements did not all come into existence at the same time, nor did any single one come into existence everywhere simultaneously. The order in which these elements came into existence is roughly that in which we list them here:

1. rising standards of living
2. industrialism
3. growth of size of enterprises
4. dispersal of ownership of enterprises
5. separation of control from ownership
6. concentration of control
7. decline of competition
8. increasing disparity in the distribution of incomes
9. declining rate of expansion leading to crisis

1. A rise in the general or average standard of living in modern times is obvious and, with intermittent breaks, goes back for a thousand years. Such progress is welcome, but it obviously brings with it certain accompanying factors which must be understood and accepted. A rising standard of living, except in its earliest stages, does not involve any increase in consumption of necessities but instead involves an increase in the consumption of luxuries even to the point of replacing basic necessities by luxuries. As average incomes rise, people do not, after a certain level, eat more and more black bread, potatoes, and cabbage, or wear more and more clothing. Instead, they replace black bread with wheaten bread and add meat to their diet and replace coarse clothing by finer apparel; they shift their emphasis from energy foods to protective foods.

This process can be continued indefinitely. A number of students have divided goods from this point of view into three levels: (a) necessities, (b) industrial products, and (c) luxuries and services. The first would include food and clothing; the second would include

railroads, automobiles, and radios; the third would include movies, books, amusements, yachts, leisure, music, philosophy, and so on. Naturally, the dividing lines between the three groups are very vague, and the position of any particular item will vary from society to society and even from person to person. As standards of living rise, decreasing proportions of attention and resources are devoted to primary or secondary types of products, and increasing proportions to secondary and tertiary types of products. This has very important economic consequences. It means that luxuries tend to become relatively more important than necessities. It also means that attention is constantly being shifted from products for which the demand is relatively inelastic to products for which the demand is relatively elastic (that is, expansible). There are exceptions to this. For example, housing, which is obviously a necessity, is a product for which demand is fairly elastic and might continue to be so until most persons lived in palaces, but, on the whole, the demand for necessities is less elastic than the demand for luxuries.

A rising standard of living also means an increase in savings (or accumulation of surplus) out of all proportion to the rise in incomes. It is a fairly general rule both for societies and for individuals that savings go up faster than incomes as the latter rise, if for no other reason than the fact that a person with an adequate supply of necessities will take time to make up his mind on which luxuries he will expend any increase in income. Finally, a shift from primary to secondary production usually entails a very great increase in capital investment, while a shift from secondary to tertiary production may not result in any increase in capital investment proportionately as great. Leisure, amusements, music, philosophy, education, and personal services are not likely to require capital investments comparable to those required by the construction of railroads, steel factories, automotive plants, and electrical stations. As a result of these factors, it may well arise that a society whose rising standards of living have brought it to the point where it is passing from emphasis on secondary to emphasis on tertiary production will be faced with the necessity of adjusting itself to a situation which includes more emphasis on luxuries than on necessities, more attention to products of elastic demand than inelastic, and increased savings with decreasing demands for investment.

2. Industrialization is an obvious element in modern economic development. As used here, it has a very specific meaning, namely, the application of inanimate power to production. For long ages, production was made by using power from animate sources such as human bodies, slaves, or draft animals, with relatively little accomplished by power from such inanimate sources as wind or falling water. The so-called Industrial Revolution began when the energy from coal, released through a nonliving machine—the steam engine—became an important element in the productive process. It continued through improvements in the use of wind power and waterpower to the use of oil in internal-combustion engines and finally to power from atomic sources. The essential aspect of industrialism has been the great rise in the use of energy per capita of population.

As a result of this increase in the use of energy per capita, industrial output per man-hour rose significantly (in the United States 96 percent from 1899 to 1929). It was this increase

in output per man-hour which permitted the rise in standards of living and the increases in investment associated with the process of industrialization. The Industrial Revolution did not reach all parts of Europe, or even all parts of any single country, at the same moment. In general, it began in England late in the eighteenth century (about 1776) and spread slowly eastward and southward across Europe, reaching France after 1830, Germany after 1850, Italy and Russia after 1890. This eastward movement of industrialism had many significant results, among them the belief on the part of the newer countries that they were at a disadvantage in comparison with England because of the latter's head start. This was untrue, for, from a strictly temporal point of view, these newer countries had an advantage over England, since their newer industrial installations were less obsolescent and less hampered by vested interests. Whatever advantage England had arose from better natural resources, more plentiful supply of capital, and skilled labor.

3. The growth of size of enterprise was a natural result of the process of industrialism. This process required very considerable outlays for fixed capital, especially in the activities most closely associated with the early stages of industrialism, such as railroads, iron foundries, and textile mills. Such great outlays required a new legal structure for enterprise. This was found in the corporation or limited-liability joint-stock company. In this company large capital installations could be constructed and run, with ownership divided into small fractions among a large number of persons. This increase in size of units was apparent in all countries, but chiefly in the United States, Britain, and Germany. The statistics on this are incomplete and tricky to use, but, in general, they indicate that, while the number of corporations has been increasing, and the average size of all corporations has been falling, the absolute size of the largest corporations has been increasing rapidly in the twentieth century, and the share of total assets or of total output held by the largest corporations has been rising. As a result, the output of certain products, notably chemicals, metals, artificial fibers, electrical equipment, and so on, has been dominated in most countries by a few great firms.

In the United States, where this process has been studied most carefully, it was found that from 1909 to 1930 the number of billion-dollar corporations rose from 1 to 15, and the share of all corporation assets held by the 200 largest rose from 32 percent to over 49 percent. By 1939 this figure reached 57 percent. This meant that the largest 200 corporations were growing faster than other corporations (5.4 percent a year compared to 2.0 percent a year) and faster than total national wealth. As a result, by 1930 these 200 largest corporations had 49.2 percent of all corporate assets (or \$81 billion out of \$165 billion); they had 38 percent of all business wealth (or \$81 billion out of \$212 billion); they held 22 percent of all wealth in the country (or \$81 billion out of \$367 billion). In fact in 1930, a single corporation (American Telephone and Telegraph) had greater assets than the total wealth in 21 states. No such figures are available for European countries, but there can be no doubt that similar growth was taking place in most of them during this period.

4. Dispersal of ownership of enterprise was a natural result of the growth of size of enter-

prise, and was made possible by the corporate method of organization. As corporations increased in size, it became less and less possible for any individual or small group to own any important fractions of their stocks. [An individual or family can maintain control of a corporation by holding as little as 5-10 percent of the stock.] In most countries the number of security holders increased faster than the number of outstanding securities. In the United States the former increased in numbers seven times as fast as the latter from 1900 to 1928. This was a greater spread than in other countries, but elsewhere there was also a considerable spreading out of corporate ownership. This was exactly contrary to the prediction of Karl Marx that the owners of industry would get fewer and fewer as well as richer and richer.

5. The separation of ownership from control has already been mentioned. It was an inevitable counterpart of the advent of the corporate form of business organization; indeed, the corporate form was devised for this very purpose—that is, to mobilize the capital owned by many persons into a single enterprise controlled by a few. As we have seen, this inevitable counterpart was carried to a quite unexpected degree by the devices invented by financial capitalism.

6. The concentration of control was also inevitable in the long run, but here also was carried by special devices to an extraordinary degree. As a result, in highly industrialized countries, the economic systems were dominated by a handful of industrial complexes. The French economy was dominated by three powers (Rothschild, Mirabaud, and Schneider); the German economy was dominated by two (I. G. Farben and Vereinigte Stahl Werke); the United States was dominated by two (Morgan and Rockefeller). Other countries, like Italy or Britain, were dominated by somewhat larger numbers.... In the United States, Morgan ... [guided] the economic swing from financial to monopoly capitalism, and yielded quite gracefully to the rising power of du Pont. In Britain, likewise, the masters of financial capitalism yielded to the masters of chemical products and vegetable oils, once the inevitable writing on the wall had been traced out in a convincing fashion. But all these shifts of power within the individual economic systems indicate merely that individuals or groups are unable to maintain their positions in the complex flux of modern life, and do not indicate any decentralization of control. On the contrary, even as group succeeds group, the concentration of control becomes greater.

7. A decline in competition is a natural consequence of the concentration of control. This decline in competition refers, of course, only to price competition in the market, since this was the mechanism which made the economic system function in the nineteenth century. This decline is evident to all students of modern economics, and is one of the most widely discussed aspects of the modern economic system. It is caused not only by the activities of businessmen but also by the actions of labor unions, of governments, of private social welfare organizations, and even of the herd-like behavior of consumers themselves.

8. The increasing disparity in the distribution of income is the most controversial and least well-established characteristic of the system. The available statistical evidence is

so inadequate in all European countries that the characteristic itself cannot be proved conclusively. An extensive study of the subject, using the available materials for both Europe and the United States, with a careful analysis of the much better American materials, will permit the following tentative conclusions. Leaving aside all government action, it would appear that the disparity in the distribution of the national income has been getting wider. In the United States, for example, according to the National Industrial Conference Board, the richest one-fifth of the population received 46.2 percent of the national income in 1910, 51.3 percent in 1929, and 48.5 percent in 1937. In the same three years, the share of the poorest one-fifth of the population fell from 8.3 percent to 5.4 percent to 3.6 percent. Thus the ratios between the portion obtained by the richest one-fifth and that obtained by the poorest one-fifth increased in these three years from 5.6 to 9.3 to 13.5. If, instead of one-fifths, we examine the ratios between the percentage obtained by the richest one-tenth and that obtained by the poorest one-tenth, we find that in 1910 the ratio was 10; in 1929 it was 21.7; and in 1937 it was 34.4. This means that the rich in the United States were getting richer relatively and probably absolutely while the poor were getting poorer both relatively and absolutely. This last is caused by the fact that the increase in the real national income in the period 1910-1937 was not great enough to compensate for the decrease in percentage going to the poor or for the increase in number of persons in that class.

As a result of such an increase in disparity in the distribution of national income, there will be a tendency for savings to rise and for consumers' purchasing power to decline relative to each other. This is because the savings of a community are largely made by the richer persons in it, and savings increase out of all proportion as incomes rise. On the other hand, the incomes of the poor class are devoted primarily to expenditures for consumption. Thus, if it is correct that there is an increasing disparity in the distribution of the national income of a country, there will be a tendency for savings to rise and consumer purchasing power to decline relative to each other. If this is so, there will be an increasing reluctance on the part of the controllers of savings to invest their savings in new capital equipment, since the existing decline of purchasing power will make it increasingly difficult to sell the products of the existing capital equipment and highly unlikely that the products of any new capital equipment could be sold more easily.

This situation, as we have described it, assumes that the government has not intervened in such a way as to change the distribution of the national income as determined by economic factors. If, however, the government does intervene to disturb this distribution, its actions will either increase the disparity in its distribution or will decrease it. If these actions increase it, the problem of the discrepancy to which we have referred between savings, on one hand, and the level of purchasing power and investment, on the other, will be made worse. If, on the other hand, the government adopts a program which seeks to reduce the disparity in the distribution of the national income, by, for example, adopting a program of taxation which reduces the savings of the rich while increasing the purchasing power of the poor, the same problem of insufficient investment will arise. In this way,

the problem of increasing disparity in the distribution of national income leads to a single result (decline of investment relative to savings), whether the situation is left subject to purely economic factors or the government takes steps to decrease the disparity. The only difference is that, in the one case, the decline in investment may be attributed to a leak of consumer purchasing power, while, in the other case, it may be attributed to a "killing of incentive" by government action. Thus, we see that the controversy which has raged in both Europe and America since 1932 between progressives and conservatives in regard to the causes of the lack of investment is an artificial one. The progressives, who insisted that the lack of investment was caused by lack of consumer purchasing power, were correct. But the conservatives, who insisted that the lack of investment was caused by a lack of confidence, were also correct. Each was looking at the opposite side of what is a single continuous cycle.

This cycle runs roughly as follows: (a) purchasing power creates demand for goods; (b) demand for goods creates confidence in the minds of investors; (c) confidence creates new investment; and (d) new investment creates purchasing power, which then creates demand, and so on. To cut this cycle at any point and to insist that the cycle begins at that point is to falsify the situation. In the 1930's the progressives concentrated attention on stage (a), while the conservatives concentrated attention on stage (c). The progressives, who sought to increase purchasing power by some redistribution of the national income, undoubtedly did increase purchasing power under stage (a), but they lost purchasing power under stage (c) by reducing confidence of potential investors. This decrease of confidence was especially noticeable in countries (like France and the United States) which were still deeply involved in the stage of financial capitalism. It would appear that the economic factors alone affected the distribution of incomes in the direction of increasing disparity. In no major country, however, were the economic factors alone allowed to determine the issue. In all countries government action noticeably influenced the distribution....

In Germany the changes in distribution of the national income were similar to those in Italy, although complicated by the efforts to create a social-service state (an effort going back to Bismarck) and by the hyperinflation. In general, the trend toward increasing disparity in distribution of the national income continued, less rapidly than in Italy, until after 1918. The inflation, by wiping out unemployment for the lower class and by wiping out the savings of the middle class, created a complex situation in which the wealth of the richest class was increased while the poverty of the poorest class was reduced, and the general trend toward increased disparity in income was probably reduced. This reduction became great under the social-service state of 1924-1930, but was drastically reversed because of the great increase in poverty in the lower classes after 1929. After 1934 the adoption of an unorthodox financial policy and a policy of benefits to monopoly capitalism reinforced the normal trend toward increasing disparity in distribution of income. This was in accord with the desires of the Hitler government, but the full impact of this policy was not apparent on the distribution of incomes until the period of full employment after

1937. Until 1938 Hitler's policy, although aimed at favoring the high-income classes, raised the standards of living of the lower-income levels even more drastically by shifting them from unemployment with incomes close to nothing into wage-earning positions in industry) so that the disparity in distribution of income was probably even reduced for a short-run period in 1934-1937. This was not unacceptable to the high-income classes, because it stopped the threat of revolution by the discontented masses and because it was obviously of long-run benefit to them. This long-run benefit began to appear when capacity employment of capital and labor was achieved in 1937. The continuance of the policy of rearmament after 1936 increased the incomes of the high-income groups while decreasing the incomes of the lower-income groups and thus served, from 1937 onward, to reinforce the normal economic tendency toward an increasing disparity in the distribution of incomes. This, of course, is one of the essential features of a Fascist government, and is obvious not only in Germany since 1937, in Italy since 1927, but also in Spain since 1938.

9. A declining rate of economic expansion is the last important characteristic of the economic system of Europe in the present century up to 1950. This decline resulted almost inevitably from the other characteristics which we have already discussed. It varied from country to country, the countries of eastern Europe suffering less than those of western Europe on the whole, but chiefly because their previous rate of progress had been so much lower. The causes of this decline are basically to be found in a relative increase in the power of the vested interests within the community to defend the status quo against the efforts of the progressive and enterprising members of the community to change it. This was revealed in the market (the central mechanism of the economic system) as a result of a relative increase in savings in respect to investment. Savings have continued or have increased for several reasons. In the first place, a tradition which placed a high social esteem on savings existed in western Europe from the Protestant Reformation until the 1930'S. In the second place, there had grown up established institutionalized savings organizations like insurance companies. In the third place, the rising standards of living increased savings even more rapidly. In the fourth place, the increasing disparity in the distribution of incomes increased savings. In the fifth place, the increase in size of enterprises and the separation of ownership from control acted to increase the amount of corporate savings (undistributed profits).

On the other hand, the inclination to invest did not rise so rapidly as savings, or even decreased. Here, again, the reasons are numerous. In the first place, the shift in advanced industrial countries from secondary to tertiary production reduces the demand for heavy capital investment. In the second place, declining rates of population increase, and geographic expansion may adversely affect the demand for investment. In the third place, the increasing disparity in the distribution of incomes, whether it is counteracted by government action or not, has a tendency to reduce the demand for investment capital. In the fourth place, the decrease in competition has served to reduce the amount of investment by making it possible for the controllers of existing capital to maintain its

value by curtailing the investment of new capital which would make the existing capital less valuable. This last point may require additional explanation. In the past, investment was not only capital-creating but also capital-destroying— that is, it made some existing capital worthless by making it obsolete. The creation by investment, for example, of shipyards for making iron-hull steam vessels not only created this new capital but at the same time destroyed the value of the existing yards equipped to make wooden-hull sailing ships. In the past, new investment was made in only one of two cases: (a) if an old investor believed that the new capital would yield sufficient profit to pay for itself and for the old investment now made obsolete, or (b) if the new investor was completely free of the old one, so that the latter could do nothing to prevent the destruction of his existing capital holdings by the new investor. Both of these two alternatives, in the twentieth century tended to become less likely (until 1950), the former by the decline in consumer purchasing power and the latter by the decrease in competition.

The way in which the relative decline of investment in respect to savings results in economic crisis is not difficult to see. In the modern economic community, the sum total of goods and services appearing in the market is at one and the same time the income of the community and the aggregate cost of producing the goods and services in question. The sums expended by the entrepreneur on wages, rents, salaries, raw materials, interest, lawyers' fees, and so on, represent costs to him and income to those who receive them. His own profits also enter the picture, since they are his income and the cost of persuading him to produce the wealth in question. The goods are offered for sale at a price which is equal to the sum of all costs (including profits). In the community as a whole, aggregate costs, aggregate incomes, and aggregate prices are the same, since they are merely opposite sides of the identical expenditures.

The purchasing power available in the community is equal to income minus savings. If there are any savings, the available purchasing power will be less than the aggregate prices being asked for the products for sale and by the amount of the savings. Thus, all the goods and services produced cannot be sold as long as savings are held back. In order for all the goods to be sold, it is necessary for the savings to reappear in the market as purchasing power. The usual way in which this is done is by investment. When savings are invested, they are expended into the community and appear as purchasing power. Since the capital good made by the process of investment is not offered for sale to the community, the expenditures made by its creation appear completely as purchasing power. Thus, the disequilibrium between purchasing power and prices in which was created by the act of saving is restored completely by the act of investment, and all the goods can be sold at the prices asked. But whenever investment is less than savings, the available supply of purchasing power is inadequate by the same amount to buy the goods being offered. This margin by which purchasing power is inadequate because of an excess of savings over investment may be called the "deflationary gap." This "deflationary gap" is the key to the twentieth century economic crisis and one of the three central cores of the whole tragedy of the century.

9.12 The Crash of 1929 and Continuing Economic Warfare

Winston Churchill and Cecil Rhodes, intimate friends, shared the same Anglo-American beliefs of returning the United States to British rule. On June 2, 1899, Churchill and Rhodes had breakfast at London's Burlington Hotel and planned South Africa's war, which began on October 11, 1899. Rhodes, on behalf of the bankers, believed that he had found his "man of action" for returning America to British domination using economic warfare. Following America's financial obligations due to its costly participation in World War I, Churchill concocted an elaborate scheme, wherein he collaborated with US officials and media magnates, to launch an economic offensive against American citizens. He, with dozens of people, constructed a financial terrorist network to eventually facilitate the 1929 stock market crash that reverberated around the world to affect economics for decades.

Despite the deliberate New York Panic (1920-21), America remained resilient and industrially strong. Independent farms provided adequate food. American infrastructure and transportation systems were modern, efficient, and technologically advanced compared to the rest of the world. In 1921, per capita income was \$522. Churchill joined forces with Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, New York Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Strong, and Montagu Norman to provide easy money for speculation. It was possible for investors to purchase \$1,000 worth of stock for \$100. On April 28, 1925, Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, returned England to the gold standard, adjusted the British pound to \$4.86, limiting industry and the quantity of British goods and decreasing the amount of affordable goods for export, also a disaster for English consumers. Churchill and his accomplices invested heavily into the United States stock market. From 1923 to 1929, the Federal Reserve's printing press created a 62 percent inflation rate, and then abruptly stopped.

After World War I, America was Britain's principle competitor. On July 1, 1927, bankers, Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, and Hjalmar Schacht of the German Reichsbank arrived in New York aboard *The Mauretania*. They met with Benjamin Strong and Charles Rist, the Deputy Governor of the Banque de France. They laid the final plans to bankrupt America in order to rescue England's economy after Churchill's maneuvers. Strong planned to deliberately create inflation, by increasing domestic prices, making American goods less desirable and affordable. Importation of cheaper goods would shift the gold to the Bank of England. In what people refer to as the roaring twenties, a time of wealth, optimism and excess, numerous newspaper and magazine articles promoted stock market speculation, claiming that one could make a veritable fortune in a short time for minimum monthly investments. However, there were also special speculators who owned dozens of accounts in various names, which they could trade in enormous blocks. Small investors, never in any position to actually manipulate the market, suffered the consequences, and received the blame for the 1929 crash, just as homebuyers received the blame for the real estate bubble and the financial crisis of 2007-2010. In 1929,

Wall Street brokers reported that there were 1.6 million active stock market accounts and 600,000 margin accounts. Those margin accounts belonged to Churchill and his co-conspirators.

Churchill, his younger brother John "Jack," his 20-year old nephew Johnny, and his 18-year old son, Randolph, toured America for fiftyfour days prior to the crash. On October 4, 1939, Randolph would marry Pamela Beryl Digby, who people have described as a courtesan due to her numerous affairs with powerful millionaires including Baron Elie de Rothschild, William S. Paley, and others. On March 19, 1971, she contacted W. Averell Harriman the day after her husband, successful Hollywood producer Leland Hayward died. She married Harriman on September 27, 1971. She financially backed Bill Clinton who, after his election, rewarded her with an ambassadorship to England. Bernard Baruch, Winston's favorite American, persuaded Charles M. Schwab to allow the British visitors the use of his luxurious private railway car. Schwab had worked for Andrew Carnegie, and participated in the 1901 deal with J. Pierpont Morgan to merge Carnegie Steel with US Steel, with Schwab as its first president. In 1903, Schwab became president of Bethlehem Steel, a company that, in 1914, built twenty submarines for Britain, in only six months, all assembled in Montreal, to avoid the neutrality issue. Bethlehem Steel produced as much as all of Britain combined. Jack Churchill was partners with Horace C. Vickers in a huge stock market firm in London, Vickers da Costa. It had a key role, second to Baruch, in the economic storm that the Churchill brothers were brewing. Baruch introduced Churchill to William Crocker, head of the wealthy California banking family. The Churchill party spent the night of September 12, 1929, at the Crocker estate before visiting publisher William Randolph Hearst, another Baruch crony. They arrived at the \$30 million San Simeon Castle on September 13, 1929, where they spent several days while Hearst and Churchill discussed the world's future.

On September 23, 1929, Winston and Jack Churchill had dinner with William G. McAdoo, former Treasury Secretary (1913-1918) under Wilson. No doubt, this lifetime Morgan agent knew exactly what was going to occur within a month, and he could supply Churchill with an understanding of Treasury operations. In the mid-1920s, Baruch bought a seat on the Chicago Board of Trade for his brother, Sailing. On October 2, 1929, Baruch, with cozy relationships in Chicago, met Churchill, and his party when they arrived in Chicago. Churchill met with several prominent Chicago businessmen, and they devised a test to see how their plot would play out in New York in just three weeks. In the final hour of trading on October 3, they flooded the market with 1,500,000 shares, forcing Schwab's competitor, US Steel to drop \$10 a share. On October 18, 1929, Churchill, accompanied by Charles Duncombe, Third Earl of Feversham and Ronald I. Campbell, visited Republican President Hoover who certainly knew the names of the plungers. At the top of the list were Baruch and John J. Raskob, a DuPont and General Motors executive, and the builder of the Empire State Building. Raskob was also the chairman of the Democratic National Committee (1928-1932). Obviously, party affiliations were and are totally irrelevant. On October 25, 1929, Hoover, with foreknowledge of the

imminent financial catastrophe, about to destroy so many people, would proclaim, "The fundamental business of the country that is production and distribution of commodities, is on a sound and prosperous basis."

Churchill's grandfather, Leonard Jerome, had a seat on the New York Stock Exchange and was chummy with the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts. During the final week before the crash, Churchill stayed with Percy A. Rockefeller (S&B), who arranged a special work area for him in his Manhattan office apartment. Percy's father, William Rockefeller, had been a close friend of Jerome, a Wall Street speculator and manipulator. On October 24, 1929, Black Thursday, Baruch maintained close contact with his brothers at Hentz & Company brokerage firm, where he kept a secret account, known only as number 19. At the opening of the market, huge transactions began taking place, 12.9 million shares that day, in blocks of 15,000 to 20,000 shares, held in some of the biggest companies. The final assault was scheduled to take place the following Tuesday. Churchill met with Baruch at Rockefeller's office then visited the Stock Exchange at 10:45. On the day of the initial crash, referred to as Black Thursday, Churchill, perhaps like other saboteurs, apparently wanted to observe some of his handiwork. He was also present for the calamitous finale on October 29, 1929, when investors traded about 16 million shares. He witnessed the devastating panic caused by his machinations in conjunction with those of his cronies, just before leaving America, much worse off than when he arrived.

On the evening of October 29, Black Tuesday, Baruch threw a lavish party at his Fifth Avenue mansion where forty guests, Wall Street's leading bankers and financiers, held a jubilant celebration that lasted well past midnight. While regular Americans commiserated over their devastating losses, the participants in the plunge partied. MacDonald joined the festivities. There were many suicides, either immediately after the crash or within a few years. On October 30, the Churchills left on *The Berengaria*. Winston Churchill wrote, "No one who has fazed on such a scene could doubt that this financial disaster, huge as it is, cruel as it is to thousands, is only a passing episode in the march of a valiant and serviceable people who by fierce experiment are hewing new paths for man, and showing to all nations much that they should attempt and much that they should avoid." The so-called serviceable people of America fought in World War I, where at least 115,000 serviceable Americans perished, and 206,000 suffered serious wounds. In World War II, 294,000 serviceable Americans perished, and 671,000 suffered wounds; the total number of serviceable Americans who perished in both wars equal 409,000 and the total wounded was 877,000. In 1929, Baruch had made repeated trips to Germany, England, and France. In September and October 1929, collaborators appropriated over \$100 billion from Wall Street and other American markets. On December 6, 1929, Baruch accompanied \$10 million in gold (16 tons) that bankers shipped to Lazard Freres, Guaranty Trust Company, Irving Trust, and Heidelbach Ickelheimer. Within five weeks after the crash, the bankers shipped \$30 million (1929 prices) to France. After the crash, gold exports exceeded \$111 million in gold, all shipped to Europe. In December 1929, \$68 million went to England and France.

In 1929-1930, like 2008-2009, the banks, purportedly short on resources, refused to make loans to small companies or individuals. Yet, J. P. Morgan, First National Bank of New York, and First National Bank of Chicago sent massive amounts of money to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Geneva, which ultimately helped countries prepare Europe for another war. Then the bankers systematically reduced the money supply to prolong the crises into the great depression. The middle class unavoidably defaulted on loans and the banks repossessed farms, homes and business properties. The worldwide crash and the subsequent depression functioned to shift assets upwards. It caused joblessness, hunger, disintegration of production and national bankruptcies. At the same time that banks were crunching credit and devaluing the money in circulation, they were creating the massive build-up of the military in the Soviet Union. In May 1929, during Hoover's administration, before Roosevelt officially recognized the Soviet Union, the Ford Motor Company contracted with Stalin to oversee the construction of a production facility. The Soviets agreed to order 72,000 unassembled Fords over the next decade. In February 1930, Albert E. Kahn, Inc. of Detroit, Michigan, founded by a Germanborn Jew who immigrated in 1880, signed an agreement with the Soviets to clone the Ford River Rouge of Detroit as part of a mega industrial complex at Gorky, which soon became a Soviet Detroit.

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In January 1932, Hoover, going through the appropriate motions, told Richard Whitney, the New York Stock Exchange President that he was going to convene an investigation into the crash. Thomas W. Lamont, who spoke for other bankers, told him to forget about it. He persevered, and by the third quarter of 1932, another banking crisis devel-

oped. The public did not re-elect Hoover. The bankers would now bring in Roosevelt and his New Deal. By March 8, 1932, the Dow Jones Index was down to \$41.22, the bankers had wiped out nearly 90 percent of its value. Those with cash paid two cents on the dollar for equipment, farmland, and real estate—at the expense of those who had worked generations to acquire their land and assets. Meanwhile the plungers continued to strengthen their holdings. 1981 With every economic crisis, huge multinational corporations who care little about the land or the animals consume private farms and ranches. Government regulations routinely restrain the few remaining independent farmers and ranchers affecting their control over their own property. Churchill toured the United States again (December 1931-March 11, 1932) to arrange support for American involvement in another war. On February 9, 1932, he delivered a speech to the New York Economic Club. His old friends sat on the podium—Baruch, Schwab, Rockefeller, Kahn, Henry Morgenthau, Samuel Seabury, Merlin H. Aylesworth, James Speyer, William C. Osborn, Nathan Miller, Raymond B. Fosdick and Karl Bickel. He thanked the United States for pouring billions of dollars into European countries since the end of World War I, and then warned about the crisis of Communism. Meyer, Baruch, Strong, and Mellon instructed the New York Federal Reserve Board to purchase \$1,100,000,000 of US Treasuries over an eleven-week period then abruptly stopped in June 1932, which halted the economic recovery to prime the people to get rid of Hoover. Hope disappeared when another 5,000 banks closed which eliminated the banker's competition. The American citizens blamed Hoover and the Republicans. The citizens readily elected Roosevelt and the Democrats controlled the country for the next two decades.

On February 27, 1933, the Dow Jones bottomed out. Baruch's candidate, Roosevelt, inaugurated on March 4, 1933, immediately closed the banks until March 15, 1933. By then, there were 15,000,000 unemployed Americans. By 1937, there would still be 11,000,000 without jobs. In 1933, fiat money replaced gold. The contrived contraction of the economy was the result of the bankers shipping the gold out of the country. Roosevelt, ordered the printing of the Illuminati seal on one dollar bills in 1933, a seal that symbolizes its claim to control of America, regardless who occupies the White House. On March 9, 1933, Roosevelt issued Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 6111, and 6260, which declared that America was bankrupt. He announced, "All the property of this country now belongs to the state and will be used for the good of the state." That evening, a joint session of Congress passed the Emergency Banking Act, amid an atmosphere of chaos and uncertainty, in less than an hour, allowing only Federal Reserve-approved banks to operate. Roosevelt ones stated:

"In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way."

On April 5, 1933, because of the stipulations in the Emergency Banking Act, Roosevelt made it illegal for citizens to own gold. He ordered people to turn in all gold coins, gold bullion, and gold certificates to the FR banks by May 1 (Illuminati was created on May 1, 1776). Baruch, the single greatest holder of gold bricks, retained possession of his gold.

People faced imprisonment and fines if they failed to surrender their gold. On June 5, 1933, Congress enacted a joint resolution outlawing all gold clauses in contracts. Now the FR was free to print unlimited amounts. While the FR augmented the war in Europe, Roosevelt's activities really energized it. Churchill and Norman had removed the English pound from the gold standard in 1931 which altered world trade. In September 1931, Britain defaulted on their gold payments, intensifying the depression. Rothschild's Bank of England calculated this move to trigger another war. 1987 Roosevelt took the United States off the domestic gold standard with The Gold Reserve Act of 1934, as requested by Baruch in his meeting with the Finance Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee.

Roosevelt, with his communistic New Deal, strengthened the FR and introduced the practice of deficit spending, the brainchild of Britain's John Maynard Keynes. In 1910, Lenin had said, "The surest way to overthrow an established social order is to debauch its currency." Keynes said, "The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of creeping socio-economic destruction, and does it in manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose."

On November 8, 2002, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said, "Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna, Regarding the Great Depression. You're right; we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again." 1952 He was referring to Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz who wrote Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 in 1971. He told the truth. Rather than a stock market crash followed by a depression, they switched tactics. Starting at the end of the second Bush regime, members of Congress, the bank's accomplices, initiated bank bailouts, and did not conceal this huge resource transfer behind a contrived crash. Every economic crisis requires the same careful planning and preparations as the 1929 crash, executed by officials at the highest level of two governments — Britain and America.

9.13 From Balfour to Israel

Palestine was promised to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration during World War 1 to get the United State involved into the war on the side of Britain and France. But this was 1917 and Israel was created in 1948. Why did it take so long and what happened in between?

There was peace between Jews and Arabs until 1917, everywhere. There existed the "Dhimmi-Law" but this was not specifically for all Jews but for all non-muslims. It said that in the countries under Sharia-Law, non-muslims had the right to exists by paying a certain tax. Through European pressure this was no longer valid in the middle of the 19th Century in the Ottoman Empire and this law became less and less important during the 20th century. There existed big Jewish communities in the Arab world, which were accepted and were a big contributor of wealth to the region. All Jews of this region were

Sephardic Jews and were seen as semitic brothers by the Arabs. In the 19th Century, many Ashkenazi Jews fled from Europe to Palestine because of anti-Jewish pogroms but Jews from Germany were rarely among them. Until 1917, there was peaceful coexistence with the natives in the area.

The trouble began when Britain started to gain influence in the Arabic world after destroying the Ottoman Empire. During this time, Zionism became more and more important. Many Jews longed for their own homeland but this movement was also resented by the Jews who assimilated fully into their host nations. In Britain, Zionism was promoted in the 19th Century and the Balfour-Declaration was probably a logical consequence. But this document already starts with deception in its name. It was not written by Balfour, but by Lord Milner, the mastermind of the secret Round Table movement, which promoted British imperialism and racial superiority. He is also known as "the Tsar of the Press" to whom belonged, among others, the "London Times". Milner was a good friend to Cecil Rhodes, who was funded by Lionel Walter Rothschild for his "Diamond adventures" in Africa.

Time has shown that the Balfour Declaration was not worth the paper it was printed on. England never came through with their part of the deal. It started with two different versions of the declaration being created, one for the Zionists, one for the Arabs. In addition, the Arabs received verbal assurances directly in opposition to the assurances the Zionists received. In today's view and while looking at modern conditions in the middle east, historians agree that the Arab-Jewish conflict was started by England. Until today, this whole area is in permanent conflict which aligns with British geostrategic goals.

The Balfour Declaration were governed by the following calculations: It was the political goal to win the Jews to fight for the Allied cause in which the Zionists should put all their efforts. A pro-western nation should build a bridge between a British-Egypt and a British-Mesopotamia and not other power should be in between. One should also nullify the Sykes-Picot-Agreement with France from 1916 and win exclusive British control over Palestine and for propaganda reasons they made it look like that gaining control over Palestine was done for the moral reason for the right of self-determination of the Jews. The Arabs were not opposed to Jewish immigration to the area. This only changed when it became public that there exist different versions of the Balfour Declaration. Until that point, negotiations between Arabs and Zionists were friendly and it led to the "Faisal-Weizmann-Agreement" of January 3rd 1919.

King Faisal I was the King of Syria who also reigned over Palestine. This agreement was for friendship and cooperation and should also lead to the independence of Syria. The reign of Britain in this area shall be ended with the help of the Jews. King Faisal wrote:

"The Jews and Arabs are close by blood and between both people there exist no conflict." To Felix Frankfurter he wrote: "We welcome the Jews in their Home ... the Jewish movement is nationalistic and not imperialistic and there is enough room for all of us in Syria."

But all agreements between Faisal and the Zionists rested upon the promise of Britain to release Syria into independence. This promise was given by England to the Syrians during World War 1 if the Syrians join the fight against the Ottoman Empire. However, this promise was never honored and the Faisal-Weizmann-Agreement never came to be. Until the summer of 1919, British dishonesty became known and the Syrian attitude changed drastically. There was no longer a basis of trust and the immigration of Jews was declined. Britain then went even one step further and promoted the Jew Sir Herbert Samuel to be the British high commissioner of Palestine. This Jew did nothing to ease the tensions. He allowed further immigration which agitated the Syrians and in turn, created a bad atmosphere for the Jews already in Palestine. First pogroms against the Jews happened as soon as 1920, the first pogroms of Jerusalem. The Arab police and the British government did not intervene in the killings, they just let it happen. Afterwards, Britain looked into the matter, created a report and allowed the Jews to have weapons. Now, we had Arabs with guns against Jews with guns. But Herbert Samuel was still not finished.

In addition to providing guns to the Jews, Britain also rearmed the Syrians to support a riot against France. The British government must have known that these guns would also be used against the Jews very soon and to make sure this happened, a man named Hadij Amin al-Hussein was used by Samuel, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (a man who shall later work with Hitler for creating Muslim SS divisions in the tens of thousands). This happened against the will of the High Council of the Muslims, which saw Hussein as an ill educated bandit. Hussein was not unknown to Britain, so they knew who they were dealing with and used him in purpose. He was arrested by England in 1920 and sentenced to 15 years of forced labour because he was a strong protagonist in the first anti-Zionist pogroms and an Arabic nationalist. Only one year later, Britain gave him the possibility to flee and also to return to Palestine. It is rather strange that Samuel should promote this man to be the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a man who was not qualified in any way for the position.

Hussein would not disappoint Britain with a lack of fanatical engagement and the next pogroms happened in 1922. At the same time, Britain tolerated the armed defensive Jewish organization Haganah, whose founder had been arrested in 1920. Also in 1922, the USA started becoming interested in the area and supported British policies. This collaboration gave first fruits in 1926, when England, the US and France partitioned the Iraqi Petrol Company, with England getting 52.5%, France and the US getting 21.25% each. The Arabs could keep only 5%. Britain received the official mandate for Palestine from the League of Nations in 1922 and with that, Britain was responsible for everything that happened in this area. Britain promoted a strong stance for the Arabs against the Jews, supported the Arabs with money, weapons, propaganda and education to create an extreme Arabic-nationalistic spirit. They also made again promises for Arab independence which were never kept. Even Churchill became a prominent figure in this, as can be read in the British white book. In there he proclaimed that "Palestine will never become as

Jewish as England is English". Agitations between Jews and Arabs increased, additional pogroms happened, especially after the Arabs started to think that the Jews wanted to create their own nation state around Jerusalem.

Especially until 1929, al-Hussein killed Jews and Arabs alike, which was d'accord with Britain, to keep the area divided. Just how much the British schemes were against the Arab spirit was shown in 1930 in the Arab newspaper "Al Inqdam":

"We are led by a group of men who sell us out and who buy and sell us like kettle. The Arab people has not proclaimed its last word in the Jewish question. When this word is spoken, it will not be a word of hate, but of peace and brotherhood, it will be appropriate for two different peoples living in a single state."

There were no anti-Jewish disturbances following the years of 1930 in the Arab states. On the contrary. People from Syria and Lebanon started a petition to France to allow Jewish settlement in their lands. American historian William Ziff said in 1938 that the Jewish-Arab conflict was not due to religious or racial differences, but initiated by the British government. Just imagine what the existence of a state with hundreds of thousands of Jews would have meant for the British Empire, especially an Arab-Jewish alliance. We should remind us of the British foreign policy, which was solely for British imperialistic goals. Led by the promise "all the world is mine", England never thought twice about even using pirates, famines or fanatics to further their ambitions. Just remind yourself of the pirate Francis Drake in the Caribbeans, which later became Sir Francis Drake. The policies of the British Empire often led to numerous dead people, either through violence or hunger. Just in India alone, there died nearly 50 million people through famines in a span of 300 years under the rule of England. British reports claimed of course that this could not be prevented due to organizational difficulties but the archives of the Trading Company show that massive amounts of food were still exported while famines were taking lives. Britain took resources by force, they took the oil fields of Mossul after a war against Germany and the last imperialistic tendencies in South Africa were to massive resources of gold and diamonds. England switched alliances as fast as the changing politics demanded.

The whole situation changed in the 20th Century when the mainstream media became fast enough to send information around the world within minutes. This allowed the "free" press to gain more influence and it became harder to hide the imperialist schemes of the British Empire. Thus, deceiving the public became of Englands biggest traits. That way, there were able to blame others for crisis and war which in reality only served British interest. Britain created the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine by making promises to the Arabs it could not keep while encouraging them to have a strong stance against the Jews (to whom they promised Palestine). This can be also seen in other instances throughout history. Before World War 1, England encouraged Russia and Serbia to take a strong stance against Austria-Hungary and made conflict inevitable. Before World War 2, they encouraged Poland to have a strong stance against Germany, creating further friction and agitation along the border. They encouraged Poland to ignore all desires for negotiations

from Germany and immediately broke their promises, feeding them first to Germany and then to the Communists (as we will see in the coming chapters). That Britain did not care about the Jews could also be seen during World War 2. Germany asked for other countries to take Jewish refugees and they were declined, Britain found with reconnaissance planes the concentration camps in Poland and they ignored negotiations for Peace by Heinrich Himmler in 1944, which included sending 100.000 Hungarian Jews to Palestine and Britain would receive 10.000 trucks in return. Of course it was declined. 10 Jewish lives were not worth 1 Truck for Britain while at the same time, they supported Stalin with material.

In 1933, Hadij Amin al-Hussein saw that his personal goals could not be achieved by further working with Britain. After working together for more than 10 years, it finally came to conflicts after Hussein expanded his assassinations to British personal. He had to flee in 1937 and tried to get into contact with Germany, for which he became an Agent in 1938. With Hitlers support, al-Hussein continued his anti-Jewish stance in the middle east. He organized a riot in Badgdad 1941 which had to shut down by force by Britain. Hussein was free to move through the other Arabic countries and spread his hate for Jews. He could even travel back and forth to Berlin and he was never captured by Britain during this time, which makes one assume that Britain was content with his actions... he just continued his policy which he started under British authority after all. The end of the Second World War was experienced by al-Hussein in Switzerland (of course, all revolutionists and mass murderers seem to have had a place there...) but he was later deported to France. In turn, France declined deporting him to Yugoslavia because he was seen as a criminal of war in this country. The Allies did not put him to trial, instead they let him go to Egypt in peace where he was accepted as a national hero. From there, he continued his war against the Jews. When King Abdullah gave the position of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem to another person in 1951, Hussein assassinated his successor. He later became the mentor of Yassir Arafat and he died in 1974 in exile in Egypt by natural causes.

But why all this? Britain feared a possible Jewish-Arabic Empire because the Jews had many influential people backing them, especially the Rothschild's. All the wealthy Jews investing their money in a middle eastern Empire was certainly nothing Britain could have wanted... especially considering that the entire middle east basically already belonged to the Ottoman Empire at that time and them creating an alliance with the Jews all around the World was probably in no ones interest in the West.

In 1902, Ibn Saud decided to get an empire of his own. He thought himself to have a mission promised by god, he was a Wahabi and wanted to get Mecca and Medina under control of Wahabism. He would be seen as a fundamental Islamist today. He was well versed in politics and diplomacy, he strided through the lands, created alliances through marriages with literally hundreds of women. It was like this: As a Wahabi, he was only allowed to have 4 wives (this poor man, just 4...). When he moved to another region, he cast out these women and this was not a problem, not for him or

for the women. In the Islamic world, a woman who had a liaison with a dignitary was even more desirable for the men. In this way, Ibn Saud had 263 confirmed sons, the daughters were not counted. The Ottomans did not like his actions and tried to contain him, which failed. Their error was in focusing their control over Arabia into their naval powers and they lacked influence through ground forces. They were not able to stop Saud's troops that way. Saud increased his influence steadily but he would have failed, if it would not have been for World War 1. The Ottoman Empire started to build railways into Arabia and this would have ended the reign of Ibn Saud. The railway to Mekka and Medina was finished in 1906 with German help and the Bagdad-Bahn also made further progress. With these modern means of transportation could have easily moved troops around to stop Saud's troops. But with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Britain, he still could keep his power. Interestingly enough, Saud was nearly defeated by the Turks, not through weapons but through bacteria. The Turks carried for the Arabs unusual intestinal bacteria and with lacking hygiene, an epidemic arose in Ibn Saud's troops which stopped their movements for several weeks. We do not know if the Turks did not use this incident to their advantage out of honor or stupidity. Fact of the matter is: Ibn Saud was supported with money and weapons from the British Empire from the start to destabilize the Ottoman Empire.

The example of Saudi-Arabia in 1917 showed that creating a new empire in the middle east was not just fiction but reality and if the power vacuum left by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire were to be taken up by an alliance of Arabs and Jews, then the war in this area would have been for nothing for Britain, especially if they would have all relevant oil reservoirs which were of major importance for the British navy to keep their empire together. The Arabic leader knew before 1917 that an alliance with the Jews were only beneficial. They were not stupid people, they studied in Universities in Europe and especially London so there is no way to think that they could not see a useful alliance from being created.

Now we have to look at this from the view of the British Empire. The creation of a Jewish-Arabic empire would have been the biggest possible catastrophe for them. Not only would they have lost control of the oil fields which they have just stolen from the Germans (no other oil fields were discovered at that time), also the Suez Channel would have been blocked and with it their naval way to India. Added to that came the fear that the Jews would have a leading role in such an empire and it could have been possible that the Jews would have remembered how they were treated by Britain in the prior centuries. One shall also not forget the influence of the Bagdad-Bahn, which was one of the major reasons why Britain "needed" war. This railway would have connected Berlin with the Arabic world and the transportation of oil from Mosul to Germany would have been possible by means way faster than that of ships, no naval power could have competed. In addition, Germany could have supported the Arabic world with industrialization which could have finally led to a German-Arabic-Jewish alliance. There were enough Jews in Germany after all which would have benefited to get their home in Palestine in a peaceful

way with the help of Germany. Of course, this was a scenario which still could have been possible after World War 1 if Britain would not have made sure that the Arabs were agitated against the Jews. The current death and terror in the middle east between Jews and Arabs is directly caused by British policies after World War 1. This also helps to understand that Britain did not really allow the settlement of Jews in Palestine which where to be send there by Nazi Germany in the 1930s (more on that in another Chapter). There was a serious threat to Britain that the Jews actually might see Adolf Hitler himself as the one who delivered them their promised homeland after England broke their promise of the Balfourt Declaration. A turn of events many people today can't even begin to think about. Britain always justified their denial to allow further immigration of Jews into Palestine by saying the political situation in the Arab world would not have allowed this, completely ignoring that they have created this situation willingly in the first place.

Still during all this conflict, the Jews were able to secure Israel on May 14th 1948. Just one year prior there happened massive pogroms with many dead and the Jews finally pushed to receive a serious and safe refuge. Interestingly enough, the Founders of Israel basically followed the decisions of the United Nations, which created the borders as a worst case scenario, even splitting the capital of Jerusalem, create the most devide possible, making sure friction between Arabs and Jews never stops.

10. The 3rd Reich

10.1 The Nazi Regime

Coming to Power

When Adolf Hitler became chancellor of the German Reich on January 30, 1933, he was not yet forty-four years old. The outbreak of war in August 1914 gave Hitler the first real motivation of his life. He became a super-patriot, joined the Sixteenth Volunteer Bavarian Infantry, and served at the front for four years. In his way he was an excellent soldier. Attached to the regimental staff as messenger for the First Company, he was completely happy, always volunteering for the most dangerous tasks. He remained on active service at the front for four years. During that period his regiment of 3,500 suffered 3,260 killed in action, and Hitler himself was wounded twice. These were the only two occasions on which he left the front. In October 1918 he was blinded by mustard gas and sent to a hospital at Pasewalk, near Berlin. When he emerged a month later he found the war finished, Germany beaten, and the monarchy overthrown. He refused to become reconciled to this situation. Unable to accept either defeat or the republic, remembering the war as the second great love of his life (the first being his mother), he stayed with the army and eventually became a political spy for the Reichswehr, stationed near Munich. In the course of spying on the numerous political groups in Munich, Hitler became fascinated by the rantings of Gottfried Feder against the "interest slavery of the Jews." As a result he was asked to join the German Workers' Party, and did so, becoming one of about sixty regular members and the seventh member of its executive committee.

The German Workers' Party had been founded by a Munich locksmith, Anton Drexler, on January 5, 1919, as a nationalist, Pan-German, workers' group. In a few months Captain Ernst Rohm of Franz von Epp's corps of the Black Reichswehr joined the movement and became the conduit by which secret Reichswehr funds, coming through Epp, were conveyed to the party. He also began to organize a strong-arm militia within the group (the Storm Troops, or SA). When Hitler joined in September 1919, he was put in charge of party publicity. Since this was the chief expense, and since Hitler also became the party's leading orator, public opinion soon came to regard the whole movement as Hitler's, and Rohm paid the Reichswehr's funds to Hitler directly. During 1920 the party grew from 54 to 3,000 members; it changed its name to National Socialist German Workers' Party, purchased the *Völkischer Beobachter* with 60,000 marks of General von Epp's money, and drew up its "Twenty-five-Point Program."

The party program of 1920 was printed in the party literature for twenty-five years, but its provisions became more remote from attainment as years passed. Even in 1920, many

of its clauses were put in to win support from the lower classes rather than because they were sincerely desired by the party leaders. These included (1) Pan-Germanism; (2) German international equality, including the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles; (3) living space for Germans, including colonial areas; (4) German citizenship to be based on blood only, with no naturalization, no immigration for non-Germans, and all Jews or "other aliens" eliminated; (5) all unearned incomes to be abolished, the state to control all monopolies, to impose an excess-profits tax on corporations, to "communalize" the large department stores, to encourage small business in the allotment of government contracts, to take agricultural land for public purposes without compensation, and to provide old-age pensions; (6) to punish all war profiteers and usurers with death; and (7) to see that the press, education, culture, and religion conform to "the morals and religious sense of the German race."

As the party grew, adding members and spreading out to link up with similar movements in other parts of Germany, Hitler strengthened his control of the group. He could do this because he had control of the party newspaper and of the chief source of money and was its chief public figure. In July 1921, he had the party constitution changed to give the president absolute power. He was elected president. As a consequence of this event, the SA was reorganized under Röhm, the word "Socialism" in the party name was interpreted to mean nationalism (or a society without class conflicts), and equality in party and state was replaced by the "leadership principle" and the doctrine of the elite. The next two years the party passed through a series of crises of which the chief was the attempted Putsch of November 9, 1923. During this period all kinds of violence and illegality, even murder, were condoned by the Bavarian and Munich authorities. As a result of the failures of this period, especially the abortive Putsch, Hitler became convinced that he must come to power by legal methods rather than by force. He broke with Ludendorff and ceased to be supported by the Reichswehr; he began to receive his chief financial support from the industrialists; he made a tacit alliance with the Bavarian People's Party by which Prime Minister Heinrich Held of Bavaria raised the ban on the Nazi Party in return for Hitler's repudiation of Ludendorff's anti-Christian teachings; and Hitler formed a new armed militia (the SS) to protect himself against Rohm's control of the old armed militia (the SA). (The SS and SA were of course also needed as protection against the Communists, which had far greater numbers in the first years)

In the period 1924-1930 the party continued, without any real growth, as a "lunatic fringe," subsidized by the industrialists. Among the chief contributors to the party in this period were Carl Bechstein (Berlin piano manufacturer), August Borsig (Berlin locomotive manufacturer), Emil Kirdorf (general manager of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate), Fritz Thyssen (owner of the United Steel Works and president of the German Industrial Council) and Albert Vögler (general manager of the Gelsenkirchen Iron and Steel Company and formerly general manager of United Steel Works). During this period neither Hitler nor his supporters were seeking to create a mass movement. That did not come until 1930. But during this earlier period the party itself was steadily centralized,

and the Leftish elements (like the Strasser brothers) were weakened or eliminated. In April 1927, Hitler spoke to 400 industrialists in Essen; in April 1928, he addressed a similar group of landlords from east of the Elbe; in January 1932 came one of his greatest triumphs when he spoke for 3 hours to the Industrial Club of Düsseldorf and won support and financial contributions from that powerful group. By that date he was seeking to build his movement into a mass political party capable of sweeping him into office. This project failed. As we have indicated, by the end of 1932 much of the financial support from industry had been cut off by Papen, and party membership was falling away, chiefly to the Communists. To stop this decline, Hitler agreed to become chancellor in a Cabinet in which there would be only three Nazis among eleven members.

Papen hoped in this way to control the Nazis and to obtain from them the popular support which Papen had so sorely lacked in his own chancellorship in 1932. But Papen was far too clever for his own good. He, Hugenberg, Hindenburg, and the rest of the intriguers had underestimated Hitler. The latter, in return for Hugenberg's acceptance of new elections on March 5, 1933, promised that there would be no Cabinet changes whatever the outcome of the voting. In spite of the fact that the Nazis obtained only 44 per cent of the ballots in the new election, Hitler became dictator of Germany within eighteen months. One of the chief reasons for this success rests on the position of Prussia within Germany. Prussia was the greatest of the fourteen states of Germany. Covering almost two-thirds of the country, it included both the great rural areas of the east and the great industrial areas of the west. Thus it included the most conservative as well as the most progressive portions of Germany. While its influence was almost as great under the republic as it had been under the empire, this influence was of quite a different character, having changed from the chief bulwark of conservatism in the earlier period to the chief area of progressivism in the later period. This change was made possible by the large numbers of enlightened groups in the Rhenish areas of Prussia, but chiefly by the fact that the so-called Weimar Coalition of Social Democrats, Center Party, and Liberal Democrats remained unbroken in Prussia from 1918 to 1932. As a consequence of this alliance, a Social Democrat, Otto Braun, held the position of prime minister of Prussia for almost the whole period 1920-1932, and Prussia was the chief obstacle in the path of the Nazis and of reaction in the critical days after 1930. As part of this movement the Prussian Cabinet in 1930 refused to allow either Communists or Nazis to hold municipal offices in Prussia, prohibited Prussian civil servants from holding membership in either of these two parties, and forbade the use of the Nazi uniform.

This obstacle to extremism was removed on July 20, 1932, when Hindenburg, by presidential decree based on Article 48, appointed Papen commissioner for Prussia. Papen at once dismissed the eight members of the Prussian parliamentary Cabinet and granted their governmental functions to men named by himself. The dismissed ministers were removed from their offices by the power of the army, but at once challenged the legality of this action before the German Supreme Court at Leipzig. By its verdict of October 25, 1932, the court decided for the removed officials. In spite of this decision, Hitler,

after only a week in the chancellorship, was able to obtain from Hindenburg a new decree which removed the Prussian ministers from office once more and conferred their powers on the federal vice-chancellor, Papen. Control of the police administration was conferred on Hermann Göring. The Nazis already held, through Wilhelm Frick, control of the Reich Ministry of Interior and thus of the national police powers. Thus Hitler, by February 7th, had control of the police powers both of the Reich and of Prussia.

Using this advantage, the Nazis began a twofold assault on the opposition. Göring and Frick worked under a cloak of legality from above, while Captain Rohm in command of the Nazi Party storm troops worked without pretense of legality from below. All uncooperative police officials were retired, removed, or given vacations and were replaced by Nazi substitutes, usually Storm Troop leaders. On February 4, 1933, Hindenburg signed an emergency decree which gave the government the right to prohibit or control any meetings, uniforms, or newspapers. In this way most opposition meetings and newspapers were prevented from reaching the public. This attack on the opposition from above was accompanied by a violent assault from below, carried out by the SA. In desperate attacks in which eighteen Nazis and fifty-one opposition were killed, all Communist, most Socialist, and many Center Party meetings were disrupted. In spite of all this, it was evident a week before the election that the German people were not convinced. Accordingly, under circumstances which are still mysterious, a plot was worked out to burn the Reichstag building and blame the Communists (Note: Thanks to post-war propaganda, people just say that the Reichstag fire was done by the Nazis (Because saying literally anything against the Nazis without proof is still accepted as truth). In reality, no such proof exists and evidence indicates that the high-ranking NSDAP members were in panic expecting a communist coup.). Most of the plotters were homosexuals and were able to persuade a degenerate moron from Holland named Van der Lubbe to go with them. After the building was set on fire, Van der Lubbe was left wandering about in it and was arrested by the police. The government at once arrested four Communists, including the party leader in the Reichstag (Ernst Torgler). The day following the fire (February 28, 1933) Hindenburg signed a decree suspending all civil liberties and giving the government power to invade any personal privacy, including the right to search private homes or confiscate property. At once all Communist members of the Reichstag, as well as thousands of others, were arrested, and all Communist and Social-Democrat papers were suspended for two weeks.

In spite of these drastic measures, the election of March 5, 1933, was a failure from the Nazi point of view. Hitler's party received only 288 of 647 seats, or 43.9 percent of the total vote. The Nationalists obtained only 8 percent. The Communists obtained 81 seats, a decrease of 19, but the Socialists obtained 125, an increase of 4. The Center Party fell from 89 to 74, and the People's Party from 11 to 2. The Nationalists stayed at 5: seats. In the simultaneous election to the Prussian Diet, the Nazis obtained 211 and the Nationalists 43 out of 474 seats. The period from the election of March 5, 1933, to the death of Hindenburg on August 2, 1934, is generally called the Period of Coordination

(Gleichschaltung). The process was carried on, like the electoral campaign just finished, by illegal actions from below and legalistic actions from above. From below, on March 7th throughout Germany, the SA swept away much of the opposition by violence, driving it into hiding. They marched to most offices of trade unions, periodicals, and local governments, smashing them up, expelling their occupants, and raising the swastika flag. Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick condoned these actions by naming Nazis as police presidents in various German states (Baden, Saxony, Württemberg, Bavaria), including General von Epp in Bavaria.

These men then proceeded to use their police powers to seize control of the apparatus of state government. The new Reichstag met on March 23rd at the Kroll Opera House. In order to secure a majority, the Nazis excluded from the session all of the Communist and 30 Socialist members, about 109 in all. The rest were asked to pass an “enabling act” which would give the government for four years the right to legislate by decree, without the need for the presidential signature, as in Article 48, and without constitutional restrictions except in respect to the powers of the Reichstag, the Reichsrat, and the presidency.

By using further schemes on the way to power, by August 1934, the Nazi movement had reached its goal—the establishment of an authoritarian state in Germany. The word used here is “authoritarian,” for, unlike the Fascist regime in Italy, the Nazi regime was not totalitarian. It was not totalitarian because two members of the Quartet were not coordinated, a third member was coordinated only incompletely and, unlike Italy or Soviet Russia, the economic system was not ruled by the state but was subject to “self-rule.” All this is not in accord with popular opinion about the nature of the Nazi system either at the time it was flourishing or since. Newspaper men and journalistic writers applied the term “totalitarian” to the Nazi system, and the name has stuck without any real analysis of the facts as they existed. In fact, the Nazi system was not totalitarian either in theory or in practice.

This movement was built up by the Quartet as a counterrevolutionary force against, first, the Weimar Republic, internationalism, and democracy, and against, second, the dangers of social revolution, especially Communism, engendered by the world economic depression. This movement, once it came to power at the behest of the Quartet, took on life and goals of its own quite different from, and, indeed, largely inimical to, the life and goals of the Quartet. No showdown or open conflict ever arose between the movement and the Quartet. Instead, a *modus vivendi* was worked out by which the two chief members of the Quartet, industry and the army, obtained their desires, while the Nazis obtained the power and privileges for which they yearned. The seeds of conflict continued to exist and even to grow between the movement and its creators, especially because of the fact that the movement worked continually to create a substitute industrial system and a substitute army parallel to the old industrial system and the old Reichswehr. Here again the threatening conflict never broke out because the Second World War had the double result that it demonstrated the need for solidarity in the face of the enemy, and

it brought great booty and profits to both sides—to the industrialists and Reichswehr on one hand and to the party on the other hand.

Except for the rise of the party, and the profits, power, and prestige which accrued to the leaders (but not to the ordinary members) of the party, the structure of German society was not drastically changed after 1933. It was still sharply divided into two parts—the rulers and the ruled.

10.2 Ideology

Certain historical eras are timeless in their facility to inspire curiosity and imagination. Ancient Egypt and Rome recall grandeur and power while the Renaissance stands as a marvelous expression of human creativity. Napoleonic France demonstrates that one man's purpose can define an age, and the American Wild West personifies the ruggedness and adventurous spirit of the pioneer generations that conquered a continent. There is much to be learned from milestones of civilization, though people interpret events differently, conforming to their particular beliefs and interests. A comparative newcomer to the chronology of significant epochs is National Socialist Germany. Richly intriguing and not without arousing a sense of awe, she exerted tremendous influence in her time. The antithesis of democratic values in a century witnessing the triumph of democracy, Germany went down fighting. The task of recording the history of the period is therefore largely in the hands of the country's former enemies. One of the flaws in their annals is the superficial assumption that National Socialism was a rootless political program and the product of one man's world view. There was in fact a conscious endeavor by the National Socialists to align policies with German and European customs and practices. They believed their goals corresponded to the natural progression of their continent and found the diametrical Western-democratic concept to be foreign and immoral.

A political creed advocating freedom of choice, democracy ascended not through popular appeal, but through overwhelming economic and military force. This in no sense diminishes its claim to moral leadership in the realm of statecraft. Against somewhat novel democratic beliefs in multiculturalism, majority rule, feminism, universal equality and globalization once stood social and political conventions of Europe that had matured over centuries of conflict and compromise, of contemplation and discovery. The conviction that a nation possesses its own ethos, a collective personality based on related ethnic heritage and not just on language or environment, has no merit in democratic thinking; nor does the belief in a natural ranking within mankind determined by performance. During the first half of the 20th Century, two world wars ultimately imposed democratic governments on European states that had been pursuing a separate way of life. One of the most successful weapons in the arsenal of democracy was atrocity propaganda. It demonized the enemy, motivating Allied armies and promoting their cause abroad. It justified the most ruthless means to destroy him. It defined the struggle as one of good

versus evil, simplifying understanding for the populations of the United States and the British Commonwealth. The atrocities that Allied propagandists attribute to Germany, the backbone of resistance against Western democracy, remain lavishly publicized to this day. Conducted more zealously by the entertainment industry than by historians, this is largely an emotional presentation. The lurid appeal negates for the future a logical, impartial evaluation of political alternatives. This is unfortunate, since comparison is one of life's best tools for learning.

It is a common trait of human nature to often judge the validity of an argument less by what is said than by who is saying it. Casting doubt on the personal integrity of an opponent can be more influential than rational discussion to refute his doctrines. In Adolf Hitler, Germany had a wartime leader whose concept of an authoritarian, socialist state represented a serious challenge to democratic opinion. Indignant that anyone could harbor such views in so enlightened an age, and especially that he could promote them so effectively, contemporary historians provide a myriad of theories for his dissent. Thus we read that Hitler's obsession with black magic and astrology impelled him to start the war, he was mentally deranged due to inbreeding in the family, he was embarrassed by his Jewish ancestry, he was homosexual, he had a dysfunctional childhood, he became frustrated by failing as an artist, he was born with underdeveloped testicles and so forth.

It would be more useful for the authors of such legends to question for example why, after the victorious Allies established democratic governments throughout Europe in 1919, this state form became practically extinct there in 20 years. Russia, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Austria, Germany, Greece, Spain, Slovakia, and soon thereafter France adopted authoritarian regimes. Several of these countries closed ranks with Germany. Hitler gave viable, popular political form to a growing anti-liberal tendency on the continent. Volunteers from over 30 nations enlisted to fight in the German armed forces during World War II. Only by the sword did the Western democracies and their Soviet ally bring them to heel. Surely the motives of such men merit investigation. Simply dismissing the leader who harnessed and directed these dynamic human resources as a demented megalomaniac is no explanation.

During the 1990's, Russian historians gained temporary access to previously classified Soviet war archives. In recent decades, the British government has gradually released long-sealed, relevant papers to the Public Record Office. Their perusal provides a more balanced insight into the causes of the war and the aims of world leaders involved. This study draws on the published research of primarily German historians, minimizing sources in print in English. This is to provide readers in America and in the United Kingdom with material otherwise unavailable to them. Liberally quoting from German periodicals circulated during the Hitler era will acquaint the student of history with essential elements of National Socialist ideology just as it was presented to the German public. No one can accurately judge the actions of a people during a particular epoch without grasping the spirit of the times in which they lived. The goal of this book is to contribute to this understanding.

The Rise of Liberalism

National Socialism was not a spontaneous phenomenon that derailed Germany's evolution and led the country astray. It was a movement anchored deeply in the traditions and heritage of the German people and their fundamental requirements for life. Adolf Hitler gave tangible political expression to ideas nurtured by many of his countrymen that they considered complimentary to their national character. Though his "opposition" party's popular support was mainly a reaction to universal economic distress, Hitler's coming to power was nonetheless a logical consequence of German development. True to the nationalist trend of his age, Hitler promoted Germany's selfsufficiency and independence. His party advocated the sovereignty of nations. This helped place the German realm, or Reich, on a collision course with a diametrical philosophy of life, a world ideology established in Europe and North America for well over a century: liberalism. During Hitler's time, it already exercised considerable influence on Western civilization. It was an ambitious ideal, inspiring followers with an international sense of mission to spread "liberty, equality, and brotherhood" to mankind. National Socialism rejected liberal democracy as repugnant to German morality and to natural order.

Liberalism had been crucial for humanity's transition into the modern age. During medieval times, feudalism had prevailed in Europe. Local lords parceled land to farmers and artisans in exchange for foodstuffs, labor and military service. This fragmented political system, void of central government, gradually succumbed to the authority of kings. Supported by narrow strata of noblesse and clergy, the royals became "absolute monarchs", supposedly ruling by divine right. Common people found little opportunity for advancement. Only those choosing a career with the church received an education. Kingdoms provided the basis for modern central governments but contributed little else to progress. The Revival of Learning, with its interest in surviving literature from the Ancient World, led men to contemplate alternatives to the socially and politically stagnant royal regimens. The Renaissance was Europe's intellectual and cultural rebellion against "absolute monarchy" and its spiritual ally, the clergy. Defying religious superstition and intolerance, the great minds of the age exalted reason above all. Awareness of the common man's latent mental aptitude animated respect for the individual. Liberalism emerged as his liberator from the bondage of absolutism. It defined the state's primary role as guarantor of one's freedom and right to realize full potential in life.

This concept acquired political form during the 18th Century. Discoveries by British and European inventors provided a suitable compliment to the new emphasis on intellect. The American Revolution of 1776 - 1783, waged against the English Crown, founded the first modern state based on liberal principles. It represented a near reversal in the roles of government and governed: The United States Constitution included a Bill of Rights that placed significant limitations on the authority of the elected representatives rather than on the population. In theory the people themselves ruled. The French Revolution introduced democracy to Europe and opened a promising field of opportunity for the common man.

The Declaration of Human Rights guaranteed the French citizen freedom of thought and expression, private ownership and security. The new Republic released the French peasant from bondage and dismantled royal restrictions on commerce. Republican France fought a series of wars against European monarchies. The French army, comprising all strata of society, mirrored the revolutionary spirit that dethroned absolutism. The Republic's minister of war, Nicolas Carnot, held military commanders to standards of conduct toward their subordinates. When the elder General Philippe de Custine once threatened deserters with the firing squad, Carnot rebuked him, explaining that "free citizens of France obey orders not out of fear, but because of confidence in their brothers" in command.

In a 1940 essay, the German historian Bernhard Schwertfeger analyzed the French army: "In the absolutist state structure of the 18th Century, the population customarily regarded grand politics with indifference. The revolution in France drew the people into its vortex. . . . One of the chief principles of the French Revolution was that in case of war everyone had to defend the fatherland. The entire resources of the nation were therefore available in an instant. While wars were previously just private affairs of the princes, now they evolved into a question of survival for the entire nation." Napoleon Bonaparte became emperor of France in 1804, but retained liberal principles adopted by the army. He arranged for soldiers demonstrating leadership qualities to be promoted regardless of birth or status. Since two thirds of France's imperial officers had left service from the time of the revolution, positions of command became open to men displaying ability. Napoleon granted field officers greater latitude in judgment calls during combat.

In October 1806, the French citizens' army routed Germany's elite, the Prussian and Saxon armies, at Jena and Auerstadt. The Prussian infantry was disciplined and obedient with a defined command structure, while Napoleon made tactical decisions as the fighting developed and relied on the initiative of subordinates to outmaneuver the enemy as opportunities arose. At Auerstadt, the German frontline troops resisted bravely for hours, while 18,000 reserves stood idly by because there were no orders from the commander-in-chief, the Duke of Brunswick, to advance. None of their officers displayed independent judgment and led the men forward. Witnessing the German defeat was the infantry Captain Neidhard von Gneisenau. His recommendations for reforming the Prussian army, summarized the following July, maintained that not superior strategy, but a new philosophy of life was the genesis of the enemy's success: "The revolution has awakened all the power of the nation and given each an appropriate field of endeavor. In this way heroes came to lead the army, statesmen the loftiest administrative posts, and finally at the head of a great people the greatest man among them. What limitless power lies undeveloped and unused within the womb of a nation! . . . Why do the nobles not choose this source to increase their power a thousand-fold, and open the portal of triumph for the ordinary citizen, the portal through which now only the nobility may pass? The new age needs more than ancient names, titles, and parchment. It needs fresh deeds and vitality!"

Gneisenau defined how to overcome France's control of Europe: "Should the other states

want to restore the balance, they must open the same resources and utilize them. They must embrace the consequences of the revolution as their own." At the Treaty of Tilsit, Bonaparte had allowed the Prussian king to maintain just 42,000 men under arms. This drastically reduced the number of active officers; of 143 generals only eight remained in service. Gneisenau and General Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst restructured the armed service free from the interference of a professional military hierarchy. Local militias became the nucleus of a national army. The broad participation of the public unavoidably began shifting political power from the monarchy to the people. As the king reviewed the first militia battalions, he remarked, "There below marches the revolution." At this time, German patriots such as Freiherr von Stein, Ernst Moritz Arndt and Gottfried Fichte promoted civil reform, partially adopting liberal values. A populist revolutionary movement led to the Prussian- German uprising against Napoleon and drove the French out. Unlike France in 1789, the Germans, not consolidated under a central government, did not revolt against the royal house. The German patriots advocated unity among their countrymen. The goal was to reform and not overthrow the existing order. Thus, after a limited revolution in 1848, Germany evolved into a constitutional monarchy.

German reforms were, of course, a necessity. A foreign invader had conquered and partially occupied the country. Napoleon had ruthlessly drained Prussia of resources; three out of four children born in Berlin under French rule died of malnourishment. The failure of the aristocracy to defend the land revealed the need for a revised state form, and German thinkers recognized the role that the population must now play as a decisive military and political factor. They acknowledged the potential of the individual. Maintaining faith in state authority, however, the Germans did not envision government purely as the people's servant. Liberalism nonetheless became popular in Germany during the 19th Century. It eclipsed the influence of the German intellectual movement, which groped for a balance between freedom and authority. This latent force became a cornerstone of Hitler's ideology in the time to come.

Democracy

As Europe lost confidence in the feudal-monarchical system that had ruled for centuries, liberalism offered a political alternative. Its great legacy was making people conscious of their individual human rights, regardless of birth, and their right to representation in government. To many, the democratic concept became synonymous with liberty itself. Hitler gained power in Germany in 1933 through constitutional means, yet campaigned to eradicate democracy. The National Socialists interpreted individual freedom differently, in a way which they argued was more realistic for Germany's circumstances. National Socialist propagandists publicly acknowledged the contribution of liberalism. Writing in *Die SA* (The S.A.), the weekly magazine of the party's storm troops, Dr. Theo Rehm cited liberalism's decisive role in leading Germany into the modern age: "Thanks to the triumph of liberal thinking, the middle class and other social strata experienced a major

spiritual and economic impetus. Many valuable elements that would otherwise have lain fallow and undiscovered were unleashed to the benefit of all and put into action. It should also not be forgotten that after the wars of liberation (against Napoleon), the best representatives of German liberalism stood at the vanguard of the struggle for Germany's unity against the interests of the egocentric princely dynasties."

Rehm nevertheless condemned the basic premise of liberalism: "The absolute freedom of liberalism will ultimately jeopardize the benefits of community life for people in a state. Attempting to place the individual ahead of the nation is wrong. . . . For the individual to live, the nation first must itself live; this requires that one cannot do what he wants, but must align himself with the common interests of the people and accordingly accept limitations and sacrifices."

Hitler advocated an organic state form. Like a biological organism, the government organizes society so that every component performs an individual function for the common good. No single stratum elevates itself to the detriment of the others. The organism prospers as an entity. In this way, so does each individual person or class. Society works in harmony, healthy and strongly unified against external influences or intrusion. As defined in the periodical *Germanisches Leitheft* (Germanic Guidelines), "Every individual element within the Reich preserves its independent character, yet nonetheless subordinates itself to its role in the community." In Hitler's words from a November 1930 speech, "Proper is what serves the entire community and not the individual.... The whole is paramount, is essential. Only through it does the individual receive his share in life, and when his share defies the laws of the entity, then human reason dictates that the interest of the whole must precede his interests."

To organize persons into a cooperative, functional society requires that its members renounce certain personal ambitions for the welfare of others. Mutual concessions signify a willingness to work together. The common goals of society, such as defense, trade, prosperity, companionship, and securing nourishment, people achieve through compromise for the good of all. Hitler believed that a nation disregarding this will not survive. He declared in an address in April 1937, "This state came into being, and all states come into being, through overcoming interests of pure personal will and individual selfishness. Democracy steers recklessly toward placing the individual in the center of everything. In the long run, it is impossible to escape the crisis such a conflict will produce." In *Die SA*, Rehm warned that without controls, the free reign of personal ambition leads to abuse: "In as much as liberalism was once of service in promoting the value of individual initiative and qualities of leadership, its ideals of freedom and personality have degenerated into the concept of downright arbitrary conduct in personal life, but even more so in economic and commercial life."

An article in the May 1937 *Der Schulungsbrief* (Instructional Essays), a monthly ideological journal, discussed liberalism's naive faith in "the natural goodness of the free personality." The author, Eberhard Kautter, explained the logic of how this applies to business life in a democracy: "Liberalism assumes that one must simply leave economic

arrangements to the individual active in commerce as he pursues his interests undisturbed.... The liberal social principle is based on the expectation that the liberation of the individual, in harmony with the free play of forces, will lead to independently formed and fair economic conditions and social order." The German Institute for the Science of Labor concluded in its 1940/41 yearbook that liberal economic policies bring about "the destruction of any orderly society," since persons in commerce "are released from every political and social responsibility." Germanisches Leitheft saw in the free play of forces an unbridled pursuit of personal wealth that contradicts the spirit of an organized society: "There is no longer a sacred moral bonding of the individual person to a community, and no bond of person to person through honor or personal trust. There is no mutual connection or relationship among them beyond purely material, self-seeking interests; that is, acquiring money." The journalist Giselher Wirsing cited the United States, the paragon of capitalist free enterprise, as an example of how liberal economic policies gradually create social imbalance with crass discrepancies between want and abundance: "Even in America herself, Americanism no longer spreads prosperity and improves the standard of living of the broad masses, but only maintains the lifestyle of the privileged upper class." German study on the depression-era United States, *Was will Roosevelt? (What Does Roosevelt Want?)*, added this: "So in the USA, one finds along with dazzling displays of wealth in extravagant, parvenu luxury, unimaginable poverty and social depravity. ... In the richest country in the world, the vaunted paradise of democracy, tens of thousands of American families endure the most meager existence. Millions of children and other citizens are underfed."

As for the parliamentary system of representative government, the same publication condemned it as follows: "The demand of the people to participate in government was justifiable and understandable in the new age, when politics was no longer purely an affair of the ruling dynasties. The damaging influence and weakness of the parliamentary form of government soon became apparent. . . . The participation of the people exists only on paper. In reality, career politicians get regularly elected to parliament through various parties they founded. They have made a novel occupation out of this activity. They focus not on the welfare of the people and of the state, but on their personal interests or certain financial circles standing behind them."

Hitler argued that the absence of sufficient state controls in a democracy enables the wealthy class to manipulate the economy, the press and elected representatives for its own gain. A widening gulf between poverty and affluence develops, gradually dragging the working class to ruin. Addressing Berlin armaments workers in December 1940, he claimed that the public's voice in democratic systems is an illusion: "In these countries, money in fact rules. That ultimately means a group of a few hundred persons who possess enormous fortunes. As a result of the singular construction of the state, this group is more or less totally independent and free.... Free enterprise this group understands as the freedom not only to amass capital, but especially to use it freely; that is, free from state or national supervision. (Note: The fight against these few, super rich capitalists

is the real reason why National Socialism is so utterly condemned to this day.)

"So one might imagine that in these countries of freedom and wealth, unheard-of public prosperity exists. ... On the contrary, in those countries class distinctions are the most crass one could think of: unimaginable poverty on one hand and equally unimaginable riches on the other. These are the lands that control the treasures of the earth, and their workers live in miserable dumps. ... In these lands of so-called democracy, the people are never the primary consideration. Paramount is the existence of those few who pull the strings in a democracy, the several hundred major capitalists. The broad masses don't interest them in the least, except during elections."

Die SA discussed another fault of parliamentary systems particularly irksome to Hitler: "There is practically no responsibility in a democracy. The anonymity of the majority of the moment decides. Government ministers are subject to it, but there is no opportunity to hold this majority responsible. As a result, the door is open to political carelessness and negligence, to corruption and fiscal mismanagement. The history of democracies mostly represents a history of scandals." According to *Was will Roosevelt?*, "Corruption has spread so much that...no American citizen gets upset anymore over incidents of shameless corruption in civil service, because mismanagement is regarded as a natural phenomenon of government." Hitler once recalled how a visit in his youth to the Austrian parliament revealed "the obvious lack of responsibility in a single person." *Germanisches Leitheft* stated, "Absence of responsibility is the most striking indication of a lack of morality."

Democracy failed because it was a product of liberalism. Focus on the individual led to "self-idolatry and renunciation of the community, the unraveling of healthy, orderly natural life," according to the German army brochure *Wofuer kaempfen wir?* (What do we fight for?). "The inordinate value placed on material possessions from the economic standpoint formed social classes and fractured the community. Not those of good character enjoyed greater respect, but the rich. . . . Labor no longer served as a means to elevate the worth of the community, but purely one's own interests. Commerce developed independently of the people and the state, into an entity whose only purpose was to pile up fortunes." The periodical *NS Briefe* (NS Essays) summarized, "Freedom cannot be made identical to arbitrariness, lack of restraint and egoistic inconsideration."

Hitler regarded liberalism's de-emphasis on communal responsibility as an obstacle to national unity. He endorsed the words of the statesman Niccolo Machiavelli: "It is not the well-being of the individual, but the well-being of all that makes us great." Hitler took the rein of government in hand in a liberal political climate. To overcome the liberal ideal, which for many was freedom personified, he introduced an alternative state form. It created opportunities for self-development, but also instructed Germans in obedience. In so doing, Hitler eventually achieved the parity between individual liberty and state authority long contemplated by the German intellectual movement of the previous century.

The Authoritarian State

The National Socialists described their government as an authoritarian state. This was roughly a compromise between the liberal concept that administrations exist to serve the public, and absolutism's doctrine granting the head of state supreme authority to make political decisions. It disallowed the majority's voice in government, but promoted the welfare of diverse social and economic groups evenly. Die SA offered this definition of the authoritarian state: "It rests in the hands of the leader alone. He forms and directs his cabinet which makes policy decisions. But he also bears sole accountability to the nation for his actions. The diverse interests of individual strata of society he brings into harmony and balances in conformity with the general interests of the people. This is accomplished through the endeavors of representatives who work within their group's respective occupations, but possess no political authority. In this way, conflicts of interest and class struggle are eliminated, as is unilateral control by any commercial or political special interest group."

In 1936, Hitler stressed that "a regime must be independent of such special interests. It must keep focused on the interests of everyone before the interests of one." With respect to commerce, he announced that he intended "to crush the illusion that the economy in a state can conduct an unbridled, uncontrollable, and unsupervised life of its own." As Fuhrer, or leader of the nation, he reserved the right to take whatever action he considered appropriate. During a wartime speech he told military personnel, "When I recognize a concept as correct, I not only have the duty to convey this to my fellow citizens, but moreover the duty to eliminate contrary interpretations."

Under National Socialism, the head of state wielded supreme power. This was with the understanding that there would be no favoritism directing public affairs, and that "along with the loftiest unlimited authority, the leader bears the final, heaviest responsibility," as stated in NS Briefe. Rehm offered this explanation in Die SA: "This system differs from dictatorship in that the appointed leader accepts responsibility before the people and is sustained by the confidence of the nation. . . . His actions insure that the leadership of the state is in harmony with the overall interests of the nation and its views. The essence of this system is overcoming party differences, formation of a genuine national community, and the unsurpassed greatness of the leadership as prerequisites. The leader of the authoritarian state personifies the principle of Friedrich the Great: I am the first servant of the state." Dr. Joseph Goebbels, in charge of propaganda in Hitler's cabinet, contrasted democracy with the authoritarian state in a speech to foreign journalists in Geneva in September 1933: "The people and the government in Germany are one. The will of the people is the will of the government and vice versa. The modern state form in Germany is a refined type of democracy, governed by authoritarian principles through the power of the people's mandate. There is no possibility that through parliamentary fluctuations, the will of the people can somehow be swept aside or rendered unproductive. . . . The principle of democracy is completely misunderstood if one concludes from it

that nations want to govern themselves. They can't do it nor do they want to. Their only wish is that the regime governs well."

The authoritarian state form required that only persons exhibiting natural leadership ability assume positions of responsibility. Hitler spoke of the importance of finding such individuals during a speech in Berlin in February 1933: "We want to re-establish the value of personality as an eternal priority; that is, the creative genius of the individual. In this way, we want to sever ties with any appearance of a listless democracy. We want to replace it with the timeless awareness that everything great can only spring from the force of the individual personality, and that everything destined to last must again be entrusted to the abilities of the individual personality."

National Socialism adopted liberalism's practice of creating opportunities for advancement for persons in the community. It disputed however, the population's right and ability to select leaders. Democracy allows the voters to choose their representatives. As a safeguard against tyrants, the parliamentary system favors moderation. It supposedly frowns on assertive persons accustomed to independent initiative. Hitler argued that this practice "thwarts the freedom of action and creative possibilities of the personality and shackles any talent for leadership." He later wrote that the "true leader will distance himself from political activity that does not consist for the most part of creative achievement and industriousness." Conversely, "timid do-nothings and blabbermouths," especially those fearing decision-making and accountability, will seek office:³⁸ "Democracy is the mortal enemy of all talent."

When Goebbels announced at the 1933 Berlin radio exhibition that Hitler's revolution has "dethroned unbridled individualism," this did not imply curtailing freedom for personal development. Hitler clarified his party's position in a January 1941 address: "Our ideal is the nation. In it we behold a mental and physical community which providence created and therefore wanted, which we belong to. Through it alone we can control our existence. ... It represents a triumph over individualism, but not in the sense that individual aptitude is stifled or the initiative of the individual is paralyzed; only in the sense that common interests stand above individual freedom and all individual initiative." The National Socialist government assigned German schools to train the country's cadre of future leaders. *Der Schulungsbrief* defined it in this way: "Education receives the twofold task of molding strong personalities and committing them to community thinking. The primary objective of ideological instruction is formation of a solid, community-oriented viewpoint. Building assertive personalities demands steady competitive performance, selecting the most accomplished, and setting standards of achievement according to questions of character, will and ability. Only achievement justifies advancement." Opportunities for self-development in the authoritarian state conformed to the National Socialist concept of individual freedom: "Being free is not doing what you want, but becoming what you are supposed to be."

Socialism

There is considerable difference in the socialism of Hitler and that of Marxist doctrine. Die SA explained that the objective of a socialist state is "not the greatest possible good fortune of the individual or a particular party, but the welfare of the whole community." Marx's purely economic socialism "stands against private property... and private ownership." Marx saw socialism as international, unifying the world's working class people who were social pariahs in their own country. He therefore considered nationalism, advocating the interests and independence of one's own nation, incompatible with socialist ideals. Die SA argued that since socialism really stands for collective welfare, "Marxist socialism divides the people and in this way buries any prerequisite for achieving genuine socialist goals." Hitler saw nationalism as a patriotic motive to place the good of one's country before personal ambition. Socialism was a political, social and economic system that demanded the same subordination of self-interest for the benefit of the community. As Hitler said in 1927, "Socialism and nationalism are the great fighters for one's own kind, are the hardest fighters in the struggle for survival on this earth. Therefore they are no longer battle cries against one another." Die SA summarized, "Marxism makes the distinction of haves and have-nots. It demands the destruction of the former in order to bring all property into possession of the public. National Socialism places the concept of the national community in the foreground. . . . The collective welfare of a people is not achieved through superficially equal distribution of all possessions, but by accepting the principle that before the interests of the individual stand those of the nation."

It should be noted that in the Soviet Union, the flagship Marxist state, the regime dealt with the non-proletariat far more harshly than what downtrodden labor suffered during the Industrial Revolution in Western countries. The Soviet police official Martyn Latsis for example, defined the criteria for trials of dissidents: "Don't seek proof of whether or not he rose against the Soviet with weapon or word. You must first ask him what class he belongs to, what extraction he is, what education and what occupation he has. These questions should decide the fate of the accused." The Russian historian Dimitri Volkogonov wrote that Soviet purges targeted "the most energetic, most capable, frugal and imaginative" elements in society. Systematic mass starvation, imprisonment, deportation, and execution in the Marxist utopia so decimated the Russian population that the Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, forbade the 1937 census from being published. Der Schulungsbrief stated in a 1942 issue, "The senseless extermination of all intelligence and talent, replacing every impulse of personality with passive herd mentality, has wiped out any natural creative aptitude" in Russia.

Hitler regarded Marxist economic policy as no less repugnant to genuine socialism as the concept of class warfare was. Marx advocated deprivatizing all production and property. State control would supposedly insure equitable distribution of manufactured goods and foodstuffs, and protect the population from capitalist exploitation. Hitler advocated private ownership and free enterprise. He believed that competition and opportunities for

personal development encourage individual initiative. He said in 1934, "on one hand, the free play of forces must be guaranteed as broad a field of endeavor as possible. On the other, it should be stressed that this free play of forces must remain for the person within the framework of communal goals, which we refer to as the people and the national community. Only in this way can we attain ... the highest level of human achievement and human productivity."

Der Schulungsbrief dismissed Marx's disparate clamor for equitable shares in national assets and equal pay for all work as stifling to personal motivation: "The man capable of greater achievement had no interest in realizing his full potential, when he saw that the lazy man sitting next to him received just as much as he himself. . . . Any initiative to do more and willingness to accept responsibility could only die out under this system."

Well before taking power, Hitler combated a tendency toward Marxist socialism in his own movement. In November 1925, district party leaders in Hannover proposed dividing large farms and distributing the land among farmhands. The state would require everyone employed in the agrarian economy to join a cooperative. Independent sale of foodstuffs would be illegal. "Critical industries" such as power companies, banks and armaments manufacturers were to yield 51 percent of the shares as "property of the nation," in other words become state controlled. The program also recommended that the government acquire 49 percent of other large business enterprises. In May 1930, Hitler met with a Berlin subordinate, Otto Strasser, who supported a similar program. Hitler told him his ideas were "pure Marxism" and would wreck the entire economy.⁷³ He bounced Strasser out of the party that July, underscoring his intolerance of Marxist socialism. Hitler considered the opportunity to acquire wealth and property an incentive for "eternal, enterprising personal initiative." Enabling talented individuals to realize their full potential in life also elevated the society they belong to and serve.

Nationalism

A definitive characteristic of National Socialism was its rejection of foreign beliefs, customs and ideas within the German community. It holds that a nation consists of its blood and soil: an ethnically homogenous people and the land they cultivate, the domain that provides shelter, refuge and nourishment from the soil where their ancestors lie buried. Through self-development will a people realize their potential; through awareness of their intrinsic identity will generations fulfill the role nature and providence intended. The NSDAP held that every nation exhibits a collective personality. The influence of foreign peoples whose life experience, environment and ancestry formed them differently will debauch the nation and is hence immoral. Leers saw the introduction of liberalism and Marxism to Germany during the 19th Century as "threatening to destroy our own values.... The history of the German people is a centuries-long struggle against spiritual foreign penetration into the realms of politics, law, tradition and our way of life, a struggle against the destruction of our race and perversion of our souls."

The trend toward German independence of custom and spirit became more tangible in the 18th Century. It contributed to the wave of nationalism prevalent in the new German Reich founded in 1871. Rediscovered in the 15th Century, publication of the long-lost *Germania* (completed in 98 A.D. by the Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus) had already provided Germans with details of their ancestors. Tacitus had written, "The peoples of Germania have never contaminated themselves by intermarriage with foreigners but remain of pure blood, distinct and unlike any other nation." He praised Rome's ancient adversary for the men's prowess and courage in battle, the women's virtue, and strong family values: "Good morality is more effective in Germania than good laws are elsewhere."

The writings of Tacitus, together with those of other Roman historians, provide accounts of the empire's unsuccessful bid to conquer Germania. The details are worth summarizing here, because of their contribution to the surge of German nationalism in the 19th Century and their significance for National Socialist ideology. Slowly advancing into German territory, the Romans established commerce, built towns and concluded tribal alliances. Many indigenous inhabitants traded with them or joined their army as auxiliaries. Rome also garrisoned troops, enacted laws and levied taxes. Aware of its military superiority, the Roman Empire was not prone to compromise. Decades earlier in neighboring Gaul, the Celtic princes had offered armed resistance to Roman rule. The Roman general Julius Caesar mercilessly crushed Gaul, killing or enslaving a third of the population.

Arminius (also known as Hermann), the son of a chieftain in the Cheruskan clan, led several large Germanic tribes in 9 A.D. to fight the Romans. A loosely unified nation of some three million farmers faced a seasoned, well-equipped army supported by the resources of an empire encompassing 60 million inhabitants. Arminius appealed to the various tribes to rise against the foreign laws, taxes, garrisons and settlements gradually spreading across their land. Assailing the summer encampment of the Roman governor Quintilius Varus, presumably at the site of the modern German city of Horn, the Cheruskans and their allies annihilated three Roman legions. A Roman general, Drusus Germanicus, launched punitive expeditions in 15 A.D. and again the following year. He told his army of over 80,000 men, "This war will not be over until the entire German nation is exterminated." The legions vengefully massacred numerous village populations en route, but were unable to capture Arminius. Early in each of the two campaign seasons, Germanicus withdrew his forces completely after a pitched battle with the Germans, a circumstance discreetly understated by Tacitus.

The Roman emperor Tiberius called off the invasion in 16 A.D. "Heavy losses in combat during 15 and 16 A.D. broke the Roman will to invade and conquer. Stopped in their tracks, the Romans from then on assumed the defensive." This spared Germany the Latin influence that helped shape the civilizations of Italy, Spain, France, Britain, the Balkans, and the Near East. To 19th Century nationalists, Arminius was the "first German." He saw beyond the local rivalries that made his people vulnerable to foreign domination. He unified the German tribes in a war of liberation that preserved his country's independence

for centuries. His life became symbolic of national solidarity and resistance to foreign values. In the opinion of the National Socialists, a Roman conquest of Germania would have corrupted the German people for all time. Johannes von Leers cited the "morally destructive influence ... the habitual lying, swindles, calculated cruelty, treachery, duplicity, and inward insincerity of the sick, mixed race that wanted to rule the Germanic peoples." Arminius rescued Germany from the fate of Gaul, as *Germanisches Leitheft* maintained: "Thanks to the deeds of the Cheruskan prince Hermann . . . the heartland of Germania was preserved from being sucked into the racially chaotic vortex of the crumbling Roman Empire."

Well before the 20th Century, the story of Arminius had inspired Germans with a sense of national unity and independence. It remained popular under Hitler's rule, though not accorded as much attention as the wars of liberation against Napoleon. These two events became pillars of National Socialism's stand against foreign influence, be it military aggression or of an ideological nature. France's liberalism, by virtue of its international character, was still a menace. "What makes the French Revolution significant for Germany," wrote Ganzer in *Der Schulungsbrief*, "is the fact that it advanced as a movement with a mission. It claimed the right to make demands for all humanity. ... It presented the 'citizen of the world' concept as binding for all nations and every race." Ganzer added that French liberalism "no longer acknowledges as valid the realities of natural origins, ethnic harmony and racial differences."

Certain arrangements of an international character were acceptable from the National Socialist viewpoint. Commerce, sports competitions like the Olympics, and humanitarian institutions such as Christian charities or the Red Cross foster good will among civilized nations. Internationalism was another matter, *Die SA* explained, if "connected with specific political objectives which ultimately sever the inner bond of a person to his people, in favor of a belief in universal humanity and commitment to so-called universal humanitarian goals to the detriment of service to one's own nation. . . . The objective of political internationalism is not the establishment of peaceful relations among nations, but undermining national vitality and the inner cohesion of a people." The NSDAP capitalized on the strong nationalist current that took shape during the previous century and was common among the Great Powers at that time. The party appealed to pride in German heritage and pointed out the benefits of the country's unmolested, natural historic development. These ideas were chauvinistic but politically expedient as well; Marxism was a genuine threat to German freedom. Promoting nationalism was an effective counterweight to this destructive foreign influence.

Racial Hygiene

A fundamental principle of liberalism and Marxism is the belief in universal equality of mankind. It challenged the bastion of absolutism, which had held that a superior privileged class was ordained to rule. It established a moral and legal foundation for individual

freedom and parliament. The dictum of America's Declaration of Independence, that "all men are created equal," underscored a political demand for representative government. The French Revolution interpreted universal equality in a biological sense as well. It maintained that "all who bear the human countenance" possess comparable natural ability regardless of physical dissimilitude, gender or historic performance. Scientists and historians disputed this view long before Hitler's time. The 19th Century English naturalist, Charles Darwin, theorized natural selection and evolution based on the study of animals and fossils. He concluded that species develop unequally, and that nature strives for improvement by favoring reproduction of those exhibiting superior traits and eliminating the unfit. Francis Galton researched the human personality, deducing that intellectual prowess and morality are inherited from parents. He advocated marriages among talented people, believing superior offspring important to advance civilization.

The French aristocrats Arthur de Gobineau and Georges Vacher questioned universal equality from a historical perspective. Gobineau identified a correlation between the growth and vitality of cultures and the races that founded them. Both men argued that ancient civilizations like Persia and India gradually crumbled as the original white populations intermarried with captive or neighboring non-white tribes. Published in 1899, Houston Steward Chamberlain's *The Foundations of the 19th Century* attributes all great cultures to the creativity of Germanic peoples. German language editions of Gobineau's and Chamberlain's writing appeared in Germany at the turn of the century. Newly formed institutions there challenged the liberal doctrine of equality on scientific and historical grounds. Similar movements came to life in Scandinavia and in Italy, where Paolo Mantegazza and Giuseppe Sergi founded academies for anthropology and race studies. Eugenics, Galton's term for the biological investigation of inheritable traits in human lineage, became racial hygiene in Germany. European universities excluded these studies from the curriculum. Racial hygiene nonetheless acquired some legitimacy early in 20th Century. Grounded in the theories of Darwin and Galton, its proponents offered cogent arguments, based on research and analysis, to establish it as a valid science. In a 1925 study, Professor Hans Gunther acknowledged that 19th Century education helped lower class individuals advance vocationally and socially. However, the more successful among them had fewer children and "this drained away more vitality than it fostered." According to Gunther, this contradicted the main priority for a healthy society: "The progress of humanity ... is only possible through augmenting the higher-quality genetic traits, which means having a greater number of children among the superior and stopping propagation of the unfit."

The study of race received public funding in Nationalist Socialist Germany. The NSDAP founded the Racial Policy Office in November 1933. Its director, Dr. Walter Gross, published articles on the subject in the monthly *Der Schulungsbrief*. This journal was an important medium for ideological propaganda, with a circulation of several million. In April 1934, Gross pointed out, "scientific literature in a democracy . . . understands a nation purely as a community unified by language and culture, disregarding blood ties."

His interpretation of the rise and fall of nations reveals how closely National Socialist doctrine conformed to the principles of Gobineau, Chamberlain and Gunther: "The old civilized states owe their existence to the Aryan man of Nordic blood who created them along with their cultures. When he encountered natives in a foreign land, he did not intermix but subjugated them. He placed those of his own kind over them as a ruling caste. "Everything the ancient peoples produced of value and accomplished came from this stratum of Nordic conqueror. Their greatness lasted only so long as the Nordic blood that created it was strong and influential enough. As soon as the pure strain and sense of awareness of differences among races became lost, as soon as the foreign blood intermingled, so began the decay of the civilizations and states. . . . The influx of foreign blood undermines traditions, religion, good character and morality."

The Racial Policy Office cited three biological factors which cause cultures to perish. The first was a decline in birthrate. This "weakens the national strength in the face of a somewhat stronger growing neighbor. It shifts the proportionate power of the two peoples so that the numerically weaker, despite potential inner superiority, will eventually be overwhelmed." A 1937 article in *Der Schulungsbrief* observed, "today, the birthrate among practically all nations of the white race is declining perilously swiftly." The second factor was a decrease in births among society's more talented elements, versus a parallel increase in children from families exhibiting "mediocre or below average ability, character, or physical and mental endowment." One author blamed the policy in many democracies of "maintaining the weak and ignoring development of the strong" on the liberal perception that everything human is "unconditionally worth preserving." *Der Schulungsbrief* pointed out how regarding education in democratic states, the liberal administrator "groups the mentally deficient into small classes in special schools staffed by exceptionally proficient teachers. He then jams 50 to 60 talented and healthy youngsters together into classrooms that are too small due to budgetary constraints, and instructs them only in the basics."

Largely influenced by mankind's more benevolent religions, sympathy for the weak or helpless has become a natural human emotion. Gross countered this with scientific arguments: "Decisive for the historic fate of a people is whether over the centuries, bloodlines of the loftiest and most gifted elements increase in number and in so doing elevate the nation, or ... in their place those bloodlines augment that are genetically inferior and unfit. . . . The result will be that the outstanding talent will gradually disappear, while the less worthwhile will become dominant. Sooner or later that means the inevitable downfall of the civilization." The third factor leading to the fall of cultures addressed intermarriage with foreign races. This causes a drop in the birthrate among the people who founded the civilization and a corresponding rise in that of society's less creative elements from cross-breeding: "The resulting group of intermixed types and bastards lacks what alone brings enduring vitality to the comparatively pure-blooded ethnic community: the harmony of body and soul, of spirit and character in every person." Dr. Theodor Artz listed the "ABC's" of National Socialist policy: "Bringing forth sufficient numbers of offspring, stifling procreation of the inferior, and preventing the assimilation

of racially foreign elements." What constitutes "racially foreign elements" was a matter of controversy within the NSDAP. Various ethnic groups comprise European civilization: Nordic, Gallic, Basque, Slavic, Baltic, Mediterranean and so forth. Pioneer racial hygienists maintained that intermarriage among diverse white clans produces a superior being. In 1924, the analyst Hildebrandt published an essay explaining, "The highest standard of living evolved where the Nordic race represented the leadership, but intermixed with others who adopted its culture." Hans Gunther wrote, "The French anatomist and race researcher de Quatresages observed in 1857 that the greatest mental and physical activity rests not among those of pure race, but among racially cross-bred populations."

Gunther argued that just as competition can motivate people, the merger of different bloodlines creates a conflict within the psyche of the individual or population itself, animating a hitherto latent zest for struggle: "Stress, confrontation, and the urge to prevail produce the greatest achievements of mind and spirit. There is more potential for tension and altercation in the racially intermixed person than is the case for a pure-blooded one....The pure-blooded man harbors too little restlessness. Germans, Englishmen, or non-Scandinavians in general are struck by the 'all too placid demeanor' of many purely Nordic Scandinavians."

Under Gross, the Racial Policy Office walked a thin line between the more relaxed criteria envisioned by Gunther and many of his contemporaries, and the "blond rapture" they cautioned against. In 1934, Gross' colleague, Wolfgang Abel, published generalizations of Germany's ethnic tribes: the Nordic, Pflazish, Eastern Baltic, Dinaric, Alpine, Western Nordic, and Western Mediterranean. He described physical characteristics, illustrated with camera portraits resembling mug shots, and collective personality traits of each. Abel offered for example, this profile of the Nordic type: "The least spontaneous, he surpasses all other races in steadfastness of purpose and cautious foresight. Thinking ahead, he subordinates his driving impulses to long-range goals. Self-composure is perhaps the most distinguishable trait of the Nordic race. In this lies a significant part of the ability to create civilizations. Races lacking this quality are incapable of following through and implementing long-term Pflaz Germans were "more steadfast than pliant, more grounded than adaptable, more level-headed than daring, more freedom-loving than power seeking." The Western Mediterranean German "takes life less seriously. Empty formula courtesies and insincere gestures play a major role, such as promising gifts and extending invitations he doesn't really expect people to accept. His inclination toward truthfulness and ethics is weaker than the Nordic person's." Hitler disapproved of such comparisons. He especially opposed reference to physical contrasts of stature, coloring, or physiognomy among German ethnic groups. In 1930 he told an aid, "Discussions about the race problem will only divide the German people further, incite them against one another, atomize them, and in this way make them inconsequential with respect to foreign affairs." He admonished senior officials of the party to avoid the subject of ethnic diversity in speeches and articles: "Everything that unifies and welds the classes together must be brought forth, what divides them, what re-animates old prejudices, must be avoided. . .

.They are the surest way to destroy a community.” He remarked that people should be selected for leadership roles “not according to outward appearance, but by demonstrating inward ability.” Goebbels, himself a diminutive man with a slight limp, recorded in his diary in October 1937, “Discussed race policy with Dr. Gross. I reproached him for our flawed standards for making selections. According to them, practically every officer today would be dismissed.”

Like the earlier race hygienist Gunther, Hitler believed that the more capable and fit among the Germans should not set themselves above other groups to preserve or advance their particular bloodline. It was their duty to help elevate the German nation as an entity. As summarized by his chronicler Dr. Henry Picker, Hitler was “firmly resolved to transfer racially excellent military units, such as formations of the Waffen SS, to every region where the indigenous people are substandard. They will provide for the population by replenishing its bloodlines.” (The Waffen SS was an elite branch of the German military requiring high physical standards for enrollment.) forming or elitist attitudes among his countrymen’s more gifted persons or ethnic groups. He measured people not by what nature gave them, but by how they contributed their talents, be they lofty or modest, to advance the national community. This was a standard every German could aspire to, regardless of his or her station in society. Personal attitude and endeavor, not the circumstances of birth, determine the superior being.

In a speech as chancellor of Germany, Hitler described the evolution of his country into a social, national, and spiritual entity: “The German people came into being no differently than almost every truly creative civilized nation we know of in the world. A numerically small, talented race, capable of organizing and creating civilization, established itself over other peoples in the course of many centuries. It in part absorbed them, in part adapted to them. All members of our people have of course contributed their special talents to this union. It was, however, created by a nation-and-state forming elite alone. This race imposed its language, naturally not without borrowing from those it subjugated. And all shared a common fate for so long, that the life of the people directing the affairs of state became inseparably bound to the life of the gradually assimilating other members. All the while, conqueror and conquered had long become a community. This is our German people of today. . . . Our only wish is that all members contribute their best to the prosperity of our national life. As long as every element gives what it has to give, this element in so doing will help benefit all our lives.”

Racism versus Marxism

The NSDAP also perceived racial hygiene as a political controversy. Der Schulungsbrief pointed out that National Socialism “is the first ideology in history to consciously incorporate the laws of nature and apply their wisdom and efficiency to mankind.”¹⁰⁸ Germanisches Leitheft contended that emphasis on race is the “antithesis of the western perception, especially former France. It was there that the grand revolution proclaimed

the equality of all who bear the human countenance. . . . Intermixing of human types was a main thrust of French democracy." The revolution of 1789, the periodical noted, was a poor example for such an altruistic ideal: "The revolution became a power struggle among ambitious party leaders. This no longer led toward a new order, but climaxed in the elimination of those public representatives still conscious of their responsibility to the people. . . . The so-called reign of terror began. It depopulated entire towns and districts. 'Death to the blondes' was the battle cry."

The National Socialists viewed Marxism as the political descendant of revolutionary France. It leveled humanity off to a "faceless mass" by destroying society's more talented, productive elements.¹¹⁰ According to *Der Schulungsbrief*, "Marxism is a radicalized variant of liberalism strongly rooted in the brutality of the French Revolution."¹¹¹ The journal *Volk und Reich* (Nation and Realm) wrote, "The Bolshevik revolution regards itself as the legitimate successor to the French."¹¹² Brutality was indeed an element common to both France's Reign of Terror and Bolshevik Russia. The first Soviet dictator, Nicolai Lenin, became the only member of the original Politburo, the governing council, to die a natural death. Stalin proclaimed a "war on terror" in December 1934, personally writing a new law imposing a death sentence for "acts of terrorism" and leading to massive executions for several years. In 1937, the Soviet state carried out 353,074 death sentences, the following year 328,618.¹¹³ Houston Stewart Chamberlain described Russia's Bolshevik regime as under "the influence of the French revolutionary ideal, which in the course of a century, turned decent people into half-beasts filled with envy and loathing."

Goebbels described the rise of the NSDAP as "one continuous confrontation with the problem of Marxism." The ideologies were at loggerheads regarding questions of the significance of race. The German study *Der bolschewistische Weltbetrug* (*The Bolshevik World Swindle*) provides this comparison: "The National Socialist world view interprets the nation racially, as a national community grounded in common historical blood ties of its people as determined by fate. The primary conviction of Marxist ideology is the class concept defining those with possessions and those who possess nothing. This class concept is bound neither by nationality nor by race. It stands like a dividing wall between people of the same nation. At the same time, it joins as brothers persons of the most diverse racial types. 'society is dividing into two immense, diametrical, hostile camps, bourgeois and proletariat,' declared the Communist Manifesto.... Adolf Hitler's judgment runs a different course. It desires the unity of naturally related people, the removal of class distinctions, and the personal feeling within every individual of belonging to the national community that the person, through fate, was born into."

A primary liberal argument against the significance of race is environmentalism. Supported by democracy and Marxism alike, this theory holds that not racial ancestry, but factors such as climate, arable land, education, luck, and social opportunities determine group or individual achievement. As *Der Schulungsbrief* explained it, "Marxism is built on the teaching that all men are equal at birth. Differences that become apparent in the course of a lifetime are the result of external influences. Personal development therefore

depends on surroundings. The more favorable the environment, the better the person will turn out." The periodical *NS Briefe* countered that this view "degrades man to a slave of his circumstances.... The determining factor supposedly rests with the environment; that man does not mold the age, the age molds the man." Application of environmentalism's principles as a matter of state policy, according to Gross, demonstrates how impractical the theory is: "The habitual criminal, the cold-blooded murderer who since boyhood went through life harboring asocial instincts detrimental to society, was just a 'victim of his surroundings.' The ruthless eradication of those manifesting such bestial, menacing natures is not the obvious solution, but attentive, painstaking education, and improvement through transfer to a 'better environment'; the prison with radios, billiards, and a library. Here the killer experiences a more comfortable lifestyle than the hard-working laborer in the land. This is the logical consequence of the belief that exterior influences decide or can alter the nature of a person."

The periodical *NS Briefe* related the German position: "No amount of education can change the inner substance of a person, since the factors that determine who he is do not come from without. They rest within him, given to him by his parents and grandparents" *Germanisches Leitheft* summarized that race alone "makes the individual and indeed the whole society masters of their environment and external circumstances, to shape them according to their will."

The Nation as One

The crux of National Socialist ideology and state form was German unity. Hitler promoted whatever contributed to this goal and rejected what did not. A literate man with a profound grasp of history, he fashioned a political philosophy that interpreted Germany's past as a continuous, progressive struggle for independence and unification. Disharmony among the Germans had cost them freedom and life. The Roman Empire had imposed an immoral foreign influence until the Cheruskan Arminius unified prominent German tribes to force the invaders out. During the 17th Century, a politically discordant Germany became the battleground for the 30 Years' War. More than half the population perished. The subsequent Peace of Westphalia in 1648, engineered by Sweden and France, partitioned Germany into a myriad of insignificant duchies and principalities. The treaty established a parliament at Regensburg for their common representation. "Our diplomacy set the wheels of the Reichstag in motion for the purpose of making any serious government in Germany impossible," boasted the French historian Jacques Bainville in 1915.

Austria and Prussia regained diplomatic and military poise during the 18th Century. Due to a lack of connection between the royal hierarchy and the population, neither state could later repulse the invasion by Napoleonic France. Conquered in 1806, only through nationalism did the Prussians again become free. Prussia unified Germany in 1871, and this introduced prosperity and progress. Crass social discrepancies nonetheless persisted.

At that time, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche expressed the yearning among his people for a deeper, enduring bond: "There are many fine threads in the German soul, but they are not woven into a single, solid and mighty knot; a sorry spectacle and a solemn peril. This must be remedied, a greater solidarity in the nature and soul of our people created, the rupture between the internal and the external eliminated. In the loftiest sense we must strive for German unity, and strive more passionately than for mere political unification. . . . Create the concept of a nation."

Hitler grew up in the social milieu that Nietzsche criticized for its class distinctions. World War I, during which Hitler saw combat in an infantry regiment, welded various social factions into an entity. "At the front, the feeling of being destined to belong together, the feeling of a community, was by and large reborn," Gross wrote in *Der Schulungsbrief*. Hitler and his comrades felt solidarity in the trenches but found it undermined by political discord at home. "The enemy no longer faced the frontline soldier just as an honorable fighting man, but also made trouble behind the front," a journal for the German armed forces related. During the post-war period, the country suffered economic distress, political disharmony and foreign exploitation. Hitler later declared that when the German people "form a unified bloc, they are a power. When they are divided, they are defenseless and impotent."

By emphasizing German unity, National Socialism followed in the footsteps of the Romans' nemesis Arminius, the Prussian reformers who rose against Napoleon, the statesman Bismarck, and the eminent Nietzsche. The matter of Germany's moral, social, and political harmony influenced the NSDAP's stand on virtually every major issue. National Socialism, the journal *Der SA. Fuhrer* (The SA Officer) wrote, recognized that "the labor question was the cardinal social problem of the 19th and 20th Centuries. . . . It confronted liberalism's materialistic, distorted idea of freedom, which leads to abuse and to the rule of a capitalist minority, with a new freedom; one based on the growth of the individual fellow citizen within the national community according to achievement. Unlike the disfranchisement of labor through liberalism, National Socialism incorporates the worker into German society, elevating him and his accomplishments onto par with the rest of the nation."

Judging someone's worth according to performance, as far as Hitler was concerned, superseded questions of ethnic standing within the German community. Though many National Socialists based their world view on scientific research on race, the government under Hitler also relied on education to realize human potential. Goebbels wrote in his diary in June 1936, "the Fuhrer sharply disapproves of the work of all the race committees." Hitler based his attitude on the potential negative impact such activities could exercise on national unity.

National Socialism was largely a product of 18th and 19th Century values. Hitler saw how the fall of absolutism released powerful forces slumbering within mankind. But as the creative surge burst traditional bonds and restraints associated with the old order, it gave birth to doctrines that evolved independently of one another and were without

historical precedent. Liberalism, the dominant philosophy, shattered convention and institution alike, entering uncharted political waters in the unassailable conviction that individual freedom was the future of humanity. Composed at the dawn of the liberal age, the fable of the sorcerer's apprentice, who tampered with and unleashed extraordinary powers he was unable to control, proved a prophetic allegory. The National Socialists believed that the exaltation of the individual in the liberal-democratic sense would "dissolve the healthy social order and lead to ruin." They nonetheless sanctioned the free play of forces, opportunity for personal development and free enterprise. The task of their authoritarian government was to promote these practices, simultaneously insuring that the collective interests of the population remain decisive. As the individual advanced in National Socialist Germany, so did the nation. Hitler harnessed yet stimulated the forces of human creativity reanimated by the Enlightenment, giving them a form, purpose, and direction not envisioned by the pioneers of liberalism and democracy.

10.3 The New Germany

On February 10, 1933, Hitler discussed his economic program at a mass meeting in Berlin for the first time as chancellor. Telling the audience, "We have no faith in foreign help, in assistance from outside our own nation", the Fuhrer opined that Germany had no friends beyond her own borders. World War I had ended in 1918 when the German Reich and Austria-Hungary surrendered, and harsh terms imposed by the Allies, despite U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's promise of an equitable settlement, had left the Reich more or less on a solitary course. Allied delegates opened the peace conference in Versailles, France, in January 1919. They demanded that Germany accept blame for the war and compensate the victors for damages. This enabled them to initiate reparations requirements that reduced the Germans to virtual bondage. To extort the Reich's signature onto the treaty, Britain's Royal Navy maintained a blockade of food imports destined for Germany. The blockade had been in force since early in the war. Over 750,000 German civilians, mainly children and the elderly, perished from malnourishment.

Despite Germany's capitulation, the British continued to block food deliveries until the summer of 1919. On March 3 of that year, the English cabinet minister Winston Churchill told the House of Commons, "We are holding all our means of coercion in full operation or in immediate readiness for use. We are enforcing the blockade with vigor. We have strong armies ready to advance at the shortest notice. Germany is very near starvation. The evidence I have received from the officers sent by the War Office all over Germany shows first of all, the great privations which the German people are suffering, and secondly, the great danger of a collapse of the entire structure of German social and national life under the pressure of hunger and malnutrition. Now is therefore the moment to settle." Allied leaders bluntly told German delegates at Versailles to accept the treaty or face a military invasion and extension of the blockade. The Germans signed on June 28, 1919. The Allies' conditions degraded Germany to a secondary power. The victors divided 13 percent

of the Reich's territory among neighboring states. The 7,325,000 Germans residing there became second-class citizens in their new countries. Lost natural resources and industry included 67 percent of Germany's zinc production, 75 percent of iron ore, a third of the coal output and 7.7 percent of lead. The Allies demanded twelve percent of Germany's exports, with the option of raising the amount to 25 percent, for the next 42 years. The malnourished German nation also surrendered a million cattle including 149,000 milking cows, plus 15 percent of the harvest. The Allies confiscated a quarter of Germany's fishing fleet. In addition to large amounts of timber, 7,500 German locomotives and 200,000 freight cars went to the former enemy. Germany also relinquished her prosperous African colonies to the Anglo-French overseas empires. Every transport vessel exceeding 1,600 tons, practically the Reich's entire merchant fleet, enriched the Allies' war booty. Germans forfeited private investments abroad.

Morally justifying the terms, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, described how the Allied victory accomplished Germany's "liberation from militarism." He gloated on another occasion, "We have got most of the things we set out to get. The German navy has been handed over, the German merchant shipping has been handed over, and the German colonies have been given up. One of our chief trade competitors has been most seriously crippled and our allies are about to become Germany's biggest creditors. This is no small achievement!" Between 1880 and 1900, Germany's share of world trade had risen from 10.7 percent to 13.8 percent. During that period, Britain's had declined from 22 to 16 percent, and France's from 13 to eight percent. Woodrow Wilson remarked in September 1919, "Is there any man or woman-let me say, is there any child-who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? This was an industrial and commercial war."

The war transformed Germany from a flourishing industrial power to a distressed state. Military service had cost 1,808,545 German soldiers their lives. Another 4,247,143 had been wounded. The country was bankrupt from defense expenditures. Marxist agitation provoked labor walk-outs. There were 3,682 strikes in 1919, which impacted 32,825 businesses and 2,750,000 workers.¹³ Decline in industrial output and reparations burdens contributed to massive unemployment. Demobilized soldiers couldn't find jobs. A new law required managers to reinstate former employees who had served on active duty during the war; however, many business owners were among the slain and their companies were gone. Additionally, large numbers of foreign workers were in Germany, having taken over the manufacturing positions of men inducted into the army. Soldiers returning home found their pre-war jobs occupied by ersatz labor. People out of work lacked purchasing power. This decreased demand for consumer goods, leading to production cut-backs and further lay-offs. Unemployment fluctuated dramatically. The downward spiral began late in 1927. In 1931 alone, 13,736 companies filed for bankruptcy. An average of 107,000 people per month lost their livelihood. In mid-1932, almost 23 million Germans (36 percent of the population) were receiving public assistance.

The London Declaration of May 5, 1921, established Germany's aggregate debt at 132

billion reichsmarks (RM). One mark equaled approximately 50 cents. It also imposed a "retroactive payment" of twelve billion gold marks plus another billion in interest. The German government in Weimar could not meet the obligation. Without foreign commerce, Germany had little income. Fearing inordinate taxation to meet Allied demands, affluent Germans invested capital abroad. The flight of currency and the national deficit contributed to inflation. In November 1922, Weimar requested a moratorium on cash payments. The Inter-Allied Reparations Commission declared Germany in default. The French army garrisoned the Ruhr-Lippe region, source of almost 80 percent of Germany's coal, steel and pig iron production. Demonstrating passive resistance, civil servants and laborers there boycotted the work places. This increased the number of persons on public aid and further reduced productivity. The Ruhr debacle precipitated the currency's slide into worthlessness. Inflation wiped out the savings of Germany's middle class. A commission chaired by the American Charles Dawes made recommendations to balance Germany's budget and stabilize the money system. The Allies assumed control of the Reich's Bank and sold shares in the national railroad. They fixed annual payments at \$250 million. Another committee convened in Paris in February 1929 under the American banker Owen Young. The Young Plan arranged a new payment plan for Germany to extend to 1988. Since 1924, Weimar had been borrowing from Wall Street banks to meet reparations demands. The worldwide fiscal crisis of 1929 curtailed this source of capital. Despite tax increases, the German government failed to generate sufficient revenue to restore the economy. By March 1933, the German national debt amounted to 24.5 billion reichsmarks.

In mid-1931, the Allies reluctantly approved Germany's request for a one-year moratorium on reparations. In June 1932, Chancellor Franz von Papen negotiated a further three years' suspension of payments. Another benefit for Germany at this time was two consecutive mild winters. This created a favorable climate for agriculture and new construction. From January to October 1932, another 560,000 Germans found jobs. Even with this improvement, unemployment still exceeded five million. In July 1932, Hitler described the Reich's economic woes in a speech distributed on gramophone records during an election campaign: "The German farmer destitute, the middle class ruined, the social aspirations of millions of people destroyed, a third of all occupational German men and women out of work and therefore without earnings, the Reich, municipalities and provinces in debt, revenue departments in disarray and every treasury empty." These were the consequences of Allied exploitation of Germany after World War I. It deeply scarred the German people. Doctors reported alarming statistics of undernourishment among children. The divorce rate was disproportionately high. During the Weimar Republic's 13 years, thousands of Germans committed suicide, many driven by despair and frustration over months of inactivity. The German author Rudolf Binding placed the number at 224,900. Throughout the period, the Germans endured violations of their sovereignty by countries whose armies had never conquered Germany but had persuaded her leaders to surrender in 1918 through the insincere promise of a conciliatory peace. It was a disillusioned and destitute nation that Hitler inherited when he took office on January 30, 1933.

The Road to Recovery

Two days after becoming chancellor, Hitler outlined his economic program in a national radio address: "Within four years, the German farmer must be rescued from poverty. Within four years, unemployment must be finally overcome." The government enacted laws based on the strategy conceived by Fritz Reinhardt, a state secretary in the Reich's Ministry of Finance. This unassuming, pragmatic economist introduced a national program to create jobs on the premise that it is better to pay people to work than to award them jobless benefits. The Labor Procurement Law of June 1, 1933, allotted RM 1 billion to finance construction projects nationwide. It focused on repair or remodeling of public buildings, business structures, residential housing and farms, construction of subdivisions and farming communities, regulating waterways, and building gas and electrical works. Men who had been out of work the longest or who were fathers of large families received preference in hiring. None were allowed to work more than 40 hours per week. The law stipulated that German construction materials be used.

Also passed that summer, the Building Repair Law provided an additional RM 500 million for smaller individual projects. Home owners received a grant covering 20 percent of the cost of each project, including repairs and additions. Owners of commercial establishments became eligible for grants for conducting renovations, plus for installing elevators or ventilation systems. Renters could apply for grants to upgrade apartments. Under the law's provisions, property owners receiving grants borrowed the balance of new construction costs from local banks or savings & loans. The government provided borrowers coupons to reimburse them for the interest on the loans. The Tax Relief Law of September 21, 1933, offered income and corporate tax credits for repairs. The regime covered nearly 40 percent of the cost for each renovation. The Company Refinancing Law, legislated the same day, converted short term loans into long term ones with lower interest. The law reduced the previous seven percent interest rate to four (and ultimately to three) percent. This did not hamper finance companies, since it prevented defaults on loans. The refinancing law released businesses from the obligation to pay their portion of unemployment benefits to former associates. The resulting available capital enabled them to re-hire employees and expand production.

The Labor Procurement Law provided newlyweds loans of RM 1,000 at one percent monthly interest. The loans came in the form of coupons to buy furniture, household appliances and clothing. To be eligible, the bride had to have been employed for at least six months during the previous two years, and had to agree to leave her job. Returning women to the home vacated positions in commerce and industry, creating openings for unemployed men. For each child born to a couple, the government reduced the loan by 25 percent and deferred payments on the balance for one year. For larger families, upon birth of the fourth child, the state forgave the loan. It financed the program by imposing surtaxes on single men and women. By June 1936, the government approved 750,000 marriage loans. Reinhardt described the policy of diverting women

into the household economy as "steadily regrouping our German women with regard to the labor market and with respect to social policy. This regrouping alone will ... in a few years be sufficient to eliminate unemployment, and bring about an enormous impetus in every branch of German economic life." The marriage law released approximately 20,000 women per month from the work force after September 1933. The increase in newlyweds created a corresponding need for additional housing. More tradesmen found work in new home construction. In the furniture industry, manufacture increased by 50 percent during 1933. Factories producing stoves and other kitchen appliances could not keep pace with consumer demand. The state imposed no property tax on young couples purchasing small single family homes. As Reinhardt predicted, reduced payments in jobless benefits and increased revenue through corporate, income and sales taxes largely offset the enormous cost of the program to reduce unemployment and revive the economy. He stated in Bremen on October 16, 1933, "In the first five months of the present fiscal year, expenditures and income of the Reich have balanced out."

When Hitler took power, labor represented 46 percent of German working people and 82 percent of the nation's unemployed.²³ The government initiated massive public works projects to expand the job market for labor. It especially concentrated on upgrading the national railway. Also, construction of a modern superhighway began in September 1933, which found work for an additional 100,000 men each year. The production and delivery of building materials for pavement, bridges and rest stops simultaneously employed another 100,000. The Reich's Autobahn project, originally planned for over 3,700 miles of new highway construction, relied primarily on manual labor. Limiting the use of modern paving machinery enabled the Autobahn commission not only to keep more men on the job, but devote 79 percent of the budget to workers' salaries. The Autobahn was a toll road; however, reduced wear on vehicles using this efficient highway system and savings in travel time were worthwhile compensation to motorists for the fee.

On the ideological plain, Hitler regarded a robust agrarian class to be essential for a healthy general population. In the turbulence of the modern age, industrialization and progress removed man further and further from his natural surroundings. Bound to the soil and the family homestead for generations, the farming community was an anchor rooted in traditional German customs and values. It drew sustenance from the land and passed it on to the nation. While labor represented a dynamic political force, the farming stratum remained the "cornerstone of ethnic life." The Fuhrer esteemed such self-reliant, rugged people as an indispensable mainstay for the nation. Addressing half a million farm folk in Buckeberg in October 1933, he stated, "In the same measure that liberalism and democratic Marxism disregard the farmer, the National Socialist revolution acknowledges him as the soundest pillar of the present, as the sole guarantee for the future." Hitler not only maintained Germany's agrarian class but augmented it; housing planners sited many new settlements of single family homes in rural areas where residents took up farming. The government provided interest-free loans and grants for the purchase of farm implements along with special marriage loans for newlyweds. The debts were to be

forgiven after the family had worked the farm ten years.

Tax reform was a major element of Reinhardt's recovery program. Initial measures legislated to this end demonstrate what a crippling influence the Reich's runaway taxation had previously exercised on commerce. The first to benefit from tax relief was Germany's automotive industry. The Motor Vehicle Tax Law of April 1933 abolished at one stroke all operating taxes and fees for privately purchased cars and motorcycles licensed after March 31 of that year. The reduction in consumer costs to own and operate a car was so dramatic as to significantly boost sales. While the industry produced just 43,430 passenger vehicles in 1932, the number rose to 92,160 during Hitler's first year in office. New car production increased annually. The number of people employed in automobile manufacture climbed from 34,392 in 1932 to 110,148 in less than four years. From 1933 to 1935, the industry built 15 more assembly plants.

Under the Reinhardt system, the government gradually supplanted the plethora of municipal, provincial and state taxes and fees with a single national tax. The finance office calculated the budgets of local and state administrations, collected all revenue and distributed it to agencies and municipalities. During the year, each citizen received an annual income tax invoice and paid the amount in twelve monthly installments. This covered his or her total tax liability. The arrangement greatly reduced administrative costs of mailing local tax bills, collecting individual fees and pursuing delinquencies. It also simplified the accounting of private corporations no longer required to determine withholding taxes on employees' salaries. In the long run, Germany's policy of reducing taxes to promote commerce increased public revenues. During the first half of 1939, the finance office reported over RM 8.3 billion in revenue, compared to RM 6.6 billion in fiscal year 1932/33.³⁰ These were evenly assessed taxes in 1939, paid by a fully employed population; not an imbalanced, excessive liability burdening working people to provide jobless benefits for the less fortunate.

In a Nuremberg speech in 1936, Reinhardt described income tax as "the main source of revenue. Income tax is measured according to (the citizen's) actual income and is therefore the most socially just form of collecting taxes."³¹ A 1933 Swedish study comparing taxation among Great Powers established that the German people paid 23 percent of their income in taxes. In the United States the amount was 23.4 percent, in Norway 25.1 percent, Britain 25.2 and Italy 30.6 percent.³² (The figure did not take into account America's numerous hidden taxes that were nonexistent in Germany.)

No program to restore German prosperity could omit international trade. Deprived of its colonies, the Reich had to develop foreign markets to acquire raw materials for industry and a portion of the food supply. With gold reserves exhausted, the National Socialist administration had to create an alternative source of purchasing power. Despite objections from Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reich's Bank, Hitler withdrew Germany's money system from the gold standard. Gold was the recognized medium of exchange for international commerce. Over centuries, it had become a commodity as well. Financiers bought and sold gold, speculated on its fluctuations in price, and loaned it abroad at high

interest. Hitler substituted a direct barter system in foreign dealings. German currency became defined as measuring units of human productivity. The British General J.F.C. Fuller observed, "Germany is already beginning to operate more on the concept of labor than on the concept of money."

In January 1938, the Soviet diplomat Kristyan Rakovsky commented on the German money system. Rakovsky had held posts in London and in Paris and was acquainted with Wall Street financiers. He explained, "Hitler, this uneducated ordinary man, has out of natural intuition and even despite the opposition of the technician Schacht, **created an especially dangerous economic system. An illiterate in every theory of economics driven only by necessity, he has cut out international as well as private high finance.** Hitler possesses almost no gold, and so he can't endeavor to make it a basis for currency. Since the only available collateral for his money is the technical aptitude and great industriousness of the German people, technology and labor became his 'gold'.... As you know, like magic it's eliminated all unemployment for more than six million skilled employees and laborers."

Germany's withdrawal from the gold-based, internationally linked monetary system in favor of a medium of exchange founded on domestic productivity corresponded to Hitler's belief in maintaining the sovereignty of nations. This was an unwelcome development in London, Paris and New York, where cosmopolitan investment and banking institutions profited from loaning money to foreign countries. Germany no longer had to borrow in order to trade on the world market. Foreign demand for German goods correspondingly created more jobs within the Reich.

Upon taking office, Hitler had assigned the elimination of unemployment as his first priority. During the first twelve months of his administration, unemployment declined by nearly 2.3 million. In 1934, 2,973,544 persons were still out of work, but by November 1935, 1,750,000 more Germans had found full time jobs. Addressing the National Socialist party congress in Nuremberg on September 12, 1936, Reinhardt presented statistics demonstrating that "mass unemployment in Germany has been overcome. In some occupations, there is already a shortage of workers." He stated that among other civilized nations, of the 20 million people out of work in 1932, only two million had returned to the work force over the previous four years (The statistics did not include the USSR, since no figures were available). During the same period in Germany, the economy created jobs for over five million previously unemployed persons. In addition, the average work day within this time frame increased from six hours 23 minutes to over seven hours per shift.

In November 1938, the German government officially recorded 461,244 citizens as unemployed. The statistic included individuals who were physically or mentally disabled, mostly homebound and hence unemployable. It also incorporated the populations of Austria and the Sudetenland. Germany had annexed these economically depressed lands the same year. Both had suffered massive unemployment, which Hitler had not yet had time to fully alleviate. From 1934 to 1937, the number of women in the work force increased from 4.5 million to 5.7 million. Despite programs to encourage women to return to tra-

ditional family roles, the government did not restrict those choosing a career. They were equally eligible for tax incentives offered for starting small businesses.

An interesting element of Germany's recovery is that Hitler, against the recommendations of Germany's principle financier, Schacht, authorized the economic programs developed by Reinhardt, a man possessing comparatively little influence. A disciple of the liberal economic theory, Schacht disapproved of government interference in commerce. He opposed state-sponsored programs to combat unemployment. Otto Wagener, head of the NSDAP's economic policy branch, told Hitler that Schacht was "an exponent of world capitalism" and hostile to the state's revolutionary approach to economics. Historians have nonetheless described Schacht as a "genius of improvisation" and a "financial wizard." One British author credits this American-educated, international banker with "financing ... unemployment programs by greatly expanding public works and stimulating private enterprise." Schacht's pre-1933 writings and verbal statements reveal no trace of the ideas introduced by Reinhardt to revitalize the economy and create jobs. Regarding unemployment, the "solutions" Schacht suggested were to reduce workers' wages, encourage thrift, and resettle people out of work in stateoperated camps,

The campaign to stabilize Germany's economy witnessed measures that were only possible in an authoritarian state. The National Socialist maxim, "community interest before self-interest," guided a policy that was efficient and uncompromising. Among the first to feel its weight were Germany's trade unions. By 1932, they had far less influence than during the previous decade. Few workers were prepared to risk their jobs by striking. Union representatives voiced no protest when Hitler, five weeks after taking power, banned the Iron Front and the Reichsbanner. These organizations had provided muscle at public demonstrations of the Social Democratic Party, which was closely affiliated with labor. In April 1933, the German trade unions issued a public statement declaring their desire to cooperate with the new government.

The Social Renaissance

Germany's triumph over unemployment, without foreign help and during worldwide economic depression, was in itself an accomplishment any government could be satisfied with. For Hitler, it was a step toward far-reaching social programs intended to elevate and unify the population. Like other elements of National Socialist rule, subsequent reforms realized ideas that long had been developing in German society. During the mid-18th Century, the Prussian monarch Friedrich the Great created an efficient state bureaucracy and revised taxation. His law providing pensions for civil servants and officers invited criticism that it would bankrupt the treasury.

The progressive thinking in the Prussian-German civil service led to the country's first labor law the following century. The regulation, ratified on April 6, 1839, banned the practice of working small children in mines. No boy could enter the work force until after at least three years of schooling. It became illegal for children to work night shifts or

Sundays. More child labor laws followed in 1853. Though primitive by modern standards, the regulations were advanced for the time. The North German League's Vocational Decree of 1869 and further measures to safeguard labor after the country's unification in 1871 placed Germany in the lead among industrial nations in the realm of social reform.

The social programs Hitler introduced had two objectives. One was to improve the standard of living of the average citizen. The other was to create a classless society in which the bourgeois, labor, agrarian folk and nobility enjoyed equal status as Volksgenossen. This translates literally to "ethnic national comrades," though the expression "fellow Germans" better conveys its spirit. Hitler believed that removing traditional class barriers would create social mobility for talented individuals to advance. All Germany would benefit through the maturation of the more promising human resources. An important organization for promoting National Socialist community values was the Volunteer Labor Service (FAD). Founded in August 1931, the FAD recruited the unemployed for public works. Paying volunteers two reichsmarks a day, a primary purpose of the FAD was to improve the physical and mental well-being of unemployed and unoccupied young Germans. Upon assuming power, Hitler expanded the organization and raised the pay scale. It numbered 263,000 members by mid-1933. The Fuhrer considered it "superbly suited for conscious instruction in the concept of a Volksgemeinschaft (national community)."⁵⁵ Membership in the FAD declined as more jobs became available. In June 1935, Hitler enacted a law making six months' labor service compulsory for teenagers upon high school graduation. No longer voluntary, the FAD became the RAD: Reich's Labor Service. Members assisted in Autobahn construction, drained swamps, planted trees, upgraded poorer farms and improved waterways.

At the NSDAP congress in September 1935, Hitler defined the RAD's social purpose to 54,000 assembled members: "To us National Socialists, the idea of sending all Germans through a single school of labor is among the means of making this national community a reality. In this way, Germans will get to know one another. The prejudices common among different occupations will then be so thoroughly wiped away as to never again resurface. Life unavoidably divides us into many groups and vocations.... This is the primary task of the labor service; to bring all Germans together through work and form them into a community." At an earlier NSDAP congress, Hitler had described the labor service as "an assault against a horrible pre-conceived notion, namely that manual labor is inferior." Having disbanded the trade unions in 1933, Hitler wanted an umbrella organization devoted to the welfare of both labor and management, so that "Within its ranks the worker will stand beside the employer, no longer divided by groups and associations that serve to protect a particular economic and social stratum and its interests." In his own proclamation defining the organization's objectives, Hitler stated, "It is in essence to bring together members of the former trade unions, the previous office worker associations and the former managers' leagues as equal members."

The structure supported the goal of eliminating strife within industry by encouraging mutual respect, based not on position but on performance. As defined in one publication,

"There is neither employer nor employee, but only those entrusted with the work of the entire nation.... Everyone works for the people, regardless of whether a so-called employer or so-called employee, as it was in the previous middle class order." This represented a revolutionary departure from the liberal democratic perception, as another German study maintained: "In the capitalist system of the past, money became the goal of work for the employee as well as for the employer. It was the individual's wages that appeared to give work a sense of purpose. The employee saw the employer simply as someone who 'earns more.' And the employer regarded the staff of workers in his firm only as a means to an end, an instrument for him to earn more. The consequences of this thinking were ominous. Should the working man have any ambition to work anymore when he says to himself, 'I'm only working so that the man over in the office can earn more?' Can a business deliver quality work if everyone thinks only of himself? . . . Labor-its purpose, its honor, the creative value, the German worker as a master of his trade and a proud, capable working man, all this became secondary. Reorganizing labor does not just mean removing the crass material deficiencies of life. It must penetrate the relationship of person to person."

In May 1933, the first congress of the German Labor Front took place in Berlin. Known by the acronym DAF, it replaced the disbanded unions and managers' associations. Hitler stated, "The goal of the German Labor Front is the creation of genuine cooperative fellowship and efficiency among all Germans. It must see to it that every single person can find a place in the economic life of the nation according to his mental and physical capabilities that will insure his highest level of achievement. In this way, the greatest benefit to the overall community will be realized." The DAF therefore contributed to Hitler's goal of welding the Germans into a Volksgemeinschaft. Here, he stated, "the head and the hand are one. The eternal petty differences will of course still exist. But there must be a common foundation, the national interests of all, that grows beyond the ridiculous, trivial personal squabbles, occupational rivalries, economic conflicts and so forth." The Fuhrer's blueprint for eliminating class division was largely an equalization process. Through useful work, everyone could earn the respect of the community. "No one has the right to elevate himself socially above another because some outward circumstance makes him appear better," Hitler argued. "The loftiest individual is not the one who has the most, but the one who does the most for everyone else.... The honest man, even if he is poor, is worth more than a wealthy one possessing fewer virtues."

One revolutionary measure, appalling to laissez faire disciples like the banker Schacht, was the government's regulation of salaries and managerial privileges. It first addressed the custom in private sector of paying white collar workers monthly stipends even when absent from the job, while according no similar benefit to factory personnel. The government abolished this discrepancy. It arranged instead "to insure the laborer a certain measure of compensation when missing work due to important family matters, plus a fixed, company-financed subsidy in case of illness." The Law for Regulation of Wages introduced guidelines for calculating salaries. Based on the principle of comparable pay

for equal demands on an individual's time and energy, its goal was to guarantee a decent standard of living for everyone who worked hard. The law stated, "Grading of salaries must correspond to the actual demands of the work involved. It therefore doesn't matter what job the individual has. Personal engagement is the decisive factor."⁶⁶ The regulation further called for an adjustment in salary for employees with unavoidable financial hardships, in order to guarantee their standard of living. Even time lost from work due to weather conditions became a factor. It also required that every citizen receive pay for overtime. The wage law did not level off personal income regardless of occupation. Grading took such factors into consideration as physical or mental demands of a job, the precision or independent initiative required, education, hazards and experience. Its purpose was to establish a system that could be applied to the most diverse careers and activities and help reduce social and economic differences. It acknowledged the value of honest labor and the need to adequately compensate all who perform it. A guiding principle of the wage grading program was not to reduce the standard of living of previously higher paid associates, but to elevate that of those who earned less.

Funneling officers into the same mess hall as the sailors corresponded to Hitler's commitment to demolish class barriers throughout society. The German navy custom of providing four menus per ship, the quality of meals varying according to rank, he also abolished. Observing once at dinner that "during the World War, the field kitchen was incomparably better when officers had to be fed from it to," Hitler arranged that henceforth, the German armed forces nourish all ranks with the same rations. "The view that it will weaken authority if distinctions are not maintained is groundless," he contended. "Whoever can do more and knows more than another will have the authority he needs. For one who is not superior in ability and knowledge, his rank in whatever office he tenants won't help."

Corrections in salary, benefits and accommodations not only raised the standard of living for labor, but helped integrate it socially. Advantages previously associated with middle class prestige became universal. This diminished one more status symbol dividing the complacent, privileged caste from those seeking acceptance. Hitler had no faith in the good will of the bourgeois and in fact blamed it for Germany's class barriers. He passed laws making exploitation of labor a punishable offense: "This must be considered necessary as long as there are employers who not only have no sense of social responsibility, but possess not even the most primitive feeling for human rights." In January 1934, the government enacted the Law for Regulation of National Labor, containing 73 paragraphs. At a press conference, Reich's Labor Minister Franz Seldte defined the foundation of the law as removal of "unsavory" class distinctions which had previously contributed to the collapse of the German economy, in favor now of "emphasizing the concept of social esteem," and the leadership idea in business life. The law's vocabulary replaced the terms "employer and employee" with "leader and follower." It designated respective roles in this way: "The leader of the facility makes decisions for the followers in all matters of production in so far as they fall under the law's regulation. He is responsible for the

welfare of the followers. They are to be dutiful to him, in accordance with the mutual trust expected in a cooperative working environment." The law imposed moral obligations on both. The German economist Dr. Hans Leistriz described them in these words: "Both the facility leader and the followers are under the commission of the people. Each always faces the same choice, of whether he should fulfill his duty or become caught up in self-serving goals. Both the facility leader and the followers can face disciplinary action that punishes transgressions against this social code of honor." The law cited examples, such as "if a contractor, leader of the facility or other supervisory personnel misuse their authority in the workplace to unethically exploit the labors of members of the following or insult their esteem." The law likewise held workers accountable for "jeopardizing the harmony of the workplace by intentionally stirring up their co-workers."

Though according management autonomy in decision-making, the law included serious restrictions as well. Business owners and directors were responsible not only for sound fiscal management of the company, but for the protection of employees from abuse. This was not presented as benign advice from the government. It was a law word for word. Income and profit were no longer the primary objectives of an enterprise. The wellbeing of its associates became a concurrent purpose. The Reich's Ministry of Labor published a table of offenses under the category of unjust exploitation of employees. These included paying salaries below fixed wage scales or failure to compensate workers for overtime, refusing to grant employees vacations, cutting back hours, providing insufficient meals, inadequate heating of work stations, and maintaining an unhygienic or hazardous work environment. Supervisors were even disciplined for browbeating their staff to work harder.

The record of court proceedings for 1939 demonstrates that the labor law primarily safeguarded the well-being of employees rather than their overseers. During that year, the courts conducted 14 hearings against workers and 153 against plant managers, assistant managers and supervisors. In seven cases, the directors lost their jobs. For more serious violations, the labor ministry enlisted Germany's Secret State Police, the Gestapo. This generally resulted in the arrest and confinement of "asocial" managers and usually involved cases where consciously allowing hazardous or unsanitary working conditions impaired an employee's health.

Despite the involvement of law enforcement, the DAF's long-term goal was to voluntarily correct attitudes that led to social injustices. Hitler opined that "the police should not be on people's backs everywhere. Otherwise, life for people in the homeland will become just like living in prison. The job of the police is to spot asocial elements and ruthlessly stamp them out." A 1937 issue of *Soziale Praxis* maintained, "The state does not want to run businesses itself. It only wants to arrange that they operate with a sense of social awareness." The DAF acknowledged that any labor law will "remain ineffective as long as it fails to persuade the leaders and followers working in the factories of the correctness and necessity of such a perception of labor, and train them in a corresponding viewpoint.

In October 1934, Hitler published a decree defining the nature and the tasks of the DAF. He wrote, "The German Labor Front is to insure harmony in the work place by creating

an understanding among facility leaders for the justifiable requirements of their followers, and balancing this with an appreciation among the followers for the circumstances of and for what is feasible for their factory.” In this sense, Hitler assigned the DAF an educational mission as well. It was but a single element of an extensive, lengthy process of “total inward re-education of people as a prerequisite” to achieve “genuine socialism.” At the party congress in 1935, Hitler pledged to “continue educating the German people to become a true community.”

Hitler told German youngsters in a 1938 speech in Nuremburg that the job of inwardly transforming the population “can only be accomplished by a unified body of our people, which did not come into being through wishes and hopes, but only through education. Through it alone can we create the nation we need.” In this way, the Fuhrer strove to achieve acceptance of the party’s socialist program among the German people with voluntary obedience rather than compliance based on law enforcement. “With police, machine guns and rubber clubs, no regimen can be maintained in the long run,” he warned.⁸⁷ In 1939, he called for drastic reduction of the national police force to release manpower to relieve the industrial labor shortage.

Rearming the Reich

Promoting programs to alleviate unemployment, rebuild the economy and socially unify the nation, Hitler devoted far less attention to strengthening national defense. Provisions of the Versailles treaty had reduced the German army to a 100,000-man force comprising professional soldiers with long enlistments. It possessed no armor, heavy artillery or chemical weapons. The treaty forbade Germany to maintain an air force. Following the London Ultimatum, the Allies banned production of motorized airplanes within the Reich. This drove Germany’s leading aeronautics firms Junkers, Dornier and Heinkel to continue aircraft development in Sweden, Switzerland and Russia. After World War I, the Allies had required the Reich’s navy to steam its modern surface fleet to a British port. Remaining with the navy, reduced to just 15,000 sailors, were six obsolete ships of the line, six small cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats. There were no submarines.

In June 1919, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau had stated, “German disarmament represents the first step toward multilateral reduction and limitation of arms.... After Germany has shown the way, the Allied and associated powers will follow the same path in complete security.” Nonetheless, during the 1920s, France, Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan and the USSR had resumed a partial arms race, focusing on the expansion of naval and air forces. This breach of faith offered Germany the moral foundation to rearm in defiance of the treaty. Thanks to the small size and limited weaponry of the German army, the country possessed virtually no armaments industry in 1933. The Germans had to conduct secret experimental development of armored vehicles, artillery and military aircraft, since it was still illegal. Though engineers re-tooled some factories

for arms production, Hitler introduced proposals for international armaments reduction during the first two years in office. During 1933 and 1934, the Reich devoted less than four percent of the budget to defense. This was not even half the percentage spent by France, Japan and the USSR, which already maintained large arsenals. Germany was in a position to implement a massive rearmament program, had Hitler wanted it, by 1936. Factories were operating at nearly full capacity. The Reich possessed a modern, efficient machine tool industry. The USA and Germany controlled 70 percent of the international export market of this commodity, with minimal corresponding import. In fact, in 1938 Germany had 1.3 million machine tools in industry, twice the number of England's. This circumstance, however, proved of little value to Germany's armed forces because Hitler did not assign priority to the manufacture of military hardware.

Industry in Germany focused on housing construction, improving working conditions for labor, public works, consumer goods, and KdF automobile and ship-building programs. These projects consumed large quantities of materials such as metals, rubber and timber, and employed a significant percentage of skilled labor. Qualified tradesmen, engineers and technicians were unavailable for the arms industry. One German historian concluded, "In the six-and-a-half years until the outbreak of the war, the German economy achieved enormous success. But the result of these huge endeavors remained relatively small for the armed forces, in the face of demands from the civilian sector."

One of Germany's more famous public works, the Autobahn, was without strategic value, contrary to popular assumption. The general staff concluded that the expressway system would be too easy for enemy airmen to spot from high altitude in wartime, and motorized units using the autobahn, if strafed, would have no place to take cover. Few prewar military formations were motorized anyway, and the army relied mainly on rail transport. In contrast to his senior army commanders, Freiherr von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck, Hitler fully recognized the tactical value of armor in future warfare. However, as to the expansion of this service branch, the attention he customarily devoted to parallel civil projects was again lacking. In the opinion of a renowned military analyst, Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, "He ultimately paid the penalty for not promoting it more emphatically."

In November 1934, the Army Ordnance Department opted for the manufacture of a main battle tank mounting a 75 mm cannon. The army produced two lightly armored, under-gunned types, the Panzer I and Panzer II, for troop training during development of the combat model. In the interim, the army also introduced the Panzer III medium tank, which proved suitable for frontline service. The Panzer IV, the main battle tank contracted in 1934, was actually in the planning stage before Hitler took power. The first did not roll off the assembly line until 1936. During 1936 and 1937, the factory in Magdeburg manufactured just 35 Panzer IV tanks. In 1939, the number was 45. In comparison, the German automobile industry produced 244,289 cars in 1936. During the final months of peace, the German army helped fill out its few armored divisions with Czechbuilt tanks it acquired when occupying Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939.

Production of other crucial ordnance suffered similar neglect. By the summer of 1939,

German factories were turning out only 30 heavy field howitzers per month. The manufacture of all kinds of ammunition was so limited that when war broke out in September, the army only had enough stockpiled for six weeks of combat. The air force had a three-month supply of light and medium bombs and no reserves of heavier calibers. Considering that most weapons are a means of delivering projectiles to a target, an insufficient store of ammunition decisively influences their effectiveness. Hitler used the armed forces first as an instrument of diplomacy. He told General Erhard Milch in 1938, "No one asks about whether I have bombs or how much ammunition I have. All that matters is the number of airplanes and cannons."¹¹⁶ During 1938, Germany produced less than onesixth the munitions its plants would manufacture throughout the war year 1944. In the verdict of General Georg Thomas, chief of the Armed Forces Armaments Staff, "Germany went to war with completely insufficient economic preparations.... The enormous economic preparations that would have been necessary for a new world war were practically not even implemented."

When Hitler assumed the chancellorship, his navy was significantly smaller than fleets of rival European powers. Between the end of World War I and 1931, German wharves laid keel on three new warships; during the same period France built 81.¹¹⁸ The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, concluded in June 1935, limited the size of the Reich's surface fleet to 35 percent of Britain's Royal Navy. At war's outbreak over four years later, the German navy comprised just 17.5 percent of the tonnage of its nautical adversary; only half what was allowed. Shipbuilders had postponed the pre-war launching of Germany's formidable battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz due to a shortage of steel. Simultaneous construction of the KdF liners Wilhelm Gustloff and Robert Ley, at a cost of over RM 50 million, continued on schedule.

Shipyards began fabricating submarines, or U-boats, around 1935. This weapon, potentially the most decisive in Germany's arsenal, received a low priority. During 1937, the year work began on the Wilhelm Gustloff, the wharves launched just one U-boat. The Germans built nine the following year and 18 in 1939.¹²⁰ Germany began the war with 22 boats capable of Atlantic sorties, of which only a third could patrol target areas at any one time.

Military commanders met with Hitler in November 1938 to discuss coordinating rearmament among the three principle service branches. One German military historian summarized, "The vague instructions as to how these as yet unspecified armaments objectives were to be realized over the next several years, do not suggest that Hitler at this time expected to be at war just three quarters of a year later." Between September 1937 and February 1939, German firms holding arms contracts filled only 58.6 percent of the orders. During 1938, barely nine percent of German industry produced military wares. The amount increased as the war approached, reaching around 15 percent by the end of 1939, though some estimates are slightly higher. England by contrast, spent 15 percent of her budget on rearmament in 1935 and 38 percent during 1938. The economist Dr. Anja Bagel-Bohlen concluded that the Reich's "arms production in reality never received

unrestricted priority in the economy as it appeared.... The German industry was in no way prepared for an extended confrontation with the enemy's industrial potential."

The German army lagged well behind other Great Powers with respect to manpower as well. In 1935, the French army numbered 655,000 men, Poland's 298,000, and the Czech army 140,000. The Soviet Union had 885,000 men under arms. None of these countries were well-disposed toward Germany. Since the Reich had had no draft for the last 15 years, there were no reservists. These are militarily-trained men who return to civilian life, but can be recalled to active duty in order to rapidly expand an armed force in the event of war. France possessed 4.5 million, Poland 3.2 million, and Czechoslovakia 1.3 million reservists.

Hitler concentrated Germany's human resources on developing social programs for his people rather than on correcting the military disparity. In January 1933, the German army and navy totaled 113,523 personnel. By the end of the year, the roster rose to just 122,000. On March 21, 1935, Hitler reinstated compulsory military service. The draft did not actually begin until October. The army added 200,000 more men, the navy 10,000. Another 20,000 joined the new air force, the Luftwaffe. The German economy had created 3.6 million new jobs by 1935. Military recruitment therefore made a small contribution to alleviating unemployment. The government in fact began increasing troop strength by transferring 56,000 policemen to the army. "The frequent argument that Hitler found the unemployed population work and bread solely through a massive build-up of the armed forces is untenable, when the actual statistics are examined," the historian Ralf Wittrich observed. Schacht confirmed this when he stated, "The elimination of unemployment in Germany... succeeded without rearmament."

The American historian David Schoenbaum concluded, "In many respects...the National Socialists went to war with a peacetime economy rather than having created a war-based economy in peacetime." An indepth study by professors William Langer and Everett Gleason stated, "Nazi military power and war production in 1939 were greatly overestimated by the democracies. There can now be little doubt that the Germans in 1939 were far from prepared for a long war on a large scale.. .war production was inferior to that of the combined British and French and they had very little in the way of reserves."

Despite comparative unpreparedness, the German armed forces would conquer larger, better equipped armies during the early war years. The German army's custom of training junior officers, down to squad leader, to exercise independent initiative in combat gave Hitler's troops a decisive tactical advantage over the French, British and Soviet armies with their inflexible command structure. Adjutant Julius Schaub later wrote that he often heard the Fuhrer complain to his closest associates, "This damned war has ruined all my plans...it's wrecked everything, all of my grand plans for rebuilding." Hitler served in the infantry throughout World War I, and he was seriously wounded. His military service record states that he participated in 84 battles. It seems unlikely that a man who experienced first-hand the devastation, privations and pointlessness of war in such measure, could aggressively prepare the nation he fought for to precipitate a similar

carnage, especially considering the secondary role he historically assigned to rearmament.

10.4 The Case for Germany

The following chapter is an excerpt from *The Case for Germany - A Study of Modern Germany* from 1939, written by A.P. Laurie (1861 - 1949), a Scottish professor of chemistry, and giving his impressions after visiting Germany himself. The document can be found by a quick online search and it might be interesting to read it in full, since I will not present all 180 pages here.

The Führer

It has often been said here of the Fuhrer that he was "only a house painter" or that he had "no education", and the general tendency of opinion in England is that he was not a public school man and therefore is not much good. This attitude shows not only a regrettable snobbishness, but a total ignorance of the origin of so many great men. It is an error which we in Scotland are not likely to fall into, as so many of our famous Scotsmen have come from a similar stock, and have had a similar upbringing and education to that of the Fuhrer. The Highland crofter with his fierce independence, and the poor Scottish student who worked on the farm all summer to pay his university fees, are our equivalent to the finest type of European peasant, who produces a Mussolini, and a Hitler, and the small farmers of America who produced an Abraham Lincoln.

It is among the peasants of Europe that the old customs and traditions are maintained; the townspeople tend to become all of one pattern, and it is to the country that we must go to find the old costumes handed down for centuries, and the old legends and fairy tales. The people in the mountain and forest districts of Germany still live in the houses, and wear on gala days the costumes with which the Grimms fairy tales are illustrated; through these tales we live in an imaginary world in our childhood, with which the familiar Grimms fairy tales are illustrated; through these tales we live in an imaginary world in our childhood which is the familiar every day world to them. However strong may be our link with Germany in later life, through the Protestant religion which we owe to her, and through her philosophy and music, the ties formed at our most impressionable age are with the peasant. In the district of Waldviertel, lives a race of peasants who, in spite of having been part of the Austrian Empire, still speak the Bavarian dialect, and have clung fiercely to their traditions and racial independence. In 1672 a son was born to two of these peasants who bore the name of Stephan Hitler. His descendants lived on in the same district, until Alois Hitler, the Führer's father, determined to see the world, and set off on foot for Vienna. He became a Customs official, but love of the soil was strong in him, and he soon bought a farm in the beautiful district where the Inn joins the Danube, where he established his family, and to which he went on his retirement to take up again

the life of a farmer which had been led by his ancestors.

It was here that Hitler passed his early childhood, and attended the monastery school where he first saw the Swastika carved on the arch of a stone well. As a boy his desire was to be an artist. On the death of his parents he went to Vienna with a few coins in his pocket taking his portfolio of drawings with which he hoped to gain entrance to the Vienna art school. "You will never be a painter", said the Professor who glanced through his drawings, "but you show some talent for architecture". An interesting prophesy for the future of the boy who was to superintend the rebuilding of Berlin. Rejected as a pupil both at the school of art and architecture, he found himself alone in Vienna with only a few coins between him and starvation. Building was going on everywhere and he found employment as a builder's labourer: the boy of 18 entering on a life of desperate poverty learnt to know all that was most sordid and cruel in the life of a great city. For long his only home was the corner of a cellar which he shared with other workmen. His fellow workmen were all followers of Karl Marx, and endless discussions went on in which young Hitler joined. He became convinced that the Socialists and Communists were on the wrong lines, refused to join the trade union and for this refusal suffered an early martyrdom,-he had no sooner got a job than his fellow workmen had him dismissed.

During this period he learnt the close connection between the Socialist movement in Vienna and the Jews. He has told us of his astonishment when he met in the street a Rabbi with long locks dressed in his caftan. He realised for the first time the existence in the heart of his civilisation of a people of an Eastern race and Eastern religion, foreign to all his racial and religious traditions and exercising an enormous influence through their control of finance. A people bound together by devotion to their race, which had survived being scattered broadcast through the world and persecuted through the centuries. Finding it impossible to earn his living as a labourer unless he accepted the teaching of Karl Marx, he managed to pick up a scanty living by painting and selling cards. Many of his sketches made at this time survive, and show considerable artistic talent. After a time he migrated from Vienna to Munich and found a lodging with a small working tailor's family. He continued to earn a small pittance by his painted cards, and began to devour all the books he could get out of the public library on history and politics. The tailor and his family have always remained his good friends, and have the pleasantest recollection of the courteous young Austrian who was adored by the children and made his good landlady anxious for his health by his omniverous reading on history and politics, which often continued through the night.

He denied himself bread in order to have the means to visit the theatre, especially the great works of Wagner whom he revered and still reveres today. When war broke out he got permission from Austria to join a German regiment, and went joyfully to fight for his beloved Fatherland; at last, he felt, he could do something for Germany. He was chosen for the dangerous task of dispatch carrier from the trenches, was twice decorated for valour, was wounded, and won the affection and admiration of his fellow soldiers. His final decoration, the Iron Cross of the First Class, was won for capturing single handed

a small French force and leading them back to his own trenches by sheer bluff and personality. At the close of the war he was blinded by a gas attack and lost his sight for some time, and ultimately returned to Munich still in the army. Munich like the rest of Germany was in a state of anarchy and after a desperate struggle had suppressed a Communist rising which committed the most brutal atrocities. Hitler was employed to lecture to the troops to correct the disaffection among them and show them the follies of Communism.

A few months after his return the disastrous terms of the Treaty of Versailles were made known to the Germans. They were received with a feeling of utter dismay which was soon succeeded by one of hopeless despair. Hitler in the meantime had discovered during his lectures to the soldiers where his real future lay, and determined to return to civilian life and devote himself to politics. He investigated all the various groups which had formed themselves, each sure that they had the means of saving Germany, but none of them had grasped what seemed to Hitler the only road to salvation. He alone conceived the bold idea of refusing to accept the exactions of the Treaty of Versailles; but how was he, an unknown soldier, to get his ideas to the people of Germany? One night he read a pamphlet, which had been given him at a meeting, by a workman called Anton Drexler, and realised that here at last was someone who was thinking along the right lines. Next evening he went to a meeting of this "Deutsche Arbeiterpartei", a group of seven men with only 7.50 marks for funds, which was later to emerge as the National Socialist Party and sweep the whole of Germany.

Hitler inevitably became their leader and convinced them that the only chance of success was to hold public meetings. One of their first modest ventures was a meeting in the Munich Hofbräu Keller, which held about 130 people. Hitler rose to address them and laid before them his whole plan for regenerating Germany. As he spoke the audience became wildly enthusiastic. He realised that he had the gift of oratory, and that by the use of this gift he could rouse Germany to action. The audience went out to spread everywhere the name of Hitler. Their future meetings grew larger and funds began to flow into the empty cash box. The Socialists became alarmed and decided to break up Hitler's meetings by physical violence; but he had foreseen this development and had called to him a handful of his old comrades of the battlefield and organised them as a militant body whom he called his Storm Troopers.

In November 1921 he decided to hold a great mass demonstration to test the real strength of the new movement, and if it succeeded to spread his organisation over the whole Reich. The Socialists determined that it should fail, and arranged to make an attack at the meeting which would smash the movement once and for all. The audience sat at little tables and refreshed themselves with beer while listening to the speaker. In Munich these beer mugs are heavy earthenware vessels. While Hitler was speaking the Socialists had been storing the empty mugs under their tables for ammunition, and at a given signal began hurling them at the heads of the audience and at Hitler who was standing on a table. During the rain of mugs Hitler never moved, and by some miracle was not hit.

His Storm Troopers went promptly into action and though they were unarmed and their opponents had knives and other ugly weapons and greatly outnumbered them, the Storm Troopers after a desperate fight drove them out of the meeting. The scene was one of the wildest description and the hall was littered with broken mugs and smashed tables and chairs. Hitler calmly continued his speech where he had left off as if nothing had happened. Henceforth the Storm Troopers were known as "Storm Detachment" (Sturm Abteilung or SA.).

While the Nazi movement was spreading through Bavaria, the Bavarians were getting more and more dissatisfied with the central government in Berlin, and a movement was spreading to separate Bavaria from the Republic. The Bavarian Minister von Knilling appointed, Herr von Kahr as Commissar with almost absolute power. Herr von Kahr broke off relations with Berlin and was joined in his revolt by the heads of the army and the police in Bavaria. There was talk of a march on Berlin, while Ebert was considering the possibility of ordering the army of the Republic to march on Bavaria. Von Kahr and Hitler were in agreement, but von Kahr hesitated and failed to push the rebellion. On November 9th 1923, Hitler and Ludendorff were marching through Munich at the head of their comrades and fellow members through cheering crowds, when they were stopped by a cordon of police who fired upon them. The scene was one of the wildest panic, the street was strewn with dead and wounded, eighteen of Hitler's comrades were killed, and Hitler was thrown down injuring his shoulder. This attack by the police was followed up by the arrest of Hitler and many of his party. At his trial he made a speech in which he unfolded his whole policy; a speech which made a great impression in Germany. "It is not you, Gentlemen",-he told the Court-"who pass judgment on us. We shall be judged before the eternal bar of history." He was condemned to five years imprisonment in the fortress of Landsberg, a sentence which was afterwards commuted to nine months, and was soon joined in prison by many of his followers who were allowed by the prison rules to mix together in the daytime. While there letters and presents poured in from all over Germany, but his organisation was rapidly falling to pieces without the presence of its leader. It was during his imprisonment that he dictated "Mein Kampf" to Hess.

When he left prison in December 1924 he had come to the conclusion that a revolution based on a coup d'état did not provide a permanent foundation on which to build a new state, and determined to undertake the colossal task of converting the whole German people and obtaining power by their votes. In spite of being forbidden to speak in several of the German federal states, his movement made rapid progress, and returned larger and larger numbers of members to the Reichstag at each election. The work of building up this great organisation was stupendous, and during elections he flew in a plane all over Germany speaking everywhere and organising his followers. Finally he had a large majority over any other party in the Reichstag, and Hindenburg conferred on him the post of Chancellor, on January 30, 1933. Hitler asked the Reichstag for absolute power for four years; this was granted, and afterwards confirmed by a plebiscite of the whole German people. Placed in power, he did not follow the usual practice of Dictators

and shoot his opponents . The more dangerous enemies of the new government were put in concentration camps, where they suffered no more hardships than the common soldier. Civil servants opposed to him and Jewish professors and heads of institutions, were pensioned off at the full value they would have received in old age. Then began the vast task of re-organising Germany; the most bloodless revolution the world has ever seen had been accomplished .

One cannot read the story of Hitler's early life without realising that everything went to form his mind for his future task. Consciously his ambition was to become a painter, but his early absorption in history and geography pointed in another direction. As a young boy, he came to realise what it meant to be separated from Germany, and to live in an Empire which is largely dominated by alien Slavonic influences. He read a history of the war of 1870 when he was a boy, and asked himself, why did we not go to the help of the Germans? The answer was plain. Because although we are Germans, we are divided from our blood brothers; the peoples would have joined, but the outside influence of rival dynasties kept them apart. Can we not see in this deep impression the reason behind his resolve to unite Austria and Germany, and his determination to bring the Sudeten Germans back to their fatherland? He has denounced the folly of conquering and subduing foreign peoples. He had a perfect example before him in his youth, in the endless struggles to subdue the turbulent slav populations of the Austrian Empire, which finally caused its destruction. He was horrified when he visited as a young man the Austrian parliament, and found it full of Slavs who were making long speeches in languages which only a few could understand, and whose racial hatreds finally boiled up into a free fight.

The great social reforms which he has carried out can in the same way be attributed to his early experience . His sufferings of poverty, uncertainty of employment, and starvation in Vienna, when he was left an orphan at eighteen and had to become a labourer, made a deep impression on his mind, and unconsciously again, fate was shaping his destiny, giving him by this harsh treatment an understanding and insight into the difficulties and struggles of the working classes, which he could never have had otherwise. He has fought and conquered for Germany the terrible disease of unemployment, remembering his own misery when he was workless, and the pressing anxiety of where the next meal was to come from.

Brought into contact with Communism, the accepted faith of his fellow workmen, he was faced at an early age with fundamental political problems . Communism aims at a class war which would split Europe horizontally and result in an international communist state. Hitler saw in nationalism an emotional force which could unite all the peoples of a nation in a common purpose of justice for all classes. Communism appeals to hate, and denies the national bond, while nationalism appeals to the natural good feeling between the members of the same community. Communism is therefore necessarily anti-Christian, and nationalism is Christian, so long as it is used as a motive for internal reform, and does not result, as it has done so often in the past, in the proof of patriotism being the

extent of our hatred of other nations . Brought into intimate contact with Communism as an active political force, and not as a subject for discussion in the study, he learnt to hate it, and to hate the men who were exploiting the workmen for their own purposes . His contact with Communism was therefore a part of his training for his future task ; still a boy in years, he had to choose between the risk of starvation or the acceptance of Communism, and he chose to suffer hunger rather than bow the knee to the god of hate and class war. As a soldier in the battlefield, he was to learn the horror and the mad futility of war, and the wickedness of hatred between nation and nation . Patriotism, according to Hitler, means, thou shalt love the people of thine own nation as thyself . Patriotism according to the Peace treaties, means, thou shalt hate the people of other nations.

The solution of these fundamental problems was hammered out by the young Hitler in suffering, and the lessons learnt burnt into his soul. Most men who had endured what he had, would have joined the ranks of those preaching the gospel of hate; hatred of the rich and powerful, and hatred of the peoples of other nations. It is true that in "Mein Kampf", he shows something of the old Adam, but the fires of suffering have burnt all dross out of his soul, so that he comes today before men with a message of Peace and goodwill. We have many impressions of Hitler from those who have known him personally, but perhaps the most interesting is the one given by his jailer . The relation of jailer and prisoner is naturally a difficult one, and yet he speaks of Hitler's unfailing courtesy, and prompt recognition of the necessity for prison discipline. The jailer occasionally had difficulties with the young Nazis, who were indignant at their imprisonment, and chafed at prison rules. When trouble arose he had only to go to Hitler, who would say, "leave it to me", and everything was put right . He speaks of his unfailing cheerfulness, how he encouraged his followers, and kept them interested to break the monotony of prison life, and of his invincible courage in spite of the apparent wreckage of his party. His kindly personality, simplicity, modesty and absence of all pretence are spoken of by everyone . When his old Munich landlady summoned up courage to call upon him, she had only to explain to the two S. S. men on guard that she had known Hitler in the old days, to have every door opened to her and to be greeted by Hitler as a dear old friend. While Hitler has this charming personality, he is of the stern stuff of which leaders of revolutions are made . He stands apart and like all men of genius who have led great movements he is simple and direct, and puzzles and alarms the complex confused personalities of the ordinary diplomatist; yet anyone who will with an open mind study his speeches and watch his actions can learn to understand him . Dwelling among his beloved mountains he makes his decisions and carries them out swiftly and with absolute certainty.

He burns with one consuming passion, his love of Germany and the German people, rich and poor, old and young, and above all the children . "How wonderful", he has said, "are the children of Germany." He feels bitterly her wrongs, the Treaty of Versailles and all that followed. The writer of "Mein Kampf" is there today, with its cynical exposure of European statesmanship, and its call for revenge, but he has found a better way. He has

realised that the war and the infamous Treaty were symptoms of a deep rooted disease and that Europe must begin anew. He bases his political creed on an idealised conception of nationality, and of race of which nationality is the flower. God, he tells us, has made different nations. Each nationality has some thing to contribute to civilisation but the value of the contribution lies in its being essentially national. Those who say that Hitler is out for the conquest of other peoples show a complete misconception of his beliefs. To introduce an alien element by conquest of another country is to injure your own. A race can only reach its highest perfection if it is kept pure, and a nation must work out its own salvation and must care above all else for its own people. Patriotism in its highest form means the complete subjugation of individual gain for the whole community. He believes that no alien element can be expected to work in with this ideal, and herein lies one of his main arguments against the Jewish community in Germany.

Instead of suppressing nationalities, the policy of the treaties which the League supported, he takes that deep emotion-love of country-and bends it to a new purpose, service to one's own people and peace with one's neighbours. There are times when God in compassion for the self inflicted sufferings of men sends a man simple and direct in thought and inspired by one passion, to carry out an ideal which controls him. Hitler has been entrusted with the task not only of saving the German people, but of securing peace in a distracted Europe. Future generations will recognise him as the man who led Europe into the paths of peace.

Side note: **General Leon Degrelle on the education of Adolf Hitler**

"Hitler was self-taught and he made no attempt to hide the fact. The smug conceit of intellectuals, their shiny ideas packaged like so many flashlight batteries, irritated him at times. His own knowledge he had acquired through selective and unremitting study, and he knew far more than thousands of diploma-decorated academics. I don't think anyone ever read as much as he did. He normally read one book every day, always first reading the conclusion and the index in order to gauge the work's interest for him. He had the power to extract the essence of each book and then store it in his computer-like mind. I have heard him talk about complicated scientific books with faultless precision, even at the height of the war.

His intellectual curiosity was limitless. He was readily familiar with the writings of the most diverse authors, and nothing was too complex for his comprehension. He had a deep knowledge and understanding of Buddha, Confucius and Jesus Christ, as well as Luther, Calvin, and Savonarola; of literary giants such as Dante, Schiller, Shakespeare and Goethe; and analytical writers such as Renan and Gobineau, Chamberlain and Sorel. He trained himself in philosophy by studying Aristotle and Plato. He could quote entire paragraphs of Schopenhauer from memory, and for a long time carried a pocket edition of Schopenhauer with him. Nietzsche taught him much about willpower.

His thirst for knowledge was unquenchable. He spent hundreds of hours studying the works of Tacitus and Mommsen, military strategists such as Clausewitz, and empire

builders such as Bismarck. Nothing escaped him: world history or the history of civilizations, the study of the Bible and the Talmud, Thomistic philosophy and all the masterpieces of Homer, Sophocles, Horace, Ovid, Titus Livius and Cicero. He knew Julian the Apostate as if he had been his contemporary. His knowledge also extended to mechanics. He knew how engines worked; he understood the ballistics of various weapons; and he astonished the best medical scientists with his knowledge of medicine and biology.

The universality of Hitler's knowledge may surprise or displease those unaware of it, but it is nonetheless a historical fact: Hitler was one of the most cultivated men of this century. Many times more so than Churchill, an intellectual mediocrity; or than Pierre Laval, who had a merely cursory knowledge of history; or than Roosevelt; or Eisenhower, who never got beyond detective novels." - Leon Degrelle (1993)

The Beleaguered City

In order to understand Hitler's denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles, it is necessary to realise the strategic position of Germany at the time he came into power, and to compare the map of Europe at that time with the map before the war. Germany is bounded by other countries, except along the Baltic, and if we proceed to trace this post-war frontier we shall find that the title given to this chapter was fully justified at that time. We shall begin with the frontier facing France. Alsace and Lorraine, which had belonged to Germany since the war of 1870, were restored to France. These territories which contain a mixed French and German population, have changed hands more than once. Louis XIV seized them in time of peace, and they continued to be part of France after the close of the Napoleonic wars, to be regained by Germany in 1870. France never ceased to look forward to their recovery; the statues in Paris representing the two provinces being always draped in black. It is probable that if they had not been taken by Germany in 1870, the war of 1914 would have been confined to Eastern Europe. While the Treaty of Versailles was being drafted, Foch wished to have the whole of the Rhine Provinces added to France, and during their occupation after the Treaty was signed, attempts were made to agitate for their separation from Germany. The plebiscite taken in the Saar at the end of its occupation under the League, showed clearly that these provinces had no desire for separation, but they were included in the neutral zone, and German troops were forbidden to enter them. France built the Maginot line of forts within five miles of the frontier, armed with powerful siege guns able to throw shells twenty miles inside the German frontier. These forts extended from the Rhine to the borders of Luxembourg.

The Treaty of Versailles re-created the country of Poland out of Russian, German and Austrian territory, and in order to give Poland an outlet to the sea, presented her with a broad strip of land on the Vistula, ending in the town of Danzig, which was made a free city under the suzerainty of Poland and the League. This strip of territory cuts off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Difficulties have arisen over Danzig, the population of which is more than 90% German, difficulties which have been increased by Poland

building the new port of Gdynia in the neighbourhood, on Polish territory, to which her sea-going trade is being diverted. The Polish corridor contains a mixed population of Poles and Germans, and was given to Poland without a plebiscite. According to the German census of 1910, it contained a majority of Germans. A considerable section of Silesia, including three quarters of the valuable Silesian coal fields, was given to Poland in spite of a plebiscite in favour of retention by Germany. As this extensive minefield had been developed by German capital, and contained a considerable German population, this region has also been the source of endless difficulties. One of the causes of trouble is the low standard of living and wages of the Polish miner, wages which the German miner who was handed over has had to accept.

The Treaty of Versailles carved up the whole Austrian Empire, creating the new country of Czecho-Slovakia, which contained six different races over whom the Czechs, having a small majority, have ruled. Bohemia which, as can be seen from the map, cuts into the heart of Germany, was formerly part of the friendly Austrian Empire, but now belongs to Czecho-Slovakia. It has been a bone of contention between the Czechs and the Germans for centuries, contains a population one third German and two thirds Czech, and includes the important historical city of Prague. The German population suffered severely under Czech rule; the Czechs never having carried out the clauses in the Peace treaties designed for the protection of minorities. Czecho-Slovakia is a democracy, but a democratic government is no protection to an alien race in a permanent minority, and the Czechs kept their prisons full of German political prisoners. It is generally admitted today that the commissioners who drew up the new frontiers showed very little wisdom or knowledge of the various peoples whose fate they were deciding in an arbitrary manner. They refused a plebiscite which had been promised by Wilson whenever it suited their purpose.

If we now look at the geographical position of Germany as a whole when Hitler came into power, it is obvious that she had extensive frontiers on the other side of which were peoples who were far from friendly, not through any faults of the German people of today, but because of long enmity extending into the past. France and Germany had been foes since the days of Louis XIV both for racial and historical reasons, and France hastened, as soon as the war was concluded, to build up an army far more formidable than the one she had possessed in 1914, to make alliances with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia directed against Germany, and to lend these countries large sums to enable them to buy arms. In Bohemia, in place of the friendly Austrian Empire, Germany had the Czechs who were her hereditary foes, and resuscitated Poland was not too friendly to the Germans who assisted in carving up her territory in the 18th century. Behind Poland and Czecho-Slovakia lies the Soviet Republic which has two reasons for hating Germany: the racial reason that as Slavs they hate Germans; and the political reason that the Soviet is a Communist Government bitterly opposed to National Socialism, the Nazi revolution being just in time to prevent a Communist revolution in Germany. Finally, France, after the signing of the Treaty of Locarno, which seemed to give Germany some security, entered into an alliance

with Russia which Czecho- Slovakia also joined. Czecho-Slovakia offered Bohemia to Russia as a base for her bombing planes, within 150 to 250 miles of every important city in Germany except Hamburg, and promised a free passage to the Soviet troops through her territory to attack Germany.

No one therefore who looks at the map can doubt the correctness of the title I have given to this chapter. The huge guns of the Maginot line can destroy the German towns to 20 miles behind the frontier, and it forms a military base for the invasion of the Rhine provinces ; while a Russian fleet of bombing planes planted in Bohemia can destroy the cities of Germany. The invasion of the Ruhr by France in time of peace had shown Germany what to expect from her neighbours if she remained in this vulnerable position to the enemy without the gates. In addition, at the time when Hitler came into power, the Communist vote had risen to 7 million, and the German people had already experienced the horrors of a Communist rising in Munich, Central Germany, the Ruhr Valley and in Hamburg. Horrors that would have been repeated all over Germany if Hitler had not acted promptly. Germany's very existence depended on a highly centralised government; a stern internal discipline; the training to arms of the young men; the possession of munitions not inferior to her neighbours; and the organisation of the whole nation for one purpose, the preservation of the German people from attack. Germany is not in the position to attack, nor desirous of attacking any nation in Europe; but no nation could be expected to tolerate for long this policy of encirclement without taking measures for defence.

National Socialism

Before describing National Socialism, it is necessary to discuss the ideas that inspired the political systems of the 19th century, which saw the rapid spread of democratic forms of government originating from the writers of the 18th century . Brought up from childhood in the belief that Democracy was the last word in perfect government I may be allowed to criticize it in my old age. The stress of the war and the aftermath of war has led not only to the flight of Kings but the collapse of Parliaments and the rise to power of rulers from the people . Dictators govern or non-parliamentary regimes exist in Turkey, Russia, Poland, Germany, Italy and Spain, dictators who have risen to power by the sheer necessity of the situation . The average man, peasant or workman, is not interested in theories of Government . All he asks is law and order and a reasonable modicum of honesty and efficiency. The failure to obtain this minimum has resulted in the rise of Dictators, to replace anarchy and revolution by law and order.

The Government of our country, which has grown up through the centuries and like a patched old coat sits comfortably on the shoulders of John Bull, is not to be taken as a typical example of Democratic Government . Artificially created Democracies are very different. A Democratic Government gives every adult citizen a vote for the election of a member of Parliament and from among the members of Parliament the Government of

the day is chosen . He therefore has a part in the Government and the utmost freedom of opinion is necessarily allowed so that the elector can decide what he wants and vote accordingly. The defect in Democracy is that while it gives the individual citizen certain powers and privileges it asks nothing from him in return for the benefit of the community. In fact the community has no organized conscious national life. The voter having recorded his vote has no further duties to the State than to keep the law and avoid the police. It is true the citizen may be called upon by the State to fight as a soldier, but in time of peace nothing is asked of him . Parliament may pass laws for the common good but they are administered by State officials. The only organized life with an ethical idea of service is centred round the Churches or voluntary organizations . The Democratic State having given the utmost tolerance to freedom of opinion leaves the citizen to act as best he can for his own aggrandisement. The State consists of separate disconnected units and is not a living organism . It has made a God of Intellect but left out Ethics . It is notorious that in continental Parliaments each Party is willing to sacrifice the common good to its own advancement, and that they are incompetent and apt to become corrupt.

We have been saved from these defects because centuries of tradition have planted in us certain instincts which cause us to regard the body politic as a whole and to pull together in times of crisis in defence of the Nation; but that does not necessarily happen in artificial Democracies. Our constitution is so complex, with a Monarchy, with a House of Lords, with traditions and customs derived from the past, and with all kinds of influences flowing into the national life, that it cannot be compared with any other Democracy. We have above all traditions of service which come from the Aristocracy and landed classes of this country who, though deprived of power and to a great extent of wealth, still occupy the front pages as news, because of what they stood for in the past, and still in many instances stand for to-day. It is true the new rich and the more frivolous members of the Aristocracy have lowered the standard, but the best of the old families continue quietly their social duties. I can admire an old family who, like the Cecils, through generations have preserved a standard of public service, but I cannot admire a successful soap boiler.

To them we owe the fact that our public schools still carry on that ideal of service-though never expressed-to the State and the Empire, and the ruling classes trained in them still keep control of the government. It is not without interest that just as our public schools with their system of monitors and heads of games and houses are training boys to rule in the best sense of the word, so Hitler has found the need for the same idea in Germany and through the Hitler Youth Organisation is giving that training which is so essential and which has always been absent from the German schools. The Established Church has also kept up a tradition of Christian conduct, and the Society of Friends has always set a high standard of public service. I remember visiting a linen mill at Belfast many years ago and being horrified to see the girls at the machines in a room full of steam, soaked to the waist, and with no opportunity of changing before going home in the bitter cold outside. I asked: "Are all your mills like this?" "All but one", was the reply, "but", with a shrug of the shoulders, "that belongs to a Quaker".

We can call our constitution a Democracy if we like, but it is modified by traditions drawn from the past which make it workable. All these traditions of national life are necessarily absent in Germany, because of her history, and have to be created. We have another advantage owing to the fact that a stable though changing form of Government has existed so long in this country. Like pebbles in a stream, we have rubbed together until we are rounded and trained in toleration and moderation. It was the absence of any idea of the State as an organized whole that led the thinkers of the 18th and early 19th century to try to plan a State in which the individual served the community. If by Socialism we mean the idea of the State as an organic whole to which the individual members must render service, it is as old as Plato's Republic, and certain early writers on Socialism, and Hegel in his Political Philosophy, developed this conception. Democracy combined with the false interpretation of the Economics of Adam Smith into a rule of conduct, had reduced the people of this country to such a condition by the middle of the 19th century that if the State had not interfered by legislation, we would have committed race suicide!

Unfortunately for the advance of civilized communities Karl Marx, by means of an unsound economic theory, side-tracked the Socialist movement from its purpose of remodelling the whole State, into a class war by which the Proletariat was to seize all the means of production and eliminate the middle class. The movement towards a true Socialistic development of the State which we owe to Ruskin, Owen, Kinglery, and Disraeli, was directed into a class war which has produced red revolution in Russia and been barren of any productive results in this country. Social legislation has been passed by both the Conservative and Liberal parties, but since a separate Labour Party was formed, though twice in office, they have produced no results, the last progressive piece of legislation-the Housing and Unemployment Acts-having been passed by the Coalition Government under Lloyd George. The attempts to create a class party and a class war in this country have proved a failure. The people of this country, tired of political strife, have now twice returned by large majorities a Coalition Government, not because they necessarily admire its capacity or efficiency but because they are determined not to trust the country or the Empire to those who lead the Labour Party and still mumble the ideas derived from Karl Marx. The Bovril of Communism mixed with luke warm water does not attract the majority of voters. The complaint is made that the youth of the country takes no interest in politics. They have too much sense.

The time has come when we must return to Plato and the conception of the State as an organic whole to which each citizen must give service, and the sacrifice of individual interests for the common good. We must remember that we profess Christianity and that the principles governing the relations of the individual to his fellows have been laid down for all time in the Gospels, and given us the right ideals on which to found a living organic State. This does not mean that we have to deny Democracy, but on the contrary endow Democracy with an ethical principle. We are not wanting as a community in ethical instincts and desire to benefit our fellow creatures, but the whole needs co-ordinating as

a conscious ethic guiding the Government and the individual. Without such an ethic, Democracy demoralizes the politician and the Press. We need therefore to return to a genuine Socialism, that is, the conception of the State as an organic living entity demanding service and sacrifice of individual gain from its members, and ending class war and spoliation. There are times in history when a great leader arises and sweeping aside all forms of Government establishes a personal rule. Such a crisis had arisen in Germany, and Hitler has become a great leader, but the main interest to the student is not his personal rule but the ideal of a State which he has evolved and is working out in Germany. He is the product of all those, from Plato onwards, who have imagined the State as an organic whole consciously guided by an ethical principle and calling on its individual members to play their part each in his place in helping forward the ethical idea by which the State is guided. His originality lies in converting these abstract ideas into a living principle of life by substituting for the abstraction the State, the living reality—the German Nation.

The sufferings of the German people have made them ardent Nationalists. The Fatherland, crushed and trampled on by the Nations of Europe, suffering every humiliation, has become to the German people the one object of their devotion. The love of the Reich has become a living and consuming flame. Hitler has seized upon that and directed it to an ethical aim. If we wish to appeal to youth we must ask them for service and if need be sacrifice. Only in that way can we utilize their ethical inspiration, and so he has appealed to the youth of Germany. He will accept no class division; he will stamp out all class war. No man can ask more than to be a citizen of the German Nation, and it is as a member of the body corporate that Hitler addresses his appeal to him. He has fused all parties together to cast them in a new mould. He has accepted the economic system of Germany as he found it, though he is modifying it in many ways by the action of the State, and while he has carried out many sound reforms profoundly modifying conditions in Germany, these are merely the outward and visible sign. He is aiming at a change of heart, a new ideal of action, a conversion of the German people, without which external machinery is of little use. Doubtless many of the experiments will fail and fresh plans be worked out, but as long as the ethical idea is there, reforms are easy which here would be difficult.

It must be remembered that the Continental Trades Unions are very different to ours, being almost entirely in the hands of political agitators. Obviously the existence of Trades Unions whose leaders were paid to promote class war, was intolerable to the Nazi idea, and Hitler substituted the organization called the Labour Front, with committees of masters and men elected by secret ballot, and State officials who act as overseers and have the last word. Most elaborate labour laws have been passed guarding the workman in every kind of way, and while wages are low the conditions of life are very much improved. Not only are full wages paid during all holidays but the "Strength through Joy" organization has brought to every workman the opportunity of attending concerts and theatres and of cheap holiday travel including sea voyages and visits to foreign countries. Two special

25,000 ton ships have been built and four others chartered for this purpose, and hiking hostels are provided everywhere. Housing is being carried out on an enormous scale, both in town and country, and factories are not only being made sanitary but pleasant to work in with the provision of dining rooms and bathing facilities. There is still much distress in big cities and the most complete and remarkable voluntary association has been created to deal with this problem, while the "one pot meal" every month during winter has helped to provide funds. It may be truthfully said that in Berlin last winter no person went without sufficient food and clothing and enough coal to keep one fire burning. The Nazi organization puts at the service of the State a million and a half willing voluntary workers.

Hitler has said that a healthy State is built on the peasant, and Germany has over half a million peasant families cultivating their own land. Our peasants alas are landless. He has made the house and land the possession of the family for all time descending from father to son, and has made it illegal to mortgage the house and farm. Any destitute member of the family has the right to food and shelter in the ancestral home. Prices are fixed and the State organizes distribution. Good food is cheap and plentiful in Germany, yet the peasant is doing well. The middle man is retained for distribution but can no longer rig the market and ruin the farmer with low prices, and plunder the consumer. The only way the traveller can judge internal prices is by what he pays in restaurants. Two of us made an excellent meal on roast venison with cranberry sauce, Swiss cheese, butter, brown bread and beer for a total of three and a half marks in Nuremberg.

When Hitler first got control there were six million unemployed in Germany. To-day there is a shortage of workmen, and Italian, Dutch and Polish workmen are being brought in. Those for whom work could not be found during the first years were employed in road making, land reclamation and similar tasks. They had to move from place to place and so live in camp, and were necessarily under discipline to ensure order and train them to a form of labour which was new to many of them. Our plan of paying men the dole and allowing them to loaf in idleness is utterly abhorrent to the German mind. The employment of the unemployed on public works in this country was destroyed by the Trades Unions demanding standard rates of wages for unskilled labour. The cost was prohibitive. Clothed, fed and housed, and his family looked after, the German unemployed are glad to work. This has been described by our Labour Party as slave labour. No one would be more astonished than the German unemployed at such a description. I shall deal in more detail with parts of this social re-organization in subsequent chapters, but I have said enough to show the general lines. They will make mistakes; but the team spirit is there and the determination to succeed. Our Policy under the false application of the teaching of Adam Smith was in the 19th century to put economic gain first. Hitler's policy has been to put the well being of the people first, to consider the race not the multiplication of goods. He has been rewarded by success in the field of economics.

Nothing has caused more criticism of the German revolution than their handling of the Jewish question. I do not propose to defend it, but give certain explanations which are

worthy of consideration. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the whole business has been grossly exaggerated and active imaginations have been at work inventing unspeakable horrors. During the early days of the revolution brutalities were committed on both sides, many of Hitler's followers being shot down by Communists, and rightly or wrongly they hold in Germany that Communism is a Jewish revolutionary movement. The hatred of the Jew on the continent is not confined to Germany. The anti-Jewish pogroms that have taken place in Poland were so dreadful that the Polish Government did not allow any news of them to leave the country, and there can be no doubt that Hitler, by bringing the whole matter under law and regulation, saved the Jews from massacre. It is difficult for us to understand this bitter hatred. We find the Jew a law-abiding, hard-working citizen, and have no complaint to make. It is doubtless true of the Jew as of all human beings, that good treatment makes a good citizen and bad treatment a bad citizen.

The only law passed by the Government dealing with the Jewish question, when Hitler came into power, was the Nuremberg Law dealing with marriage. There are to-day some 500,000 Jews in Germany but they are excluded from many professions and Government service. On the other hand they have their own cultural society, theatres and concerts and are protected from ill treatment by the Police. Mixed up with this Jewish question is the racial question. The Nordic peoples differ from the Latin peoples in guarding jealously the purity of the blood. We have never in this country objected to intermixed marriages with Jews, but an officer in the army in India who marries a Hindu girl would have to resign his commission, while in the U.S.A. and South Africa etc. the slightest taint of negro blood means social ostracism. In dealing with this difficult question I merely wish to point out that enmity to the Jew is not peculiar to Germany, and that it is better to regulate the Jewish position by law than to have outbreaks of fanaticism. True, Karl Marx was a Jew and rightly or wrongly, as I have said, Communism is regarded in Germany as being Jewish in origin and being organized by Jews.

The dismissal from their posts of distinguished men of learning, artists, musicians, scholars and men of science because they were of Jewish blood gave great offence among the intellectual classes. Art, science and learning recognizes no boundaries of race. What was not known in this country was that these men were offered full retiring pensions if they remained in Germany and that they had managed to fill a large preponderance of posts to the exclusion of Germans. It is true that our Government is doing its best to-day to exclude foreign musicians and actors from this country, a most indefensible proceeding which makes it difficult to criticize the action of Germany, but it was the dismissal given in the highest ranks of learning that shocked Europe and America. Every revolutionary political movement like every religious movement has its excesses and intolerances, and far too much has been made of their blunders. To-day we regard the French Revolution with all its horrors and excesses as marking a step forward in political history. It is only necessary to look back at contemporary writing in this country to realize we could not see the wood for the trees. The quarrel with Rome was inevitable, because the Vatican will interfere in politics, and just as we had to fight the Vatican to a finish for two hundred

years, so any strong Government which wishes to be master in its own home has sooner or later to face the opposition of Rome. We at any rate should understand and sympathize with the position of the German Government.

To us the whole idea of imprisonment for political opinions is abhorrent, but we do not hesitate to arrest and imprison thousands of prisoners without trial in India, and in Belfast to-day any Roman Catholic is liable to arrest and trial before a secret tribunal and can be imprisoned merely on "suspicion" without trial. Political prisoners are not peculiar to Germany. All continental countries, including Democratic Czecho-Slovakia and even France have their political prisoners and secret police.

The Foreign Policy of Germany

Before explaining the foreign policy of Germany it is necessary to describe briefly the mental attitude of the Nations of Europe towards each other, as expressed by their Press and their politicians, - an attitude that has been clearly revealed by all that has happened in connection with the Spanish civil war. This civil war has inevitably resulted in different nations taking sides, Germany and Italy supporting Franco, and Russia and France the Government in Madrid, while in this country both sides are represented. From the beginning of the civil war armament manufacturers in all countries have been busy supplying munitions to both sides. In addition to munitions thousands of volunteers have poured into the country, more especially from Italy where the people and the Government are both violently pro-Franco. Our Government, by setting up the non-intervention committee have tried to restrain the flood of armaments. Germany was the first to propose that all Governments pledge themselves to restrain to the best of their ability the entrance into Spain of volunteers, and after considerable delay the non-intervention committee adopted that policy.

Since the date when that pledge was given both Germany and Italy have been repeatedly accused by the French and English Press and by prominent politicians, of having broken faith in this matter, on no evidence except the excited statements of the Madrid Government, and the rumours collected and transmitted as facts by the journalists. The most outrageous statements have been published, from the accusation that the bombing raid on Guernica was ordered from Berlin, to the accusation by Litvinoff that the Italian Government were responsible for the pirate submarines. Anything in the way of unreliable rumours can be excused to the Madrid Government, suffering from war hysteria, but the accusations in our Press and by prominent politicians are a different matter.

Let us probe a little deeper into this mental attitude of distrust. France has busied herself making "mutual security" Pacts and lending large sums for the purchase of arms to various nations, so as to secure an overwhelming combination of force directed against Germany. The assumption underlying this policy is that owing to the rapacious instincts of Germany, Peace can only be kept by the threat of war, and by collecting on one side the biggest battalions. Our military alliance with France is made on the assumption that the German

Nation is ready at any moment to make an unprovoked aggressive attack on France, an action of which the German Nation has never been guilty. The same atavistic conceptions of the relations between nations is to be found in the League Covenant itself. In that Covenant the Nations solemnly pledge themselves to refer disputes to the League and accept the League's decision, and even if this prove impossible, to delay war for so many months. Yet in Articles 10-16 it is assumed that the responsible Governments of these Nations are capable at any time of making unprovoked attacks on each other and therefore according to the suppositions of the League Policy, Peace can only be preserved among these treacherous ruffians by organizing under the League an overwhelming military force composed of a similar collection of scoundrels.

If the members of the League cannot be trusted, the mutual security pacts are worthless, as all agreements and arrangements between people or nations with the mentality of crooks is unreliable. I do not propose to be led here into a discussion of the complex and highly disputatious question of Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Abyssinia, but in so far as Europe is concerned, since the formation of the League of Nations only three cases of unprovoked aggression have taken place in Europe, - the seizure of Vilna by Poland, of Memel by Lithuania and the occupation of the Ruhr by France. That wars may arise in Europe is quite possible. The Treaties of Versailles and Trianon have sown the seeds of numerous wars, but the first step towards Peace is that Nations should accept and believe the honest intention and desire for Peace and for fair play of other nations. That we have departed so far from this reasonable attitude is not due to the peoples of Europe, but to their Press and their politicians. If I print in a newspaper that Mr. Jones is a liar and a treacherous scoundrel Mr. Jones is able to bring an action for libel, but there is no law of libel for Nations or the rulers of Nations, and the most that can be done is for the aggrieved Government to demand an apology. When a very distinguished politician calls Hitler a gangster in the House of Commons there is no redress.

Evil speaking, lying and slandering is specially forbidden in the Prayer Book but apparently it does not apply to Nations or the Governments of Nations. When M. Blum made a speech while still Prime Minister, in which he promised Czechoslovakia that in case of an unprovoked aggression by Germany, France would declare war, he assumed that an unprovoked aggression was just the kind of thing that Germany would indulge in. We have been told in the French Press that Germany intends to make war on Czechoslovakia, that next spring she intends to attack France, that she is preparing for war against Russia to conquer and annex the Ukraine. I have discussed this mental attitude at some length because it is so universal that it is assumed as a matter of course, and the grossest insults against a friendly Power are allowed in Parliament with no protest from our minister of foreign affairs. In discussing, therefore, the foreign policy of Germany, I am handicapped by the reply that Hitler in his speeches is telling lies to deceive Europe. It is no use stating that his foreign policy is thoroughly understood and accepted by the German people.

The reply is that they are ordered with the dread of imprisonment to deceive foreigners, and quotations torn from the context and taken from "Mein Kampf" are given as proof

of their duplicity . No one in Germany, including Hitler himself, regards the extreme foreign policy in "Mein Kampf" as a guide to German foreign policy to-day. Let me in spite of these disadvantages do my best to explain . We have seen that the Nazi movement is one welding the German people into a living organic State developing their own nationality and culture. From this devotion to their own nationality comes a respect for other nations. Hitler expressed the faith within him when he said God has created different nations that each should fulfil its own life and culture as its contribution to civilization. He therefore regards the conquest of another Nation as a crime against the national idea, and territory so acquired as a source of weakness to the conquering Nation, because alien elements are introduced into the national life and the conquered people have to be held in subjection, thus destroying their right to fulfil their own national life . He points out that Europe has been engaged for centuries in territorial conquests and in the end the nations have retained their original boundaries. He regards war for territorial conquest in Europe as a crime against civilization and a useless and unwise expenditure of force. I believe that if Alsace and Lorraine were offered to Germany as a gift she would refuse . He therefore quite truthfully says he cannot conceive of any possible cause for quarrel with France.

On the other hand the German Nation is intensely interested in the conditions under which Germans are living under alien rule, and it has long been obvious that the Germans in Austria and the Germans in the Sudeten German area would ultimately become members of the Reich . Wherever Germans are living they wish them to become converted to the Nazi conception of a State, but that does not mean disloyalty to the people among whom they dwell. On the contrary it will make them better citizens. There is nothing aggressive towards other Nations in the Nazi faith, and many passages in "Mein Kampf" have been misunderstood because Hitler is discussing the German people in alien lands. This conceptions of the true attitude of the German Nation to other Nations is thoroughly understood in Germany. If we examine the foreign policy of Germany, we find this new conception running through their political action. Hitler has introduced a new idea of the relations between countries in his Peace Pacts, a Treaty between two neighbouring States not to make war on each other for a term of years. This Treaty contains no obligations to act as allies against other Nations. It is the only genuine Peace Treaty ever suggested, all other Treaties being alliances for purposes of war. This idea is transforming the whole political situation in Europe. Germany will never sign again a Treaty like the Treaty of Locarno which pledged the members to war under certain circumstances, nor join the League of Nations while Article 16 is operative. She alone of all Nations in Europe is free from obligations to make war under certain circumstances . The extent to which we are committed no citizen of this country knows.

Germany has offered these Peace Pacts to all her neighbours including ourselves. In addition Germany has agreed to a navy only one third the size of ours, and has pledged herself to respect the neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. She has established very friendly relations with Italy as they both dread the spread of revolutionary Commu-

nism, but she will form no Treaty or Alliance involving possibilities of war. Germany is very far removed in her mentality from a Pacifist policy. She believes in armed national defence and quick reprisals to an outrage like the bombing of the "Deutschland", but her conception of the right relations between the Nations of Europe is so new and the mental attitude of the other European politicians towards each other so atavistic that it is a difficult mental gulf for them to cross, and yet it is plain ordinary common sense.

A striking instance of German diplomacy is the agreement that she has made with Belgium . Under the Treaty of Locarno, France and England were pledged to go to the assistance of Belgium if attacked, and Belgium was equally obliged to go to their assistance. France and England proposed to Belgium the renewal of the old arrangements but Hitler dropped an explosive bomb into the negotiations by announcing that Germany was prepared to pledge herself to protect the neutrality of Belgium without any conditions. The Belgians being astute diplomatists used this to compel France and England to drop the clause requiring assistance from Belgium in case they were attacked, and France proceeded at once to spend vast sums on a line of forts between herself and her old ally. The Treaty between Germany and Belgium has now been ratified . Germany pledges herself not only to respect Belgian neutrality but to go to her defence if she is invaded, thus protecting her from an act of aggression by France . As the Daily Express says, the new Independence of Belgium is Independence from France. Germany has entered into the closest relations of friendship with Italy, and Yugoslavia has signed a Peace Pact with Italy and Bulgaria on the German model . Bulgaria has signed a Treaty of Friendship and of arrangement for mutual arbitration with Turkey, and Turkey has signed a Peace Pact on the German model with Persia, Iraq and Afghanistan . We alone have failed to realise the implications of a Peace Pact, and have shown more hostility to Germany since we signed it than we did before.

In none of these Treaties is there a hint of an alliance for purposes of war. The Pax Germanica now extends from the Channel to the Baltic, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and to the frontiers of India. Ultimately the Peace Pacts will result in the denunciation of the mutual security pacts . Poland having signed a Peace Pact both with Germany and with Russia is getting restive about her mutual security pact with France, which she realises is an obligation that might force her into war against a friendly neighbour. The great mass of mankind ask for Peace and security abroad, and law, order, and efficient government at home. Alone among European nations by her home and foreign policy Germany is securing this for the peoples of Europe and therefore the smaller nations are clustering round Germany. There is another aspect of this question that requires to be dealt with before leaving it. It is probably true that in 1914 the outbreak of war was very largely due to those in military command in the various countries involved. The last serious war in Europe had been in 1870. It was quickly over, the loss of life was according to our present standards insignificant, and it did not profoundly disturb the economics of Europe or even of France. Those in command of the armies of Europe in 1914 envisaged a war like that of 1870 and if they did not deliberately promote war, did nothing to avert

it. After all war is a soldier's business. To-day the situation is very different. Those in responsible command in Europe dread the idea of war, as they realize from their intimate knowledge what a fearful business it will be. The demand for war comes not from the Totalitarian States, not from the dictator or the soldier, but from the parties of the left in the Western Democracies. The whole policy of France was formerly directed to the oppression of Germany, and the creation of a divided Europe, and the danger of France setting fire to Europe was much increased by having a party of the left in power including the Communists. Daladier had to break with the Communists before he could get his Peace Pact signed.

Athens we know was forced into the Syracusan war by the mob, and to-day it is the parties of the left who are always clamouring for war. They work themselves into a state of hysteria over the sensational, unverified and one-sided statements published by the Press, and pass resolutions at public meetings urging war on the Government. At the end of the Abyssinian campaign I was present at a meeting of the Council of Action with Mr. Lloyd George in the chair, a body which consists of Nonconformists and Liberals. They carried a resolution with one dissentient vote, which I gave, in favour of a blockade of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea by our fleet. This would not only have meant war with Italy but as Italy was already in possession of Abyssinia, would have meant serious complications with other Powers including the U.S.A. At a meeting of the Labour Party not long ago they carried a resolution in favour of our expenditure on armaments because, the leaders explained, if returned to power they would require these armaments to make aggressive war on nations like Germany whose form of Government they did not approve, or undertake ventures like attacking Italy or Japan. The absurdity of their attitude towards the use of bombing planes by Japan is that we are building a huge fleet of bombing planes to use in exactly the same way if there is war in Europe, the proposals of Germany to limit the use of bombing planes to the actual battle areas having been rejected or at any rate ignored by our Government. As General Goering said when addressing the war veterans, "I believe that those who rattle the sabres have not participated in war."

In pre-war days we used to complain of the German Emperor rattling the sabre. To-day the rattling is done by the Labour leaders in England, and the real danger of war in Europe would be the success of the Labour Party in a general election. While pretending to be in favour of peace they are the firebrands that might set Europe alight. It is madness to have the mob of the left attacking and insulting Nation after Nation in public meetings, and our foreign office entering into commitments in Europe unless we are prepared at once to introduce conscription. We sent our half trained boys to fight trained soldiers in 1914 with the result that in the war of attrition that Earl Haig was always talking about three English soldiers were killed for one German. Is the same slaughter of our youth to take place again? Why can we not go quietly about our lawful occasions and leave other Nations alone?

England and Germany

In regard to Anglo-German relationship there has existed no reason for complaint during the last twenty years. The Germans have made a number of approaches with a view to establishing a better and closer understanding but all without avail. There is no evidence to show that these German approaches were not made honestly and fairly. I will quote only two examples from a number of such statements. The first is the relative passage in the Führer's speech of April 28, 1939, when he stated:

"During the whole of my political activity I have always expounded the idea of a close friendship and collaboration between Germany and England. In my Movement I found innumerable others of like mind. Perhaps they joined me because of my attitude in this matter. This desire for Anglo-German friendship and cooperation conforms not merely with sentiments which result from the racial origins of our two peoples, but also to my realization of the importance for the whole of mankind of the existence of the British Empire. I have never left room for any doubt of my belief that existence of this Empire is an inestimable factor of value for the whole of human cultural and economic life. By whatever means Great Britain has acquired her colonial territories—and I know that they were those of force and often brutality—nevertheless I know full well that no other Empire has ever come into being in any other way, and that in the final resort it is not so much the methods that are taken into account in history as success, and not the success of the methods as such, but rather the general good which the methods yield. Now there is no doubt that the Anglo-Saxon people have accomplished immeasurable colonizing work in the world. For this work I have a sincere admiration. The thought of destroying this labour appeared and still appears to me, seen from a higher human point of view, as nothing but the effluence of human wanton destructiveness. However, this sincere respect of mine for this achievement does not mean foregoing the securing of the life of my own people. I regard it as impossible to achieve a lasting friendship between the German and Anglo-Saxon peoples if the other side does not recognize that there are German as well as British interests, that not only is the preservation of the British Empire the meaning and purpose of the lives of Britishers, but also that for Germans the freedom and preservation of the German Reich is their life purpose. A genuine, lasting friendship between these two nations is only conceivable on the basis of mutual regard. The English rule a great Empire. They built up this Empire at a time when the German people were internally weak. Previously Germany had been a great Empire. At one time she ruled the Occident. In bloody struggles and religious dissensions, and as a result of internal political disintegration, this empire declined in power and greatness and finally fell into a deep sleep. But as this old empire appeared to have reached its end, the seeds of its rebirth were springing up. From Brandenburg and Prussia, there arose a new Germany, the second Reich, and out of it has grown at last the German People's Reich. And I hope that all English people understand that we do not possess the slightest feeling of inferiority to Britishers. Our historical past is far too great for that!

England has given the world many great men, and Germany no fewer. The severe struggle for the maintenance of the life of our people has in the course of three centuries cost a sacrifice in lives, which, far exceeds that which other peoples have had to make in asserting their existence. If Germany, a country that was for ever being attacked, was, not able to retain her possessions, but was compelled to sacrifice many of her provinces, this was due only to her political misdevelopment and her impotence as a result thereof. That ; condition has now been overcome . Therefore we Germans do not feel in the least inferior to the British Nation. Our self-esteem is just as great as that of an Englishman for England. In the history of our people, now of approximately two thousand years standing, there are occasions and actions enough to fill us with sincere pride. Now if England cannot understand our point of view, thinking perchance she may look upon Germany as a vassal state, then our love and friendly feelings have indeed been wasted on her . We shall not despair or lose heart on that account, but-relying on the consciousness of our own strength and on the strength of our friends-we shall then find ways and means to secure our independence without impairing our dignity. I have heard the statement of the British Prime Minister to the effect that he is not able to put any trust in German assurances. Under the circumstances I consider it a matter of course that we no longer wish to expect him or the British people to bear the burden of a situation which is only conceivable in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. When Germany became National Socialist and thus paved the way for her national resurrection, in pursuance of my unswerving policy of friendship with England, of my own accord I made the proposal for a voluntary restriction of German naval armaments. That restriction was, however, based on one condition, namely, the will and the conviction that a war between England and Germany would never again be possible. This wish and this conviction is alive in me today."

Secondly, in "Mein Kampf" there are many long references to Great Britain, and all of them are couched in tones of great appreciation. Hitler says that if German statesmen had had sufficient foresight to conclude an alliance with England early in the twentieth century, as Japan did in 1904, there would have been no Great War. Another important mistake made by German diplomats was to underestimate the fighting strength of the British Empire. Britain's total effectives were calculated in the basis of her standing army, a most fatal mistake . In this connexion Hitler writes "The fact that England did not possess a national army proved nothing; for it is not the actual military structure of the moment that matters, but rather the will and determination to use whatever military strength is available. England has always had the armament which she needed. She always fought with those weapons which were necessary for success. She sent mercenary troops to fight as long as mercenaries sufficed; but she never hesitated to draw heavily and deeply from the best blood of the whole nation when victory could be obtained only by such a sacrifice. And in every case the fighting spirit, dogged determination, and use of brutal means in conducting military operations have always remained the same. But in Germany, through the medium of the schools, the Press and the comic papers, an idea of the Englishman was gradually formed which was bound eventually to lead to the worst

kind of self-deception . This absurdity slowly but persistently spread into every quarter of German life. The result was an undervaluation for which we have had to pay a heavy penalty.

The delusion was so profound that the Englishman was looked upon as a shrewd business man, but personally a coward even to an incredible degree. Unfortunately, our lofty teachers of professorial history did not bring home to the minds of their pupils the truth that it is not possible to build up such a mighty organisation as the British Empire by mere swindle and fraud. The few who called attention to that truth were either ignored or silenced. I can vividly recall to mind the astonished looks of my comrades when they found themselves personally face to face for the first time with the Tommies in Flanders. After a few days of fighting the consciousness slowly dawned on our soldiers that those Scotsmen were not like the ones we had seen described and caricatured in the comic papers and mentioned in the communiqués."Soon after the War there was a widespread movement in Europe which had as a leitmotif the liberation of India. On this point Hitler writes in "Mein Kampf":

" I remember well the childish and incomprehensible hopes which arose suddenly in nationalist circles in the years 1920-21, to the effect that England was just nearing its downfall in India . A few Asiatic mountebanks, who put themselves forward as the champions of Indian Freedom', then began to peregrinate throughout Europe and succeeded in inspiring otherwise quite reasonable people with the fixed notion that the British World Empire, which had its pivot in India, was just about to collapse there. They never realised that their own wish was the father of all these ideas. Nor did they stop to think how absurd their wishes were . For inasmuch as they expected the end of the British Empire and of England's power to follow the collapse of its dominion over India, they themselves admitted that India was of the most outstanding importance for England. Now in all likelihood the deep mysteries of this most important problem must have been known not only to the German-National prophets but also to those who had the direction of British history in their hands. It is down right puerile to suppose that in England itself the importance of India for the British Empire was not adequately appreciated . And it is a proof of having learned nothing from the World War and of thoroughly misunderstanding or knowing nothing about Anglo-Saxon determination, when they imagine that England could lose India without first having put forth the last ounce of her strength in the struggle to hold it . Moreover, it shows how complete is the ignorance prevailing in Germany as to the manner in which the spirit of England permeates and administers her Empire . England will never lose India unless she admits racial disruption in the machinery of her administration (which at present is entirely out of the question in India), or unless she is overcome by the sword of some powerful enemy . But Indian risings will never bring this about. We Germans have had sufficient experience to know how hard it is to coerce England . And, apart from all this, I as a German would far rather see India under British domination than under that of any other nation."

The real Enemy of Europe

In the former chapters I have tried to show that Germany is engaged in building up a state on new and original lines which is entirely her own affair, whether we like it or not, has no aggressive designs on any other country and wishes to be left alone to develop her internal economy and external trade. She is also quite willing to continue to pay the salaries of Protestant Pastors and Roman Catholic Priests on condition that they leave politics alone and do not use the pulpit to attack the Government. This being her policy there seems no reason why other Nations and other ideologies should not have left her alone. She is, it is true, strongly armed but so are her neighbours and they began it.

After the threat of war by both France and Great Britain over the Sudeten German question, which was not the business of either of us, she naturally fortified her French frontier, an essential net of defence. As far as we are concerned as we had fallen far below the standard of other countries it was in an uncertain world, but it is obvious that these armaments are not directed against Germany unless our intention is a war of aggression. Nor is Germany arming against us. She has no cause of quarrel with us and no reason to believe that as long as we have a responsible Government in spite of the continued attacks in our Press and by certain politicians, that she has any reason to fear hostility on our part. She is not looking towards France and England but is looking across the plains of Poland at a much more dangerous enemy. The Soviet with 2,000,000 men on a Peace footing under arms, spent last year £1,000 millions on additional armaments and has behind her an unlimited supply of man power in Asia.

On the contrary while showing occasional nervousness at our expenditure on armaments, which if a popular front coalition came into power would be directed against her, she realises that all the armed forces of Germany, France, Italy and England may be needed to rescue Europe from an Asiatic invasion more formidable than any of the invasions of the past. I myself share her confidence in our peaceful intention. To-day Germany is no longer anxious to keep a watch on the Rhine, but on the Dneiper. The suggestions therefore of a mutual reduction of armaments between France, England and Germany are now out of date though at one time Germany would have considered them. She would rather say keep up your bombing plots and your munitions. They may all be needed to defend European civilisation from going down in a hideous massacre.

It is extraordinary how we shut our eyes to this danger with the horrible example of Spain before us. How we talk about the help given to Franco by Germany and Italy but ignore the help given to the Red Government by the Soviet. While the Nazi form of Government is, as Hitler has said again and again, intended for home consumption, Communism is international and is carrying on an underground agitation throughout the world, and insinuating itself into society and other organisations under various plausible names and disguises, having at its disposal the most formidable secret society in the world, continental Free Masonry, which is a very different affair to our amiable Free Masonry over here, and is revolutionary and anti-Christian. The centre of the Comintern is Moscow

and the Soviet Government gave themselves away when they broke of diplomatic relations with Hungary because she joined the anti-Comintern pact.

One of the cleverest lies put forth by the Communists and accepted over here, is that the anti-Comintern pact is directed against Democracy. It is true Germany resents the continued attacks made upon her in the name of Democracy and occasionally shows up the claims of Democracy to be the one perfect political system, but she has no desire to attack or replace Democracy in any Democratic country by another system. To each country the Government it prefers, is her motto. It is true that there is Nazi agitation in some European countries, because throughout the world many people have been convinced in favour of a Nazi State, but such agitation is not encouraged by the German Government. Communism is an international movement organising revolution in every country, and it has now been clearly demonstrated that the hideous massacres in Spain of Priests, Monks and Nuns, and the burning of Churches was connived at by the Government of the adventurers in Madrid made up of adventurers who had seized power.

The sustained attack on the German Government and the propagation of lie upon lie through our Press and by means of an endless stream of publications is to be traced back to Communist propaganda. While active Communist agitation has made little progress in this country, India and Burmah are rotten with Communism and Communism is wishing to set the four Powers at each other's throats. Whenever a step has been made towards agreement it swings back again, through a poisonous propaganda in which the British Press leads. Certain enmity to Germany is therefore to be expected on the part of Socialists, Extreme Protestants and the Roman Catholic Church. Germany has also another enemy-International Finance, because she will not borrow money outside but is holding up an economic system in which there is no room for the international financier.

If she would only borrow £100,000,000 in the City all our Press would coo like sucking doves and our friendship or hostility to the new Spanish Government will depend on whether she consults the City for money. All the different sources of hostility are at work, but they do not account for the persistent agitation on which large sums of money are being spent, an agitation for a deliberate purpose, a war in which the four Capitalist States will destroy each other so that a Communist state will be built on the ruins, and the one organised source of this persistent agitation is the Comintern with ample funds behind it in Moscow.

The Japanese war in China is not directed against the independence of China or for the possession of territory. It is war against the Soviet. The complete control of the Soviet over Czechoslovakia has been amply proved. When Hitler said he would if compelled fight his way into Sudeten Germany it was not only to free the Sudeten Germans but to close the open door into Europe for the Soviet armies. As I have already pointed out if we had been so rash as to plunge Europe into war on that question and invite the assistance of the Soviet, Europe would have been doomed. In the strategic position of the mountains of Poland, the guns are now pointed not towards Germany but towards Russia. Hungary in past centuries fought bravely against Asiatic invasion holding the strategic position

where the Danube turns abruptly to the east. We cannot trust the Slavonic peoples because of their racial affinity and Benes did his best to organise them against Germany. If Spain had turned red and we had supported Benes against Germany, the day might already have arrived for which the Soviet is waiting. Everyone who however innocently helps the agitation against Germany is playing for war and the triumph of Communism.

Communism vs National Socialism

I have already dealt with the dangerous war propaganda of the Labour Party in this country supported by politicians who do not belong to the Party, but it is necessary to look a little deeper into this matter. The word Socialism is used with so many different meanings that it is necessary before writing these observations to define in which sense it is used in Germany. The broadest definition is the conception of a State which is a living organic whole, in which the members of the State are inspired and guided by the duty of service to the State as paramount. That is the meaning given to the word by the German to-day when he describes the German State as a National Socialist State.

The meaning attached to the word by the Communists and the members of our Labour Party who are followers of the Jew Karl Marx, is quite different. By Socialism they mean the ownership of all Capital and administration of production, distribution and exchange by the State, and the elimination of the producer and trader for private profit. The Communist differs from the official Labour Party Leaders, not in his aim but in his method, which is certainly somewhat drastic. The Communist proposes confiscation of all private Capital, the Labour Party leaders propose to buy out the owner of Capital and property. He is to become a pensioner of the State and will no longer be allowed to use his Capital for private venture, a proposal more soothing to the Capitalist than the firing line. The Socialism of our Labour Party is the Bovril of Communism diluted with luke warm water.

The experiment of running a State on these lines is being tried in Russia to-day, but it is too early to say whether it can be successfully done and whether it improves the conditions of the masses of the people. I do not propose to discuss the merits and demerits of such a system, in which private enterprise is replaced by a huge bureaucracy, in whatever form it be disguised. I merely wish to point out that such a system is incompatible with Democracy, a free Parliament, and freedom of the individual as we understand it. As we see in Russia to-day such a system results in political trials and the firing squad. The Government cannot and dare not allow the slightest divergence in action or opinion. These political trials are an instructive preliminary to establishing universal suffrage in Russia, and remind me of the Colonel who shot every tenth soldier in a regiment "pour encourager les autres". The Labour Party has failed to convert the majority of the British people to their economic theory of a State. It is true that by adopting the name the Labour Party, they have swept into their organization the Trades Unions and rely on them as a source of income and so create a class party which is supported by a large minority

principally composed of wage earners; but these wage earners are not necessarily followers of Karl Marx and many, while subscribing through their union to the party funds, vote for the Conservative Government. The political issue is therefore confused.

The policy of this country has been and is based on individualism in production and trade, modified in two directions, -protection for the wage earner, and when open unregulated barter has proved inefficient, modification of it by a certain amount of organization and arrangement of prices by the State. If we turn now to Germany we find that the Germans have completely and utterly repudiated Karl Marx Socialism. The best proof of this is, that they are building their whole economic system on the peasant proprietor, and doing all they can to conserve and strengthen his position, thus pursuing the opposite policy to the Soviet which tried to abolish the peasant proprietor and convert him into the wage slave of the Communist Government. After a fierce struggle in which millions died of starvation the Soviet have arrived at a grudging compromise in which the peasant is allowed a little land and a small modicum of stock of his own. The German economic experiments are all on our lines. They have carried the protection of the wage earner much further than we have. They have adopted as universal the organization that we have established in the railways for settling disputes about wages. They have improved on our factory inspectors by appointing state officials who have cognizance of the whole conditions of labour.

In the other province they are bringing in State regulation of prices when they think that free competition has been ruinous to the small producer, injurious to the consumer, and only benefited the middle man with ready Capital at this command. There is another interesting point in this connection. The German Government is building up in trade, in manufacture, in agriculture, organizations of those engaged in the industry with the minimum of State control, in direct contradiction to Karl Marx Socialist ideas, and preserving in that way the liberty of the producer from too much State interference. They are following and improving the lines we have always followed, basing the economic State on individual effort. The result is that their bitterest enemies to-day are the followers of Karl Marx from Moscow to the T.U.C. They attack and misrepresent the Nazi rule on every platform and are ready to plunge Europe and this country into war to crush the economic system adopted by the Nazi Government. As the real issue would not appeal to the public, they raise a false cry of Democracy in danger, while they advocate an economic system which would destroy Democracy. There need be no quarrel about forms of Government between us and Germany. They frankly prefer their own as we frankly prefer ours; but they have no desire to force their opinion on other nations, while our Labour Party are prepared to go to extremes to force their opinion on Germany. A prominent Labour leader said at a "Peace" meeting the other day that he was willing his son should fight and die to destroy the Nazi rule in Germany.

The aggressive party in Europe to-day is not the Nazi party but the followers of Karl Marx whether they call themselves Communists or Socialists. This quarrel therefore between the Nazis and the followers of Karl Marx is influencing foreign politics and our foreign

relations and involving the possibility of war. It is therefore necessary for the sober British citizen to regard with suspicion what he reads in the Press in the journalistic world here and abroad. It would be the very irony of fate if we were dragged into a war to promote Communism abroad when we have rejected it at home. Passing from internal organization to external politics, we find German foreign policy governed by a revolt against control of the nations by a super State centred at Geneva so that whether we examine their domestic or foreign policy, we find the fundamental principle of freedom, freedom of the individual in his own development, and freedom of the group of individuals (the nation) in its development. These ideas are fundamental and strike much deeper than the form of Government. Behind the Labour Party in this country is the Comintern carrying on Communist propaganda in every corner of the world. It is therefore necessary for us to recognise what is the real ideological battle which is going on in Europe. It is the battle between Communism on the one hand, which means not only the State ownership of all property, and the crushing of individual enterprise, but the denial of God and the destruction of Christianity; and the idea, on the other hand, of a State built on the right of individual enterprise and ownership of private property which are the foundations on which liberty is built.

The issue has been cleverly falsified by representing the struggle of the two ideologies as a war between Communism and "Capitalism". If by "Capitalism" we mean the right to private ownership of property, then the war is rightly described as being between Communism and "Capitalism," but the word "Capitalism" calls up a vision of a fat financier smoking cigars at five shillings apiece, as he rides to the city in his Rolls Royce. The establishment of Communism and its maintenance necessitates a ruthless tyranny over the individual. We hear little about Russia from the Labour Party to-day. It is buried under a black cloud through which comes the rattle of the shots from the firing squads. If we had been dragged into war over the quarrel between the Germans and the Czechs we would have fought with Stalin as our ally, and we have rightly drawn back shuddering from such a catastrophe. The revolution in Spain began with horrible massacres accompanied by bestial cruelty in which it is estimated some 400,000 perished, and the ferocity of the murderers was principally directed against the Church.

Behind the struggle of the Sudeten Germans, the Poles and the Hungarians, for freedom from Czech rule, the real contest was with Communism. When Benes made his treaty with Russia it was hailed by the Comintern as a victory for Communism, and Benes was a favoured guest at Moscow because he had opened the door for the entry of the Soviet armies into the heart of Europe. The first act of the new Government in Czecho-Slovakia, which is as democratic as the former government, has been to break the treaty with the Soviet and suppress the Communist societies. Communism has received its severest blow since the Soviet Government was defeated by the armies of Poland. France has oscillated between the policy of friendship with and enmity against Germany according to whether the parties of the right or the left were in power, and the Communist party refused to support Daladier in his policy of reconciliation with Germany, and organized a

general strike to prevent the signing of the Peace Pact, and M. Blum, Communist and leader of the Socialist party, has declared against the Peace Pact with Germany.

The world struggle is not between democratic and totalitarian forms of government, but between the civilization of Western Europe built on individual liberty of action and the ownership of private property, and a State in which all are wage slaves: who, if they fail in their quota of production are shot. The shooting of the brilliant inventor who designed the planes which reached the North Pole, because one of the planes came down, should have filled the civilised world with horror. The amiable idealists of our Labour Party think they can get the best of both worlds with one foot in the Communist camp and the other in the democratic camp. It cannot be done. It is necessary for the democratic countries to decide on which side they stand. There need be no quarrel between Democracy and National Socialism; we both have the task of saving European civilization from the inroads of Asiatic barbarians inspired by a theory which is fundamentally opposed to our conception of civilization. The vanguard facing Communistic Asia is Germany, sword in hand, protecting Europe.

The Hitler Youth Movement

We regret in England, and many Germans with whom I have discussed the matter share the regret, that the German Youth movement so closely following the model of the Boy Scouts, has been made into a separate organization. They told me that more than one imitation of the Boy Scouts movement had been started in Germany and that it was essential at the present stage of the training of the whole country to a new conception of a Nation of people, bound to service and the development of the German national life, to have a separate German organization. I sympathise with the German point of view and am glad that the friendliest relations have been established and exchange of visiting members arranged, between the two organizations. The lie has frequently been repeated in this country that the German Youth movement is military in its object and practice. This is an invention of the enemy and is not true. I owe the following account of the Hitler Youth Movement to Baldur von Schirach.

Nothing is more suited to a friendly exchange of opinion between educationalists of different nations than the matter of youthful upbringing. The more the youth leaders in the various nations of culture succeed in agreeing on certain fundamental points, the more chance there is of our young people growing up in a friendly spirit toward each other instead of antagonistic. In this field of international understanding the aim should not be to effect certain political ideas and maxims but rather the more human aspects, those of mutual respect, comradeship and real sincerity. The more the youth of all nations gets to know each other by means of personal contact the more it will come to respect each other's individualities and to understand existing differences, for each country produces the kind of youth movement expressive of its characteristics and its nature. I am convinced that the Hitler boy, just as the English boy scout and the small

fry of the Italian Balila typifies the essential qualities of his native land. The National Socialist Youth developed in 1926 out of an enthusiasm felt by a few young Germans for the personality and the ideas of our Führer. The principle laid down in the very beginning, - "Youth must be led by youth" - supplies the necessary balance to pure School education by the early shouldering of duties and personal responsibility. The mistakes that may still be found in this system and its possible deficiencies, in my opinion, fade away when faced with the enormous gain resulting from the early development of responsibility and the attendant stimulus to exert all faculties. The key to each situation is efficiency and the efficiency of a young person is no less valuable than that of an older one.

During the development of the Hitler Youth Movement the necessity arose for organized formations . Apart from the fact that the girls were organized from the very beginning in a special body known as the B .D.M. (Association of German Girls), the boys from 10 to 14 grouped under the "Young Folk" and from 14 to 18 as the "Hitler Youth", all these were divided up into a special system of units. The training of leaders for these various units takes place in special training schools which are almost without exception to be found in beautiful surroundings . Here they go in for sport, receive physical training and theoretical instruction in the theory of life with the team spirit pervading everything. Contrary to many other countries the young people in Germany are not trained in the handling of military effectives. Shooting which is practised to a very small degree only in the training schools for leaders is only with air guns and is a form of sport. Such words as "home", "camp" and "outing" are so much a part of the Hitler boys that I could not fail to touch on them briefly. The homes are as it were clubs providing a place of congregation for the boys and making them independent of cafes and so of alcohol and nicotine. In the "Hour of the Young Nation" broadcast throughout Germany the uniform spirit is inculcated. By camping is naturally meant tent life which provides an equable balance for the city lads, above all for the industrial workers. The days in camp are spent in play and the evenings round an open space with singing and performances etc. Opportunities are given for swimming and riding. Last year about one million youths slept out in tents and we hope before long that there will be no Hitler boys who have not spent at least three weeks a year out camping. The hiking Hitler youth is afforded cheap night lodgings through a special organization and facilities for sojourn. This is the German Youth Hostel Association. There are some 2,000 hostels scattered throughout the country in castle ruins or old town turrets and the like which are especially maintained for the youthful wanderers.

Referring now to the essential political aspect of my organization I should like to point out first and foremost that today as from the beginning the pride of the Hitler Youth is the fact that the young workmen are with us whom we have been struggling to win over for so long. With the advent of the regime the struggle of the National Socialist youth was by no means ended ; on the contrary, the hard fight for effecting the claim to totality began and with it the decisive question whether other organizations and units aside from the Hitler Youth should have the right to train the rising generation. National Socialist Germany

maintained then as now that outside the schools there should be no educational body in Germany other than the Hitler Youth. This viewpoint was propounded in 1933 . At the commencement of 1934 the inclusion of all protestant youth was provisionally completed and outside the Hitler Youth there was only one other youth organization, a catholic one, all other belong to our community, the fellowship of young Germany. Nevertheless, there is a plane on which the confessional organization is essentially justified and recognised by the Hitler Youth. If the former refrains from exerting temporal powers and confines its sphere of influence to matters of the soul I see no reason why there should be no confessional organization of the youth of the country.

And now with reference to something of material importance. Of all the Hitler Youth activities I would like to touch on but one here, namely, the Reich Crafts Competition which the youth of Germany organized in conjunction with the German Labour Front. This is looked upon by the young people as the most idealistic avowal of an entire generation to German Labour. In his "Wilhelm Meister" Goethe denoted respect as the keynote to all education . The youth whose leader I have the honour to be is aiming at this ideal in the spirit of the great Master who has named it as the aim of the world youth common to all and uniting all. When Hitler was reviewing the Hitler youth in Nuremberg the other day he said, giving us a glimpse into the heart and soul of the man, "How wonderful how beautiful are the children of Germany".

The Winter Help Organization

Apart from the extreme poverty which seems to haunt our modern civilization especially in large cities, Germany has suffered terribly not only from the war but from the reparation payments; the occupation of the Ruhr which, under the incompetent socialist administration, brought about the flight from the mark ruining thousands of homes ; and later on the appalling amount of unemployment. The National Socialist Party as soon as they came into power decided that the distress, especially in great cities, quite apart from Government relief and work for the unemployed, required the personal touch of a voluntary association and so with characteristic German thoroughness they proceeded to do it. In this as in all other matters where the volunteer worker is wanted, the Nazi organization covering the whole country is of course invaluable. The aim of the National Socialist Welfare Society is the relief of persons who are physically and mentally sound, but who, in consequence of adverse general conditions, have fallen into a state of distress which threatens the health and development of both themselves and their dependents.

In accordance with this principle of preserving the healthy part of the German Nation, the National Socialist Welfare Society does not help those who are hereditarily diseased or suffering from incurable mental or physical diseases. These persons are cared for by the State. Any person in Germany may be given relief by the National Socialist Welfare Society, whether he is employed or not. Special attention is paid to persons who are employed, but whose wages scarcely suffice to support their large families. Since the

foundation of the Winter Help Scheme, the number of persons assisted has decreased steadily from 16,617,681 in 1933/34 to 13,866,571 in 1934/35 and 12,909,469 in 1935/36 and 10,711,526 in 1936/37, owing to the favourable development of employment and trade in Germany. It is to be noted that these figures include family members. The National Socialist Welfare Society never distributes money as relief. Relief always takes the form of goods. In this way any possibility of the relief being used for other purposes or unnecessary purchases is avoided. In order to increase the possibility of choice, increasing use has been made of vouchers for food, clothing, electricity, gas and other necessities.

The Winter Help Scheme operates during the six months from October to March which experience has shown to be the most critical period of the year in regard to employment and sustenance. Many seasonal trades have to cease work during a great part of this period owing to inclement weather, and for the unemployed and those in receipt of small pensions the necessity of buying heating materials and winter clothing weighs heavily on a budget already burdened by the normal increase in price of many foodstuffs during winter time. The Winter Help Organization began in October 1933, with an initial contribution of 15,000,000 marks by the State. It collected not only contributions in kind, but also monetary contributions in many and varied appeals throughout the country, and used the funds collected for large scale buying of the necessities for daily life, thus making the money go considerably further than it would have gone had it been distributed as money. Apart from the initial gift mentioned, this organization receives no State assistance, and is supported entirely by individual people in Germany, through their contributions and sacrifices. It is a fundamental principle that the contributions must be absolutely voluntary. No one is in the slightest way forced to contribute. The National Socialist Welfare Society's main sources of income are as follows:

Contributions from individuals. These contributions may be divided into two kinds. First there are those from persons in receipt of wages, who may volunteer a monthly contribution of an amount equal to about 10 per cent of their monthly Wages Tax. This sum is collected by the firm, in so far as the employees have declared their consent. Secondly, those who are not employed, but who have a private income, volunteer contributions in the form of small deductions from their Postal or Bank accounts. Special advantages are gained through the free transport of coal for the Winter Help given by the German Railways. The transport costs must be paid, but are refunded later. Contributions by Germans living abroad, which are collected by the Foreign Department of the National Socialist Party. The proceeds from the "One Pot Meal". On the second Sunday in every month, a simple meal is prepared in all households. The money saved by giving up a more costly meal is forwarded to the Winter Help.

1. The National Socialist Welfare Society is organized with the object of helping so far as possible all those in need of relief. This is only possible through a considerable participation of the population in voluntary assistance work. The "helpers" are thus divided into two classes - those in receipt of salaries or remuneration, and honorary permanent and occasional helpers. The National Socialist organizations and unions are

also called upon to help, as well as other societies dedicated to social work and whose membership is entirely voluntary.

2. The National Socialist Welfare Society is organized in the following unified system:

a) Block Leader. This leader is responsible for social supervision in a block which usually contains three or four tenements. He collects the regular contributions and his most important duty is to ascertain persons in need of assistance and to supervise their relief. This is a difficult and responsible position, as often, especially in the case of the most respectable people - those in distress are reluctant to acknowledge their condition. All the contributions collected, together with the reports on the position of those in need of relief and further developments are directed to the

b) Cell Leader . This official is in charge of eight to ten blocks, and he gives exact, and where necessary, personal information about the cases reported, to the

c) Local Group . The Local Group also receives all contributions in money and in kind from the cell leader . The Local Group, after consulting the Block and Cell Leaders, decides the relief which must be administered. d) The District Group, the Regional Group and the Reich

administration are competent to administrate the organization of the National Socialist Welfare Society, and to administrate the monetary proceeds.

The District and Regional Groups receive mostly goods presented by business concerns . The District Groups have often stocks of clothing, etc ., and the Regional Groups always have supplies . Apart from the smaller relief, such as potatoes, coal and food, given regularly by the Local Group, the Regional Group provides more relief in the form of clothing, shoes, domestic utensils, furniture, and sends people to the country to recover their health . The person in need of relief is provided with the necessities on production of a certificate from his Local Group.

All the money contributed is administered by the Regional and Reich administration. As mentioned above, no relief is given in the form of money, so these contributions are used to buy large quantities of goods, which makes it possible to obtain considerably lower prices. The difference of these wholesale prices and the retail values of the goods distributed appears as "added value" in the accounts of the Society. The costs of administration, of wages and compensation for the helpers are extremely small. During the Winter 1936/37 the total costs for salaries, wages, compensation, office work, printing, rent, light, heating etc . came to 1 .84 per cent of the total proceeds. The total income for 1936/37 amounted to 387,088,000 marks without the "added value". This scheme has several good points worthy of our consideration. In the first place the whole ground of charitable relief is covered by one Society. There is no overlapping. In the second place the whole of a city is divided into small circles of three or four tenements in charge of the Block Leader, thus enabling the close personal supervision which alleviating real distress requires to prevent fraud. In the third place the payment is in kind . This does not of course eliminate the sale of food tickets for drink and similar abuses, but it is the best that can be done, and the Block Leader will soon discover such cases of fraud.

The remarkably low administrative expense. The Society has 1,349,008 helpers of whom only 8,652 are paid. The "One Pot Meal" is an excellent idea and has become universal in Germany. It is a definite reminder of the needs of our poorer brethren and a simple sacrifice in which all participate. It is not only a source of income but has a symbolical meaning and an ethical value. It is the boast of the Society that in Berlin last Winter not one person was inadequately fed or clothed or without a fire all the winter in one room. One of the interesting features of National Socialism is that it is developing its own symbolism. The march of the burnished spades, the slowly moving river of the blood red flags in the Stadium in the temple of light, the one pot meal, which will become a social sacrament, are all examples of this symbolism to impress the hearts as well as the minds of the people with a new conception of service one to another.

The Four Years Plan

Extraordinary misconceptions of the nature and purpose of the four years' plan have become common in this country. According to the Daily Express our Foreign Office have made it a condition of more friendly relations with Germany that the four years' plan be withdrawn, a most remarkable request as my readers will agree when I have explained what the plan is. The economic position of Germany, with no gold reserves, heavily indebted abroad and with no colonies and foreign investments, has been dealt with already. Evidently under these circumstances she is thrown entirely on her own resources, and must find what possibilities of development are to be found within her own country. It is also necessary for her to consider what would happen in case of an attack by the allied powers of Europe. In the last war she was starved out and had in addition a serious shortage of materials required for munitions. She must therefore be prepared for this eventuality.

These considerations are not absent from the councils of other Nations. We are taxing all users of petrol to enable the I.C.I. to make petrol from coal without a loss and are heavily subsidizing agriculture without, it must be admitted, much success. It is also obvious that increased use of imported raw materials for purposes of manufacture will not do anything to relieve the situation. She must seek to utilize the land to its highest capacity to produce food, and in addition call upon the ingenuity of her chemists to utilize fully her two raw materials, coal and wood. In order to carry out this task in a comprehensive manner Field Marshall Goering has been appointed as the head of the four years' plan and an organization has been created divided into six offices. The Board for the production of raw materials has undertaken

- a) to increase the production of natural raw materials,
- b) the prevention of waste through the use of raw materials for purposes not absolutely necessary,
- c) the production of certain synthetic raw materials such as petrol, mineral oils, rubber and artificial wool which are made from coal or wood,

- d) the encouragement of relevant research including a complex examination of the German subsoil,
- e) the organization and direction of the production of industrial fats.

The section dealing with agriculture has to aim at producing raw materials which are scarce in Germany wherever there is a possibility of agriculture being able to do so. The cultivation of the Soya bean to obtain a supply of vegetable fats is an excellent example, the production of vegetable fibres and an increase in sheep farming to add to the supply of wool. It is also the duty of this department to take all possible steps to increase the production of food. In connection with food an interesting enquiry is to be made into the loss and deterioration of foodstuffs in transit and in the home. The estimated loss from these two causes is put at 1,500 million marks a year. When we consider how careful and economical the German housewife is, the loss in this country is probably much greater. The savings in this direction involve correct storage of perishable foods and the collection and classification of refuse. This household refuse is to be used for feeding pigs. Some 4,000 pigs are fed in this way on State property in Magdeburg. A similar arrangement prevails in other cities. Powers are given in connection with the whole plan for the control of prices.

The difference between the position of Germany before the war and to-day is well illustrated by the following figures. Before the war she had 30,000 million marks invested abroad; to-day she has foreign debts of 13,000 million marks. Her export trade has now improved sufficiently to show a surplus which is sufficient but no more than sufficient to pay the interest on her foreign debts. The aim of the whole plan is not self-sufficiency, which is both undesirable and impossible, but the making of an economically sound Germany which will lead to a natural development of her export and import trade.

The Labour Front

To imagine that when we speak of the Trades Unions in Germany before National Socialism we are speaking of organisations which were the same as our Trades Unions in this country, is to misread the whole situation that existed in 1933. There are three organisations in this country which the wage earning class have built up for themselves, -the Friendly Societies, the Trades Unions and the Co-operative Societies. The Trades Unions, built up through years of struggle when they were illegal institutions, have become part of the recognised organisations of Labour in this country and in some cases a complete scheme for dealing with the problems which arise between Labour and Capital has been developed like that which exists in our railways, with the Trades Unions, the employers organisation and the railway board as final arbiters. It is also necessary to remember that the Trades Unions not only represent the organised workers in labour disputes but are also benefit societies. There is no necessary connection between Trades Unionism and Socialism. There is no reason why a Trades Union secretary should not be a member of the Primrose League and walk on to the platform of the congress with a primrose in his

buttonhole, except that it is one of the things which is not done. To-day he is expected to be a member of the Labour Party and accept without question the pale pink brand of Socialism produced by the Bureaucratic mind, the mere thought of which makes a genuine Communist vomit.

The Socialist resolutions passed every year by the T.U.C. do no harm to anyone, and do not produce the mildest flutter on the Stock Exchange. Every man voting for them is more or less a Capitalist, the Trades Unions themselves have their funds well invested, the Friendly Societies and the Co-operative Societies have hundreds of millions of invested capital. Harcourt once said we are all Socialists now. He might as well have said we are all Capitalists now. Keir Hardie did the workman a bad turn when he persuaded the Trades Unions to hoist the banner embroidered by the fair hands of Mrs. Webb, but he secured ample funds for the political organisation. Both the Liberal and the Conservative Parties can claim credit for the advance in social conditions in this country. Only one Party is absolutely sterile and for this reason, that they have adopted a dogma of foreign origin, a patent medicine to cure all social ills, and the Englishman rightly distrusts cure ails and suspects a neatly logical system because he instinctively distrusts logic outside the Book of Euclid. The marriage of Trades Unionism to Socialism has been an unfortunate marriage for the workman, but it has not wrecked the Trades Union organisation.

If we now study the Trades Unionism in Germany before 1933, we find the Trades Unions run by political adventurers, entirely absorbed in politics, riddled with Communism, hopelessly in debt, and with an income insufficient to pay the official salaries. It was necessary in the interests of the German workman to sweep away the whole rotten system by which he was being exploited. It is forgotten that Hitler as a youth and young man lived in great poverty picking up casual labour in Vienna, and he had the inestimable advantage of studying international socialism and communism from the inside, a victim with an intelligent and critical mind. He found out two things in Vienna, -one that the class war leads nowhere, the other that the only people who made money out of the class war were the Jews. He himself, one of the workers and one of the victims, had long thought out his solution when he ordered his followers to take over the Trades Union organisation, to dismiss the official parasites, and organise in its place the Labour Front, which took over the liabilities of the old Trades Unions and secured for the old members the benefits for which they had paid the money which had been squandered. Quite apart from National Socialism, the Trades Unions were rotten, were bankrupt and something had to be done in the interests of the working man.

The central idea of the Labour Front is an organisation of industry workshop by workshop, in which all those employed in production including the employer and employed are in one organisation with the object of honest production for the good of the German people. Your interests, said Hitler, are not divided, they are the same. While you quarrel over the share of the payment for production, production itself ceases. He determined to replace the economic system of the 19th century, under which labour is bought as a ton of coal is bought and the employer admits no responsibility to the worker, and the State has to

intervene at every stage to protect his health and life, by the ideas permeating the old mediaeval guilds. Production was to become human instead of inhuman. We look back with horror upon the exploitation of child labour in the middle of the 19th century. Karl Marx and Hitler were equally horrified by the inhuman exploitation of the 19th century, but Karl Marx a journalist, saw it from the outside . Hitler lived and suffered inside the system, and Karl Marx gave the world a message of hate, of spoliation, of a brutal materialism, while Hitler brought it a message of Peace and revival of the message of the gospel. You are all wrong, he cries to the revolutionary Socialists, your way is the way of death. The negative of evil must be driven out by the positive of good . We need an ethical idea with which to permeate the body politic. Lenin in his frenzy used to cry out for torrents of blood. He bathed in them before the end, and the Russian workman has got a new master, the Communist official. "He beat you with whips but I will beat you with scorpions."

Man moves forward by new ethical ideas or rather by the unfolding of the inner meaning of old ideas like the opening of a flower from its green case, petal after petal is displayed and each means a step upwards. I do not deny that our English Socialism, though I believe it to be wrong on economic lines, is an ethical movement, but Continental Socialism is and has been a very different affair controlled by men lusting for power and exploiting labour for its own ends. The new organisation of labour is known as the Labour Front, which not only carries on the old benefits of the Trades Unions, and supplies them for half the subscription but has undertaken new activities in the "Strength through Joy" movement which we have never thought of in this country. It has also made universal the payment for holidays, which is based upon the National Socialist idea of the workman as a man with rights as a citizen of the German State, and not merely a penny-in-the- slot machine who is only to be paid when his wheels turn inside. If the T.U.C. instead of passing Socialist resolutions would take up the practical tasks of the Labour Front, they would find universal support in this country and double their membership.

Besides the Labour Front which contains to-day over 20,000,000 members, the National Socialist Government has passed an elaborate Labour Law which I shall make some attempt to describe, but before doing so deal with one of the main accusations against the National Socialist Government, that they have forbidden strikes. Strikes are a form of war, and in the U.S.A. are frequently accompanied by actual warfare, and are destructive and ruinous to both parties and to the community. It took us a long time to recover from the blow to trade of the General Strike. I remember in the Coal Strike of 1921, the Miners Union called out the men at the pumps, thus destroying many millions of pounds of property on which their own living depended. At that time being head of the Technical College in Edinburgh, I wired for our mining students to return from their holidays and go straight to the Fife coal fields and man the pumps. In two days the water was under control, but the Government who had promised to send soldiers to protect the mines were of course not ready, so the mob of miners threw out our boys, the mines were flooded and millions of pounds of property destroyed, and after the strike was over the

Fife miners had to wait six months before they could resume their work underground.

I was violently abused by the Fife miners secretary who afterwards became Secretary for Scotland in the Labour Government for taking the side of the mine owners. I replied I have nothing to do with the quarrel between the miners and the mine owners. The mines do not belong either to the mine owners or the miners. They are my property as a member of the British Commonwealth and I have a right to protect my property, a sound National Socialist principle. It must not be forgotten that while strikes are forbidden lock outs are also forbidden and it was a lock-out of the miners by the mine owners, before the Commission had reported, that caused the general strike. If the dreams of the T.U.C. are fulfilled and we become a Socialist State one of the first acts of the State will be to abolish the Trades Unions and forbid strikes.

The Labour Law

The Labour Law is so utterly different from any Act of Parliament in its ideas and expression that it is difficult to follow an intelligible path through its intricate proposals. In the first place there is the new constitution known as the confidential council in every factory. This body contains representatives from every section of the industry, the workman's representatives being chosen by secret ballot from a list prepared in consultation with the Labour Front, a list for which certain qualifications are necessary such as that to be on the list, a workman must be over 25 and must have belonged to the establishment for a year, with not less than two years' previous experience in a similar industry. The office of a member of the council is an honorary one, and the employer or manager is bound to give the council information necessary for carrying out their duties.

The employer or manager is responsible for the welfare of the workers and the council is to assist the employer in his duties with a view to increase the efficiency of the factory and to deal with any disputes arising between the employer and the employed. The members of the council must all belong to the Labour Front organisation. The majority of the council may lodge an appeal in writing to the "Labour Front" against any decision of the employer. The voting list for members is drawn up by the employer and the chairman of the National Socialist cell organisation. The "Labour Trustee" is a government official and appointed to supervise a group of factories; he has no connection with trade or industry. The duties of the Labour Trustee are as follows: They supervise the formation and operation of the confidential councils and give a decision in case of a dispute. They decide in cases of appeal by the council and may reverse a decision of an employer and issue the necessary ruling themselves.

The Labour Trustee decides respecting proposed dismissals. The employer is bound to give notice in writing of more than 9 dismissals out of a 100 employees, and more than 10% of dismissals over 100. The dismissals cannot take place until four weeks after the Labour Trustee has been notified. Establishment rules of hours and wages and grounds for dismissal without notice must be issued in writing by the employer to the work

people. The Labour Trustees may lay down guiding principles for each establishment and rules and general rates where minimum conditions of employment are needed, for the protection of the work people. The Labour Trustee has great powers over his district and can make rules to apply to the special conditions of that district. The Labour Trustee appoints an advisory council of experts for the various branches of industry in his district for consultation on questions which are of a general nature or which involve a principle. Three fourths of the experts must be chosen from lists of individuals drawn up by the Labour Front.

Employers and members of the confidential councils shall be selected in equal numbers . One fourth of the members can be appointed by the Labour Trustee from suitable persons in the district. The Labour Trustee can appoint a committee of experts to advise in individual cases.

One of the most interesting ideas in the Labour Law is the Social Honour Court. The idea of the Social Honour Court is that a person can harm the State by actions which are not illegal and that the employers and employees in a working community have responsibilities to each other, the works and the State. Offences under this category are as follows: If an employer exploits his workmen, or abuses his authority, or is disobedient to instructions given by the Labour Trustee: If a member of the confidential council reveals without authority confidential information or technical or business secrets which have become known to him through his duties as a member of the confidential council: If an employee endangers industrial peace by maliciously provoking other employees, or if a confidential man interferes unduly in the conduct of the establishment, or continually disturbs the community spirit. The Honour Court consists of an official of the judiciary appointed by the Federal Minister of Justice and the Federal Minister of Labour, as chairman, one leader of an establishment and one confidential man as assessors. These two are selected by the chairman from a list drawn up by the German Labour Front. The Honour Courts may impose a warning, a reprimand, a disciplinary fine, disqualification for the position of leader, or confidential man, and removal of the offender from his post. Decisions on offences against social honour are given on the application of the Labour Trustee by an Honour Court established for each Labour Trustee's district.

Strength through Joy

There must have been a time before the black cloud of industrialisation pouring from a million factory chimneys destroyed joy in life, when the people however poor they may have been had some communal pleasures. The folk songs, the peasant dancing, the beautiful peasant costumes worn on important occasions all indicate that such a time once existed . The beauty of the buildings in our villages also show a people living in the land who had the capacity for appreciating and the pleasure in building the house and the Church . Mankind does not live by bread alone and this is the central idea of the "Strength through joy" (KdF, Kraft durch Freude) organisation which is a branch of the

Labour Front.

The movement has taken four directions. One is that the pleasures of the theatre, the concert hall and travel, even as far as Madeira could be put in the reach of all at a very small expenditure by the individual. Last year by means of the "Strength through joy" organisation 4,850,000 German work people attended theatres. Travelling companies that go from village to village have been organised, the theatres have agreed to give certain special performances at cheap prices, the whole movement has not only brought the theatre to every door but has proved profitable for the theatres themselves. Excellent music is now also available and the German has always had a love for good music.

The organisation of travel during holidays at first confined to Germany is now being extended overseas and the organisation is now building its own ships for holiday excursions. Last year eleven million workers enjoyed travel in Germany and abroad through the organisation. The second side of their organisation is the development of music and dramatic societies and athletic clubs. All this of course would have been impossible by a central organisation. The fact is the "Strength through Joy" idea has caught on in Germany, and with a little guidance from headquarters the villages and the workshops are organising these things for themselves. Broadcasting is being used to transmit the best of their local efforts. The third idea is improving factory conditions, not only by providing washing and bathing facilities and dining rooms, but by making the factories inside more pleasant places, and turning waste ground outside into gardens, and even converting the hideous dumps into things pleasant to look at. Factories in this country are often pleasant places and well equipped. Bryant and Mays in East London is surrounded by gardens and tennis grounds for their employees. But it is only necessary to penetrate the industrial quarters of Manchester, of the Five Towns, of Birmingham, or of Glasgow, to realise their appallingly dreary ugliness.

50,000,000 marks have been spent on improving the factories since the "Strength through Joy" movement was started, and prizes are given for the most beautiful villages. The fourth side is their very complete organisation of educational work. The astounding success of this movement would never have been achieved, as I have said, by a central organisation alone. The people of Germany have grasped the idea of National Socialism and with a little direction and suggestions from headquarters are working out the practical application for themselves. Hitler is right when he says, "I represent to-day the German people more closely than any Prime Minister of a Democratic country". The lightest touch on the wheel from the captain is all that is needed to steer the ship.

Munich and After

Since the signing of the Peace Pact between Chamberlain and Hitler in September events have moved rapidly in Europe. The reply in Great Britain to the Peace Pact was a violent campaign in the British Press against Germany, and an attack on Chamberlain's policy both by the Opposition in Parliament and by many members of his own party. The Peace

Pact was ignored and war with Germany discussed as a matter of course. Chamberlain was only able to save his position by increasing enormously the expenditure on armaments. The large number of people in this country, who believe a good understanding with Germany essential had no opportunity of putting forward their point of view in the press. The members of Parliament were intimidated by the press campaign. The only institution left where a free expression of opinion was possible was the House of Lords. The warmongers controlled both the press and the B.B.C.

The final victory of Franco enormously strengthened the position of the Axis in Europe to the great astonishment of our press who, having pursued him with a vile campaign of calumny during the war, assisted by a political agitation in this country, imagined that he would join with us. Franco's reply to our advances was to join the anti-Comintern Pact and France, who had taken the side of the Communists, found herself with three potential enemies on her three frontiers. Hungary also joined the anti-Comintern Pact, and Yugoslavia entered into the closest friendship with Germany and Italy, so that Great Britain and France found themselves faced with a formidable bloc in Europe, of nations they had treated with hostility or indifference. President Roosevelt next joined the campaign against Germany and Italy. The Press and the wireless had been used for months to spread lies about Germany and when the ground had been prepared Roosevelt made a violent attack on Germany and Italy, and proposed a combination of the Democracies against them and a trade boycott. As Senator Pittman put it clearly, "Why kill them when we can starve them?" These proposals by Roosevelt were acclaimed by our Press but it soon became evident that the people in the U.S.A. were not going to be drawn into another European war and that Roosevelt would find it very difficult to get the Neutrality Law altered so that he could if he chose supply munitions to one side and not to the other, thus putting into the hands of the President the decision of Peace or War.

It was obvious that Germany and Italy could not continue to ignore the feverish preparations for war in Great Britain, France and the U.S.A., and consequently two dramatic events took place, one quickly following on the other. Slovakia separated herself from Czechoslovakia, claiming independence. The Czech Government, faced by internal revolution, asked Germany to intervene and Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia incorporating them as a Protectorate in the Reich. It was impossible any longer to tolerate this promontory penetrating deep into Germany and governed by people who were largely communistic and hostile to Germany, an area which French military authorities had openly stated would be used as a base for bombing planes, aiming at destroying the cities of Germany. It was evident from the replies made by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax that they did not regard the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia as a matter affecting our interests, as, owing to the break away of Slovakia, Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist and an occupation by German troops made at the request of the Czech Government could hardly be described as an act of military aggression.

Then the storm cloud, organised by those working for war, burst and has swept the Government like helpless logs in its torrent towards war. The public excitement was

increased by the publication in the London Press of a message purporting to come from Rumania - but now believed to have been concocted in London, to the effect that Germany had threatened Rumania with war if she did not give her a complete monopoly of all her external trade. The British Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to lodge a protest with the German Government, and to tear up the Peace Pact signed by Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain. This was followed later by the occupation of Albania by Italy thus securing the Adriatic from the hostile fleets of England and France bombarding Italian towns.

According to Mr. Chamberlain these two necessary acts of self defence filled the whole world with "horror". I have been young and now am old and in my lifetime I have seen Great Britain wage war after war to "extend" the Empire. It is not for us, satiated with conquest, and oppressing today by force the Arabs in Palestine, a country in which we are interlopers, and which incidentally occupies a strategic position on the Mediterranean, to criticise the actions of other nations. These two inevitable acts were received quite calmly in Europe but were made the excuse for a fresh campaign here and in the States in which it was stated that Germany and Italy meant to invade and annex all the small nations in Europe as a preliminary to world conquest, and our Press arranged for alarmist messages from every capital in Europe. An imaginary crisis was created and the enemies of Chamberlain gathered their forces to turn him out of office. Churchill, Eden, and their friends worked night and day to organise a revolt in the Conservative Party, and Fleet Street said he would not remain in power for another week. If he fell Eden, who cannot speak without showing his insolent attitude to the German people, Churchill and their friends would form a government Churchill and their friends would form a government. Chamberlain saved himself by his speech in Birmingham attacking Hitler, and by proposing to resuscitate the old plan which he had only a year ago condemned as unworkable, a coalition of the small nations in Europe against Germany.

Without waiting to be asked, we promised Poland to defend her if Germany attacked her independence, went round Europe trying to draw the small nations into a combination against Germany, and approached the Soviet for the same purpose. When Italy occupied Albania, we hastened to offer Greece and Albania our defence if their independence was attacked. The response to these efforts has been very remarkable. Ten nations in addition to France and Italy, are in contact with the German frontier. Of these Belgium is guaranteed by England France and Germany. Of the other nine, only Poland has accepted. The other eight have declined our offer of protection, saying they have no cause for alarm, and in addition, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Bulgaria stand aloof. A Norwegian Minister speaking the other day, declared that for three hundred years, the Scandinavian countries have been fighting with England for the right to maintain their neutrality. Rumania and Greece have thanked us for our offer to defend them, but have explained that they have no intention of entering into a reciprocal treaty and only Portugal, Poland and Turkey, have agreed to a mutually defensive treaty.

Rumania has been rewarded with a loan of five million pounds, for graciously allowing us to defend her. The Soviet in spite of our beseeching attitude has so far not come

to any agreement with us. The part they will play if war should come, is that of the jackal feasting on the corpses of the slain. All we have done is to present Hitler with a splendid testimonial from the small nations in Europe. Just as we were forced by the "City" to crush the small independent Boer Republic in order to gain control of the gold mines, so the real reason why we are interfering in Poland, Rumania and Greece, is that our financiers have large interests in the Polish coal mines, where the miners wages are disgracefully low, Rumanian oil and Greek banking. A pipe line runs from the oil fields of poverty stricken Rumania to the city of London, pouring the wealth of that country into the pockets of our financiers. They are determined that Germany be warned off these countries, where they have established a monopoly of financial control. The British public are deceived by the cry "Defend the independence of small nations".

The attempt we are making to persuade the Soviet to invade Europe pouring in hordes of barbaric troops from European and Asiatic Russia, whose advance would be accompanied by Communist risings and massacres, is probably the greatest crime against Christianity and civilization in the history of Europe. By following this extraordinary foreign policy our Government has sinned against four principles which should govern the foreign policy of nations. No Government has the right to pledge the lives of the people, except in self defence or defence of a vital interest. The inclusion of Bohemia in the Reich touches no interest of ours. No Government has a right to hand the control of its foreign policy to another nation or nations. Let us suppose, for instance, that Greece quarrelled with Italy and they went to war; we are bound to fight for Greece whether she is right or wrong. The following quotation from a speech made by Captain Euan Wallace, Minister of Transport, at Bognor, condemns the government foreign policy out of their own mouths. "Let us make no mistake about it, the decision whether we will fight has been taken out of the hands of the people of this country, and out of the hands of our governors. We have made commitments which are automatic. If those commitments are broken, this country is committed for better or for worse to take up arms."

It is the duty of a Government to reduce outside commitments which may lead to war, and to secure the friendship of all nations. Our Government has increased our commitments which may lead to war, and by this action caused the Peace Pact and the Naval Treaty with Germany to be torn up. We had' torn up the Peace Pact and Germany has now quite reasonably denounced the Naval Pact which was of great value to us. The final result of our action has been that Hitler is freed from his Peace Treaty with Poland and any restraint in strengthening his navy, so that he is left with a distinct diplomatic gain by our action. No Government has the right to lure a nation into war with a third nation if they cannot fulfil their offers of help. If Poland, having accepted our advances, makes war on Germany, we could not by any possibility go to her assistance. As the Fuhrer pointed out in his speech on April 28, 1939, when he first signed a Peace Pact with Poland he made no objections to the existing "Mutual Security Treaty" with France; but for Poland, having signed the Peace Pact, to make a treaty with Great Britain undertaking to make war on Germany under certain conditions, is an obvious breach of the Peace Pact.

What does Poland imagine she gains by this move? The Polish Corridor is an injustice to Germany and many people are astonished that she has put up with it so long. Danzig is as much a German city as Liverpool is English. Suppose we had lost the War and Germany had given Liverpool to De Valera ? How long would we have tolerated that state of affairs? Hitler made the Peace Pact with Poland and has faithfully observed it. Now they have broken it he is free to take back the Polish Corridor and include Danzig in the Reich. If Poland imagines that she can drag England into a war with Germany about Danzig she is greatly mistaken. Our Government has been careful to guard themselves on that point. Supposing Poland declares war and does manage to bring us in it will not save her. We are as helpless to save her as if she was on the Planet Mars. For us to tempt her to make such a suicidal war is an act of mischief deliberately disturbing the Peace of Europe. Roosevelt who hopes for a third term of office in spite of having landed the U.S.A. with a huge internal debt and 20 millions people on the dole, was looking out for a good slogan and thought that a call to the Democracies to defend "Christianity, Democracy and International Good Faith" would do.

He has had to retreat, and has thrown out a smoke screen to hide his retreat by sending to the World Press and Hitler and Mussolini an absurd document, in which they are told to pledge themselves to Peace for 25 years with a long list of nations, and then hand their future over to a world congress controlled by the three Democracies who were responsible for the Treaty of Versailles . This has been hailed as a wonderful document by the Governments of Great Britain and France. In the meantime Peace among the nations of the Danube Basin and of the Balkans is being assured by Hitler and Mussolini, who are having conference with the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. There are three dangers to Peace, - the territorial demands of Hungary and of Bulgaria, and the trouble with the Croatians, but with the friendly assistance of Germany and Italy both nations will doubtless be able to come to terms with their neighbours.

These nations are all centering round the Axis because it will give them the three things which the people of Europe most desire, Peace, ordered stable Government, and trade . The Totalitarian States stand for certain fundamental principles Peace among the nations, each following out its own economic life. Government with only one object the good of the people, instead of being used for the struggle for power of rival political Parties. The abolition of Politicians. The abolition of the use of the Press controlled by financial groups to promote war by spreading lies. A higher conception of the relation of the individual to the community, which is not merely negative-the obeying of the law-but positive,-the service of the community being the first duty.

A stable economic and financial system and work for all. Freedom from control by international finance. Arms for defence but not for attack. It is obvious that the European nations are grouping themselves in friendly alliance round the Axis and it is time we recognised that fact and accepted the friendship which has been offered us by Germany and Italy. It is also time that France, for long under the influence of our foreign office with its pernicious traditions, reversed her policy and made friends with her neighbours who

have no quarrel with her, settled the quite reasonable demands of Italy, and developed trade with the three countries on her frontiers. Why should France sacrifice so much because we choose to quarrel with Germany? There will probably be no war in Europe because Hitler and Mussolini stand for Peace. The Europeans are settling down to a long Peace, which clears the deck for the larger question of World Trade and the huge monopoly of Gold, Raw materials and tropical and sub-tropical products held by the three Democracies and the Soviet. In every speech Hitler and Mussolini have given warning on this matter and they not only represent the needs of themselves and Japan but many other nations. This of course is what Roosevelt is really thinking about. He is prepared to plunge into a World War to defend Monopoly in the name of "Christianity, Democracy and Good Faith." The power of the Monopolists is colossal. They possess the world's wealth, rule a great part of the world's population, and have at their command our overwhelming sea power, which enables them to control trade on the high seas, and as we have seen, Roosevelt has already proposed that a trade boycott force the Have Nots into submission.

It is really for this reason that Germany is seeking to develop trade on the old trade route from Asia to Europe and it is for this reason that we are trying to prevent it. While in Parliament the Government talk about small nationalities, the Conservative Party organisation through its political instructors is telling us that we do not care what happens to small nationalities, but we must stop the development of Germany's trade in the Danube Basin and the Balkans so as to be able to starve her out by a blockade. It is obviously not only in the interest of the Have Nots, but of the whole world and even of the Monopolists themselves that the trade of the world be set free. Strangely enough the Monopolists are suffering most from their own policy having huge armies of unemployed. The British Empire when it was a Free Trade Empire had the goodwill of all the world. To-day when it has surrounded itself with tariffs, Ottawa agreements, quotas and international restrictions on output, it no longer has that goodwill which was its real strength, and piling armaments on armaments is not the solution of the question.

Not so important but of great interest is the Gold monopoly, a monopoly not only of the Gold available but the world's Gold mines which the Monopolists share with the Soviet. The U.S.A. is still hoarding larger and larger quantities of Gold. It does not seem to occur to her economists that to exchange goods for Gold, which is buried in their Bank Vaults and is "sterilized" to use the Stock Exchange jargon, is to give away their goods for nothing. Trade is the exchange of goods which have a utility value for other goods which have a utility value, and sterilized gold has no utility value at all. As long as Gold is still regarded as wealth by the mass of mankind, it is thought necessary for a trading nation to have a Gold reserve, but Germany - deprived by her creditors of all her Gold - has challenged that idea and is building up an export trade without it and is to-day our largest customer. Germany has not only challenged the political system of the Democracies but the economic system of international finance and international monopolies, and it is to that challenge that all the attacks in the Press and the attempts to force the people of

this country into war are due.

If Germany succeeds in her economic system of basing her currency on labour values and exchanging goods for goods, the whole of the Gold stored in the Bank vaults of the U.S.A. can be written off as a dead loss, and Gold mining which depends on selling Gold at a higher and higher price to the Governments who buy the Gold bars and do nothing with them, will collapse. The old story of King Midas who starved because everything he touched turned to Gold will come true. The German Government has shown that Gold is not necessary and that is one of the reasons for the policy pursued against them by Great Britain, France and the U.S.A. Millions are being spent on this propaganda, but when once the peoples of Great Britain, France and the U.S.A. realise that the cry that Germany aims at universal dominion is a lie to-day just as it was a lie in 1914; that the only danger facing Democracy is its own misrule, weakness in the face of vested interests and sacrifice of public interest to the greedy scramble of politicians for power; that they are being driven like sheep to the slaughter by big finance just as they were driven into the Boer war, they will turn in revolt. The revolt has already begun in England though not reported by our Press. Germany has symbolized international finance by calling it "the Jew". It is true Jews are to a great extent interested. International finance is the public enemy and the promoter of war among the peoples, but those controlling it belong to all nations, and it is centred in London, Paris and New York. The "City" rules this country. They threw the Labour Party out of power when it suited them, and they control our Government today. When Roosevelt and our Government say they are willing to consider how to set free the supply of raw materials they are promising what they cannot perform as they are helpless in the grip of the huge combines. Only the Totalitarian States are free states. King Midas is the Public Enemy number one. While the Monopolists combine to accumulate Gold it is no longer the basis of their paper currency. We have ourselves abolished the ratio between Gold and paper, and France devalues the Franc at intervals. The confusion between the world currencies continues and will end in a collapse. The only sound currency to-day is the German currency.

It is also necessary for the world to return in some form or other to Free Trade, but it must be a Free Trade that does not cause a competition between different standards of living. Germany has solved these problems by exchanging goods for goods based on barter. Before these international questions are discussed the Monopolists have to ask themselves why, with the world wealth in their possession, they suffer from serious unemployment, which has reached in the U.S.A. the appalling figure of 20 million people on the dole, while Germany has to hire surplus labour abroad. They must reform their own economic system before they reform the world. They have also to ask themselves two very fundamental questions, namely, is it possible to combine the Democratic idea with the principle that the first duty of the citizen is the welfare of the community, and with honest government not controlled behind the scenes by the Financiers.

Democracies are in many cases financially corrupt Governments. In our case that is not true but our Government and Parliament are intellectually dishonest. Truth is sacrificed

every day to a party advantage. If lies were only consciously told it would not be so serious but political life produces a mental degeneration in which it is no longer possible for the politicians to distinguish between truth and falsehood. An excellent example occurred in the House of Commons the other day when the leaders of the Opposition accused Franco of dropping from his planes chocolate boxes containing infernal machines so that when children picked them up they were blown to pieces. Men who can say such things are really mentally insane and these champions of Democracy are our rulers to whom we submit the safety of our State. The Parliamentary system is becoming unworkable. The Peoples of the Democracies, owing to the iron control of publicity, are dumb and can be driven to war without a protest. Even a pig is allowed to squeal before he is killed. We shall owe to Germany not only the abolition of the Politician, but a new ethical conception of a community, Peace in Europe and a reformed economic and trading system which will reconstruct world economics and abolish the evil influences of international finance and huge trading monopolies.

The great speech made by the Führer has deflated the war balloon blown out with poison gas by the Press. Germany makes no threat of war against any nation. The war anxiety among the small nations of Europe is not due to German action but to the uncertainty as to whether we do not intend to provoke war and the fear of our hysterical and unbalanced Democracy, for they know that Great Britain is dangerous when she is filled with moral indignation at the sins of her neighbours. When the giants are fighting the small nations will suffer. It is true Holland is busy arming her frontier facing Germany but she is just as busy arming her harbours facing England. France is evidently hesitating between Peace, Trade and friendship with Germany and being further involved in our reckless foreign policy. It is said that our beginning of conscription is the price we are paying to keep her with us. Before finally considering the two policies put before the peoples of Europe and the peoples of this country by the Führer and the British Government respectively, let us briefly look at the present condition of Europe as revealed by our attempts to consolidate it in a new policy against Germany. Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania deny that they fear any act aggression on the part of Germany, refuse to be drawn into any alliance that may commit them to war, and state that if war comes they will remain neutral. Germany, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, Hungary and Jugoslavia are united in the closest bonds of friendship and mutual confidence. Rumania and Greece, while not refusing our offer of assistance if attacked, will not sign a Treaty which will in any way commit them to war. A chain of Peace Pacts beginning in Italy joins Italy to Jugoslavia, Jugoslavia to Bulgaria, Bulgaria to Turkey. Poland alone has formed a mutual security pact with us, and by so doing broken her Peace Pact with Germany.

France is isolated in Europe to-day and has chosen to quarrel with her three neighbours on her frontiers-Spain, Italy and Germany. This attitude of hostility can be ended when she chooses, and grants the quite reasonable requests of Italy. Before Hitler rose to power all countries in Europe had armed and a criss cross of mutual security pacts made war

possible and no one could say where it would stop. Since Germany rose to power the consolidation of Europe into friendly nations promoting trade has proceeded apace. A central area of Europe from the frontiers of Holland to the frontiers of Rumania, and united to Italy and Spain is settled as a permanent area of Peace,-an area equal to the old Austrian Empire and united to Germany by friendship not by dominance of a central Government. If Germany and Italy acting jointly are able to settle the differences about land frontiers between Hungary and Rumania, this will extend to the Black Sea. Formerly Poland could be included. Unfortunately for her she has broken away owing to our interference. This Pax Germanica which is gradually extending over Europe is the work of two men-Hitler and Mussolini.

Let us now consider the two policies offered by Hitler on the one hand and our Government on the other. To Hitler we owe the idea of Peace Pacts. Two nations agree not to go to war for a term of years. This does not involve any alliance against a third Power. This policy has spread over Europe and into Asia. Turkey, Iraq, Persia and Afghanistan are united by Peace Pacts. The first Peace Pact between Germany and Poland resulted in the friendly settlement of very delicate and difficult points and it is disastrous for her that Poland has broken it. The other policy of mutual security pacts is simply the Policy of Treaties between two nations directed against a third nation under a new name which existed before the war and had such disastrous consequences. Germany was bound to Austria, England was bound to France, and France to Russia, and so an insignificant Balkan war involved all Europe in a catastrophe . This policy was tried during the reign of the League and produced unrest and fear of war all over Europe. It means the assumption by a nation of obligations to fight for a foreign policy over which it has no control, and it ensures automatically a local war between two powers involving all those linked by mutual security pacts. A break at any point in the complicated chain involves the whole in disaster. It means dividing Europe into two hostile camps, which must end in war sooner or later. Hitler has always denounced mutual security and Germany beyond her guarantee of the integrity of Belgium and of Slovakia is free from all such commitments. Our alliance with France has been disastrous to both countries as neither country is free to follow the foreign policy suited to its own interests. It is, for instance, essential for France to-day to develop friendly relations with Spain and Italy, and above all with Germany. Many intelligent Frenchmen curse the alliance with us dragging France into our disastrous and reckless Foreign Policy.

The peoples of Europe, of Great Britain and the British Empire have the chance of adopting the policy of Hitler and Peace, or of Chamberlain who is being driven by forces hostile to Germany to war. I thank God that the Peace of Europe is in the guardianship of the Fiihrer and therefore, in spite of the frantic efforts of all those here and in Europe and America who want war, secure.

10.5 Finance and Economy

Bleeding Germany Dry

From "The Jewish Declaration of War on Nazi Germany, Article from The Barnes Review, Jan./Feb. 2001, pp. 41-45.", we learn:

Long before the Hitler government began restricting the rights of the German Jews, the leaders of the worldwide Jewish community formally declared war on the "New Germany" at a time when the U.S. government and even the Jewish leaders in Germany were urging caution in dealing with the new Hitler regime. The war by the international Jewish leadership on Germany not only sparked definite reprisals by the German government but also set the stage for a little-known economic and political alliance between the Hitler government and the leaders of the Zionist movement who hoped that the tension between the Germans and the Jews would lead to massive emigration to Palestine. In short, the result was a tactical alliance between the Nazis and the founders of the modern-day state of Israel - a fact that many today would prefer be forgotten.

To this day, it is generally (although incorrectly) believed that when Adolf Hitler was appointed German chancellor in January of 1933, the German government began policies to suppress the Jews of Germany, including rounding up of Jews and putting them in concentration camps and launching campaigns of terror and violence against the domestic Jewish population. While there were sporadic eruptions of violence against Jews in Germany after Hitler came to power, this was not officially sanctioned or encouraged. And the truth is that anti-Jewish sentiments in Germany (or elsewhere in Europe) were actually nothing new. As all Jewish historians attest with much fervor, anti-Semitic uprisings of various degrees had been ever-present in European history. In any case, in early 1933, Hitler was not the undisputed leader of Germany, nor did he have full command of the armed forces. Hitler was a major figure in a coalition government, but he was far from being the government himself. That was the result of a process of consolidation which evolved later.

Even Germany's Jewish Central Association, known as the Verein, contested the suggestion (made by some Jewish leaders outside Germany) that the new government was deliberately provoking anti-Jewish uprisings. The Verein issued a statement that "the responsible government authorities [i.e. the Hitler regime] are unaware of the threatening situation," saying, "we do not believe our German fellow citizens will let themselves be carried away into committing excesses against the Jews." Despite this, Jewish leaders in the United States and Britain determined on their own that it was necessary to launch a war against the Hitler government. On March 12, 1933 the American Jewish Congress announced a massive protest at Madison Square Gardens for March 27. At that time the commander in chief of the Jewish War Veterans called for an American boycott of German goods. In the meantime, on March 23, 20,000 Jews protested at New York's City Hall as rallies were staged outside the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American

shipping lines and boycotts were mounted against German goods throughout shops and businesses in New York City.

According to The Daily Express of London of March 24, 1933, the Jews had already launched their boycott against Germany and her elected government. The headline read "Judea Declares War on Germany - Jews of All the World Unite - Boycott of German Goods - Mass Demonstrations." The article described a forthcoming "holy war" and went on to implore Jews everywhere to boycott German goods and engage in mass demonstrations against German economic interests. According to the Express:

"The whole of Israel throughout the world is uniting to declare an economic and financial war on Germany. The appearance of the Swastika as the symbol of the new Germany has revived the old war symbol of Judas to new life. Fourteen million Jews scattered over the entire world are tight to each other as if one man, in order to declare war against the German persecutors of their fellow believers. The Jewish wholesaler will quit his house, the banker his stock exchange, the merchant his business, and the beggar his humble hut, in order to join the holy war against Hitler's people."

The Express said that Germany was "now confronted with an international boycott of its trade, its finances, and its industry.... In London, New York, Paris and Warsaw, Jewish businessmen are united to go on an economic crusade." The article said "worldwide preparations are being made to organize protest demonstrations," and reported that "the old and reunited nation of Israel gets in formation with new and modern weapons to fight out its age old battle against its persecutors." This truly could be described as "the first shot fired in the Second World War."

In a similar vein, the Jewish newspaper Natscha Retsch wrote:

"The war against Germany will be waged by all Jewish communities, conferences, congresses... by every individual Jew. Thereby the war against Germany will ideologically enliven and promote our interests, which require that Germany be wholly destroyed. The danger for us Jews lies in the whole German people, in Germany as a whole as well as individually. It must be rendered harmless for all time.... In this war we Jews have to participate, and this with all the strength and might we have at our disposal."

However, note well that the Zionist Association of Germany put out a telegram on the 26th of March rejecting many of the allegations made against the National Socialists as "propaganda," "mendacious" and "sensational." In fact, the Zionist faction had every reason to ensure the permanence of National Socialist ideology in Germany. Klaus Polkehn, writing in the Journal of Palestine Studies ("The Secret Contacts: Zionism and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941"; JPS v. 3/4, spring/summer 1976), claims that the moderate attitude of the Zionists was due to their vested interest in seeing the financial victory of National Socialism to force immigration to Palestine. This little-known factor would ultimately come to play a pivotal part in the relationship between Nazi Germany and the Jews.

In the meantime, though, German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath complained of the “vilification campaign” and said:

“As concerns Jews, I can only say that their propagandists abroad are rendering their co-religionists in Germany no service by giving the German public, through their distorted and untruthful news about persecution and torture of Jews, the impression that they actually halt at nothing, not even at lies and calumny, to fight the present German government.”

The fledgling Hitler government itself was clearly trying to contain the growing tension - both within Germany and without. In the United States, even U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wired Rabbi Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress and urged caution:

“Whereas there was for a short time considerable physical mistreatment of Jews, this phase may be considered virtually terminated.... A stabilization appears to have been reached in the field of personal mistreatment.... I feel hopeful that the situation which has caused such widespread concern throughout this country will soon revert to normal.”

Despite all this, the leaders of the Jewish community refused to relent. On March 27 there were simultaneous protest rallies at Madison Square Garden, in Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cleveland and 70 other locations. The New York rally was broadcast worldwide. The bottom line is that “the New Germany” was declared to be an enemy of Jewish interests and thus needed to be economically strangled. This was before Hitler decided to boycott Jewish goods. It was in direct response to this that the German government announced a one-day boycott of Jewish businesses in Germany on April 1. German Propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels announced that if, after the one-day boycott, there were no further attacks on Germany, the boycott would be stopped. Hitler himself responded to the Jewish boycott and the threats in a speech on March 28 - four days after the original Jewish declaration of war - saying:

“Now that the domestic enemies of the nation have been eliminated by the Volk itself, what we have long been waiting for will not come to pass. The Communist and Marxist criminals and their Jewish-intellectual instigators, who, having made off with their capital stocks across the border in the nick of time, are now unfolding an unscrupulous, treasonous campaign of agitation against the German Volk as a whole from there.... Lies and slander of positively hair-raising perversity are being launched about Germany. Horror stories of dismembered Jewish corpses, gouged out eyes and hacked off hands are circulating for the purpose of defaming the German Volk in the world for the second time, just as they had succeeded in doing once before in 1914.”

Thus, the fact - one conveniently left out of nearly all history on the subject - is that Hitler’s March 28, 1933 boycott order was in direct response to the declaration of war on Germany by the worldwide Jewish leadership just four days earlier. Today, Hitler’s boycott order is described as a naked act of aggression, yet the full circumstances leading up to his order are seldom described in even the most ponderous and detailed histories of

“the Holocaust”. Not even Saul Friedlander in his otherwise comprehensive overview of German policy, Nazi Germany and the Jews, mentions the fact that the Jewish declaration of war and boycott preceded Hitler’s speech of March 28, 1933. Discerning readers would be wise to ask why Friedlander felt this item of history so irrelevant. The simple fact is that it was organized Jewry as a political entity - and not even the German Jewish community per se - that actually initiated the first shot in the war with Germany.

Germany’s response was a defensive - not an offensive - measure. Were that fact widely known today, it would cast new light on the subsequent events that ultimately led to the world-wide conflagration that followed. To understand Hitler’s reaction to the Jewish declaration of war, it is vital to understand the critical state of the German economy at the time. In 1933, the German economy was in a shambles. Some 3 million Germans were on public assistance with a total of 6 million unemployed. Hyper-inflation had destroyed the economic vitality of the German nation. Furthermore, the anti-German propaganda pouring out of the global press strengthened the resolve of Germany’s enemies, especially the Poles and their hawkish military high command.

The Jewish leaders were not bluffing. The boycott was an act of war not solely in metaphor: it was a means, well crafted, to destroy Germany as a political, social and economic entity. The long term purpose of the Jewish boycott against Germany was to bankrupt her with respect to the reparation payments imposed on Germany after World War I and to keep Germany demilitarized and vulnerable. The boycott, in fact, was quite crippling to Germany. Jewish scholars such as Edwin Black have reported that, in response to the boycott, German exports were cut by 10 percent, and that many were demanding seizing German assets in foreign countries (Edwin Black, *The Transfer Agreement - The Untold Story of the Secret Pact between the Third Reich and Jewish Palestine*, New York, 1984). The attacks on Germany did not cease. The worldwide Jewish leadership became ever the more belligerent and worked itself into a frenzy. An International Jewish Boycott Conference was held in Amsterdam to coordinate the ongoing boycott campaign. It was held under the auspices of the self-styled World Jewish Economic Federation, of which famous New York City attorney and longtime political power broker, Samuel Untermyer, was elected president. Upon returning to the United States in the wake of the conference, Untermyer delivered a speech over WABC Radio (New York), a transcript of which was printed in *The New York Times* on August 7, 1933.

Untermyer’s inflammatory oratory called for a “sacred war” against Germany, making the flat-out allegation that Germany was engaged in a plan to “exterminate the Jews.” He said (in part):

“...Germany [has] been converted from a nation of culture into a veritable hell of cruel and savage beasts. We owe it not only to our persecuted brethren but to the entire world to now strike in self-defense a blow that will free humanity from a repetition of this incredible outrage.... Now or never must all the nations of the earth make common cause against the... slaughter, starvation and annihilation... fiendish torture, cruelty and persecution that are being inflicted day by day upon these men, women and children....

When the tale is told... the world will confront a picture so fearful in its barbarous cruelty that the hell of war and the alleged Belgian atrocities pale into insignificance as compared to this devilishly, deliberately, cold-bloodedly planned and already partially executed campaign for the extermination of a proud, gentle, loyal, law-abiding people... The Jews are the aristocrats of the world. From time immemorial they have been persecuted and have seen their persecutors come and go. They alone have survived. And so will history repeat itself, but that furnishes no reason why we should permit this reversion of a once great nation to the Dark Ages or fail to rescue these 600,000 human souls from the tortures of hell.... ...What we are proposing and have already gone far toward doing, is to prosecute a purely defensive economic boycott that will undermine the Hitler regime and bring the German people to their senses by destroying their export trade on which their very existence depends. ...We propose to and are organizing world opinion to express itself in the only way Germany can be made to understand...."

Untermeyer then proceeded to provide his listeners with a wholly fraudulent history of the circumstances of the German boycott and how it originated. He also proclaimed that the Germans were bent on a plan to "exterminate the Jews":

"The Hitler regime originated and are fiendishly prosecuting their boycott to exterminate the Jews by placarding Jewish shops, warning Germans against dealing with them, by imprisoning Jewish shopkeepers and parading them through the streets by the hundreds under guard of Nazi troops for the sole crime of being Jews, by ejecting them from the learned professions in which many of them had attained eminence, by excluding their children from the schools, their men from the labor unions, closing against them every avenue of livelihood, locking them in vile concentration camps and starving and torturing them without cause and resorting to every other conceivable form of torture, inhuman beyond conception, until suicide has become their only means of escape, and all solely because they are or their remote ancestors were Jews, and all with the avowed object of exterminating them."

Untermeyer concluded his largely fantastic and hysterical address by declaring that with the support of "Christian friends... we will drive the last nail in the coffin of bigotry and fanaticism...." That his allegations against Germany were made long before even Jewish historians today claim there were any gas chambers or even a plan to "exterminate" the Jews, displays the nature of the propaganda campaign confronting Germany. However, during this same period there were some unusual developments at work: The spring of 1933 also witnessed the beginning of a period of private cooperation between the German government and the Zionist movement in Germany and Palestine (and actually worldwide) to increase the flow of German-Jewish immigrants and capital to Palestine.

The modern-day supporters of Zionist Israel and many historians have succeeded in keeping this Nazi-Zionist pact a secret to the general public for decades and while most Americans have no concept of the possibility that there could have been outright collaboration between the Nazi leadership and the founders of what became the state of Israel, the truth has begun to emerge. Dissident Jewish writer Lenni Brenner's *Zionism In the Age*

of the Dictators, published by a small press and not given the publicity it deserves by the so-called "mainstream" media (which is otherwise obsessed with the Holocaust era), was perhaps the first major endeavor in this realm. In response to Brennar and others, the Zionist reaction has usually consisted of declarations that their collaboration with Nazi Germany was undertaken solely to save the lives of Jews. But the collaboration was all the more remarkable because it took place at a time when many Jews and Jewish organizations demanded a boycott of Germany.

To the Zionist leaders, Hitler's assumption of power held out the possibility of a flow of immigrants to Palestine. Previously, the majority of German Jews, who identified themselves as Germans, had little sympathy with the Zionist cause of promoting the ingathering of world Jewry to Palestine. But the Zionists saw that only the anti-Semitic Hitler was likely to push the anti-Zionist German Jews into the arms of Zionism. For all the modern-day wailing by worldwide supporters of Israel (not to mention the Israelis themselves) about "the Holocaust", they neglect to mention that making the situation in Germany as uncomfortable for the Jews as possible - in cooperation with German National Socialism - was part of the plan. This was the genesis of the so-called Transfer Agreement, the agreement between Zionist Jews and the National Socialist government to transfer German Jewry to Palestine.

According to Jewish historian Walter Laqueur and many others, German Jews were far from convinced that immigration to Palestine was the answer. Furthermore, although the majority of German Jews refused to consider the Zionists as their political leaders, it is clear that Hitler protected and cooperated with the Zionists for the purposes of implementing the final solution: the mass transfer of Jews to the Middle East. Edwin Black, in his massive tome *The Transfer Agreement* (Macmillan, 1984), stated that although most Jews did not want to flee to Palestine at all, due to the Zionist movement's influence within Nazi Germany a Jew's best chance of getting out of Germany was by emigrating to Palestine. In other words, the Transfer Agreement itself mandated that Jewish capital could only go Palestine.

Thus, according to the Zionists, a Jew could leave Germany only if he went to the Levant. The primary difficulty with the Transfer Agreement (or even the idea of such an agreement) was that the English [!!!; Scriptorium] were demanding, as a condition of immigration, that each immigrant pay 1,000 pounds sterling upon arrival in Haifa or elsewhere. The difficulty was that such hard currency was nearly impossible to come by in a cash-strapped and radically inflationary Germany. This was the main idea behind the final Transfer Agreement. Laqueur writes:

"A large German bank would freeze funds paid in by immigrants in blocked accounts for German exporters, while a bank in Palestine would control the sale of German goods to Palestine, thereby providing the immigrants with the necessary foreign currency on the spot. Sam Cohen, co-owner of Hanoaiah Ltd. and initiator of the transfer endeavors, was however subjected to long-lasting objections from his own people and finally had to concede that such a transfer agreement could only be concluded on a much higher

level with a bank of its own rather than that of a private company. The renowned Anglo-Palestine Bank in London would be included in this transfer deal and create a trust company for [this] purpose."

Of course, this is of major historical importance in dealing with the relationship between Zionism and National Socialism in Germany in the 1930s. The relationship was not one merely of mutual interest and political favoritism on the part of Hitler, but a close financial relationship with German banking families and financial institutions as well. Black writes:

"It was one thing for the Zionists to subvert the anti-Nazi boycott. Zionism needed to transfer out the capital of German Jews, and merchandise was the only available medium. But soon Zionist leaders understood that the success of the future Jewish Palestinian economy would be inextricably bound up with the survival of the Nazi economy. So the Zionist leadership was compelled to go further. The German economy would have to be safeguarded, stabilized, and if necessary reinforced. Hence, the Nazi party and the Zionist organizers shared a common stake in the recovery of Germany."

Thus one sees a radical fissure in world Jewry around 1933 and beyond. There were, first, the non-Zionist Jews (specifically the World Jewish Congress founded in 1933), who, on the one hand, demanded the boycott and eventual destruction of Germany. Black notes that many of these people were not just in New York and Amsterdam, but a major source for this also came from Palestine proper. On the other hand, one can see the judicious use of such feelings by the Zionists for the sake of eventual resettlement in Palestine. In other words, it can be said (and Black does hint at this) that Zionism believed that, since Jews would be moving to the Levant, capital flight would be necessary for any new economy to function. The result was the understanding that Zionism would have to ally itself with National Socialism, so that the German government would not impede the flow of Jewish capital out of the country.

It served the Zionist interests at the time that Jews be loud in their denunciations of German practices against the Jews to scare them into the Levant, but, on the other hand, Laqueur states that "The Zionists became motivated not to jeopardize the German economy or currency." In other words, the Zionist leadership of the Jewish Diaspora was one of subterfuge and underhandedness, with only the advent of German hostility towards Jewry convincing the world's Jews that immigration was the only escape. The fact is that the ultimate establishment of the state of Israel was based on fraud. The Zionists did not represent anything more than a small minority of German Jews in 1933. On the one hand, the Zionist fathers of Israel wanted loud denunciations of Germany's "cruelties" to the world's Jews while at the same time demanding moderation so that the National Socialist government would remain stable, financially and politically. Thus Zionism boycotted the boycott.

For all intents and purposes, the National Socialist government was the best thing to happen to Zionism in its history, for it "proved" to many Jews that Europeans were irredeemably anti-Jewish and that Palestine was the only answer: Zionism came to represent

the overwhelming majority of Jews solely by trickery and cooperation with Adolf Hitler. For the Zionists, both the denunciations of German policies towards Jews (to keep Jews frightened), plus the reinvigoration of the German economy (for the sake of final resettlement) was imperative for the Zionist movement. Ironically, today the Zionist leaders of Israel complain bitterly about the horrific and inhuman regime of the National Socialists. So the fraud continues.

Using the Greenback-System

From "The Web of Debt" we learn:

The Treaty of Versailles had imposed crushing reparations payments on Germany. The German people were expected to reimburse the costs of the war for all participants – costs totaling three times the value of all the property in the country. Speculation in the German mark had caused it to plummet, precipitating one of the worst runaway inflations in modern times. At its peak, a wheelbarrow full of 100 billion-mark banknotes could not buy a loaf of bread. The national treasury was completely broke, and huge numbers of homes and farms had been lost to the banks and speculators. People were living in hovels and starving. Nothing like it had ever happened before – the total destruction of the national currency, wiping out people's savings, their businesses, and the economy generally.

What to do? The German government followed the lead of the American Greenbackers and issued its own fiat money. Hjalmar Schacht, then head of the German central bank, is quoted in a bit of wit that sums up the German version of the "Greenback" miracle. An American banker had commented, "Dr. Schacht, you should come to America. We've lots of money and that's real banking." Schacht replied, "You should come to Berlin. We don't have money. That's real banking." The German people were in such desperate straits that they relinquished control of the country to a dictator, and in this they obviously deviated from the "American system," which presupposed a democratically-governed Commonwealth. But autocratic authority did give Adolf Hitler something the American Greenbackers could only dream about – total control of the economy.

He was able to test their theories, and he proved that they worked. Like for Lincoln, Hitler's choices were to either submit to total debt slavery or create his own fiat money; and like Lincoln, he chose the fiat solution. He implemented a plan of public works along the lines proposed by Jacob Coxey and the Greenbackers in the 1890s. Projects earmarked for funding included flood control, repair of public buildings and private residences, and construction of new buildings, roads, bridges, canals, and port facilities. The projected cost of the various programs was fixed at one billion units of the national currency. One billion noninflationary bills of exchange, called Labor Treasury Certificates (Money backed by work), were then issued against this cost. Millions of people were put to work on these projects, and the workers were paid with the Treasury Certificates. The workers then spent the certificates on goods and services, creating more jobs for more people.

The certificates were also referred to as MEFO bills, or sometimes as “Feder money.” They were not actually debt-free; they were issued as bonds, and the government paid interest on them. But they circulated as money and were renewable indefinitely, and they avoided the need to borrow from international lenders or to pay off international debts.

Within two years, the unemployment problem had been solved and the country was back on its feet. It had a solid, stable currency and no inflation, at a time when millions of people in the United States and other Western countries were still out of work and living on welfare. Germany even managed to restore foreign trade, although it was denied foreign credit and was faced with an economic boycott abroad. It did this by using a barter system: equipment and commodities were exchanged directly with other countries, circumventing the international banks. This system of direct exchange occurred without debt and without trade deficits. Germany’s economic experiment, like Lincoln’s, was short-lived; but it left some lasting monuments to its success, including the famous Autobahn, the world’s first extensive superhighway.

According to Stephen Zarlenga in *The Lost Science of Money*, Hitler was exposed to the fiat-money solution when he was assigned by German Army intelligence to watch the German Workers Party after World War I. He attended a meeting that made a deep impression on him, at which the views of Gottfried Feder were propounded: The basis of Feder’s ideas was that the state should create and control its money supply through a nationalized central bank rather than have it created by privately owned banks, to whom interest would have to be paid. From this view derived the conclusion that finance had enslaved the population by usurping the nation’s control of money. Hitler was enormously popular with the German people, at least for a time. Zarlenga suggests that this was because he temporarily rescued Germany from English economic theory – the theory that money must be borrowed against the gold reserves of a private banking cartel rather than issued outright by the government. Again, the reasons for war are complex; but Zarlenga postulates one that is not found in the history books:

“Perhaps [Germany] was expected to borrow gold internationally, and that would have meant external control over her domestic policies. Her decision to use alternatives to gold, would mean that the international financiers would be unable to exercise this control through the international gold standard, . . . and this may have led to controlling Germany through warfare instead.”

Dr. Henry Makow, a Canadian researcher, adds some evidence for this theory. He quotes from the 1938 interrogation of C. G. Rakovsky, one of the founders of Soviet Bolshevism and a Trotsky intimate, who was tried in show trials in the USSR under Stalin. Rakovsky maintained that Hitler had actually been funded by the international bankers through their agent Hjalmar Schacht in order to control Stalin, who had usurped power from their agent Trotsky. But Hitler had become an even bigger threat than Stalin when he took the bold step of creating his own money. Rakovsky said:

“[Hitler] took over for himself the privile[ge] of manufacturing money and not only phys-

ical moneys, but also financial ones; he took over the untouched machinery of falsification and put it to work for the benefit of the state Are you capable of imagining what would have come . . . if it had infected a number of other states and brought about the creation of a period of autarchy. If you can, then imagine its counter-revolutionary functions.”

Autarchy is a national economic policy that aims at achieving selfsufficiency and eliminating the need for imports. Countries that take protectionist measures and try to prevent free trade are sometimes described as autarchical. Rakowsky's statement recalls the editorial attributed to the *The London Times*, warning that if Lincoln's Greenback plan were not destroyed, “that government will furnish its own money without cost. It will pay off debts and be without a debt. It will have all the money necessary to carry on its commerce. It will become prosperous beyond precedent in the history of the civilized governments of the world.” Germany was well on its way to achieving those goals. Henry C K Liu writes of the country's remarkable transformation:

“The Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, at a time when its economy was in total collapse, with ruinous war-reparation obligations and zero prospects for foreign investment or credit. Yet through an independent monetary policy of sovereign credit and a full-employment public-works program, the Third Reich was able to turn a bankrupt Germany, stripped of overseas colonies it could exploit, into the strongest economy in Europe within four years, even before armament spending began.”

In *Billions for the Bankers, Debts for the People* (1984), Sheldon Emry also credited Germany's startling rise from bankruptcy to a world power to its decision to issue its own money. He wrote:

“Germany financed its entire government and war operation from 1935 to 1945 without gold and without (national) debt (debt to other countries was still there), and it took the whole Capitalist and Communist world to destroy the German power over Europe and bring Europe back under the heel of the Bankers. Such history of money does not even appear in the textbooks of public (government) schools today.”

What does appear in modern textbooks is the disastrous runaway inflation suffered in 1923 by the Weimar Republic (the common name for the republic that governed Germany from 1919 to 1933). The radical devaluation of the German mark is cited as the textbook example of what can go wrong when governments are given the unfettered power to print money. That is what it is cited for; but again, in the complex world of economics, things are not always as they seem.

(Note: By 1939, Nazi Germany did indeed suffer from heavy inflation showing that you can't just print money at will without suffering consequences. Yet, they were free of the international debt slavery. The Nazis themselves expected to run into some economic problems by 1942 (war not expected), but not a complete economic collapse. This is usually falsely given as evidence that the 3rd Reich needed war to survive.)

10.6 The Jewish Question

The book “Germany and the Jewish Problem“ by Dr. F. K. Wiebe from 1939 describes “The Jewish Question“ from the viewpoint of Nazi Germany at that time. It was published on behalf of the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem, Berlin. Some excerpts are to be found here:

Introduction

Ever since the day when the National Socialists came into power in Germany, thereby placing the solution of the Jewish problem in the forefront of German politics, public opinion the world over has become increasingly interested in that problem. Anti-semitism has been frequently described as a phenomenon exclusively confined to Germany, as a National Socialist invention which must necessarily remain incomprehensible to the rest of the world. But to-day it is evident that the Jewish question is by no means a purely German question, that it causes on the contrary grave anxiety to statesmen in many countries, and that in many lands a pronounced anti-Jewish reaction has already set in. We do not propose to enquire, for the moment, whether these phenomena are a result of the example set by Germany. It is sufficient to register the fact that the Jewish question has, or is about to become everywhere acute, and that there is scarcely a country nowadays which does not find itself compelled to contribute in some way or other to its solution.

It is a mistake to believe that the Jewish question has only arisen within the last few years, or, indeed, that its origin is to be sought in modern times. The Jewish question is not an invention of National Socialism, nor is it derived from the anti-semitic movements that marked the close of the nineteenth century. If National Socialism can lay claim to any originality in the matter, then only because the National Socialist Party was the first to deduce the logical conclusions from a historical fact. The present German attitude towards the Jewish question is based on the experience made by Europe in the course of two thousand years. And this experience has been a particularly bad one for Germany, especially during the last few decades. The Jewish question undoubtedly dates back some two thousand years. Strictly speaking it is even older — namely, as old as the history of the Jews. The Jewish question arises everywhere where the nomadic Jewish race comes into contact with other peoples having a settled abode.

This historical fact is admitted by the Jews themselves. The Jüdische Lexikon, which is the standard work of the German Jews—published long before the advent of National Socialism to power—confirms the historical continuity of the Jewish question throughout the centuries when it writes (vol. III, column 421): “this Jewish problem is as old as the association of the pronouncedly differentiated and dissimilar Jewish people with other peoples.“ It is a unique, and in the last resort inexplicable phenomenon, that on the one hand the Jews have never been able to find a permanent home in which to develop a

political and social existence "sui generis," while on the other hand they have never proved capable of being absorbed by any of the innumerable countries in which they have sought hospitality. This peculiar destiny of the Jews is, however, subject to variations. But these variations, in their turn, are only the perpetual ebbing and flowing of an unbroken tide. There were times in which the Jewish problem appeared definitely solved, in which the foreign immigrants appeared to have become completely assimilated and to have lost their distinct ethnical personality. In such halcyon days no Jewish problem seemed to exist. But sooner or later the illusion was dispelled, and after many years of comparative rest and quiet Ahasuerus was compelled to again resume his eternal wanderings.

The first expulsions of Jews on a large scale occurred already in the earliest history of Palestine. 700 years before the Christian era the Assyrian King Sarrukin forced the Jews to leave the country, and his example was followed in 586 B. C. by King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon. Persecutions in Alexandria and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in A. D. 70 opened a period in which the Jewish question was not less acute than it is to-day. Further milestones in the eternal wanderings of the Jews are the crusades, the expulsion of the Jews from England under Edward I in 1290, and their expulsion from Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic in 1492. There is not a single century in which an expulsion of Jews has not taken place. Every nation in Europe has sought to preserve itself against Jewish domination by all the means at its disposal.

It is an incontrovertible historical fact that those peoples with a settled abode who throughout the ages afforded hospitality to nomadic Jewish tribes, invariably regarded the latter as an essentially dissimilar race and not merely as a different religious community. Hence hospitality was only granted to the Jews under special conditions. It is interesting to observe in this connection that in every case where a European State was weak and financially impoverished, the restrictions imposed on the Jews were greatly relaxed and eventually abrogated. The numerical preponderance of the Jews in Eastern Europe — which has become the reservoir of Jewry in modern times — is to a large extent attributable to the political and financial weakness of the former Kingdom of Poland. The opening of the so-called "modern era" seemed nevertheless to herald a period of permanent peace and rest for the hitherto restless wandering Jew. It was the era of enlightenment, of liberalism, of belief in the ideals of progress and the rights of man. Conformably with the principles in vogue in this era, the Jews only differed by their religion from other citizens and as such enjoyed equality with the adherents of other religious bodies. They were no longer considered as appertaining to a different race, in other words as strangers. Differentiation on ethnical grounds between the Jews and the native population was on principle abolished by the French Revolution, and this principle was adhered to alike by the legislation and the social custom of ensuing decades.

The nineteenth century was thus dominated by the tenet of the emancipation and assimilation of the Jews. It was considered best not even to mention the Jewish question and to act as if such a question did not exist. In the countries of Western Europe the Jews themselves were animated by an intense desire for assimilation. Conversions and mixed

marriages were the principal means employed by the Jews for acquiring, in the words of Heinrich Heine, himself a Jew, an "admission ticket to European culture", and thereby acquiring a preponderating influence in political, cultural, and economic life. It should be added that a number of Jews were inspired by a sincere desire to throw-off their skin and obliterate as far as possible their hereditary tracks. This process of assimilation reached its culminating point in the first three decades of the twentieth century, during which Israel became King of the Western world. But it cannot be reasonably doubted that this epoch has come to an end. The most farsighted among the Jews had clearly perceived the inevitability of a reaction. Forty years ago a leading German Jew, Dr. Walther Rathenau, in a book entitled *Höre, Israel!* had criticised the policy of assimilation and uttered a warning for the benefit of those of his co-racists who occupied, or were about to occupy, prominent positions in Germany. "They apparently do not even dream," wrote Rathenau, "that only in an epoch in which all the forces of Nature are artificially enchained, can they be protected against that which their fathers endured."

That modern Jewry did not heed the many warning voices in its own ranks affords another proof of the fact that the Children of Israel have not learnt, or wished to learn, the lessons taught by their own fate — that they are blind to the errors so often committed by themselves in their selfcomplacency. It is also typical of the Jewish mind that even Walther Rathenau himself failed to draw the logical consequences from his own perception of ultimate events. Some forty years ago a comparatively small number of Jews, headed by Dr. Theodore Herzl, founded what is known as the Zionist movement in the conscious recognition of the uselessness — nay, harmfulness — of the "assimilation policy," and of the consequences that were bound to follow. The Zionist movement represented an effort to avoid those consequences. Influenced by the anti-semitic movement that arose in France at the close of the nineteenth century in connection with the Dreyfus case, Herzl proclaimed to his co-racists the doctrine: "return to Palestine." Such a doctrine, although backed by an energy inspired by Herzl's lofty persuasive idealism, appeared nothing short of astounding at a time when the so-called "assimilation policy" had reached its zenith. Hence it was explicable that Herzl's exhortation found a resounding echo chiefly among the great mass of East European Jews, in Jewry's immense reservoir in Poland, Lithuania, and Rumania. These Jews had never had any share in the benefits of emancipation and "assimilation." Their economic and social position was as a general rule unsatisfactory, and their political situation was such as to render them particularly susceptible to an appeal to found their own national home in an independent Jewish State.

But despite their numerical superiority, these East European Jews were of minor importance from the point of view of the realisation of Herzl's ambitious plans, for they lacked both economic and political significance. Economically and politically, the influence of the West European and North American Jews was decisive, and for these the novel doctrine preached by Herzl was like unto the seed sown on rocky and hence unfruitful ground. Blinded by the alluring glitter of an artificial "golden age," the Western Jews had only an ironical smile for what they considered as the vagaries of Zionism, to which, moreover,

they were profoundly hostile. And even after this much derided Zionism had assumed a more or less concrete shape in the following decades, the participation of Western Jews in the movement was almost exclusively confined to financial support. Practical Zionists among them were very few in number. On the other hand, Herzl's plan to establish a Jewish National Home soon awakened great interest among Western nations which had the questionable privilege of harbouring the descendants of Abraham. Already in 1903 Joseph Chamberlain — the father of the present Prime Minister — in his capacity as Colonial Secretary, submitted, on behalf of the British Government, a plan for establishing a Jewish settlement on a large scale in Uganda. The realisation of this practical plan, which was laid before the Zionist Congress in Bâle, was frustrated by the doctrinaire attitude of the Zionists, who insisted on an exclusive settlement of the Jews in Palestine.

It will thus be seen that the British Government recognised expressly the existence of a Jewish question, and the necessity of its solution, at a time when belief in the blessings of an "assimilation of the Jewish race" prevailed without contestation in Germany. In 1917 Zionism won a decisive victory with the publication of the Balfour Declaration, by the British Government which promised unreserved British support of the endeavour to create a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The fulfilment of this promise began shortly after the Great War. But after the lapse of twenty years the failure of the effort is obvious. In the light of experience, Herzl's scheme has been proved impracticable. Herzl did not foresee the wave of anti-semitism which is now sweeping over Europe — or, at any rate, did not calculate its rapidity. What we may call the "assimilation era" has come to an end after about 150 years, without any possibility for the Jews to escape in time the inevitable consequences of an unavoidable reaction. There can be no doubt whatever that the counter-current of anti-semitism is rapidly increasing in strength the world over. Even a cursory glance at the papers of many lands suffices to show that the responsible leaders of states in all corners of the globe are compelled in varying degrees to take account of this phenomenon. Foreign critics who maintain that anti-semitism is limited to Germany may be reminded of the well known words of the Zionist champion Dr. Chaim Weizmann that the world is divided into two groups: namely, those countries which desire to expel the Jews, and those which do not desire to receive them.

The first of these groups includes not only Germany but also Italy. In the latter country comprehensive legislative measures have been directed alike to excluding Italian Jews from public life and to getting rid of foreign Jews. Mention may also be made of Poland with a Jewish population of over three millions, or over 10% of the entire population. Not only have various specified professions already been entirely closed to the Jews in Poland, but it has been officially stated in Warsaw that the problem of the Polish Jews can only be solved by emigration. In Hungary, a Bill, originally brought in by the Daranyi Cabinet and reintroduced by the Imredy Cabinet, aims at restricting Jewish participation in economic and cultural life. In Rumania, which has some 1,500,000 Jews, the anti-semitic movement has by no means come to an end with the collapse of the Goga ministry, as is shown by the extensive measures since adopted and by aiming at the deprivation

of their recently acquired Rumanian nationality of all Jews who have immigrated into Rumania since the Great War. There can be no doubt that anti-semitism is constantly progressing in Rumania and will sooner or later become the dominating factor in that country.

The above mentioned countries are those whose Governments have already adopted pronouncedly anti-semitic measures. It would lead too far were we to enumerate the countries — such as Holland, France, and Great Britain — which have not adopted similar measures, but in which anti-semitic movements are none the less noticeable and the influence of anti-semitic organisations on public opinion is none the less increasing. The second group of countries — those who do not desire to receive the Jews — comprises the States into which Jewish immigrants have poured as a result of the growing antisemitic peril. They are mostly oversea countries, first and foremost among them being South American republics and the Union of South Africa. These countries had at first opened their doors wide to Jewish immigration and offered the immigrants a wide field for the exercise of their activities. But they have had meanwhile every reason to regret their hospitality. The consequence is that they have been compelled to restrict ever more and more the extremely liberal regulations originally enacted by them concerning immigration, so that to-day there is practically no country in which Jewish immigrants can hope to find adequate means of subsistence. This was clearly shown at the international conference at Evian, convened in the summer of 1938 for the purpose of dealing with the problem of Jewish emigration, but which failed to achieve any concrete result for the reason that none of the numerous States represented at the conference was willing to declare its readiness to admit Jewish refugees. (Note: In the summer of 1938, delegates from thirty-two countries met at the French resort of Evian. Roosevelt chose not to send a high-level official, such as the secretary of state, to Evian; instead, Myron C. Taylor, a businessman and close friend of Roosevelt's, represented the US at the conference. During the nine-day meeting, delegate after delegate rose to express sympathy for the refugees. But most countries, including the United States and Britain, offered excuses for not letting in more Jewish refugees. Responding to Evian, the German government was able to state with great pleasure how "astounding" it was that foreign countries criticized Germany for their treatment of the Jews, but none of them wanted to open the doors to them when "the opportunity offer[ed].")

It has been proved beyond any possibility of a doubt that Jewish refugees, fleeing before the menace of anti-semitism in the lands in which they were formerly domiciled, bring with them the deadly anti-semitic bacillus into the promised land in which they had fondly hoped to found a new home. Thereby is once more proved the fact, solidly established by the experience of millenniums, that Jewry and Anti-semitism are interchangeable terms, that the Wandering Jew is himself the carrier and transmitter of the anti-semitic germ. Hence it is explicable that in countries in which anti-semitism was formerly unknown, and to which Jewish emigrants have recently flocked, anti-semitic currents should have been created, sufficiently strong for no Government to be able to ignore them.

“[Anti-Semitism] is an understandable reaction to Jewish defects“ - Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism

Anti-semitism is nothing but the antagonistic attitude produced in non-Jews by the Jewish group. This is a normal social reaction. - Albert Einstein

Thus no one who is far removed from the overheated contemporary political atmosphere, and who seriously and with a due sense of responsibility studies the Jewish question, can conscientiously maintain that anti-semitism is exclusively confined to Germany. Such an objective study must also lead to a negation of the proposition occasionally formulated, that the spread of anti-semitism is exclusively attributable to the example set by Germany. As a matter of plain fact, can anyone really believe that such a doctrine could be artificially fostered in a country fundamentally unreceptive to it? Or was it not really the case that the seed had already been sown on ground so fertile, that it only needed a certain chain of circumstances to cause it to bear fruit?

Germany's attitude towards the Jewish question can be rightly understood only if we consider it from the standpoint of a philosophy of history based on the conception of the race as fundamental factor of social evolution — i. e. of the philosophy which from the outset has inspired the National Socialist effort to reconstruct and reorganise the entire life of the German nation. According to this philosophy, the differentiation and variety of the heterogeneous human races, as well as of the peoples who descend from them, constitute an essential element of the Divine creative purpose. Pro vidence has assigned to each people the task of freely and fully developing its own specific characteristic traits. Hence it is contrary to the Divine purpose if a people allows its destiny to be shaped by extraneous forces; and such a people will assuredly perish in the struggle for existence. The question of the intrinsic value of such forces is irrelevant. The sole thing that matters is that they are extraneous — that they have no part in or relation to the hereditary structure, biological and traditional, of the people among whom they operate. No clearer demonstration of this truth has been furnished in the history of the world than by the downfall of the Roman empire, which was doomed from the moment when the ancient Roman element that formed its nucleus began to be stifled by the inroad of foreign influences. The whole life — political, social, economic, military — of the Roman Empire was finally dominated by alien influences, the result being a racial and cultural syncretism which could not but prove fatal to the Empire in the long run.

The family, as the cell of the social community, is naturally subject to the same law of heredity as the aggregate. Those peoples who are derived from the Germanic race, to cite only this particular example, have a strongly developed family instinct. They know, thanks to instinctive intuition fortified by hereditary experience, that the destiny of every family is determined throughout successive generations by the predominance of certain biological and traditional factors. Hence in all families where the consciousness of this truth has not been obliterated, the greatest possible care is invariably taken that there shall be no admixture of new blood susceptible of adulterating the racial composition or debasing the traditional standard of the family. A number of families illustrious in history

have consistently maintained this standard by a rigorous adherence to the principle of consanguinity. Germany, starting from a philosophy of history based on the principle of racial differentiation, is the first country to have consistently drawn the conclusions resulting from the lessons of the past two thousand years in regard to the Jewish question. Those lessons have taught us the reason why the attempt to solve that question by means of the abortive attempt to assimilate the Jews was pre-doomed to failure. Those lessons have proved to the hilt the utter impossibility of assimilating the Jews, and have shown the inevitability of the periodical recurrence of anti-semitism in consequence.

The lessons taught by the past two thousand years may be résuméd as follows:

1) The Jewish question is not a religious, but exclusively a racial, question. The Jews, the overwhelming majority of whom are of Oriental, i. e. Near Eastern descent, have no racial affinity whatever with the peoples of Europe. It should be observed that the attitude of the German Government towards the Jewish question is dictated solely by the fact that the Jews are an alien race, without any consideration of the intrinsic value of the specific qualities of that race. Even in the era of emancipation, during which the Jews were on principle incorporated in the national communities of the Western world, and which was characterised by the "conversion" of millions of Jews to Christianity, it proved impossible to blot out the traces of their ineradicably alien nature. Sufficient evidence of this fact is forthcoming from Jewish sources. In his book *Höre, Israel*, the late Dr. Walther Rathenau wrote: "In the life of the German national the Jews are a clearly differentiated alien race . . . In the Marches of Brandenburg they are like unto an Asiatic horde." The well known Jewish author Jakob Klatzkin expressed himself with refreshing candour in his work *Krisis und Entscheidung im Judentum* (1921) as follows: "Everywhere we are strangers in the lands in which we live, and it is our inflexible resolve to maintain our racial idiosyncrasy."

2) For the past 2000 years the Jewish race has been perpetually on the move. The whole world is its home, conformably with the motto *ubi bene, ibi patria*. True to their destiny, the Jews will never admit being bound by any national ties. The abnormal structure of the Jewish community, in which neither peasants nor handicraftsmen find a place, renders it impossible for the Jews to adapt themselves to the conditions of life in the countries which give them hospitality.

3) Racial predisposition and historical destiny combine to incline the Jews to certain categories of activity, whose sphere of influence is, by their very nature, international. It is consequently explicable that, during the era of emancipation, the Jews should have successfully sought to obtain control of a) public opinion, b) the stock and share markets, c) wholesale and retail trade, d) certain influential cultural organisations, and — last, but not least — e) political life. At the close of the emancipation era in Germany, the Jews enjoyed a practical monopoly of all the professions exerting intellectual and political influence. This enabled them to stamp their entirely alien features on the whole public life of the country.

4) One of the results achieved by the policy of "assimilation" during the era of emancipation was the release of the Jews in Eastern Europe from their ghettos, and their emigration to the more liberal-minded States of Western Europe and North America. Between 1890 and 1900, some 200,000 East European Jews found their way into Great Britain. The number of Jews who emigrated to the United States between 1912 and 1935 is computed at upwards of 1,500,000. If the Jewish question has to-day attained such vital importance, this is to a large extent due to those migrations of Jews — migrations which, on the one hand, demonstrated the illusory nature of the theory of the Jews' capacity for assimilation, and, on the other, hastened the process of the domination of West European and North American States by Jewish elements. The process in question had been practically completed in Germany before the advent of National Socialism to power. An alien race, without roots in German soil and without even the most remote affiliation with the German people, had taken possession of Germany. The poison of an alien spirit, of an alien manner of thinking, had been instilled, cunningly and systematically, into the German mind. Hence the whole German organism necessarily conveyed a totally misleading impression to an observer from outside. National Socialism was therefore faced by the urgent necessity of solving a problem which vitally affected the very existence of the German nation.

Impartial foreign observers had long since recognised the inevitability of a radical solution of the Jewish question in Germany. Already in December, 1910, the Times, in a review of Houston Stewart Chamberlain's book "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," remarked that nearly everything in Germany had come under Jewish control — not only business life, but the Press, the theatre, the film, etc., in short, everything susceptible of influencing German spiritual life, and that it would be inconceivable that the Germans could tolerate such a state of affairs in the long run. A clash must sooner or later inevitably occur, in the view of the Times. Since a solution of the Jewish problem by means of the assimilation of the Jewish race, of its absorption in German national life, had proved wholly impossible, there remained to the National Socialists but the single alternative of solving the Jewish question by the elimination of that unassimilable race from Germany. Foreign critics take particular exception to this view. Even objective observers, fully aware of the consequences of Jewish ascendancy and of the resulting inevitability of an anti-semitic reaction, condemn the methods adopted by National Socialism for the solution of the Jewish question in Germany as inhuman and barbarous when pushed to their only logical conclusion. Whether considered from a purely psychological, or from a concrete political, point of view, this criticism of Germany's attitude is bound to exert great influence on Germany's relations with other countries. It is therefore necessary to carefully examine the grounds on which that criticism is based. It is incontestable — in fact no attempt has been made to deny or even to minimise the fact — that the policy of the German Government towards the Jews has entailed numerous hardships — amounting in certain individual cases to a positive miscarriage of justice. It cannot be denied that a number of Jews affected by recent legislative measures directed against their race honestly felt themselves to be thoroughgoing Germans. Such Jews had done

their best to render service to the State as functionaries, artists, men of letters, scientists, and — last but not least — as soldiers in the Great War.

In order to understand why Germany has proceeded to such a radical solution of the Jewish problem by means of methods of such relentless severity, it is necessary to make abstraction of individual cases, however interesting they may be intrinsically, and to bear in mind that no legislative measure, nor indeed any far-reaching political action, can be conceived, which does not inevitably entail more or less numerous individual hardships. But in order to understand the German attitude towards the Jewish question it is necessary to go still farther — to remember (as has already been indicated) that the unceasing encroachment of the Jews on the entire public life of Germany within the last few decades finally resulted in a terrible national catastrophe. The disastrous end of the Great War for Germany, followed as it was by complete political and economic collapse, by cultural and moral deterioration, by unemployment on a colossal scale with its consequent impoverishment of all social classes to a degree hitherto undreamt-of in modern times — this epoch of Germany's greatest and most cruel humiliation coincided with the final triumph of Jewish emancipation, with the culminating point of Jewish ascendancy in Germany, just as the aforementioned writer in the Times had prophesied in 1910.

Already more than a generation ago, one of the most sincere and farsighted minds in international Jewry, the late Zionist leader Theodore Herzl, described this interdependence of general distress and Jewish ascendancy in a passage of his *Zionistische Schriften* (vol. 1, pp. 238/9), which is by no means applicable solely to Germany, but which has, on the contrary, universal validity. Therein Herzl characterised as follows the part played by the Jews:

“There are among them a few persons who hold in their hands the financial threads that envelop the world. A few persons who absolutely control the shaping of the most vitally important conditions of life of the nations. Every invention and innovation are for their sole benefit, whilst every misfortune increases their power. And to what use do they put this power? Have they ever placed it at the service of any moral ideal — nay, have they ever placed it at the disposal of their own people, who are in dire distress? . . . Without those persons no war can be waged and no peace be concluded. The credit of States and individual enterprises are alike at the mercy of their rapacious ambition. The inventor must humbly wait at their doors, and in their arrogance they claim to sit in judgment on the requirements of their fellow beings.”

Nothing could be better calculated to clear Germany from the reproach of sinning against the laws of humanity, than a detailed enumeration of the facts which prove to what an appalling degree Germany herself experienced the truth of Herzl's words — of the facts which incontestably show what immeasurably bitter experiences have forced Germany to seek a radical solution of the Jewish problem, as far as she is concerned, by the ruthless elimination of all Jewish influence in German life. The following chapters endeavour to present a résumé of the importance of the part played by the Jews at the peak of the era

of emancipation — i.e. up to the advent to power of National Socialism.

Population and the Social Structure of German Jews

It is essential, in the first place, to get an accurate picture of the numerical significance of German Jews in those days, as well as their regional distribution within the Reich and their social structure. The result of the census in 1925 — the last to be held before national socialism took over power — showed that out of a total population of 62.5 millions there were 546,379 professing the Jewish faith. In other words, this was just less than 1% of the total population. It must be noted however that this statistic merely embraced those Jews professing Jewish faith and not those who were Jews by blood and race but who for some reason or another had accepted a Christian faith. No method whatsoever existed for compiling statistics in respect of this latter category. All that one could do was to set up a statistic for those who were orthodox Jews. Hence all statistics that follow are necessarily still based on the figures for orthodox Jewry.

We have shown that the total percentage of German confessional Jews in 1925 was just below 1%, to be exact, 0.90%. But this did not mean that the regional distribution within the Reich was on the same scale. Whereas the purely rural districts of Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Thuringia or Anhalt possessed only a very sparse Jewish population (0.16 to 0.32%), the majority of Jews were heavily concentrated in the large urban areas, particularly in Prussia, Hamburg or Hessen (1.05 to 1.72%). In Prussia, the largest of the German federal states, the census showed that nearly 73% of the total number of Jews were concentrated in the large cities with a population of more than 100,000 — whereas the corresponding ratio for the non-Jewish population reached barely 30%. A comparison with the results of the various census since 1871 shows that the status of Jews in the rural districts of Germany has consistently decreased, whereas all urban districts have shown a constant increase. This can be ascribed to a veritable and phenomenal domestic migration of German Jews within the last 50 years towards the large urban areas. One of the main objectives of this Jewish migration was Berlin, the capital of the Reich, where the number of Jews had become trebled between 1871 and 1910, (36,000—90,000). In this metropolis, the centre of national, political and cultural activity, Jews had established their headquarters. Here they were able to develop unhampered their own peculiar racial characteristics.

The 1925 census returns for Berlin showed that there were 172,500 Jews or 4.25% out of a total population of approximately 4 millions. This percentage is four times greater than the percentage of Jews in the whole German population. Berlin, the capital of Prussia, the largest of the federal states, therefore possessed 42% of the 400,000 Prussian Jews. Twenty-five percent of these 172,500 Berlin Jews were aliens. This fact alone illustrates clearly the total lack of Jewish affinity for national ties and national sentiment. Nearly one-quarter or 18.5% of the 400,000 Jews in Prussia possessed foreign nationality.

It is self-evident that the complete one-sided distribution of German Jews and their

systematic migration to, and concentration in, the large urban areas was an unsound policy and disastrous not only for the Jews but also for the national life of Germany. But the structure of professional life also suffered from this morbid one-sidedness. Here statistics show that Jewry was a tree without roots, without any anchorage whatsoever in social life. This abnormal social composition was responsible for the fact that the Jews exclusively preferred the commercial professions and steered clear of all manual work. These facts can be checked by the results of the trades records established in the various German federal states in 1925. In Prussia, Württemberg and Hessen, these census gave the following results in regard to the percentage of Jews employed in the various groups:

Group	Prussia	Wuerttemberg	Hessen
Trade & Commerce	58.8%	64.6%	69%
Industry	25.8%	24.6%	22%
Agriculture	1.7%	1.8%	4%

It is often asserted that external pressure, political and social considerations, as well as ghetto and boycott have squeezed the Jews out of handicraft trades and forced them into commercial spheres. Here however we must reply by stating that in rural districts, particularly in the former province of Posen and in Hessen-Nassau, the Jews had every opportunity of working as farmers or craftsmen. There were certainly no restrictions placed on them. Felix A. Theilhaber, the well-known Jewish economist, reporting his observations on the causes of Jewish disintegration in *Der Untergang der deutschen Juden — The Decline and Fall of German Jewry—* (Berlin 1921), confirms the fact that so-called primitive production is not in keeping with Jewish characteristics. He admits, primarily, that racial talents force the Jews into the so-called business professions as they are more easily able to guarantee commercial success and material security. Theilhaber finally arrives at the following conclusion:

“Agriculture has little material attraction for German Jews. . . . Racial instincts, traditions and economic preconditions compel them to choose other professions Hence it is natural that certain types dominate in German Jewry, for example, clothiers, agents, lawyers and doctors. Jewish characteristics and peculiarities are also evident in other branches (departmental stores, furs, tobacco and even the press). One peculiar Jewish feature is the craving for individualism,— the urge to become independent and wealthy.”

Among the intellectual professions named by this Jewish author, that of medicine and law were the two most attractive. They were the professions that offered most material gain. Jewish influence in these professions was therefore most marked and finally assumed a dominating character. In 1932 there were approximately 50,000 German medical practitioners of which 6,488, — 13% — were Jews. That is to say, a figure ten times greater than that to which they were entitled on the basis of population ratio. It is noteworthy to mention in this connexion that the majority of these Jewish doctors classed themselves as specialists in venereal diseases. In Berlin, the capital of the Reich, the percentage of

Jewish doctors was still greater. The figure was 42% and 52% for the panel doctors. In the leading Berlin hospitals 45% of all the doctors were Jews. An abnormal and disproportionate state of affairs also existed in the legal professions as compared with the population ratio. In 1933 there were 11,795 lawyers practising in Prussia of which 3,350 or nearly 30% were Jews; 2,051 or 33% of the total number of 6,236 public notaries were Jews. In Berlin itself the percentage was much higher, — bordering between 48% and 56%.

In 1931, in the bigger cities, law teachers were around 30% Jewish, medicine teachers were nearly 40% Jewish and philosophy teachers were around 30% Jewish. Two of the most important phases of public life, law and public health were thus in danger of coming under complete Jewish control.

Jews in German Economic Life

Jewish penetration into German economic life was still more pronounced. In strict accordance with the objectives referred to in the previous chapter, trade and commerce were the principle spheres in which Jews centred their attention. Their peak activity in this respect, be it noted, was reached during the currency inflation from 1919 to 1923. In that particular period very little material benefit accrued to anyone engaged in productive and strenuous work. An instinct for speculation and commercial shrewdness was the ruling factor in those days. It is no wonder therefore that Jewish business concerns sprang up like mushrooms overnight in that period. We need only recall such well-known Jewish names as Jakob Michael, Richard Kahn and Jacob Shapiro or the corrupt business concerns associated with the Austrian Jewish speculators, Siegfried Bosel and Castiglioni, two names that became notorious far beyond Germany's frontiers. At huge cost to the national budget all these concerns finally collapsed when German currency was stabilized.

In 1931, Dr. Alfred Marcus, the Jewish statistician previously referred to, carefully examined Jewish participation in individual branches of German trade in his book *Die wirtschaftliche Krise des deutschen Juden*, — *The Economic Crisis of German Jews*. — His investigations led to the following remarkable results:

In 1930, 346 or 57.3% of the total of 603 firms in the metal trades were in Jewish hands; in scrap-metal there were 514 firms of which 211 or 41% were Jews; grain merchants totalled 6,809 of which 1,543 or 22.7% were Jews; textile wholesalers numbered 9,984 of which 3,938 or 39.4% were Jews; in the ladies dress branch there were 81 Jewish firms out of a total of 133, or 60.9%. In the art and booksellers trades, both of which possess an extremely cultural value, many of the most important firms were Jewish. We need only mention S. Fischer, Cassirer, Flechtheim, Ullstein and Springer.

Still more important is the financial or banking business. Here well-nigh every leading business was in the hands of Jews. A few individual instances can be quoted. Both the governing directors of the Deutsche Bank und Discontogesellschaft (1929) and four of its

twelve board members were Jews. The chairman, two vice-chairmen and three of the five governing members of the board of the Darmstädter und Nationalbank were Jews. The chairman, vice-chairman and three of the seven members of the governing board of the Dresdner Bank (1928) were Jews. Finally, every one of the three owners of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft were also Jews. The big private banks were also nearly all in Jewish hands. We need only recall such well-known firms as Arnhold, Behrens, Warburg, Bleichröder, Mendelsohn, Goldschmidt, Rothschild, Dreyfuss, Bondi and Maron, Aufhäuser, Oppenheim, Levy, Speyer-Ellissen, Heimann, Stern. By means of these key positions in the financial world Jewish influence penetrated by way of the boards of directors to every section of German industry. The Adress Buch der Direktoren und Aufsichtsräte — A Guide to Company Directors & Boards of Management — published in 1930, i.e. long before the national socialists assumed power — proves the alarming influence of Jewish capital or capital controlled by Jews on German economic life.

Outstanding among Jewish financiers in this respect was Jacob Goldschmidt, a member of the boards of no less than 115 companies. He was closely followed by Louis Hagen, a Jewish banker, with 62 appointments. Third on the list was a Christian lawyer, followed successively by four Jewish bankers who together held 166 positions on the boards of various companies. Further down this list Jews continued to play a very prominent role. This concentration of business-company authority in the hands of a small group of Jewish financiers was certainly not compatible with a conscientious fulfilment of the exacting duties of a company director. On the other hand no effort or work was necessary in producing extraordinary handsome returns. This was one of the most important factors that led to discrediting the political and economic systems of that period, and also formed one of the causes which led to a widespread growth of anti-semitism among the broad masses in Germany.

The domination of German industry by a system of Jewish boards of business directors certainly went hand in hand with direct Jewish penetration and subsequent control of industrial production. The complicated nature of this vast field and its complex structure makes it possible to give only a few illustrations which, however, by no means exhaust the real extent of Jewish expansion. In the electrical branch for example, mention must be made of the AEG, — the German General Electric Company. This company was established by the Jew Emil Rathenau and after the Great War, was controlled by two Jews. The whole of the metal market was controlled by the Jew Merton, head of the Frankfurt Metal Bank. The Osram Company, the leading electric globe concern, was controlled by Meinhardt, a Jew. The Continental Rubber Company in Hannover, Germany's largest productive plant, and the Calmon Rubber Company at Hamburg were established and controlled by Jews. Adler, Oppenheim, Salamander and Conrad Tack & Co., four Jewish firms, dominated the entire German leather industry. The iron market was controlled by the Jew Ottmar Strauss. Hugo Herzfeld, a Jew, exercised a decided influence in the potash industry. In the mining industry section, Paul Silverberg dominated the Rhenish lignite or brown coal industry whilst two co-religionists, the Petschek brothers had a

similar function in the Central German lignite district.

Jewish participation was also extraordinarily large in industrial organisations and in official organs of German economic life. This influence was particularly pronounced in the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. To quote one example: The Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the largest of its kind in Germany, had 98 members in 1931 of which no less than 50 were Jews or half-caste Jews. Fourhundred of the 1,300 members attached to the Chamber as advisory experts were Jews, whilst 131 of the 209 commercial judges appointed by the Chamber were also Jews. The Chamber itself was presided over by a President and five vice-presidents. The president himself and three of his deputies were Jews. The position was far worse on the exchanges. We need do no more than give the Berlin Exchange, the most important one in Germany, as an example. Twenty-five of the 36 committee members of the Securities and Bonds Exchange were Jews. Twelve of the 16 committee members of the Produce Exchange were Jews and ten of the 12 committee members of the Metal Exchange were also Jews. The committee of the whole Exchange was composed of 70 members of whom 45 were Jews. Attendance at the Exchange was also more or less a Jewish monopoly. In 1930 for example, the attendance at the Securities and Bonds Exchange totalled 1,474 of which number approximately 1,200 were Jews. The Produce Exchange had an attendance of 578 of which 520 were Jews, and at the Metal Exchange out of an attendance of 89 there were 80 Jews.

It is obvious that the Reichsbank, the official bank for the issue of paper money, was in no position to resist permanently this well-nigh Jewish monopoly of capital and economic interests. The result was that in the period between 1925 and 1929 four of the six members of the controlling board of Reichsbank directors were Jews or half-caste Jews. All three members of the Central Council of the Reichsbank and two of their deputies were Jews. It is necessary now to supplement the aforementioned quantitative analysis of Jewish participation in German economic life by a qualitative one in which the following facts must be borne in mind: When compiling the aforementioned statistics in regard to certain professions in the various German states since 1925, it was ascertained that in Prussia, the largest State, out of a total of approximately 3 million employed in the professions — either independently or in leading capacities — approximately 92,000 were orthodox Jews.

This means that 48% of all Jews professionally employed held leading positions, whereas the corresponding ratio for the remainder of the population amounted to only 16%. If we compare this with the Jewish share in the nonindependent manual work branch, then the whole abnormal social structure of Jewry stands revealed in its true light: Whereas Prussia in 1925 employed approximately 8.5 million ordinary workers (i. e. 46.9% of the sum total of all in employment). Jews totalled only 16,000 i.e. (8.4% of all Jews in employment). The percentage of Jews (which in the leading positions was three times greater than that of the whole population) dropped therefore in the manual trades to onesixth of the figure for the rest of the population, and for all practical purposes had reached zero. This supplementary qualitative assessment makes it perfectly plain that

prior to the national socialist regime the whole of German economic life had reached that alarming stage where it was under foreign domination by Jews and principally by Jews in leading key positions.

Summarizing the aforementioned particulars, it must be emphasized once more that the Jews concentrated themselves exclusively on commercial and financial undertakings and assumed therein absolute leading positions. Agriculture and other manual work were severely left alone. Abnormal concentration of Jews in large cities, particularly in Berlin, must not be forgotten. It does not require much intelligence to realize that such an abnormal social and regional structure must ultimately lead to a state of severe tension, if not to serious disturbances in public life.

Jews and Corruption

It is no exaggeration to say that public life in those days was governed by an epidemic of corruption. This was by no means confined to Germany. Europe and the United States of America were similarly affected. Jews played a leading part in corruption scandals everywhere. In France it was Hanau, Oustric and Stavisky; in the United States of America it was Insull and in Austria, Bosel, Berliner and Castiglioni were the outstanding figures. Fundamentally it is not surprising that this plague of corruption became most widespread and acute in the period which followed the disastrous World War. On the other hand, however, it is typical of the Jew and his character that he should be the bearer and the principal beneficiary of this process of disintegration. It is understandable that Germany, as the loser of the war, became infected to a particularly acute degree with the germ of corruption. During its most distressful period of trial and tribulation — the result of the Dictate of Versailles — Germany therefore became acquainted with Jewry as the exploiters and beneficiaries of its national misfortunes. No other country can point to a similar experience.

The list of Jewish profiteers in those years of national distress who veritably swamped the crumbling structure of German economic life and finally were responsible for its total collapse and ruin — ranges from the company promoter type and inflation profiteer to all the various types of soldiers of fortune and large-scale swindlers. In no other national economy has Jewish nature with its selfishness, its unscrupulousness and its urge for quick profits developed itself so unrestrictedly as in Germany throughout that particular tragic period. Even the war companies, which during the Great War attended to the supplies of raw materials, were allowed to come more and more under Jewish influence. The largest concern of its kind, the Zentral Einkaufsgesellschaft — the Central Buying Company — for example, was controlled by a Jew. The important Kriegs Metall Company — the War Metals Company — was in charge of 14 governing men of whom 12 were Jews. A public scandal as the result of the business methods of this company was avoided for the simple reason that the political and military developments of the war confronted Germany with other and more pressing tasks.

Jewry's great and triumphant hour of corruption came with the end of the Great War. The liquidation of the armaments factories and the sale of military stores and equipment offered splendid opportunities for handsome profits and the Jews were not backward in exploiting this state of affairs. The Jew, Richard Kahn, to mention an example, made a contract with the Deutsche Werke — the largest state-owned armaments plant — whereby the whole of its valuable stock was sold to him at scrap-metal price. Business in deflated currency in the years 1919 to 1923 brought many outstanding triumphs to corruptive and speculative dealers. The Jews in particular were prominent in floating large companies as the result of shady transactions on the exchange. These concerns, which were none too securely established, paid out large dividends in the early stages before finally crashing. The most well-known names in this respect are the Jews Jakob Michael, Richard Kahn and the Eastern Jew Ciprut and his brother. These two brothers are referred to by Pinner, the Jewish author, in his book from which we have already quoted. He states: "The Ciprut brothers are of the breed that comes from the south-eastern plains of Roumania or Persia; soldiers of fortune attracted by the decomposing stench of German currency."

All these cases however were not the deciding factors that turned the Jewish question in Germany into a most burning problem for the whole nation. No. They took place at a time when all phases of economic and political law and order were extremely lax. To a certain extent they even passed unnoticed in the general chaotic state of affairs during the first post-war years. But nothing was more calculated to open the eyes of the general public in Germany and fan the flame of anti-semitism than the huge wave of Jewish corruption which had assumed such a criminal character that one public scandal followed another in rapid succession. We refer in particular to the five Sklarz brothers, the three Barmat, the three Sklarek and the two Rotter brothers as well as the scandals associated with Michael Holzmann and Ludwig Katzenellenbogen. All these Jewish past-masters in corruption were, with the exception of Katzenellenbogen, Easterners i. e. Galician or Polish Jews who had migrated to Germany either during or after the Great War. The first of the big corruption cases was the one in connexion with the five Sklarz brothers. With the help of influential connexions in the social-democrat party they succeeded, shortly after the war, in obtaining a monopoly for supplies to those troops that had been commissioned with the task of restoring domestic law and order. These contracts led to enormous profits within a short space of time. These brothers increased their wealth considerably by further shady manipulations and by discreet bribes to leading government officials. All this helped these unscrupulous Jewish blackguards materially when they subsequently came up for trial. Very little light could be thrown on their shady conduct and after a well-nigh endless trial, only one of the five brothers was convicted in 1926. These five brothers were ably assisted by a Russian Jew, Parvus-Helphand, one of the most unscrupulous blackguards and swindlers produced by the war. He utilized the millions he made out of war supplies in order to establish good relations with the social-democrats in power at that time. As a principal wire-puller he remained in the background of many corruption scandals. No one dared to institute proceedings against

a man who had successfully bribed so many leading government officials.

The three Barmat brothers were artists in corruption on a more imposing scale. Their home was at Kiev and during the war they were engaged in business in Holland as food merchants. With the help of Heilmann, the Jewish politician, the five Sklarz brothers and Parvus - Helphand these three Barmat brothers ultimately received permission to settle in Germany. By means of ruthless exploitation of human weaknesses, small and large favours which culminated in direct bribes, these brothers were able finally to win the confidence of influential friends and members of the government. In this way they soon became the owners of ten banks and a great number of industrial concerns. With the help of fraudulent balance sheets they procured a loan of 38 million Marks, partly granted by the Prussian State bank and partly by the Reich Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. When finally this inflated Barmat concern crashed, its debts were estimated at 70 million gold Marks, and half of this sum had to be covered by the savings of small investors. The subsequent court proceedings against these Barmat brothers ended in very small terms of imprisonment. Herr Bauer, the social-democrat Reich Chancellor at that time, who had become involved in the proceedings was forced to resign. After the crash, Julius Barmat went abroad again. In his new surroundings he applied with great success the methods which he had adopted in Germany. By bribing influential politicians he was able to obtain loans and finally defrauded the Belgian National Bank of 34 million gold francs. He evaded the law by committing suicide in 1937. The three Jews, Iwan Baruch, Alexander Kutisker and Michael Holzmann were less successful in their efforts than their predecessors. Nevertheless they are worthy of mention. They turned their attention to the Prussian State Bank which Barmat had previously defrauded. They also succeeded in defrauding this institution to the extent of 14 million gold Marks. By far the largest scandal however was brought about by the Sklarek brothers of whom there were three. The case is certainly unparalleled in the history of crime, politics, business and bribery. The principle sufferers were the city authorities in Berlin.

The Jews in German Political Life

In Imperial Germany the Jews did not play any important roles in the political life of the country, that is to say, not insofar as they were in possession of important key positions. But this state of affairs changed radically with the outbreak of the 1918 revolution and the introduction of a new constitution. There is no need here to examine the question of whether this new state structure was in line with the governing political ideas of Jewry. The facts, however, are that with the commencement of November 1918, a veritable rush was made by the Jews to capture the leading key positions in the Reich and in the federal states. Among the six so-called "Representatives of the People" who formed the first Reich Government after the collapse, there were two Jews, Hugo Haase and Otto Landsberg. Kurt Eisner, a Jew, headed the list as Minister-President in Bavaria; in Prussia the Jew Paul Hirsch assumed a similar function. The first Reich government

established in 1919 on a parliamentary basis contained five Jews. Many of the most important departments in the Reich ministries were controlled by Jews. To thoroughly appreciate the significance of this fact, one must bear in mind, that Jewish usurpation of political leadership commenced with the beginning of an epoch of political weakness which, in foreign affairs led to complete surrender and shameful servility; in the domestic sphere to complete disunion and disruption.

Those particular Jewish politicians were also in no way satisfied that a change from constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary-republican regime had taken place in German affairs. This is testified to by the Jewish author, Rudolf Schay, in his book *Juden in der deutschen Politik* (Jews in German Politics) published in 1929. He states:

“Among the elements who carry on the revolution, and will not accept a free and bourgeois and a democratic-republican order — but who insist on the complete fulfillment of all social demands, — Jews have played a dominant role; viz: Rosa Luxemburg, Eisner and Landauer . . .”

This complete fulfillment of all socialist demands was nothing else than a realization of the communist manifest inspired and dictated by the Jew Karl Marx. But that was only possible by completely surrendering all national ideas and interests of the German nation. It is therefore not surprising that Jewish politicians were playing a leading role, even during the Great War, in all those movements which aimed at undermining the political and military strength of Germany. Which of the Allied countries would not have taken immediate steps to punish the author of a treacherous article such as that which appeared on October 20, 1918, in the social-democratic paper *Vorwärts*, written by its editor, the Jew Friedrich Stampfer. He stated:

“Germany must — that is our inflexible will as socialists - strike her war flag for ever, without bearing it home in victory for the last time.”

Prominent among these organisation was the *Neues Vaterland* (The New Fatherland) subsequently known as “The German League for Human Rights.” Its policy was principally dictated by the Jews Witting, Grelling, Bernstein, Magnus, Hirschfeld, Heymann, Gumbel, Wulfsohn etc. The pacifist Youth Organisation was also led by Jews: Max Hodann, Jakob Feldner, the Jewish communist Scholen and the half-caste Jewish sons of Karl Liebknecht. It is not our intention to criticize pacifism as such. Unquestionably pacifism is a political conviction of great moral significance and is certainly worthy of every effort to support it.

Prominent in this work is the Jew already referred to, Dr. Richard Grelling — a name undoubtedly still well-remembered in the former Allied countries. Before the War he emigrated to Switzerland and there published his two books *J'accuse* and *Das Verbrechen* (The Crime) in which he attempted to prove Germany's alleged guilt for the outbreak of hostilities. This book was very widely circulated in the Allied and neutral countries as an “authoritative and convincing” personal document of Germany's war guilt and all the attendant horrors. In 1917, Karl Federn, Grelling's co-religionist and also an author, replied

by denouncing Grelling's conduct as "dishonourable" and stating further that Grelling had built up his case "by lies and the use of false and forged documents." Grelling never replied to these severe charges which were constantly repeated in later years. Geheimrat Willing, a highly placed German official, brother of the Jewish author Maximilian Harden, was responsible for the unlawful and widespread publication in pamphlet form of a private memorandum ("My London Mission"), the property of Count Lichnowsky, the former German Ambassador in London. This memorandum contained observations of a purely personal character but their unlawful publication was just as disastrous to Germany's political position as the works of Grelling.

Jews also took a prominent part in the work of planning the 1918 revolution in Germany which finally, led to the collapse of the entire western front. It was Dr. Oscar Cohn, the social-democratic deputy who early in November 1918 accepted the sum of four million gold roubles from M. Joffe, the Soviet-Russian ambassador to Berlin in those days, and also a Jew. This money was intended to finance the German revolution. Hugo Haase, a Jewish Reichstag deputy, was the master-mind behind the Sailors' revolt at Kiel, which was the signal for general revolution throughout Germany. At the national meeting of protest held on May 12, 1919, when it was unanimously decided to vote against signing the peace terms, it was the Jew Haase, as leader of the Independent Social Democrats, who alone insisted on accepting the terms. It must also be added that in the Prussian Diet of that period it was a Jew, Kurt Rosenfeld, who on May 7, 1919, on the occasion of a similar protest meeting demanded that these terms should be accepted.

It is not possible to conclude this chapter of Jewish defeatism without mentioning the following: It is true that there were also numbers of non-Jewish Germans who both during and after the war committed treason on strictly Jewish lines. But the Jewish percentage in this dastardly political work is not only relative but actually incomparably higher. In fact, the percentage is so abnormally great, that the list of non-Jewish perpetrators is almost insignificant. Seeking for an explanation of this curious fact one finds that Jewry is outwardly as well as inwardly completely rootless; on the basis of its racial habits and its historical past it recognizes no ties which can in any way be connected with love for a homeland. At the same time, however, this political attitude of the Jews clearly shows up the glaring ingratitude which they have demonstrated in Germany. There is no country where the requirements of Jewish emancipation have been more justly fulfilled than in Germany; and there is not another country in which Jews were so accommodatingly allowed to fill positions in the public services. But in no other country in the world have Jews in times of severe national distress played such an inglorious, destructive and treacherous role as in Germany.

The Jews in the German Press

Jews have always possessed a special aptitude for journalism and the organisation of press work. Accordingly, they played a prominent part in the establishment of German

newspapers. Hardly any other function has given them so much power as their influence on the press. They soon proved however that they had little or no interest in that sense of high moral obligation which is the duty of those who are responsible for influencing public opinion. If one examines the Jewish controlled German press of the last decades, one realizes that for purely material reasons it served a craving for sensation, for vanity and the lower instincts of the masses. Circulation was increased in proportion as newspapers undermined in the most grave manner all respect for morals, law and order. The two largest German newspaper concerns were, before 1933, in Jewish hands: viz. Ullstein and Mosse. Both these firms were founded by Jews and their directorates and editorial staffs were comprised of nearly all Jews.

Ullstein. Publishers & Printers

The circulation of this largest newspaper concern averaged 4 million daily. They published five large daily newspapers, several weekly papers and many periodicals and magazines of every description. The Ullstein News Agency influenced a great number of provincial papers. In addition to this, Ullstein possessed also an extensive book publishing branch. The whole of the shares in this vast concern were held by the five Jewish Ullstein brothers. The directorate consisted of these brothers, three other Jews and only two Christians. The largest newspaper issued by this concern was the Berliner Morgenpost which had a larger circulation than any other German paper (more than 600,000 daily). Besides a Jewish editor this paper had in 1927 ten other Jews as members of the editorial staff. The editorial staff of the Vossische Zeitung — an extremely influential political organ — was in charge of the Jew Georg Bernhard and fourteen Jewish sub-editors. Bernhard at that time was keen on making a name for himself in politics. The position in regard to the remaining Ullstein papers was practically the same.

Mosse. Publishers & Printers

This firm was, as far as size is concerned, not so important as Ullstein. Its daily circulation was 350,000. Established and maintained as a family concern by the Eastern Jew, Rudolf Mosse (formerly Moses), its influence was none the less very great. Its chief publication was the Berliner Tageblatt established long before 1933. It was this paper which for many years was looked upon abroad as representative of German public opinion. The editor of this paper was the Jew Theodor Wolff, who also took a prominent part in politics. Apart from him the important positions on the editorial staff were filled by seventeen other Jews. In five important capitals outside the Reich the Berliner Tageblatt was represented by Jews. Another paper issued by this concern was the Acht-Uhr- Abendblatt, another politically influential publication in which Jews were dominant with a chief editor and eight co-religionists as sub-editors.

It was only natural that the rest of the German press could play only a very insignificant part when compared with the activities of these two mammoth concerns. Neither the provincial press with its economic disunity nor the publishing house of August Scherl — the only large Christian undertaking in the capital — were able to exercise influence

sufficient to seriously challenge the united power of these two big all-Jewish undertakings. That the marxist party press was overwhelmingly directed and influenced by Jews has already been stated above. Moreover the official press departments of the government — particularly in Prussia — were also in charge of Jews. The three most important press departments in Prussia, the largest of the German federal states were, in 1930 for example, in charge of four Jews. It was therefore only a matter of course that the professional and economic organisations of German journalists came entirely under Jewish influence. The largest of these organisations, the Reichsverband der deutschen Presse — the German Press Association — was directed for many years and until 1933 by the Jewish chief editor of the *Vossische Zeitung*, Georg Bernhard. In the *Verein Berliner Presse* — the Berlin Press Union — which was the leading social and benefit society for all journalists in the capital, the right to nominate and elect members had been vested from 1888 in the hands of a purely Jewish committee.

Finally, the official organisation of “free lance” German writers, the *Schutzverband deutscher Schriftsteller* was controlled by a directorate which, in 1928 and 1929, consisted of 90% Jews. Its president was at that time the Jewish publicist Arnold Zweig, author of the war novel, *Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa*, in which he foully besmirched the national honour of the German people. In this connexion it is necessary to examine the work and the significance of those Jews who for many years were regarded in Germany and abroad as the most authentic apostles of German publicism. We refer in particular to Georg Bernhard, Theodor Wolff and Maximilian Harden. All three were Jews. All three were journalists of surpassing technical skill, men who, through their masterly handling of the written word alone, were well able to make “converts” to the ideas they represented.

But behind the winning exterior was hidden the same dangerous spirit of denial of all traditional values, of criticism for criticism’s sake, the spirit of destruction, disintegration and instability which we have been compelled to recognize as the main characteristics of Jewry in all spheres. It is exceptionally significant that Georg Bernhard’s real profession was that of banker and stock exchange financier. He belonged until shortly before the Great War to social democracy, and his whole life displays a remarkable vacillation between two such contradictory things as stock exchange journalism and marxist activity. Then, in 1913, he was appointed chief editor of Ullstein’s *Vossische Zeitung*. In this position, in two different hours of destiny in Germany’s post-war history, he played a calamitous part:

In the critical weeks before the signing of the Versailles Treaty, when the German people and its leaders well-nigh unanimously rejected the intolerable and harsh conditions of that dictated peace, he made common cause with those really comparatively few men of public influence who, through the medium of the spoken and printed word, ruthlessly suppressed every flickering of the spirit of national resistance, and thereby destroyed all hopes of securing more bearable conditions. One requires only to glance at the old issues of the *Vossische Zeitung* for those weeks and months to realize how systematically Bernhard went about this work (Note: When reading these lines, it reminds me of the

mainstream media in the US Presidential elections “Trump vs. Clinton“, or how the “rise“ of a new conservative party in Germany is handled starting mid-2015). Even the most humiliating terms of this treaty — the “War-Guilt“ clause, he attempted to represent as a mere bagatelle. Thus he wrote — to give only one example — on June 18th 1919:

“The German reader of the Note will most easily be able to reconcile himself with those parts which deal with the historical origin of the war and with the question of guilt for it . . . if one regards the matter in this manner, one cannot take the scolding in the war-guilt paragraph tragically.“

With these words Bernhard attacked the German government from behind whilst the latter was waging a dramatic struggle regarding these points of honour, in particular the clause relating to war-guilt and the release of German officers. It will be understood outside Germany as well that we cannot forget such a betrayal of national interests, such a lack of proper pride and feeling for honour as was displayed by the Jewish journalist Bernhard. In the second case, we already find Bernhard committing open criminal treason. During the occupation of the Rhineland, there arose in the occupied zone a movement, supported and forwarded for political reasons by foreign money, which strove to prevent for ever the return of the occupied Rhineland to the Reich, and to establish its complete independence. Georg Bernhard with his *Vossische Zeitung* got into contact with these Rhenish separatists. The separatists received from him political advice and financial support. In the year 1930, one of the owners of Ullstein, the Jew Dr. Franz Ullstein, published this fact in the periodical *Tagebuch*. He declared that Georg Bernhard’s agent in Paris, the Jew Dr. Leo Stahl, had paid a sum of money to Matthes, the leader of the separatists, and that Bernhard himself had corresponded and associated with Matthes. This political scandal forced Bernhard eventually to retire from political journalism. He became, and this is also characteristic, the head of a large departmental store association. Since 1933 he has been busy abroad publishing an anti-German emigre paper.

Theodor Wolff, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt* behaved in a different but equally objectional manner. An apparently convinced monarchist during the war, there was, after the change of constitution in Germany, no one who reviled and slandered the deposed Hohenzollerns in so evil a manner as Wolff. Even if we could forgive him such opportunism, quite inexcusable is his behaviour at the time when the increasing spread of indecency and immorality in Germany forced the government in 1926 to take constitutional steps for the suppression of filthy and otherwise low-grade literature. The intention was, above all, to protect youth from coarsening and indecent influences. Theodor Wolff openly opposed this effort. He condemned the new law and as a protest, resigned from the democratic party which he had helped to found because they had supported the new measure. In order to understand the whole frivolous irresponsibility of this Jewish publicist, one must know just how far the flooding of the German book and periodical markets with dirty, pornographic productions had gone. We shall have more to say about this later on. Still more influential than Georg Bernhard and Theodor Wolff, certainly the mightiest man of the pen which Germany had for a generation, was Maximilian Harden, a brother of

Witting, the previously mentioned Jewish defeatist. With his periodical, *Die Zukunft* — The Future — he indulged in high politics for more than twenty years. Hardly any other man has shown so much fluctuation in character and principles as he. He began by setting himself up as judge of morality in Imperial Germany and dealt a death blow to the reputation of the monarchic system by his journalistic scandalmongering about the Hohenzollern court. During the Great War he was certainly the only real “annexationist” in Germany, demanding as the price of victory the whole of Belgium, the French coast opposite England and the Congo Basin, (Vide *Zukunft* of 17th October 1914). Then when the fortunes of war, in 1916, began to turn away from Germany, Harden also retreated. He attacked German war policy and became an enthusiastic admirer of President Wilson. In 1919, he finally conducted a cowardly campaign against the national resistance to the tyrannical peace treaty terms, naming this resistance “artificially-forced hysteria and miserable falsehood.”

The driving forces of such characterless behaviour were vanity and petty selfish ambition. Harden is rightly described by the world-renowned historian, Friedrich Thimme, as “The Judas of the German people.”

Jews in German Art and Literature

Many years before the National Socialist régime, indeed, even before the War and prior to the period when Jewish emancipation had reached its climax, anxious observers pointed out that cultural life in Germany hardly deserved the epithet of “German” any more and that it had actually become a merely Jewish sphere of activity. The crisis in German cultural life has never been more aptly described and the Jewish problem has never been discussed in clearer terms than in the article by the Jewish essayist Moritz Goldstein, already published as early as 1912 in the *Kunstwart* (issue dated March 1912), a German Art magazine of very high standing. Goldstein depicts how the Jews, at the beginning of their emancipation, generally invaded all branches of German cultural life and, as alert scholars, soon commenced to supplant their masters. Goldstein gives the following synopsis of the consequences resulting from this development:

“Jews suddenly filled all those positions which are not withheld from them by force, they have converted German aims and tasks into their own and they strive for them accordingly. It seems as if German cultural life were to be completely transferred into Jewish hands. This was neither anticipated nor desired by the Christians at the time they granted the pariah in their midst a share in European cultural life. They began to take defensive measures, they resumed their custom of calling us aliens, they commenced to regard us as a danger in the Temple of their Art. Consequently we are now faced by the following problem. We Jews guide and administrate the intellectual property of a nation which denies our qualification and competency to do so.”

Goldstein describes this Jewish administration and control of German art and culture as a “prodigious fact.” A retrospective examination of German intellectual life as it was

before 1933 will corroborate Goldstein's testimony. In all spheres, be it on the stage, in literature, music, painting and the plastic arts, be it in the film or, more recently, in broadcasting, Jews always occupied the leading positions, compelling all to follow their intellectual guidance. To take the theatre, for instance, — the Berlin stages, which, as the most modern, are naturally always imitated by the theatres of all the provinces, were all under Jewish management. The choice of the programmes was made according to an entirely Jewish outlook and the result was that Jewish authors predominated.

In the domain of literature, the best-sellers were invariably the output of Jewish authors or publishers. Readers abroad, who took an interest in German literature during those days, will still be able to recall such names as Emil Ludwig, Jakob Wassermann, Arnold Zweig, Lion Feuchtwanger and various others. The sale of their books outweighed that of all other German authors by far. Statistics have shown that practically the half of all German belletristic literature circulating abroad during the last ten years was the product of Jewish authors. Music life was similarly dominated by Jewish influence. In the great majority of cases, the important conductors' positions in Berlin and in the provinces were occupied by Jews. The intellectual influence resulting from this trend was decisive for the choice of the works appearing on the programmes of opera and concert hall. The participation of Jewish composers grew to astonishing dimensions. — Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schönberg were substituted for Beethoven, Richard Wagner and Hans Pfitzner were supplanted by Franz Schreker. Music critiques written by Jews and the influence of the professional agencies, which were practically totally in Jewish hands, naturally did their part to support this development.

This tendency was even more evident in the sphere of the lighter type of entertainment music such as the operetta, the film, in the gramophone industry and in broadcasting. An ever increasing Jewish influence upon conservatories, in the publishing branch as a whole and in professional music literature could be observed so that, taken as a whole, the conclusion was justified that Jewish preponderance in music life was indeed alarming. The situation was no different with regard to the plastic arts and painting. Jewish art traffic and Jewish art literature paved the way to success for a whole generation of Jewish painters and sculptors, — a way which was barred to the majority of German artists. Film and broadcasting were practically exclusively reserved to Jewish activity, so that it is nearly impossible to speak of a German participation in these domains. To destroy any possible doubt as to the accuracy of these statements regarding the Jewish preponderance in German intellectual life, it is merely necessary to revert to the testimony of such a trustworthy Jew as Moritz Goldstein who, already in 1912, made the following observations in the essay quoted above:

“Nobody actually questions the power the Jews exercise in the press. Criticism, in particular, at least as far as the larger towns and their influential newspapers are concerned, seems to be becoming a Jewish monopoly. Predominance of the Jewish element in the theatre is also generally recognized: nearly all the managers of Berlin stages are Jews; the same may be said of a large part, even perhaps of the majority of the actors,

whilst the fact that the concert and theatre are dependent upon the Jewish public is continuously being proudly asserted and also deplored . . . Many an apostle of German art has been forced, much against his will, to convince himself of the enormous number of Jews amongst German poets."

Since 1912 this development progressed very rapidly. The main cause was that Jews even invaded the official administration of German intellectual life. They were granted governmental positions which had been closed to them before the War. For many years the Jewish lawyer Seelig acted as the responsible head of the Department for Theatres in the Prussian Ministry for Culture, whilst the Department for Music was in the hands of the Jew Leo Kestenberg. As the policy of the German press was controlled by Jews, indeed, the supreme official administration was conducted by Secretary of State Weismann, it is easily possible to conjecture to what an extent the Jewish usurpation of the entire German intellectual life was officially sponsored and propagated. This Jewish preponderance was by no means the result of an intellectual superiority, of greater talents or creative powers on the part of the Jewish race. On the contrary, it was mainly the Jewish economic ascendancy described above which led to the establishment of their dominant position in German cultural life. This economic domination was the instrument to attain the practical application of their intellectual and cultural influence. In this connection it is even more important to bear in mind that the characteristic Jewish intellectual attitude, which manifested itself in all spheres of cultural life, decisively favoured the realization of their craving for predominance. Their lack of national sentiment, their egoism, their absolute rationalism, their absence of scruples and their characteristic habit of speculating upon the basest instincts, — traits which have already been mentioned in the chapter devoted to Jewish journalism, — were the foundation for their economic success, upon which their intellectual domination was based.

The consequence was the disintegration and decay of German cultural life. As a matter of fact, it was not so much the dimensions of Jewish power, nor the extent of the alien usurpation which aroused opposition and protest on the part of the German nation, finally leading to the most acute anti-semitism, but it was rather the characteristic Jewish moral standpoint, their innate spirit and the methods applied by the Jewish race to use and abuse this intellectual power.

The book then goes on to depict detailed examples in Literature, Theatre and Cinema spanning 20 pages. The interested reader can find the book with a quick online search for free. Their conclusion:

The disintegration and decay of German intellectual life under Jewish supremacy are most apparent and assume their crudest aspects in the sphere of light entertainment art. In the operetta, and especially the revue, frivolity and licentiousness had developed to such an unbelievable extent that Berlin was regarded as the most immoral town in the world in those days; under the circumstances this was not at all astonishing. None others than the Jews introduced the new form of public amusement, the revue, a branch of art utterly unknown in the Germany of pre-War days. Not content with the introduction of

this novelty, they abused it and converted the revue into that species of entertainment which was to blame for quite a large part of the depravity and laxity which had attacked German moral life.

It is extremely characteristic that every one of the Berlin Revue proprietors — in the provinces there were very few enterprises of this nature — were Jews without a single exception. Many a former visitor to Berlin will still associate such names as James Klein, Hermann Haller, Rudolf Nelson, the two Rotter brothers and Eric Charell with most unpleasant recollections. The complementary staff of authors, composers, directors and stars were also generally chosen amongst the members of the Jewish race. These revues were veritable orgies of sexuality and licentiousness. All realities of life were regarded from the one and only aspect of erotic desire and its satisfaction. Modesty and decency were scoffed at as being old fashioned and ridiculous. The loud and vulgar titles given to these revues, for which enormous propaganda was made, speak for themselves. The following translations give an impression of what was presented to the public:

“Undress yourselves“ - “A thousand Naked Women“ — “The Sins of the World“ - “Houses of Lust“ — “Strictly Prohibited“ - “O Gee, A thousand Pretty Girls“ — “Sweet and Sinful.“

The advertisements for James Klein’s Revue “Undress yourselves“ were deliberately designed to awaken the lowest instincts of the public by enticing it with the following enumeration: “An evening without morals and principles — Sixty nude models, winners of beauty prizes — The adventures of beautiful women — Experiences with a girl of fifteen —.“

The posters advertising the revue “A Thousand Naked Women“ announced: “The grand revue of Free Love — Forty Pictures of Morality and Immorality.“

The performances themselves absolutely fulfilled the expectations. The scenes on the stage revealed all what the most daring phantasy can imagine, in short, a display of absolute libertinism and a complete surrender to sensual passions.

The Jewish Share in Immorality

Even a strictly impartial and sober observer without any pronounced anti-semitic views cannot any longer remain unimpressed by such examples of laxity and frivolity which all point to typical Jewish indecent and immoral characteristics. At the same time such characteristics are contrary to the spirit which animates all cultured nations. For all that, the reproach that the Jews are an inferior race, which these facts reveal, is so grave that it seems necessary to make a few further observations in this respect. It will be seen however as far as Germany is concerned, that everywhere where existing moral standards have been deliberately relaxed — where immorality was made into a business — Jews were prominent, if not dominant in this work. Even the so-called “Sexual Science“ — one of the unsavoury products of the last century — was a purely Jewish invention and

exploited by them into a most flourishing and lucrative branch of trade.

The authentic "Jewish Encyclopedia" was even compelled to admit a marked racial sexuality in its co-religionists. Cautiously it stated: "The Bible itself contains many references to the fact that the sensual element in sexual intercourse was often very pronounced . . . The words of the Prophets resound with complaints and threats in regard to adultery of which one hears so much." (Vol. V, p. 384.) With the advent of emancipation this Jewish urge, restrained by the ghettos of the middle ages, poured forth into the public life of the state. A clear field however was only given to it when, as the result of the revolution in Germany in 1918, all barriers of law, order and censorship were broken down. A veritable storm flood of Jewish immoral literature, obscene films and plays then broke over Germany. Cinemas and theatres have already been exhaustively dealt with. It remains to be said that in literature all authors of obscene works were Jews in every case. Among the hundreds of thousands of books confiscated by the national socialists in 1933 very familiar names repeatedly cropped up. Together with publishing firms such as Benjamin Harz, Richard Jacobsthal, Leon Hirsch, M. Jacobsohn or Jacobsthal & Co. mention must be made of the publishers of *Kulturforschung* — Cultural Research — a Vienna firm whose production was sufficient to fill many libraries. The titles speak for themselves. *Sittengeschichte des Lasters* (The Moral Story of Depravity), *Sittengeschichte der Schamlosigkeit* (The Moral Story of Profligacy), *Bilderlexikon der Erotik* (Illustrated Lexicon of Sexual Love), *Sittengeschichte des Geheimen und Verbotenen* (The Moral Story of Secret and Forbidden Things), etc. etc.

Among the publishers, the following must be recalled to mind: Dr. Ludwig Levy-Lenz, Leo Schidrowitz, Dr. Iwan Bloch, Franz Rabinowitsch, Georg Cohen, Dr. Albert Eulenburg, Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld. Iwan Bloch and Magnus Hirschfeld were in reality the real exponents of this so-called scientific sexual research. In reality it was nothing else than a downright treatise on obscene subjects and a degradation of all marriage and family ties. Their assistants were Felix Abraham and Levy-Lenz. No amount of search will ever reveal a Christian collaborator in this "sexual science." The publications issued by these obscene pseudo-scientists tell their own particular story of what took place in Magnus Hirschfeld's "Institution for Sexual Science" and in similar concerns: "Sexual Catastrophes," "Sexual Pathology," "Love Chains," "How to avoid Pregnancy" (by Magnus Hirschfeld), "The Perverters," "Prostitution," "Sexual Life in our Age" (by Iwan Bloch), — these were the popular subjects.

It was due to their unrestricted and infamous efforts that the general public became acquainted with all the noisy talk of free love, a call for unlimited right to allow all passions and instincts to run riot, as well as the demand to make homo-sexuality and abortion non-punishable offences. A heated campaign was waged on the question of unrestricted and non-punishable acts of abortion championed by Jews: Dr. Max Hodann, Dr. Lothar Wolf, Dr. Levy-Lenz, Martha Ruben-Wolf, Felix Halle and Alfons Goldschmidt. This circle of Jews issued at the same time numerous publications advocating greater birth restriction and the avoidance of pregnancy. Finally we must not overlook Dr. Max Hodann, Berlin's

Medical Officer of Health. With his "Workers' Sexual Magazine" he contrived to inject the poison of moral disintegration into the broad masses. He also earned for himself a particularly unsavoury reputation for his outspoken propaganda for sexual self-abuse. Hr. Scavenius, the Danish Chargé d'Affaires at the Hague, was undoubtedly right when he declared three years ago in a wireless lecture that "Germany at that time was the pornographic centre of the world."

The Jewish Share in Crime

It is difficult indeed to ascertain the real extent of the German Jewish share in crime throughout the Reich for the following reasons: The criminal records kept in Germany since 1882 recognized only orthodox Jews. Those innumerable Jews who had accepted a Christian faith or who were not associated with any established religion, were never embraced in these records. Therefore a great number of criminals, Jewish by race, has been absorbed in other statistical categories. To this must be added the fact that commencing with the year 1918, criminal records ceased to show any subdivision into confessions. This step was in all probability the result of Jewish intervention. The following statistics therefore cannot in any way be regarded as complete. Nevertheless they are food for thought in throwing light on Jewish characteristics. When taking all this into account, the official "Statistics of the German Reich" (New Edition, Vol. 146) reveal the fact that a number of certain crimes were committed more frequently by Jews than by Christians. Taking an average valuation for the period 1892 to 1901, we obtain the following table:

Crime	Jewish percentage compared with Christian criminals
Fraud & Trickery	14 times greater
Usury	13 times greater
Copyright infringement	11 times greater
Fraudulent bankruptcy	9 times greater
Fraudulent insolvency	6 times greater
Receiving stolen property	5 times greater

It will be seen from this that Jews have a strong liking for commercial crime. That this fact has in no way been sufficiently explained by the large percentage of Jews in business is revealed by the investigations conducted by the Jew Ruppin. In his book, *Die Juden der Gegenwart — Contemporary Jews —* (Berlin 1904), with the aid of comparative statistics Ruppin arrives at considerably greater figures for commercial crime than Jewish participation in commerce would seem to indicate. The Jew Wassermann arrives at the same conclusion in his book *Beruf, Konfession und Verbrechen, — Profession, Confession and Crime —*, (Munich 1907). He proves that Jewish criminality in bankruptcy in 1900 was seven times greater than among non-Jewish criminals and six times greater in cases of fraudulent insolvency. Wassermann obtained these statistics by being guided expressly by the percentage participation in commercial professions. The official "Statistics of the

German Reich“ for the period 1910 to 1914 furthermore prove that at a later stage very little alteration had taken place. The following table exemplifies this:

Crime	Jewish percentage compared with Christian criminals
Commercial Fraud	3 times greater
Usury	12 times greater
Copyright infringement	8 times greater
Fraudulent bankruptcy	13 times greater
Fraud	2 times greater
Receiving stolen property	5 times greater

Quite apart from these commercial crimes Jews have taken a still greater share in other branches of crime far more reprehensible. We refer to the drug traffic and prostitution, illicit gambling and pickpocketing. The “Central Organisation for Combatting Drug Crime“ has established that in 1931, out of 272 international drug traffickers no less than 69 (25%) were Jews. In 1932 the figures were 294 and 73 (again 25%). In 1933, the Jewish percentage had increased to 30%. The Central Organisation for Combatting Unlawful Gambling and Games of Chance registered 57 Jews out of a total of 94 cases which came to its notice in 1933. In 411 cases of pickpocketing in 1932 193 Jews were involved. In the same year it was found that among the international pickpocketing gangs, out of a total of 163 criminals 134 were Jews or 82%. The high percentage of Jews in immoral crime — already referred to in the chapter on Jewish immorality — is frankly admitted by the Jewish scientist Ruppin, to whom we have already referred. He writes:

“That Jews live principally in the large towns and cities is responsible for the fact that certain crimes usually limited to city life are associated with them; for example, procuration, cooperation in immorality.“

In view of the limited space at our disposal, we could necessarily only give a r é s u m é of the part played by the Jews in Germany before 1933. It would be easy to write a substantial volume on the subject¹). But even such a work could only reach the same conclusions at practically every page. Our r é s u m é will suffice to convince unprejudiced and objectively minded readers of that which it was our object to prove—namely, that the preponderating influence of the Jews developed into a national calamity of the worst sort for Germany, and that the previously cited words of Theodore Herzl, “every misfortune increases their power,“ have proved in the result to be only too true. The interdependence of national distress and Jewish ascendancy has scarcely ever been manifested with such luminous clearness as in Germany. Under these circumstances, it surely behoves us to seek to understand the fundamental reasons underlying the Jewish problem in this country as it has presented itself during the past decades.

Animated by a desire to solve this ancient problem if possible, by the emancipation and assimilation of Jewish elements, Germany had shown herself more accessible to the absorption of Jews than many other countries had done. All barriers had been taken

down, all restrictions abolished, all spheres of activity opened unreservedly to the Jews — nay, leading positions were assigned to them even in those domains which were of the most vital importance for national life. The Jews, who numbered less than 1% of the total population of Germany, occupied the key posts in German industry. Political leadership was to a large extent in their hands. The Press and cultural life in general were predominantly under their influence. Their aggregate income exceeded that of the 99% remaining inhabitants by over one-third. Truly, the Jews had every conceivable opportunity for merging their distinctive existence in the collective life of the German community — a distinctiveness, moreover, frequently deplored by some of the best Jewish elements. But the Jews consistently ignored the rules of fair play as far as their credulous German partner was concerned. The overwhelming majority of them never desired to be merged in the German nation, because they were aware of the fact that their racial dissimilarity constituted an insuperable obstacle to assimilation. During the years of great tribulation they never hesitated to betray Germany, and to shamelessly misuse the opportunities afforded them in such abundance for their own egoistical purposes and interests. Defeatism and treason, political degradation and economic corruption, moral depravity, the debasement of all national and religious values — these were the outstanding features of a Germany dominated by the alien Jewish race.

Germany had to pay dearly for the illusion that it is possible to solve the Jewish question by means of a generous effort to assimilate the Jews. She had reckoned without a factor of decisive importance: namely, the congenital, ingrained, boundless ingratitude of the Jewish race. Not the least of the reasons for the uncompromising attitude of German anti-semitism — an attitude that has often been misunderstood abroad — is the glaring contrast, irrefutably evidenced by the events of the past decades, between the incontestable good faith of the Germans and the cynical ingratitude of the Jews. That this contrast constitutes, so to speak, the nucleus of the whole Jewish problem, has been publicly admitted by two leading Jews. The Chief Rabbi of Hamburg, Dr. Joseph Karlebach, wrote in the Jewish review *Der Morgen* (vol. II, p. 129, 1930): “to be a Jew, is to be opposed to the natural attitude of human beings.” The French Jew Bernard Lazare, who was well known at the close of the last century, was even more candid in his book *l'Antisémitisme*, in which he puts the question: “By what qualities or defects has the Jew drawn upon himself such universal reprobation? Why has he alternately and in equal measure been maltreated and hated by Egyptians and Romans, by Persians and Arabs, by Turks and Christian nations? It is because the Jew is everywhere, and right down to the present day has remained, an asocial being.”

These admissions by candid Jewish writers, whose authority is undisputed, explain better than any words of ours why National Socialism was compelled to give a definite and final solution to the Jewish question, so far as Germany is concerned. Anti-semitic feeling in this country has not been roused to such a degree by the mere fact of the preponderance of an utterly alien influence, but by the spirit underlying that influence and inseparable from it — a spirit of an essentially asocial nature, which requited evil for good and invariably

prompted those inspired by it to repay hospitality and benevolence with treachery and unrelenting, destructive hatred. When the National Socialists came into power in 1933, they endeavoured to solve the Jewish question by methods calculated to peacefully reduce the excessive influence of the Jews on public life to proportions compatible, firstly, with the position of the Jews as an alien race, and, secondly, with their number — which, as has already been said, was less than 1% of the total German population. When the amount of misfortune brought on Germany by the Jews prior to 1933 is recalled, the methods adopted to diminish their influence on German public life must be accounted remarkably moderate, and as evidencing extraordinary restraint and discipline among the leaders of the new Germany. The fact is too easily overlooked, that the advent to power of National Socialism constituted a revolution in the truest sense of the word, and it may without exaggeration be asserted that scarcely a revolution in history has been accomplished with such exemplary discipline.

The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 formed the basis of a peaceful and orderly settlement of the Jewish question in Germany. But the Jews themselves were not prepared to reckon with the incontestable fact that their era of emancipation in Germany was definitely at an end. They were not willing to abandon their usurped supremacy without a struggle, and since this was no longer possible in Germany itself, they deliberately stirred up an agitation abroad, hardly less dangerous than an openly proclaimed war. By means of a consistently carried out poisoning of the sources of public opinion, they have succeeded in creating a caricature of National Socialist Germany and inflaming international opinion against the latter. By organising a boycott of German goods, they have endeavoured to throttle Germany economically. They have even gone so far as to reply to the measures of the National Socialist Government by the assassination of Wilhelm Gustloff and Ernst vom Rath.

The world-embracing associations and interests of Jewry as an international power, as well as the asocial spirit animating it, could not be evidenced in more convincing manner than by its success in putting the whole world instantaneously, so to speak, into movement against National Socialist Germany. For the world has taken very much less notice of processes of elimination carried out elsewhere on a far greater scale. Who has championed the cause of those millions of Russians driven from their land by the Bolshevist revolution, or who, unable to escape in time, were tortured and massacred? Who ever spent a thought on the Germans in the Baltic States, 80% of whom were forced to emigrate after the Great War, and who to a large extent are condemned to a life of perpetual hardship in foreign countries? On the other hand, wherever the interests of even a single Jew are affected, international Jewry howls for redress and assistance until international peace is seriously menaced by its bellowings. Germany knows full well where the source of the everlasting disquiet is to be found, which perpetually enervates the world and effectively prevents the realisation of all efforts to reach international understanding and peace. The German Government, conscious of its responsibilities, has drawn the logical conclusion, and surely and definitely eliminated all Jewish influence, of whatever nature it

may be, at home. It has thus contributed, for its part, to getting rid of an element which, in the words of the illustrious historian Theodor Mommsen, is “an operative ferment of national disintegration.”

At the close of our study of the Jewish problem in Germany, the problem arises of what is to be done with the Jews. For it is evident that the effects of the policy of the German Government towards the Jews cannot remain confined solely to Germany, but must be far-reaching. Anti-semitism has been awakened in all countries where belief in the blessings of “assimilation” has been rudely shaken by the course of events, and by the spiritual and political renaissance which characterises the present era. The multitude of Jewish emigrants carry with them the Jewish question, with all its inevitable consequences, into such new “homes” as may be opened to them. Hence it is clear that the Jewish problem is susceptible of solution only on an international basis. The Jews themselves have unambiguously recognised the necessities arising out of the existing situation. The *Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt* of December 30, 1938, wrote: “For all who wish to see, it is evident that territories will ere long be required for the settlement, not only of Jews from Germany, but of Jews from other European countries also. Whoever is able to interpret current events cannot fail to observe the rapidity with which the Jewish question is becoming increasingly urgent in a number of European States and the consequent necessity of a correspondingly rapid solution of it.” It has already been said that the projected creation of a National Home for Jews in Palestine will not afford a solution of the Jewish problem. What is needed, is to find territories, the ownership of which is not, as is the case in Palestine, claimed by others — territories which by virtue of a general agreement shall be allotted exclusively to the Jews. This need is reflected in the fact that even in England, the Mandatory Power, herself, the possibility of settling Jews in overseas territories is envisaged. Germany, having no colonies, is not in a position to make any effective contribution to these international discussions.

Racial characteristics and historical destiny combine to render it somewhat more than problematical that the attempt to solve the Jewish question by means of the creation of a Jewish State can ever hope to be successful. We have exposed this point of view in detail when dealing with the problem of Palestine. In the long run it must depend on the Jews themselves, and on their immense financial power, whether the united efforts of the Western countries to find a solution will be fruitful or not — whether, after two thousand years of incessant wanderings, Ahasuerus will eventually find rest.

To show that other countries were seeing “The Jewish Question” in a similar matter... From “Hitler’s War” we learn:

Early in November 1938 Hitler’s uncritical loyalty to his Party henchmen was put to its most severe test – by an incident symptomatic of racial troubles that had been festering in Central Europe for many decades. The Jewish problem was at its root. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, there were 259,000 Jews; they were not popular, and the new regime steered a delicate course, pandering to its powerful neighbour. President Emil Hacha, the venerable lawyer who had succeeded Benes, initiated a series of anti-Jewish measures,

obliging Jewish industrialists to resign. The influx of Jewish refugees from the Sudeten territories led to fresh antisemitism, particularly among the Czech academics who publicly demanded the removal of these 'immigrants.' In Bohemia and Moravia there were about 99,000 Jews; in Slovakia 87,000, and in the tiny Carpatho-Ukraine no fewer than 66,000 (or 12 percent of the population.) Slovakia eagerly enacted the anti-Jewish decrees that the Reich demanded. A wave of deportations began. Nobody, however, wanted to house these homeless Jews. When Ribbentrop (Reich Foreign Minister) journeyed to Paris with much pomp in December to sign the joint declaration that Hitler had first suggested to François-Poncet, foreign minister Georges Bonnet begged him not to flood France with German Jews, as they already had enough Jews of their own. ('In fact,' Ribbentrop informed Hitler, 'they are considering Madagascar for this purpose.') Poland's attitude was no more sympathetic. Ambassador Joseph Lipski had assured Hitler as recently as October 21 that if he ever succeeded in solving Europe's Jewish problem, Warsaw would happily erect a statue in honour of his achievement. The Polish government had followed developments throughout 1938 most closely. Fearing, after Hitler's occupation of Austria, that he would repatriate the thousands of Polish Jews from Vienna, in March they had speedily enacted a Law of Expatriation designed to deprive such Jews of their native Polish citizenship. The Munich agreement panicked Warsaw into the further ruling that after October 31 no expatriate Poles would be allowed back into their country without a special entry visa. The last days of October thus saw frenzied scenes on the frontier. While Polish frontier officials slept, the Nazis quietly shunted unscheduled trains loaded with Jews across the line into Poland.

11. 1933-1939

11.1 The Anschluss

Austria-Hungary, ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty, had been Germany's ally during World War I. In 1919, the victorious powers dismembered this vast, motley empire. Hungary and Czechoslovakia became independent countries. Other components fell to Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Italy. Multiple cultures often populated each region. It was impossible to apportion provinces to their respective new countries without placing some of the ethnic colonies inhabiting them under the dominion of the prevailing foreign nationality. Austria, the nucleus of the old realm, shrunk from sovereignty over nearly 30 million people to a diminutive, landlocked republic of 6,500,000 persons. Southern and eastern Europe's smaller nations had traditionally belonged to larger empires. The decision to establish independent states for them conformed to Wilson's proclaimed ideal of self-determination; the right of every people to govern themselves. U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing interpreted Wilson's cartographic experiment as follows: "If the right of self-determination were sound in principle and uniformly applicable in establishing political allegiance and territorial sovereignty, the endeavor of the Southern States to secede from the American Union in 1861 would have been wholly justifiable."

On November 12, 1918, Austria's provisional national assembly declared its country "a component of the German republic." It officially adopted the name "German Austria." This contradicted the Allied objective of eliminating the former Central Powers as a future rival. To sanction the Austrian-German union would have helped restore the Reich to its pre-war magnitude. It would also have facilitated German economic influence in the Balkan and Danube regions. Allied delegates at the peace conference informed Austria that she must "abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly, or by any means whatsoever, compromise her independence." It also forbade the country from using the name German-Austria. Chancellor Karl Renner protested to the Allies that this violates the population's right to selfdetermination, to which they responded that this right does not extend to defeated enemy countries. Britain forced Vienna to comply by threatening to resume the blockade of foodstuffs.

Post-war Austria became the only part of the former Habsburg realm from which the Entente demanded reparations. Deprived of its industrial base, which fell to Czechoslovakia, Hungary's agrarian economy and the Danube export market, this was catastrophic for the little country. Discharged soldiers and German-speaking civil servants from the lost provinces returned to the homeland, unable to find work. Unemployment rose to 557,000. Most Austrians favored unification with Germany. Hitler, reared in Linz, shared this sentiment. In April 1934, he assigned the Reich's Foreign Office to prepare a report

defining policy. Regarding possible annexation of the country, the report opined that "German efforts in this direction will be frustrated by the unanimous resistance of all European Great Powers." In a Reichstag speech in May, Hitler declared, "The German people and the German government have, out of the simple feeling of solidarity toward common national heritage, the understandable wish that not just foreign peoples, but also German people everywhere will be guaranteed the right to self-determination."

The Austrian government had become a dictatorship. In 1931, the country elected Engelbert Dollfuss Bundeskanzler (National Chancellor). He dissolved parliament in 1933, founded the Fatherland Front, and proscribed other political parties. Dollfuss established detention camps in September, which corralled members of the Communist and National Socialist parties. Dollfuss reinstated the death penalty. The following February, he ordered the police to disarm the Social Democrats' Defense League. This led to armed resistance in Vienna and in Linz. Dollfuss deployed the army, which bombarded workers' housing districts in the capital with artillery. Over 300 people died in the fighting. Having suppressed the revolt, he banned the Social Democratic Party, abolished the trade unions, and hanged eleven Defense League members. The bantam dictator died in July 1934, during an equally abortive coup staged by Vienna's National Socialist underground (No connection to the German National Socialists could be proven). Minister of Justice Kurt Schuschnigg replaced Dollfuss. Under the new chancellor, 13 of the conspirators received death sentences, based on a proposed statute not signed into law until the day after their execution. The police arrested the chief defense attorney three days after the trial. Without a hearing, he spent the next six months in the Wöllersdorf detention camp.

Having attained power without a single vote, Schuschnigg relied on the Fatherland Front to maintain the dictatorship. Political dissidents, lumped together as "national opposition," landed in concentration camps. Documented cases of inmate abuse include confinement without trial, house arrest for prisoners' relatives, two or more trials and sentences for the same crime, convictions and fines without evidence, the presumption of guilt until proven innocent, withholding medical care from inmates who were ill, sometimes resulting in death, and forced confessions. The regime denied persons of "deficient civic reliability" the right to practice their occupation. Schuschnigg judicially persecuted Austrians who favored unification with the Reich. The verdict often fell on members of choral societies and sports clubs nurturing cultural ties with Germany. "Suspicion of nationalistic convictions" cost civil servants their jobs. This included forfeiture of pension and loss of unemployment compensation. The dictator sought an alliance with Italy to support Austrian sovereignty. The Italian head of state, Benito Mussolini, anticipated that an Austrian-German union would jeopardize his country's control of southern Tirol. The Entente had awarded this province, populated by 250,000 ethnic Germans, to Italy after World War I. During Dollfuss's tenure, Mussolini had supplied aid to Austria. The new Bundeskanzler failed to maintain the good relationship that Dollfuss had cultivated with Rome. The vivacious Mussolini did not relate well to the austere, impersonal Schuschnigg. The Austrian government's human rights violations alienated France and Czechoslo-

vakia. The Italian-German dissonance that Schuschnigg hoped to capitalize on diminished in 1936. When Italy invaded Abyssinia, she was able to defy League of Nations sanctions through Hitler's economic support. Mussolini advised Schuschnigg to normalize relations with Germany.

Hitler, unjustly blamed for the 1934 coup to topple Dollfuss, sought to break the diplomatic deadlock. He appointed Franz von Papen, a conservative aristocrat distant to National Socialism and a devout Catholic, special ambassador to Vienna. Papen presented Austrian Foreign Minister Egon Berger with the draft for an Austrian-German "Gentleman's Agreement." The compact corroborated Hitler's strategy for incorporating Austria as an evolutionary process, promoting economic and cultural ties between both countries. The preamble stated, "The German Reich's Government recognizes the complete sovereignty of the Austrian national state." It bound Germany not to interfere in Austria's internal political affairs. In return, the preamble obligated Schuschnigg "with respect to the German Reich, to maintain a basic position that conforms to the fact that Austria sees herself as a German state." The document required that "all decisive elements for shaping public opinion in both countries shall serve the purpose of developing mutual relations which are once again normal and friendly." The agreement offered general guidelines for promoting commerce, such as lifting restrictions on travel and trade across the frontier. Schuschnigg agreed to allow members of the "national opposition" to participate in government. He released 15,583 political prisoners. Many were National Socialists whom Hitler arranged to resettle in Germany. Upon the Führer's insistence, Schuschnigg relaxed restrictions on the press. An important element of the agreement stipulated, "Both governments will exchange views in foreign policy matters that affect both countries." Papen and Schuschnigg signed the agreement in Vienna on July 11, 1936. Germany's assurance to respect Austrian independence drew praise from the international press, even in France. Hitler summoned Josef Leopold, leader of the Austrian National Socialists, and instructed him to take the new treaty "very seriously." The Führer warned Leopold that he wanted no encore of the 1934 coup: "The Austrian National Socialists must maintain exemplary discipline and regard unification as an internal German matter, a solution to which can only be found within the scope of negotiations between Berlin and Vienna." Hitler was hopeful, thanks in part to Schuschnigg's encouraging remark that Austrian-German unification was "an attainable political objective for the future."

The Bundeskanzler, however, had no interest in honoring the compact. He openly criticized Hitler for allegedly misinterpreting the mission of the Reich: "With his assertion that the unity of the Reich is based on the harmony of the race and the language of the people living within it, Hitler has falsified and betrayed the spirit of the Reich. The Reich is not determined by race and is not heathenish; it is Christian and universal." Schuschnigg publicly described Austria as "the last bulwark of civilization in central Europe," a studied insult to his ethnic neighbor to the north. During 1937, Schuschnigg entreated the British government to guarantee Austrian sovereignty. This clandestine diplomatic maneuver, as well as the unfriendly public statements regarding Germany, directly violated

the agreement signed in July.

Europe was in the age of nationalism; the average Austrian rejected Schuschnigg's liberal perception of Austria as a universal realm transcending ethnic roots and customs. While the country wallowed in the throes of economic depression, commerce in the Reich flourished. Unification with Germany promised employment and prosperity. Schuschnigg was himself a dictator; he could not argue that incorporating his country into the German authoritarian state would cost Austrians their liberties. England and France showed no interest in guaranteeing a country that flouted democratic principles. In an atmosphere of internal unrest and diplomatic isolation, the Bundeskanzler turned again to Germany.

Hitler invited Schuschnigg to meet at the Berghof on February 12, 1938. The Führer hoped to get Austrian-German relations back on track toward unification as an evolutionary process. A member of Austria's "national opposition," Arthur Seyss-Inquart, prepared a list of proposals for Schuschnigg as a basis for negotiations in Berchtesgaden. These included bringing political opponents into the government. Informed of the proposals, Hitler prepared his own list. The ten German proposals, among others, called for joint consultation in foreign policy matters mutually affecting Austria and Germany, amnesty for political prisoners, pensions for dismissed civil servants, and legalization of the National Socialist party in Austria. They demanded freedom of the press and preparations to merge the two countries' economic systems. This last would be particularly beneficial to the Austrian population. The list recommended several names - none of them hard-line National Socialists - for cabinet posts, including Seyss-Inquart. Point eight proposed a military officers exchange program, joint general staff conferences, promoting camaraderie, and sharing knowledge in weapons development.

Schuschnigg attended the Berchtesgaden session with his military adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel Bartl, and Guido Schmidt. During the initial private session between the two heads of state, Schuschnigg became defensive and asserted that it was he, not Hitler, who represented Austria. Hitler, born an Austrian, retorted, "Just once, try holding a free election in Austria, with you and I opposing each other as candidates. Then we'll see." During parallel talks between Guido Schmidt and Germany's newly appointed foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Austrian government won significant concessions. It reduced the obligation to joint consultation on foreign policy matters to "an exchange of thoughts." It limited the political activity of National Socialists in Austria. Hitler agreed to publicly condemn illegal acts, such as sabotage, of his followers there. The Führer approved Vienna's request that aggressive National Socialists be relocated to Germany. The Germans withdrew those candidates suggested for Austrian cabinet posts that Schuschnigg objected to. Berlin abandoned its plan for a joint economic system and reduced the scope of military cooperation. At the conclusion of the conference, Hitler told Schuschnigg, "This is the best way. The Austrian question is regulated for the next five years." Newspapers in England, France, and the USA claimed that Hitler presented his demands as an ultimatum, intimidated Schuschnigg by inviting three German generals to the conference, and threatened invasion if the Bundeskanzler failed to sign. The fact that

the Austrians negotiated significant modifications demonstrates that Germany's proposals were not an ultimatum. The generals attended to provide consultation on questions of integrating the two countries' armed forces. Schuschnigg brought along his own military advisor. Guido Schmidt testified later that he had no recollection of a German threat to invade Austria.

Papen stated that it was his impression that Schuschnigg enjoyed full freedom of decision throughout the sessions. The Bundeskanzler confessed that he had been under considerable mental stress but nothing more. The British ambassador to Austria, Sir Charles Palaret, reported to London on a number of initial demands which Hitler withdrew. He confirmed that Schmidt told him nothing of German threats. Palaret cited "Herr Hitler's desire to achieve his aims in regard to Austria by evolutionary means." Schuschnigg appointed Hitler's choice, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, interior minister and national police chief on February 15. The next day in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart told Hitler of his intention to operate "strictly on the basis of a self-sufficient and independent Austria" and "within the framework of the constitution." Hitler accepted this. Addressing the German parliament on February 20, the Führer thanked Schuschnigg for his "understanding and kindness." He predicted that "friendly cooperation between the two countries in every field has been assured." The following day, he received Austria's underground National Socialist leader, Josef Leopold. Calling his activities "insane," he brusquely ordered Leopold and his four chief lieutenants to pack up and move to Germany. Hitler believed that the compact insured a period of harmony that would gradually bring Austria into the German realm through democratic means. Schuschnigg did not share this belief. Theodor Hornbostel, chief of the Austrian State Chancery, told the British ambassador that month, that the loosely defined guidelines of the agreement with Hitler would be easy to circumvent. Hornbostel confided that his government "really doesn't want to put them into practice."

Stability in Austria however, deteriorated. The international stock exchange, with its usual nose for ominous developments, experienced a sudden flight from the Austrian shilling. Austrian government bonds plummeted in value, especially in London and Zurich. National Socialist sympathizers in the Fatherland Front and in the Austrian youth organizations steadily transformed the political disposition of these groups. Spontaneous mass demonstrations by National Socialists enjoyed popular support. Graz, for all practical purposes, came under their control. In many areas, Schuschnigg's followers scarcely risked appearing in public. Displaying his customary lack of political finesse, Schuschnigg took a desperate step to rescue his career. In Innsbruck on March 9, he announced a national plebiscite to take place in four days' time. The purpose was to give voters the opportunity to affirm their confidence in the government and preference for Austrian independence. Such a poll could only accentuate the division between German and Austrian. It transgressed against the spirit of the evolutionary process of assimilating the two cultures, a process Schuschnigg had accepted by signing the agreement with Germany.

Since no elections had taken place since 1932, there were no current lists of registered

voters. There was insufficient time to prepare new rosters. Only citizens above 25 years of age were eligible. This prevented young adults, a disproportionately large percentage of whom backed National Socialism, from participating. The general secretary of the Fatherland Front, Guido Zernatto, prepared guidelines that allowed only members of the reigning political party to staff the balloting stations. The ballot cards had the word "yes" printed on one side but were blank on the other. This required people voting "no" to write the word in the same size characters on the back of the card. Polling station personnel, all members of the Fatherland Front, would therefore be able to identify dissenters. During preparations for the election, the government press announced that anyone voting "no" would be guilty of treason. Publication of these details evoked protests from the "national opposition." Fearing German intervention, Schuschnigg appealed to France and Britain for assistance. In the midst of another cabinet crisis, France could not respond. The British recognized the plebiscite as a flagrant challenge to Hitler. Chamberlain called the plebiscite a "blunder." Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax considered Schuschnigg's maneuver "foolish and provocative."⁶⁵ He blandly informed the Austrian dictator that England could offer neither advice nor protection. Halifax could not help adding that Schuschnigg failed to seek Britain's counsel before announcing the plebiscite, "which has caused so much trouble."

Hitler was aghast that Schuschnigg violated their agreement only weeks after signing. At first he simply refused to believe the news; however, once he did, his reaction was temperate. He flew his diplomatic troubleshooter, Wilhelm Keppler, to Vienna. Keppler's instructions were to either prevent the plebiscite "without military threats" or at least arrange for it to include the opportunity to vote for Anschluss, or unification, with Germany. Seyss-Inquart and General Edmund von Glase-Horstenau, minority representative in the Austrian cabinet, confronted Schuschnigg. They pointed out that the entire balloting process drawn up by the Fatherland Front violated the constitution. They demanded a postponement, allowing time to prepare a plebiscite in which all parties would be fairly represented. The dictator summoned Defense Secretary General Zehner, security chief Colonel Skubl, and Lieutenant-Marshal Hülgerth of the Fatherland Front militia. He asked whether armed resistance against a German invasion was feasible. The Austrian army, reduced to 30,000 men by the 1919 treaty, was not mobilized. Skubl dismissed the police force as too saturated with National Socialists to be reliable. Only the militia, Hülgerth assured the Bundeskanzler, was prepared. Recognizing this force as insufficient, Schuschnigg attempted without success to telephone Mussolini to solicit military aid. Out of options, he resigned as chancellor. This terminated the era of a politician who entreated Austria's wartime enemies France, Britain, and Italy, and called upon his own followers as well, to transform his country into a battleground in a war against his German brethren and former comrades-in-arms of the World War.

Schuschnigg's entire cabinet withdrew, and Austria was, practically speaking, without a government. Throughout the land, members of Austria's SA and its smaller, elite cousin, the SS, began assuming administrative functions. The following day, March 12, 1938,

German troops crossed into Austria. Schuschnigg ordered the Austrian army not to resist. Hitler's decision to militarily occupy Austria was neither premeditated nor desired by him. He had hoped to maintain a semblance of legality in assimilating Austria. With Seyss-Inquart as Bundeskanzler and a new cabinet, the two governments could have coordinated the transition smoothly via the evolutionary process. In fact, the German army general staff had no operational plan for an invasion of Austria in place; the entire maneuver was impromptu. The Führer was aware of the bad publicity abroad such an apparent act of force would generate; however, he feared that Austrian Marxists might capitalize on the country's momentary political vacuum and stage an uprising. Göring warned of the possibility that the Alpine republic's neighbors might also exploit its temporary weakness. Italy could occupy eastern Tirol, Yugoslavia the Kärnten province, or Hungary the Burgenland. Yugoslavia had already annexed part of Kärnten in 1919 during Austria's post-war impotence.

Described as aggression by the foreign press, the German army's advance made a welcome impression inside Austria. A sergeant in the SS Signals Battalion related his experience while sent with a comrade ahead of the column to reconnoiter the route to Vienna. Two days under way, the pair stopped at an inn. As the soldiers entered, "Almost everyone present rose and greeted us with shouts of 'Heil! '... We were pressed to a table, the waiters rushed over with coffee and pastries, and we kept shaking hands with people, answering questions and expressing our gratitude for all the attention.... It was harder to leave the inn. The guests stood up, clapped, wished us well and stuffed cigarettes in our pockets." Another member of the battalion gave this account: "The closer the column approached Vienna, the greater was the rejoicing of the people lining the roads. Often with tears in their eyes, they gave full expression to their joy, shook hands with the soldiers in the vehicles and tossed flowers and packs of cigarettes to them. Everyone seemed seized with frenzy." Throughout the military occupation of Austria, largely symbolic in nature, not a single shot was fired nor was one person injured.

Hitler scheduled joint plebiscites in Austria and Germany for April 10, 1938. Both populations decided on whether to incorporate the two countries into a single state. The people of Austria cast 99.73 percent of their ballots in favor of Anschluss with Germany. The Germans voted 99.08 percent for unification. As testimony to how distant Schuschnigg had been to the heartbeat of his nation, he had personally estimated in early March that 70 percent of the Austrian populace supported his regime's policy of independence. On March 18, 1938, the German government notified the League of Nations that Austria had cancelled its affiliation. This international body, which had never manifest concern for the plight of the distressed little nation, now debated whether Germany was responsible for paying Austria's delinquent membership dues of 50,000 Swiss francs from January 1 to March 13. This ended the chain of circumstances leading to the unification of Hitler's homeland with the German Reich, an event known to history as "the rape of Austria."

11.2 Czechoslovakia

A few months after the Anschluss [with Austria], Germany annexed the Sudetenland, the ethnic German territory lining the periphery of western Czechoslovakia. The transfer of the region to German control provoked a serious war scare. The controversy traced its origin to the 1919 Versailles system. During World War I, Czechs served in the Austro-Hungarian army. Immigrants in London and Paris established the Czech Committee on November 14, 1915. Two Czechs in exile, Tomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, won the Entente's endorsement for a future Czechoslovak state to be carved from portions of the Hapsburg realm. On October 18, 1918, Czechs in Paris and in the USA claimed Czechoslovakian independence. The new country had three components. Furthest east was Ruthenia, the population of which voluntarily joined Czechoslovakia. In the center was Slovakia, and many Slovaks wanted independence or at least considerable autonomy. The western part consisted of Bohemia and Moravia, where three million German Austrians dwelled with the Czechs. These Germans wished to remain with Austria.

Masaryk and Benes enjoyed prevailing influence in fashioning the post-war structure of Czechoslovakia. Masaryk persuaded Wilson to alter his 14 points, which promised each nationality of Austria-Hungary the opportunity for autonomous development, to exclude Germans. Benes consciously underestimated the number of Sudeten Germans by nearly a million. He falsely claimed that they were not a unified minority, but lived in settlements integrated with Czechs. "The Germans in Bohemia are only colonists," he asserted.

Rich in raw materials and industry, the border territory offered Czechoslovakia a topographical defensive barrier against Germany. Benes based his deliberations more on economic and strategic advantages than on the natural rights of the population. The 1910 census offered a comparison of the number of German "colonists" wishing to remain with Austria in the affected areas to Czechs residing there. In Bohemia lived 2,070,438 Germans to 116,275 Czechs; in the Sudetenland 643,804 Germans to 25,028 Czechs; in the Bohemian Forest 176,237 Germans to 6,131 Czechs; in southern Moravia 180,449 Germans compared to 12,477 Czechs. Since the Paris peace conference continued until mid-1919, the German provinces were technically still part of Austria when the Austrian republic held its first democratic election that February 16. The Sudeten Germans prepared ballots to participate. The Czech army forcibly disrupted the arrangements. On March 4, thousands of Sudeten Germans organized peaceful demonstrations in their towns and villages to protest. Czech soldiers fired into the unarmed crowds, killing 54 Germans, 20 of them women.

The Allies finalized a compact with Czechoslovakia formally recognizing her statehood. The preamble to the document endorsed the arrangement, "in consideration that the peoples of Bohemia, Moravia, and part of Silesia, as well as the people of Slovakia have decided of their own free will to join into a lasting union." Benes promised the Allies "to give the Germans all rights they are entitled to. . . . It will all in all be a very liberal regime." Denigrating the ethnic German population to "immigrant" status, the Czech

government instituted a policy of “rapid de-Germanizing” in Bohemia and in the Sudetenland. Prague transferred military garrisons, railroad personnel, civil servants, prison populations and even hospital patients in large numbers there to manipulate the census figures. Czech officials tallied Czech transients as residents, even though “residency” seldom extended beyond two days. In Trautenau in northern Bohemia, a 600-man Czech infantry battalion spent one winter day in an unfinished barracks to be counted in the survey. The resulting statistics deprived German districts of adequate representation in parliament. Prague occasionally employed less subtle means to maintain its minorities’ political impotence. At an election rally of the Sudeten German Party in Teplitz-Schönau in 1937, the key speaker, Karl Frank, criticized Benes. Czech police scattered the assembly. Fifty-three Germans died in the melee and hundreds suffered injuries.

Prague authorities closed smaller German schools throughout the Sudetenland. They replaced them with Czech language institutions, often requiring German youngsters to attend. The government closed nine of Bohemia’s 19 German universities. Only 4.7 percent of state financial assistance went to German college students, although ethnic Germans comprised nearly a fourth of Czechoslovakia’s population. The government issued all public forms and applications in Czech language, even in the Sudetenland. Half the German municipal and rural officials lost their jobs, 41 percent of German postmen and 48.5 percent of railroad personnel. The Czechoslovakian government’s Land Reform Act redistributed real estate so that every rural family would receive sufficient acreage to subsist from the soil. The head of the program, Karel Viskovsky, defined the results as follows: “The soil is passing from the hands of the foreigners into the hands of the Czech people.”⁸⁰ Most went to Czech legionnaires and their families. Viskovsky auctioned off the balance to affluent Czechs and Slovaks. They purchased the properties below market value, allowing the former owners to return as tenant farmers. The Germans in Bohemia and Moravia lost 25 percent of their land to Czechs through the state-sponsored land reform. Approximately one third of the Sudetenland consisted of woodlands, of which the state took over administration. The authorities dismissed some 40,000 German forestry workers, replacing them with Czechs. By 1931, the number of ethnic German tradesmen out of work was three times that of Czechs. Relief efforts concentrated on areas with predominantly Czech populations. A study by the British Foreign Office in 1936 estimated that Czechoslovakia’s German colony - approximately 22 percent of the population - comprised 60 percent of the unemployed.⁸¹ Among the most economically distressed areas was Reichenberg, once home to a thriving glass and textile industry. Between 1922 and 1936, 153 factories there closed. Prague awarded contracts for construction and other public works projects for Reichenberg to foreign companies who brought in their own labor.

Benes described his people as “mortal enemies of the Germans.”⁸³ In May 1919, during the inauguration ceremony in Pilsen for President Tomas In 1921, Masaryk deployed Czech troops in German settlements without provocation. In Grasslitz, four miles from the frontier with Germany, protestors clashed with entering Czech military personnel.

The soldiers shot 15 Bohemian Germans dead. Under the "Law to Protect the Republic," Czech authorities arrested Sudeten Germans demanding self-determination as traitors or spies. They jailed for espionage tourists from Germany visiting Czechoslovakia for sports competitions or for ethnic festivals. Between 1923 and 1932, the state conducted 8,972 legal proceedings against dissident members of ethnic minorities. Defendants in sedition trials often included Sudeten Germans belonging to sports leagues, youth groups, singing societies, or backpacking clubs. Prague established an immense "border zone" in which lived 85 percent of all Sudeten Germans, the entire Polish and Ruthenian populations, and 95 percent of the Hungarian colony. It came under permanent martial law. The army supervised the administration of factories, major construction projects, public works, the telephone service and forestry. Military authorities limited the civil liberties of citizens in the "border zone," which comprised 56 percent of the entire country. This did not prevent Benes from lauding Czechoslovakia as a "lighthouse of democracy."

Although during the first years of Hitler's chancellorship, few among the German public were concerned with Czechoslovakia, for Hitler himself, the fate of the Sudetenland symbolized the tragedy of Germans under foreign rule. The Sudeten people waged a dogged, solitary struggle to maintain their German identity. Hitler made it his personal mission to recover the Sudetenland. He introduced the topic during the Reichstag speech on February 20, 1938: "As long as Germany was herself weak and defenseless, she had to simply accept the continuous persecution of German people along our borders. . . . The interests of the German Reich also include the protection of those fellow Germans who are unable on their own, on our very frontier, to insure their right to basic human, political and ideological freedoms."

Benes replaced the 85-year old Masaryk as president of the republic in December 1935. Only months before becoming president, Benes as foreign minister had concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union. The pact provided for significant Czech-Russian cooperation. By the beginning of 1936, the Czechs had completed 32 air fields sited near the German frontier as bases for the rapidly expanding Red Air Force. They established depots to stockpile aviation fuel, aerial bombs and other war materiel. The Red Army stationed troops in Bohemia and Moravia to undergo parachute training for a possible airborne assault against Germany. It transferred officers to the Czechoslovakian War Ministry in Prague and to local command centers. On February 12, 1937, the London Daily Mail reported that immediately after ratification of the Prague-Moscow pact, Russian flight officers inspected Czech air bases and fuel dumps for their air force. Hence, a possible communist threat was again right at Germany's doorstep.

Prague was a converging point for Communist immigrants who had fled Germany in 1933 and Austria after the Anschluss. Sir Orme Sargent of the British Foreign Office called Czechoslovakia a "distribution center" for Stalin's Comintern propaganda against Germany.⁹¹ With France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR connected by military alliances since 1936, the Führer felt boxed in. When he re-garrisoned the Rhineland on March 7 of that year, Benes offered France the support of the Czechoslovakian army for a joint

invasion of Germany. During the months to follow, it swelled to a force of 1,453,000 men.

The Germans were undecided on how to recover the Sudetenland. In 1938, the British ambassador in Prague, Sir Basil Newton, advised the Foreign Office, "How precisely they will proceed it is impossible to prophesy, but the indications are that they will at first seek to achieve their aims by friendly diplomacy rather than by physical or economic terrorism." On May 6, British newspaper magnate Lord Harold Rothermere praised the Germans as "very patient people" in an editorial in the Daily Mail. The Austrian Anschluss encouraged the Sudeten German Party, the SdP. Under the leadership of its founder, Konrad Henlein, it had already won 44 seats in the Czechoslovakian chamber of deputies and 23 in the senate in the May 1935 elections. At an SdP assembly in Carlsbad on April 25, 1938, Henlein demanded autonomy for the ethnic German region. With 90 percent of Sudeten voters behind him, he had sufficient influence to compel the Czechs to enter negotiations. Henlein and Karl Frank had met with Hitler on March 28, but were unable to persuade the Führer to pressure the Czechs. Ribbentrop told the two guests that it was not Germany's task "to offer individual suggestions as to what demands should be made of the Czechoslovakian government." Berlin instructed the German embassy in Prague to limit support of the SdP to private talks with Czechoslovakian statesmen, "if the occasion presents itself." The allegation of post-war historians that at the meeting, Hitler ordered Henlein to impose impossible terms in order to provoke the Czechs, is without substance. The British government monitored the escalating controversy. "The plain fact is that the Sudetendeutsche are being oppressed by the Czechs," noted Vansittart. Newton sent London a detailed analysis from Prague on March 15. He predicted that as long as they can reckon with Anglo-French support in present policy. The Germans cannot be deterred from aggression if they consider it necessary. If Paris and London encourage Prague to resist compromise, war is inevitable.

England and France, Newton continued, cannot prevent Czechoslovakia from being overrun. At most they can wage war to restore a status quo that is already proving unworkable. He concluded that no German government will accept "a hostile Czechoslovakia in their flank." Having read Newton's report, the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, cabled his ministry on May 17, "I share unreservedly and in all respects views expressed by Mr. Newton in his telegram." The Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy discussed Newton's analysis the following day. As its minutes record, "The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence said that he had been struck by Mr. Newton's view that Czechoslovakia's present political position was not permanently tenable and that she was in fact an unstable unit in Central Europe. If, as he believed, this truly represented the position he could see no reason why we should take any steps to maintain such a unit in being."

On March 21, the chiefs of staff submitted a report to the committee explaining that the British and French armies were too weak to go to war against Germany, Italy, and Japan in an expanding conflict over Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain and Halifax considered the military assessment "an extremely melancholy document." Halifax summarized on April

27, "Neither we nor France were equipped for a war with Germany." That month, Hitler ordered General Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the Armed Forces Supreme Command (OKW), to prepare a study on the possible invasion of Czechoslovakia. He told Keitel that he did not at present intend to invade. Guidelines Hitler furnished the OKW emphasized that he would reject any scenario proposing a "strategic surprise attack out of the clear sky without grounds or possibility of justification." The Führer described "an untenable situation for us should the major confrontation in the East... with Bolshevism ever come.... Czechoslovakia would then be the springboard for the Red Army and a landing place for its air force." While Hitler did not know that the Soviet Union already had their hands in Czechoslovakia, his foresight was correct, like already described.

On May 20, Benes called up over 150,000 military reservists to active duty, claiming that the measure was necessary because of a secret mobilization of the German armed forces. The Czech war office charged that eight to ten German divisions were marching toward the common frontier. The French military attaché in Berlin cabled his government that he saw no evidence of larger troop movements. Henderson sent two British army officers on his Berlin embassy staff on an extensive reconnaissance through the German border provinces of Saxony and Silesia. He wrote later, "They could discover no sign of unusual or significant Germany military activity, nor indeed could any of the military attachés of other foreign missions in Berlin, who were similarly engaged in scouring the country." Hitler more or less ignored Benes' provocation and took no action, military or otherwise. Journalists in Paris, Prague, London, and New York accepted Benes' spurious allegations about German troop deployments. They published stories about how the Führer had massed his divisions to bluff the Czechs into submitting to his demands. When Benes defiantly countered with his own partial mobilization, Hitler supposedly "backed down" and recalled his formations, a profound humiliation for a dictator who was "incapable of acting on his own threats." His declarations regarding the Sudetenland were "nothing but hot air." This is just one instance how the "free press" produces propaganda which fools the masses.

Halifax warned Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador in London, that a Czech-German war would bring France and Britain into the conflict against the Reich. The foreign secretary then composed a personal letter to Ribbentrop admonishing him of the hazards any "rash actions" would lead to for European civilization. Henderson recorded, "What Hitler could not stomach was the exultation of the press.... Every newspaper in Europe and America joined in the chorus. 'No' had been said, and Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic powers had brought the totalitarian states to heel, etc." The British conducted partial mobilization of their fleet and the French garrisoned their fortifications along the German border, even though both knew that their Czech ally had instigated the crisis. For Hitler, threats and accusations of cowardice were his reward for the forbearance he had exercised.

The May crisis impressed Hitler with how hostile the western democracies and Czechoslovakia were toward Germany. Even the USSR had publicly reaffirmed its military obligation

to the Czechs. He concluded that a peaceful settlement of the Sudeten issue was unlikely. On May 30, he revised the earlier armed forces directive addressing potential war with the Czechs to begin with the sentence, "It is my unalterable resolve to smash Czechoslovakia through a military action in the foreseeable future." The document stressed that "preparations are to be implemented without delay."

Historians present this statement as proof of Hitler's warlike intentions. Yet just 18 days later, he revised the classified directive, deleting the sentence about the resolve to smash the Czechs. He stated instead that the "solution of the Czech question" was "the near-term objective." There is little evidence here of a clear intent to wage war. Henderson wrote Halifax, "It stands to reason that Hitler himself must equally be prepared for all eventualities. But from there to say that he has already decided on aggressive action against Czechoslovakia this autumn is, I think, untrue." The British ambassador wrote again in August, "But I do not believe he wants war." In his own memoirs, Henderson later reflected on the May crisis: "When we were thinking only that Germany was on the point of attacking the Czechs, the Germans were apprehensive lest the latter meant to provoke a European war before they themselves were ready for it."

Hitler still possessed a diplomatic trump; democracy's own arguments about human rights. The Führer publicly stated, "What the Germans insist on is the right to self-determination that every other nation also possesses. ... I demand that the oppression of the three-and-a-half million Germans in Czechoslovakia stop, and that in its place the free right to self-determination step in." This was the Achilles heel of his adversaries. Henderson confessed, "On the broadest moral grounds it was thus difficult to justify offhand the refusal of the right to self-determination to the 2,750,000 Sudetens living in solid blocks just across Germany's border. Its flat denial would have been contrary to a principle on which the British Empire itself was founded, and would consequently never have rallied to us the wholehearted support either of the British People or of that Empire." The permanent undersecretary for the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, concluded that the Sudeten problem "was not an issue on which we should be on very strong ground for plunging Europe into war." But it becomes quite apparent that Britain is willing to play Europe's police force if something might happen that goes against their policy, even if their empire isn't threatened in any way.

Chamberlain assessed England's position: His country had not yet sufficiently rearmed to honor the commitment to support France in the event of war (meaning that they have to stall in order to increase their armaments first). To allow Hitler a free hand to settle accounts with Benes would have marred British esteem abroad; "We shall be despised forever," ventured Halifax's secretary, Sir Oliver Harvey. A plebiscite for the Sudetenland also had pitfalls. Prague opposed the idea because the precedent would encourage the Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles, and Ruthenians to demand one as well. Since these minorities suffered under-representation in government and from oppression, the result would likely dissolve Czechoslovakia. Daladier proposed a compromise: Czechoslovakia would cede the Sudetenland to Germany without conducting a plebiscite. In this way, the Czech

state would remain reasonably intact. Its importance to France, as Daladier explained to Chamberlain, was that "in any military operation there are wonderful possibilities for attacking Germany from Czechoslovak territory." French Aviation Minister Pierre Cot echoed this attitude with a remark quoted in London's News Chronicle of July 1, 1938. Cot stated that France and England needed Czechoslovakia, "because from this state the German economy and the German industry are most easily to be destroyed with bombs... Joint attacks of the French and Czech air forces can very quickly destroy all German production facilities."

In August, Chamberlain proposed travelling to Germany to meet with Hitler to settle the Sudeten question together. He elicited a promise from his host that Germany would take no military action during the negotiations. Czech Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta told the British and French governments that his country refused to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. London countered bluntly, "The Franco-British plan is the only means of preventing the threat of a German attack," and that if Prague rejects it, England and France will not intervene (i.e. They couldn't even if they wanted to) if Germany invades Czechoslovakia. On September 21, Benes unconditionally acquiesced to the proposal. During September, Chamberlain visited Germany three times. The first meeting with Hitler took place in Berchtesgaden on September 15. The session was cordial and constructive. Chamberlain approved Hitler's proposals for the Sudeten areas to be annexed. Halifax wrote his ambassadors, "In fact it corresponded very closely to the line we have been examining." Chamberlain spent the following week in meetings with Daladier and the Czechs to obtain their consent. In Berlin, the German monitoring station in the Reich's Ministry of Aviation eavesdropped on a telephone conversation between Benes and French Colonial Minister Georges Mandel. Undermining Daladier, Mandel told Benes, "Paris and London have no right to dictate your attitude to you. If your territory is violated, you should not wait a second to issue orders to your army to defend the homeland... If you fire the first shot in selfdefense... the cannons of France, Great Britain and also Soviet Russia will begin firing on their own." The Germans also intercepted communications between Prague and its London and Paris embassies. The Benes government had instructed them to stall for time until the "war parties" in England and in France topple Chamberlain and Daladier.

On September 22, Hitler conferred with Chamberlain at the Hotel Dreesen in Bad Godesberg. Reports of mounting unrest in the Sudetenland clouded the atmosphere. Henlein had formed an ethnic German militia, numbering nearly 40,000 men, which skirmished with Czech soldiers and police. The Czech government correspondingly implemented more repressive measures. In 14 days, 120,000 Sudeten Germans crossed into the Reich to escape the violence. Henlein appealed to Hitler to send in the German army, "to put an end to any more murders resulting from Czech fanaticism." At Bad Godesberg, the Führer demanded the right to militarily occupy the territory to be annexed in four days. He cited mounting turmoil there as justification. Chamberlain was taken aback. Bitter haggling followed. The tension pervaded the next night's conference, until an orderly

interrupted with news that Benes had just declared general mobilization. Another 1.2 million Czech reservists were returning to active duty. Hitler thereupon reassured his English guest that he would keep his promise to withhold any military response, "despite this unheard-of provocation." This relaxed the atmosphere and the discussion assumed a friendlier tone.

In the days following the conference, Chamberlain negotiated with the Czechs. British and French diplomats ultimately prevailed upon Hitler to relax his additional demands. Göring showed Henderson transcripts of the telephone dialogs between Benes and Jan Masaryk illuminating the Czech intrigues. Neither the British nor the French doubted their authenticity. At Munich on September 28, Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier, and Mussolini finalized details of the annexation of the Sudetenland which Prague had agreed to on the 21st. Angry with Chamberlain, Jan Masaryk could only bluster, "What bad luck that this stupid, badly informed person is the English prime minister." French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet praised Hitler for softening his Godesberg terms. The Führer also reaped an accolade in the London Times on October 2 for his concessions and for reducing military measures to "solely a symbolic partial occupation." Choosing exile in London, Benes later told an associate, "We needed a war and I did everything to bring the war on."

Once Benes was gone, Germany attempted to improve relations with Prague. There remained 378,000 ethnic Germans in portions of Bohemia-Moravia not annexed by the Reich. Hitler ordered on October 3 that this minority, while nurturing its cultural heritage, was to relinquish political activity toward autonomy or returning its lands to German sovereignty. He met with the new Czech foreign minister, Frantisek Chvalkovsky, on the 14th. Hitler urged him to help "normalize relations in a friendly way." In November, the legal department of the German Foreign Office submitted a draft for a Czech-German friendship treaty. Though Hitler postponed the matter until January 1939, the initiative indicates his interest in working with Prague. His first gesture to the new regime was a generous policy toward Czech residents of the annexed Sudetenland. There were 743,000 of them who initially came under German dominion. 260,000 Czech soldiers, civil servants and their families returned to Czech territory under orders from their government. Another 160,000 not wishing to live under German jurisdiction migrated voluntarily.

A treaty the two states ratified on November 20 permitted Czechs and Slovaks remaining in the Sudetenland to choose their citizenship. Men at least 28 years of age, together with their wives and children, received German citizenship upon request. The Reich's Government allowed people opting to remain Czechoslovak nationals to stay on as guest residents. People leaving the Sudeten territory retained ownership of private property there with the option to sell or rent it. Under the treaty's provisions, the German and Czech governments respectively could expel foreigners considered a political risk. Out of the more than 300,000 Czechs choosing to continue to live in the Sudetenland, the Germans deported just 140 "undesirable persons." Hitler exempted Czechs and Slovaks absorbed into the Reich from service in its armed forces.

The ethnic German minority residing in Prague-controlled sections of Bohemia-Moravia experienced the resentment of the Czechs after their defeat at Munich. Thousands of Germans lost their jobs. Many were unnecessarily watched by the police. The government denied them and their families unemployment benefits. Czech health insurance companies refused claims for the German university clinic in Prague. Hitler confronted Chvalkovsky on January 21, 1939, with a list of grievances resulting from what he called a lingering "Benes mentality" throughout the republic. Citing the hostile tone of the Czech press, the Führer warned that no Great Power can tolerate a smaller neighboring country representing a perpetual threat in its flank. He stressed once more the necessity of improving relations. Ribbentrop read Chvalkovsky passages from prominent Czech newspapers. One predicted, "Four months after Munich it is already clear that a war is unavoidable." Another read, "The momentary political situation will not be regarded as unchangeable and a permanent circumstance." Henderson advised Voytech Mastny, the Czech ambassador in Berlin, to urge his government to avoid abuse of its ethnic German residents.

None of the rivalries in this political constellation would matter long. The Munich Accord, engineered by the western democracies to save Czechoslovakia, was ironically her death sentence. Its precedent for selfdetermination encouraged the country's other captive minorities to follow the example of the Sudeten Germans. Most prominent among them were the Slovaks. The Czech army and militia had occupied their land in 1919. Tomas Masaryk failed to deliver on his promise of regional autonomy. Nor were Slovaks equally represented in public administration; of 8,000 civil servants in Prague's government offices, just 200 were Slovak. Hitler wished to remain neutral in the friction dividing Czechs and Slovaks. On November 19, the Reich's Foreign Office directed its mission in Prague to watch events with reserve. The German press received instructions to maintain a non-partisan attitude in reporting on tensions in Slovakia. Hitler ordered, "For the time being, no political talks with the Slovaks are opportune."

Prague lost its grip on the disaffected minorities. In October, the Slovaks and Ruthenians established regional parliaments; a right finally conceded by the central government as a step toward autonomy. Delegates used their influence and authority to steer the regions more toward independence. The new Czech president, Dr. Emil Hacha, resorted to the usual hammer methods. On March 6, he deployed troops in the Carpatho-Ukraine and appointed General Lev Prchala, their commander, minister of the interior and finance. In Slovakia, Hacha dissolved the regional parliament. He placed the capital, Pressburg, under martial law and jailed 60 Slovakian politicians. Czech soldiers and police transferred to Pressburg. Hacha faced mounting chaos and the threat of open rebellion. He appealed to Dr. Joseph Tiso, whom the Slovaks had elected their prime minister, to help restore order. On March 13, Tiso visited Berlin to ask Hitler how he would react to a Slovakian declaration of independence. The Führer replied only that he has no interest in occupying Slovakia, since the land had never belonged to the German Reich.

Tiso returned to Pressburg. He proclaimed national independence in parliament the

next day. Fearing that the Hungarian army would invade and annex Slovakia, Tiso asked for German protection. Hitler replied, "I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram and hereby assume the security of the Slovakian state." On this day, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a republic. The German chancellor pacified the Hungarians by allowing them to occupy the Carpatho-Ukraine. Hacha requested an audience with Hitler. He and Chvalkovsky arrived in Berlin by train the night of the 14th. Since taking office, both men had worked to improve relations with Germany. The machinations of Benes's remaining associates, the anti-German press, and a public attitude tainted by nearly 20 years of Czech chauvinism promoted by Benes had sabotaged their efforts. Prior to meeting Hitler, Hacha told Ribbentrop that he had come to "place the fate of the Czech state in the hands of the Führer."

During their subsequent conversation, Hitler told Hacha that he was sending the German army across the frontier the following day. He had ordered the OKW to prepare the operation three days earlier. The Führer advised his guests to order the Czech army not to resist: "In this case your people still have good prospects for the future. I will guarantee them autonomy far beyond what they could ever have dreamed of in the time of Austria." Hacha duly relayed instructions to his army chief, General Jan Syrový, to stand down. The German troops who entered Czech territory at 6:00 a.m. on March 15 had orders forbidding them to fire their weapons. Advanced elements of the German army occupied the Morava-Ostrava industrial complex near the Polish frontier. Warsaw was about to exploit the momentary turmoil in Czechoslovakia to militarily seize the center and hold it for Poland. Local Czech residents understood the German initiative and offered no resistance.¹³⁴ The Polish government was angry with Hitler for this rebuff of its ambitions.

The Germans mollified the initial hostility of the Czech people, largely thanks to the efforts of the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (NSV), Germany's national social welfare organization. In the first ten days of the occupation, it distributed RM 7,000,000 worth of food to the distressed population. The NSV freely handed out RM 5,000,000 worth of clothing. The organization concentrated on cities and industrial regions, where shortages were more likely to occur than in rural areas. The German military authorities also arranged for the prompt restocking of grocery and department stores. Relief efforts favored the Czech populace and not the remaining ethnic German colony. The army also guarded against spontaneous attempts by members of the local *Volksdeutsche Partei* (Ethnic German Party) to gain control of the economy or of public administration. The Germans entered a land with 148,000 unemployed. Demobilization of the Czech army substantially increased the number. The Reich's Ministry of Labor established offices in the Czech Protectorate - as it now became known - to recruit out-of-work persons for German industry. During the first month of the occupation, 15,000 people took advantage of the opportunity and found jobs. Over the next few months, unemployment continued to decline, and in June, the Czech government negotiated trade agreements with Norway, Holland, and several other nations to boost commerce.

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The Germans confiscated most Czech army ordnance and integrated it into their own armed forces. German troops briefly entered Slovakian territory to empty Czech military depots near the frontier. The vast quantity of war materiel substantiated Hitler's protest that Czechoslovakia in a coalition with other European powers represented a threat to Germany. During the first week of the occupation, the Germans shipped 24 freight trains filled with military hardware into the Reich. They estimated 500 trains would be necessary to complete the transfer. Quartermaster General Eduard Wagner wrote his wife on March 30 that the quantity of combat ordnance discovered in this small country was "downright frightening."¹³⁹ The inventory included 1,582 aircraft, 2,175 field guns, 468 tanks, 501 anti-aircraft guns, 785 mortars, 43,856 machine guns, over a million rifles, three million artillery rounds, a considerable array of military specialty items such as bridge building equipment and searchlights, plus over a billion rifle rounds for the infantry. It consisted of up-to-date, well-designed weaponry. Modern production facilities such as the Skoda plant were expansive enough to simultaneously fill defense contracts for the USSR. Ribbentrop sent Dr. Friedrich Berber to Prague with a special research staff to peruse documents in the Czech diplomatic archives dating from March 1938 to March 1939. The team examined records "related to the English and French approach to the Czech question."

Based on an abundance of documentary evidence assessed both in Prague and a few months earlier in Vienna, Berber's analysis concluded that London had systematically intervened "in the politics of these countries" in order to "maintain their independence and weaken Germany." The records also revealed that the British "have acted in the same manner regarding Poland," the report deduced. Hitler concluded from the findings that "England wants war."

11.3 The Munich Agreement

The conference held in Munich on 29 September 1938, at which Chamberlain for Britain, Daladier for France, Mussolini for Italy and Hitler had set down the procedure for the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, was the consequence of the Versailles politics that could have no long-lasting existence:

1. because no state is viable which, to a large extent, comprises ethnic minorities, and which discriminates and terrorizes these minorities with all its state-approved means;
2. because in such a State, where the leadership speaks of “democracy”, “equality”, “autonomy” and the “will to mutual understanding”, but practices the exact opposite, there can be no thought of reconciliation in the field of domestic affairs;
3. because the majority in the State – the Czechs – failed to gain the friendship of a single one of the minority groups nor of any of the neighbouring countries; in fact, these minorities (principally the Slovaks) and neighbouring Poland and Hungary were even working, on their own initiative, towards the destruction of the Czech State during the crucial year of 1938;
4. because the creation of a state for purely strategic reasons as was done by the victorious World Powers³) was bound to founder, as soon as decisive strategic weights would shift in the course of time. Thus, in 1938 the following strategic aspects changed in comparison with 1919:
 - a) From a military standpoint, Germany had to be taken seriously again in 1938, while France was weakened in her internal affairs.
 - b) The Anschluss of Austria led to an almost complete geographical encirclement of Czecho-Slovakia and opened up a border for Germany which was not fortified on the Czech side.
 - c) The German West Wall (Siegfried Line), under construction since 1936, hastily accelerated after the May 1938 crisis that had been provoked by Benes, was nearing completion in September 1938 and, therefore, would frustrate any prompt assistance from France to be given to the Prague government.
 - d) The strategic importance of Czecho-Slovakia to France and Britain was dependent upon whether approximately 40 German divisions in the area of Bohemia-Moravia could be pinned down until the French army could make a successful breakthrough across the Rhine. The Anschluss, the Siegfried Line, the superiority of the German air force over the Czech air force and the secure leadership situation in Germany nullified these requirements.
 - e) The Prague government has produced during its 20-year rule such an aggravated domestic situation that the soldiers – from the ethnic minorities – could no longer be considered as reliable.
 - f) Great Britain, 1918 joint victor with France, more or less withdrew after the First World War, concentrating on her Empire, and was in 1938 not prepared to get drawn into a European war by Czecho-Slovakia; especially since it was perfectly plain for the British politicians that Stalin would exploit such a conflict for the implementation of Bolshevik world revolutionary interests.

g) France was not able in 1938 to rally any support for Czecho-Slovakia from Eastern Europe, since none of these countries was willing – and they made this very clear to Paris! – to lift a finger for the Prague government. These countries categorically refused to give any concession for Soviet troops to be passing through their territories. Poland and Rumania especially feared “that the secret intention behind Russia’s request was to recapture Bessarabia without a fight”. Poland, incidentally, was making demands herself on Czecho-Slovakia. Furthermore, Poland was also no longer in tune with France, not having got over the French- Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact of 1935/36.

“The adjoining countries were hostile or indifferent towards Czecho- Slovakia. Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia openly declared their hostility towards the Prague government. Rumania refused to allow Russian troops to pass through her territory. Thus the conditions set forth by Russia for her intervention [in favour of Czecho-Slovakia] were not fulfilled.”

h) The military and political allies of Czecho-Slovakia – France and Great Britain – did an about-turn against their Czech protégé because of the strategic shift in the balance of power in September 1938. With this action, they thwarted E. Benes’ intentions to solve his problems of the internal affairs by means of a European war.

The creation of Czecho-Slovakia with her 49.5% minorities that never wanted to co-exist in a state ruled by the Czechs was questionable from the beginning. The British Lord Chancellor, Lord Maugham, was to declare in the Munich conference debate in the House of Lords that this state, for which one had gone to the brink of war, should never have been set up.⁸) Viscount Rothermere, director of the Ministry of Information’s press office at the time, judged similarly:

“This caricature of a country under its Czech leaders has from the moment of its birth committed almost every conceivable folly.”

The British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, also was to inform on 9 September 1938 his Ambassador in Paris that one had to consider carefully

“ whether it was worthwhile to make war for something that nobody can maintain and that nobody seriously wants to restore. ”

A Polish diplomat, Count Grzybowski, personal friend of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck, explained during a private conversation with his French colleague Coulondre on 26 May 1938, thus months before the Munich conference:

“ Trying to save Czecho-Slovakia is a wild dream. Sooner or later she will collapse like a house of cards.”

Even Marshal Pilsudski has, ever since 1918, considered Czecho-Slovakia to be not viable – in the same way as he considered Austria to be not viable. For him the only question was which of the two states would disappear first. The Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck,

had regarded Czecho-Slovakia, "with whom one cannot engage in politics anyway", merely as an European disgrace. On 25-26 May 1938 – months before the Munich conference! – Polish diplomacy was to let the European governments know, "that Czecho-Slovakia, an arbitrary combination of words, of several exceptionally mutually hostile minorities, was a country condemned to death."

"Already at the peace negotiations after the First World War the Czech 'Memorandum 3' denied to the Sudeten Germans the right of self-determination, as they were held to be the descendants of immigrants and settlers."

A Czech historian admitted the fact as well:

"The widespread belief that without the capitulation of the Western Powers in Munich, Czecho-Slovakia could hold her own ground is not based upon facts. This is only one of the many propagandist legends which found their way into the public mind."

The antagonism towards German national traditions and culture was continually added to by the – since Versailles 1919 – existing determination of the Czechs in their drive of inflicting damage to that German entity living alongside the frontier who had resigned themselves to the newly – and against their will – created order, in a social, economical and cultural way, to spoil their feeling of belonging to this state and to force them out of the country.

"From the beginning the Czechs considered themselves to be the people who represented the state and did not think it worthwhile to try to give the two main minorities – German and Slovak – the feeling that the new state was also theirs."

F. Gause states:

"The unification of the Germans in Czecho-Slovakia was not only the result of Hitler's coming to power in 1933, but was equally as well the consequence of the conduct displayed by the Czechs in the sphere of internal development of the state. Therefore, their efforts to obtain autonomy within the state were genuine, and the situation in 1938 was self-induced by Czecho-Slovakia when all German proposals for concord were rejected."

The culture war of the Czech people was not directed against National Socialism but rather against German traditions and culture. Therefore, National Socialism could not have been responsible, especially since this fight for national identity was already begun in 1919. Many years before Hitler was politically effective the Czech newspapers had adopted the habit – in spite of national censorship – of circulating in this thoroughly unfriendly tone:

"The 'Ceske slovo' of 29 October 1920 demanded that one ought not to give equal rights to the Germans, but rather 'have them hanged from gallows and candelabras'. 'Zlata Praha' stated on the occasion of the Sokol festival in 1919 that one ought to have the Germans 'flogged' across the border. 'Vonkov' regretted on 6 January 1926 that the Sudeten Germans had not taken up arms against the Czechs after the putsch in 1918, as that would have presented the best opportunity 'for sorting things out'. The

official state newspaper 'Cesko-Slovenska' wrote in October 1921: 'The German minority in Brünn will melt away like a piece of ice in the sun and nothing can save them. To be contributing to the acceleration of this development is a self-evident duty of the Czech majority'."

At a military celebration in 1923 in Podersam a Czech speaker stated:

"We Czechs must strive to seize all industry. For as long as the last chimney stack of German factories has not... disappeared, and as long as German assets are not all in our hands, until then we must fight."

This attitude, which had as a consequence that the Sudetenland under Czech rule had the highest infant mortality and the highest suicide rate in the world, was surely not an appropriate reaction to the attention that had been given to the Czech people in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Czecho-Slovakia was evaluated and viewed by Britain and France almost exclusively on the basis of a possible military deployment against Germany, not as a free state that might also at some stage have good relations with the Reich or that might at least be encouraged to adopt a reasonable line of conduct for the sake of peace in Europe. The culture war against the ethnic Germans instigated by the Czechs and the subsequent "crimes against humanity" were deliberately overlooked in the capitals of Western Europe. In France the political leadership had other interests. In 1919 the French Marshal Foch had already declared, in his capacity as principal military advisor at the Versailles peace negotiations:

"You see [looking at a map of Czecho-Slovakia], here is a great bastion. You will not give me permission to extend the frontier to the Rhine, then at least leave me this bulwark."

In his memoirs Churchill also admitted this attitude:

"The mere neutralisation of Czecho-Slovakia means the liberation of twentyfive German divisions, which will threaten the Western front; in addition to which it will open up for the triumphant Nazis the road to the Black Sea. ... The subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia robbed the Allies... of twenty-one regular, fifteen or sixteen second-line divisions..."

A historian corroborated that the old Czecho-Slovakia, allied to France and the Soviet Union, had been "a dagger pointed at Germany's heart, a hostile stronghold right inside German territory, a gate of entry of the Reichs' enemies". She was created for this purpose.

That Eduard Benes, at that time Czech Foreign Minister, was involved during the years 1918-1921 in the enforced transference of German territory to Poland is mentioned only in passing. This Benes, having advanced to President in 1935, deemed himself qualified in home affairs on the basis of his strategy in foreign affairs, as described in his memoirs:

“During all those exacting and exhausting negotiations (from 1935 onwards), I tried my utmost to steer a straight course with the Soviet Union on one side and France on the other. On June 4th 1936, after the French elections which resulted in the formation of the Government of the Popular Front, the new Premier, Léon Blum, had sent me a message that France would never again behave with such weakness as his predecessor had done at the time of the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and assured me that his Government would be strong and firm towards Germany and that we might count on this. This was really France’s last stand. The Foreign Minister, J. Paul-Boncour, sent me a number of messages in the same strain. He tried especially to reestablish the Eastern front of the Little Entente and he also tried to win over Poland.”

It now becomes evident that the political and military co-operation between Czecho-Slovakia and a Soviet Union geared for world conquest, with the purchasing of Soviet bombers and the Soviet promise of assistance in spite of the absence of a common frontier, as well the French attempt to open up a route to Prague for the Red Army in the event of war, was to have a disastrous effect on the development in Europe.

H.E. Barnes states:

“Russia had already delivered three hundred war planes to Czecho-Slovakia, and in addition several squadrons of Soviet planes were on Czechoslovak airfields.”

Not Hitler, but Eduard Benes, had been aggravating the Sudetenland crisis more and more! The British historian A.J.P. Taylor was to confirm that “In the spring of 1938 Hitler did not see his way clearly”, but that Benes, however, was willing to settle his Sudetenland problem – “insoluble at home” – “on the international field”. The diplomatic records show that on 12 March 1938 the assurance was given by Göring to the Czechs that “Germany is not considering taking action against Czecho-Slovakia”. After the Anschluss, Hitler stated that the “solving of the Czechoslovak question was not urgent”, and there is no proof that he acted otherwise.

P.H. Nicoll states:

“It is often said that the Nazis deliberately roused up otherwise contented German minorities to imagine their grievances and make political capital for Germany out of them. The impartial investigations of Lord Runciman effectually routed this charge. Hitler had not stirred up discontent in the Sudetenland. On the contrary! German diplomats in Bohemia tried to hold back the Sudeten Germans in the face of any Czech provocation, when the excitement over the union of Austria with Germany was at its peak.”

Other politicians, on the other hand, were already examining the Czecho-Slovak question “long before Hitler had formulated his intentions”. “Not only did the British and French urge concessions on the Czechs. The British also urged Hitler (already on 10 May 1938) to make demands. This took him by surprise.”

Before the May 1938 crisis, the Reich government had on six occasions endeavoured to negotiate with Benes. He turned down the German negotiators every time. The

May crisis in 1938 was triggered off by President Benes with his order for mobilization of the Czechoslovak army. As a pretext he used rumours of alleged concentration of German troops on the Czech border. The source of these rumours were British news services, "apparently from the Foreign Office". In any case, they were originating from the same capital city whence it had just recently been put to Hitler to make demands in respect to Czecho-Slovakia "which had surprised him very much". Needless to say that these rumours and their consequence in the shape of the Czech mobilization likewise "surprised" him.

"In actual fact there is no movement of German troops – as was established beyond a doubt at the Nuremberg trials after the war. What then induced the Czech government to start these clear provocations for war? There are only two possibilities, the accuracy of which, however, can only be a matter of conjecture for now. Either the Czech government, similar to Schuschnigg with his 'plebiscite', simply took a leap forward and quite deliberately provoked a war. . . . There is the other possibility in that German resistance circles learned of the drawing up of the second survey 'Green', but not the contents. Possibly London was informed of the designing of this study – anti-Nazi circles at the highest military level were in fact giving information of the most secret military nature to the British government – and from that would have drawn the conclusion that the study was a short-term plan of attack. The British and French press is filled with alarming reports. War seems directly imminent! Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, advises his civil servants to send their wives and children back home. He makes the same recommendation to the press corps. The protests continued to pour in – not against the Czech mobilization, but against the non-existent German troop movements. The governments of France and the Soviet Union openly threaten with military intervention."

In fact, mobilization signifies to be in a state of war, even today after the Second World War! Benes was upholding the mobilization even when the rumors that had been used as pretext were disproven by (neutral) foreign journalists and military attachés; the reservists would only be demobbed mid June 1938. Britain and France, in spite of Hitler's appeals, never advised the Czechs to cancel their mobilization! The Czechs, were not content with mobilization only. They were, at the same time, intensifying their military action against the inhabitants of the border zones and were also escalating their hostile press campaign with the mocking argument, Hitler's restraint and inactivity was to be taken as a sign of weakness. Therefore, as Hitler had apparently already retreated from tiny Czecho-Slovakia, how easy it should be, then, for the Great Powers to finish the Reich! Thus, this and more could be thrust at Germany without running any risk whatsoever! The press of the West collaborated and

"was praising the Czech military machine again and again for the unexpected efficiency and quickness with which it was working. We regained our confidence, seeing that we were not alone."

How provocative the moves were from Eduard Benes would also be evident in the weeks before the Munich conference in that he could not even be persuaded by the pressure ex-

erted by the Western Powers to propose a compromise solution to the Sudeten-Germans. The reason for this was that besides the Western Powers he could bring yet another “friend” into the game: Stalin.

“The Soviet government, which had declared itself ready to fulfil its commitments under the Soviet-Czech agreement, confirmed in mid-May 1938 its willingness to defend Czecho-Slovakia against any aggressor, even if France should refuse to help.” “The Soviet government approached the governments of Great Britain and France several times suggesting combined operations in support of Czecho-Slovakia. . . . The Soviet Union declared itself ready to intervene on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia, even if France were not to grant her support, which, however, had been a prerequisite for Soviet aid. . . . even if Poland or. . . Rumania should refuse to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory. The Soviet government informed the President and the government of Czecho-Slovakia that the Soviet Union would assist Czecho-Slovakia under one condition: when Czecho-Slovakia is willing to defend herself and will ask for Soviet help.”

For the rest, this Soviet promise of aid was unconditional, i.e. independent of the legal position and of the “question of the aggressor”. According to Soviet teaching, everybody is an aggressor anyway, who has been labelled as such by the Communists, irrespective of the circumstances. Even the US Ambassador in Paris, Bullit, seemed to be getting perturbed by the crisis- and war-promoting influence of the Soviet Union on the Czech government. In a letter to President Roosevelt of 22 May 1938 he advised that the general mobilization ordered by the Czech government

“has to be understood as provoking war, which could have only one result: establishing Bolshevism on the whole continent.”

The Munich conference, which took place four months after these events, could have been avoided if President Benes had accorded to the German minorities the rights which had already been guaranteed in 1919, and if he had not let himself get carried away in continual provocations in the certitude of enjoying the support of his many and powerful and, sometimes, goading “friends”.

At that time there were 500,000 Sudeten Germans permanently unemployed, without any support from insurance benefits and without assistance from the trade union or health funds (out of 800,000 in the whole of Czecho-Slovakia); to those numbers the destitute dependants need to be added – such a state of affairs could not remain unchanged. In Czecho-Slovakia, payment of unemployment benefits was tied to membership of a trade union and would in this instance still only be paid for six months. The subsequent phase would be social welfare or the relief fund of the community. This would amount to a weekly payment (monthly in the case of money from the relief fund) of 10 Crowns for single people and 20 Crowns (one to two Reichsmark) for married people. This whole picture of misery is enlarged by the consequential result of this situation in the form of malnutrition and disease, a rising death rate and a severe decline in marriages and births. The systematic ousting of the Sudeten Germans from the economy and the

administration, even in their exclusively German spheres, remained a political concept, and as such was bound to lead to an aggravation of the situation. The 200 paragraph "Defence of the Realm Act" and its implementation decrees of 23 June 1936 supplied the "legal basis" for the elimination and weeding out of the Sudeten Germans complete with their culture and traditions. This law was embarked upon immediately by the newly elected President and thus "Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces", Eduard Benes, upon his election on 18 December 1935, and it remained one of the longest lasting corpus of law. With the aid of ambiguous phraseology concerning "national unreliability", any employee could be dismissed and any employer dispossessed, who did not suit the Prague government. Any remaining possibilities left to the Sudeten Germans for eking out a living, which had not been covered by this last regulation, were eliminated by the "borderland" rule. The refusal to exert any political influence on these entire happenings, the flight of more than 214,000 Sudeten Germans across the border to Germany, the slaying of 200 Sudeten Germans and much suffering were bound to bring the situation, without any influence from Hitler, continually to a head. Every foreign visitor, who was travelling in those parts at that time, was agreed that this state of affairs was intolerable. Lord Runciman, the British government's special Envoy, who stayed in Czecho-Slovakia from 25 July until mid-September 1938 to investigate the situation on the spot, was just one amongst many.

Hitler had not demanded the Munich conference in the context of an ultimatum. It had been likewise proposed by other powers and justified on the grounds of a common European interest. In this connection, the role of US President Roosevelt is, more often than not, misjudged. Yet it was he who, on 26 September 1938, was urging Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Benes in pertinent communications to call an international conference in order to solve the Sudeten question. Since Roosevelt took many of his decisions in secret, without consultation or counselling from anyone in his Cabinet, and since the US State Department documents on the Munich conference are, to a large extent, still unavailable, one can only guess at Roosevelt's motives.

"Meanwhile we have some clues, all of which point in the same direction, namely, that Mr. Roosevelt did not regard Munich as any final settlement with Hitler but believed that it might lead to war at no distant period. Hence, he continued his plans for a vast armament program, with emphasis on airplanes, which would help to provide Britain and France with the sinews of war and make the United States ready for possible involvement in the impending struggle."

Roosevelt knew, or should have known, what was about to be negotiated at the Munich conference. But in spite of this knowledge he did not encourage Britain and France to support the status quo in Czecho-Slovakia. He favoured the Franco-British decision for a transfer of the Sudetenland to the German Reich (messages from Roosevelt of 26 September). Shortly after the ratification of this decision (29 September), his manoeuvres were such "that Chamberlain was made generally responsible for the whole disgrace". At the same time he encouraged London, Paris, but also Warsaw

“... to take a stand relative to Germany that was likely, if not sure, to bring war...”

The backdrop to this stand had been, in the main, correctly perceived by the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Jerzy Potocki, even though the threads which Roosevelt had personally woven for the Munich conference, remained hidden from him. On 12 January 1939, Potocki wrote to the Foreign Minister:

“I can only add that, as an astute politician and expert on American mentality, he [President Roosevelt] has succeeded in quickly and adroitly diverting public opinion from the true domestic situation and interesting that opinion in foreign policy. The ‘modus operandi’ was perfectly simple. All Roosevelt had to do was to stage correctly, on the one hand, the menace of world-war brought about by Chancellor Hitler, while on the other hand, a bogey had to be found that would gabble about an attack on the U.S.A. by the totalitarian countries. The Munich Pact was indeed a godsend to President Roosevelt. He lost no opportunity in translating it as France’s and England’s capitulation to bellicose German militarism. As people say in this country: Hitler drew a gun on Chamberlain. In other words, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a most shameful peace.”

But France and Britain refused to be drawn into a conflict over Czecho-Slovakia by Benes or Roosevelt. Chamberlain, who liked to call Czecho-Slovakia “a faraway country” and the Czechs “people of whom we know nothing”,

“believed also that the country ‘would not have followed us if we had tried to lead it into war to prevent a minority from obtaining autonomy, or even from choosing to pass under some other government’.”

The actions of the British government before Munich were not dictated by fear of war, but rather because of a “belief that Germany had a moral right to the Sudeten German territories”. Chamberlain himself had already stated in May 1938:

“ that not even a victorious peace would restore their [Czech] present frontiers.”

The Western Powers induced the Czechs on 19 September 1938 to cede the Sudeten German territories to the Reich. Hitler had neither been consulted about this decision nor about talks with the Prague government. Czecho-Slovakia had already capitulated in the face of the Anglo-French intervention eight days prior to the Munich accords and was not, as it is still commonly depicted to this day, destroyed by “Munich”. So it was that Chamberlain and Daladier flew to Munich with precise instructions from their Cabinets and with an agreement already accepted by the Czechs. At Munich it was merely a question of sorting out the agreement. Word-for- word, this is what the agreement states:

“Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon...”

Neville Chamberlain explained in the ensuing, quite extended debates in the House of Commons at the beginning of October 1938:

“We did not go [to Munich] to decide whether the predominantly German areas in the Sudetenland should be passed over to the German Reich. That had been decided already.”

The conservative member Raikes, stated to the House:

“Do not forget that the Czechs annexed the German areas before the Treaty of Versailles accepted it. Honorable Members talk about time limits, but I would remind the House that it took the Czechs twenty years before rights were conferred on the Sudeten Germans.”

Sir H. Croft remarked on the same occasion:

“The Labour Party and the Liberal Party at the time of the treaty were most emphatic against the whole of this patchwork-quilt of Czecho-Slovakia.”

The fact that Chamberlain flew to Munich and not Hitler to London cannot be interpreted as a ‘dictate’ by Hitler. While Hitler was justifiably concerned that hostile demonstrations might ruin the chances of a successful outcome of a conference, so it fitted Chamberlain’s policy to come to Germany, as he wrote in a private letter on 13 September 1938:

“Indeed it would not have suited me [if Hitler had come to London], for it would have deprived my coup of much of its dramatic force.”

Chamberlain declared in his important speech in Birmingham on 17 March 1939:

“Not one voice of criticism was to be heard when I first announced that I would go to Munich. Everybody applauded that experiment.”

During that same speech he added:

“It [the ceding of the Sudetenland to Germany] was something in existence ever since the Treaty of Versailles, a problem that could have been solved long ago if the statesmen of the previous 20 years had only had a more generous, more extensive and more enlightened attitude towards their duties. It had become like a long neglected malady, and a surgical operation was necessary to save the life of the patient.”

It seems incredible that from October 1938 onwards there appears a persistent fondness for describing the Munich conference as a prime example of the “cynical power politics of dictators in relation to the peace-loving and fair-acting democracies”. By considering the facts it is absurd to maintain that in the discussions Hitler had “taken by surprise”, “humiliated” or suchlike his opposite number at the talks, a claim that in fact was never made by the two Western heads of government themselves. After the signing of the Munich agreement the two Western statesmen were not only wildly acclaimed in Paris and London by the population (as indeed also in Munich), but also the respective parliaments expressed their approval by an overwhelming majority.

Therefore, one cannot assert afterwards, as Chamberlain did on 17 March 1939 at Birmingham, that Hitler had sprung upon the world with the Sudeten question “an unpleasant surprise” which “shocked and affronted public opinion throughout the world.” The “offending surprise” is to be charged exclusively to the Versailles “peace politicians”, as indeed was confirmed by Chamberlain and Daladier with their signatures in Munich. After all, anything associated with the name “Versailles” after the First World War, was far more than “an offending surprise”! There would not have been a Munich conference, had it not been for the victors’ practice of transgressing against all equality and justice for the past twenty years. The “peaceable methods” of diplomacy had been tried and tested for the resolution of the hair-raising state of affairs in Eastern Europe by the various German politicians for twenty years – all without success. So it is hardly surprising, when after twenty years of patience the manner of amicably asking and complaining is being gradually changed in order to deal with these urgent matters of concern. Without a doubt, the yielding at this late stage was only attained through the notion of an impending war which however, should not be placed solely on Hitler’s shoulders, because the one who was calling for war and who caused the tension to intensify into the threat of war was Eduard Benes! To this should be added certain circles in the “Western democracies” as well as the Soviet leadership!

11.4 Prague

The “brutal violation of little, defenceless Czecho-Slovakia” – a statement that was given as reason for concluding that Hitler had broken his promise and was also in breach of trust – was another example of the falsehood which was unceasingly pounded into the masses by the opinion-makers of the press. The incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich had equally as little to do with the realization of territorial claims as it had with a plan of attack, a “plot against peace”, or the “creation of a platform for the encirclement of Poland and for a breakthrough to the Black Sea”. This action arose from the inevitable consequence and the interplay of various historical, ethnographic, political and military factors.

The disintegration of this multi-cultural creation, joined together in total disregard of historical and national principles, happened without any German help and would already have come about in 1918 had not Russia and Germany been utterly and totally destroyed. Who in the world is aware nowadays that there were in existence – just to give an example of the diverse tension-producing elements in this State – in Czecho-Slovakia, apart from the different languages of all the minority groups, even two national anthems, one for the Czechs and one for the Slovaks? Poland and Hungary were asserting territorial claims and Carpatho- Ukrainians were demanding their independence. The People’s Party of Hlinka was already insisting strongly at Whitsun 1938 (30 May) – months before the new Sudeten solution! – actually on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Pittsburgh agreement, on autonomy for the Slovaks. The Pittsburgh agreement of 31

May 1918 had been negotiated during the First World War by Tomas G. Masaryk, who was to become the first president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and a group of Slovakian emigrants to the United States. It was the "Pittsburgh Post" that announced then to the world the founding of this Czecho-Slovakia.

"Professor T.G. Masaryk was the only representative of the smallest Czech party – the so-called Progressives – in the Vienna parliament. He was in no way entitled to speak in the name of the Czech nation. During the war his conduct was sharply criticised abroad and in Bohemia... The Czech people by no means echoed Masaryk's battle-cry: 'Destroy Austria!' "

The Slovaks for their part were insisting from the beginning that the "Slovakian League in America" did not have the authority to consider themselves as the executor for the Slovak people.²⁾ At any rate, there is – out of consideration for Woodrow Wilson alone, on whose approval the whole project depended in 1918 – in the agreement an assurance given for a cultural special position for the Slovaks, i.e. independence in cultural matters. In addition it was set forth that the elected representatives of the Slovakian people should, within the next ten years at the latest, be given the opportunity to decide for themselves on the future of Slovakia. The Pittsburgh treaty had placed the government, or rather the parliament, of the planned state under the obligation to incorporate this fact in the constitution and to organize on federal lines the state that was to be established. Already in 1919 the Pittsburgh agreement was broken when the so-called Revolutionary National Assembly that was not made up of lawfully elected representatives of the people but was rather arbitrarily put together – and where Slovaks were actually represented by Czech delegates – approved a constitution of the Czecho-Slovakian Republic which did not respect fundamental clauses of the Pittsburgh accord. Since the Allied Powers were not lifting a finger for the rights of the Slovaks as laid down in the Pittsburgh agreement, so over the years a constantly growing tension which was already exacerbated by the leadership in Prague, was building up between the Czechs and the Slovaks.

As all the posited demands made on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Pittsburgh agreement had been denied, all Slovakian members of parliament, with the exception of the Communists and Social Democrats – there was neither pressure nor encouragement from Hitler – on the 6 October 1938 were requesting autonomy once again. This did not come about, first and foremost, as a reaction to the policies of the German Reich, but rather because of the Pittsburgh agreement and its violation by the Czechs.

For twenty long years the Czechs have flouted their commitments. On the basis of the parliamentary decision of 6 October 1938, Dr. Tiso had formed on the 7 October 1938 an autonomous Slovakian government in Pressburg which was recognized by the Prague Cabinet, the Munich accord still fresh in their minds. Immediately after, on 9 October 1938, the Carpatho-Ukraine likewise organized in Ushchorod an autonomous government under Brody, which was also accepted by Prague. The two Prime Ministers of both nationalities were sworn in on the constitution of the State in Prague, having now become

a Federal Republic. On the 22 November 1938 a formal constitutional amendment in Prague – the Slovak Autonomy Law – came into force. Although its provisions did not satisfy the hopes of the Slovakian people, it was, nevertheless, a further milestone along the route of an internal political development where sections of the population were agitating for independence. With the help of this Autonomy Law a provincial Slovak government was envisaged: It would have administrative and executive powers, i.e. a Slovak Diet (parliament) with wide legislative authority, but certain subjects of common interest would be reserved for the central government in Prague.

Hitler had, at first, even encouraged Czech opposition to the impatience of the Slovakian people and also to the Hungarian territorial claims after the Munich conference. For example, he had endeavoured still in February 1939 to impede the Slovakian struggle for independence (There were still 113,000 Germans in Slovakia). Yet, Hitler could not resolve the fundamental differences in these two peoples. By invoking the Slovak Autonomy Law the Slovaks were demanding, in the spring of 1939, the right to have a say in the allocation of taxes, the right to self-administration and to be given a voice deciding the leadership of the Czecho- Slovakian armed forces. The Czechs turned down these demands, and the Slovaks remained second class citizens in their own country, although they were now able, in contrast to previous times, to intensify their actions for independence. While the British Ambassador in Prague, Newton, had already reported on 6 March 1939 that “relations between Czechs and Slovaks to be ‘heading for a crisis’”, so the “Foreign Office Memorandum on the Position of His Majesty’s Government in connection with possible Developments of the Slovak Crisis” of 13 March referred to “The position in Slovakia” as “thoroughly unsatisfactory since Munich”. It conveyed the expectancy that in view of the German press reports on Czech acts of terrorism Hitler may be marching upon Prague, and it stated in these actual words:

“Until very recently there were no signs of German intervention on the lines of (b)... [b = deliberate disintegration of the Czechoslovak state by Germany.] Both the official Czech broadcast and Dr. Chvalkowsky maintained that there was no evidence that such propaganda had been inspired from the Reich or by the German minority in Czecho-Slovakia... The most likely development of the present situation would therefore seem to be a Slovakia either nominally independent or bound by even looser federal ties than at present to Prague and dominated in either event by German influence.”

The Prague crisis intensified to such an extent that the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, recommended, on his own authority, to the Czech Envoy, Mastny, to have their Foreign Minister Chvalkowski come to Berlin.

A.J.P. Taylor states:

“He [Hitler] acted only when events had already destroyed the settlement of Munich.”

There had been no encouragement from Hitler to induce Poland to incorporate the Olsa territory that included the town of Teschen, where part of the population was German. Further, he had not ordered provincial parliamentary elections in Slovakia and Carpatho-

Ukraine and did not pre-determine their result. The population there had voted 98% and 92.4% respectively in favour of setting up an autonomous government and against centralism from Prague. Furthermore, no fault attaches to Hitler for the fact that for the Czechs, after the annexation of Austria and the breaking away of Slovakia, there remained a frontier area of only 50 kilometres bordering the outside world which, actually in this case, was a far from friendly Poland. Hitler had not summoned the Slovak leader, Prof. Tuka, to Berlin. More accurately, he came on his own initiative on 12 February 1939 because, in his opinion, "continued co-existence with the Czechs had become impossible for the Slovaks". He was laying the destiny of his people into "your hands, my Führer (he addressed Hitler as 'My Führer'); my people await their complete liberation by you" (9). In spite of the request for German protection, Hitler was still refusing, in this month before the crisis, to advocate an independent Slovak state.

"Hitler answers evasively. He wants on no account to tie himself down and he fears that an official German intervention in favour of the Slovaks could do harm to the newly reached German-French agreement. Hitler ... merely assures that he will, if Slovakia should become independent, guarantee the independence that the people want."

The improper dissolving of the Ruthenian government on 6 March and the equally unconstitutional removal from office of the Slovakian Prime Minister Tiso and two of his staff, as well as the arrest of several Slovakian politicians and the appointment of the Sidor government by the Prague powers-that-be, all took place on the 9 and 13 March without any help from Hitler. K. Zentner writes:

"The Czech actions have taken everyone in Germany totally by surprise. Hitler is in Vienna attending the celebration of the anniversary of the Anschluss, Göring is on holiday in San Remo.... Hitler's anger at the repeated provocation – for this is how he perceives the Czech conduct – knows no bounds. He immediately orders to prepare for an invasion of Czecho-Slovakia."

If Dr. Tiso, after these happenings in Slovakia, should be asking for a consultation with Hitler and if, subsequently, he should have the Slovak Diet declare unanimously the independence of the State, then the Reich Chancellor cannot be held responsible for this development. Similarly, there is no ground for assuming that Hitler had caused or requested the declaration of independence of the Carpatho- Ukrainian government on the 14 March 1939 or their appeal for protection to the Reich. Nor had Hitler advised, much less ordered, the Hungarians, even before the German occupation, as a trigger – so to speak – for further radical changes in that area (Poland was interested in Mährisch-Ostrau and had already early on concentrated military reinforcement on the border), to invade Carpatho-Ukraine – on the 14 March 1939. Winston Churchill was to admit that the Hungarian troops advancing into the eastern province of Czecho-Slovakia (Carpatho-Russia) were secretly being supported by Poland – not Germany! – and that the Polish Foreign Minister had stated publicly in Warsaw on 14 March 1939,

"that his Government had full sympathy with the aspirations of the Slovaks."

The Polish government was the first to say openly that the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia was inevitable. In stark contrast to Hitler, Colonel Beck, who liked to call Czecho-Slovakia a “temporary arrangement” and “a caricature of a state”, set to work after the Munich conference towards achieving the further disintegration of this state, a common Polish-Hungarian frontier and the acquisition of Slovakian areas of territory and of Czech industrial areas by resorting to “extremely strong . . . pressure”, “if necessary, by force.” G. Bonnet writes:

“Even more so, Poland was of the opinion that Czecho-Slovakia had to disappear in the near future, and she was preparing herself to take a part of the legacy. I for my part spoke with the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiewicz, on this very subject on 25 May 1938 and requested that he urge his government to put itself willingly on the side of the Great Powers that defended Czecho-Slovakia. Lukasiewicz answered that Czecho-Slovakia was a state arbitrarily composed of numerous minorities decidedly hostile towards one other, a country condemned to death. To try, in spite of all, to preserve it would be a grave error on the part of France and Great Britain.”

The Czech President Eduard Benes had already on 21 September 1938, in his response to the British-French plan – not being aware of the constitutional amendments towards federative alignment of Czecho-Slovakia that were to follow later – stressed:

“In the opinion of the Government, acceptance of a proposal of this kind would be tantamount to acquiescence in the complete mutilation of the State in every respect; from an economic point of view and from that of transport, Czecho-Slovakia would be completely paralysed, and from the strategic point of view she would find herself in an extremely difficult situation; and especially, she would sooner or later fall under the absolute influence of Germany.”

No one can seriously maintain that all small states in Europe – here we are discussing Hungary and Poland – had been “vassals of Hitler”. Winston Churchill was also surprised at the Polish attitude which did not suit his plans:

“We see them [the Poles] hurrying, while the might of Germany glowered up against them, to grasp their share of the pillage and ruin of Czecho-Slovakia. During the crisis the door was shut in the face of the British and French Ambassadors, who were denied even access to the Foreign Secretary of the Polish State. It is a mystery and tragedy of European history that a people capable of every heroic virtue, gifted, valiant, charming, as individuals, should repeatedly show such inveterate faults in almost every aspect of their governmental life. . . . The Hungarians had also been on the fringe of the Munich discussions. Horthy had visited Germany at the end of August, 1938, but Hitler had been very reserved in his attitude.”

The Czech order of 23 September 1938, for general mobilization and the planning – highly dangerous and menacing for Germany – on the part of the Soviet Union and France for a ‘mother-ship’ base, depositing war planes on Czech airfields, were not, on the whole, made inoperative after the Munich conference. Winston Churchill in a speech

from Speech on 14 March 1938 in the House of Commons:

“No doubt they [the Czechs] are only a small democratic State, no doubt they have an army only two or three times as large as ours, no doubt they have a munitions supply only three times as great as that of Italy...”

For Winston Churchill, this was but harmless number games. But for Germany it was deadly reality. Even more so, as in every looming crisis situation Czecho- Slovakia and her military ally, the Soviet Union, plus France, would have formed a common front against Germany. The Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance made aware of the diplomatic activities that were undertaken on a broad scale against Germany, when he became mindful of the policy of stirring up rumours to plant in the public mind, when he was to find out about the British armament, about the forecast of a German-Polish break-up, the intimidation of Italy, the disdain shown for the German attempts towards peace and of the rejection of the new disarmament proposals – only then did he decide to support the Slovaks rather than the Czechs. P.H. Nicoll writes:

“In leader articles that were given a big spread in the British press the assertion was made that Hitler had broken his promise, made at the Sportpalast in Berlin on 26 September 1938, not to make any further territorial claims in Europe. It was declared that he had not kept his previously given word and, subsequently, he was no longer to be trusted. No mention was made, however, about Chamberlain going back on his word that he had given to Hitler on 30 September 1938, with regard to the British-German friendship declaration, when he was informing Mussolini during the period of 11 and 14 January 1939, that he was considering using military action against Hitler – weeks before Hitler took any steps against Czecho-Slovakia.”

In spite of this British activity immediately after “Munich”, matters might still have developed differently, had not the Czechs continued oppressing their minorities in the accustomed manner as practised since 1919, and had the Poles not caused a change in conditions by delivering one ultimatum after another to Prague. The Slovaks did not have the protection of the German troops imposed upon them, and because of that had forced their independence, but Tiso, the Prime Minister of the autonomous Slovakian government, was of the opinion that Slovak independence was only then guaranteed, when the unwarranted territorial and political demands of the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs could be effectively opposed.

The “No” of the Polish government in reply to the German negotiation proposals regarding Danzig and the Corridor through West Prussia also accelerated events in Czecho-Slovakia, if indeed it did not trigger them. The Polish “No” was becoming, from January, February and March of 1939 onwards, ever more determined, and it was accompanied by the combined actions of mobilization and of oppression of the German element – in the Olsa region already since October 1938 – as well as ever more unrestrained journalistic endeavours. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, declared on the morning of 16 March 1939 in the House of Commons:

“With that [the breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia from the inside], a situation has ceased to exist which His Majesty’s government has always regarded as temporary.”

With that statement, Chamberlain confirmed that the British leadership also, since the Munich conference, had not rated the chances of a long life very high for the remainder of the Czech State. There is no evidence for it that Hitler had prepared this march on Prague with long-term and precise planning, which might possibly have warranted the British steps taken since October 1938. The Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky stated in a document of 21 January 1939 that was accepted by the Inter-allied Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 1945-1946

“that he [Hitler] had strictly fulfilled the promise made on 14 October 1938, although under very trying circumstances.”

After all, it goes without saying, that this hotbed of unrest called Czecho- Slovakia in the year 1939 – without Hitler’s help – could easily have sparked off a war and in any case, that by re-arranging affairs in this way the shedding of blood in the heartland of Europe, which might not have remained limited to local areas only, was averted. There is plentiful evidence showing that the Czechoslovak state, especially while continuing with their present policy, after the separation of the Sudetenland was, in the long term, no longer able to exist. President Benes told the French and the British Ambassador on 19 September 1938:

“The Anglo-French plan of 19 September 1938 [cession of territories with more than 50% German population] signifies the crippling of the state, economic paralysis, strategically the handing over to Germany and complete subjugation to Germany in the near future.”

British and French documents, also recognized as genuine by the IMT (International Military Trial at Nuremberg), also make it clear:

“In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March 1939.”

Only after the dismissal of the Slovakian ministers, that is, after the Prague-triggered crisis, are there references appearing in those documents to a German action – reaction, in this case, would be more appropriate – and not before. This, though, irrespective of the fact that the Slovak independence leader, Prof. Tuka, had already in February 1939 turned to Hitler with the appeal for the liberation of his country from Czech rule. Winston Churchill stated after the re-integration of the Sudetenland into Germany:

“I venture to think that in future the Czechoslovak State cannot be maintained as an independent entity. . . Perhaps they [Czecho-Slovakia] may join it [the Nazi regime] in despair or in revenge.”

The territorial demands of Poland and Hungary and the efforts by the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians to attain independence marked the start of the realization of the Churchill forecast. The state dissolved in such a way that Neville Chamberlain, on 14 March 1939, that is one whole day before the German march on Prague, could state in

the House of Commons that no unprovoked aggression on Czecho-Slovakia had taken place by Germany. P.H. Nicoll writes:

“Chamberlain, as well as Sir John Simon, stated that the Slovakian and Ruthenian independence movements, which they had no intention of weakening or suppressing, signalled the demise of the Czech state. Consequently, protection of the Czech borders had become unnecessary.”

The British Ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, who was in favour of appeasement and, because of that, had been put under considerable pressure in Britain after the outbreak of war, wrote about this in his memoirs, published in London in 1941:

“Unfortunately the Czechs were incredibly short-sighted: they were domineering in their treatment of the Slovaks, and the separatists among the latter were no less blindly disloyal in their attitude towards the Czechs. It was obvious that the controversy which had arisen between them was exposing both equally to German influence, and during the week which preceded the occupation of Prague I did my utmost to persuade the Czech Minister at Berlin to use all his influence with his Government to induce it to lose no time in settling its dispute with the Slovaks and in withdrawing its troops from Bratislava before it was too late....”

The Czech President, Dr. Hacha, travelled to Berlin on the 14 March 1939 – of his own free will and at his own request. P.H. Nicoll further writes:

“The break away by Slovakia and Ruthenia was to lead to a grave crisis in Prague, and Sir Basil Newton, the British Envoy in Czecho-Slovakia, advised President Hacha that it would be best to travel to Berlin to discuss the situation with Hitler.”

In any case, it was not Hitler who “brought things to a head”.⁴⁰) With prior approval from his Cabinet, Dr. Hacha set out for his journey to Berlin in order to avert chaos breaking out in Bohemia and Moravia, which was threatening to erupt unless the Reich government intervened, following the declaration of independence by the Slovakian Diet on 14 March 1939. Dr. Hacha, who had been forbidden to make the journey by air because of his heart trouble and had left Prague by special train,

“ was received with full military honours due to a visiting head of state: The guard of honour was presenting arms at the station to the sound of the Czech and German national anthems ringing out. At the Reichskanzlei (Reich Chancellery) the ‘Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler’ (special body-guard for the Führer) stands to attention, the band of the ‘Leibstandarte’ is playing the Präsentiermarsch, while Dr. Hacha inspects the guard of honour.”

Already on the way from the station to his quarters at the Hotel Adlon, Dr. Hacha was telling State Secretary Meissner ‘in excited tones’,

“that he had, in view of the now intolerable situation in his country, come to the decision to ask the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich for help and protection, and he was hoping that he might find him willing to establish a common political ground.”

There is no international principle which entitles foreign governments to scream blue murder when a freely elected and confirmed president, who is congratulated by his predecessor, Eduard Benes,⁴⁴) voluntarily transfers the sovereignty of his state to a superior power as his country is in a hopeless situation. Although much tragedy and explosive material might be embodied in such an act as Dr. Hacha's, so there are often varied factors that cannot be put down to the "malicious" intention of one solitary man which make it necessary every now and then to have to take decisions of this magnitude. Deserted by the minorities (even without the Sudeten Germans there still remained 3.5 million people in a state of 7 million Czechs), as well as by her big friends Britain, France and the USSR, threatened by Hungary and Poland, economically without protection and militarily helpless, Prague was no longer in control of the situation.

The fact, that after the Munich conference, the Hungarian government, as well as Dr. Tiso for the Slovaks and Dr. Hacha for the Czechs, had consulted Hitler and Mussolini rather than the four Great Powers of Munich, in order to have the Hungarian territorial claims adjudicated by an impartial arbiter, cannot be laid to Hitler's charge. During the negotiations, resulting in the "Vienna arbitration award" of 2 November 1938, Germany was lending her decisive support to the Czechs, which is all the more remarkable as the Czechs had been living for two full decades – in fact, right up to the time of the recent arrangement – at daggers drawn with the Reich, while the Reich, on the other hand, was allied in friendship to Hungary. Furthermore is this Vienna arbitral award additional proof that Hitler had not been making long-term plans, or that he had "intended" anyway, to smash or eliminate Czecho-Slovakia. If that had been the objective, then there would not have been a more favourable opportunity as when he was presented with this request at the conference in Vienna.

That Hitler, in view of Dr. Hacha's deliberate Berlin visit, intervened actively in these changes that were taking place in the Czech sphere, one may find regrettable. To pass judgment on this in the name of humanitarianism, of peace and in the name of a generally binding system of values arising from occidental ethics, could prove extremely difficult. Those Powers, however, who considered it appropriate to compel 3.5 million Germans against their will to have to live within a state of 7 million Czechs, and who themselves had appropriated, with varying degrees of violence, colonial territories and protectorates all over the world with the intention of keeping them forever, are then most emphatically not in a position to protest, when later on the Czech government felt induced to endorse the policy of becoming integrated into a state federation with 75 million Germans, while retaining their autonomy. If Hitler had remained inactive, then his passivity would have made a peaceable impression, but the results would probably have proved disastrous for peace in this area and for the security of the Reich, because other powers would have exploited these changes and, without question, would have increased the belligerent atmosphere in Europe – in fact, against the intention of the Czech government.

The Czech national identity was not in any way demeaned by the Reich and cultural autonomy and economic prosperity throughout the war was ensured, no Czech was con-

scripted for military service, and the entry and settlement in Bohemia required a special permit. Thus did Hitler “violate” a country that had been part of the Reich for 1,000 years, where in the centre was to be found the oldest and one of the most outstanding German universities, yes, whose capital city Prague had been, for more than fifty years during the Middle Ages, the capital of the Reich. What the Czechs had never granted the Sudeten Germans – autonomy, being in charge of their own national, cultural and economic life and exemption from military service – this was offered by Hitler to the protectorate.

11.5 American Affairs

American Press Opinion Relative to the Rhineland

In the United States the news of the Nazi occupation of the Rhineland evoked nationwide interest. The Baltimore Sun and the Louisville Courier-Journal were suspicious of Hitler’s proposals, and the San Francisco Chronicle was confident that anything that emanated from Hitler was counterfeit: “The world does not trust him at all.” The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman feared that a general European war was imminent. After this Hitler coup, war would “ensue inevitably.” The Emporia Gazette shared this view: “The danger of a European war draws nearer.” The Portland Morning Oregonian refused to be frightened by the specter of war, and the Hearst press put on a similar brave front. The 5th Louis Post-Dispatch was inclined to look with favor upon Hitler’s peace proposals: it was high time for a New Deal in Europe. The Omaha World-Herald expressed a similar opinion: “One can only wait and see—and hope. Hitler presents the possibility that he may become the post-war peacemaker... . The Versailles Treaty could well be sacrificed for such positive gains.” The Cincinnati Enquirer went so far as to defend Hitler’s bold move into the Rhineland: “Great Britain and France, not to mention Russia, Japan and the United States are at work building unprecedentedly great military machines. . . . The Powers, therefore, have no logical objection to Chancellor Hitler’s newest move into the Rhineland.”

Points of Friction along the Economic Front

This rising tide of American dislike for Nazi Germany was not contained within strong dykes of mutual economic interest. The foreign commerce between Germany and the United States was seriously affected by different theories of international trade. Under the terms of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Secretary Hull pushed a program which emphasized the principle of equality of treatment as the basis of commercial relations. He was insistent that the idea of equality should not be defeated by the imposition on the part of other nations of exchange controls, government monopolies, and quotas. He was particularly opposed to barter deals. In 1934, President Roosevelt named George N.

Peck to the Office of Foreign Trade Adviser, and Peck lost no time in negotiating with Germany a barter agreement whereby the Nazi Government would buy 800,000 bales of American cotton through the facilities of the Export-Import Bank. Payment for this cotton would be arranged so that one-fourth of the price would be paid in American dollars and three-fourths in German currency plus a premium of 22.5 per cent. The banks would sell this currency to American importers of German goods who could use it for their purchases.

Secretary Hull voiced vehement opposition to this barter deal and was able to secure not only its defeat but also the abolition of the Office of Foreign Trade Adviser. Needless to say, this action was a blow to everyone who had hoped that the development of economic ties with Germany might lead to better political relations. The difficulties of 1934 expanded into further friction in 1936. Under the terms of a ruling by the Attorney General, the German plan for subsidizing exports was classified as a discriminatory trade practice. The Treasury Department then applied the antibounty provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 with countervailing duties ranging from 22 to 56 per cent on about a dozen German commodities. The German Government at once sent a group of experts to Washington in an effort to obtain the removal of these high duties.⁵¹ Failing in this endeavor, it then tried to conciliate the Treasury Department by issuing a decree which forbade the use of Aski marks and barter deals in German-American trade. The Treasury Department refused to look with favor upon these gestures of accommodation. Instead, it struck another blow at German-American trade by instructing American consular officials in Germany to require that every invoice of exported German goods should be accompanied by a complete declaration of "any benefits or privileges, including marks subject to special exchange" which had been extended to the shipper by his government. Since under German law the revelation of business secrets to foreigners was strictly forbidden, the new regulation by the Treasury Department was highly effective in depressing the volume of trade between the Reich and the United States.⁵² On August 13 the German Government announced that subsidies on exports to the United States would be discontinued. The Treasury Department cautiously replied that the countervailing duties would be revoked when satisfactory assurances were received that German exports actually did not receive any artificial stimulation. To conserve the small volume of trade that continued despite all these difficulties, the Continental Export and Import Company was established to act as a clearinghouse for German-American commercial exchanges. Exporters of American raw materials were brought into contact with American importers of German goods, and a balance was struck between the respective debits and credits. It was a condition of trade upon weak crutches with the probability that either might slip or break at any moment.

Secretary Ickes Widens the Breach between the United States and Germany

In the early months of 1937 the Department of Commerce became deeply interested in promoting commercial travel by airships. This type of travel had been developed to a point of high efficiency by German scientists, with the Hindenburg as the test dirigible. On February 2, 1937, Colonel Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, wrote to Walton Moore, the Assistant Secretary of State, to inform him that the matter of additional flights for "the Hindenburg to and from the United States has been discussed at the White House. The reaction there is favorable." In view of this fact the Department of Commerce was willing to grant a German request for a "reasonable number of flights, say ten or twelve." On February 17 the Department granted "permission for not to exceed eighteen round trip flights by the Hindenburg between Frankfort-on-the-Main, Germany, and Lakehurst, New Jersey." The Hindenburg was making its first flight under this permission when it exploded and burned on May 6. Secretary Roper was deeply shocked by this disaster, and on May 12 he issued a statement to the press in which he remarked that "some wellguarded plan will be worked out whereby helium gas from our reserves can be made available for world commercial needs without . . . any sacrifice whatever of our peace policy." The following day Colonel Johnson expressed the opinion that Americans could look forward to a "modification of our national policy with respect to the release of helium for use beyond our own frontiers."

President Roosevelt acted promptly in this matter and appointed a five-member inter-Cabinet committee to "formulate and recommend a policy for the sale and exportation of helium gas." On May 25 this committee consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, Commerce, and Interior sent a letter to the President stating that the helium reserves of the United States were "adequate for many years." It therefore recommended that the Government be authorized to "make both domestic and export sales for operation of commercial lighter-than-air craft plying between the United States and other countries." It was believed that these sales could be surrounded with safeguards that would "prevent the use of helium by foreign countries for military purposes." Congress responded to this Executive pressure by passing the Helium Act of September 1, 1937, which permitted the exportation of helium gas for use in "commercial airships operating between the United States and a foreign country." Sales of this gas would have to be approved by the National Munitions Control Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Commerce. The concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior was added as an extra precaution against any unwise sale of helium gas. Regulations governing the exportation of helium were promulgated on September 3.

In accordance with the terms of these regulations the German Zeppelin Company, through its agent, American Zeppelin Transport, Inc., applied to the Secretary of State for an allotment of 17,900,000 cubic feet of helium gas. On November 23, 1937, this application was granted by the Secretary of State with "the unanimous approval of all the members of the National Munitions Control Board and the Secretary of the Interior." On January 31,

1938, a license was issued to the American Zeppelin Transport, Inc., to export 2,600,000 cubic feet of helium gas. The company then submitted to the Secretary of the Interior a contract for the purchase of 10,000,000 cubic feet of helium gas, and deposited with him a check for \$76,850 as required by the sales regulations. All formalities had now been fulfilled and the company was informed "by officers of the Interior Department that the contract would be ready for signature within a few days." After receiving this assurance, the American Zeppelin Transport, Inc., sent a vessel to Houston, Texas, with empty gas containers for the promised supply of helium gas. But this matter of the sale of helium gas assumed a political aspect in the early months of 1938 when it became apparent that Germany had aggressive intentions towards Austria. Representatives Bruce Barton, John M. O'Connell, Donald L. OToole, Alfred N. Phillips, James G. Polk, and Mark Wilcox voiced objections to the sale of helium to any German agency, their main argument being that such a sale would "exhaust for a year the available supply of helium and thus jeopardize the national defense." The Secretary of War, Admiral Leahy, and a series of experts in the War and Navy departments testified that it was "almost inconceivable that the German Government could contemplate the use of this helium for bombing purposes or that it could carry out such an intention." After reviewing these facts, the executive secretary of the National Munitions Control Board remarked that "recent developments in the European situation do not affect the fundamental issues involved in this case. . . . This Government would lay itself open to a charge of bad faith if it were now to refuse to permit the proposed exportation or to employ indirect means such as the requirement of an exorbitant bond from the purchaser in order to make the proposed exportation impossible."

This charge of "bad faith" was given definite substance by the very "indirect means" that Mr. Green had feared. On March 31 a new set of regulations was issued which provided "both for the posting of a bond to guarantee the non-utilization of helium for war purposes and for control within Germany by American officers of the disposition of helium." The German Foreign Office complained to Ambassador Hugh Wilson that "both of these conditions were impossible of acceptance for the reason that they cast doubt upon the good faith of the German Government." Wilson himself expressed to Secretary Hull the opinion that the German Government was "sincere in its belief that the new regulations would constitute an unfair departure from the original understanding." He was afraid that they would arouse "so deep a resentment" in the Foreign Office that it would be difficult thereafter to "obtain effective protection and fair treatment for American individuals and interests" in Germany. As soon as Hugo Eckener, the genius behind the German Zeppelin Company, heard of the regulations of March 31, he sent a telegram to President Roosevelt in which he emphasized the fact that it was the unanimous opinion of all experts in Germany that it was "absolutely impossible" for a helium-inflated airship to conduct military operations. He therefore begged the President to take immediate favorable action upon the pending application for the export of helium gas. It was obvious that a crisis in German-American relations was inevitably approaching, and many important German leaders were apprehensive of what might happen. According to a

competent American observer who had recently visited Germany, Hitler was "exceedingly perturbed at the relations between Germany and the United States and the extent of the feeling in America against him personally and to the Nazi regime in general." Secretary Lckes shared this feeling of deep dislike for Hitler, and it was his refusal to approve any contract for the sale of helium gas to Germany that shattered the hope of Dr. Eckener. Many Americans regarded the action of Secretary Lckes as unfortunate. The periodical *American Aviation* published an editorial which commented upon the new regulation which required the posting of a bond to guarantee the non-military use of purchased helium. How any

"domestic bonding agency can guarantee that a foreign government would not confiscate helium in time of war is one of those matters beyond human conception. The irony in the whole helium business is that Secretary Lckes is going on the assumption that helium for lighter-than-air craft is of military value. On the other hand, the Navy Department has refused to recognize any military value in the dirigible. . . . We fear that Secretary Lckes has acquired another one of his publicity phobias."

On April 27 the Office of the National Munitions Control Board prepared a memorandum which frankly stated that all the evidence available to the board indicated that neither the German Zeppelin Company nor the German Government had "any intention whatever of using any of the helium, to be exported under the allotment mentioned above, otherwise than for the inflation of the airship LZ-130 in commercial operations between Germany and the United States."¹¹ During a conversation with Ambassador Wilson on April 28, General Goring spoke with "deep emotion and bluntness" about the helium matter. The American reversal of policy concerning the sale of helium gas to the German Zeppelin Company "could only mean deliberate unfriendliness on the part of the American Government." Relations between Germany and the United States had been brought

"to the lowest possible point and this over a matter of minor importance to both nations. He said "I cannot understand what leads a nation to earn the enmity of another over such a little thing." . . . If it was impossible to get helium the German people would not forget America's attitude."

In a final effort to secure the delivery of helium gas the German Government, in May 1938, sent Dr. Eckener to the United States to talk with American officials. On May 21, Ambassador Dieckhoff and Dr. Eckener were received by President Roosevelt who was "plainly embarrassed." He greeted them in an "excessively friendly manner" and said that he was "firmly convinced that helium should be delivered to us." Regret was expressed that the stubborn opposition of Secretary Lckes had delayed any decision in the matter. Nothing could be done without his approval. But the question of the sale of helium to Germany was still under consideration, and there was "hope" that it would finally be settled to the "satisfaction" of the German Zeppelin Company. These hopes were never realized and the helium gas was never shipped to Germany. On May 14, Ambassador Wilson reported that hostile feeling was running "exceedingly high in German circles among those who are aware of our decision respecting helium." It was

apparent, however, that restraint had "been exercised on the German press," and the Foreign Office was seemingly anxious to cultivate American good will. A week later Wilson informed Secretary Hull that Hitler was making a personal study of the "current strain in German-American relations" in the hope of finding a basis for a "rapprochement." In this regard it was said that the Chancellor was considering approaching the President directly, proposing a joint effort to liquidate outstanding "controversies." Before making such a proposal he would have to take steps to curb the activities of certain German societies in the United States. He was ready to take these steps.

Ambassador Bullitt Has Some Important Conversations

A few days after this important conference in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Ambassador Bullitt decided to pay a visit to Poland and Germany in order to discover if the ship of European peace were likely to founder upon some hidden rock of misunderstanding. During his visit to Warsaw, November 14-17, 1937, he had some extended conferences with important Polish leaders. Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, confided to him that he believed that Germany

"in the near future would take some action against Czechoslovakia. . . . He and Marshal Smigly-Rydz both expressed the opinion that France would not intervene to save Czechoslovakia. . . . I [Bullitt] disagreed with this opinion as I believe that at the present moment the French would mobilize at once in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, either direct or through the Germans of Bohemia. I do not know how long this state of mind on the part of the French Government will prevail. . . . I asked Beck what Poland would do in case France should become involved in war with Germany because of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Beck replied that in the hypothetical case I had presented . . . Poland positively would not march under no circumstances would Poland become involved in protecting French satellites in Central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia. . . . In discussing the question of Danzig, Beck said that Hitler personally had given Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, the most absolute assurance that he cared too much about Germany's good relations with Poland to permit the Germans of Danzig to do anything which would be totally unacceptable to Poland."

From Warsaw, Bullitt went to Berlin where he had several conversations with German officials. He found Baron von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, to be "supremely self-confident" and the atmosphere of "the Wilhelmstrasse was as cocky as before the war." Neurath gave assurances that

"Germany certainly desired peace. So far as France was concerned, there was absolutely no outstanding question whatsoever between Germany and France. . . . The national economies of the two countries supplemented each other perfectly, and there was no reason why their trade should conflict. . . . Furthermore, the French had made it clear that they were ready to return the German colonies they had been given by the

Treaty of Versailles, provided that England should take a similar course.... He feared that the British were going to be extremely stiff-necked on the subject of the German colonies. . . .“ In conclusion, Neurath said to me: “Tell your French friends that we are quite ready to establish the best possible relations with them.”

Bullitt found that Dr. Schacht was rather cautious in his comments. He did feel impelled to speak of the “absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe before the outbreak of war toward which the Continent was drifting.” Hitler was “determined to have Austria eventually and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia.” The one way “he could see peace was through direct negotiations between France and Germany.” General Goring was quite voluble. He repeated Dr. Schacht’s opinion that there was no real quarrel between France and Germany. With regard to many of the problems that faced Germany, Goring expressed himself in great detail:

“I asked Goering if . . . Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. . . . Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. . . . I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question: the Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich. Goering then went on to say that he deplored greatly the present state of trade relations between Germany and the United States. The trade between the two countries was ceasing to be of any importance which was contrary to all reason. . . . He then asked me why I believed there was such hostility to Germany in the United States. I replied that there were many sources of this hostility. All Americans were devoted to the ideal of democracy. There has been a democratic government in Germany . . . which had been destroyed and replaced by Nazi dictatorship.... Furthermore, the German Government had at the same time attacked with the utmost violence the Jews, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. . . . He thought that the violence of the reaction in the United States probably was due to the Jews. I replied that in some measure it was due to the Jews as was only natural. . . . I then added that . . . it appeared that the Nazi Government was engaged in forming Nazi organizations in the United States. Neither the Government nor the people of the United States could tolerate the formation on their soil of any national group . . . directed by any foreign country. . . . Goering said that he considered this entirely reasonable and understandable. . . . The German Government had forbidden any German citizen to participate in any way in the formation of such groups. . . . Goering then said that he hoped I realized there was an intense desire on the part of the German Government to develop better relations with the United States.”

Hitler Plays Host to Lord Halifax

Germany desired "better relations" not only with the United States but also with Great Britain. Goring had been very frank with Ambassador Bullitt with regard to the absorption of Austria. This same candor might pay big dividends with some important British statesman. Goring felt that he and Lord Halifax had a common denominator of understanding that was created by a mutual love of hunting. In the autumn of 1937, Goring, as game warden of the Reich, invited Halifax to Berlin to attend the International Exhibition of Hunting. As a well-known master of foxhounds, Halifax had never accepted Oscar Wilde's tart description of fox hunting: "The pursuit of the uneatable by the unspeakable."

Before Halifax reached Berlin the German Government made a quick survey of the situation. Franz von Papen had left Vienna for a brief visit to Paris where he discussed with French statesmen some of the important problems that required prompt settlement. He was a more devious person than Goring and did not speak as frankly of Hitler's ultimate aims. In a conversation with the French Minister of Finance he expressed the hope that France would "stop calling every extension of German influence in the Danube region a threat to French interests." When Bonnet inquired as to the real objectives of Germany in that region, von Papen answered with the glib lie that Germany wished merely the "closest community of economic and intellectual interests, with the preservation of Austrian independence." Later when talking with Premier Chautemps, von Papen repeated this exercise in mendacity. He did not reveal Hitler's determination to absorb Austria. The Fiihrer desired a "marked extension of German influence in Austria obtained through evolutionary means." When Chautemps heard von Papen's assurance that Hitler's policy in the Danubian region was evolutionary rather than revolutionary, he was so overcome with emotion that he impulsively embraced the Nazi diplomat and exclaimed with delight: "Tell the Fiihrer it would be a milestone in world history if we two were to place European politics on a new and healthier basis."

In London, Halifax had a brief talk with Ambassador Ribbentrop with reference to his approaching visit to Berchtesgaden. It was apparent that his conversations with the Fiihrer would deal mainly with the "Austrian and Czech questions," and with the important matter of the restoration of German colonies. Halifax stressed the viewpoint that a war between Britain and Germany would "mean the end of civilization." Ribbentrop agreed with this dire prediction and then observed that "not a single German desired such a conflict."

On November 10, Halifax arrived in Berlin and soon had a talk with General Goring who confided to him that the German Government was bent upon incorporating Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich. He made the further statement that Hitler also wished the return of Danzig to Germany and a reasonable solution of the Polish Corridor problem. After hearing Goring's candid statements concerning the aims of the Nazi Government, Halifax went to Berchtesgaden to match wits with Hitler. On November 19 he had his

momentous conversation with the Fiihrer. There are four versions of this conversation, three of them from the German Foreign Office,³³ the fourth from the unpublished report Lord Halifax made to the British Foreign Office. A copy of this Foreign Office version was sent to the Department of State in order that President Roosevelt might have an "inside picture" of the European diplomatic crisis.

After the conversation had been formally opened by Lord Halifax, Hitler remarked that an agreement between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy would not be worth much "unless it took account of realities however unpleasant." The status quo "could not last forever. Changes could be brought about by (1) the play of forces—which meant war; (2) settlement by reason. We had had experience of (1) and it was therefore imperative to turn to (2), the way of reasonable solution." Hitler then complained that "democracies were difficult to do business with owing to the party system and freedom of the press. All his previous efforts except the Naval Agreement had failed owing to this difficulty of doing business with democracies." Lord Halifax drily replied that "if agreement had to wait upon the abandonment of democracy by Great Britain, it was a waste of time to talk of an agreement." Hitler then hurriedly remarked that his reference had been "mainly to French democracy."

Halifax then remarked that in England it was believed that it was "perfectly possible to clear out of the way the misunderstandings which existed at the present moment" between Britain and Germany. The solution sought for might be found in an "open exchange of views." These views could possibly lead to an agreement that would include not only Britain and Germany but also France and Italy. Hitler thought that such an agreement should go much farther than merely "mutually polite relations." Germany should first of all be treated as a nation that "no longer bore the moral or material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles." The nucleus of the problem was the question as to "what active political co-operation could be accorded by a country which in other respects was not even accorded the most urgent necessities of life." Halifax quickly replied that everyone in England "respected Germany as a great and sovereign country and that it was only upon this basis that she would be treated." The British Government did not necessarily believe that the status quo "must be maintained under all circumstances." Changes, however, should take place only upon "the basis of reasonable agreements reasonably reached."

But Hitler expressed the fear that it would be difficult for democracies to negotiate "reasonable agreements" because of the pressure exerted by demagogues. In the matter of restoring the colonies taken from Germany at the close of the World War he knew that the British Conservatives would vigorously oppose such a measure. The "same was the case in France." Political parties with their constant need to build political fences would erect high barriers along the road to realism. Lord Halifax sharply challenged the view that the British Government was the "slave" of politicians with demagogic views. In England, no government "which was worthy of the name was under the domination of outside parties." He wished also to make it clear that Britain did not take the position that the question of the return of German colonies must not be discussed. British statesmen, however, were

firm in their belief that it was a problem that required a general settlement and therefore negotiations between Britain and Germany should be merely of a preparatory character.

As far as Austria was concerned Hitler referred to the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936, and expressed the hope that "it would lead to the removal of all difficulties." In the case of Czechoslovakia the Czechs themselves were in a "position to clear away any existing difficulties." Germany "set great store by good relations with all her neighbours." In his report to the British Foreign Office, Lord Halifax remarked that the atmosphere at Berchtesgaden and the

"whole conversation was quiet and friendly although the Chancellor showed a certain reserve due perhaps to tiredness or perhaps to a feeling that his outlook has so little in common with that of democratic Governments. Herr Hitler said that he hoped we might get away from the atmosphere of "imminent catastrophe." The situation in Europe was not dangerous and of all the nations only Russia might think of war today. The German Chancellor and others gave the impression that they were not likely to embark on adventures involving force or at least war.... Lord Halifax formed the view that they would pursue their objectives in Central or Eastern Europe in a fashion that would be perhaps unlikely to give other nations cause or at least the opportunity for intervention."

On November 29, Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had a conference in London with the French Premier and the French Foreign Minister. Lord Halifax reviewed his conversation with Hitler and expressed the "general conclusion" that Germany thought that it was now up to Britain and France to "propose a solution of the colonial question if they wanted one." In this regard Germany believed that "all her former African colonies should be restored." Halifax then gave his personal impressions of Hitler and of the European situation. His main impression was

"that the Germans intended to press their colonial claim, but that they would not press it to the point of war. Unless the claim could be met in some form it would be impossible to improve relations in such a way as to make an advance towards the object which we all had in view. The question we had to ask ourselves, therefore, was whether it was possible to use this problem as a lever for getting some of the things both the French and British Governments wanted, such for example, as a contribution by Germany towards European peace.... His [Lord Halifax's] broad impression was that Germany was extremely anxious for friendly relations with us. The Germans to whom he had spoken were also anxious to convince him that Germany had no direct cause of difficulty with France. . . . At the same time, while he [Hitler] desired to be friendly with us, the Chancellor was not prepared to run after us and was conscious of his own strength. He was not bent on early adventures, partly because these might be unprofitable, and partly because he was busy building up Germany internally. . . . General Goering had assured him that not one drop of German blood would be shed in Europe unless Germany was absolutely forced to it. The Germans gave him [Lord Halifax] the impression of being convinced that time was on their side and of intending to achieve their aims in orderly fashion."

remier Chautemps broke into the Halifax discourse and asked about the sincerity of Hitler's "reassuring words about Czechoslovakia." Halifax replied that he had been "surprised at the moderation of Herr Hitler's remarks on this point. He could only suppose the degree of permanence would in part depend on Germany's general international position and on the influence which we might exercise on the later developments of German policy." It was obvious, he believed, that Hitler was awaiting for some concrete proposal on the colonial issue before engaging in a discussion of other issues. Shortly after Premier Chautemps returned to Paris, Ambassador Bullitt had a long talk with him concerning the European situation. Chautemps stated that he

"believed any immediate practical developments would be impossible due to the unwillingness of the British to make any concessions in the colonial domain to Germany. During the conversations in London his [Chamberlain's] Government had begun to approach delicately the question of whether France might be disposed to hand the Cameroons to Germany at once without any quid pro quo. Chamberlain had not made any direct statement on this subject, but he, Chautemps, had perceived what was in Chamberlain's thoughts and had therefore said at once that France could not place herself in the position of being the only country to make concessions to Germany in the colonial domain and would do so only if England was prepared to make similar concessions, and if such concessions should be a part of a general settlement. . . ."

American Reaction to Anschluss

American reaction to the absorption of Austria by Nazi Germany was recounted in considerable detail in the dispatches of Ambassador Dieckhoff. On March 12 the ambassador called at the Department of State to discuss the situation in Austria. Although Secretary Hull asked a number of questions, he did not "express any critical or even disapproving attitude." This was also largely true of the American press on March 12 and 13, but the next day a "sudden change took place." The absorption of Austria was now stigmatized as "a breach of treaty, as militarism, as the rape of defenceless little Austria by her big neighbor bristling with arms." As far as the "shaping of the opinion of the American Government was concerned," the ambassador believed that the President himself had "intervened personally and gave instructions to both the State Department and the press." In the Department of State "they were probably, from the very outset, thinking less of Austria than of Czechoslovakia, with all the possible complications." On March 14, Dieckhoff had another conversation with Secretary Hull who maintained a calm and courteous demeanor, but Sumner Welles received the German Ambassador with a sour expression. Indeed, in a dispatch to the Foreign Office on March 15, Dieckhoff complained that Welles "gave expression to a sort of malevolent bitterness" when he alluded to the Nazi absorption of Austria.

In the Department of State there is a copy of the conversation between Dieckhoff and Welles on March 14. After the ambassador had turned over to the Under Secretary of

State the texts of the decrees incorporating Austria into the Reich, he evidently expected Welles to make some comments upon them. When Welles remained silent, Dieckhoff, with a show of "very considerable degree of nervous excitement," broke out with the exclamation: "This is a great day, a wonderful day for Germany." When Welles continued to remain silent, Dieckhoff then "embarked upon a tirade" against the critics of the recent Anschluss. He was particularly disturbed over the comments in the American press which he condemned as outright "lies." Next he sharply attacked the Jews and asked Welles why they were permitted "to dominate the press and public opinion." The Under Secretary denied the truth of such a statement and then remarked that "the Jewish element in the population of the United States was only a small percentage of our total population, nevertheless, the people of the United States felt that that element among them was as much a part of the United States as any other element of the population."

Dr. Goebbels, in Berlin, was also greatly perturbed over the hostile attitude of the American press. He thought that it was

"lamentable that this campaign of hatred should be carried on. He did not in any way expect that Germany would escape criticism, but. . . what he did not expect and what he deeply deplored were wilful misstatements of fact and slander and libel against the persons of the Reich Chancellor and those immediately around him. He said that the person of the Fuehrer was venerated by every German. . . . Therefore the Germans deeply resented the personal attacks upon him. . . . He was sure that in the coming months I would have frequent opportunity to talk with and know the Fuehrer, and I could not but be impressed with the singleness of purpose and the undeviating honesty of the man's character. . . ."

Many people in Germany felt that relations with America were so bad through the press that there was no use trying to do anything about it. . . . But he was not one of those and such a point of view was to him a stultifying attitude. He thought there were possibilities of making it better and believed that if we could work with some measure of confidence we could bring about an improved relationship. Ambassador Wilson expressed the opinion that the

"most crucial thing that stood between any betterment of our Press relationship was the Jewish question. . . . Hatreds so deep as those which existed in my country on this question could not be mitigated in weeks or even months. It was a matter of years before such hatreds would lessen or be forgotten, and then only if new incidents did not give fresh fuel to the flames."

Turning from this outstanding question, Ambassador Wilson then remarked that much of the existing American hostility towards Germany was the result of a Freudian complex

"by which deep affection which is shattered turns inevitably to hatred. . . . Americans of my age and generation had been accustomed to see the best intellectuals in our country go to Germany for education in medicine, technical matters, arts, and so on; . . . that ten thousands of families had German relatives. Thus the bonds between the two lands

went so deep that we could not regard what happened in Germany with indifference."

Goebbels confessed that this was "an entirely new and interesting point of view," and he voiced the hope that the American Ambassador would come often to talk over matters of common interest.⁴⁵ There was little doubt that Goebbels was anxious to explore the reasons that lay behind German-American hostility. He had uncovered one of the important causes for friction when he referred to the German veneration for Hitler and the ceaseless attacks in the American press upon the Fiihrer. It was obvious to many close observers of the scene in Germany that Goebbels himself had been indefatigable in his efforts to create this veneration for the Fiihrer. His speech on April 20, in honor of Hitler's birthday, was a typical example of the Goebbels rhetoric in this regard. He was certain that an air of divinity surrounded the Chancellor. He recounted that after Hitler entered Austria his attendants saw a man "rush up to the Fiihrer's car with his hands uplifted in prayer, and we had the feeling that here the emotion of the human soul had found its consummate expression." With vast numbers of Germans sharing this viewpoint it became more and more difficult to maintain friendly relations between the two countries when the American press continued its campaign of criticism and ridicule.

This matter of the hostility of the American press continually thrust itself into the diplomatic picture in Berlin. At the end of April, Ambassador Wilson had a long talk with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and the familiar topic of press criticism inevitably came up for discussion. Ribbentrop said that he had just been looking through a mass of clippings from American newspapers and they showed

"a depth of hostility which had startled and shocked him. There was a lack of comprehension of everything that Germany had done and an immense proportion of complete misstatement of fact. . . . These reports could only be based upon gossip and rumor and usually originated from those who by race or politics were hostile to the regime and therefore inclined to distort facts."

He then observed that he had

"spent a long and happy time in the United States as a boy, as well as in Canada; that he had numerous American friends with some of whom he still corresponded; that no one could spend a portion of his youth in a country without leaving a bit of his heart there; . . . hence it was doubly depressing to him that this outpouring of wrath should take place against his country."

Wilson interrupted this discourse to venture the opinion that this American hostility to Germany had many causes. The persecutions of Protestants and Catholics, the intimate relations between Germany and Japan, the Jewish question, and the manner in which the Nazi Government had absorbed Austria were important factors in creating a widespread dislike in America for the Nazi Government. Ribbentrop then commented upon this factor of German absorption of Austria. Britain and France were far more concerned with the Austrian question than the United States, yet the press in those countries had taken a much more objective attitude than the American press. When the German editors read

the vehement criticisms in American newspapers, they promptly "pled for the right to reply to them in their press. So far the German Government had refused to permit it. He defied me [Wilson], for instance, to find a personal criticism of President Roosevelt." Wilson made no attempt to disprove this statement. He merely confessed that he was afraid that the hostility in the American press "would not disappear for some years." In the meantime it was obviously the "part of those dealing in foreign affairs to try" to hold "their countries in normal and friendly relationships."

Ambassador Wilson was entirely correct in his belief that the criticisms in the American press of Nazi Germany would "not disappear for some years." As they continued, the reaction in Germany became more pronounced. On the night of August 10 a reception was given in the Italian Embassy in honor of Marshal Balbo. During the course of the evening, Mr. Riddleberger, a member of the staff of the American Embassy, had a talk with Marshal Goring who immediately ascribed much of the hostility in America towards Germany to the machinations of the Jews and then launched into a

"discussion of the Jewish problem. He predicted that within "ten years from this night" the United States would have become the most anti-Semitic country in the world. . . . I [Mr. Riddleberger] said to General Goering that this statement respecting the possibilities of anti-Semitism in the United States had interested me although I naturally did not agree with his prediction. I said that without going into a discussion of German policy with respect to the Jews, I was sure he would understand how this policy had caused grave concern to our and other Governments within whose jurisdiction the German Jews were seeking refuge. . . . General Goering made no answer to this, but went on to declare that the Jews must be eliminated from German economic life. . . . Returning again to the problem of German-American relations, General Goering said that although they were none too harmonious, it was not necessary to despair and that we must hope for better days. . . . He ended his remarks by stating that the combination of Negroes and Jews in the United States, with the latter furnishing the leadership, was a matter that should give rise to considerable anxiety as to our future."

It was apparent to Ambassador Wilson that while the German Government cordially disliked the American press it was nevertheless quite anxious to remain on friendly terms with the Department of State. For this reason Wilson accepted the invitation to attend the Nazi Party celebration in September at Niirnberg. He made plans to be present "during approximately the same period as the French and British Ambassadors." This decision evoked from the B'nai Israel Jewish Centre of Brooklyn, New York, a spirited protest. Attendance at the Niirnberg celebration would be a "tacit condonance of the Nazi program of racial and minority persecution." The Department of State refused to accept this viewpoint, and Ambassador Wilson went to Niirnberg with his British and French colleagues.

It was the last Niirnberg celebration that any American Ambassador would attend. Underneath the surface of German-American relations there were many points of difference that constantly threatened to pierce the thin texture of political accord. The American

press was unceasing in its attacks upon the German way of life and in many parts of the United States there were gestures of contempt that must have infuriated the Nazi leaders. On the amusement pier at Venice, California, there was an archery stand that used a life-size painting of Hitler as a target for a patronage that was "mostly Jewish, Italian and German."⁵² In other cities Hitler was depicted on toilet paper and on other articles of toilet use. These forms of vulgar ridicule were infuriating to multitudes of Germans and they created a background for eventual war. Hatred is one of the heralds of conflict and already in the summer of 1938 he was busily blowing upon his trumpet all along the German- American front. After Munich his blasts would gain in volume and in tempo, but most Americans closed their ears to his din and continued to cherish the hope that President Roosevelt would keep them out of war. They did not realize that, like Lincoln, he was so fond of peace that he was ready to fight for it.

Kennedy Predicts U.S. Intervention in World War II

In London, Ambassador Kennedy was watching the situation in Prague and Niirnberg with evident apprehension. During a conversation with Lord Halifax he voiced the opinion that it was "essential to take every possible step to avoid a misunderstanding in Herr Hitler's mind." The British Government should be ready for any emergency and he wondered if "it might not be possible for the Soviet Government to make some movement that would compel attention, such as a concentration of aeroplanes near the frontier." As far as America was concerned, he had been interested to notice that "American opinion was much more excited against Germany now than he had ever known it." If Britain were drawn into the war now threatening Europe, and if London were bombed, the "history of the last war would be repeated, leading a good deal more rapidly than in the last war to American intervention.⁷⁰ While Ambassador Kennedy was predicting American intervention in a second world war on the side of Britain, the German charge d'affaires in Washington was writing in the same key. Although President Roosevelt was trying to preserve peace in Europe, it was very likely that if a German invasion of Czechoslovakia caused Britain and France to come to the aid of the Czechs, then America would be "found on their side."

As an offset to these widespread rumors of probable American intervention in any new war that might break out in Europe, President Roosevelt, at a press conference (September 9), blamed American newspapers for creating a war psychosis. Any inference that he was ready to support "the Democracies" against the totalitarian bloc in the event of war was not warranted by his formal or informal remarks. If newspapermen would pay careful attention to his exact words they would discover that they had been "100 per cent wrong."

President Roosevelt Extends Monroe Doctrine

As tension developed in Europe over the problem of the Sudeten Germans, President Roosevelt became deeply concerned over the possible outbreak of war. In January 1938 he had vainly endeavored to secure British support of a plan for world peace, but Prime Minister Chamberlain had rejected this appeal on the ground that it might adversely affect his efforts to conciliate Italy and thus dislodge the uneasy Duce from the eager arms of Hitler. In the midsummer of 1938 the President decided to take an independent step in foreign policy which apparently would be along a road familiar to Americans since 1823. He would have his fellow countrymen raise their eyes from accustomed American sights to a distant horizon where a one-world concept could be dimly seen. Since 1932 he had been lustily singing in a chorus of isolationists but had been furtively eyeing the exotic wench of collective security who waited in the wings for the cue that would inevitably come.

In order to give this cue in the most impressive manner, he paid a visit to Queens University in Kingston, Ontario (August 18) for the ostensible purpose of receiving one of his innumerable honorary degrees. As a part of this ritual for securing knowledge by degrees, Roosevelt then made an address which formally placed Canada under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine: "I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire." After this broad promise of protection he then began to talk as though the Monroe Doctrine had some far-flung implications. He made it clear that the Dominion of Canada was a "part of the sisterhood of the British Empire." The question then arose: if America would help one of these sisters in distress would she stand idly by if the others were reduced to dire straits? In partial answer to this query he repeated one of the Hull clichés to the effect that "we in the Americas are no longer a far-away continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. . . . The vast amount of our resources, the vigor of our commerce, and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world peace whether we choose or not."

Some American newspapers regarded the President's address at Kingston as a "somewhat startling statement" of a familiar fact,² but it was admitted that he had given it a "calculated portentousness" by timing it at "a tense moment in international affairs."³ In London, J. L. Garvin, noted editor of the *Observer*, interpreted the President's words as an "intimation to the dictatorships that at a pinch the United States would be unable to keep out,"⁴ while the *Manchester Guardian* was certain that they were "virtually a guarantee of help against aggression."

In France, the Kingston address was received as a definite assurance of support to the "democracies" if a serious crisis arose. Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, was moved to make several suggestions to Ambassador Bullitt. He thought it would be helpful if the American Ambassador in Berlin were instructed to inform the German Foreign Office that the Department of State believed the negotiations at Prague between the Sudeten Germans

and the Czech Government “offered substantial possibilities for success.” Therefore, the “use of force” to influence these negotiations would be regarded with disfavor. Bonnet also suggested that “in case of dire necessity” the President could offer to serve as a mediator in the difficulties between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans and thus save the situation. A few days later, Leon Blum, former Premier of France, urged the President “to address himself to Europe with all the prestige of his person and with all the authority of the State whose moral or material support would be finally decisive in any general war.”⁷ It was obvious that a large part of the world was looking to the United States for leadership in a crisis that threatened war, and the President was strongly tempted to respond to this pressure. But Prime Minister Chamberlain was once more devising a settlement through appeasement, so the American Chief Executive had to bide his time.

American Opinion of Munich

This Presidential indifference to the implications of the Munich Agreement was not shared by the American press. To the Miami Herald, on the eve of Munich, it seemed that Europe was about to be “plunged into the mass murder of modern war because of the will of one man.” The Richmond Times-Dispatch was confident that the “responsibility for war, if it comes, will remain on the shoulders of Nazi Germany, where it belongs,” and the New Orleans Times-Picayune voiced a similar opinion: “In the event that the world is thrown again into chaos, the war guilt almost inevitably will be chained to the neck of Adolf Hitler.”

When the text of the Munich Agreement was made public many papers had words of praise for Chamberlain. The New York Herald-Tribune thought that there could be “only heartfelt applause for the scrupulous integrity and the self-sacrificing devotion with which he [Prime Minister Chamberlain] labored for peace.” Other papers were equally laudatory. The Washington Post regarded the agreement as a step down the road to peace. The sacrifices of the Czechs would “seem a small price to pay for peace, particularly if the peace thereby obtained is stabilized.” The Washington Evening Star had no doubt that Hitler had “won a considerable victory,” but of “paramount importance is the fact that a bloodless solution has been found for the gravest threat to international tranquility in the last quarter of a century.” The Atlanta Constitution thought the Munich accord had many imperfections, but “hope has come where only yesterday was despair, and the peoples of the world can take heart anew.”

The New York Times had words of praise for Munich: “Let no man say that too high a price has been paid for peace in Europe until he has searched his soul and found himself willing to risk in war the lives of those who are nearest and dearest to him.” The Chicago Tribune was also impressed with the importance of preserving the peace of Europe: “No doubt there were neurotics and hotheads in all the countries concerned who were eager for war, but they were outnumbered a thousand to one by those who were willing to make substantial sacrifices for peace.” The Los Angeles Times belonged to this large group of

papers that had words of praise for the results of the Munich Conference: "There was no doubt that war was narrowly averted at Munich." Therefore, in comparison "with its immediate alternatives it rates among the first diplomatic achievements of history." The Cleveland Press had a similar viewpoint. The critics who heaped blame upon Chamberlain and Daladier should pause a moment and think of the horrors of war. Then they would "thank God for the truce thus achieved." The Boston Evening Transcript stressed the fact that the "big thing at the moment is that there is still peace in the world. Reason has not abdicated, it is only trampled a bit." This theme was repeated by the Christian Science Monitor: "Reason has played a part in the present agreement. . . . It is a peace made without war—possibly the most notable one in history."

These favorable comments in the press were balanced by adverse remarks in many other papers. The Philadelphia Inquirer believed there were "aspects of this so-called settlement . . . which thoughtful persons the world over must view with a profound sense of futility and foreboding." The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot could see nothing to praise in the Munich negotiations. The net result was an "ill-smelling peace." The Emporia Gazette saw the settlement at Munich as only a stopgap. Real peace had not been achieved: "America may breathe deeply now, but she should tighten-up her belt for tomorrow, gird up her loins for the inevitable strife." The Portland Oregonian was openly derisive of a peace with Hitler: "What good is a peace pact with this curser of democracy, torturer of Jews, coercer of minorities, and maestro of brutal prison camps?"

The Atlanta Constitution was of the opinion that the Munich Agreement conclusively showed that the United States could "no longer trust Great Britain. The policy of the empire is expediency and the people of this country cannot rely upon England's word under these circumstances." The Constitution, however, had warm words of praise for the policy of President Roosevelt. It was he who had "almost singlehandedly tugged the world back from the brink. . . . To his eternal credit, Franklin Roosevelt did not falter in his purpose, now so dramatically brought to a fruitful conclusion." The Hearst press had the same surprising viewpoint: "There can be no doubt that if a peaceful adjustment of the crisis in Europe is achieved, as a result of the Four-Power agreement in Munich, President Roosevelt will have contributed enormously to that end...."

Not to be outdone in passing out words of praise for individuals who supposedly worked for peace in Europe, the New York Daily News had some friendly words for Adolf Hitler: "Now is the time for haters of Hitler to hold their harsh words. He has made a significant gesture towards peace; one that nobody but himself could have made at this time."

The Economic Offensive against Germany Is Accelerated

While political relations with Germany were daily becoming more strained, Secretary Hull widened the breach between the Department of State and the German Foreign Office by pushing with increasing ardor his economic offensive against the Reich. In order for his trade agreements program to be really effective it was necessary for him

to enlist the support of Britain. In the early part of 1936, Hull bluntly informed the British Ambassador in Washington that the "clearing arrangements reached by Britain with Argentina, Germany, Italy and other countries were handicapping the efforts of this Government to carry forward its broad program with the favored-nation policy underlying it." The tendency in most of these arrangements was "to drive straight toward bilateral trading and to restrict and obstruct the sum total of world trade." These restrictions and obstructions were milestones along the road to war.

In October 1936, Hull instructed James C. Dunn, chief of the Western European Division, to write a letter to Ambassador Bingham in which the situation was placed squarely before the British Government. No time should be lost in establishing "sound and substantial trade upon a firm basis of equality of treatment and exchange of opportunities for trade to the greatest extent each nation can possibly contribute." Widened trade opportunities would provide a basis for world peace.

Finally, on November 17, 1938, a formal ceremony was held at the White House at which Secretary Hull, Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada, and Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador, signed important trade agreements on behalf of their respective governments. The capstone was thus placed upon the large economic structure sponsored by Secretary Hull. The most important trading nations were now lowering barriers while many other countries were raising theirs. The concessions provided for in these agreements were "generalized" so that a considerable number of nations could profit by them if they could supply any of the products affected. American farmers were particularly benefited by reduced rates on important agricultural exports. Duties were entirely removed from wheat and lard. Canadian concessions to the United States included reductions in the duties on fruits, vegetables, and types of machinery not manufactured in the Dominion. In return, three of Canada's major exports to the United States were "bound" to the free list—pulpwood, wood pulp, and newsprint paper. America's answer to Munich was given in strong economic accents which grated loudly upon German ears that were closely attuned to the dubious harmonies of bilateral agreements.

Germany Is Anxious for an Accord with the United States

The actions of Secretary Hull and the acidulous comments of Sumner Welles seemed to point the way to a definite deterioration in German-American relations. Mr. Gilbert, the American charge d'affaires in Berlin, thought that it was possible that Hitler had decided to break off diplomatic relations with the United States "immediately after Christmas." He had learned that the Fihrer had become "exceedingly irate" upon being informed of the reply of Sumner Welles to the protest of Dr. Thomsen relative to the tart remarks of Secretary Ickes on December 18. Ribbentrop was believed to be preparing a counterblast to the pungent comments of the Secretary of the Interior. Although Ribbentrop did not make this expected attack upon American officials, Mr. Gilbert was told that "certain extremists" close to Hitler were "urging a break with the United States." But such a break

in relations would not be "popular in Germany," and the charge had not been able to detect "even a hint" of hostility in his conversations with German officials.

From Paris, Hugh Wilson reported that Dr. Goebbels had recently requested the Havas correspondent in Berlin "not to present in his despatches the future of German-American relations in too gloomy fashion." The German Government had "no intention of aggravating the present conflict and sincerely desired the re-establishment of normal relations between the two countries." It was apparent that Goebbels and other Nazi officials awaited with deep interest the President's message to Congress in January 1939. It contained the expected warning that acts of new aggression were all "about us" and that the "God-fearing democracies of the world" could not "forever let pass without effective protest" these threats to their way of life. But it was made clear that democratic protests must be along "peaceful lines." It was also emphasized that there were many methods "short of war" that could be employed to bring home to aggressor nations "the aggregate sentiments of our own people." The temperate language of this Presidential message to Congress gave reassurance to the German Government and led it to continue the recent gestures of conciliation. These gestures were listed by Mr. Gilbert as follows:

- 1) A cessation of the unrestrained violence of the press.
- 2) The invitation to the Evian Committee to come to Berlin.
- 3) More conciliatory replies to our notes respecting discrimination against certain classes of American citizens together with publicity given to recent exchanges.

The question of whether these actions were "gestures for immediate ends" or whether they represented a "considered change of policy" remained to be seen. It should appear obvious to German leaders that "self-interest would suggest the desirability of better relations with the United States." This self-interest led General Goring to have a conference with Mr. Rublee on the refugee problem and to arrange for a series of talks between Rublee and Ministerial Direktor Wohltat. Goring then invited Mr. Gilbert to his private residence for a discussion of German-American relations. The atmosphere of the meeting was

"most cordial and friendly and Goering stressed repeatedly that he was anxious to find a solution of the Jewish problem. He appeared to be fully conscious of the importance of settling the problem from the point of view of good relations with other countries particularly the United States. . . . He discussed the subject of Jewish emigration generally and particularly emphasized the necessity of moving rapidly... In concluding the conversation, Goering laid great stress at considerable length on the desirability of good relations between Germany and the United States. Outside of the Jewish problem he saw no concrete problems which should trouble relations between the two countries."

Dr. Schacht was equally conciliatory. In a talk with Donald Heath, third secretary of the American Embassy, he said that he would be interested in "taking over any worth-while project which might be offered him either in Germany or abroad." After this intimation that he might be willing to accept a position with some large American banking institu-

tion, he stated that he was largely responsible for the invitation that had been extended to Mr. Rublee to visit Berlin with reference to the refugee problem. It was due to "his initiative" that the recent conversations between Rublee and Nazi officials had taken place. He had personally suggested the matter to "Hitler and had his approval before he started his talks." He had also "gotten Hitler's approval of each stage of the conversations."

Germany Fears the U.S. Will Intervene in World War II

From London, Kennedy sent further information on the threatening situation in Europe. Halifax had asked the Nazi Ambassador in London (von Dirksen) why Hitler, if he really wished to have peace, was continuing his "terrific armament program." Dirksen replied that "they were greatly disturbed in Germany at the almost weekly utterances of the President of the United States and they had become convinced that the United States would come to the aid of England and France not in two years, but probably in two days and they therefore felt that the only thing to do was to keep making themselves strong." It was Kennedy's own belief that the "top-side men" in the British Government asked themselves every night how Hitler, in the face of the tremendous armament program in Germany, could possibly proceed to a peacetime basis. There was little doubt that the "long-term outlook for England was exceedingly dark."

These German fears of American intervention in a possible second world war were confirmed by the statements of American diplomats like Kennedy and Bullitt. Before the Munich crisis, Kennedy repeatedly told Chamberlain that America would rush to the assistance of Britain and France in the event of unprovoked aggression. Bullitt had been more cautious but at times he gave similar assurances. In a conversation with Count Potocki, Polish Ambassador at Washington, he spoke of the possibility of a conflict between Germany and the European democracies. When asked if the United States would enter such a war he replied: "Undoubtedly yes, but only after Great Britain and France had made the first move." Sentiment in the United States was "so tense against Nazism and Hitlerism" that it amounted to a "psychosis" similar to that which existed "before America's declaration of war on Germany in 1917." After stating that this "psychosis" was partly created by "emigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia" who incited the American public against Germany by the use of "various calumnies," he finally came to the topic of American sentiment towards Russia:

"It is interesting to note that in this extremely well-planned campaign which is conducted above all against National Socialism, Soviet Russia is almost completely eliminated. Soviet Russia, if mentioned at all, is mentioned in a friendly manner and things are presented in such a way that it would seem that the Soviet Union were co-operating with the bloc of democratic states. Thanks to the clever propaganda the sympathies of the American public are completely on the side of Red Spain."

On January 14, Bullitt had a last talk with Ambassador Potocki before leaving for Paris with instructions from President Roosevelt. He stated that he was prepared to assure

Britain and France that they could rely upon the fact that the United States would be prepared "to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war." America was ready to "place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal."⁵⁶ In February 1939, after he reached Paris, Bullitt informed the Polish Ambassador, Jules Lukasiewicz, that if hostilities should break out one could "foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain."

Secretary Hull Makes a Statement on U.S. Policy

The approach of a general war between China and Japan was viewed with open dismay by the British Foreign Office. As early as May 1937, Prime Minister Chamberlain had expressed great concern about the situation in the Far East and had proposed an exchange of views between the Foreign Office and the Department of State with reference to various means whereby Anglo-American-Japanese relations could be improved. On June 1, Secretary Hull handed to Sir Ronald Lindsay his reply to this British proposal. It had been intimated to the Department of State that Japan might be ready to adopt a policy of "co-operation with her neighbors in the Far East and with the Powers that had great interests there." This intimation had been received by Secretary Hull with great interest. He believed that "there were forces within and between Japan and China working toward peace." In the event, however, that war would break out in the Far East the American Government would follow traditional procedures with reference to the situation.

The British Foreign Office favored a "combined Anglo-American demarche" in Tokyo and Nanking. Ambassador Grew sent a long dispatch to Secretary Hull which stated that the British Embassy in Tokyo was opposed to any precipitate action on the part of Secretary Eden. A strong suggestion along this line had been sent to London. As far as American action was concerned, Grew advised that "the American Government refrain from offering its good offices toward settlement of the North China incident." One of the principal objectives of Japanese foreign policy was "the elimination of the influence of western powers as a factor in Far Eastern politics." There was no reason, therefore, for any belief that Japan would look with favor upon any attempt at American mediation. In conclusion Grew emphasized the fact that the recent improvement in Japanese-American relations had resulted from the fact that the Department of State had transferred the stress of its representations to Japan from an "endeavor to restrain the use by Japan of force to the laying down of reservations of American rights in China."

After Secretary Hull had made it clear to the British Foreign Office that he preferred to follow a policy along independent rather than joint lines, he issued (July 16) a public statement indicating the attitude of the Department of State with reference to the situation in the Far East. He began by expressing a viewpoint which had become quite familiar: "There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not in one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country." American policy, therefore, strongly accented the importance of settling international disputes by peaceful

means. Other items in the American creed were then cited: "We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations."

On July 21 he repeated to Ambassador Saito his earnest desire for peace in the Far East and gave further assurances of his "impartial" attitude towards both nations.²⁰ When Ambassador Grew communicated to the Japanese Foreign Minister these sentiments of Secretary Hull, Hirota replied that he was still hopeful for peace. Everything depended upon the execution of "the agreement drawn up on July 11 and signed on July 19 by General Chang." Japan was not asking Nanking to recognize the agreement "but only that it shall withhold obstruction."

The Mission of Admiral Ingersoll to London

It was evident to most statesmen that Britain could exert pressure upon Japan only in close concert with the United States. In order to prepare the way for that concert, Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, kept hammering upon this theme in his conversations with Ambassador Grew. He insisted that the United States "should stand shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in opposing Japanese depredations because injury to British interest in the Far East would automatically injure the interests of the United States." Grew realized the danger that attended the proposed close concert with Britain, and feared that America would have to pay the price "of British ineptitudes, both of action and of statement, which have contributed their full measure toward the developing of the feeling of exacerbation now prevailing between Great Britain and Japan."

President Roosevelt was now convinced that we should move closer to Britain, and with this thought in mind he decided to send Admiral R. E. Ingersoll to London to explore the situation. Ingersoll arrived in the British metropolis in January 1938. The "primary purpose" of his mission was

"to investigate and to talk with the British Admiralty officials as to what we could do if the United States and England would find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific, to explore all the means, what means could be used, what arrangements it would be necessary to make in regard to command relationships, in regard to communicating with each other, of establishing liaison officers and preparing certain codes and ciphers, and so forth."

After extensive conversations with the officials in the War Plans Division of the British Admiralty it was arranged that there should be a "distribution of codes and ciphers." There was no definite agreement based upon these conversations, but the exploration of the probability of Anglo-American joint action was significant. As Admiral Ingersoll frankly stated: "Everybody knew as indicated by this trip that I made to London in 1938, that sooner or later, we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves, and we had to

make preliminary arrangements to explore what could be done to arrange for a means of communicating with each other." If "everybody" in the Roosevelt circle knew that "sooner or later" we would intervene in World War II, the pointed Roosevelt protestations in 1940 to the contrary would indicate how he became a master of mendacity.

The Role of Russia Becomes Increasingly Important

As Chamberlain's dreams of co-operation with Hitler and Mussolini began to fade he slowly turned in the direction of another dictator, Joseph Stalin. In the third week in March he had devised a four-power formula that might stop Hitler, but the Polish Government had objected to any association with Russia. Chamberlain did not blame the Poles for their suspicious attitude because he himself had long cherished a "most profound distrust of Russia." The British Foreign Office shared this viewpoint and was ready to "relegate Russia to a second line of defence not only because of the practical difficulties of including her in any agreement reached with the Poles but also because they have little confidence in Russia's reliability."

Lord Halifax, however, cautiously kept the line to Moscow open, and on April 11, he had a conference with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London. He found Maisky "cynical about the whole situation and rather of the opinion that the fat is in the fire as far as everybody is concerned with Russia sitting on the side lines." This candid cynicism caused Halifax "completely to distrust" Maisky and led him to refrain from telling the ambassador anything of importance for fear that it might be passed on to possible enemies. French officials felt much the same way. Bonnet informed Bullitt that the Soviet Government had "replied evasively" to French proposals for military conversations between French and Russian staff officers. He found the Russians were "much stronger in their speeches and statements than they were when it came to negotiation." But Bonnet had persisted in asking the Russians for a "unilateral guarantee" of Romanian frontiers in the event of German aggression against that country. He had also suggested that the Soviet Union seriously consider the negotiation of an "agreement with France for immediate assistance in case of war similar to the Anglo-Polish Agreement."

It is evident that despite the distrust that both Britain and France had for Russia, they still tried to extract from the Russian Foreign Office some promises of aid if Hitler made another step along the road to German expansion. On April 15, Sir William Seeds, at Moscow, presented to Litvinov a suggestion that his government, following British and French action, should make upon its own initiative a public declaration that "in the event of any act of aggression against any neighboring State to the Soviet Union which that State were to resist, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be given, if the desire for it were expressed."

Bonnet told Bullitt that the Soviet Government had rejected this British proposal and had suggested instead that "Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France should conclude accords for immediate military support in case of aggression similar to the pact recently

concluded between Great Britain and Poland.⁵⁴ Apparently the Russian proposals also included suggestions that British assistance to Poland should be restricted to the contingency of German aggression and that any Polish-Romanian alliance should apply to all States and not merely to Russia. According to the Polish Ambassador at Moscow, Grzbowski, the terms of the Russian proposals included permission for Soviet troops to enter Poland by northern and southern routes and for a declaration by Britain that her guarantee of Poland applied only to her western frontier.⁵⁵ Jules Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador at Paris, adds that Russia also wished a free hand in the Baltic states and a Polish-Russian treaty with far-reaching implications.

But even though Polish officials knew of these Russian hopes to control her future, they continued to reject any German proposal for an understanding. On March 26, Ribbentrop once more pressed upon Ambassador Lipski an agreement that would include the "reunion of Danzig with the Reich and the construction of an extra-territorial motor-road and railway connection between the Reich and East Prussia." Lipski curtly countered with the remark that "any further pursuance of these German plans . . . meant war with Poland."⁵⁷ By May 2 the Polish press had proceeded to the point where a demand was made that "Danzig become Polish."⁵⁸ With Warsaw expressing a rising sentiment of Polish nationalism there was little prospect for a German- Polish agreement.

Chamberlain Begins to Pursue the Russian Phantom

British opposition to Russian demands became weaker as the European situation grew more grave. By the last of June the British Foreign Office was ready to go to great lengths to appease Russia. This story was told very frankly by Daladier to Ambassador Bullitt:

"Daladier said that the British were now falling over themselves to accede to the Russian demands. Two texts for submission to the Soviet Government had been prepared today. The first contained no specific mention of the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, but would be accompanied by a secret memorandum covering them. The second contained a complete acceptance of the Russian demands. Strang in Moscow would be instructed tonight or tomorrow to present these two texts to the Soviet Government and to state that the British and French preferred the first text but were ready to accept the second if the Russians should insist. I asked Daladier if he believed that this would conclude the negotiations or if he believed the Russians would insist upon subjecting this political accord to the conclusion of a future military agreement. He said that he had urged the British to take up the question of a military agreement with the Russians before taking up the matter of the political agreement but the British had refused to do this. He was by no means certain that the Russians would surrender this demand and feared that the negotiations might be dragged out indefinitely. . . . He added that the Soviet Government had repeatedly assured the French and British Governments that it was not negotiating in any way with the German Government."

Britain and France Make New Overtures to Russia

Daladier had some doubts about Russian assurances, but he had no idea that the Nazi-Soviet accord was really moving towards an early conclusion. Leger expressed to Bullitt the opinion that "there were eighty chances in a hundred" that the Anglo-French conversations with Molotov in Moscow "would be concluded successfully in the near future." But there were other difficulties:

"Relations between Poland and France had again become extraordinarily unpleasant. At a moment when it was absolutely essential for the French Government to know the exact thoughts of the Polish Government with regard to Danzig, the Polish Ambassador in Paris was so nervous and irritable that it was impossible to have any really intimate conversation with him. He had insulted both Daladier and Bonnet so grossly that Daladier would no longer see him and Bonnet could get nothing out of him. Similarly, Beck in Warsaw had no relations of an intimate nature with the French Ambassador. As a result, all the French Ministers from Daladier down were reluctant to do anything of a concrete nature for Poland."

Leger's optimism concerning the satisfactory progress of the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Government was distinctly premature. The matter of guarantees caused serious concern because some of the states that would be covered by these proposed pledges were openly against them. Finland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland strongly voiced their objections in the first week in July,²⁸ and this fact forced Britain and France to seek desperately for some formula that would be generally satisfactory. The British Ambassador in Moscow was also instructed to indicate the "prejudicial effect on the peace front (in view of public or private objection by Baltic States and Rumania and the unknown attitude of Holland to a Soviet or tripartite guarantee) of Russian demands for publication in treaty of a list of States guaranteed against aggression." He should express British preference for the enumeration of these guaranteed states in a secret supplementary agreement. It was also important to include the Netherlands, Switzerland, and possibly Luxemburg in the list of states whose protection would be guaranteed.

Molotov was willing to have the list of guaranteed states extended so as to include Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, but he strongly objected to the addition of the Netherlands and Switzerland unless pacts of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and Turkey be immediately concluded. He also wished the term "indirect aggression" to be defined as "an internal coup d'etat or a reversal of policy in the interest of an aggressor."

There were several alternative formulas dealing with "indirect aggression," but none of them was satisfactory and conversations continued. Agreement upon the matter of a military convention was also difficult. On July 7, Lord Halifax was ready to make further concessions to the Soviet Government. He would accept the following definition of indirect aggression: "Action accepted by State in question under threat of force by another Power and involving abandonment of its independence or neutrality." The British

Ambassador in Moscow was directed to endeavor to include "consultation in case of aggression against Holland, Switzerland or Luxemburg." If agreement was impossible on this suggestion then he was to try to secure a "limited tripartite agreement susceptible of extension and providing for consultation in the event of aggression against another Power." It was made clear that the Foreign Office would not "agree to make entry into force of agreement depend on conclusion of military conversations."

Some two weeks later [July 19], the British Foreign Office made another concession but would not accept the entire Russian program. The situation was tersely described to Ambassador Kennedy by Lord Halifax:

"Halifax said that their final words to the Russians now is that they will accept the military pact but will not accept the Russians' definition of indirect aggression and if the Russians insist on it the English are going to call the whole deal off."

The following day Kennedy had a talk with Prime Minister Chamberlain. Although he was fairly optimistic about the general outlook for the next thirty days, he was

"sick and disgusted with the Russians and while he believes that the Russians are willing to continue talking without accomplishing anything, his patience is exhausted. He told me he had a conversation with Prince Paul, of Yugoslavia, and Prince Paul was definitely of the opinion that if England did not consummate a deal with the Russians, Germany would. The Prime Minister said he does not feel there is any danger of that."

On August 5, Lord Halifax sent to Sir Ronald Lindsay, in Washington, a brief notation: "At interview on August 2nd, Molotov again refused to accept our definition of indirect aggression." The game was just about up and Molotov was almost ready to show his hand. The farce of further conversations continued on August 12 when the British and French military missions arrived in Moscow. Voroshilov promptly asked the highly embarrassing question whether Poland and Rumania would permit the passage of Russian troops through their territories in the event of German aggression. General Doumenc telegraphed to Paris and urged the Daladier Government to accept the Soviet viewpoint and exert pressure upon Poland in favor of concessions to Russia. (Note: Interestingly, Britain was ready to put pressure on Poland for a British-Soviet pact Germany, but they were not willing to put pressure on Poland for further negotiations with Germany which would prevent the war from starting.)

11.6 Britain after Munich

Hitler's Bid for British Friendship

The Anglo-German relationship was the most important European issue after the Munich conference. An Anglo-German understanding could mean peace, prosperity, and security for Europe. A new Anglo-German war would bring destruction, ruin, and despair. The

former condition would offer nothing to the doctrine of Bolshevism, which thrived on human misery. The latter situation would present a unique opportunity for expansion to the Bolshevik leaders. It is not to be wondered that the Bolshevik leaders hated the Munich conference which had prevented an Anglo-German war. They feared that from its aftermath a permanent Anglo-German understanding would emerge.

The British attitude toward Germany was the crux of the problem. The attitude of Hitler toward Great Britain was favorable from the standpoint of establishing the permanent peace between the two nations which had been envisaged in the Anglo-German friendship declaration of September 30, 1938. Hitler hoped to avoid what he considered to have been the failures of Hohenzollern Germany. He condemned the idea of a large German navy, which had been brilliantly advocated before 1914 by Admiral von Tirpitz. He was unenthusiastic about the acquisition of German colonies overseas, and he regarded Germany's legal right to her former colonies as a mere bargaining counter. Hitler opposed trade rivalry between Germany and Great Britain. He wished the British to preserve their world commercial supremacy. The attitude of Hitler was familiar to the British leaders. The prominent Labour Party spokesman, George Lansbury, who had been the chief of the British Labour Party until 1935, had done what he could to inform the British Conservative leaders of Hitler's ideas. Lansbury met Hitler in Berlin on April 19, 1937. He was greatly impressed with the German leader, and he was convinced that he did not desire war. Lansbury discussed Hitler with Lord Halifax, and he rendered strong support to Chamberlain at the time of the Munich conference. He emphasized that no important section of the British population opposed Chamberlain's trip to Munich.

Arnold Toynbee, a leading English historian and an expert on international affairs, had visited Hitler in March 1936. He returned to England with a clear impression of Hitler's ideas. He informed Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin that Adolf Hitler was a sincere advocate of peace and close friendship between Great Britain and Germany. Thomas Jones, the closest friend of Lloyd George and Stanley Baldwin, had excellent connections with British statesmen. He was with Hitler in Munich on May 17, 1936. Jones was on close terms with Ribbentrop, and he was fully informed about Hitler's attitudes. Hitler had said that, if an Anglo-German understanding was achieved, "my biggest life's desire will be accomplished." Jones promised Hitler in Munich that Great Britain hoped "to get alongside Germany," and he praised Hitler's decision to give the English language priority after German, in the German schools, as a significant contribution to future contacts between the two nations.

Leopold Amery, one of the principal Conservative statesmen, was in Germany on a vacation in August 1935. He was hostile toward Hitler's aspirations, and he had not intended visiting the German leader. Hitler was informed that Amery was in Germany and he immediately extended an invitation to him. He and Amery discussed recent developments in Germany and future German aims for several hours. Hitler assured Amery that Germany accepted the Polish Corridor settlement, and he hoped one day to be in a position to offer Poland a German guarantee of her western frontier. Amery reluctantly concluded that

Hitler was “not unpleasantly boastful,” and he was charmed by Hitler’s statement that he “could not claim originality for any of his reforms.” Viscount Rothermere was a prominent British newspaper publisher and a leader of the British armament campaign. He was with Hitler in Berchtesgaden in 1937 shortly before the Hitler-Halifax conversations. Rothermere believed that the Hitler with whom he spoke was “convinced that he had been called from his social obscurity to power not to make war, but to preserve peace and rebuild both spiritual and physical Germany.” Rothermere and Hitler were also in correspondence. Hitler wrote to Rothermere that his ultimate objective was a comprehensive understanding among Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Rothermere also remained in correspondence with Ribbentrop until a few weeks before the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Rothermere explained in a wartime book, which contained an introduction by Winston Churchill, that Ribbentrop had never been unfriendly toward Great Britain.

David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of the victorious British coalition Government of 1918, visited Hitler in September 1936. Hitler made no secret of the fact that he was tremendously impressed with the achievements of the British wartime leader, and it was evident that he was extensively informed about his career. Lloyd George replied that he “was deeply touched by the personal tribute of the Führer and was proud to hear it paid to him by the greatest German of the age.” Lloyd George returned to Great Britain convinced that Hitler had performed a Herculean task in restoring prosperity and happiness to truncated Germany. The prominent British Conservative leader, Lord Londonderry, and the popular British journalist, Ward Price, both visited Hitler on numerous occasions. Each of these men published books in 1938 which favored an Anglo-German understanding, and which explained the aims and ideas of Hitler to their countrymen. Hitler tried repeatedly to arrange a meeting with British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in 1936, but neither he nor Ribbentrop were able to overcome Baldwin’s anti-German prejudices. Baldwin remarked at the time of his retirement on April 20, 1937, that he “envied Lansbury the faith which enabled him to go and tackle Hitler.” He might also have envied Hitler the faith which enabled him to seek out Baldwin and other British leaders in a vain effort to appease their distrust of Germany.

Hitler knew that a personal visit to Great Britain, before an Anglo-German understanding had been achieved, would not be possible because of this anti-German prejudice. He had offered to meet Baldwin at sea in the vicinity of the British coast. Later he received three visits from Prime Minister Chamberlain, but these occurred during a crisis when conditions were not normal. Chamberlain noted that Hitler “seemed very shy” at their first meeting on September 15, 1938. Hitler confessed his fear that he would “be received with demonstrations of disapproval” if he visited England, and Chamberlain agreed that it would be wise to choose the right moment.

Winston Churchill never met Hitler. He was in Munich for a few days in April 1932 and he expressed a desire to see Hitler. He claimed later, on the strength of an unlikely supposition, that Hitler refused to see him because Churchill had allegedly criticized Hitler’s attitude toward the Jews. Ernst Hanfstaengl, who was commissioned by Hitler to

entertain Churchill in Munich, explained that Hitler was in Nuremberg and that he was distracted by several important crises during a crucial phase of his struggle for power. Churchill made no effort to see Hitler after the latter was appointed Chancellor. There is no evidence that he had criticized Hitler's attitude toward the Jews prior to 1932. Churchill wrote in 1937: "If our country were defeated I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations." The champion to whom he referred with such enthusiasm was Adolf Hitler. Anthony Eden met Hitler on several occasions. The first meeting took place in 1934; Eden noted that Hitler was "restrained and friendly" and "showed himself completely master of his subject (European armaments)." The second meeting occurred in March 1935 after the British Government had severely criticized Hitler for introducing peacetime military conscription a few days earlier. The personal relations between Eden and Hitler remained friendly at the second meeting. But there was not much real communication, because Eden had little awareness of German problems. This fact was apparent at a discussion between Foreign Minister Eden and Neville Henderson at Cliveden on October 24, 1937. Thomas Jones noted that the British Ambassador to Germany "has lived in the countries we talked about and Eden has not and this was apparent."

Sir John Simon, one of the closest advisers to Chamberlain in 1938, accompanied Eden to Berlin in March 1935, and he afterward recorded his impressions of Hitler at that meeting. He noted that Hitler displayed no desire during their conversation to play the role of dictator. He had no doubt that Hitler was sincere in his desire for a permanent understanding with the British. He was equally convinced that Hitler considered the moral rehabilitation of defeated Germany an urgent task. But Simon also remained convinced that it was a vital British interest to challenge Hitler at the favorable moment. It was this attitude, based on anti-German prejudice, which constituted the great obstacle to an understanding between Great Britain and Germany.

Chamberlain's Failure to Criticize Duff Cooper

The first few days after the Munich conference provided a startling revelation of the depth of resentment toward Germany among British officials. It should be emphasized that it was the hostility within the British leadership which constituted the danger. The mass of the British people were obviously desirous of peace with Germany. The ovation which Chamberlain received in London on the rainy Friday afternoon of September 30, 1938, when he returned from Munich, was unprecedented. He was the hero of the hour among the common people because he had prevented war. The enthusiasm remained unbroken until the debates on the Munich conference opened in the British Parliament on Monday, October 3, 1938. King George VI departed for Balmoral castle in Scotland on October 2nd. He issued an announcement prior to his departure in which he expressed his confidence in Chamberlain and his hope that the peace of Europe would be preserved. The British war enthusiasts lost no time in launching their effort to spoil the celebration

of peace. The first blow was a message to Chamberlain from Parliamentary First Lord of the Admiralty, Alfred Duff Cooper, on October 1, 1938. Duff Cooper announced that he distrusted the policy which had avoided war. He was resigning from the British Cabinet, and he intended to deliver a major speech in Parliament to explain this decision. Chamberlain replied in mild tones that he was aware of the fundamental disagreement which existed. Duff Cooper was an ideal ally of Churchill in the struggle against peace. He hated the Germans, and he had disliked the German language and German literature since his student days. He was appointed Secretary of State for War in 1935, and by that time his principal concern was the "ever-growing German menace." He agreed with Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, that everything possible should be done to prevent Italy from aligning with Germany. He was convinced that it was more important to oppose Hitler than to oppose Communism. He condemned the entire German nation as a "cruel people," and he criticized Englishmen who were inclined to forget the German "crimes" of World War I. He had been convinced since 1936, as had Lord Halifax, that an Anglo-German war was inevitable.

The derogatory comments which Chamberlain made about Hitler after their first meeting failed to appease Duff Cooper. He wanted war with Germany, and he feared that the chance might be lost. He believed that he could do more to promote war if he joined the Churchill faction of Conservatives outside the Cabinet. Duff Cooper was allowed to deliver the first speech of the debate in the House of Commons on October 3, 1938. He criticized the Government for not assuming a definite commitment during the Czech crisis. He asserted that Great Britain would not have been fighting for the Czechs, because this would have been an insufficient basis for war. He insisted that she would have been fighting for the balance of power, which was precious to some British hearts. He believed that it was his mission and that of his country to prevent Germany from achieving a dominant position on the continent.

Chamberlain astonished his critics by refusing to reply to this condemnation of his policy by a former subordinate. He said instead, in the tones of mawkish sentimentality which he frequently employed, that he always was moved by the resignation speeches of Cabinet ministers. It was obvious that he cherished a deep affection for Duff Cooper, and the differences between them were those of tactics rather than basic principles. He praised Duff Cooper for doing a good job at the Admiralty, and he apologized for him by observing that many of the Cabinet ministers would carry the scars of the recent crisis for a long time to come.

The British Tories in Fundamental Agreement

There was no disagreement between Chamberlain and Duff Cooper about the antiquated British policy of the balance of power. The theory had first been espoused in England in the 16th century by Thomas Cromwell, a disciple of Machiavelli, and a wealthy adventurer who had witnessed at first hand the late phase of balance of power diplomacy

in Renaissance Italy. It was Thomas Cromwell who persuaded Cardinal Wolsey to conduct English policy along these lines. The policy had been employed to prevent a strong state, such as Milan, from gaining supremacy over the weaker Italian states. It was useless when outside Powers such as France and Spain appeared on the scene with overwhelming forces and crushed a divided Italy. The balance of power policy was effectively employed in Europe by England for several centuries to prevent any single Power from attaining the sort of supremacy over the divided continent which was enjoyed in North America by the United States after 1865. It meant the relentless curtailment of any seemingly preponderant continental state, regardless of the domestic institutions or foreign policy of such a state. The purpose of the policy was to give Great Britain a permanent position of control over the destinies of her neighbors. The policy was futile by the 1930's, when outside Powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States were in a position to appear upon the scene with overwhelming forces and to share dominion over a crushed and divided Europe.

There were several occasions, after Thomas Cromwell and Henry VIII, when English policy rejected the balance of power. Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector of England during the 1650's, was scornful of the balance of power theory, which he regarded as a decadent basis for policy. The balance of power policy was revived by King William III of England in the 1690's in a remarkable series of speeches from the throne to Parliament. King William, the great-grandson of the German prince of Nassau-Orange, William the Silent, was flexible in his national loyalties. He built up English power at the expense of his native Holland because in England there was greater respect for the monarchical institutions which he cherished. William used French support of the Catholic Scotch-English Stuarts as the pretext for plunging England into the war of the League of Augsburg, but he explained after the war was well under way that the balance of power was his primary consideration.

The balance of power was used to justify English participation in the next major European and Overseas struggle, the War of the Spanish Succession. England made great gains when she concluded a separate peace with France at Utrecht in 1713, and the balance of power received a new lease on life, once the horrors of the war had been forgotten. The English statesman, James Stanhope, led a brief attempt to organize a preponderant League of European States, but it collapsed in 1720 during a severe economic depression and a change in English leadership. England returned to the balance of power under Robert Walpole, and no subsequent English Statesman was able to equal his skill in conducting English policy under this system. He kept England out of the European War of the Polish Succession in the 1730's because he realized that the balance of power was not threatened by the war. He was unable to prevent England's entry into an unnecessary war against Spain in 1739, and he was soon forced from power.

England was the principal European Power when her American mainland colonies revolted in 1775. She was unable to crush the insurgent American colonies because of her inability to hire sufficient mercenary troops in Europe, but she defended her European position

with the ease against an enemy coalition which included France, Spain, and Holland. The English leaders sought to frustrate the attempts of Russia, France, and Spain to expand during the decade between the end of the American war in 1783 and the outbreak of war between England and Republican France. No single Power offered an impressive challenge to the balance of power at that time. The balance of power received dramatic emphasis during the four wars of coalition waged against France under the first Republic, and after 1804 under the first Napoleonic Empire. The fourth coalition waged a second war against Napoleon when he returned from Elba in 1815. The balance of power was used on several occasions during this period to justify the continuation of English warfare against France, when the other enemies of France had left the field. Robert Castlereagh was conducting British foreign policy when France was crushed in 1815, and he hoped to abandon the balance of power policy.

England followed the balance of power policy without interruption after 1822. This was true either when she was in "splendid isolations" or when she was a member of some alliance system. England supported Napoleon III against Russia in the Crimean War of the 1850's because she believed that Russia was stronger than France. She refused to protect Belgium from a possible German invasion in 1887, because she believed that a Franco-Russian combination was more powerful than Germany and her allies. Decisions were difficult during these years, because opposing forces were almost in perfect balance without England. This meant, on the positive side, that England could pursue her balance of power policy in "splendid isolation" without promoting a complicated system of alliances, although at one time she was closely associated with Bismarck's Triple Alliance.

There was a period of great confusion in English foreign policy during the 1890's. The five principal continental Powers were organized into two alliance systems. It was feared in London that the two systems might combine against England in one of the frequent colonial crises of these years. Joseph Chamberlain, the father of Neville, led a group who favored an English alliance policy. Prime Minister Salisbury opposed an alliance policy. He insisted that alliances were superfluous for England and would impair the flexibility of English policy. The military reverses suffered by England in the early phase of the Boer War helped to carry the day for Chamberlain and alliances. Salisbury was right when he insisted that the opposite conclusion should have been drawn, because the continental Powers did not intervene against England in this crisis when she was most vulnerable. The growth of German wealth and productive power during these years was phenomenal, and it seemed to more than compensate for the reverses currently suffered by Germany in diplomatic affairs. Many of the British leaders began to suspect that German growth was a challenge to the balance of power. The balance of power had its own morality. Any nation which seemed to challenge it should be treated as an enemy. It did not matter whether or not Germany planned to attack British interests, or whether or not she was in a position to strike a blow at England. The prospect that she might become stronger than any possible hostile continental combination suggested that it was time "to redress

the balance of power.”

The situation was more complicated than it had been during earlier centuries. Great Britain launched her alliance policy by concluding an Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, but it was easy to see that the rising imperial power of Japan might become a real challenge to British interests in Asia. Both the United States and Germany surpassed Great Britain in industrial strength before 1914. British power since 1750 had been based more on industrial and naval supremacy than on diplomacy, and the loss of industrial supremacy made the British position more difficult. A challenge to Germany would play into the hands of the United States, just as a challenge to America, which almost occurred during the 1895-1896 Venezuelan crisis, would have played into the hands of Germany. Cecil Rhodes, the architect of British imperial expansion in Africa, recognized this dilemma, and this prompted him to advocate permanent peace and cooperation among Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. This would have meant the abandonment of the balance of power policy, but Cecil Rhodes was sufficiently shrewd to see that the policy was obsolete. The ruling British leaders did not see it that way and Great Britain suffered an enormous loss of power and prestige in World War I despite her victory over Germany.

The Soviet Union began to emerge as an industrial giant of incalculable power during the two decades after World War I. It was evident that there were at least four nations immediately or potentially far more powerful than Great Britain. These four nations were the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan. This was different than in the old days when it had merely been a question of one preponderant Spain, or one preponderant France. It seemed momentarily that Great Britain might be returning to the policies of Stanhope and Castlereagh when she joined the League of Nations in 1919. Unfortunately this was not the case. France after 1919 was no longer as powerful as Great Britain, but she enjoyed continental preponderance for several years because of the treaty restrictions on Germany, the intrinsic feebleness of Italy, and the disappearance of Austria-Hungary. Revolutionary upheavals after the defeat in World War I temporarily reduced Russian power. The British responded by employing their balance of power policy against France. There had been notorious rivalry between the two nations in the Near East during World War I, because of oil and traditional prestige factors, and the British nearly succeeded in “biffing” the French out of their Syrian claims. The British and French took opposite sides in the post-war struggle between the Greeks and the Turks. The British continued to oppose French policies with increasing vigor when the Turks emerged victorious with French support.

The climax came when Great Britain opposed the efforts of France and Belgium to collect reparations in the Ruhr in 1923-1924. The French were confidently pursuing a policy of independence under Poincaré's bold leadership, but the debacle suffered in the Ruhr was a stunning psychological blow to the French. Edouard Herriot, who took the reins of policy from Poincaré, concluded that nothing could succeed without British cooperation. There were later instances of friction between France and Great Britain,

but the French leaders were always inclined to accept the British lead. It was apparent to everyone during the Czech crisis in 1938 that Anglo-French policy was conducted from London. The British occasionally pursued policies which seemed to strengthen French preponderance on the continent. They joined France and Italy in squelching the feeble attempt of Chancellor Brüning of Germany to conclude a customs union with Austria in 1931. It did not seem that the "Hunger Chancellor" was capable of removing the threat of Communism in Germany, which implied a new preponderant Russo-German combination, or of challenging the old preponderance of France.

The situation changed with the arrival of Hitler in 1933. The new Chancellor dealt a few annihilating blows to German Communism, and challenged France by withdrawing Germany from the disarmament conference at Geneva, where German claims to equality received farcical treatment. The balance of power on the continent was restored when Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland in 1936. The French might have challenged this move successfully had they received an assurance of British support. As it was, the French feared that action would mean an Anglo-German combination against them as in 1923. Duff Cooper and Chamberlain agreed in October 1938 that Great Britain should continue the balance of power policy. They agreed that everything possible should be done to prevent a permanent alignment of Italy with Germany. They both underestimated the Soviet Union and believed that she was much less powerful than Germany. They also agreed that the Czech cause as such was not worth British participation in a European war. The sole point where they disagreed was whether or not it would be wise for Great Britain to attack Germany in 1938. Duff Cooper believed that Great Britain was sufficiently strong in 1938 to attack Germany, but Chamberlain believed that it would be wiser to play for time. Neither Chamberlain nor Duff Cooper had any sympathy for Germany, the nation which Chamberlain called the bully of Europe as early as 1935. It is possible from this perspective to see that the differences within the British Conservative Party in October 1938 were not really very profound. Anti-German prejudice was the dominant attitude within the entire Conservative Party.

Tory and Labour War Sentiment

The London Times seemed to incline toward the evaluation of Duff Cooper when it announced on October 3, 1938, that Germany was relieved to escape from a war "which, in the opinion of most sections of the population, it would almost certainly have lost." The Times predicted that "Mr. Chamberlain will find plenty of critics" in the current parliamentary debates. It is important to recall that Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of the Times, had provided valuable support for Halifax and Chamberlain during the Czech crisis. On the afternoon of September 6, 1938, he had revised the famous article which appeared in the Times on the following day, and advocated the cession of the Sudeten districts to Germany. Dawson was especially close to Halifax, whom he had met in South Africa in 1905. He published an article on October 30, 1925, which praised Halifax without stint

or limit when it was announced in London that the latter had been appointed Viceroy of India. Halifax had given Dawson a detailed private analysis of his visit to Hitler in November 1937, and he had told Dawson that he was well-satisfied with the visit. Dawson noted that Halifax probably could have negotiated a lasting agreement with Germany at that time, had Great Britain agreed to remain aloof from possible complications between Germany and her eastern neighbors. Dawson also realized that Halifax was not willing to do this.

It was significant that the London Times, which had been the principal journalistic organ of appeasement during the Czech crisis, began to adopt a more critical attitude toward Germany immediately after the Munich conference. It followed the policy of Halifax in this respect. The differences between the attitudes of the Times and of the Daily Express toward Germany became increasingly pronounced. This was because Lord Beaverbrook, the owner of the Daily Express, was a sincere advocate of appeasement as a permanent policy, whereas Geoffrey Dawson was not. The Daily Express continued to hope and to predict that there would be no war with Germany until within a few days of the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. This attitude reflected the wishes of wide sections of the British population in the autumn of 1938, and in November 1938 the Daily Express noted that its circulation had increased to over 2 million within a very short time, which gave it the largest circulation of any newspaper in British history. When Halifax at last launched a gigantic propaganda campaign in March 1939 to sell the British public on war with Germany, the editorial policy of the Daily Express gradually became a liability for circulation rather than an asset. It is not surprising that Beaverbrook finally made concessions to the warlike mood in order to preserve his newspaper. It became evident that a large-circulation British newspaper with consistent principles was an impossibility in the modern age. Chamberlain paid special tribute to Halifax in the British House of Commons on October 3, 1938. He claimed that Halifax felt a duty not only to England, but to all humanity. There was no point in wondering what prompted Chamberlain to make this sentimental statement, because it was consistent with his usual oratorical style. There is no record that Halifax ever recanted his maiden speech to Parliament, in which he denied that all men were equal and insisted that the British were the "superior race" within an Empire which comprised more than a quarter of the population of the world. Chamberlain leaned on the prestige of Halifax to protect his own position.

The War Party hoped that by contesting the results of the Munich conference they could either unseat Chamberlain or push him into an anti-German policy. They knew that the Labour Opposition was much too weak in Parliament to accomplish this result without important allies from the British Conservative Party. The Labour Party leaders professed to believe that cooperation with National Socialist Germany in foreign affairs would discourage necessary reforms at home. Chamberlain continued his speech by reading the text of the Anglo-German declaration of friendship of September 30, 1938. He mentioned that this agreement would not be effective unless there was good will on both sides. This left room to claim later that the British had to oppose Germany because Hitler did not

show good will toward England. Chamberlain noted that Munich had merely provided a foundation for peace and that the structure was still lacking. He then turned to his favorite theme of British armament, and he reminded the House with pride that the pace of the British armament campaign was increasing daily. He promised that the British Empire would not relax her efforts unless the rest of the world disarmed. He concluded with the announcement that military power was the key to successful British diplomacy.

Halifax delivered an important speech in the British House of Lords on October 3, 1938. He shared the opinion of Hoare that Great Britain should never fight for a foreign state unless she was in a position to restore its old frontiers after a victorious war. This was an interesting idea, especially when one considers that Halifax refused to guarantee the Polish frontier with the Soviet Union when he concluded the Anglo-Polish alliance of August 25, 1939. It was obvious that this argument was largely sophistry to Halifax, and a sop to appease the Opposition. He revealed to the Lords that he had done what he could to improve British relations with the Soviet Union by placing the blame solely on Germany and Italy for refusing to invite the Soviets to Munich. The key to the Halifax speech of October 3rd was the statement that Great Britain would continue to prepare for a possible war against Germany despite the Anglo-German friendship declaration of September 30, 1938. Halifax, like Chamberlain, devoted the latter part of his speech to a discussion of the British armament campaign. He emphasized that the need for more weapons was the principal British concern at the moment.

Baldwin delivered a speech in Lords on the following day. He complained that it had been difficult to establish personal contact with the German and Italian dictators during the past five years. This was an astonishing statement when one recalls that Hitler had made repeated efforts to meet Baldwin at any time or place while the latter was Prime Minister. Baldwin dropped the mask completely when he claimed that Great Britain needed the spirit of 1914 to solve contemporary world problems. He was supposedly defending the peace settlement of Chamberlain, but in reality he was invoking the glory of the British attack on Germany in 1914.

It was known that President Roosevelt in January 1938 had advocated a world conference on European problems, which was supposed to include both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Labour leaders adopted the world conference slogan and stressed the importance of the voice of the Soviet Union in the councils of Europe. Leslie Burgin, Minister of Transport, spoke on behalf of Chamberlain, and he repeated the argument that a war for the Czechs would have been immoral, unless it could have been shown that it was possible to restore the Czech state in its entirety after the war. It is astonishing that these same people accepted war on behalf of Poland without a murmur, when it was obvious after August 22, 1939, that the Soviet Union was hostile to Poland, and that Great Britain had no intention of opposing Russia. It should have been apparent to anyone that the defeat of Germany would not enable the British to restore the new Polish state. In reality, the British leaders were not truly concerned about either the Czechs or the Poles. The same argument about not being able to restore the Czechs was

repeated on October 4th by Sir Thomas Inskip, another British Cabinet member. In the following weeks the argument was repeated ad nauseam. It seems impossible that anyone could have forgotten it within the short span of one year. Nevertheless, the deluge of propaganda in England, after March 1939, was so great that it would have been easy to forget the Ten Commandments.

On October 5, 1938, Winston Churchill followed with his long awaited anti-German speech. The other English war enthusiasts hoped that he would make his speech as provocative as possible, and he did not disappoint them. He agreed with his close friend in America, Bernard Baruch, that Hitler should not be allowed to "get away with it." Churchill claimed that Hitler had extracted British concessions at pistol point, and he loved to use the image of Hitler as a highwayman or a gangster. He hoped to worry Hitler by intimating that he had contacts with an underground movement in Germany. He suggested that a common Anglo-Franco-Soviet front in support of the Czechs would have enabled an opposition movement within Germany to cause trouble for Hitler, and possibly to overthrow him. He used flowery rhetoric to describe the allegedly mournful Czechs slipping away into a darkness comparable to the Black Hole of Calcutta. The speech was couched in elegant phrases dear to the hearts of many of Churchill's countrymen. The simple and stark purpose of the speech was to foment a war of annihilation against Germany. Churchill had been excluded from Conservative Governments in England for many years, but he had made countless speeches, and his personal influence remained tremendous. He had propagated the myth that Great Britain was disarmed in 1932, indeed, that she had wrongly practiced a policy of unilateral disarmament in response to the noble sentiment of the League Covenant. In reality, the British military establishment in 1932 was gigantic compared to that of Germany, and much larger than that of the United States. Great Britain had less than one million men in all of her ground forces throughout the Empire, but it had never been traditional British policy to maintain a large standing army. She had the largest navy in the world, despite the Washington conference of 1921-1922 which envisaged eventual British equality with the United States. The maintenance of a navy was no less expensive or militaristic than the upkeep of an army.

Churchill had conducted an uninterrupted campaign of agitation against Germany since March 1933, and he was a veteran in the field. Some of his inaccurate statements about alleged German armaments in this period are contained in his 1948 volume, *The Gathering Storm*, and in his 1938 book of speeches, *When England Slept*. Churchill wanted to convince his countrymen that Germany was governed by an insatiable desire for world conquest. In his speech of October 5, 1938, he did more than anyone else to warn Hitler that Germany was in danger of being strangled by a British coalition in the style of 1914. Churchill does not bear direct responsibility for the attack on Germany in 1939, because he was not admitted to the British Cabinet until the die was cast. The crucial decisions on policy were made without his knowledge, and he was frankly amazed when Halifax suddenly shifted to a war policy in March 1939. Churchill was useful to Halifax in building up British prejudice against Germany, but he was a mere instrument,

at the most, in the conduct of British policy in 1938 and 1939.

Tory Confidence in War Preparations

The alarmist public utterances of the British leaders, when Hitler had done nothing contrary to the Anglo-German declaration or the Munich agreement, were mild compared to statements made through the channels of secret diplomacy. The January 1939 visit of Halifax and Chamberlain to Rome offered eloquent testimony of hostile British intentions toward Germany. The British leaders were in excellent spirits because of the unexpected successes of the aerial armament campaign after the Munich conference. The production of British fighter aircraft was 25% beyond the figure which had been predicted at the time of Munich in the early autumn of 1938. The American expert Charles Lindbergh, who lived in England, made a considerable impression on the English leaders before Munich with his report on German air power. Lindbergh praised the quality of German aerial armament in the strongest terms which the facts would permit. He was glad to contribute what he could to pointing out the senselessness of a new European war, and he surmised correctly that the British attitude was the key factor in deciding whether or not there would be such a war. He was overjoyed by the news of Munich, and he sincerely hoped that peace had been saved.

Unfortunately, the British leaders realized that the German lead in the air was very narrow in 1938. They were not merely interested in defense against a possible German aerial offensive. They hoped that their own air power would be a decisive offensive instrument in a future war. British aerial strategy since 1936 had been based on the doctrine of mass attacks against objectives far behind the military front. Their strategy contrasted sharply with that of the Germans, who hoped that aerial bombardment would be restricted to frontline military action in the event of war. The difference in strategy was reflected in the types of aircraft produced by the two countries. Germany produced many light and medium bombers for tactical operations in support of ground troops, but the major British emphasis was on the construction of heavy bombers to attack civilian objectives far behind the front. The British Defence Requirements Committee decided as early as February 1934 that "the ultimate potential enemy" in any major war would be Germany.

The British in the Spring of 1938 were hoping to build 8,000 military aircraft in the year beginning April 1939, and this goal was later achieved and surpassed. They had expected to build only 4,000 military aircraft in the year April 1938 to April 1939, but they were far ahead of schedule by January 1939, and their key secret defense weapon, the "radar project," had made gigantic strides since 1935. The British leaders and experts were concerned about their air defenses, but they had not lost sight of a possible aerial offensive against the civilian population of Germany. The ratio of fighters to bombers in the autumn of 1938 program of Air Minister Sir Kingsley Wood was 1:1.7. The construction of medium bombers had been discontinued, and the emphasis was solely on heavy bombers capable of attacking distant objectives. The British leaders admitted that

defensive preparation of British civilian centers to meet German retaliation bombing was “insufficient to dispel anxiety“ during the final months before the outbreak of World War II. Nevertheless, they were convinced that they were reasonably secure against successful German retaliation, and hence the strategy for the bombardment of the German civilian masses was developed with single-minded energy.

Mussolini Frightened by Halifax and Chamberlain

It is not surprising that the sudden and unexpected increase in military power made the British leaders more aggressive in attitude, and this was reflected in their conversations with the Italian leaders. It is interesting to compare the British and Italian records of these talks. Two of the principal conversations included Chamberlain, Halifax, Mussolini, and Ciano, one included Halifax and Ciano, and one included Chamberlain and Mussolini. The first conversation of the four leaders took place at Mussolini's office in the Palazzo Venezia in Rome on the afternoon of January 11, 1939. The British record noted that Mussolini pledged Italy to a policy of peace for internal reasons, and for the general stability of Europe. The Italian leader asserted that a new war could destroy civilization, and he deplored the failure of the Four Munich Powers to cooperate more closely to preserve peace. He reminded Chamberlain and Halifax that he had envisaged close cooperation when he proposed a Four Power Pact of consultation and friendship among Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in 1933. He favored the limitation of arms. The Jewish question was discussed, and Mussolini stated his personal opinion that the best solution would be for all Jews to come under the laws of a sovereign Jewish state, although they need not all live there. Mussolini was concerned about the British attitude toward Germany. Chamberlain declared that he had considered the possibility of conversations with the Germans toward the end of 1938, but that he had changed his mind. He claimed that he had reconsidered because he was disappointed in the German attitude.

Mussolini, Ciano, Chamberlain, and Halifax met at the Palazzo Venezia again on the afternoon of January 12, 1939. Franco-Italian relations were on the agenda. The Italian leaders insisted that the mysterious recent demonstrations against France in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on November 30, 1938, were entirely spontaneous. They blamed the French for much of the recent tension between Italy and France, which had culminated in this incident. Chamberlain turned the discussion to Germany. He claimed to be impressed by rumors of sinister German intentions. He had heard that Germany was planning to establish an independent Ukraine, and to attack Great Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union (False information given to Britain by the German underground resistance movement).

Mussolini assured the British leaders that German armaments were defensive, and that Hitler had no plans for an independent Ukraine or for attacks on the various countries which Chamberlain had mentioned. He added that Germany desired peace. Chamberlain disagreed. He declared that German arms were more than sufficient to deal with attacks

from countries immediately adjacent to Germany, and that hence the Germans must be harboring aggressive plans. He claimed that Great Britain, on the other hand, was merely concerned with defending herself from the German menace. He defended the extremists of the British Conservative Party, and he denied that anyone, including Churchill, advocated a British military offensive against Germany. The British and Italian leaders agreed that it would be difficult to guarantee the Czechs, and the British mentioned a guarantee formula which the French had previously rejected. This formula stipulated no aid to the Czechs unless three of the Four Munich Powers agreed that aggression had taken place. Mussolini mentioned a series of requirements, including the need for stable conditions within the Czech state, which would have to be met before a guarantee could be considered. The conversation concluded with comments about the British General Election planned for the autumn of 1940 and the Rome International Exposition scheduled for 1942. Mussolini was much concerned about plans for the Rome Exposition, and Chamberlain made the obvious remark that the British would like to participate.

The British also neglected another major point made by Mussolini. The Italian leader could understand British concern about rumors suggesting an impending attack on their own country or on neighboring France. He could not appreciate their apparent concern about the welfare of the Soviet leadership. Mussolini denied that Hitler had plans for the dismemberment of Russia, but he could not refrain from commenting that the end of Communism in Russia would be a blessing for the Russian people. This remark did not impress the British leaders. Mussolini swore that he knew with absolute certainty that Hitler had no hostile plans against the West. Mussolini also was surprised that Chamberlain was predicting trouble between Germany and Poland. He shared the optimism of Hitler that an understanding between Germany and Poland could be attained. Polish Foreign Minister Beck had recently visited Hitler, and the German Foreign Minister was scheduled to visit Beck at Warsaw in a few days. The Italian leader was unaware that Polish Ambassador Raczynski in London had requested British support against Germany in December 1938, or that Halifax had expressed a desire to support Poland at Danzig as early as September 1938. Mussolini warned Chamberlain not to be influenced by anti-National Socialist propaganda. Chamberlain stridently denied Mussolini's claims about German defensive needs, and he insisted that Russia did not have the strength to be a menace to anyone. One is reminded here of the statement of Anthony Eden in March 1935 that the Soviet Union would not be in a position to wage a war of aggression for fifty years. Mussolini was amazed by Chamberlain's remark, and he repeated that Germany had good reason to fear a hostile coalition of overwhelming strength.

The Italian leader used every possible argument to cope with Chamberlain's anti-German phobia. He cited the Siegfried line, along the German frontier with France and Belgium, as an indication of the defensive nature of German armament. Chamberlain insisted that German armament was far too impressive, and he suggested that Hitler should speak publicly of his desire for peace, if he was truly peaceful. This suggestion astonished Mussolini, and he inquired if Chamberlain was unaware of Hitler's New Year Declaration

of January 1, 1939, in which the German leader had professed a fervent desire for the perpetuation of European peace. Mussolini repeated that the current scope of German armament was fully justified by the existing situation. He wished to be helpful in allaying Chamberlain's alleged fear of German intentions. He was willing to cooperate with Chamberlain in organizing a conference for qualitative disarmament as soon as the war in Spain had ended. Chamberlain displayed no interest in this proposal. Mussolini referred to the inner instability of the Czech state, the failure of the Czechs to dissolve their ties with Russia or to adopt a policy of neutrality, and the fact that the new Czech borders in many directions had not received their final definition on the ground by international border commissions. The Italian record was emphatic in stating that Chamberlain agreed with Mussolini's remarks about the Czechs.

The Italian record also shows that Mussolini was disappointed by Chamberlain's attitude. The visit was successful from the British perspective, but unsuccessful from the Italian standpoint. The British leaders had hoped to intimidate Mussolini, and to discourage him from supporting Hitler if and when war came. They were successful in this effort, although this diplomatic success was cancelled in 1940 because of the unexpected fall of France. The Italians, on the other hand, had hoped that their assurances would prompt the British to adopt a more tolerant attitude toward Germany and a more cooperative policy toward the settlement of current European problems. They were fully disappointed in this expectation. It was evident that British hostility toward Germany was implacable. Mussolini discussed the situation with German Ambassador Mackensen at the British Embassy reception on the evening of January 13, 1939. He said that the results of the visit were meager, and he complained that the British had made him feel like a lawyer in one of their courts when he had attempted to explain German armaments and German foreign policy. He left no doubt in Mackensen's mind that the British leaders were ready to find Germany guilty of every crime. The Germans received further information about the Rome visit from Italian Ambassador Attolico in Berlin on January 17, 1939. This included an excellent condensed summary of the conversation of January 11, 1939. It was followed by a report from Mackensen, which contained an account of the conversation of Chamberlain, Halifax, Mussolini, and Ciano on January 12, 1939. The Germans learned that their armament program provided the main topic of discussion. Mackensen also discovered that Chamberlain had been clever in making table-talk propaganda with Mussolini. Chamberlain referred to Italy and Great Britain as imperial Powers, with colonies overseas, in contrast to Germany, a mere continental nation. This was satisfactory to Hitler, who had no desire to hoist the German flag in distant parts.

Hitler's Continued Optimism

The tragedy which overtook Italy in World War II indicates that Mussolini's alarm at British hostility toward Germany in January 1939 was amply justified. There had been no German moves since Munich. Nevertheless, the same British Prime Minister who had

persuaded Hitler to sign the declaration of Anglo-German friendship on September 30, 1938, was branding Germany an aggressor nation in January 1939. His assurance that Great Britain was ready for war with Germany indicated that he envisaged the likelihood of a conflict, and his defense of Churchill's attitude toward Germany was ominous.

Cohn Brooks was one of the leading British writers of the 1930's who advocated huge British armaments. He explained in his persuasive book, *Can Chamberlain Save Britain? The Lesson of Munich*, which was written in October 1938, that "the Four Power Conference of Munich in September 1938 gave to the world either an uneasy postponement of conflict or the promise of a lasting peace." This was true, but the promise of lasting peace was undermined by the attitude of the British leaders toward Germany. Brooks was an alarmist. He claimed that Great Britain was in peril because the balance of power was threatened. He called on British youth to be equal to the British imperialistic tradition, and not to be further influenced in their attitudes by the unusually heavy losses suffered by Great Britain in World War I. He reminded his readers that Great Britain had spent 102 years fighting major wars during the past 236 years since 1702, and that she had fought many minor wars during the otherwise peaceful intervals. He recognized that Great Britain had a record of aggressive military action unequalled by any other Power in modern times. He wished British youth to recognize this obvious fact, and to prepare for the new struggle against Germany.

Karl Heinz Pfeffer, a cosmopolitan German expert on British and American attitudes, attempted in a 1940 book, *England: Vormacht der bürgerlichen Welt* (*England: Guardian of the bourgeois World*), to explain British hostility toward Germany during this period. He noted that the alleged British disarmament between World War I and World War II was a myth, but that the British public had been deluged with the peace propaganda of private groups late in 1931, on the eve of the much-heralded general disarmament conference of February 1932. French obstruction wrecked the conference, and Great Britain began to search for justification for an increase in her already considerable armament. Propaganda was needed to overcome the popular longing for peace. The experience of World War I suggested the answer, and this partially explained the initial hate campaign against Germany in the period 1932-1938.

Hitler had been warned by Mussolini. Ribbentrop's prediction of January 2, 1938, that it would be impossible for Germany to arrive at a lasting agreement with England, before Hitler had completed his program of peaceful revision, had received new confirmation. Hitler hoped that he could complete his program before the British were ready to attack Germany, and that he could persuade them afterward to accept the new situation. This had been the sole answer to the dilemma of British hostility in the age of Bismarck. It offered a fair prospect of success, but a policy of drift offered none at all. Germany was the major Power in the European region between Great Britain in the West and the Soviet Union in the East. British hostility was reaching a crest, and the alternatives were peace or war. Hitler was in the middle of the stream. He was determined to reach the high bank. He wished to rescue Germany from the swampland of insecurity, decline,

and despair. He wished Germany to have the national security and the opportunity for development which had been the heritage of Great Britain and the United States for many generations. He hoped to bring Germany out of danger, and to reach solid ground which was safe from any hostile British tide. He believed that this objective could be attained without harming Great Britain or the United States in any way. Hitler looked forward to an era of Anglo-American-German cooperation. This would have been the best possible guarantee of stability and peace in the world. There was good reason to believe in January 1939 that this objective could be achieved, although the perils which faced Germany were very great. The worst of these was British hostility after Munich.

11.7 The Danzig Problem

The Repudiation of Self-Determination at Danzig

The establishment of the so-called Free City of Danzig by the victorious Allied and Associated Powers in 1919 was the least defensible territorial provision of the Versailles Treaty. It was soon evident to observers in the Western World, and to the people of Germany, Poland, and Danzig, that this incredibly complicated international arrangement could never function satisfactorily. Danzig in 1919 was an ordinary provincial German city without any expectation or desire to occupy a central position on the stage of world politics. The Danzigers would have welcomed special Polish economic privileges in their city as a means of increasing the commerce of their port. They were horrified at the prospect of being detached from Germany and separately constituted in an anomalous position under the jurisdiction of an experimental League of Nations, which did not begin to exist until 1920. One might well ask what the attitude of the people of Portland, Oregon, would be if their city were suddenly detached from the United States and placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the interest of guaranteeing special port facilities to Canada near the estuary of the Columbia River. It would be small consolation to recall that the area around Portland, before passing under the sovereignty of the United States in 1846, was settled by the British Hudson Bay Company. The traditionally friendly relations between Canadians and Portlanders would soon deteriorate under such exacerbating conditions. It is not surprising that the National Socialists of Adolf Hitler won an electoral majority at Danzig before this was possible in Germany. The Danzigers hoped that perhaps Hitler could do something to change the intolerable conditions established during 1919 and the following years.

The issue exploited by Lord Halifax of Great Britain to destroy the friendship between Germany and Poland in March 1939 was the Danzig problem. The final collapse of the Czech state in March 1939 produced less effect in neighboring Poland, where the leaders were inclined to welcome the event, than in the distant United States. The Polish leaders had agreed that the return of Memel from Lithuania to Germany in March 1939 would not constitute an issue of conflict between Germany and Poland. Hitler emphasized

that Germany would not claim one inch of Polish territory, and that she was prepared to recognize the Versailles Polish frontier on a permanent basis. Polish diplomats had suggested that a settlement of German requests for improved transit to German East Prussia would not present an insuperable problem. The German leaders were disturbed by Polish discrimination against the Germans within Poland, but they were not inclined to recognize this problem as an issue which could produce a conflict between the two states. It was primarily Danzig which made the breach. It was the discussion of Danzig between Germany and Poland which prompted the Polish leaders to warn Hitler that the pursuance of German aims in this area would produce a Polish-German war.

Polish defiance of Hitler on the Danzig question did not occur until the British leaders had launched a vigorous encirclement policy designed to throttle the German Reich. It is very unlikely that the Polish leaders would have defied Hitler had they not expected British support. The Polish leaders had received assurances ever since September 1938 that the British leaders would support them against Hitler at Danzig. Many of the Polish leaders said that they would have fought to frustrate German aims in Danzig had Poland been without an ally in the world. They were seeking to emphasize the importance which they attached to Danzig in discussing what they might have done in this hypothetical situation. This does not mean that they actually would have fought for Danzig in a real situation of this kind, and it is doubtful if Pilsudski would have fought for Danzig in 1939 even with British support. It is evident that Danzig was the issue selected by the Polish leaders to defy Hitler after the British had offered an alliance to Poland.

The Poles were usually impervious to logic when Danzig was discussed. This in itself made a preposterous situation more difficult, although a compromise settlement on the basis of generous terms from Hitler might have been possible had it not been for British meddling.

The Establishment of the Free City Regime

Danzig was historically the key port at the mouth of the great Vistula River artery. The modern city of Danzig was founded in the early 14th century, and it was inhabited almost exclusively by Germans from the beginning. There had previously been a fishing village at Danzig inhabited by local non-Polish West Slavs which was mentioned in a church chronicle of the 10th century. The Germans first came to the Danzig region during the eastward colonization movement of the German people in the late Middle Ages. Danzig was the capital of the Prussian province of West Prussia when the victors of World War I decided to separate this Baltic port from Germany. The city had been a provincial capital within the German Kingdom of Prussia prior to the establishment of the North German Federation in 1867 and of the German Second Empire in 1871.

The Allied Powers in 1920 converted Danzig from a German provincial capital to a German city state in the style prevailing in the other Hanseatic cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck. The latter three cities remained separate federal states within the German

Empire created by Bismarck. The renunciation of Danzig by Germany and the creation of the Free City regime was stipulated by articles 100 to 108 of the Versailles Treaty. A League High Commissioner was to be the first instance of appeal in disputes between Poland and Danzig. The foreign relations of Danzig were delegated to Poland, and the Free City was to be assigned to the Polish customs area. The Poles were allowed unrestricted use of Danzig canals, docks, railroads, and roads for trading purposes and they were delegated control over river traffic, and over telegraph, telephone, and postal communications between Poland and Danzig harbor. The Poles had the privilege of improving, leasing, or selling transit facilities. The residents of Danzig forfeited German citizenship, although formal provision was made for adults to request German citizenship within a two year period. Double citizenship in Danzig and Germany was forbidden. The League of Nations, as the Sovereign authority, was granted ownership over all possessions of the German and Prussian administrations on Danzig territory.

The formal treaty which assigned specific property of Poland was ratified on May 3, 1923. Facilities were assigned to the Free Harbor Commission supervised by the League of Nations in which the Poles participated. The Poles requested a munitions depot and base for a small Polish Army garrison. The Westerplatte peninsula close to the densely populated Neufahrwasser district was assigned to Poland on October 22, 1925. The Danzig Parliament protested in vain that this decision constituted "a new rape of Danzig." The Poles also received permission to station warships and naval personnel in the area. These various awards meant that by 1925 the Polish Government was the largest owner of property in the Free City area.

The Danzig constitution was promulgated on June 14, 1922, after approval by Poland and the League of Nations. The constitution provided for a Volkstag (assembly) of 120 members with four year terms. It was primarily a consultative body with the right to demand information about public policy, although the formal approval of the Volkstag for current legislation enacted by the Senate was required. The Senate with its 22 members was the seat of carefully circumscribed local autonomy. The President and the other seven major administrative officers, who were comparable to city commissioners, were elected for four years and received fixed salaries. The British Government played a more active role than any other Power, including Poland, in the organization of the Danzig regime. British policy was decisive in the regulation of early disputes between Danzig and Poland. The British at Danzig furnished the first three League High Commissioners, Sir Reginald Tower, General Sir Richard Haking, and Malcolm S. MacDonnell, and the last of the British High Commissioners, after an Italian and Danish interlude, was Sean Lester from Ulster, who held office from 1934 until late 1936. British interest was largely a reflection of British investment and trade, and much of the industrial enterprise of Danzig came under the control of British citizens during these years. The British also played a decisive role in securing the appointment of Carl Jacob Burckhardt, the Swiss historian who succeeded Lester and who held office until the liberation of Danzig by Germany on September 1, 1939. The so-called liberation of Danzig by the Red Army

on March 30, 1945, referred to in recent editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, was actually the annihilation of the city.

The territory of the Free City had approximately 365,000 inhabitants in 1922. The Polish minority constituted less than 3% of the population at that time, but the continued influx of Poles raised the proportion to 4% by 1939. The German vote was badly split among the usual assortment of Weimar German parties. The Conservatives (DNVP) elected 34 deputies and the Communists elected 11. The Social Democrat Marxists elected 30 and the Catholic Center 15. The remaining 25 deputies were elected by strictly local Danzig German parties. This disastrous fragmentation in the face of a crisis situation was changed after the National Socialists won the Danzig election of 1933. The divided Danzig Senate presided over by a Conservative president was followed by a united National Socialist Senate. This created a slightly more favorable situation for coping with the moves of the Polish Dictatorship at Danzig.

The Poles with varying success began an uninterrupted campaign in 1920 to push their rights at Danzig beyond the explicit terms of Versailles and the subsequent treaties. One of the earliest Polish aims was to establish the Polish Supreme Court as the final court of jurisdiction over Danzig law. This objective was never achieved because of opposition from the League High Commissioners, but Poland was eventually able to establish her Westerplatte garrison despite the early opposition of League High Commissioner General Sir Richard Haking. The Poles never abandoned these efforts, and everyone in Danzig knew that their ultimate objective was annexation of the Free City. The existing system was unsatisfactory for Poland, Germany, and Danzig. The Poles wished to usurp the role of the League, and both Germany and Danzig favored the return of the new state to the German Reich. There could be no talk of the change of system in Germany in 1933 alienating the Danzigers, because the National Socialists won their majority in Danzig before this had been accomplished in Germany. The change of system in Germany was matched by the unification of Danzig under National Socialist leadership.

Danzig's at Separation from Germany

Danzig saw nothing of war or invasion from 1814 until the defeat of Germany in 1918. The Danzigers did not contemplate the possibility of annexation by the new Polish state until after the close of World War I. They were assured by German Chancellor Hertling in February 1918 that President Wilson's peace program with its 13th Point on Polish access to the Sea did not threaten their affiliation with Germany in any way. The President's Ambassador had assured the German Government that this was the case when the point about Polish access to the Sea was discussed before American entry into the war. The President's program was based on national self-determination, and Danzig was exclusively German. The Danzigers thought of port facilities for the Poles in German harbors along the lines subsequently granted to the Czechs at Hamburg and Stettin. This arrangement satisfied the Czech demand for access to the Sea. No one thought of Polish rule at Danzig

until it became known that the Poles were demanding Danzig at the peace conference, and that President Wilson favored their case. The disillusioned Danzigers petitioned the German authorities at Weimar to reject any peace terms which envisaged the separation of Danzig from Germany. There was still some hope in April 1919, when the Allies refused to permit Polish troops in the West under General Haller to return to Poland by way of Danzig. German troops occupied Danzig at that time, and the Poles were required to return home by rail.

The Danzigers were in despair after receiving the preliminary draft of the Versailles Treaty in May 1919. They discovered that some queer fate was conspiring to force them into the ludicrous and dubious situation of a separate state. Danzig discovered in May 1919 that the 14 Points and self-determination had been a trick, a ruse de guerre à l'américaine, and in June 1919, with the acceptance of the treaty by the Weimar Government; it was evident that Danzig must turn her back on her German Fatherland. The Allied spokesmen in Danzig urged her to hasten about it, and not be sentimental. The Germans had been tricked and outsmarted by the Allies. After all, Danzig had lost World War I.

Poland's Desire for a Maritime Role

The distinguished Polish historian, Oskar Halecki, has declared that the demands of Dmowski at Versailles were "unanimously put forward by the whole nation." Polish spokesmen have insisted that the entire Polish nation was longing for a free marine frontier in the North, and for a coastal position which would enable Poland to play an active maritime role. This was doubtless true after 1918, although for more than three hundred years, when Poland from the 15th to the 18th centuries held most of the West Prussian coastline, the Poles played no maritime role. Poland made no effort to build a merchant marine or to acquire colonies, although the neighboring German principality of Brandenburg, with a less favorable 17th century geographic and maritime position, engaged in foreign trade and acquired colonies in Africa. These facts in no way diminished the Polish right to play a maritime role in the 20th century, but it was unwarranted for Polish spokesmen to mislead the Polish people about their past.

An especially crass example of this was offered by Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, Vice-Premier of Poland from 1935 to 1939, and from 1926 the leading Government figure in Polish commerce and industry. Kwiatkowski was a close personal friend of President Moscicki, and he was entrusted with the organization of the Central Industrial Region (COP) of Poland before World War II. He was an expert engineer who had studied in Krakow, Lvov, and Munich, and he had earned the proud title "creator of Gdynia" for his collaboration with Danish colleagues in the construction of Poland's principal port. Kwiatkowski, like some other scientists, was guilty of distorting history, and he went to absurd lengths to identify Poland with the nests of West Slavic pirates of the early Middle Ages who had operated from Rügen Island off the coast of Pomerania. Kwiatkowski announced at a maritime celebration on July 31, 1932, that, if the heroes of Poland's great naval past

could raise their voices once again, "one great, mighty, unending cry would resound along a stretch of hundreds of miles from the Oder to the Memel: 'Long live Poland!'"

At Paris the Poles had argued that Danzig was indispensable for their future maritime position. Lloyd George frustrated their plan to annex Danzig, but they were told by the Danes that the West Prussian coast north of Danzig presented the same physical characteristics as the north-eastern coast of Danish Zealand. The Danes had built Copenhagen, and there was no reason why the Poles could not build their own port instead of seeking to confiscate a city built by another nation. The Poles were fascinated by this prospect, and they were soon busy with plans for the future port of Gdynia. The construction of Gdynia and Polish economic discrimination in favor of the new city after 1924 produced a catastrophic effect on the trade of the unfortunate Danzigers. The Poles had originally insisted that Danzig was the one great port they needed to guarantee their maritime access. They soon began to speak of modern sea power, and it was easy to demonstrate that one port was a narrow foundation for a major naval power. They described Danzig as their second lung, which they needed to breathe properly. It was a matter of complete indifference to them that Danzig did not wish to be a Polish lung.

They were equally unmoved by the fact that millions of their Ukrainian subjects did not care to live within the Polish state, and that nearly one million Germans had left Poland in despair during the eighteen years after the Treaty of Versailles. Life had been made sufficiently miserable for them to do otherwise. It could be expected that the Germans would also evacuate a Polish Danzig, and thus make room for a Polish Gdansk. The Polish leaders were encouraged to hope for this result because of the manifestly ridiculous and humiliating situation created for Danzig by the Treaty of Versailles.

Pilsudski's preventive war plans dated from 1933, when Germany was weak. After the 1934 Pact, the Poles opened an intensive propaganda campaign against the Czechs, and the prospects for a Polish success at Teschen, in cooperation with Germany, were not entirely unfavorable. It seemed by contrast that Poland had nothing more to seek at Danzig. Pilsudski had declared in March 1935 that no Power on earth could intimidate Germany any longer. Hitler talked with good sense and conviction of abandoning claims to many German territories in Europe which had been lost after World War I. These included territories held by Denmark in the North, France in the West, Italy in the South, and Poland in the East. Hitler expected Poland to reciprocate by conceding the failure of her earlier effort to acquire Danzig. Hitler was not prepared to concede that Danzig was lost to Germany merely because she had been placed under the shadowy jurisdiction of the League. Danzig was a German National Socialist community plagued with a Polish economic depression and prevented from pursuing policies of recovery to improve her position. Danzig wished to return to Germany.

Hitler's Effort to Prevent Friction at Danzig

The Poles were seeking to extend their privileges at Danzig when Hitler was appointed Chancellor in 1933. There had been chronic tension between Danzig and Poland throughout the period of the Weimar Republic in Germany. Indeed, the 1919 settlement at Danzig virtually precluded conditions of any other kind. The improvement of German-Polish relations shortly after the advent of Hitler was accompanied by a temporary relaxation of tension between Poland and Danzig, but it would have required a superhuman effort to maintain a lasting *détente* within the context of the Versailles status quo. Hermann Rauschning, the first National Socialist Danzig Senate leader, was known to be extremely hostile to Poland, but Hitler persuaded him to go to Warsaw for talks with the Polish leaders in July 1933. Rauschning was accompanied by Senator Artur Greiser, who was known for his moderate views on Poland. A favorable development took place on August 5, 1933. Danzig and Poland agreed to settle important disputes by bilateral negotiation instead of carrying their complaints to the League of Nations. Either party was obliged to give three months' notice before appealing to the League if bilateral negotiations failed. The Poles also agreed to modify their policies of economic discrimination against Danzig, but they failed to keep this promise.

The following year was relatively calm although there were many irritating minor incidents involving economic problems and the operations of Polish pressure groups on Danzig territory. Danzig and Poland concluded an economic pact on August 8, 1934, which contained mutual advantages on taxes and the marketing of Polish goods in Danzig territory. The conciliatory trend at Danzig was strengthened when Greiser succeeded Rauschning as Senate President on November 23, 1934. The Poles had no complaints about Greiser, but they objected to Albert Forster, the National Socialist District Party Leader. Forster was an energetic and forceful Franconian with the *Sturheit* (stubbornness) characteristic of the men of his district. He was one of Hitler's best men, and his assignment at Danzig was a significant indication of the seriousness of Germany's intentions. Forster was less cosmopolitan than Greiser, but he was highly intelligent, and he fully understood the scope and significance of the Danzig problem despite his West German origin. He was a stubborn negotiator with both Poland and the League, but he loyally supported Hitler's plans for a lasting agreement with Poland. He also shared Hitler's enthusiasm for an understanding with England. Lord Vansittart described Forster in his memoirs as "a rogue [Forster was exceptionally handsome] who came to our house with glib professions and a loving mate [Forster's wife was exceptionally beautiful]." This brief rejection of Forster by the leading British Germanophobe tallied closely with the negative attitude of the Poles.

The effort of Hitler to achieve greater harmony with Poland at Danzig did not achieve lasting results. Friction began to increase again early in 1935, and this trend continued until the outbreak of war in 1939. Many of the new disputes were economic in nature. Danzig was experiencing a severe depression, and the local National Socialist regime wished to do more to help the people than had been done by the Conservative regime in

the past. The lack of freedom made it impossible to emulate the increasing prosperity which existed in Germany. The deflationary monetary policies of Poland were anathema in Danzig, where the Danziger Gulden was tied to the scarce Zloty of the Poles. An attempt to free the Gulden from the Zloty, without leaving the Polish customs union, produced a crisis in May 1935. Danzig received much expert advice from Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the German Reichsbank. The Polish financial experts regarded this as unwarranted German interference in the affairs of German Danzig. The crisis reached a climax on July 18, 1935, when Poland put Danzig under a blockade, and commanded the shipment of all goods through Gdynia. Danzig responded by opening her economic border with East Prussia in defiance of Poland. This involved an attempt to circumvent the Polish customs inspectors and to ignore the Polish tariff requirements. Hitler intervened at this critical point and used his influence to obtain the agreement of August 8, 1935, which amounted to a total retreat for Danzig. This capitulation ended any hope that Danzig might be able to ameliorate the economic depression through her own efforts.

A typical dispute of this drab period transpired in 1936 when the Poles abruptly issued regular Army uniforms to the Polish customs inspectors in the hope of accustoming the Danzig population to a regular Polish military occupation. The Danzig Government protested, but the Poles, as usual, refused to accept protests from Danzig. A dangerous atmosphere was maintained by the constant agitation of the Polish pressure groups. The Polish Marine and Colonial League demonstrated in Warsaw in July 1936 for the expansion of existing Polish privileges at Danzig, and its activities were accompanied by a new campaign against Danzig in the Polish press. Relations between Poland and Danzig were as bad as they had been during the Weimar Republic. Hitler had attempted to reduce friction on the basis of the status quo, but this effort had failed.

The Deterioration of the Danzig Situation after 1936

Issues of dispute between Danzig and Poland were markedly on the increase throughout 1937. Chodacki later declared that fifteen one thousand page volumes would be required to describe the Danzig-Polish disputes prior to World War II. There can be no doubt that the year 1937 contributed its share. Times remained hard in both Danzig and Poland, and the great majority of disputes were economic in nature. The Poles placed heavy excise taxes on imports from the huge Danzig margarine industry to protect Polish competitors. They rejected the contention of Danzig that this measure was a violation of the August 6, 1934, economic treaties to eliminate trade barriers between the two countries. This single dispute produced an endless series of reprisals and recriminations. Irresponsible fishing in troubled waters by foreigners also occasioned much bad feeling. A typical example was the circulation of rumors by the Daily Telegraph, an English newspaper. The Daily Telegraph reported on May 10, 1937, that Joseph Goebbels had announced Germany's intention to annex Danzig in the near future. It is easy to understand the effect produced on the excitable Poles in the Danzig area by such reporting, and it would

have been a pleasant surprise if this particular newspaper of Kaiser-interview and Hoare-Laval Pact fame had not contributed to alarmism at Danzig. The statement attributed to Goebbels in this instance was purely an invention. By 1938, tension had been built up to a point where incidents of violence played an increasingly prominent role. Meetings of protest, more frequently than otherwise about imaginary wrongs, were organized by pressure groups in surrounding Polish towns. They invariably ended with cries of: 'We want to march on Danzig!' and with the murderous slogan: 'Kin the Hitlerites!'

Chodacki told Smigly-Rydz at Polish Army maneuvers in September 1937 that the National Socialist revolution in Danzig was virtually completed, and that the "Gleichschaltung" (coordination) of Danzig within the German system had been achieved. The one exception was that Danzig still had her made-in Poland depression, whereas Germany was swimming in plenty. The effective organization work of Albert Forster convinced the Poles that Danzig was at last slipping through their fingers. Awareness of this increased Polish exasperation. Chodacki claimed that in 1938 one of his speeches at Torun or elsewhere in West Prussia would have been sufficient to set a crowd of tens of thousands marching against Danzig. He admitted that he was often tempted to deliver such a speech. He felt goaded by fantastic attacks in the Krakow press that he was too conciliatory toward Danzig.

The Need for a Solution

The Danzig problem by 1938 was a skein of conflicting interests between exasperated Poles and impatient Danzigers. The absurd regime established at Versailles was a failure. Hitler intervened repeatedly for moderation, but he was no less disgusted with the humiliating farce than the Danzigers, and he was weary of conciliation at Danzig's expense. Intelligent foreign observers expected this attitude. Lord Halifax, who had out-manuevered Gandhi of India on many occasions, visited Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 19, 1937. He inquired whether Hitler planned to do something about Danzig. Hitler was understandably evasive in his reply, but Halifax made no secret of the fact that he expected German action to recover Danzig. The current mentality of the Polish leaders indicated that a solution would be difficult, and it is painful to recall that the entire problem would not have existed had Danzig not been placed in a fantastic situation by the peacemakers of 1919. The Danzig problem resulted from a wretched compromise between Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson. It epitomized the comment of the American publicist, Porter Sargent: "The Anglo-Saxon peoples held the world in the palms of their hands, and what a mess they made of it". There was nothing left but to try for a solution. It would be scant consolation in the event of failure to know that the blame would be shared by men of two generations. The cost of failure would be paid by untold generations.

11.8 German-Polish Relations 1918 – 1939

Poland declared independence upon the collapse of Russia, and the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918. France supported Polish claims for additional territory in order to strengthen the emerging state. Wilson remarked, "The only real interest of France in Poland is in weakening Germany by giving Poland territory to which she has no right." The French historian and political analyst Jacques Bainville observed, "The liberated peoples of the East have been entrusted with the task of serving as a counterweight to the German multitude."

At this time, the Bolsheviks under Lenin were consolidating their control of Russia. The Red Army invaded Lithuania, which had declared independence in January 1919. The Polish army drove the Bolshevik forces back. Poland's popular military leader, Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, became head of state. An aggressive field commander, he invaded the Ukraine in April 1920 to destroy a Soviet troop concentration on the frontier. Believing that Poland must become "a power equal to the great powers of the world," Pilsudski conquered territories where less than five percent of the population was Polish. The Treaty of Riga ended the see-saw war against the Red Army on March 18, 1921, with Poland gaining Galicia. On Poland's western frontier in December 1918, the Polish secret military organization, Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW), seized Posen, where Polish and German residents lived in harmony. German Freikorps militia launched a successful counterthrust. France's Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch demanded that the Reich's Government withdraw these troops from Posen. Too weak to resist the French ultimatum, German Prime Minister Friedrich Ebert complied. Polish insurgents continued attacking German villages in the region.

President Wilson proposed a plebiscite for Upper Silesia to allow the inhabitants to choose their country. 22,000 POW men staged an insurrection in August 1919 to take the region by force. The Freikorps broke the revolt in less than a week. In February 1920, the Inter-Allied Control Commission assumed the administration of Upper Silesia. Over 11,000 French soldiers, supported by small contingents from the Italian and British armies, arrived to supervise the plebiscite. In the spring 1921 poll, 706,820 Silesians cast for union with Germany and 479,414 for Poland. Many Polish residents voted for Germany.

While the Allied commission fumbled with determining the ultimate boundaries, the POW staged another uprising in May 1921. Supplied with French weapons, the insurgents organized an army of 30,000 men. The Polish government officially denied supporting Wojciech Korfanty, the instigator of the revolts. The correspondent for the London Times observed ammunition trains passing regularly from Poland into Upper Silesia. The frontier was as "freely traversed as our London Bridge" he wrote on May 10. Though outnumbered, 25,000 Freikorps volunteers counterattacked on May 21, and forced the Poles onto the defensive. Once the Germans began to advance, the French and British stepped in to restore order. In October, the League of Nations awarded nearly a third of

the contested territory to Poland. Based on the plebiscite, the entire region should have fallen to Germany. In the portion granted Poland dwelled 40 percent of the Upper Silesian population. It contained six-sevenths of the zinc and lead production, all the iron, and 91 percent of the coal. Among the lands Germany lost was a 6,300 square-mile vertical strip of West Prussia extending from the Baltic coast down to Upper Silesia. Poland required this corridor, the Allies reasoned, to permit her to have unrestricted access to the sea. Within the corridor was the German port of Danzig. Just 15,000 of the city's 400,000 inhabitants were Polish. The people of Danzig overwhelmingly demonstrated for union with Germany, but the Peace Commission favored Poland. Lloyd George's tenacious resistance forced a compromise: the town became a "Free City" under League of Nations jurisdiction, subject to Polish customs administration.

During the Weimar Republic, every German administration and most influential political parties had advocated Poland's destruction. This attitude prevailed in the Reich's Foreign Office and in the Reichswehr as well. In September 1922, General Hans von Seeckt wrote to Chancellor Joseph Wirth, "Poland's existence is intolerable and incompatible with Germany's vital interests. It must disappear, and will do so through its own weakness and through Russia with our aid."

The Polish government's oppressive minority policy provoked the ire of other European states. Poland's Jewish, Ukrainian, and German populations suffered legal persecution to disenfranchise them, strip them of political influence, or force their migration out. The regime dismissed German officials and employees from civil service. It confiscated German farms, closed ethnic schools and forced the pupils to enroll in Polish educational institutions. These measures compelled many Prussian and Silesian Germans to move into Germany. A quarter of the ethnic German population had left Poland by 1926. Heinrich Brüning, German chancellor from 1930-1932, pursued a trade policy the Poles considered disadvantageous to their commerce. Pilsudski responded by conducting military maneuvers and massing troops near Germany's border. The Polish army concentrated formations in a ring around East Prussia, geographically separated by the corridor from the Reich. In 1930, *Mocarstwowiec* (The League of Great Powers), a newspaper mirroring Pilsudski's views, published this editorial: "We know that war between Poland and Germany cannot be avoided. We must prepare for this war systematically and energetically. ... In this war there will be no prisoners taken. There will be no place for humanitarian feelings." The Polish general staff had been weighing options for invading the Reich since 1921. German diplomats considered the appointment to Polish foreign minister of Joseph Beck, an army colonel and confidant of Pilsudski's, in November 1932 as indicative of a more militant policy.

Polish saber-rattling provoked resentment in Germany. The Reich's Foreign Office refused to renew even minor compacts with Poland about to expire. When Hitler became chancellor in January 1933, relations with his eastern neighbor were strained to the utmost. The Polish press launched a campaign of vilification against the new chancellor. Pilsudski deployed combat divisions near Danzig and reinforced the 82-man garrison guarding the

Westerplatte.

In April 1933, Pilsudski asked Paris for the second time in less than two months to join in a "preventative war" to invade the Reich. The French showed no interest. The German representative in Warsaw, Hans von Moltke, discovered the plan and duly warned Hitler. The Führer sidestepped a confrontation. During his first meeting with the Polish envoy on May 2, 1933, he proved gracious and reassuring. Hitler agreed to a public declaration that his government would observe all Polish-German treaties currently in force. In his foreign policy speech to the Reichstag on May 17, the German chancellor spoke of "finding a solution to satisfy the understandable demands of Poland just as much as Germany's natural rights." In November, Hitler offered Pilsudski a friendship and non-aggression pact. Only after another discreet, unsuccessful bid to enlist France for his "preventative war" hobbyhorse did the marshal agree. The two governments ratified a ten-year treaty the following January. New trade agreements provided a fresh market for Poland's depressed economy. Hitler banned newspaper editorials addressing German claims in the East. Warsaw relaxed the anti-German tendency of its own press. The Führer directed Danzig's National Socialist senate to cease complaining to the League of Nations about Polish violations of legal compacts there.

The German public disapproved of Hitler's rapprochement toward Poland. U.S. Ambassador William Dodd reported that even convinced National Socialists were disillusioned that the Führer had concluded a pact with Warsaw. Prussian nobles in the general staff and foreign office harbored anti-Polish sentiments and likewise rejected the change of policy. In October 1935, Moltke cabled from Warsaw, "Today the German minority in Poland feels left in the lurch by the German Reich." Hitler stayed on course. Warsaw's new emissary in Berlin, Joseph Lipski, experienced a warmth and popularity among his hosts previously unimaginable for a Polish diplomat.

After Pilsudski's death in May 1935, two government officials assumed virtual autonomy in their respective ministries, much to the detriment of Polish-German relations. These were Foreign Minister Beck and the army commander-in-chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly. Both were disciples of an expansionist foreign policy.

The friendship treaty with Germany evoked little sense of obligation on Poland's part. From Warsaw, Moltke informed his superiors, "The Poles think that they no longer need to restrict their steps against the German minority. They must be gaining the impression from the lack of any reaction in the German press, that all infringements will be accepted by German public opinion without objection." In February 1936, the German consul general in Thorn, Kiichler, wrote Berlin about the disproportionate transfer of German farms into Polish hands through government-implemented land reform: "As much German property as possible is supposed to be broken up before expiration of the ten-year agreement." Consul Nöldeke in Katowice described how on March 15, "In Königshütte, an assembly of the German Farmers Union was dispersed by a mob armed with sticks and clubs, during which German performers of the Upper Silesian country theater who were uninvolved bystanders were physically abused."

Diplomatic relations between Poland and the Reich further deteriorated due to a simultaneous tariff dispute. Dissatisfied with Germany's compensation for coal trains crossing the corridor from the Reich to supply East Prussia's energy needs, Warsaw announced in January 1936 that it would curtail 50 to 80 percent of German rail traffic there. The Polish Ministry of Transportation threatened to block it completely during negotiations. In March, Beck informed the French that Poland was ready to join France in a war against Germany. Marshal Rydz-Smigly visited Paris in September. He persuaded the French to loan Poland \$500 million in cash and war materiel to upgrade the Polish army. Warsaw already devoted over a third of the budget to armaments, even though the country suffered one of the highest illiteracy rates in Europe and much of the population lived in poverty. Rydz-Smigly ordered General Tadeusz Kutrzeba to draft a war plan against Germany. Completed in January 1938, the study envisioned a war with the Reich for 1939. To date, Hitler had never made a threatening gesture to Poland.

Of all territories robbed from the Reich after World War I, the German people felt most keenly the loss of Danzig and the lands taken by Poland. To placate his own public and remove one more obstacle to improving relations with Warsaw, Hitler required at least a nominal correction of the Versailles arrangement. He limited his proposal to two revisions. First, he asked to construct an Autobahn and railroad line across the corridor to connect Germany with East Prussia. The German diplomat Julius Schnurre had already suggested this to Beck in 1935 without receiving an answer. Secondly, Hitler wanted Danzig to come under German sovereignty. In return, he was prepared to acknowledge Germany's eastern border fixed by the Allied Peace Commission as final, something no Weimar administration had hitherto done, and offer Poland a 25-year non-aggression pact.

The Autobahn plan meant that Hitler was willing to renounce an entire province in exchange for a strip of real estate wide enough to accommodate a highway. Financed by the Reich, the project would utilize Polish labor and construction materials to help relieve unemployment in Poland. The recovery of Danzig required even less of Warsaw. The Danzig territory, encompassing 730 square miles, was under League of Nations, not Polish, jurisdiction. Regarding the city's value as a harbor, the Poles no longer needed it for nautical export; further up the coast they had constructed the port city of Gdynia, which opened in 1926. Offering economic incentives to shippers, they had taken more than half of Danzig's commerce by 1930. Hitler's package called for the Reich's forfeiture of Upper Silesia with its valuable industry, Posen and West Prussia. These provinces had been German for centuries and had belonged to Germany less than 20 years before. Nevertheless, it would abandon nearly a million ethnic Germans residing there to foreign rule, despite the fact that since March 1933, the Reich's Foreign Office had documented 15,000 cases of abuse against Poland's ethnic German colony. The Führer was willing to publicly announce that no more territorial issues exist with Poland. No Weimar administration could have survived such an offer.

Meeting in Berchtesgaden with Polish Ambassador Lipski on October 24, 1938, Ribben-

trop brought the German revisions to the table. His guest disputed the Reich's perception of Danzig's status as a "product of Versailles." Only Poland's rise, Lipski contended, had lifted the city from "insignificance." He told Ribbentrop that public opinion would never accept the city's transfer to Germany. Warsaw reaffirmed Lipski's position in writing on October 31. The letter conceded that Poland was prepared to guarantee the right of "Danzig's German minority" to preserve its national and cultural identity. Describing the population of a city that was 96 percent German as a minority was a studied provocation which Hitler decided to overlook. The Polish press campaign against Germany resumed.

On January 5, 1939, Beck visited Germany to negotiate with Hitler. The Führer insisted that Danzig's return to Germany must be a part of any final settlement with Poland. He reassured Beck that the Reich would never simply declare that the city has returned to Germany and present Warsaw with a *fait accompli*. He pledged that no final arrangement would deprive Poland of her access to the sea. Beck asked for time to weigh the situation carefully. In mid-January, Beck told Rydz-Smigly of his decision to reject the German proposals, though two weeks later he mendaciously reassured Ribbentrop that he was still contemplating the matter. A wave of fresh persecution swept over the ethnic German minority. On February 25, the British ambassador there, Sir Howard Kennard, reported to Halifax on a dialog with Moltke concerning farmhands and industrial workers in Poland who "were being dismissed because they happened to be Germans." In addition to the forced closing of German schools, it was becoming practically impossible for a German living in Poland to earn enough to exist. Kennard concluded that there was "little likelihood of the Polish authorities doing anything to improve matters."

An unrelated episode aggravated tensions. On March 22, the Germans recovered Memel from Lithuania. This was a narrow, 700-square mile strip of northeastern Prussia which the Lithuanians seized by force in 1923. The League of Nations demanded that the territory be governed according to democratic principles. In the 1925 elections, 94 percent of the voters – including many Lithuanian residents – cast for German parties. The Lithuanian government in Kaunas refused to recognize the results. The entire country fell under a dictatorship the following year. The authorities began jailing Prussian residents found guilty of "preserving German heritage."

After the Austrian Anschluss, Memel-Germans organized public demonstrations. In November 1938, Kaunas offered to negotiate with Berlin over the region's future. In an internationally supervised plebiscite in December, 87 percent of voters decided for union with Germany. Ribbentrop promised Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbys economic incentives for his country. Upon the transfer of Memel back to Germany, the Lithuanians employed their own dock workers and administrative personnel at the harbor there. They also operated a railroad across the now-German strip of Memel territory directly connecting the port to Lithuania. This was the same solution that Hitler had proposed to Warsaw regarding Danzig and the corridor. During the weeks before the final settlement with Kaunas, Berlin deployed the three army divisions garrisoned in East Prussia on the border with Memel. Rydz-Smigly declared this to be evidence that Ger-

many was about to annex Danzig. On March 23, 1939, he accordingly mobilized a large part of Poland's army reserve. Since Memel was at the opposite end of the province from Danzig, the three divisions were actually moving away from the city that Rydz-Smigly claimed they were about to seize. The Memel affair coincided with Germany's occupation of the Czech rump-state on March 15. Beck exploited the occasion to negotiate with London to form an alliance against Germany. On March 24, Beck told Lipski and senior members of his staff that Hitler was losing the faculty to think and act rationally. Poland's "determined resistance" might bring him to his senses. Otherwise, Beck proclaimed, "We will fight."

Hitler maintained a conciliatory posture. His army commander-in-chief, General Brauchitsch, noted, "Führer does not want to settle the Danzig question by force." Hitler cancelled a March 24 directive that the diplomat Ernst von Weizsäcker had prepared for Moltke as a guideline for resuming negotiations. The Führer considered it "somewhat harshly formulated" and objected to its tenor "confronting the Poles with a sort of friend-or-foe option."

Returning to Berlin, Lipski delivered a letter to Ribbentrop on March 26 formally rejecting the Danzig-Autobahn proposal. Lipski bluntly told his host, "Any further pursuit of these German plans, especially as far as the return of Danzig to the Reich is concerned, will mean war with Poland." This threat, together with Rydz-Smigly's partial mobilization against Germany, violated the 1934 non-aggression and friendship treaty: The pact stated word for word, "Under no circumstances will (the signatories) resort to the use of force for the purpose of settling issues in controversy."

The British responded favorably to an alliance with Poland. The western democracies had just lost Czechoslovakia as an ally flanking the Reich. Her military-industrial resources were now at German disposal. The British army chief of staff warned Chamberlain that in the event of war against Germany, it would be better to have Poland on the Allies' side. On March 30, Kennard received instructions from London to present the British offer to guarantee Poland. Beck accepted immediately. The next day, Chamberlain explained the details in the House of Commons: "In the event of any action which clearly threatens Polish independence and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power."

Beck visited London to conclude details for the alliance on April 3. On the 23rd, Warsaw mobilized another 334,000 army reservists, again in the absence of threats from Germany.

Hitler addressed the Reichstag on April 28. He explained how the Anglo-Polish agreement obligated the Poles to take a military position against the Reich, should it enter into an armed conflict with any state guaranteed by England. Hitler continued, "This obligation contradicts the agreement I previously made with Marshal Pilsudski; since the (1934) agreement only takes into account obligations already in existence at that time, namely Poland's commitments regarding France. To belatedly expand these commitments is

contrary to the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Under these circumstances, I would never have concluded this pact back then; for what sense does it make to have a non-aggression pact, if it leaves a number of exceptions for one partner practically wide open? Hitler voided the compact. He added in his speech that he would welcome a Polish initiative to negotiate a new treaty governing Polish-German relations.

Warsaw's agreement with London opened a floodgate of war scares and hostile editorials in the Polish press. The German consul general in Posen reported to Berlin on March 31, "Scarcely a day goes by in which Posen newspapers don't publish more or less aggressive articles or insulting observations about Germans." Although Hitler had personally instructed his foreign office that there must be "no talk of war" in the negotiations, the French ambassador in Warsaw, Leon Noel, reported to Paris, "Patriotic sentiment among the Poles has reached a zenith in all parties and classes, thanks to the German threats."

Poland's ethnic German community suffered the backlash of media-generated Polish chauvinism. On April 13, the German consul in Danzig cabled to Berlin that rural Germans in the corridor "are so cowed that they have already buried their most valuable possessions. They no longer risk traversing roads and fields by daylight. They spend their nights in hiding places beyond the farms, for fear of being attacked."

The May 11 edition of the Polish newspaper *Dziennik Bydgoski Bromberg Daily News*) published an editorial asserting that the Germans in Poland "know that in case of war, no indigenous enemy will escape alive. The Führer is far away but the Polish soldier close by, and in the woods there's no shortage of limbs." The previous month, the Polish mayor of Bromberg, a town with a comparatively large German population, told journalists that if Hitler invaded there, he'd be stepping over the corpses of Bromberg's Germans.

Beck explained his policy to the Polish parliament on May 5. He claimed that Danzig was not German, but has belonged to Poland for centuries. He attributed the city's prosperity to commerce conducted by Poland ferrying export wares into Danzig via the Vistula River, omitting the fact that the waterway was no longer navigable, thanks to 19 years of improper maintenance under Polish administration. Beck disparaged Hitler's offer to recognize Polish sovereignty over the corridor, Posen, and Upper Silesia in exchange for Danzig. Since the provinces were already incorporated into Poland, he argued, Hitler was giving nothing in return. "A nation with self-respect makes no one-sided concessions," he crowed.

Historians praise Beck for defiantly defending his country from becoming a German satellite. Since Hitler's proposal included an offer for Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, reaching a Danzig settlement with the Reich would have supposedly drawn the Poles into an alliance with Germany against the USSR. Warsaw would then have eventually become embroiled in Hitler's planned military crusade against Russia. Beyond the fact that no German documents exist to support this theory, it overlooks the essence of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Its purpose was to promote cooperation among civilized nations to prevent internal Communist subversion. Governments would share intelligence, much

in the same way that Interpol affiliates do to combat global terrorism today. Also, Hitler had expressed his often-quoted ideas about invading Russia when he wrote *Mein Kampf* during the previous decade. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power in the former Czarist empire, the Führer no longer advocated such an option.

Through personal observation and discussions with diplomats in Berlin, Henderson was able to convey to London a realistic picture of German opinion. He wrote Halifax in May, "It must be borne in mind that Danzig and the corridor was the big question prior to 1933. One of the most unpopular actions which Hitler ever did was his 1934 treaty with Pilsudski. He had the whole of his party against him. Today the most moderate Germans, who are opposed to a world war, are behind him in his present offer to Poland." Henderson added that foreign emissaries in Berlin also consider Hitler's proposals justifiable: "According to my Belgian colleague, practically all the diplomatic representatives here regard the German offer in itself as a surprisingly favorable one."

Henderson grasped that Hitler's package was not a demand for Polish territory but accepted a significant loss of formerly German lands to Poland. In a May 17 dispatch to Halifax, Henderson wrote, "The fact that what was regarded here as a generous offer of a 25-year German guarantee of the existing Polish frontier in exchange for a satisfactory settlement of the Danzig and Corridor problem had been rejected out of hand by Poland has not only incensed Herr Hitler personally, but has made a deep impression on the country as a whole." The ambassador also referred to "the traditional German feeling of hatred for Poland, particularly in the army, and Polish ingratitude for Germany's past services." On May 16, Henderson summarized a conversation with Weizsäcker in a letter to Sir Miles Cadogan, the undersecretary in the Foreign Office: "He like all Germans feels bitterly about the Poles. They grabbed what they could after Vienna and Munich and then bit the hand that fed them on these occasions. That is the German view nor is there a single German who does not regard Hitler's offer to Poland as excessively generous and broadminded."

Hitler understood that he could never normalize relations with Poland without a Danzig settlement. The British guarantee for Poland had robbed Hitler of the opportunity to withdraw his demands without losing face. On April 3, 1939, he ordered the OKW to draft a study for combat operations against Poland. He stipulated that the military solution would only be exercised "if Warsaw revises its policy toward Germany and assumes a posture threatening to the Reich."

Berlin continued to receive reports from its consulates in Poland regarding harsh treatment of the German colony there. On May 8, on instructions from Hitler, press chief Otto Dietrich directed newspaper editors to "practice a certain restraint in reporting such incidents" and not publish them on the front page. Regarding the Polish media, Henderson observed, "The fantastic claims of irresponsible Polish elements for domination over East Prussia and other German territory afford cheap fuel to the flames."

In June, Hubert Gladwyn Jebb and Sir William Strang of the British Foreign Office

visited Warsaw. Jebb sent back a report on the 9th that summarized the discussions with Polish government ministers and army officers. He quoted a Polish economist in Warsaw's foreign ministry as describing how Polish farmers anticipated generous grants of German land after the war with Germany. Jebb opined that the Polish general staff was "overly optimistic" and that officials in Warsaw had become "amazingly arrogant" since the British guarantee.¹ The following month, British General Sir Edmund Ironside visited Poland. Rydz-Smigly told him that war with Germany is unavoidable. None of the British emissaries said anything to the Poles to mollify this bellicose attitude. Since June, as reported by Moltke, 70 percent of the Germans in Upper Silesia were out of work, compared to Poland's national unemployment rate of 16 percent. The Reich's Government registered 70,000 ethnic German refugees who had recently fled Polish sovereign territory. Another 15,000 had taken refuge in Danzig. Among the acts of brutality inflicted on those still in Poland were five documented cases of castration. Kennard protested to the Polish government about the abuse of the German minority. The complaint "did not appear to have had any definite results," he notified his superiors.

The crisis also focused on Danzig, still administered by League of Nations Commissioner Carl Burckhardt but under Poland's customs union. The city's senate was embroiled in a perpetual controversy over the conduct of the Polish tariff inspectors. Originally numbering six, in 1939 the roster had climbed to well over 100. Polish officials performing these duties roamed areas beyond their jurisdiction, primarily interested in potential military details. They rendezvoused at Danzig's rail terminal, which was under Polish administration. A transmitter there relayed intelligence to Warsaw. In the event of war, the inspectors were to lead irregular troops, supplied from arms caches concealed in the city, to hold positions in Danzig until the Polish army arrived. Danzig's senate president, Arthur Greiser, protested to the Polish commissioner in Danzig, Marjan Chodaki, on June 3, 1939, about the customs inspectors. Chodaki replied that the number of his customs agents was still insufficient, because German inspectors were not doing their job. He threatened economic sanctions against Danzig. In another note on August 4, Chodaki stated that Polish customs officials would henceforth be armed. Interference with their activity would result in an immediate reprisal against Danzig; the Poles threatened to block the import of foodstuffs. Beck informed Kennard that Poland would intervene militarily if the Danzig senate failed to comply with Polish terms.

On August 9, Weizsäcker met with the Polish chargé de affaires in Berlin, Michael Lubomirski. He protested the Polish ultimatum to Danzig of August 4. Sanctions against the "Free City", Weizsäcker warned, may result in Danzig seeking stronger economic ties with Germany herself. The next day, an undersecretary in Warsaw's foreign ministry told the German chargé de affaires that any involvement by the Reich's Government in the Danzig issue would be regarded by Poland as an act of war. Rydz-Smigly contributed to tensions with remarks made in a public speech: "Soon we'll be marching against the hereditary German enemy to finally knock out his poison fangs. The first step on this march will be Danzig. . . . Keep ready for the day of reckoning with this arrogant

Germanic race]’ Burckhardt described Poland’s intentions as “excessively belligerent.”

Warsaw issued an official press release detailing how Greiser had withdrawn his demands after the note exchange with Chodaki. According to the Polish press, a single, mildly harsh note had “forced Hitler to his knees.” The Anglo-French media triumphantly reported that the Führer had had to “climb down.” Hitler told Burckhardt on August 11, “The press said I lost my nerve, that threats are the only way to deal with me. That we backed down when the Poles stood firm, that I had only been bluffing last year, and my bluff flopped thanks to Poland’s courage that the Czechs didn’t have. I’ve read idiotic remarks in the French press that I lost my nerve while the Poles kept theirs.”

Hitler asked Burckhardt, “Could you go yourself to London? If we want to avoid catastrophes, the matter is rather urgent.” Halifax, certainly no friend of Germany, cabled Kennard on August 15, “I have the impression that Hitler is still undecided and anxious to avoid war.” The day before, Roger Makins in the British Foreign Office wrote England’s delegate in Geneva, Frank Walter, that the Führer wanted to open negotiations to prevent an armed clash. Historians assert that Hitler was determined to invade Poland. However, had this been his intention, he could have instructed the Danzig senate to pass a resolution abolishing League of Nations jurisdiction and returning the city to the Reich’s sovereignty. This would have provoked the Polish military response Beck warned of, and Germany could then intervene with her own army in order to defend the Danzig population’s right to self-determination. Given the sensitive issue of democratic principles, and the fact that Poland was striking the first blow, it would then have been difficult for Britain to justify support for Poland under the provisions of the guarantee.

The Polish government rounded up “disloyal” ethnic Germans and transported them to concentration camps. Authorities closed daily traffic between Upper Silesia and Germany, preventing thousands of ethnic Germans from commuting to their jobs in the Reich. Polish coastal anti-aircraft batteries fired on Lufthansa passenger planes flying over the Baltic Sea to East Prussia. The Luftwaffe provided fighter escorts for the airliners. In Danzig, the police chief formed his law enforcement personnel into two rifle regiments. In defiance of the League of Nations charter, the city re-militarized. The Germans transferred a battalion from SS Death’s Head Regiment 4 to Danzig. The 1,500-man “SS Home Guard Danzig” paraded publicly on Danzig’s May Field on August 18. The Poles evacuated the families of their civil servants, fortified public buildings and installations with armor plate or barbed wire and posted machine gun nests at bridges.

In his directive to the armed forces the previous April, Hitler had cited isolating Poland as a prerequisite for the military option. On August 23, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The pact, signed in Moscow, contained a secret clause defining mutual spheres of interest. It stated, “The question of whether or not maintaining an independent Polish state will appear desirable for both parties’ interests, and how this state should be divided, can be clarified in the course of further political developments.” In return for roughly half of Poland, the Soviet dictator gave Germany a free hand to invade. The Germans hoped that news of Soviet-German rapprochement would demonstrate to

Beck that his country's position had become precarious, compelling him to return to the conference table. Beck however, dismissed the alliance as untenable, because Russia and Germany harbored a serious ideological rivalry. A Warsaw communiqué stated, "The conclusion of the non-aggression pact has no influence on Poland's situation or policy."

On August 23, Hitler told his armed forces adjutant that the military must be ready to invade Poland by the morning of the 26th. The Führer then postponed the attack, explaining to General Keitel that he needed to "gain time for further negotiations," still seeking a "solution without bloodshed." The Poles, without provocation from Germany, closed Danzig's borders. Since the metropolis imported much of its foodstuffs, this created a critical situation for the population. Hitler and Göring requested British mediation to help persuade Warsaw to resume talks. From Warsaw, Kennard cabled London on August 25 that, were Beck or Lipski to seek an audience with Hitler, the Führer would consider this a "sign of weakness" and respond with an ultimatum. Chamberlain concluded the alliance with Poland the same day.

Along the German-Polish frontier, Polish border guards fired on ethnic German refugees attempting to flee into Germany. German infantry patrols crossed into Poland and fought to free them. On the 26th, a Polish cavalry unit rode boldly through German villages near Neidenburg in East Prussia. The German army's Artillery Regiment 57 engaged the horsemen on sovereign Reich territory. The Poles withdrew, leaving 47 dead on the battlefield. Hitler told Ribbentrop, "I would like to think that Beck and Lipski have good intentions. But they are no longer in control of the situation. They are captives of a public attitude that has become white-hot through the excesses of their own propaganda and the bragging of the military. Even if they wanted to negotiate, they aren't in a position to do so. This is the real root of the tragedy." Ribbentrop handed Hitler a telegram describing three further incidents of Polish gunners firing on German commercial aircraft. The Führer responded, "This is pure anarchy. What are we supposed to do?"

On August 29, Hitler received a half-hearted pledge from London to urge the Poles to enter negotiations, without, however, stating when. Tired of these dilatory tactics, Hitler wrote back that he expected a Polish diplomat empowered to negotiate by the following day. Examining the note in front of Hitler that evening, Henderson protested that it "has the ring of an ultimatum." The Führer retorted, "This sentence only emphasizes the urgency of the moment. Consider that at any time it could come to a serious incident, when two mobilized armies are confronting one another." Henderson insisted that the deadline was too short. Hitler responded, "We've been repeating the same thing for a week. . . . This senseless game can't go on forever.... My people are bleeding day after day." In Warsaw, Beck, Rydz-Smigly and the defense minister, Tadeusz Kasprzycki, conferred. They decided to declare general mobilization the next morning.

German diplomats and lawyers spent the morning of August 30 preparing the 16-point Marienwerder proposal as a basis for discussions with the Poles. The salient points were Danzig's immediate return to the Reich, a German transit route linking East Prussia to Germany, Gdynia remaining under Polish sovereignty, a minority protection treaty,

and a plebiscite for the population of the northern corridor region. Göring emphasized that the Führer is trying to avoid infringement of Poland's vital interests. Henderson confessed to London that Hitler is considering how generous he can be. Chamberlain's cabinet concluded that the proposal does not harm Poland's interests nor threaten her independence. Even the suggested corridor plebiscite should not have concerned Warsaw, since it claimed that the population there was 90 percent Polish. The French government recommended to the Poles that they negotiate. London telegraphed Kennard, instructing him to formally protest Poland's recent practice of shooting at German refugees.

The Polish Foreign Office assumed that Hitler would interpret any willingness on its part to negotiate as a sign of weakness. In reality, simply receiving the German 16-point plan represented no threat to Poland. It would have opened a dialog, and at the very least postponed the outbreak of war. The Poles could have broken off the discussions if Berlin imposed an ultimatum. They could then have fully relied on the support of the Western powers. Beck however, wanted no negotiations. On August 31, he cabled Lipski with instructions to inform Ribbentrop that Warsaw will "weigh the recommendation of the British government (to negotiate) in a favorable light and give a formal answer to this question in a few hours."

In the same message, Beck instructed his ambassador not to discuss anything with the Germans, and that he is not authorized to receive their proposals. That morning, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes tried to give a copy of Hitler's 16-point program to Lipski at the Polish embassy in Berlin. The Pole refused, replying that "in the event of war, civil strife will break out in this country and Polish troops will march successfully to Berlin."

The radio monitoring station in the Reich's Air Ministry intercepted Beck's transmission ordering Lipski not to accept a copy of Germany's Marienwerder proposals. Hitler now knew that Poland would not compromise over Danzig and the corridor. He nonetheless postponed the military operation once more, upon Göring's request for a last-minute conference with Henderson and the Swedish mediator Birger Dahlerus. Later that day, Göring's conference took place. He showed Henderson a transcript of Beck's instructions sent to Lipski. Henderson wrote Halifax, "The highly efficient German intelligence system proved its worth that afternoon in Berlin. Beck's telephone call, including the secret message, was instantly decoded. Here was proof to the German Government of Poland's delaying tactics and refusal to negotiate seriously." The meeting between Henderson and Göring was cordial, but failed to reach a solution. A session between Lipski and Ribbentrop the same evening was also fruitless. Hitler summoned Keitel at 9:00p.m. The directive he gave the general began, "Now that all political possibilities for relieving the intolerable conditions for Germany on her eastern border by peaceful means are exhausted, I have decided for a solution by force." Less than eight hours later, the German armed forces invaded Poland.

Historical documents reveal that the attack on Poland was not a step in a long-planned, systematic program to expand Germany's living space. Hitler ordered the offensive upon the failure to achieve a negotiated settlement. Among the most important issues was

the welfare of the ethnic German colony beyond the Reich's borders, though to wage war for the sake of people related by blood, but no longer by nationality, may today seem unjustified. The present-day "global community" concept rejects the notion that a nation can be defined more by its race than by geographical boundaries. During the 1930's, however, pride of ethnic heritage was a powerful force in the consciousness of the European peoples. The 1938 Munich Accord, by which Germany regained the Sudeten territory populated by ethnic Germans under foreign rule, was regarded by the Reich's Foreign Office as a legal precedent: "The right of protection from the mother state was fundamentally acknowledged once and for all, through an international act in which the four Great Powers and three other states took part." In August 1939, Hitler confronted a serious situation regarding Danzig and the German minority in Poland. Blockaded by the Poles since August 24, the Free City's German population faced economic ruin and potential starvation. During the month's final days, Polish radicals murdered over 200 ethnic German residents of western Poland. "German intervention was completely legitimate in accordance with on one hand, the right of the mother state to protect its ethnic families living under foreign rule, and on the other hand, with respect to their right to self-determination," as a German diplomat asserted. Hitler wrote Daladier on August 27, "I would despair of an honorable future for my people, if under such circumstances we were not resolved to settle the matter no matter what."

Beyond the moral and legal issues was that of national security. As mentioned, the Germans had discovered documents in Vienna and Prague revealing a covert policy of the British Foreign Office to weaken Germany. Chamberlain's arbitration of the 1938 Sudetenland crisis had satisfied Hitler's demands but also had rescued Czechoslovakia; at that time, Britain and France had not been equipped to wage war to defend this small but useful ally. Once Czechoslovakia collapsed in March 1939, the Anglo-French lost an integral component of their "collective security" alliance system. London's public guarantee of Poland followed immediately. Hitler surmised that Chamberlain's purpose for this declaration was to turn Poland against Germany, to replace one hostile state on the Reich's eastern frontier with another. The Führer told his architect, Hermann Giesler, that he believed that the coalition forming against Germany wanted war: "I must strive to prevent the encirclement of Germany or punch through it, regardless of what direction."

On August 9, 1939, Henderson had written Undersecretary Cadogan in London that both the Germans and the Italians believed that Poland would attempt to settle the dispute with the Reich by force that year, before British support becomes lukewarm. In Warsaw, army commanders and certain Polish politicians recommended challenging Germany soon, since the cost of indefinitely maintaining so many soldiers on active duty was too great a strain on the national budget. The general mobilization Poland announced on August 30 was another ominous sign for Hitler. Feeling threatened both to the east and to the west, he opted to strike first. One could perhaps judge his decision in the spirit of a maxim of Prussia's 18th Century monarch Friedrich the Great. He declared that in war,

the real aggressor is he who forces the enemy to fire the first shot.

11.9 Poland wants War

German Territories in Polish Hands

After the First World War, the “Right of Self-Determination of Nations” was to inaugurate an era of peace, as a new principle of international law. Accordingly, the U.S. American President W. Wilson tried to draw the borders in Eastern Europe along ethnographic settlement lines, respecting the principle of majority. Although wanting to secure access to the Baltic Sea for Poland, his understanding of the term, however, was to declare the Vistula (Weichsel) international and Danzig as a free port. But Poland was not going to wait for the outcome of the Versailles Peace conference that was stretching over many months and, instead, used the armistice of Germany to occupy the Posen region and parts of western Prussia. Wilson, who evidently had no understanding of the political and historical situation of Eastern Europe, would be hoodwinked, in the end, not only by the three leading Polish agitators Sosnowski, Dmowski and Paderewski, but also by the French, who were using falsified maps and faked statistics, as well as drawing attention to the Polish electoral votes in the U.S.A. The Versailles Peace conference accepted from Poland the *fait accompli*, with the stipulation, however, that the transfer of territory was made dependent on the Polish obligation of having to guarantee to the German and Jewish minorities far-reaching independence and the preservation of their national culture and traditional way of life. Irrespective of the Versailles border ruling, the Poles still occupied the eastern bank of the Vistula as well as other districts of West Prussia, thus denying all German access to this river.

France, that was to occupy a dominant position in European politics after the First World War and was to favour an eastern buffer against Germany “for security reasons”,⁴⁾ was lending her support to the Polish rebels’ campaigns of terror against the population in eastern Upper Silesia, as well as to the manipulations of constituencies taking place. Ultimately, this rich industrial area was made over to Poland, despite the German winning result of the plebiscite in 1921. In this way Poland acquired wrongfully a German territory of 46,150 square kilometres that was populated in the majority by Germans. That Versailles “peace treaty”, which was “another way of continuing the war”, “a potential declaration of war” that could “become an even greater evil for the whole world than the war itself”,⁶⁾ gave more to Poland than was deserved and much more than she should have claimed. Not only historians from abroad but statesmen of that period, yes, even Polish politicians, did not grow tired of pointing to the injustice hereby created and to the seedling of a new war hereby planted. Marshal Pilsudski’s famous remark:

“So you are lusting after Upper Silesia? But really Upper Silesia is an age-old Prussian colony!”

Indeed they were desirous of Upper Silesia. Many years of groundwork had been put in by Polish agitators in Britain and in the U.S.A. – here with more success. Thus Sosnowski, in a letter to President Wilson dated 7 April 1917, was demanding Upper Silesia on the grounds that it was especially the coal and coke industry that was mining that area, with all the related by-products, which had created the power base of Prussian militarism and that this threat needed to be eliminated. That there was the additional request in that programme for the destruction of Prussia, the dismemberment of Germany and the “restitution of the coastal territories stolen from Poland” (pronounced East Prussia), should be mentioned in passing. Underlying Dmowski’s agitating was the belief that “only a total remodelling of the European structure of states” could restore the balance “which has been destroyed by German expansionism”, and that Poland would have to become the focus of the non-German Central Europe. The prerequisite was for Poland to be economically and politically strong, and that reason made her possession of Upper Silesia, among other things, a necessity. Those same “statesmen”, who had described the partitioning of their country (by far the largest part went to Russia) as one of the biggest criminal acts in the history of the world, but who in turn were elevating just such dividing-up and destruction of their neighbour state (Germany) into one of the most important principles of their governing system, were now the new masters of Poland.

It goes without saying that they knew, as well as Pilsudski, who publicly stated it on 5 February 1919, that the “western borders of Poland were a gift of the coalition”, but this knowledge was never to be reflected in their policies. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, during the Paris negotiations:

“I tell you once more, we would never have thought of giving to Poland a province that had not been Polish for the last 900 years. . . The proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history, must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe...”

They knew this... and did nothing. Woodrow Wilson’s words of 7 April 1919 also went unheeded:

“France’s only real interest in Poland was to weaken Germany by giving the Poles areas to which they had no claim.”

U.S. Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, remarked on 8 May 1919:

“Do examine the treaty and you will find that whole populations, against their will, were delivered into the power of those who hated them, while their economic resources were snatched away and handed over to others. The result of such directives has to be hatred and bitterness, if not despair. It may take years until these oppressed nations are able to shake off the yoke, but as sure as night follows day, the time will come when they will try to break free. We have a peace-treaty, but it will not bring lasting peace, as it was founded on the quicksand of selfishness.”

The former British Ambassador in Berlin, D'Abernon, on 23 January 1926:

“The Polish Corridor remains the great powder keg of Europe!”

Even the Soviet press supported at that time the German demands for a revision. The French Professor of Slavonic studies, René Martel, in 1929:

“Amongst the thorny questions that have troubled us since the war, none is as regrettable and terrible as that of the eastern borders of Germany. There is not one person nowadays that does not know this truth.”

It should also be noted here that no German politician accepted these borders from 1920 till 1933 and that they were always open for revision. Hitler himself was the only one who offered these borders to be finalized but his offers were always ignored.

Poland Demands Territories outside Poland

Even the acquisition of the “Corridor” and Eastern Upper Silesia did not satisfy Poland, and this attitude had the reproach of imperialism directed at Poland in 1919 already by the Chief Powers of Versailles.

The Polish concept of a state would consider territorial expansion to the west as vital, because it would increase the availability of raw materials and thus secure for Poland the status of a leading European power. The Polish claims after 1918 knew no bounds. They included East Prussia, Danzig, Upper Silesia, parts of Mid Silesia and the “Oder territories”. These highly imaginative ambitions had already assumed a political character in numerous statements of the political agitators Sosnowski, Dmowski and Paderewski, or rather in the statements of the Polish National Committee, founded in Paris in 1917, and in the writings of the Polish peace delegation in Versailles, whose main representatives were Dmowski and Paderewski.

While the followers of Dmowski's policies were already at the beginning of the First World War making demands, during a lecture talk in Moscow, that Poland take possession of East Prussia, of Posen-West Prussia, of Upper Silesia and two districts of the county of Breslau, so Dmowski was demanding, in a treatise from July 1917, the annexation of Upper Silesia*), a small part of Mid Silesia, the province of Posen*), West Prussia*) and the districts of Lauenburg and Bütow in the province of Pomerellen and East Prussia. In his memorandum he put a choice of two possibilities to the western politicians:

“On the one hand, the future of 2 million Germans in East Prussia shall be secured at the expense of 25-30 million Poles. Among those 2 million, a considerable number would be German by language only; many of them would still remember that they are of Polish or Lithuanian origin, and often they would have a hostile attitude towards the Germans. On the other hand, the second possibility would be for Poland to establish her State within the proposed borders. In that way the (above mentioned) Germanized strip of land will be cut off from Germany, will quickly be developed economically and,

at the same time, will be opened up to Polish influence and to Polish immigration. It is not difficult to decide which of the two solutions is the more humane and more in accord with justice'."

What in the name of this "justice" was to happen to the East Prussian population was clearly articulated in the Polish "specialists' memorandum" of March 1919, which was presented to the Peace conference:

"The territorial isolation of East Prussia, this seat of Prussian militarism, is necessary for a lasting peace, and this must result in a voluntary and continuous de-Germanization of this important strategic area, from whence the Prussian dynasty has set off to conquer the world."

Dmowski also found arguments for requesting the incorporation of Danzig into this new Poland, since he had falsified totally the history of this German city:

"The Danzig of today is German; but under normal conditions, that is, with the requirements of a natural economic development, it will inevitably become a Polish city."

Dmowski expressed himself still more clearly in the previously quoted memorandum of March 1919:

"The Germanization of Danzig is superficial and, as soon as the Poles have the right to settle there, the city will once again become Polish (*redeviendra polonaise*), just like Krakow and other cities in Poland which at a certain era have had a German majority..."

Up to the middle of 1918, the Polish ambitions were met everywhere only with resistance and shaking of the head. Dmowski himself wrote:

"In Western Europe, not only amongst politicians, but also among men of science, geographers, statisticians, was the idea that the coastline of the Baltic Sea up to the mouth of the Niemen was German and could only be German so entrenched that when I began to talk about our territorial claims to the Baltic coast, they started rubbing their eyes, looking at me as if I were half mad. This went on for about three years. It is difficult for people to get rid of deep-seated ways of thinking. Still in the spring of 1918, a high-ranking French diplomat, who had devoted much time to the Polish question, told me: 'But it would truly be a miracle, Sir, if things were to happen as you say and your state reached up to the Baltic!' 'Perhaps it would be a miracle,' I replied, 'but the miracle must happen, if both your country, as well as we Poles, want to exist as an independent nation...' We have obtained that piece of coastline only because the war lasted so long, allowing us time to create favourable conditions, and especially to spread precise information about the true state of affairs in Pomerania."

It was not clear to President Wilson – as indeed many arguments of the Poles were not clear to him – why Poland and France, within the framework of the League of Nations, should be the "acting executive body" with regard to Germany. Yet none of this stopped Dmowski's memorandum of 8 October 1918 not only from being presented to the US President as well as to the Versailles Peace conference, but also from being

seriously discussed – although according to these proposals, this new Poland could not even produce 50% of inhabitants of Polish origin. In this memorandum East Prussia was described as “conditions there being positively medieval”, where “the peasant masses were kept in near-slavery and were brought up in the spirit of servitude”. If “social and political progress” were to be introduced there, then, according to Dmowski – and this report of his was submitted in the name of the Polish National Committee! – East Prussia had to go to Poland.

“... Yet the Polish ruling class and Polish intellectuals had aimed at the restoration of a Poland bounded by the frontiers of 1772. These frontiers would not in any way correspond with ethnical boundaries, and a State contained within them would not be a National State. Historical Poland was not a National State, but a multinational Empire which arose in the course of centuries when the dogma of Nationalism, as understood in modern times, did not exist.”

The British Foreign Minister, Balfour, also energetically opposed the French with the explanation:

“I have listened to this recommendation with concern; the Poland of 1772 shall become that of 1918, according to your reports. We did not pledge ourselves to that. What we have committed ourselves to is the creation of a Poland comprising Poles (Polonais). The State of 1772 does not meet this objective.”

Again and again the demand for revising the Versailles Treaty resounded throughout Poland after 1919. This, however, was understood by the Polish politicians to mean merely the fulfilment of further claims, first and foremost the claim for East Prussia and Danzig. Roman Dmowski, the leading Polish agitator at Versailles, explained in 1923:

“I never fought for the return of Poland – since that was taken for granted – what I was fighting for was the creation of a Greater Poland. The presentday Poland is not small, but we must all keep in mind that it is only the first instalment for a truly Greater Poland. As yet Poland is not a totally complete empire, but she must expand until she has become one, if her continued existence is ever to be permanent.”

Roman Dmowski was not alone in this. President Wojciechowski was emphasizing the request for additional territories for the purpose of creating Greater Poland. In the same year of 1923, the Polish Minister of Education and the Arts, Stanislaw Grabski, in his work “Observation on the present historical Moment of Poland”, had elevated the Polish expansion northwards into the supreme principle for Poland’s foreign policy. The objective of this policy was to be

“reinforcing the elements of victory in the struggle with Germany that was not yet at an end... The Baltic coast will, sooner or later, be the object of a clash between Poland and Germany... The Polish people cannot accept the result of the plebiscite in the Masuren region as the final verdict in this affair... The existence of the republic can only ever be of a permanent nature once we are victorious in the unavoidable fight

against Germany.”

Here we have Polish officials already thinking of war with Germany when Adolf Hitler hadn't even written *Mein Kampf* yet. The right-wing parties in Poland, particularly the National-Democrats, were rejecting a border revision along ethnographical principles already for the reason that the Treaty of Versailles had not satisfied all of their territorial demands. But also the Centre and the Left were not prepared to go along with it.¹⁸) The National-Democratic party of Poland was keeping alive their pan-Slavic expansionism, which had already been agreed upon as a Russian-Polish war aim in mid August 1914 between the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov and Dmowski and was condoned during the First World War by the Western Powers¹⁹) during the period 1919-1939. Dmowski's party colleague Giertych wrote on the subject of the Treaty of Versailles:

“Under the treaty, Poland obtained far more of the territories stripped from Germany than all the other states in Europe put together, including France... If any country can look upon the Versailles Treaty as a great political triumph, that country is Poland. ... We can say without exaggeration that, after the union with Lithuania in the year 1386, the Versailles Treaty constitutes the greatest achievement of Polish diplomacy in the course of our thousand-year history... Versailles is the only political victory in our history since the 17th century.” Roman Dmowski, in a speech in Posen 1923, took “the gifts from the coalition at the western borders, where Poland had not attained anything by her own efforts” merely for “a small down-payment for a truly Greater Poland”.

His National-Democratic doctrine did not simply intend to claim for Poland what was Polish, but rather

“that Poland demand as much as she could manage to Polonize.”

The Polish paper *Dzien Polski* stated in 1923:

“The taking possession of the Memelland was to be only the trial run for the eventual inevitable impending acquisition of East Prussia by Poland.”

Gazeta Gdansk on 9 October 1925:

“Poland must insist on the fact that she cannot exist without Königsberg and the whole of East Prussia. We must now demand at Locarno that the entire East Prussia be dissolved. It can have an autonomy with Polish sovereignty. Then there will no longer be a Corridor. Should this not come about in a peaceful way, then there will be a second Tannenberg (battle from 1410) and then, hopefully, would all domains return to the fold of their beloved motherland.”

A high-ranking Polish General Staff officer, H. Baginski, in a book published in Warsaw in 1927 and awarded the annual prize of the “Polish commission for international intellectual co-operation”, specified the main aims of Polish foreign policy: annexation of Danzig, East Prussia and most of Silesia.

“There can never be peace in Europe until all Polish territories are restored to Poland,

until the name Prussia, the name of a nation no longer in existence, is erased from the map of Europe, until the Germans have moved their capital westwards from Berlin, for example to the former capital of Magdeburg on the Elbe, or Merseburg on the Saale, until their state has again assumed its former name and until they have stopped dreaming about a 'revision of their border in the East'."

The French professor of Slavonic studies, René Martel, in the year 1929:

"All Polish ideas end up, basically, as plans for expansion. Far from wishing to resolve the question of the Corridor in a manner acceptable to Germany, they are dreaming in Poland of extending that territory by annexing Danzig and East Prussia in one way or another."

An article appearing in 1930 in the review *Mocarstwowiec* ("The great power league"), close to Pilsudski and, like all publications, subject to state censorship, read in part:

"We are aware that war between Poland and Germany cannot be avoided. We must systematically and energetically prepare ourselves for this war. The present generations will see that a new victory at Grunwald (allusion to the Battle of Tannenberg 1410) will be inscribed in the pages of history. But we shall fight this Grunwald in the suburbs of Berlin. Our ideal is to round Poland off with frontiers on the Oder in the West and the Neisse in Lausatia, and to incorporate Prussia, from the Pregel to the Spree. In this war no prisoners will be taken, there will be no room for humanitarian feelings. We shall surprise the whole world in our war with Germany."

During the year 1930-1931 there was published in the Sejm an official memorandum "Aims of Polish Foreign Policy" of the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw, in which Oder and Sudeten are described as the western-border-aspiration. The Polish nationalists were making additional demands for Memel and Lithuanian territory, as well as Czech and Slovakian assets.

"For the Polish press it was not enough that every request for a modification of the borders in favour of Germany had been rejected, but was propagating the need for 'the restoration of all Polish territories to Poland'. Thus we may read, for example, in the *Kalendarz Morski* (Gdingen) that the Polish people 'with all resoluteness' must demand 'the return of East Prussia' and, in the event of this not happening, 'the world would awake one day amid a thunderous roaring of war'. The result of the plebiscites in East and West Prussia of 1920 was fiercely attacked at every opportunity as a falsification of the true circumstances. Poland could not relinquish her 'ancient rights'..."

The Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, in 1932:

"Poland could not even be content with the status quo."

In the year 1939 also, members of the Polish government were repeatedly involved in increasing the warmongering and the propagating of these territorial demands – quite apart from the censored press that was keyed into this tune anyway. It is regrettable that in all this nobody thought of reproaching any of them for "being vengeful" and

“war-mongering”, and a law forbidding the “stirring-up of hatred amongst nations” and “racial mania” did not exist in Poland either.

On 3 June 1939, the Polish Vice Premier Kwiatkowski declared at the opening meeting of the Economic Council of Pommerellen:

“Pommerellen is, and ever will remain, Poland’s connection with the world.”

Equally, the Social Welfare Minister Koscialkowski stated on the 4 June 1939, on the occasion of the unveiling of the Pilsudski Memorial Tablet at Ciechocinek:

“The possession of Pommerellen is an indispensable condition for Poland’s economic and political prosperity. . . In the event of a struggle being forced upon Poland, to regain those ancient Polish regions which ought to have come to Poland long ago, is the aim of this fight.”

Apart from the innumerable press reports and statements that were made by leading spokesmen of the Polish public and delivered with the same aggressive zeal, there were five books in particular that would endorse this attitude of mind:

The first of these books:

Consulibus “Experiences and errors of our foreign policy with regard to the tasks of the present”, Warsaw 1926. Content: Demands partition of East Prussia between Poland and Lithuania and of Upper Silesia between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

The second:

Melchior Wankowicz “On the trail of the Smentek”, Warsaw 1936. Content: A journey through East Prussia, which will reveal the alleged oppression of the Mazurs, who, for their part, had become almost completely alienated from Poland.

The third:

J. Kilarski “Gdansk”, Posen 1937. Content: The city of Danzig is passed off as being formerly Polish; the population is allegedly only awaiting liberation from their ‘white-wash coating’ of Germanness.

The fourth:

Stanislaw Wasylewski “In the Opper Silesia”, Kattowitz 1937. Content: Aim and purpose of this book would be – according to the author – to acquaint the Polish public with a hardly noticed piece of ground, neglected and forgotten by Poland for centuries.

The fifth:

Jozef Kisielewski “The soil preserves the past”, Posen 1939. Content: “We were on the Elbe, we were pushed beyond the Oder... A favourable wind is filling our sails. After a long span of disfavour...”

The Polish demands for German land were not isolated occurrences. The official programme of the Polish West Marches Association, as defined in April 1926, demanded the drawing up of a Polish frontier from the Oder in the west (to include Stettin) up to the middle and lower Duna in the east (including Riga).

When in 1921 Poland was drawing up the frontier (treaty of Riga between Poland and

the Bolsheviks), incorporating seven million Ukrainians and two million White Russians into her state association, by no means did this signify that the dreams of a Great Polish Empire between the three seas – the North Sea, the Black Sea and the Adriatic – of the “geopolitical region of Poland” were now over. The Polish magazine *Nasza Przyszlosc* was proposing a Polish-Japanese border along the Urals in the summer of 1939. Polish maps depicting national frontiers reaching the Volga, along with corresponding publications and utterances by well-known Poles, were no isolated efforts.³⁹) The Greater Polish notions of incorporating the Ukraine up to and including Kiev and an overland connection to the Black Sea were as alive in 1939 in Polish government circles as they had been in 1919-1920.

“Mr. Beck ‘made no secret of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed towards the Soviet Ukraine’, when Ribbentrop visited Warsaw on 1 February [1939].”

For years the Polish governments have been tolerating these trends, have encouraged them, supported them and justified them. Not one of these demands have come about from any so-called need for having to offer resistance to the National Socialist form of rule in Germany or indeed to the foreign politics of the Third Reich. “The Piastian idea” of westward expansion was an equally purely Polish body of thought as was that of expansion northwards and eastwards. There is proof that the aim of the Polish general public before 1933 and after 1933 was exactly the same: to drive out and to displace the East German population.

From the time of her renewed founding in the year 1916, or rather 1918, up to 1939, Poland has been at war with every one of her neighbours (except Rumania) or was preparing to go to war. Of the 5,147 kilometres of Polish border almost 4,000 kilometres are disputed. In spite of her painful wounds Germany remained in these twenty years the only neighbouring country with whom Poland could enjoy temporary friendly relations – during the Hitler period!

In his memoirs, the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, described that policy as follows:

“Pilsudski well knew how much Poland owed to the victorious Allies of the first war. He was not blind either to the strength of the Western Powers or to the fact that their own interest prompted them to help Poland to achieve a place in the sun, despite pressure from her neighbours to the East and West. But he was more inclined to rely on his own resources than on the goodwill of Allies whom he lacked either the means or the inclination to get to know more closely. Moreover, Pilsudski, and especially those of his disciples who came to power after him, suffered, perhaps unconsciously, from an inferiority complex. It was, in their eyes, vitally important to cure their fellow-countrymen of their supposedly submissive and deferential attitude towards foreigners, due to uncritical admiration of the latter material or cultural superiority. This frame of mind on the part of Pilsudski and his successors gave rise to the so-called ‘Great Power policy’. In the Marshal’s day this was no doubt justified by political calculation; but after his death it degenerated into a

noxious fiction which threatened the very existence of the Polish State.”

However, this recognition did not prevent Raczynski to subscribe to the very same expansionist and great-power-policy mentality with which he charged the leadership. This emerges powerfully from his open letter to Lloyd George of 25 September 1939: In this letter he accused Lloyd George to be essentially responsible for the Polish defeat, because in 1919 he had awarded to Poland a “strategically indefensible” frontier and because he had prevented “the demilitarization of East Prussia” and “the restoration of the historic union of Danzig with Poland”. That the Polish leadership in the spring of 1939 was making claims to colonies and was intending to discuss these with the British government, and that three weeks later Lord Halifax was giving the unconditional guarantee against Germany in the full knowledge of these expansionist endeavours on the part of Poland – or precisely because of that? – should just be mentioned in passing.

H. Seton-Watson writes:

“The fact that the true political aim of the Polish ruling class was not nationalist at all but imperialist, that it involved the domination of Poles over large numbers of people of origin other than Polish, has never been sufficiently understood in Western Europe.”

Another German historian notes:

“If you would have visited Poland before the war you would have thought to be in a huge mental facility.”

Poland's Policy on her Minorities Fundamental Position

In spite of the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities, as decreed by the League of Nations, Poland considered Posen-West Prussia and the misappropriated part of Upper Silesia, but also the German city of Danzig, the territories to be “Polonized” once and for all. These aims were openly declared, and the relevant measures were taken stage by stage without any consideration for the people affected. Poland was using every conceivable means in this struggle for the cultural, traditional and national element and identity (Volkstum). The yearly agrarian reforms and the reparcelling of the agricultural land (“Flurbereinigung”), as well as the border zone laws, all contributed to a bloodless dispossession of the German population. A referendum for the choice of a particular nationality (Option), which had been brought about without informing the general public beforehand of the consequences that a positive declaration for Germany would incur, led already in 1920-1921 to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Germans. The German language as official language was to be prohibited and severely constricted otherwise. Exorbitant taxes, confiscation of community buildings and newspaper offices, systematic boycotting of German firms and shops, biased prosecutions against the press, lawsuits and bureaucratic harassment all led to financial strain, then to economic ruin and, finally, to the German people being turned out from their homeground. Associations and organizations were banned, professional licences refused or revoked, businesses expropriated.

German workers were systematically laid off, then deprived of unemployment benefit and evicted from company accommodation. All jobs in the public sector were allotted to Polish immigrants. Trade and commerce of the German people were heading towards ruin, especially since young Germans were denied apprenticeships. German schools were closed, German teachers intimidated if not dismissed, and German students were expelled from universities and thereby prevented from professional training.

“Of the 657 public schools for the German minorities in the year 1925 (1927: 498), there remained, at the beginning of the school year 1938-39, only 185 (150 in Posen-West Prussia and 35 in Upper Silesia). Resistance to this policy was faced down with the most drastic measures... In 1924 alone, about a third of German holdings (510,000 hectares) went into liquidation.”

Insults and violence were also the order of the day, and the Polish police would refuse, in most cases, to give protection to the German victims. The cultural life of the German minority was thus paralysed by these measures. The “liquidation of German estates and the de-Germanization of the western provinces” was no accidental public utterance from the former Premier Sikorski in 1923; it was unconcealed government policy 2) – since the year 1919. In October of that year, the future Minister for Education and the Arts, Stanislaw Grabski, announced, at a delegates’ conference, the “Posen programme” with the following words:

“We want to base our relations on love, but there is a love for fellow countrymen and another love for foreigners. Their percentage amongst us is by far too high. Posen can show us how 14 per cent or even 20 per cent can be reduced to 1.50 per cent. That foreign element will need to decide whether it will be better off somewhere else. Poland is exclusively for the Poles!”

Following a few examples of the various means of displacement:

“Withholding or withdrawal of citizenship, followed by expulsion from the territory on the grounds of dealing with a “foreigner”, deportation of former civil servants, teachers and other public employees together with their families, one-sided administration of taxes – especially of the enforcement of the tax regulations and of the rules for the Agrarian Reform, withdrawal of the entitlement to practise one’s occupation (by revoking of licences, concessions, permits) with the effect of wrecking the basis of economic life, calls for boycott tolerated by the authorities. ‘The consequent feeling of insecurity with regards to justice and the awareness of being at the mercy of an alien Power gave rise to a state of panic amongst the Germans, leading to panic selling of property and emigration of such magnitude that it even exceeded the consequential result of any Polish force brought to bear.’ This policy forced the German element of West Prussia and Posen to emigrate en masse between 1919 and 1926.”

German documentation attests:

“The hatred for Germanism had spokesmen in every party. Next to the National-

Democrats stood the Christian-Democrat Korfanty and the Pilsudskifollower and Voivode of Silesia, Grazynski. But even stronger than the sway held by political parties over public opinion was the influence of a number of organizations and institutions, although most of all it was the press that considered the fight against everything German to be their sole duty. Foremost of these is to be mentioned the 'Western Marches Society', whose original purpose had been to secure a Polish national character in the new western territories by a possibly complete displacement of the German element, but which had soon extended its activities throughout Poland. These consisted in the regular organization of whole weeks of propaganda, and also in 'spontaneous demonstrations' which were unleashed, after due preparation, against German schools, newspapers, bookshops, as well as against the personal safety of individual Germans. The 'Western Marches Society' was responsible for the 'Black Palm Sunday' 1933 in Lodz, when on that day German cultural institutions (publishing house, school, bookshops etc. were wrecked. Furthermore, the Polish insurgent associations in Upper Silesia and Posen were to distinguish themselves by their radical, often brutal, anti-German attitudes. They saw to it that even in times, when an obvious easing of political tension was evident, the anti-German mood was kept alive."

Again, it must be emphasized, this policy was an official government programme. Whatever historical documents are consulted, everywhere is to be found depressing evidence which, on the part of Prussian or German policies vis-à-vis the Poles of such single-mindedness and degree of violence, had hitherto been unknown. Whatever Poland might say of the Prussian Kulturkampf of the 1870s, the Settlement Law of 1886 or the Expropriation Law of 19087), the fact remains that after a century of German rule (1815-1918), there were in the province of Posen 41.3 per cent and in West Prussia 24.1 per cent of the rural land holdings in the possession of Polish landowners.⁸) The generosity of Prussia even went so far as to make it possible, at the turn of the century, for Polish seasonal workers to acquire private land on a scale of 29,000 hectares in the purely German region of East Prussia, where there had never been a Polish settlement before. These seasonal workers were directed by the West Marches Association (Westmarkenverband), the "Landbank", founded in Posen in 1886, and a close network of Polish Cooperative banks and institutes engaged in the parcelling-out of land. In the notorious memorandum of 8 October 1918, which Roman Dmowski had presented to the American President Wilson, demanding considerable territorial expansion for Poland, this Polish agitator admitted – and thereby the following Polish agitation to this day is reduced to absurdity:

"All the endeavours of the German people and the German government could not break the national resistance of the Poles. The Polish population and the Polish ownership of property were growing steadily and the Polish businessman, as well as Polish industry, was rapidly gaining a foothold in the competition with German commerce and German industry. This is proof of the strength and the ability to survive of the Polish population in the entire territory, and is, at the same time, also the most striking example of a government acting against the will and the interest of the people, a government that will

retain its destructive character as long as the Polish provinces are part of Germany.”

Let history record the following: While under German rule, “Polish ownership of property was growing steadily”, and Polish commerce, as well as Polish industry, “was rapidly gaining a foothold amongst their competitors”! This Poland of the twentieth century looked upon co-existence with the German people in a completely different light:

“Weighty also were the economic and social measures put upon members of the [German] minority: expropriation of forest and farmland, dismissal of public and private employees, refusal to take on apprentices and other applicants for employment or to accept applicants for civil service posts, refusal to promote public servants on the grounds of nationality, cancellation of the entitlement to pensions and state-benefit income, refusal to consider German-owned businesses for municipal public orders. This in particular affected the Germans in both Poland and Czechoslovakia. The persons affected by these and similar restrictions of rights should have had recourse to the protection of the League of Nations. In retrospect it has to be acknowledged with deep regret that the way this duty was discharged by the League was quite inadequate. Already the procedural prerequisites, which had been designed for the complaints of minorities, were detrimental to a speedy and benevolent settlement of such cases; so it was that not even a twentieth part of the petitions, which had been sent to the League of Nations between 1920 and 1930, were given a decisive ruling. The other 95.5 per cent were either rejected or remained unfinished.”

In 1936 Marshal Smigly-Rydz’s paper, the Warsaw Kurjer Porany, commented on this subject:

“One cannot actually state that the Germans will succeed in stopping the continuing process of de-Germanization of the Western regions, but there is no doubt that they intend to put obstacles in the way of this process. Thus the Poles could be sure of getting ever closer to their goal of ejecting or absorbing the German element. The only thing they need fear from the activity of the Germans was a certain slowing of the pace.”

Of course, French and British politicians protested now and then in Warsaw, but without any vigour and without any effect. The Manchester Guardian reported from Poland on 14 December 1931:

“The minorities in Poland are to disappear. Polish policy makes sure that they do not disappear on paper only. This policy is recklessly pushed forward, without the least regard for world public opinion, international treaties or the League of Nations. Under Polish rule the Ukraine has become hell. The same can be said of White Russia with even more justification. The aim of the Polish policy is the disappearance of the national minorities, on paper and in reality.”

The same British newspaper had stated a year earlier, on 17 October 1930:

“The Polish terror in the Ukraine is today worse than anything else in Europe. The Ukraine has become a land of despair and destruction. The situation is all the more of

a provocation, considering that while the rights of the Ukrainians have been guaranteed under international law, the League of Nations remains deaf to all their appeals and requests and the rest of the world knows nothing of the facts, or else does not care..."

An indication of just how charged were the German-Polish relations before 1933 is the fact that up to 1923 over half-a-million Germans had to leave their homeland Posen-West Prussia and, according to Polish quarters, that number had risen to one million by 1931. That figure represented – even before Hitler came to power – almost half of the local German residents! By August 1939, about one and a-half million (1.5 m) out of a total of two million and two hundred thousand (2.2 m) Germans from the territory of the Corridor and East-Upper Silesia were forced to flee to the Reich. In the summer of 1939 alone, the number of refugees put up in German camps amounted, by the 21 August 1939, to seventy thousand (70,000), not counting those refugees who had found private shelter or those who were shot or captured during their flight.

A Dutchman, Louis de Jong, Executive Director of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam, was given the task by UNESCO, after the Second World War, to examine the frequently quoted and secretive German "Fifth Column" in a historical-scientific way. His results:

"The Polish-German non-aggression pact, dating from 1934, was of no real moment. Both the government and public opinion in Poland increased their pressure on the "Volksdeutschen/German minority." "No German data, however, have been made known that conflict with the view that the large majority of the "Reichsdeutschen" and "Volksdeutschen" living in Poland played a passive part up to the arrival of the German troops." "But it is a remarkable fact that there is no proven or even clear connection with the German military operations for many of the reported observations." "During the Nuremberg trial of the principal German war criminals, an affidavit of Bohle's was read, in which he asserted that neither the Auslands- Organization nor its members had ever 'in any way received orders the execution of which might be considered as Fifth Column activity' – either from Rudolf Hess, whose immediate subordinate Bohle was, nor from himself. Nor had Hitler ever given any directives in that respect, Bohle said. He admitted that there had been Germans abroad who had been used for espionage purposes, but that sort of work had been carried out by the French and the British for their espionage services as well, and in any case the espionage work done by the Germans in question had had nothing whatsoever to do with their membership in the Auslands-Organization."

"The arguments used by Hess and Bohle were not printed by the world press."

Professor Hans Koch, an authority on the subject of German nationals abroad, stated:

"Kurt Lück, a leading expert on German-Slavic relations, has compiled a lexicon where in over fifty pages are recorded insulting and obscene Polish songs about the Germans; an enormous number of songs of almost pathological arrogance in which the Germans are usually compared to dogs. On the German side, songs of such profound repugnance are not in existence. On the other hand, it is well known that we have rather a whole

array of songs expressing sympathy for the Poles. . . Just as there is no well-known novel or poem about the march on Moscow, so there is not one German book which speaks about the march on Warsaw. However, there exists a two-volume Polish work, published in Thorn in 1927, about a march on Berlin. . .”

In 1937 Erwin Hassbach, senator and chairman of the Council of Germans in Poland, and Rudolf Wiesner, regional head of the German Youth Party (Jungdeutschen), once more lodged a complaint with the Sejm:

“The German element in Upper Silesia has become, after a period of fifteen years of the Geneva Convention, a starving, unemployed and desperate group of people. Everything has been taken away from us, over eighty per cent are without jobs and starving in Upper Silesia, our youth is growing up without any chance of being apprenticed; and against our businessman and trader a relentless campaign is waged. Must we also lose our land? The State and the Polish people need to clearly understand that poverty and starvation have limits which must not be crossed. There has been enough talk about equality and equal rights to jobs and bread for all. We Germans want finally to see action. From now on we intend to push through our national, cultural and economic rights by exercising the internal political channels. The precondition on the Polish side, though, is for them to abandon their intentions of annihilation.”

The informal discussions, proposed by Berlin, by experts from their respective Ministries of the Interior with a view to improving the conditions of the minorities in the Reich as also in Poland, were repeatedly rejected by the Polish government.

Intensified Action 1938-1939

There is no causal relationship between these Polish policies and the German negotiation proposals made to Poland on 24 October 1938 or, indeed, with the occupation of Prague on 15 March 1939; but they are directly interrelated, however, with the fundamental Polish attitude towards Germany in connection with the promise from London to Warsaw in August/September 1938 to support Poland “as much as possible” against Germany at Danzig. Already after the annexation of the Olsa territory, at the beginning of October 1938, Poland was implementing ruthless enforcing measures such as mass redundancies, abolition of German as official language, which even the Czechs had tolerated, the banning of the press, of holding assemblies, of organizing official events, while outrages and arrests were carried out on the German population, amongst others, but also on the Czech population. (In the parliamentary elections of 1935 in Teschen and Oderberg, the Germans had achieved respectively 46.8% and 40% of the votes, the Poles 10% and 20%.) 20% of the German population in the Teschen region – approximately 5,000 people – were forced to leave within the first month of Polish rule.⁹) The diplomatic contacts between Poland and Germany remained unaffected by these occurrences, owing to the restraint of the Reich government (Hitler’s orders, not to publish anything unfavourable to Poland).

In their biting attacks on Germany the Polish press did not even wait for the British guarantee; rather they were satisfied with secret assurances from London in August and September 1938, as well as the news from January to March 1939 received from London and Washington. Already one month before Hitler's entry into Prague, on 15 February 1939,

“Poland published, in spite of warnings from the Western Powers against doing so, the List of Names of properties which were soon to be requisitioned for parcelling in the course of the Agrarian Reform. The list contained an extraordinary large number of German names. On 24 and 25 February there occurred serious anti-German excesses by the student body.”

While the land reform robbed the minority Germans in 1938 of two thirds of their arable land, so the Frontier Zone Law and Agrarian Reform expropriated in February 1939 agricultural land, of which 72% belonged to German people (in previous years the proportion had averaged 66%). Within a 30 kilometres wide border strip Germans were no longer allowed to own land; this concerned in the 85-110 kilometres wide “Corridor” nearly all of the West Prussian region.¹³) In addition, there was the activity of the West Marches Society, “the only point on whose program[me] is extermination of the German element at the Polish western frontier”.¹³) The head of this West Marches Society, M. Zaleski, was claiming at the same time, in a speech made at Kattowitz that Poland had made the pact with Germany in 1934 only for tactical reasons, so as to prepare the ground for a future conflict; that it would be a comfortable screen for the Polish government to hide behind while they could rid themselves of the German minority.

Those with specialized knowledge of this development had already earlier realized these realities. Additionally to the Agrarian Reform, countless German enterprises, community buildings and associations were closed, confiscated or demolished, German children were tormented in school by their Polish school mates, who were taught to hate them, German farmhouses were set on fire, “demonstrations against the Germans” were organized, there were mass-arrests, expulsions initiated, fighting tolerated and fomented, workers were systematically dismissed, the defining of the state of emergency in the border zone was extended to over one third of the Polish sovereign territory,¹⁵) and wide-ranging lists of arrest warrants were prepared.

The British backing, hinted at since August/September 1938, then the official blank cheque of 31 March 1939, but also the goading tone of President Roosevelt, boosted Polish chauvinism into open persecution of the minority Germans. For several months British Ambassador Kennard had been warning his government about the dangerous consequences of these Polish activities. The German government also was repeatedly drawing London's attention during the decisive months of the year 1939 – April to August – to the exceedingly grave occurrences in Poland. Factually correct – and never refuted by historical research – the German White Book ascertained in the year 1939:

“German protests were of no avail (No. 360). At the beginning of April, a public

appeal proclaiming the general program[me] for de-Germanization of the country was circulated throughout Poland (No. 358). Towards the middle of April, the first German fugitives crossed the frontier (No. 359). It was practically impossible for the Consulates to report every individual case (No. 361). Anti-German agitation raged unchecked in Upper Silesia (No. 362). Reports from the German Consuls were full of terrorist acts (No. 363). The Polish Insurgents Society gave the orders for these actions (No. 364). On May 6, the Consul-General in Kattowitz reported two hundred acts of terror (No. 365) and on May 19, another hundred, all of which had occurred in Upper Silesia alone (No. 372). All Germans were in fear of their lives and property. Terrorism spread also to Congress Poland and was intensified by systematic acts of incendiarism (No. 366). The last strongholds of German culture were destroyed (No. 369, 373, 374, 377, 379, 383, 385, 390, 391, 399, etc.). In despair, the German minority appealed to the Polish President (No. 369). The British Government, although kept informed by the German Embassy in London of the nature of these developments which inevitably endangered peace (No. 368), remained inactive. Towards the middle of May, anti-German demonstrations developed into pogroms, in the course of which thousands of Germans were hunted "like unprotected game" (Nos. 370, 371). The number of fugitives increased (No. 374) as did Polish "sabre-rattling", the declaration of annexationist war aims (Nos. 367, 378) and public insults and affronts to the Fuehrer which led to renewed protests (No. 382). In the commercial world, German co-operative societies, dairies and pharmacies were systematically liquidated (Nos. 380, 395). On June 7 a report from Lodz stated: "The threat of death, torture etc., for German nationals, has become an everyday matter of course." Whole families, because of constant threats of murder, passed their nights in the shelter of the woods (No. 381). The only answer to protests lodged with the Polish Foreign Office was a shrug of the shoulders and the tacit avowal that nothing could be done against the military authorities and Polish chauvinism (Nos. 382, 385). . . . Polish bishops were requested by a colonel on the General Staff to pray "that the time of tribulation for our Polish brethren beyond the frontier might be shortened and that another Grunwald might release them from bondage" (No. 392). . . . Time and time again the authorities themselves proved to be responsible for this process of liquidation (No. 396). . . . Germans in Galicia were faced with annihilation; the outlook was hopeless, and they were threatened with arson and murder (No. 407). What was left undone by open terrorism was made up for by an insupportable burden of taxes and chicanery on the part of the authorities (No. 408)."

Independent historians were also confirming these facts after the war. S.L. Sharp writes:

"What happened to Poland in 1939 was by no means surprising. The outcome had, as a matter of fact, been predicted quite early in the twenties by thoughtful analysts and a handful of statesmen. Yet these early predictions were easily forgotten. The superficial stabilization of conditions in Poland, propaganda, wishful thinking, emotional judgment, and an erroneous evaluation of the real strength behind the sabre-rattling of the Pilsudskiite regime, combined to create, in the thirties, the false picture of a Poland which had

seemingly come to stay, even if under somewhat difficult conditions. The annihilation of the Polish state must have come as a shock to many who had been exposed to the optimistic picture (including the bulk of the Polish population, misled into interpreting its government's bluster as strength). To the well informed it was hardly a surprise; however, the pretence of being shocked by what was perfectly predictable is a standard form of behaviour in international relations."

L. de Jong writes:

"Months before the outbreak of hostilities the Polish government had given orders for drawing up lists of suspect Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche. This was probably done in April and May, 1939, at about the time that Hitler denounced the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Some groups of Volksdeutsche, as we saw, were taken into custody before the outbreak of war and were conveyed to internment camps."

Note: I skip further quotes about the situation about the German minorities in Poland, the author of this excerpt (Walendy) quotes around 20 additional historians about this subject.

A British publicist, who had still been travelling in Poland during the summer of 1939, noted:

"One must ask whether it is in keeping with the rights of small nations or nationalities that they should thus be included in States where they are exposed to such treatment. Poland has tried to make the minorities relinquish their language and customs; she has failed, despite more than twenty years of activities such as I have described in this chapter. But the attempts are still going on. One begins to wonder whether the Ukrainians, White Russians and Germans should not also enjoy some protection from England, or must it only be the Poles?"

The first blood that was flowing before the start of the Second World War was the blood of minority Germans in Poland. In spite of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the tension in Polish-Soviet relations, the Poles did not shy away from intensifying the persecution of the Germans and the anti-German campaign in the press. By mid-August, 76,535 Germans had already fled to the Reich though certainly not because Hitler had forced them. The Germans in Poland had 20,000 dead to mourn before and after the start of the clashes, of whom 12,500 could be identified by name. That would mean nearly double the death toll of Volksdeutsche through murder than German soldiers killed during the entire Poland campaign (10,572). These excesses could not be excused under the pretext that it was the case of the Polish government losing their grip on a "mass-movement" getting out of hand. The Polish leadership had been working systematically for months, yes, even years, towards this very end!

What is the official Polish attitude after the war? L. de Jong writes:

"The Poles were not sorry for what had been done."

From Munich to the Outbreak of War

The foreign policy of Poland 1938-1939 was the same as her conception of the State and her strategy. Towards the end part of the year 1938 Poland removed herself from the position of being "prepared to co-operate with the Hitler-Reich". A steadily worsening crisis, whose peaceable settlement through negotiations was refused by Poland, was the consequence. Given this basic position, the German negotiation suggestions, even the one of 29 August 1939, which in principle went no further than that of 24 October 1938), were really proposals for calling an armistice, for

"A state of half-war amounting to a kind of armistice had existed in Europe since March, and by July we were drifting rapidly towards war."

Foreign Minister Beck had shown himself willing, in October 1938, to negotiate with Hitler about Danzig and about improving the connection between Berlin and Königsberg.*) Nevertheless, he deliberately delayed the start of these unwelcome negotiations, for he wished to wait-and-see with regards to the British armament and wanted to thwart an international conference. The fact that as yet no alliance with Britain had been realized was not a reason for Beck to withdraw from negotiations with the Reich. Not only that, but he was challenging Germany with his threat of war, the partial mobilization, the plans for an offensive, the renewed intensified pressure on the German minority and the announcement that Germany in future would be held fully responsible for every action taken by the Danzig Senate (23, 26 and 28 March 1939), even before the conclusion of this unconditional guarantee, so that he could demonstrate his independent Great-Power-policy.

Of course, since August and also September 1938 did Beck have the assurance 'in the bag' that Great Britain would support Poland 'as much as possible' at Danzig. At the same time there was also in evidence, since the end of the year 1938/1939, an unrestricted sympathy for Poland from the American government, whose diplomats "also probably influenced" Poland. The rejection of the German negotiation proposal of 26 March 1939 was deliberately provocative, since there was no cause whatsoever for answering this with war-threats, mobilization, aggravated minority policies, with the "awakening of the anti-German mood among the Polish people of every social strata and circle" and, lastly, to underline it with the acceptance of a British *carte-blanche*. The assertion that Hitler's entry into Prague on 15 March 1939 was responsible for this response is demonstrably false. The Polish leadership, "the only one not to have issued a formal protest against the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia", did not consider the establishment of the protectorate – done with the approval of the Czech government! – as being a threat to Poland. Indeed, they were the ones who had never believed in the viability of Czecho-Slovakia and, in addition, it was they who were working towards the further partitioning of this State with their claims and ultimata after the Munich conference, and who were defending a common border with Hungary. Already on 27 October 1938 the German Ambassador in Warsaw, von Moltke, had informed the Foreign Minister of the Reich:

“As I have already stated in report PV 47 of October 14 1938, Poland is trying to induce Slovakia to break away from the political union in which she has been joined until now.”

Foreign Minister Beck expressed satisfaction with the eventual independence obtained by Slovakia and announced his recognition of this country under national law already on 15 March 1939. Therefore, when adopting her measures against Germany on 26 March 1939, Poland did not even refer to Germany's actions with regard to Prague; to do so would have meant a realistic assessment of German power, which was not in existence in Poland right up to the outbreak of war. The Polish leadership, on the contrary, was citing time and time again Hitler's desire for peace, Hitler's perception of the Bolshevik danger and Hitler's military weakness as so many reasons why their provocations bore no risk whatsoever. Beck, during a conversation with Rumanian Foreign Minister Gafencu in March 1939:

“Unlike all his predecessors, Hitler is aware of the reality of the Bolshevik danger. He has always been fighting it. I know that precisely this is for Hitler's new Germany the pivotal, the principal and the decisive problem, besides which all other problems pale into insignificance. How then does it follow from this for Germany to be interested in fighting against Poland? Once the Polish bastion falls, then the gateway of Europe will be open to Soviet expansion. Is this supposed to be what Hitler wants? I know that he does not! Of course he wants Danzig back, but he would not be prepared to pay such a price in order to gain the Free City.”

Beck's intention in the negotiations with Ribbentrop from October 1938 onwards were to hold out hopes for a review more along the lines of the German proposals and yet refrain absolutely from making any concessions. This stance, which eventually reached a temporary climax with the threat of war, the mobilization, the heightened pressure on the minorities and with the acceptance of the British blank cheque in March 1939, had just as little to do with the subject matter of the German proposals as it did with the German handling of the negotiations or indeed with German policy as such. Even the “Polish White Book” on the immediate pre-war period confirms this:

“The Polish government, like the Governments of the other States who, down till 1938 inclusive, were prepared to co-operate with the Hitler Reich, acted on the assumption that they must neglect nothing which might preserve Europe from war.”

This statement establishes unequivocally that Poland and England changed their attitude towards Germany at the end of 1938; they declined – to put it mildly, as in the words of this Polish statement – from this time on, any further collaboration with the German Reich and accepted “oversights and neglects” in the peace efforts, insofar as these “neglects”, anyway, were to have been their new foreign policy baseline! The result, in any case, was that “many foreign diplomats in Warsaw see that public opinion here at present is bellicose and believe that the Polish Government intends to force an issue with Germany”. Already on 16 March 1939 the French Ambassador in Warsaw, Noël, reported to his

Foreign Minister:

“On the other hand, nobody could fail to notice the increase of anti-German sentiment amongst Poles of the most diverse social classes and circles of society.”

Beck accepted the British blank cheque on 31 March 1939 and on 5 April 1939 made a reciprocal offer of help to Great Britain, irrespective of whatever action Great Britain – apart from an attack on the British Isles – was to regard as a threat to her vital interests and to which she would respond with military measures. What had induced the Polish Foreign Minister to go down this foolhardy road, when he, for his part, had rejected London's demands: the collaboration with the USSR, the accepting of Soviet arms for the eventuality of a war, the conclusion of a military alliance with Rumania against Germany and Hungary? Beck had come to realize

“that the method by which Britain had handled this matter had made it three times easier to get Poland to agree to almost anything Britain wanted.”

Beck knew that Hitler had not threatened him and “did not believe that Germany had any offensive intentions”. Beck assumed that Hitler was not going to threaten Poland in future either, as he

“basically was a timid Austrian who would not risk war against a determined and strong opponent.”

Beck stressed in his London talks from 4-6 April 1939 that there was “a kind of a lull at the moment”, since “after the recent events the German government was to have been taken back by the reaction that they had created in the world” (cf. establishment of the Bohemia and Moravia protectorate on 15 March 1939). Beck knew that his policy must “make Hitler and all his chiefs furious”. He was, nonetheless, counting on Hitler dispatching “with all the tokens of friendliness” his Foreign Minister to Warsaw, whom only recently Beck had chosen to portray as a “dangerous fool”. Given the prevailing situation, Beck was convinced that he himself could then decide “the limits of the negotiations” or when to trigger off the war that “would have Germany founder”. Beck was

“more than happy to have England's support given in the way that it was, i.e. that Poland is the one to determine when England is to come to her rescue.”

The fears already expressed by the British Ambassador in Warsaw on 5 October 1938

“that recent events will encourage him [Beck] still further to ignore any pressure or advice from us,”

were to become more and more realized. In Beck's view, the impetus behind the political development of Europe ought to be given to Poland, as befitting a European Great Power. Beck wanted to make the conditions, and he was not sparing in his threats of war already at the time before the British guarantee. This man with “the less statesmanlike aspects of his character, including his personal ambition and vanity”, who believed “that Poland had nothing to lose by the threat of direct action”, had found the partner who, without

any scruples, gave him free rein to pursue this course!

Plainly, this was incitement to war, which did not even have to use the arguments of an “aggressive” or “lusting-after-world-domination” or, in general, the “warwilling” Hitler. Quite the opposite. Beck started from the assumption that Hitler did not want war, that he could not even afford a war and, for this reason, would swallow provocations of the most evil kind from the “determined” and willing-to-fight Poland and still have to dispatch “with all the tokens of friendliness” his Foreign Minister to Warsaw! Britain, having full knowledge of the underlying motives and the balance of power, was lending a helping hand in this undertaking, already many months before the continually intensifying German-Polish tension reached the climax. It represents a singularly unparalleled cynicism to then speak, after the outbreak of war, of “protection of the smaller nations”, of Christianity and of the “obligation of the alliance in fighting the aggressor threatening Europe and the world”.

The unceasing British encouragement, already before the guarantee, was even recognized by Polish diplomats as a resolution for war:

“It is childishly naive, and at the same time unfair, to propose to a nation which is in such a position as Poland that she should compromise her relations with so powerful a neighbour as Germany and to expose the world to the catastrophe of a new war, only for the gratification of Mr. Chamberlain’s internal policies. It would be still more naive of them to presume that the Polish Government did not understand the real meaning of this manoeuvre and its consequences.”

This serious charge was made by the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukaszewicz, on 29 March 1939 in a report to his Minister for Foreign Affairs. This statement, which is not the only one,²²) is an unmistakable proof that Poland had been encouraged, already before Britain’s *carte blanche*, to compromise their relations with Germany and to unleash a war. The Polish government quickly became expert at this language. K. Zentner writes:

“Straight after the British guarantee-declaration, which was followed immediately by the French guarantee, there began in Poland a malicious anti-German rabble-rousing. . . Demands for the occupation of the city of Danzig appear in Polish newspapers. So it continues. The Polish army is to march into East Prussia and to annex this part of Germany. Other papers claim even more: the borders of Poland have to be pushed forward to the Oder. At public meetings, there are demands made which border on lunacy. Not the Oder but the Elbe is Poland’s Western border. Berlin is not a German city, but an ancient Slavic one, an ancient Polish settlement! Poland starts off with partial mobilization, large posters appear on the walls of houses: ‘Let’s go to Berlin!’”

Beck carried on compromising himself: In his note of 26 March 1939 to the Reich Foreign Minister he had described any further handling of the German matters of concern in Danzig as a reason for war, and at the beginning of April he communicated this to his interlocutors in London. Beck, who yet on 20 April 1939 had ascertained in his briefings to the Polish diplomats abroad that although by now the reciprocal British-Polish guarantee

had come into force “no sign of any haste on the part of Germany” was in evidence but, on the other hand, that a “new wave of rumours” had been noticed, was giving a speech on the 5 May 1939, thus only a few days later, in the Sejm which – as it was dishonest and was misrepresenting the actual state of affairs – was bound to appear like an outright declaration of war. With this talk he ultimately rejected any agreement, in whatever form. Beck’s utterance, “We in Poland do not recognize the conception of ‘peace at any price’”, could hardly have been more cynical and war-minded, given the recent German-Polish negotiations and the German readiness to reach an agreement. Apart from the untrue assertion that Germany was only making demands without giving anything in return, there is also the following characteristic portrayal of Beck’s aggressive posturing, albeit historically falsified:

“I insist on the term ‘province of Pomorze’. The word ‘Corridor’ is an artificial invention, for this is an ancient Polish territory with an insignificant percentage of German colonists.”

The unconditional guarantee given by Great Britain had “blinded the Polish leadership to the practical advantages of an understanding with Germany”. Hitler had never put any pressure on Poland, nor hinted at such, had not set any deadlines and did not make any unreasonable demands. Hitler’s policy at that time could be likened to a kind of “lull”, according to Beck’s own statement in London. Yet, the Polish Foreign Minister placed himself at the head of the anti-German and wareager Polish public, dispatched inflammatory and false rumours to other countries, and he did nothing to prevent or to restrict the excesses of his fellowcountrymen. G. Rhode writes:

“The outbreak of war on 1 September 1939 is now seen in Poland as a totally undeservedly endured attack by the powerful German neighbour, like a bolt out of the blue, as it were, falling on an unsuspecting land, forgetting completely, however, that since March of that year Poland had been in a state of a continually rising warlike atmosphere, that in the numerous articles and letters from readers appearing in newspapers war was strongly desired, that owing to certain actions, such as the volunteering for a commando unit of ‘human torpedoes’ (after a misunderstood Japanese model) and talks given by Polish officers praising the qualities of the Polish soldiers to the sky while defining the German equipment as inferior, the belief in an assured victory was created, with dreams of a quick march on Berlin.”

Nothing remotely similar would have been found in Germany in 1939! There was not one German politician, not one German diplomat, not one German general, not one German publicist, who considered the question of “war or peace” as unimportant. To the Polish Ambassador in Paris, Lukasiwicz, however – and to Polish diplomacy in general – this question was one of indifference. The French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, came to realize this when he was trying to explain to Lukasiwicz the significance of the British-French-Soviet military talks.

“We are not afraid of anything. Russia will not let Germany touch us; Germany will

prevent Russia from doing us any harm.”

At the conference of 24 March 1939, attended by the Foreign Minister, the outline of Polish foreign policy was established, whereby, if the “perimeter of our direct interests and our normal needs” was to be impaired – “we will fight”.*) This denial of any fear whatsoever, already apparent in early 1937 in remarks made by the Polish President, Ignacy Moscicki, was to acquire aggressive undertones in 1939 to such a point that the Polish leadership showed scant regard for “world opinion” while they demonstrated their intended goals, and even the few wellmeaning pieces of advice proffered from a friendly side were arrogantly rebuffed during the last days and hours before the outbreak of war. So not without reason was a telegram sent on 2 April 1939 (shortly before Beck’s visit to London) by the British Ambassador in Warsaw to his Foreign Minister:

“The chief difficulty is that the Polish Government has hitherto failed to educate public opinion on the lines that any concessions are necessary.”

Nevertheless, no conclusions were drawn from this in London for the preservation of peace. On 17 May 1939, the representatives of France and Poland concluded a military agreement by which the French General Staff committed themselves to break through the “Siegfried Line” on the fifteenth day after the outbreak of war. With this was the Polish aspiration “for a mobile campaign with the invasion of Germany and the advance on Berlin”,³⁴) brought closer to complete fulfilment. The French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, also came to realize the Polish intentions the day that the Polish Ambassador, Lukaszewicz, had urged him to incorporate the secret clause – that “Danzig is of vital importance to Poland” – into the agreement that was to be concluded. Bonnet wrote about this in his memoirs:

“It seemed to me that Beck’s subtle game was to exploit the French-British alliance by forcing from one of us, with the help of the other, ever more extensive and more precise obligations.”

The crisis was approaching a climax, and yet the Polish government refused to discuss a settlement. A.J.P. Taylor writes:

“The Poles faced the approaching crisis imperturbably, confident that Hitler would be exposed as an aggressor and that the justified grievances of Danzig would then be forgotten.”

The High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, Carl J. Burckhardt, wrote on the 26 July 1939 to the General Secretary of the League, Joseph Avenol:

“A dangerous mood is beginning to emerge among the Poles. Frequently it has been admitted or, even worse, openly stated that a general war would mean the only salvation for the Republic. What is particularly dangerous is that people have begun to get used to the idea that a catastrophe is inevitable; exaggerated statements are made, and the end result is a kind of emotional poisoning in this unfortunate city. There was arriving a stream of camp-followers as the bringers of bad tidings and an omen of foreboding who

frequently were only interested in intensifying the crisis, either by personal interventions in the localized quarrel or by fanciful reports.”

But England was already fully aware of this development! After the British Cabinet had drawn up a statement on the British policy with regard to Poland, which was to be announced by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons,

“Beck asked Halifax [on 5 July] to omit the compromising phrase in which he said that the Polish Government ‘would approach such conversations (with Germany) objectively but with good will’. The phrase was omitted when Chamberlain spoke in the Commons on July 10.”

A travel report that was written by two British diplomats on 9 June 1939 to be presented to their then Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, has now, after forty years, been made available to the public by the Foreign Office. The writers were Sir William Strang, at the time Head of department dealing with Germany-Eastern Europe at the Foreign Office in London and Gladwyn Jebb, private Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, also at the British Foreign Office. Although the report was drawn up by the lower ranking Jebb and then approved by Strang, the observations recorded in it represented, nevertheless, a combined contribution. The title of the account is “Visit of Mr. Strang and Mr. Jebb to Poland” and is initialled with the date of 13 June 1939 by Kirkpatrick, the official in charge of such matters. Gladwyn Jebb wrote:

“What struck me most was the apparent calm and confidence of the Poles with whom I talked. I think some were over-confident, and ignorant of the very real dangers of an attack by the disciplined and mechanized German divisions. H.M. Vice-Consul at Kattowitz, for instance, told me that the local Polish officials had been ‘terribly uppish’ since our guarantee, and were talking of a quick defeat of Germany and an occupation of Breslau. Again, the peasants on an estate south of Thorn, where I spent a most refreshing week-end, were (I was assured by the son of the house) longing to have a go at the Germans. This was confirmed by the highly intelligent head of the Economics Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wszelaki, who said that the bellicosity and anti-Germanism of the peasants were due partly to racial and partly to economic reasons (increase in population, and consequent hunger for the German farmers’ land). Wszelaki, indeed, went so far as to say that, if war broke out, he feared that a terrible massacre of the German-Polish peasants might be difficult to prevent. Further, it seems that the Polish peasants, while remaining anti-Russian, are now less conscious of the Russian danger. My friends were not disposed to say that this would result in any return of pan-Slavism, but they admitted that in the long run, and in the face of continued German pressure, something of the kind might result. ... I cannot, of course, profess to know what the Polish Military are thinking. All I can say is that the Colonel to whom I sat next at dinner – principal assistant to General Stachiewicz, the Chief of the General Staff – was an intelligent and reasonable man. He admitted freely that the Polish army was deficient in some respects, but was confident that, if necessary, they would acquit themselves very well. Partly from him and partly from other persons I gathered that the

idea was to attack East Prussia at the outset of war, since the Germans would find it very difficult to reinforce this province quickly and adequately. Moreover, it was capable of being attacked from many points simultaneously. The booster effect of an occupation of Königsberg might, it was hoped, counterbalance an inevitable retreat from the Western salient. In any case, Poland would not necessarily be defeated even if she withdrew to the line of the Vistula. And by the time the Polish armies were back there the Germans, as well as the Poles, might well be running short of certain essential supplies. Emphasis tended to be laid on the probability of a war in the East being an 'open' war with freedom of manoeuvre and that this might tend, in the early stages at least, to favour the Poles. In order to draw my Polish friends I usually at a certain stage, asked them what they proposed to do with the Germans when the fortune of war had – as they believed was probable – decided in their favour. No two persons gave the same answer to this awkward question. But the general line seemed to be that Germany ought to be carved up into two or more pieces and that the larger section should be composed of a Southern and Catholic bloc, perhaps under the Archduke Otto [von Habsburg]. In any case, there seemed to be a general idea that East Prussia should be annexed by Poland. The second-in-command of the Eastern section of the Foreign Office went indeed so far as to say definitely that this was the Polish plan. He justified it on the grounds that the population of East Prussia was declining; that much of it was really Polish anyhow; that in any case population transfers could be arranged; and that Poland as a young and rapidly increasing State ought to have a coast-line commensurate with her national importance. But there is, unless I am wrong, a still larger and more shadowy project in existence for Poland's future after 'a victorious war against Germany'. This is the conception of a federal Poland, including Lithuania, with some form of autonomy for the Ruthenians. Warsaw, in accordance with this dream, would be the centre of a huge agglomeration, the western frontiers of which might be extended almost to the Oder, and the southern march with a reconstituted Hungary. ... There are few Poles in authority, I think, who are unconscious of the very real dangers of a war with Germany, and many seem to realize that this might in fact mean a steady retreat into the interior of the country, which might quite well not be counterbalanced by the occupation of East Prussia, where the standing defences (apart from the present reinforcement difficulty) are very strong. Their belief, however, is that in the general war which they believe would follow a German attack on Poland, Germany would be defeated in the end, and that the Polish Army, even if badly mauled, would then re-emerge from the Pripet marshes or the 'Jungle' of Bialowieza and proceed to occupy Greater Poland in much the same circumstances as in 1919. Nor is this belief in any way pathetic or fantastic. Poles point out, I think with justice, that the German situation, whether military, internal or economic, is far less strong than the German propaganda machine would have us believe. They hold that some form of German collapse within a year of the outbreak of a general war is a very real possibility; and while they have no doubt that the Germans will fight extremely well in the initial stages, they are confident that the ring will hold and that the effect of a blockade will be noticeable far sooner than it was in 1914-18..."

The British government had accepted and was resigned to the situation of Poland not wanting to negotiate (why not take back their clean slate and force Poland to negotiate?). Result: more war cries in Poland. Chodacki, the Polish Commissioner General in Danzig, was the man, who was representing Polish policy at the centre of German-Polish relations, and who spoke repeatedly about war as, for instance, at the time when Danzig would not let its population be starved out of Danzig because the very livelihood of the Germans was threatened with ruin as a result of the pressure exerted by Poland and when, instead, Danzig wanted to open the border with East Prussia.

On 10 August, in the heavily censored *Kurier Polski*, it was written that

“Just as Carthage had to be destroyed 2,000 years ago, today more and more voices are heard calling to put an end, once and for all, to Germany’s craving for power over the other nations in Europe. ... Ever more widespread was the general opinion in the land that “Carthage” must be destroyed. The time is fast approaching, when it will be universally held that the removal of the festering sore in the centre of Europe is a necessity. All that will be left of Germany, then, will be only a heap of ruins.”

This demand was not an isolated occurrence in the Polish pre-war press, rather, it was the basic tenor of a strongly censured journalism. When, in addition to this, noted spokesmen of this State were whipping up the people with unceasing warmongering speeches and were openly proclaiming their annexationist goals, then this was considered as a policy of war! 41) The one to start the military advance by giving the order first is not the one that can be branded as guilty for the war, but rather it is the one who, over a long period, has so geared his whole policy as to force the opponent into military intervention, and who has already in the interior of the country turned the hostilities against the foreign minorities into a permanent state of affairs! Carl J. Burckhardt, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, had stated in a report of 20 December 1938:

“The Poles have a bit of a mad streak. At midnight they start smashing their glasses. They are the only unhappy people in Europe longing for the battlefield. They are thirsting for glory, and in that they know no bounds. There is Mr. Beck, but there is also the army and a public opinion ready to explode at any moment.”

Roger Makins, British delegate of the League in Basel, reported on 11 June 1939 about a conversation with Burckhardt:

“Mr. Burckhardt detected certain symptoms of Polish imperialism, and formed the impression that ultimate Polish aims were of wide scope.”

The French Ambassador in Berlin, Coulondre:

“Their only salvation [of Poland and of Rumania] lay in preserving the peace, but they made no move in the direction that would have been necessary for it.”

M. Freund, a historian well-known for their antagonism to Hitler:

“The history of Poland in the last few years before the Second World War is a history

of heroism and folly. Also, increasingly Poland succumbed to an anti-German fervour. But still, it can hardly be denied that in every clash the Poles were always adopting the fiercest reaction - apart from war - possible."

The Polish leadership would take the initiative for constantly aggravating the crisis in every conceivable sphere: in their foreign policy, with the mobilization, the military agreements with France, in the displacement of the minorities, in the communications sector including propaganda on radio and on billboards, in their literature, in the public appearance of leading speakers, in the actions taken against Danzig, in the diplomatic snubbing of the German neighbour, in the increasingly frequent border violations (the *Ilustrowany Kurjer* of 7 August 1939 even featured an article about a competition among Polish military units of destroying and seizing Wehrmacht equipment on the other side of the border),⁴⁸ in putting the troops on stand-by for attack, with official threats of war, in the order to Ambassador Lipski, issued at the height of the crisis, "not to let himself get involved in any pertinent talks", and in the general mobilization which had already been announced the day before. The firing on the undefended German town of Beuthen with artillery during the night from 31 August to 1 September was as characteristic in this chain of events as was the incident of the sudden attack on the transmitting station in Gleiwitz, although not a deciding factor. By the time of these lastly mentioned two incidents the die was already cast.

The Polish course of action against Danzig and their conduct in the last days of peace merit a separate account; yet this will merely complement and confirm the whole attitude of Polish foreign policy in the year 1939 against Germany.

The Polish Course of Action against Danzig

C. Höltje wrote:

"Poland's constant efforts of trying to extend her authority in the Free City of Danzig, with the ultimate aim of revoking its autonomy, led to continual conflicts."

These "constant efforts" go back to the year 1919, and they are a part of the territorial demands made by Poland. These were continuously intensified during the year 1939. According to a statement from the Polish Commissioner General in Danzig, Chodacki, "fifteen one thousand page volumes would be required to describe the Danzig-Polish disputes" in the year 1939.²) Danzig, a city undisputedly described as German also by the Polish government was, indeed, changed by the Versailles "treaty" into a "Free City" on the outside, but in reality little remained of this "freedom". These rights, which Poland had received ever since 1919 in Danzig, were so extensive that Warsaw exercised a decisive influence on the economy and thus on the political fate of the city: Poland represented Danzig abroad, consequently also in the League of Nations. Poland was represented in Danzig by an ambassador, Germany and other states by a consul at best. Poland controlled Danzig's border including the one with East Prussia and also determined the

customs tariffs according to her own discretion. Poland was maintaining twentythree authorities besides her own post office. Poland administered the Danzig railways and was responsible for the “national defence” of Danzig. Poland was keeping on the Westerplatte, within the “Free City”-terrain, a military contingent and a munitions store.

The League of Nations, “protector” of the “Free City” and its constitution, authorized a High Commissioner, elected for a three-year term, who was to prevent outside encroachments and internal unrest or rather, to have these settled. Since their endeavours at mediation between Poland and Danzig, more often than not, broke down, so it was left up to the Council of the League in Geneva, as the highest judicial authority, to deal with Danzig-matters at nearly all its sittings. But this Council of the League neither possessed an explicit authority nor did it have the necessary power to carry through a constructive solution. In the summer of 1936 it created a so-called “Committee of Three” whose members were the Foreign Ministers of England, France and Portugal (later of Sweden). Poland was, as “representative for the foreign affairs of the Free City”, also a member of this Committee. The attitude of the Polish representative led to a paradoxical situation already at that time: “The roles of the League of Nations and that of Poland appeared to be reversed.” 3) This Committee of Three was to take over from the Council of the League all of the Danzig issues. The reality was that with the formation of this committee England and France became more heavily involved in Danzig than they had been before. Henceforth, the official channels for the High Commissioner of the League ran directly to and fro between London and Paris.

This arrangement was unsatisfactory for all concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that the High Commissioners of the League in Danzig, without exception, were arguing for a readjustment of the local situation. By this they understood the re-integration of Danzig into Germany, especially since the Polish pretext of needing a port had been rendered invalid with the building and extension of Gdingen, with the economical strangling of Danzig and, furthermore, with the securing of a free port area for Poland in Danzig. Count Manfredo Gravina, High Commissioner of the League from 1929 to 1932, had proposed during his term of office:

- to link East Prussia to the Reich by extending the Danzig territory to the west;
- to empower the League of Nations, as the protector of Danzig, with the necessary authority;
- to free Danzig from all restrictions imposed by Poland (railway, customs, economy, foreign policy, etc.);
- to transfer Gdingen and the surrounding region, as well as a free port area in Danzig, to Poland and to secure this arrangement with a guarantee from the League of Nations.

C. J. Burckhardt had also described in the year 1937 and later on the return of Danzig to Germany as imperative.4) But he too had to realize that he was powerless to change the situation, and he was to admit that it had even been put to him privately from a not unauthoritative party to dispense with his attempts of appeasement in Danzig, as these

were regarded as “harmful”. Since 1935, when the Under State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, Count Szembek, made this entry in his diary:

“It would be in the interest of many people to see a worsening in the Polish- Danzig relations, Polish nationalists as well as Danziger Germans hostile to Hitler, Jews and business men from the port of Gdingen...”,

the same groups have remained continuously active, in the sense as described by Szembek. The proposal by Hitler made to Poland on 24 October 1938 was considerably more modest than any of the previous Danzig demands from German and foreign politicians. It was conveyed – and this is confirmed by all the subsequently collected documents! – with the sincere intention of placing relations with the Eastern neighbour on a better and more secure footing. Hitler did neither threaten nor did he even faintly hint at coercion, as a means for achieving his goals. There was no question, either, of any deadline. On the contrary, right up to the outbreak of war, Hitler repeatedly urged moderation on the Danzig Senate, while, nevertheless, making it quite clear, that Danzig had the protective support of the Reich.

It is a provable fact that Hitler intervened in the Danzig happenings only after the Polish ultimatum of 4 August 1939. This he did by

- a) summoning Gauleiter Forster (the District head) to Berchtesgaden to make a report (10 August 1939), and he ordered to “avoid any fresh incident in Danzig so as not to aggravate matters there”;
- b) asking Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, for mediation;
- c) advising Poland that Germany would not be tolerating to have Danzig subjected to starvation or military occupation – this reaction was declared in a Polish statement from 10 August 1939, should it be to the detriment of Polish interests, as an “act of aggression”.

D. Hoggan writes:

“Hitler was not opposed to any of Poland’s further economic aspirations at Danzig, but he was resolved never to permit the establishment of a Polish political regime at Danzig. The Sudeten Nazis, like the Austrians before them, built up the tension gradually without guidance from Hitler. In Danzig the tension was already complete; and Hitler, so far as he did anything, held the local Nazis back.”

The Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, on the other hand, was pursuing his policy in Danzig “not for Danzig as such, but out of principle – Danzig has become a kind of symbol”. But what did this “principle-policy” that Poland followed in Danzig look like? Such is the opinion of the German Ambassador in Paris, Otto Abetz:

“The proposition of a ‘spontaneous’ awakening of Polish nationalism after Munich does not bear close examination. The anti-German demonstrations demanding the Polish annexation of Danzig and East Prussia were taking place in by far too many and too thinly

spread places, the boycott of German-speaking businesses was too well synchronized, the stone throwing at windows of the German embassy in Warsaw and the German consulate general in Thorn was happening too close together in time for any spontaneity to have been likely.”

With the backing from Great Britain, Warsaw was forcefully driving forward her Polonizing campaign against Danzig. The initiative for aggravating matters lay, as so often since 1919, solely with Poland – and England was leading Poland “far up the garden path”. Foreign Minister Beck told a friend in his Rumanian exile, after the defeat of Poland in 1939:

“No one in his right mind can claim that Danzig was the cause of the war.”

At the end of 1938, Poland was issuing stamps which represented Danzig as if it were a Polish city.

C. Tansill writes:

“By May 2 1939 the Polish press had proceeded to the point where a demand was made that ‘Danzig become Polish’. With Warsaw expressing a rising sentiment of Polish nationalism there was little prospect for a German-Polish agreement.”

On 5 May 1939 the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, declared in his speech to the Diet, the Polish Parliament:

“The population of Danzig is to-day predominantly German, but its livelihood and prosperity depend on the economic potentialities of Poland. What conclusions have we drawn from this fact? We have stood and stand firmly on the ground of the rights and interests of our sea-borne trade and our maritime policy in Danzig.”

On 11 June 1939, Warsaw again increased the number of its customs officials in Danzig. The financial burden thus incurred was carried by the Danzig community. This measure was all the more provocative as the number of Polish customs inspectors in Danzig had risen to four times the number compared with the level of 1929, while in the same period the trade in Danzig was cut down to one third of its turnover value.¹⁹) In the same month the Polish-Danzig border was closed down to Germans. According to official Polish figures, “10.9 per cent of Poland’s overseas export were carried by waterways in 1924”. 1937 the figure was 4 per cent, and in 1938 it was 2.3 per cent.²⁰) At the end of June 1939, the Polish minority leader in the Danzig Volkstag, Budzynski, assured his few fellow Danzig Poles in a speech delivered at the Polish “Festival of the Sea” that the union of Danzig with Poland would be achieved by the army.

On 11 July 1939 Lord Halifax informed his Ambassador in Warsaw about a talk held with the Polish Ambassador, Count Raczynski, who had recently returned to London:

“Colonel Beck is aware that the ‘Polish public opinion was too excited’, so that he felt obliged to state he ‘hoped that it might be possible to do something to tone it down’... Beck admits that nothing had ‘materially changed the situation, and Danzig

itself was still commanded by Poland'... But Beck had announced 'to increase their military preparations round Danzig. Nevertheless, Colonel Beck felt the situation could not continue indefinitely on its present lines, as there was the danger of being faced with a *fait accompli*'... 'Although he had not yet come to any definite decision, Colonel Beck thought that perhaps the best way in which to call a halt would be to select very carefully one perfectly clear breach of the Constitution by Danzig, which would not be of so grave a nature as to cause an immediate explosion. If a stand were made on this carefully chosen ground, the Danzigers might be compelled to beat a retreat. Colonel Beck had in view some joint tripartite action, not at Berlin but at Danzig. He thought this preferable, as it would not confront the German Chancellor directly with any possible loss of face, and it would be easier for him to effect a retreat through Danzig'... 'Colonel Beck was, however, opposed to sending strong notes without careful consideration, since they might only lead to unfortunate results'. Colonel Beck was not, in fact, taking into consideration any talks 'on the Danzig question. . . and thought that a tug of war would probably be necessary to re-establish the position, as there had been too many breaches of the Danzig Statute.'"

Although the British government had once again been made explicitly aware, by the middle of July 1939 at the latest,

a) that Poland was planning to become active in Danzig and, by contrived means, diminish the German influence there, with the ultimate aim of eliminating it altogether, and
b) that Hitler was in no hurry where the Danzig question was concerned, and that he was prepared to negotiate through the channels of the League of Nations ("We are having recourse to the High Commissioner and not to Geneva itself"),²²) they sent shortly after a military mission to Moscow together with the French, with the aim of enlisting the Bolshevik Power for the fight against the German Reich in Europe.

At the end of July, Poland's reaction to the suggestion made by the Danzig Gauleiter, Forster, to drop "all military measures now taken in Danzig" if there was a *détente* in the situation, was such that even Lord Halifax had the warning issued to Warsaw that the Polish government was to avoid any "provocative assertions that the German Government are weakening".²³) But this too was of no avail. On 1 August 1939, Warsaw terminated the export of duty-free herring and margarine from Danzig to Poland. This decision affected ten per cent of the trade in Danzig. No detailed explanation is required to understand how much this additional measure would further impair the already severely restricted basic necessities of life in Danzig. The French Consul in Danzig informed his Foreign Minister on 1 August:

"As the Senate has adopted a policy of silence with regard to the repeated Polish protests in matters of customs inspection, so the Polish government has now taken economic retaliatory measures which could have grave consequences."

All this was taking place at a time when it was well-known in Poland that "hitherto the Senate had never risked coming too far into the open. . . and that any threat of a customs union with Germany should [not] be taken too seriously". In the discussion of

2 August about these matters the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Arciszewski, gave British Ambassador Kennard to understand “that the general situation might become critical towards the end of this month...”

“He admitted that the situation might develop within a few hours from the political to the military phase.”

Incidentally, the economic severance of Danzig from Poland was in total contradiction to the Polish empty rhetoric that Poland was unable to survive without Danzig. This step of ceasing trading with Danzig – already since 1919 Poland had been continually cutting down her trade with Danzig – was, therefore, meant to serve militant goals.

On 4 August Poland delivered to the “Free City” an ultimatum, with a limitation of seventeen hours, threatening immediate retaliatory actions and reprisals in the event that an (alleged, but not issued) order from the Senate, regarding the field of activity of the Polish customs inspectors, was not withdrawn and attempts be made to interfere in the duties of the, henceforth, armed Polish customs inspectors or to impede them. The reason for this: a rumour. M. Freund writes:

“The French Ambassador in Warsaw is of the opinion that the Polish action was a tactical mistake. Also, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, Professor Burckhardt, maintains that the Polish ultimatum of 4 August has ruined all attempts at easing the tension. There is no doubt that Poland, in this instance, has brought to a head an altercation which might well have been evaded without losing any influence and without any material disadvantage.”

In the early hours of the morning of 5 August, the President of the Danzig Senate, Greiser, was informed that the import of all food products would be stopped, should Danzig defy the ultimatum of the previous day. Greiser, who considered that “the tenor of the ultimatum, the short deadline and the substance of the threat make any answer impossible”, turned to the High Commissioner and declared himself willing to speak on the telephone with the Polish Commissioner General in Danzig, Chodacki, so that he could rectify the trigger-cause of the facts of the case and thus prove the groundlessness of the accusation.²⁷) Although Chodacki agreed to try to get his government to accept the telephone explanations as a verbal note, he did, however, insist that the Danzig Senate confirm in writing the “compliance with the Polish demands”. In the meantime, Burckhardt had also been notified by Chodacki that the wives and children of the Polish civil servants were going to be evacuated. By delivering this threat to starve out Danzig, with no immediate cause, the Polish government was infringing upon the vital spheres of interest of Danzig and the Reich. Poland was carrying the crisis to further extremes in that she did not withdraw the ultimatum and the threat of embargo, but also in that she never revoked the arming of the Polish customs inspectors, although it had become evident that the pretext for this action was indefensible.

On 6 August, Marshal Smigly-Rydz announced to 150,000 legionnaires gathered in Krakow

“that Poland was determined to meet ‘force with force’ and would oppose emphatically every attempt at transgressing upon her interests, directly or indirectly. Danzig, bound to Poland for many centuries, he added, was the lung of the Polish economic organization, and the Warsaw government had defined their position on this issue clearly and unequivocally.”

The conservative Polish newspaper *Czas* commented on this speech the following day, to the effect

“that if the Danziger Nazis were trying to produce a *fait accompli*, the Polish cannons would roar. The guns which protect the honour of Poland are pointing at Danzig. Everybody must realize that these guns will be fired if the authorities of the Free City, contrary to the obvious interest of the Danzig population, are going to confront Poland with a *fait accompli*.”

The Polish Ambassador in Washington, Jerzy Potocki, thus drew the conclusion from his talks in Warsaw on this 7 August:

“Poland prefers Danzig to peace.”

On the 9 August the Reich government informed Foreign Minister Beck that a repetition of demands made in the form of an ultimatum to Danzig would lead to greater tension in the relationship between Germany and Poland and that an embargo would force Danzig, the “Free City”, to seek other possibilities for her imports and exports. Although Hitler had indicated here that he would stand by Danzig, he did not, however, threaten. This Polish note from the 10 August was additional confirmation that Poland intended to totally eliminate Germany’s influence on Danzig – also in the event of a blockade – and to act with aggressive force there. Once again, Poland had aggravated the situation to such a degree that even Lord Halifax, on 15 August, suggested, “. . . the Polish government [should]. . . from the point of view of world opinion. . . examine the possibility of negotiation over Danzig. . . and to give him [Hitler] no excuse for acting.” Ambassador Henderson had also realized the significance of this Polish note and could not “believe” that Hitler would have remained as calm as he, indeed, did when he learnt about this note.

The Polish government was not alone in this: On 13 August Foreign Minister Beck was able to show to the Ambassador of the USA in Warsaw, Biddle, a report from the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, which contained the explicit approval of the British government for all recent Polish measures.⁴¹) That the Polish government should feel encouraged by this goes without saying. The consequences were to follow. On 18 August the Polish Commissioner General in Danzig, Chodacki, offered to remove the economic embargo if the – meanwhile armed and further reinforced – customs inspectors and frontier guards were granted the right of unrestricted operation in the Danzig territory. The acceptance of this demand would have meant military occupation and, with that, the Polonizing of Danzig. So now Danzig was virtually faced with a second ultimatum which allowed for only four alternatives:

- a) Political customs strangulation and thus the destruction of the economy or rather their livelihood, for the future too (since 1 August Polish measures along those lines were in force!);
- b) consenting to a military occupation by Poland;
- c) opening up the frontier to East Prussia to avoid starvation – thus accepting a likely state of war as had been threatened by Poland for such measure; d) seeking help from the German Reich, and thus also accepting a likely state of war as had been threatened by Poland for such measure.

The Danzig Senate accepted the economic strangulation and remained passive. The British Consul General, Shepherd, left the “Free City” on 24 August without taking leave of the Danzig Senate. He was not to return again. The reports of this expert were not utilized by Halifax for any peace resolution. The negotiations on the question of customs inspectors in Danzig were broken off by Poland on the same day, the 24 August. Even if the documentation as reprinted in the ADAP, according to which the Danzig Senate was “employing delaying” tactics in the negotiations with Poland, be genuine, it is surprising that Poland did not complain about the manner of negotiating and demand that the talks be put in concrete terms.⁴⁵⁾ With breaking off the talks, the refusal to even attempt finding a mediator (e.g. Burckhardt or the British government), and the outright rejection, right up to the outbreak of war, to hold any kind of negotiation whatsoever with either the Danzig Senate or the German government and, finally, with the unequivocally formulated annexationist demands, Poland has explicitly demonstrated her lack of interest in these discussions and revealed her true intentions. On the 26 August 1939, in the evening, Chodacki urgently recommended to the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, Carl J. Burckhardt, to evacuate his family quickly, “since there might be clashes any day now, and the town could be bombed”. Polish Ambassador Lipski wrote

“that, in the event of war, unrest is going to break out in Germany and that the Polish troops would march successfully on Berlin.”

Since the end of March 1939, the Polish government had refused all talks with the Reich government under threat of war, had opposed every compromise and, even when crisis point was reached, was rejecting every gesture of goodwill for holding negotiations. Already on 27 May 1939, Foreign Minister Beck had given to Burckhardt the impression that “he was giving him instructions, instead of discussing with him ways of working together”.⁴⁸⁾ “Within the momentary tension”, so stated Beck in this discussion with Burckhardt, “no talks between Berlin and Warsaw are possible”.⁴⁸⁾ Such “explanations” are no excuse for the lack of any commitment to negotiations in those who have created the tension. As mentioned before, Danzig was not the only goal for Poland, not the only target for her provocations, but rather a means to an end. Poland, along with her English and French friends, was determined to deprive the “Free City” of the freedom to live according to her national and cultural ties, yes, they were even at pains to further

limit Danzig's economical basic necessities. This undertaking was ultimately justified on the ground that the "freedom" of the whole world was menaced by Hitler.

B. de Colonna, was for many years a special correspondent for British and New Zealand newspapers, wrote:

"Danzig is German. The elections alone prove this. I have quoted the opinions of famous men. No one can deny that the vast majority of the Danzigers are Germans, or that they wish to join Germany. But if the Poles believe to the contrary, why not hold a plebiscite under English control and abide by the decision? Warsaw would, as I was told there, refuse such a solution, knowing the result in advance. Poles told me that this was not a fair test since they had claims to the mouth of the Vistula. But I have dealt with those claims in an earlier chapter, and can only repeat that such arguments would be equivalent to giving the Dutch estuary of the Rhine to Germany, or the Portuguese area around the Tagus to Franco Spain. There is no sense in fighting to keep one group of Germans in Danzig from joining another group of Germans in the Reich. It would be tantamount to some other country going to war to prevent England and New Zealand from sharing a single government if they wanted to. Danzig, as a city, was founded by Germans. That Slavs may, many centuries ago, have opened a trading centre on the site of the present Free City is no reason for giving the area to Poland. The Serbs are also Slavs, and one might as well award it to them, for we have no proof that the Poles are the descendants of such Slavs. Indeed, historians declare they are not. But his point is not even of academic interest, and if we base claims on ancient days of occupation, we may as well begin by presenting the East coast of England to Denmark, for it belonged to the Danes long after the Slavs who may have founded a trading centre in the Danzig region had migrated. Imagine Germany – or for that matter France, Russia, or Italy – wishing to guarantee Denmark the East coast of England on historic grounds! The historical side of the argument could not be denied – but its utter absurdity would make all Europe laugh."

11.10 German-Polish Friction in 1938 & 1939

The Obstacles to a German-Polish Understanding

It was a tragedy for Europe that the Munich conference was limited to the Sudeten question and failed to include a settlement of German-Polish differences, although Mussolini was probably right in favoring a successful limited conference prior to any general conclave. It might have helped had Great Britain received a prize such as Helgoland at Munich. The acquisition of Cyprus at Berlin in 1878 had made palatable the statement of Disraeli that he returned bringing "peace with honour." The British were not accustomed to attend conferences involving transfers of territory without acquiring new territory themselves. There were four major obstacles to a German-Polish understanding after the Munich conference. The most important of these was the notion of Polish lead-

ers that the defeat of Germany in a new war would serve the interests of Poland. The prevalence of this attitude after the death of Pilsudski was implicit in the Polish attempt to foment a war against Germany during the Rhineland crisis of March 1936. There were two primary reasons for this Polish attitude. There was the idea that Poland could not really attain the status of a European Great Power if she was overshadowed by any of her immediate neighbors. There was the dissatisfaction with the territorial provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and the hope of Polish leaders that future territorial expansion at German expense would be possible. Neither of these reasons would have carried much weight after Munich had the British not reverted to a hostile policy toward Germany.

The second hindrance was the failure of Polish leaders to recognize the danger to Poland from the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov and the American diplomat, William Bullitt, once travelled together on the train to Moscow, when Bullitt was Ambassador to the Soviet Union. They arrived at the town of Bialystok in Central Poland, and Litvinov commented that this was his native city. Bullitt observed that he had not realized the Soviet diplomat was of Polish birth. Litvinov replied that he was not of Polish birth and that the city of Bialystok would not remain Polish. This incident occurred shortly after the admission of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations and at a time when Litvinov was the acknowledged leader of the League attempts to outlaw aggression. Bullitt repeated the incident to Polish Foreign Minister Beck. The Polish Foreign Minister had no illusions about the Soviet attitude toward the new Polish state, but he underestimated the industrial strength and military striking power of Russia. Georges Bonnet later said that he did not require a battle of Stalingrad to be convinced of Soviet strength, and this was doubtless true. The majority of European diplomats were prejudiced against Communism to the point of blindness, and they simply could not admit that the Communist system was capable of producing the most formidable military striking power in Europe until they were shown by irrevocable events. Anthony Eden declared after his visit to Moscow in March 1935 that the Soviet Union would be incapable of aggression for the next fifty years.

The Polish Foreign Office on March 9, 1938, circulated a complacent survey of the Soviet scene among its missions abroad. The current Terror in Russia was seen to be the dominant factor on the Russian internal front, and the 1936 democratic Soviet constitution was correctly described as a fraud. The balance of the report was preoccupied with the alleged decline of Soviet power, and with the current Popular Front tactics of Communist parties abroad, which were described as a protective front to veil the weakness of the Soviet Union. There was no suggestion that the Soviet Union might emerge more ruthlessly and efficiently united than ever before when the current purges were completed. A realistic Polish appraisal of the Soviet danger might have been an effective force in promoting German-Polish cooperation. The contemptuous dismissal of Russian power prevented the Poles from perceiving their common interests with Germany. It also caused them to suspect some sinister motive in the repeated German attempts to form a common front with Poland against Bolshevism.

The third problem resulted from feelings of German insecurity about two of the German communities in the East which were neither under German nor Polish rule. These communities were Danzig and Memel, with a total German population of more than 500,000. Many German communities in the East had been uprooted since 1918, and the thought was unbearable to many Germans that this might also happen to Danzig and Memel, after Germany was strong again. There could be no lasting confidence in German-Polish cooperation until these communities were restored to Germany. German concern about Memel was apparent during the March 1938 Polish-Lithuanian crisis. This occurred at the time of the Anschluss between Germany and Austria, when Beck was visiting in Italy. The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who rarely seemed to have a good word about anyone, referred to Beck as not "particularly strong nor singularly intelligent." A Polish frontier guard was killed on Lithuanian territory on March 11, 1938. Polish Senator Kazimierz Fudakowski insisted, in a Senate interpellation on March 14th, that Lithuania should be forced to submit to extensive Polish demands. It was evident that the Polish leaders were in a mood to score some success at Lithuanian expense, to parallel Hitler's triumph in Austria. Beck returned to Poland on March 16, 1938, by way of Vienna, where he received a brief glimpse of the excitement in the former Austrian capital. Beck discovered that many Polish leaders advocated demands on Lithuania which he considered to be exorbitant under the circumstances. He believed that Lithuania would gradually come within the Polish orbit if too much was not attempted all at once. There were demonstrations in Warsaw and Wilna favoring the acquisition of Memel by Poland, and the creation of a new Polish port on the Baltic Sea.

The fourth obstacle to a German-Polish understanding was the ruthless Polish treatment of minorities. This concerned primarily the Polish mistreatment of the Germans, but the Polish attempt to strand more than 50,000 of their Jewish nationals in the Reich, in 1938, also had a bad effect on German-Polish relations. The Polish policy in this maneuver to rid Poland of a large number of Polish Jews was both cruel and audacious. The step itself is not comprehensible unless one takes account of the rising tide of anti-Jewish feeling in Poland early in 1938.

The Polish Passport Crisis

Considerable attention was given to the problem of encouraging Jewish emigration from Germany in the years from 1933 to 1938, but far more Jews departed from Poland than from Germany during these years. An average 100,000 Jews were emigrating from Poland each year compared to 25-28,000 Jews leaving Germany annually. From September 1933 to November 1938 a special economic agreement (Havarah agreement) enabled German Jews to transfer their assets to Palestine, and the German authorities were far more liberal in this respect than Poland. There were also special arrangements for wealthy Jews in Germany to contribute to the emigration of others by capital transfers to various places. 170,000 Jews had left Germany by November 9, 1938, compared to

approximately 575,000 who had departed from Poland during the same years. It was noted that thousands of Jews who left Germany in 1933 returned to the country after 1934, and that scarcely any of the Polish Jews returned to Poland during the same period.

Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki made it clear to American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles in March 1938 that Poland wished to increase the emigration of Polish Jews, and Welles agreed to aid the settlement of Polish Jews in Latin America, and especially in the rich country of Venezuela. A special Polish mission under Major Michal Lepecki was sent to Madagascar in 1937 to study the possibilities for Jewish settlement in that rich, but sparsely populated, French possession. It was clear that the Poles were seeking to encourage the emigration of the greatest possible number of Jews at the least possible cost. American Ambassador Biddle reported from Warsaw on March 28, 1938, that many Polish Jews would welcome a new European war. The destruction of the new Polish state might improve the status of the Jews, and many of them believed that the Soviet Union was a veritable paradise compared to Poland. Biddle added that conditions for the Jews in Poland were becoming constantly more unfavorable, and, of course, this trend increased Jewish disloyalty toward Poland. Biddle declared that both Jewish and Polish leaders favored maximum Jewish emigration, although they did so for different reasons. The Jews had been accused of creating a financial panic during the March 1938 Polish-Lithuanian crisis, when there was a noticeable run on the savings banks. Distrust and dislike of the Jews in Poland extended right to the top. Prime Minister Stawoj-Sktadkowski claimed, in a conversation with League High Commissioner Burckhardt at Warsaw in 1937, that 60% of all Polish Jews were Communists and that 90% of Communists were Jews.

Biddle announced on March 29, 1938, that the Polish Sejm was passing a large number of new anti-Jewish laws. He explained that 53% of Polish lawyers were Jews, whereas the Jews accounted for merely 8% of the total Polish population. The aim of the new legislation would be to limit Jewish lawyers to a quota based on their proportion of the population. This type of law was sponsored by the Government, but there was always the danger that the situation would get out of hand. A bill passed the Sejm in March 1938 which made the eating of kosher meat illegal, although 2.5 million Jews in Poland ate only kosher meat. The Government naturally feared the effect on the Polish meat industry of such a forced conversion to vegetarianism, and steps were taken to prevent the implementation of this law. The extremity of the legislative measure provided a good indication of Polish hatred of the Jews. A law also passed the Sejm in March 1938, which permitted the Polish Government arbitrarily to withdraw Polish citizenship from nationals abroad. The specific provisions stipulated that individuals could be declared stateless if they had been out of the country for five years. The implementation of the law was postponed until the Czech crisis had run its course. The law had been passed as part of the 1938 Polish anti-Jewish program, and its obvious purpose was to prevent the return to Poland of as many Jews as possible. Many of the Polish-Jewish citizens abroad were in Germany. Friction between Germany and Poland was inevitable when the Poles

published an ordinance on October 15, 1938, to implement the March 1938 citizenship law.

The Poles were well aware of the German attitude toward the Jewish question. Years had passed since Hitler had introduced his anti-Jewish policy in Germany, and his program had received legal sanction in the Nuremberg Reichstag laws of 1935. Hitler believed that the policy of granting full legal and political equality to the Jews, which had been adopted in Germany and Great Britain during the previous century, had been a great mistake for Germany. He believed that inter-marriage between Germans and Jews harmed the German people and should be discontinued. He shared the conviction of Roman Dmowski in Poland that the Jews were harmful in the economic and cultural spheres. He also believed that the Jewish influence on German politics had weakened Germany. Hitler worked for the day when there would be no more Jewish subjects in Germany, just as Abraham Lincoln in his last years had worked for an exodus of Negroes from America. Hitler's view on the Jewish question was intolerant, and this was perfectly clear to the Polish leaders when they implemented the law of March 1938.

The German Foreign Office made several efforts to persuade the Poles to cancel their decree, but these efforts met with no success. The German authorities took great pains to act without guilt or blame. They organized the transport of Polish Jews with great care, and they made certain that the travellers had good facilities, including plenty of space and ample good food. The story told years later by the American journalist. William Shirer, about "Jews deported to Poland in boxcars" under brutal conditions, was clearly fictitious. The first trains passed the border to Polish stations before the Poles were prepared to stop them. After that, the unbelievable happened. Although the last day for issuance of the stamps was not until October 29th, and the new exclusion policy was not scheduled to take effect until October 30th, and Polish border police attempted to prevent the Jews from entering Poland. The Germans had made no preparation for this development, and soon thousands of Polish Jews were pouring into a few small border towns in Upper Silesia and elsewhere. W.K. Best, the German police official in Charge of the operation, declared that "through the massing of thousands of Polish Jews in a few border towns on the German- Polish frontier, some very disagreeable conditions resulted." The German police decided to bring as many Jews as possible into Poland at night by means of the "green border," which meant by obscure paths in heavily wooded areas or across unguarded meadows. This was dangerous work. There was considerable small-arms fire from the Polish side, but no actual engagements occurred between the Germans and the Poles along the border.

The Poles retaliated immediately by driving across the border into Germany small numbers of Jews from Western Poland, who had retained German citizenship since World War I. The Polish Government issued a decree on the afternoon of October 29, 1938, for the expulsion of enough ethnic Germans from Posen and West Prussia to make up for the discrepancy in numbers between the two Jewish groups. This Polish act of defiance brought the German action to a halt. It was feared that the Poles, with deliberate

exaggeration, would organize vast transports of Germans, and exploit the occasion to empty the former Prussian provinces of their remaining German population. Furthermore, Hitler did not like the bitter nature of the affair, and he feared that German-Polish relations might be wrecked if the incident was not checked.

The German authorities had not rushed the Polish-Jews out of their homes under the impression that they would never be permitted to return. They were explicit in promising them that they could return, when their passports were validated in Poland, and when the Poles gave them re-entry permits. The parents and sisters of Herschel Grynszpan, a syphilitic degenerate living in Paris, had been on one of the German transports. Grynszpan received a post card from one of his sisters on November 3, 1938. This postcard described the journey to Poland, but it did not contain any special complaint. The German transports were carefully provided with comfortable facilities and adequate food. Grynszpan had been living with an uncle in Paris since 1936, but there was a French police order demanding his expulsion from France. Grynszpan had been thrown out of his uncle's house on the day before he assaulted the German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath. Grynszpan had decided to murder German Ambassador Welczeck, and he actually spoke to him without recognizing him in front of the German Embassy on the morning of November 7, 1938. Afterward he entered the German Embassy, and he fired his revolver at vom Rath after he discovered that Welczeck was absent. Grynszpan was still living in Paris after World War II, and the story of his trial and imprisonment by the French, and of his imprisonment by the Germans, is an interesting chapter in legal history. Dorothy Thompson in the United States sponsored the collection of large sums for the legal defense of the allegedly heroic young Jew, who actually belonged in an institution before the affair at the German Embassy. Ironically, Ernst vom Rath had been a resolute opponent of Hitler's anti-Jewish policy.

Kristallnacht

The murder of von Rath was the cause of the Kristallnacht, the "anti-Jewish pogroms" from November 9. and 10., 1938. (Note: The following text of this "Kristallnacht-Chapter" is from "Hitler's War" by David Irving)

That evening he was in his modestly furnished Munich apartment in Prinzregenten Strasse when word arrived that Counsellor vom Rath had now died of his gunshot injury. According to Goebbels, he told Hitler that there had been anti-Jewish demonstrations in two provinces. His diary records: 'The condition of the diplomat Rath shot by the Jew in Paris is still very grave,' and 'The German press opens up with a will.' Then he added that the Jews 'have a few things coming their way.' He received word of demonstrations in Kassel and Dessau, and of synagogues being set on fire. At five p.m. the official press agency announced that the diplomat Rath had died of his injuries. As Goebbels and Hitler left to attend the Nazi festivities in the old city hall, news arrived that the Munich police were cracking down on anti-Jewish demonstrations. Hitler ruled, said Goebbels later, that the

Party was not to organise any such demonstrations – but under the circumstances it was not to quell them if they should occur spontaneously. We have only Goebbels's word for this, quoted at a subsequent internal Party inquiry; in his diary he wrote, 'Colossal activity. I brief the Führer on the affair. He decides: Allow the demonstrations to continue. Hold back the police. The Jews must be given a taste of the public anger for a change.' Goebbels then left Hitler as he had to speak to an assembly of Party notables in Munich's old city hall. The minister instructed his listeners, according to one version, that further such demonstrations were to be organised although the Nazi party must not appear responsible. In his diary, he proudly recorded his own leading role in what was to prove one of the most shameful episodes of Hitler's rule: 'A few gau officials get cold feet. But I keep pulling everybody together. We must not allow this cowardly murder to go unpunished. Let things run their course. The Stosstrupp [shocktroop] "Hitler" sallies forth at once to deal with Munich. And things happen right away. A synagogue is smashed to smithereens. I try to save it from the flames, but fail.' He continued: 'Over to gau HQ with [Gauleiter Adolf] Wagner. I now issue a detailed circular setting out what may be done and what not. Wagner gets cold feet and trembles for his [Munich's] Jewish shops. But I won't be deterred. Meanwhile the Stosstrupp goes about its business. And with no half measures. I direct [Werner] Wächter [director of the propaganda bureau] in Berlin to see that the synagogue in Fasanen Strasse is smashed.' (Note: the Kristallnacht riots were also fuelled by international propaganda against the Third Reich and its citizens, which was something that was ramped up considerably from 1933- 1938. The straw that broke the camel's back for the Germans was the assassination of Ernst vom Rath by Herschel Grynszpan.)

The responsibilities thus seem clearly defined. A subsequent action report by the leader of the SA Group Nordmark would state:

At about ten p.m. on November 9. the need for the operation was put to a number of gauleiters assembled in the Munich Hotel Schottenhammel by an anonymous member of the Nazi Party's Reichsleitung (Reich directorate). I thereupon volunteered the services of my SA Group Nordmark to the gauleiter [of Schleswig-Holstein], Hinrich Lohse. At about 10:30 p.m. he telephoned his chief of staff in Kiel: 'A Jew has fired a shot. A German diplomat is dead. There are wholly superfluous places of congregation in Friedrichstadt, Kiel, and Lübeck; and these people are still trading in shops in our midst. We don't need either the one or the other. There's to be no plundering, nor any manhandling. Foreign Jews are not to be molested. If there's any resistance, use your firearms. The whole operation is to be in plain clothes, and is to be over by five a.m.'

Toward midnight Hitler prepared to leave his apartment for the spectacular SS swearing-in ceremony. Himmler of course was with him. Himmler's chief of staff Karl Wolff arrived with an indignant message from Heydrich at the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten: the local Gestapo HQ had just phoned, reporting that Goebbels's district propaganda offices everywhere were whipping up anti-Jewish demonstrations and ordering the police – Himmler's police – not to intervene. Himmler turned to Hitler for guidance. Hitler replied

that the Gestapo were to protect Jewish property and lives. It was clear to Himmler that the whole affair had come out of the blue to the Führer. After the midnight ceremony, back at his apartment, Hitler was informed at one a.m. by one of his Wehrmacht adjutants that the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten had now telephoned to ask them to come and retrieve their baggage as the synagogue next door was on fire. Julius Schaub, Hitler's personal aide-de-camp, wrote after the war a graphic account of the ensuing night of horror, but Goebbels's diary describes Schaub as being in top form, 'his old Stosstrupp past comes flooding back.' 'As I drive back to the hotel,' continues this entry, 'there is the sound of breaking glass. Bravo! Bravo! Like gigantic old kilns, the synagogues are blazing.'

Telephone calls began coming from private citizens reporting fresh outbreaks of arson and Jewish businesses being looted all over Munich. Perplexed, Hitler sent for SS Gruppenführer Friedrich Karl von Eberstein, the city's police chief, and ordered him to restore order at once. He telephoned Goebbels and demanded: 'What's going on?' He sent out Schaub and other members of his staff to stop the looting and arson. He ordered special protection for the famous antique dealers, Bernheimer's. At 2:56 a.m. a telex was issued by Rudolf Hess's staff as Deputy of the Führer – and was repeated to all gauleiters as Party Ordinance No. 174 – forbidding the arson: 'On express orders issued at the highest level of all there is to be no arson or the like, whatever, under any circumstances, against Jewish businesses.*' At 3:45 a.m. the Berlin Gestapo repeated this prohibition. Goebbels, now in no doubt where Hitler's real favour lay, also spent the night on the telephone trying to extinguish the conflagration that his mischievous tongue had ignited.

The damage had, however, been done, and Ribbentrop left Hitler in no doubt of this. Hitler responded that he could not get rid of Goebbels now – not when he was about to need him more than ever. He did send for Goebbels the next morning, November 10, to discuss 'what to do next' – the minister used the word *nunmehr*, which implied an element of apprehension. Göring protested to Hitler that German insurance firms would have to pay the Jews compensation; the cost in foreign currency would be huge, as the broken plate-glass would have to be replaced with imports from Belgium. Hitler refused to discipline Goebbels as the Reichsführer SS demanded. Nor, except in the most savage instances, were the humble Party members who had actually committed the outrages brought to book, although ninetyone Jews had been murdered that night. Goebbels successfully argued, over lunch with Hitler, that the pogrom had shown international Jewry that Germans abroad were not fair game for Jewish assassins. 'This is one dead man who is costing the Jews dear,' Goebbels gloated in his private diary. 'Our darling Jews will think twice in future before simply gunning down German diplomats.'

There was trenchant criticism of this Goebbels extravaganza from every other leading Nazi (except Hitler himself). 'The order was given by the Reich Propagandaleitung [Goebbels],' recorded Himmler, 'and I suspect that Goebbels, in his craving for power, which I noticed long ago, and also in his empty-headedness, started this action just at a time when the foreign political situation is very grave. . . . When I asked the Führer

about it, I had the impression that he did not know anything about these events.' Hitler post facto endorsed the excesses of his henchman. When Göring sent him a sharp letter of protest Hitler replied that he should drop the matter; but as a sop to him he appointed the field marshal to co-ordinate all further moves in the Jewish problem. A collective fine of one billion marks was imposed on the Jewish community for the murder. After Hitler returned to Berlin on November 15, Goebbels smugly entered in his diary: 'He's in fine fettle. Sharply against the Jews. Thoroughly endorses my,' a Freudian slip which at once expanded to, 'and our, policies.'

(Footnote by David Irving: Some writers now argue that the Nazis had fallen into a Zionist trap. The Haganah officials with whom Adolf Eichmann negotiated on his trip to Palestine in November 1937 had hinted that it would serve their interests if things were made hot for Germany's Jews, to accelerate Jewish emigration to Palestine. It deserves comment that Grynszpan, although a destitute youth, was able to reside in a hotel in 1938 and purchase a handgun for 250 francs, and that his defence counsel Moro Giafferi was the best that the money of the International League against Anti-Semitism ('lica') could buy; lica's Paris office was around the corner from Grynszpan's hotel.)

Continued as presented in "The Forced War" by Hoggins:

The tragedy in Paris was exploited by Goebbels in an obvious effort to increase the severity of the general German policy toward the unfortunate German-Jews. At the time of a previous murder of a prominent German abroad by a Jew, in 1936, Goebbels had warned that the next incident of this type would lead to severe measures against the Jews. When vom Rath died of his wounds on November 9, 1938, Goebbels did what he could to carry out this threat. He gave an anti-Jewish speech at Munich on November 9th which was seized upon by German S.A. leaders as an excuse to attack Jewish property. Some of the Jewish synagogues in Germany were destroyed by fires set by organized groups on November 10, 1938, and much business property was damaged. American reaction to the events in Germany was more vigorous than elsewhere, and for the first time it appeared that conditions for Jewish life were becoming worse in Germany than in any other country of Europe.

Hitler was persuaded by Goebbels, after the demonstrations, to levy a 1 billion Mark (250 million dollar) fine on the wealthy and moderately wealthy Jews of Germany. Goebbels had argued that otherwise the Jews would be able to pocket vast amounts of money from the German insurance companies, because the assets damaged or destroyed on November 10, 1938, had been heavily insured. The poorer Jews who had less than 5,000 Marks in immediate cash assets were exempted. The German insurance companies were ordered to pay the Jews promptly for all damages suffered to property on November 10th, and it was permissible to use part of this money in paying the fine. The fine was to be paid in four installments, on December 15, 1938, February 15, May 15, and August 15, 1939. The Jews complained that their total capital in Germany in November 1938 was only 8 billion Marks, and that the fine was tantamount to the confiscation of a large share of their assets. A German law was announced on November 26, 1938, that would eliminate

Jewish retail stores, and its provisions were to go into effect on January 1, 1939. At the same time it was promised that welfare care and other state relief measures on behalf of the Jews would be continued.

The Polish passport crisis and its repercussions had little effect on the official relations of Germany with foreign countries other than with the United States and Poland.

Persecution of the German Minority in Poland

The entire year of 1938 was a bad period for the German minority in Poland because of the intensification of the official Polish anti-German measures. It seemed as if the Poles were suddenly in a great hurry to eliminate the German minority. The Polish leaders rationalized their policy of persecuting Germans with the specious argument that conditions facing the Polish minority in Germany were worse than ever before. Polish complaints reached a staccato peak when the results of the May 15, 1938, census were announced, and a mere 15,000 individuals in Germany claimed to be ethnically Polish. This result had been anticipated by the Polish leaders. The Union of Poles in Germany began a campaign on orders from Warsaw to demonstrate that the situation of the Polish minority was deteriorating. The Polish organization claimed that the activities of Poles were being restricted in many spheres. The Germans realized that the grievances of a minority are never entirely imaginary, and they hoped to appease the Poles in the interest of the much larger German minority in Poland. The German Ministry of the Interior promised to deal with Polish complaints after calling a conference of experts. They were under strong pressure from the German Foreign Office to do this, and they were advised that the Polish press was "drawing ugly parallels with the oppression of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia." It was noted that "the war-mongering Jewish New York Times" had taken up the theme.

The German Ministry of the Interior in a report on June 24, 1938, admitted that certain Polish grievances "correspond to some extent with the actual situation." Instances of discrimination against Polish students and of restrictions on the distribution of books by Polish cooperatives had been discovered. German Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick received the leaders of the Polish minority, and he promised them that Polish grievances would be remedied. The German Ministry of the Interior also insisted that "the position of the German minority in Poland offered far greater cause for complaint" The need for periodic conferences among representatives from the two nations was stressed, and the German Foreign Office was secretly informed that this was "the only effective means of alleviating the difficult position of the German minority in Poland." The Ministry of Interior realized that unilateral concessions to the Poles in Germany would not solve the problem of the Germans in Poland. Coordination of German and Polish policies was demanded, but it was precisely this coordination that the Germans were never able to attain.

Frick's reception of the Polish minority leaders on June 24, 1938, was publicized in the

Polish press. Nevertheless, the official *Gazeta Polska* argued in an editorial devoted to the question that coordination of policies by the two nations was unnecessary. The editors took the position that minority questions should be treated as a purely domestic concern by each Government. This declaration was tantamount to an abrogation of the November 1937 German-Polish minority pact, which stipulated official Polish interest in the Poles of Germany and official German interest in the Germans of Poland. The difficulty was that the German minority in Poland was more numerous and prominent than the Polish minority in Germany. It was easy for the Polish leaders to conclude that the elimination of the large German minority in Poland would more than compensate for any possible losses to the Poles in Germany were the Germans eventually goaded into retaliation. Indeed, a less tolerant German policy might have encouraged a revival of Polish nationalism among the Poles of Germany. Most of the Polish-speaking people of Germany were proud of German prosperity and efficiency, and they preferred to be considered German. The Polish leaders hoped that they would rediscover their Polish hearts if Germany adopted a less favorable policy or experienced another disaster as bad or worse than 1918. In the meantime they could take care of themselves. It was much as if Germany and Poland were nations at war. The Poles had a vast number of German hostages and the Germans had a considerably smaller number of Poles. The reciprocity which sometimes prompts belligerent nations to treat prisoners humanely, because many of their own People are in the hands of the enemy, was sadly lacking in this instance.

There were signs that the German Foreign Office would not desist forever from according to the Polish mistreatment of the German minority the major emphasis which it deserved. Lipski appeared at the German Foreign Office on June 13, 1938, to protest about obstacles to the completion of a new Polish school for girls at Ratibor in West Upper Silesia. The local German authorities were exasperated about this new school. They claimed that it was being erected on the wrong side of the frontier, because most of the girls studying there would be from Poland. The incident seemed a minor one to State Secretary Weizsäcker, and he admitted to his colleagues that he was sorely tempted to challenge Lipski about current Polish measures against the Germans in Poland, but he had desisted because of the Czech crisis. At last, on June 17, 1938, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop issued an order for German diplomats in Poland to assemble a list of grievances from the German minority in Poland. It was evident that the Poles were going too far and that the German Foreign Office was reluctantly contemplating recourse to diplomatic protests on behalf of the Germans in Poland.

Senator Hasbach, the leader of the Conservative German faction in Poland, was appalled by this situation. He argued that the German Government should confine itself to requests for the coordination of minority policies. He was terrified by the increasing tension between Germans and Poles in Western Poland. There were rumors that the German press was about to retaliate against the anti-German Polish press campaign and Hasbach was convinced that this would be a disaster. He pleaded with German diplomats in Poland that press retaliation would whip the provincial Poles into a frenzy. They had been told

by their local newspapers that the Germans never complained about conditions in another country unless they intended to conquer it. Hasbach predicted fearful consequences if the restrictions on the German press were removed. Moltke did not favor complete press silence about Polish treatment of the German minority, but he did agree with Hasbach that the question should be handled with great caution. Moltke was scornful about the complaints of the Polish minority in Germany, and he noted that they had admitted on June 2, 1938, that they had no complaint about discrimination in the economic sphere. Economic discrimination was the major issue for the Germans in Poland, although they also had to face much more cultural and educational discrimination than the Poles of Germany.

Moltke reported with great indignation on July 7, 1938, that the Poles had discovered that Germany was planning a press campaign to expose Polish mistreatment of the Germans. The German newspapers had discovered that the Foreign Office was collecting material about Polish outrages, and the editors proceeded to do likewise. They had sent instructions to several correspondents by public telephone, and in Poland where the wires were tapped this was equivalent to broadcasting the news. Moltke strongly advised that the Polish Government should be given some assurances about this situation. The warning from Moltke suggested to the German Foreign Office that Lipski might raise the question in Berlin. A special memorandum was prepared on July 8, 1938, for use in possible conversations. It contained a few of the major grievances about the mistreatment of the Germans in Poland. The Polish 1938 annual land reform law was heavily biased against German interests. Most of the larger agricultural holdings in Posen and West Prussia belonged to Poles, and only these larger holdings were subject to confiscation and redistribution under the law. Nevertheless, the Germans in these two provinces were compelled to supply more than two thirds of the acreage for confiscation in 1938. The new Polish program of establishing a thirty kilometer border zone, in which the Germans could own no land, included all of East Upper Silesia and broad strips of Posen and West Prussia.

The memorandum accused the Polish authorities of tolerating and encouraging a private boycott of all industrial firms which employed Germans. Eighty percent of the German labor force in East Upper Silesia was unemployed, and it was apparent that an increasing number of desperate young Germans were abandoning their homes in that area. The German youth were denied the apprenticeships which would have enabled them to find employment in the many craft professions. The Poles had intensified their program of closing German schools. The memorandum, which sketched the existing situation in general terms, concluded with the suggestion that future concessions to the Poles of Germany should be dependent on the improvement of conditions in Poland. Moltke was instructed to tell Beck, on the same day, that the complaint of the Polish minority and the extensive treatment of this complaint in the Polish press had done "extremely great damage in many respects." The response of Beck was characteristic. He agreed to inform the Polish Ministry of Interior of Moltke's complaint, but he added pointedly that the

question was not within his competence as Foreign Minister. This statement followed the line adopted by the *Gazeta Polska*, and it indicated that the Poles regarded the 1937 minority pact as a dead letter.

It was feared in the German Foreign Office that Hitler would not raise a finger to prevent the doom of the German minority in Poland. In August 1938 the Political Division of the German Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on the question for Werner Lorenz, the chief of the Central Agency for Germans Abroad. This organization had maintained strict neutrality toward the feuds and conflicts of the German political groups in Poland. Hitler did not wish the Agency to pursue an active policy in Poland and he intervened to prevent the memorandum from reaching Lorenz. The text of the memorandum was in conflict with Hitler's policy. It suggested that no considerations of higher policy could justify the abandonment of the German minority in Poland. The situation of the Germans in the former Prussian, Austrian, and Russian sections of Poland was described, and the lack of initiative and unity among the German minority communities was deplored. It was noted that the principal Polish effort was directed against the German community in former Prussian territory, and that the Poles had exploited the 1934 Pact with Germany to intensify their de-Germanization policies.

Polish Demonstrations Against Germany

Moltke attempted to explain the increasingly unfavorable situation of the German minority in a report on September 2, 1938. He blamed much of the trouble on the OZON (Camp of National Unity) which had been founded by Colonel Adam Koc. This vast officially-sponsored pressure group was seeking to secure a broad basis of popular support for the policies of the Polish Government. Moltke charged that the Government Departments in Poland were under OZON influence, and that they were seeking to increase their popularity by exploiting and encouraging the rising anti-German sentiment. The Government was trying to be more anti-German than the people, rather than opposing popular superstition and prejudice about the Germans. This policy was incompatible with the spirit of the 1934 Pact. The German Ambassador admitted that this development was stimulated by German successes. The Anschluss had produced a catastrophic effect, and the uneasiness and excitement had increased with the opening of the Sudeten crisis. The Poles knew that the militant Sudeten German minority in Czechoslovakia was the most powerful ally Hitler had in dealing with the Czechs, and they were determined that the Germans in Poland should remain intimidated. Moltke noted that an increasing number of Germans were being sentenced to prison by Polish courts for such alleged remarks as "the Führer would have to straighten things out here," or "it would soon be Poland's turn." There was no way of knowing how many of these unfortunate individuals were entirely innocent of the remarks attributed to them.

The flames were fanned by Poles who returned from Germany with the claim that they had encountered German propaganda directed against Poland. It was said that propagandists

were encouraging the Ukrainians to revolt against Poland, and that they were demanding the return of the Corridor to Germany. Moltke was especially annoyed by the apparent indifference of the Polish Government toward the increasing number of anti-German mass demonstrations. He was indignant that groups of Poles had recently appeared before German consulates, without official interference, to sing the provocative Rota, a popular anti-German song with many different versions. One central theme in 1938 was that God would reward Poles who hanged Germans. Moltke concluded his report with a list of prominent individuals in Poland who had recently adopted a more hostile attitude toward Germany. He remained completely deceived about Jozef Beck, whom he continued to regard as pro-German. It was unfortunate for Hitler that Moltke was unable to penetrate Beck's attitude to some extent. Hitler might have been able to avoid the trap that Halifax was preparing for him had he realized that Beck was one of his enemies.

The Outrages at Teschen

The situation at Teschen in October 1938 offered a vivid illustration of the problem created by Polish persecution of the Germans. Hitler had given Poland full support in her successful effort to acquire this district from the Czechs. The Poles, however, proceeded to treat the German and pro-German elements of the district as archenemies. De-Germanization measures began immediately after the Polish military occupation of the area. Every German school in the district was closed at once. The original staffs of German teachers had been dismissed. It was announced that Polish was the sole official language, and the doctors and lawyers of the area were told that they would not be allowed to practice unless they learned Polish within three months. Bank assets were frozen for a considerable period, and pensions and state salaries to Germans were reduced. The mayors of both Teschen and Oderberg were removed. Mayor Kozdon of Teschen was the leader of the local Slonzak community, which was a small West Slavic group similar to the Kassubians of West Prussia, or the Lusatian Sorbs of Saxony. When Kozdon was disgraced and sent to prison in Poland, the local Slonzak community replied with the scornful slogan that they would rather be inmates of a German concentration camp than so-called citizens of Poland.

On October 3, 1938, after the occupation of the city of Teschen, the Polish armed forces pushed on to Trynetz, Lazy, and Karwin in the Teschen district ahead of the schedule agreed upon with the Czechs. The Polish excuse for the rapid advance was the hostility of the local population. The *Gazeta Polska* explained that it was necessary to anticipate the formation of "German shock troops" at Oderberg. It was added that the German authorities were not permitting these forces to receive arms from Germany. In reality, the Poles were not fighting German shock troops, which did not exist, but a few desperate Slonzak workers and farmers. Polish placards posted during the day were torn down at night, and a pitched battle took place between the Polish soldiers and the Slonzaks at Trynetz. Governor Grazynski of East Upper Silesia, who was scheduled to administer the

new district for Poland, concluded that the Slonzaks needed considerable re-education before they could become useful Polish citizens. A first major step in the Polonization program was to drive out as many Germans and Czechs as possible, and to bring in Polish specialists and industrial workers from East Upper Silesia.

Approximately 20% of the total German population of the district fled within the first month of Polish occupation, and it was necessary to house 5,000 of the refugees in emergency camps in West Upper Silesia. Thousands of refugees received temporary quarters in private German homes. Governor Grazynski had raised feelings to a white heat among his followers with charges that the Teschen Germans were guilty of an insurrectionary conspiracy. A series of anti-German measures accompanied the national election to the Polish Sejm in November 1938. The German minority leaders urged their people to vote, although candidates of German extraction were no longer allowed to stand for election. Four of the remaining six German secondary schools in Posen province were deprived of their status as public schools at this time and they forfeited both the special state protection extended to public institutions and their tax privileges. Governor Grazynski of East Upper Silesia considered an election a favorable time to agitate publicly against the Germans. He presided at a meeting which had the temerity to resolve that the Polish minority in West Upper Silesia should place its allegiance in Poland, rather than in Germany. He also intensified his campaign to secure the discharge of the remaining German workers in East Upper Silesian mining and industry.

New Polish measures of school censorship were introduced in West Prussia. The index of forbidden Germanic books was expanded to include such works as the *Nibelungenlied* (the most highly prized early German heroic epic), Goethe's *Poetry and Truth*, Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, and Stanley's *Through Darkest Africa*. The leading German charity organization in the city of Grudziadz (Graudenz) was closed and its property was confiscated. The exclusively German private school in little Neustadt was told that it would be forbidden to hold its annual Christmas play in 1938. The anti-German and anti-Jewish pressure group, Association of Young Poland, planned a major boycott against all German firms in Polish West Prussia for January 1939, and at that time it was permitted to picket German firms without interference from Polish authorities. Indeed, the boycott would probably never have been attempted had the Polish authorities given the slightest indication that they would oppose it. The encouragement of anti-German measures was part of the formula with which the Polish leaders were seeking to promote the popularity of their regime. It is incredible under these circumstances to read in a widely-accepted Polish source, outside of the Communist orbit and more than twenty years later, that the persecution of the Germans in Poland was entirely "imaginary."

It was evident that Hitler was willing to close one eye to a great amount of Polish mistreatment of the German minority. It was not clear at the end of 1938 how far the Poles would push this policy in the immediate future, or whether or not Hitler would be willing to tolerate whatever the Poles might decide to do. It would have meant a great deal had the Poles indicated a positive attitude toward a comprehensive settlement along

the lines proposed by Germany on October 24, 1938. It is probable that Hitler in such circumstances and for reasons of higher policy would have ignored anything they chose to do to the Germans of Poland short of slaughtering them. The failure of the Poles to indicate a positive attitude contributed to the increasing German-Polish friction toward the end of 1938.

German Confusion about Polish Intentions

League High Commissioner Burckhardt was visiting Beck in Warsaw at the time of Lipski's conversation with Ribbentrop. He was pleased to discover that Beck seemed to be in a very friendly mood toward Germany. Beck told Burckhardt that he was willing to surrender the Polish right to represent Danzig diplomatically in foreign countries. He believed Danzig should receive permission to maintain her own diplomatic representatives in Germany, Poland, and elsewhere. He deprecated the role of the League at Danzig. Beck observed that Poland's interest in Danzig was mainly economic, and not political. Burckhardt was delighted with this remark, and he interpreted it as a confession that Poland was willing to have Germany acquire Danzig. He advised the Germans on November 21, 1938, that "only a German suggestion was necessary for discussions with Poland." The effect of this report on the Germans is easy to understand. They did not know where they stood with Poland. The discrepancy between the Burckhardt reports of November 9th and November 21st was obvious. They could not base their policy on the remarks which Beck made to a League representative. Burckhardt did not know that negotiations on Danzig had been in progress between Germany and Poland for four weeks. The adamant position which Lipski had taken on Danzig two days earlier did not permit the German diplomats to share the optimism of Burckhardt.

Hitler was considering every possible means of resolving the dilemma. He wondered if it might not be possible to gamble on Beck's willingness to accept a *fait accompli*. Negotiation of an agreement with Poland would be incomparably easier once Germany was established at Danzig. Hitler issued an order to the German armed forces on November 24, 1938, to prepare for the swift occupation of Danzig independently of an agreement with Poland. He placed special emphasis on the fact that he was not contemplating a war with Poland, but that he wished to be prepared for "a politically favorable situation." Hitler was considering a Danzig coup at the moment when relations with Poland were as cordial as possible and when Polish armed reprisals against Germany were least likely. This did not mean that he was willing to take such a gamble on the day that he issued the order. The risk was too great because he knew very little about the real Polish attitude. It was extremely significant that the German Foreign Office received permission on the same day to convey full information to the Danzig leaders about the current German-Polish negotiation. The Danzig leaders were to be kept abreast of all future developments. Hitler might not have taken this step had he believed that it would be a simple matter to reach a settlement with Poland at Danzig. He wished Forster and

Greiser to be fully informed so that he could coordinate steps with them on the shortest possible notice.

It was useful for the Danzig leaders to have accurate information directly from Hitler. Burckhardt had returned to Danzig on November 21, 1938, and his description of the Polish attitude in conversations with the Danzig leaders was entirely too favorable. He suggested that a Ruthenian solution favorable to Poland might be adequate compensation to Beck for the abandonment of Polish obstruction tactics at Danzig. Burckhardt had succeeded in creating the impression among his listeners that Poland was prepared to give way at Danzig. He seemed to think that Poland's improved diplomatic situation would prompt her to be generous. He observed that "Poland was no longer in the very difficult situation of four weeks ago, and that she could now again count much more on the support of England and France, particularly since Germany had injured herself politically, at least for the present, through her action against the Jews." Burckhardt told the Danzigers that he had accepted a hunting invitation from Göring, and that he planned to discuss the European situation with Goebbels before returning to Danzig. He obviously believed that an auspicious moment had arrived to settle the Danzig question.

Burckhardt was disgusted by the attitude of the American Ambassador to Poland, Anthony Biddle, who predicted on December 2, 1938, that the Poles would fight Germany in the near future. Biddle declared that he would welcome this development. He reminded Burckhardt of the great hatred of Germany in the most influential American quarters, and he also predicted that Great Britain and France would intervene in a German-Polish war. Burckhardt summarized his conversation with Biddle in pithy fashion: "Fine perspectives! Calvin against the descendants of Luther, and Lenin as Calvin's ally."

Secret Official Polish Hostility toward Germany

Lipski returned to Poland on November 22, 1938, to discuss the Danzig situation. His assurance to Ribbentrop about the superhighway and the railway had been a mere ruse designed to appease the Germans. The Polish leaders agreed that no concessions would be made to Germany either at Danzig or in the Corridor transit question. The affable manner of Ribbentrop, despite the adamant Polish stand on Danzig, impressed the Polish leaders. Beck speculated that Danzig might not be the issue after all which would produce a conflict between Germany and Poland. He suggested that Hitler might be allowing Ribbentrop unusual liberty in the Danzig question to see what he could accomplish. Lipski's attitude was similar to Beck's. His latest conversation with Ribbentrop had caused him to modify his earlier opinion that Germany would never retreat at Danzig. He suggested that the injury done to German relations with the United States by the anti-Jewish policy might affect German policy toward Poland. Lipski tended to exaggerate the effects on German foreign relations of the demonstrations against the Jews in Germany on November 10, 1938. He predicted that a Franco-German declaration of friendship, which had been discussed by Hitler and the French leaders since the preceding month, would

never be signed because of the negative reaction to the anti-Jewish demonstrations. This prediction proved to be false, and Ribbentrop signed the declaration at Paris on December 6, 1938.

Lipski and the other Polish diplomats were influenced in their judgment of this question at the moment by a report which had been telegraphed by Count Jerzy Potocki from Washington, D.C., on November 21, 1938. The Polish Ambassador was informed by William C. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France who was visiting in the United States, that President Roosevelt was determined to bring America into the next European war. Bullitt explained to Potocki at great length that he enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt. Bullitt predicted that a long war would soon break out in Europe, and "of Germany and her Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, he spoke with extreme vehemence and with bitter hatred." He suggested that the war might last six years, and he advocated that it should be fought to a point where Germany could never recover. Potocki did not share the enthusiasm of Bullitt and Roosevelt for war and destruction. He asked how such a war might arise, since it seemed exceedingly unlikely that Germany would attack Great Britain or France. Bullitt suggested that a war might break out between Germany and some other Power, and that the Western Powers would intervene in such a war. Bullitt considered an eventual Soviet-German war inevitable, and he predicted that Germany, after an enervating war in Russia, would capitulate to the Western Powers. He assured Potocki that the United States would participate in this war, if Great Britain and France made the first move. Bullitt inquired about Polish policy, and Potocki replied that Poland would fight rather than permit Germany to tamper with her western frontier. Bullitt, who was strongly pro-Polish, declared it was his conviction that it would be possible to rely on Poland to stand firmly against Germany.

Potocki incorrectly attributed the belligerent American attitude solely to Jewish influence. He failed to realize that President Roosevelt and his entourage considered World War I to have been a great adventure, and that they were bitter about those Americans who continued to adopt a cynical attitude toward American militarism after President Roosevelt's quarantine speech in 1937. President Roosevelt had been one of the few advocating permanent peacetime military conscription in the United States during the complacent 1920's. Such factors were more than sufficient to prompt Roosevelt to adopt an aggressive attitude toward Germany. He had no strong pro-Jewish feelings; he jokingly said at the 1945 Yalta Conference that he would like to give the Arabian leader, Ibn Saud, five million American Jews. The Jewish issue was mainly a convenient pretext to justify official American hostility toward Germany, and to exploit the typical American sympathy for the under-dog in any situation. Potocki overestimated the Jewish question because of his own intense prejudices against the Jews, which were shared by the entire Polish leadership. He was highly critical of the American Jews. He believed that Jewish influence on American culture and public opinion, which he regarded as unquestionably preponderant, was producing a rapid decline of intellectual standards in the United States. He reported to Warsaw again and again that American public

opinion was merely the product of Jewish machinations. The Poles themselves had a grievance against Germany because of the recent anti-Jewish demonstrations, but it was not prompted by any sympathy for the Jews. They resented the fact that recent German measures against the Jews placed Germany in a better position to compete with Poland in disposing of her Jews abroad. The majority of the remaining German Jews were at last ready to believe that emigration was better for them than life in Germany, and most of them were in a far better financial position to contemplate emigration than the Polish Jews.

Moltke reported from Warsaw on November 22, 1938, that the Polish press had maintained reserve in describing "the reprisal action carried out in Germany against Jewry." The *Dziennik Narodowy* (National Daily) had complained that Germany was right in seeking to get rid of her Jews, but wrong in her methods. Only a few of the leading newspapers had given their unreserved approval to the recent German measures. *Czas* (The Times) claimed that the Germans had gone too far in some instances. Moltke noted that the Polish Government feared a Ukrainian insurrection, and that this consideration was prompting them to slow down the campaign against the Jews within Poland. At the same time, they were stepping up their diplomatic offensive to find new goals for the Polish-Jewish exodus, and they were convinced that the recent events in Germany would handicap them in these efforts. Lipski claimed at the Polish Foreign Office conference on November 22, 1938, that there was a bright side to this picture. He asserted that German public opinion had been alienated by the recent anti-Jewish measures, and that this had shaken the position of the Hitler regime. He suggested that a strong Polish stand on Danzig might threaten Ribbentrop's position and convince Hitler that Ribbentrop was not an able diplomat. Polish High Commissioner Marjan Chodacki, who had come to Warsaw for the conference, was quick to agree with Lipski. He suggested that Poland might influence the situation by adopting a more stern policy in dealing with the Danzig authorities. Beck did not seem particularly concerned about the deterioration of German-Polish relations after the Munich conference. He told Jan Szembek on December 7, 1938, that relations with Germany had reached an impasse. This was a simple statement of the situation which Beck was not inclined to remedy. He still hoped that Germany would support him in Ruthenia, and he did not believe for one moment that Hitler intended to use Ruthenia as a base for Ukrainian irredentism. He knew that Hitler was sincerely pro-Polish, and he complained to Szembek that it might have been possible to obtain more concessions from him had it not been for the opposition of the anti-Polish Junker aristocracy, and the members of the German Cabinet who had belonged to the former conservative German National People's Party.

Beck indulged in some wishful thinking when he claimed to Szembek that Hitler and Ribbentrop were not in close agreement, and that it was Neurath, and not Ribbentrop, "who understood and executed perfectly the projects and instructions of Hitler." Neurath was actually one of the anti-Polish diplomats whom Beck had condemned, and he was far less tolerant toward Poland than was Ribbentrop. The similarity between Beck's career

and that of the German Foreign Minister stimulated Beck's dislike for his colleague in Berlin. Neither Beck nor Ribbentrop were actually career diplomats. Beck had pursued a military career for many years, and Ribbentrop had earned a fortune as a merchant after serving as a German army officer in World War I. It had been possible for both men to obtain top posts in the diplomatic services of their respective countries for the same reason. Beck had been intimate with Pilsudski for many years, and Ribbentrop had won the confidence of Hitler. The two men had established their supremacy over the career diplomats because they enjoyed the favor of their respective dictators. The Polish Foreign Minister decided that Lipski, for tactical reasons, should continue to take a positive attitude toward the German superhighway, but that he was not to involve Poland in any definite commitments, nor admit that there was any connection between the problems of Danzig and Corridor transit. Beck would continue to press for a bilateral treaty with the Germans to be based on a German renunciation of Danzig. Beck suspected that Hitler would insist on the annexation of Danzig, but he was not certain about it, and, above all, he did not know how long he could count on Hitler's patience.

Beck had decided to direct his main attention toward Anglo-Polish relations, and his entire policy was based on the assumption that he would obtain British support against Germany. Beck was clever in his relations with the British. He wished to impress them with his independence and to tantalize them by the reserve with which he approached important problems. He permitted Count Raczynski in London to tell Halifax, at the time of the German offer on October 24, 1938, that Poland would stand firmly against any German demands, but he denied Raczynski permission to come to Warsaw to discuss the situation. It was nearly two months before the Polish Ambassador was allowed to appear in Warsaw to discuss Beck's plan for an understanding with the British. Beck agreed in December 1938 to come to London within a few months to discuss the coordination of Polish and British policies, but he balanced his agreement by arranging on his own initiative for a meeting with Hitler in January 1939. He wished the British to know that he could make a deal with the Germans if he desired it, and he assumed correctly that this would increase Polish prestige in London. He did not wish the British to regard Poland as a mere puppet state in the style of Austria or Czechoslovakia. Beck had learned a great deal since his hurried visit to England in March 1936, and his vain plea for British military intervention against Germany.

A German-Polish Understanding Feared by Halifax

The British diplomat, Ogilvie-Forbes, reported from Berlin on November 9, 1938, that there were increasingly frequent rumors of an impending agreement between Germany and Poland. It seemed to him only a matter of time before "the ripe fruit" of Danzig fell into the German lap, but he predicted difficulties in the question of German transit through the Corridor. He speculated that the Germans might seek to offer Poland special compensation for a transit arrangement by supporting them against the Czechs, the

Lithuanians, and even the Russians. Ogilvie-Forbes had received the impression from Polish circles in Berlin that there was a genuine Polish desire to “compound with the Mammon of Iniquity.” He correctly assumed that this quaint reference to Hitler would amuse and please Halifax. He was also watching out for his own interest, because he was considered in London to be pro-Hitler. He did not believe that German acquisition of Danzig would solve the problem of German-Polish friction. He concluded that “a speedy settlement of all German-Polish questions in a manner permanently acceptable to the national pride and the political and economic interests of both parties would seem to be a miracle of which not even Hitler is capable.”

William Strang, the chief of the Central Division of the British Foreign Office, predicted to Ambassador Kennard in Warsaw on the following day that there would be trouble between Germany and Poland. He instructed Kennard, “you will no doubt be interested to know that we have received reliable information to the effect that Hitler now holds the view that Poland has not yet consolidated her position as an independent state, and that he has plans for dealing with the Polish question. He expects to be able to do this without a European war.” Strang invented this rumor in the hope that it would make Beck nervous when Kennard repeated it to him, and that it would discourage any temptation he might have to reach an agreement with Hitler. Kennard feared at this time that Beck would accept Hitler’s proposals about Danzig and Corridor transit. Nevertheless, he hoped that German-Polish friction in the minority question would spoil an agreement on the other points.

Kennard denied that the Poles were either nervous or in any hurry to settle their differences with Germany. He informed Halifax, at the time of the Burckhardt visit to Warsaw in November 1938, that the League High Commissioner shared his belief that the Poles would be willing to relinquish Danzig to Germany. Kennard reminded Halifax that nothing had been done since the Teschen crisis to secure for Poland the permanent seat on the League Security Council which Great Britain had advocated, and he warned him that Beck would remain critical of the League of Nations until this point was settled. Kennard had made no secret of his hatred for Germany when he discussed the situation with Burckhardt, and the Swiss diplomat in turn lost no time in supplying the Germans with full information about Kennard’s attitude toward them. Hitler was interested to learn that the British Ambassador in Warsaw, who enjoyed the confidence of Halifax, was an enemy of appeasement. Halifax did not like to contemplate the possibility that the League High Commissioner might identify himself with the German position at Danzig. He explained to Kennard that Burckhardt had been told in 1937 that the main object of his mission was “to prevent the establishment of a full National Socialist regime in the Free City.” It is interesting that Halifax emphasized this in December 1938, when one recalls that he told Burckhardt in May 1938 that he hoped Danzig would return to Germany by means of a negotiated settlement.

Halifax discussed the situation with Raczynski in London on December 14, 1938, in the hope of obtaining more information about the current Polish attitude toward a settlement

with Germany. Raczynski declared that the main problem for Poland at the moment was to obtain international aid to rid the country of its Jewish population. He assured Halifax that the Jews constituted "a really big problem" in Poland. Raczynski emphasized that Poland favored an active British policy in Eastern Europe, although "it was perhaps not possible for His Majesty's Government to intervene directly in practical fashion in the event of trouble in Eastern Europe." It was clear to both Halifax and Raczynski that British soldiers could not be landed on the Polish coast in the event of war, but Raczynski hoped that the British would not disinterest themselves in the area. Halifax promised that he was prepared to give the question of British support to Poland careful consideration. Halifax was annoyed that Beck had not allowed Raczynski to give him tangible information about current German-Polish negotiations. The certainty of a German-Polish conflict was an essential element in the formulation of his plans.

He instructed Kennard to use every means to discover Beck's real attitude. Kennard ingeniously suggested to Beck that it might be better to allow the Germans to take Danzig now, rather than permit them later to link Danzig with demands for the return of the entire Corridor. Beck "stated categorically that any question of concession in the Corridor would involve war." Kennard eagerly inquired if this would apply to a German request for transit facilities across the Corridor. Beck replied that any such German suggestion "could hardly be considered," although he had allowed Lipski to nourish the illusion among the Germans that Poland might accept this. Halifax was able to conclude that a German-Polish understanding was virtually impossible because of the chimera of British aid to Poland, and despite the fact that Beck was currently refusing to inform him about his negotiations with the Germans.

Poland Endangered by Beck's Diplomacy

The tortuous diplomacy of Beck during this period had a double purpose. The British were prevented from taking for granted Polish opposition to Germany at a time when appeasement was the official British policy. It was evident that the British leaders would have to educate their public to hate and fear Germany before a shift in British policy could take place which would permit a British commitment to Poland. The Polish diplomat knew that he would not be treated as an equal by Great Britain unless he maintained a similar reserve in the conduct of his own policy. The Germans were deceived about Polish policy in the interest of gaining time. Beck realized that Hitler would have more room to maneuver if he tipped his hand before the British leaders were ready to attack Germany. He knew that the patience of Hitler was his greatest asset, and he intended to challenge Germany when the time was ripe, rather than to receive an unexpected German challenge. This tortuous diplomacy would have been unnecessary had Beck perceived that the interests of Poland could best be served by joining Germany in a common front against Bolshevism. Hitler had offered reasonable and honorable terms which were highly advantageous to Poland. The friction caused by the minority question would have been

a minor issue within the context of a German-Polish understanding. The Germans of Poland were far too disunited and intimidated to cause trouble if Hitler gained a success at Danzig, and a German guarantee of the existing German-Polish frontier would have convinced the few chauvinists among them that there was no point in hoping for union with the Reich. Poland could have played an important role as a bulwark of European defense against Bolshevism, and, with German support, she would have stood a good chance of surviving an attack from the Soviet Union.

The British had nothing to offer Poland. Their policy of hostility toward Germany, which was thinly veiled by appeasement while they prepared for war, placed the Soviet Union in the enviable role of *tertius gaudens*. A suicidal internecine struggle among the capitalist powers of Europe was the answer to a Soviet Marxist prayer. The geographical position of Poland was such that she would be the first victim of ultimate Soviet expansion toward the West. The British leaders did not intend to send a large army to Europe, as they had done in World War I, and the British Navy and British Air Force could offer no protection to Poland. The dream of the Great Poland of 1750 was the fateful legacy which clouded the judgment of Beck. Pilsudski had shared this dream, but he was also a realist who would have been capable of making many major adjustments in Polish policy. It was the fate of Poland to find herself in the hands of the epigoni at the most crucial moment of her history. There was no sign that the Polish leaders were awake to the realities of the European situation when the year 1938 drew to a close.

The Polish Terror in East Upper Silesia

The Polish authorities in East Upper Silesia launched a campaign of mass arrests against the German minority on August 14, 1939, and they proceeded to close and confiscate the remaining German businesses, clubs, and welfare installations. The Poles were furious because Viktor Szwagiel, one of their police officials, was shot and wounded by a Young German Party member during the first phase of the arrests. The arrested Germans were not interned in the area, but were forced to march toward the interior of Poland in prisoner columns. Thousands of Germans were seeking to escape arrest by crossing the border into Germany. Their efforts were sometimes aided by so-called smugglers, who led them across the "green border" (away from main thoroughfares and control stations) for prices ranging from 10 to 600 Zloty. The refugees noted that in some cases the smugglers worked in connivance with the border control officials, who sympathized with the plight of the Germans. Senator Rudolf Wiesner, the leader of the Young German Party, was arrested by the Polish authorities at 11:50 p.m. on August 16, 1939. The German Foreign Office learned the same day that official Polish policy was not encouraging for any Danzig compromise plan. August Papde, the Polish representative to the Vatican, gave a negative reply to the suggestion of Cardinal Secretary of State Luigi Maglione on August 16th that Poland contribute to the preservation of peace by permitting Germany to recover Danzig. Papde replied that Poland would invade Germany with or without

British and French support if Hitler attempted to secure the return of the Danzig to the Reich.

The various German groups in Poland were frantic by this time, and they feared that the Poles might attempt the total extermination of the German minority in the event of war. German Chargé d'Affaires Baron Wühlisch at Warsaw received a desperate and highly compromising secret appeal from the German minority spokesmen on August 15th. The German Government was requested to command the German Air Force, in the event of war, to drop leaflets in Poland threatening reprisals against the Poles for further atrocities against the German minority. The German press denounced the Polish policy of mass arrests, and the Poles were warned not to regard the German minority as helpless hostages who could be butchered with impunity.

The Crisis at Danzig

Chodacki returned to Warsaw by airplane from Danzig on August 16, 1939, to discuss the situation with Beck. An unrewarding and lengthy conversation between Chodacki and Senate President Greiser that morning had failed to modify the deadlock between Danzig and Poland. Chodacki told Greiser that the Polish economic boycott against Danzig products would continue until Danzig recognized the unlimited right of the Polish inspectors to perform their functions anywhere on Danzig territory. The Polish diplomat claimed that Danzig would capitulate in this question were it not for her interest in secretly unloading German arms and ammunition in the Free City. League High Commissioner always told him that a meeting with Greiser had "gone right" when in fact nothing had "gone right." Burckhardt was also furious with the Danziger Vorposten (The Danzig Sentinel) for the indiscreet printing of news about his supposedly secret meeting with Hitler on August 11th. Burckhardt had intended that the meeting should be known to the German, British, French and Danzig leaders, but concealed from the Poles. He complained that his relations with the Poles were sufficiently unfavorable without the charge that he was conducting important European diplomatic missions for Hitler.

German Chargé d'Affaires Wühlisch at Warsaw warned the German Foreign Office on August 18, 1939, that the Poles were about to launch a campaign of mass arrests against the German minority in the areas of Posen, West Prussia, and Central Poland, in addition to East Upper Silesia. The Poles justified the mass arrests in Upper Silesia by charging that "the arrests in Upper Silesia are obviously to be attributed to the organization of diversionary groups which is done from various centers in the Reich." The Poles now charged that similar groups existed in the other districts. The events in Upper Silesia had been a prelude for a general campaign of terror throughout Poland. Polish High Commissioner Chodacki returned from Warsaw on August 18th with new instructions for conversations with Greiser at Danzig. He told the Senate President that he had a blank check to remove the Polish economic embargo of Danzig if the local authorities granted the right of unrestricted operation in the Free City for both custom inspectors and Polish

frontier guards. Greiser complained that this demand was equivalent to a total Polish military occupation of Danzig. Greiser promised to release two inspectors arrested on August 14th for illegal activities, but he refused to accede to the general Polish demand which had no foundation in the existing treaty relationship between Danzig and Poland. Chodacki turned the subject to the German-Polish crisis, and he observed with biting sarcasm that the basis for an agreement between the two countries had to be narrow, because Beck had assured him that Poland was not prepared to make any concessions. Chodacki declared that Poland would not launch military operations against Germany unless Germany attacked Polish interests, but he warned Greiser that the Polish nation would stand together as a nation of soldiers in any war.

National Socialist District Party Leader Forster concluded after this conversation that the Polish position prevented a solution of the embargo crisis. He advised Edmund Veesenmayer, an assistant of Ribbentrop visiting at Danzig, that the local authorities would be more successful with the Poles if they adopted a more vigorous position. Veesenmayer disagreed with this view, and he argued that the Danzig Government should continue to exercise restraint and to permit the Poles to shoulder the responsibility for whatever happened at Danzig. Forster was scornful to discover that three Germans were arrested in West Prussia as agents of the Danzig Government. The Poles were treating the so-called Free City as a separate hostile Power. A sensation was created at Danzig on August 21st when Senator Rudolf Wiesner arrived on the territory of the Free City after escaping from Poland. He had been arrested by the Poles on August 16th on suspicion of conducting espionage for Germany in Poland. Wiesner, who was the most prominent of the German minority leaders in Poland, discussed the current situation with representatives of the German Reich at Danzig on August 22nd. He complained that the German national group had sought to establish loyal relations with the Polish state, but that this effort had failed. He had vainly hoped that German ethnic consciousness would not be incompatible with loyal citizenship in Poland. Wiesner spoke of a disaster "of inconceivable magnitude" since the early months of 1939. He claimed that the last Germans had been dismissed from jobs without benefit of unemployment relief, and that hunger and privation were stamped on the faces of the Germans in Poland. German welfare agencies, cooperatives, and trade associations had been destroyed. The exceptional martial law conditions of the earlier frontier zone had been extended to include more than one third of the territory of the Polish state. The mass arrests, deportations, mutilations, and beatings of the past few weeks surpassed anything which had happened before. The tragedy was that this punishment was undeserved. Wiesner insisted that the German minority leaders continued to hope for a peaceful solution between Germany and Poland. They were not seeking a return to the German Reich. They merely desired the restoration of peace, the banishment of the specter of war, and the right to live and work in peace. The German diplomats and Danzig authorities discussed the possibility that the publication of the Wiesner statements might alleviate the wretched conditions of the German minority. Albert Forster, the local National Socialist Party chief, did not believe that this would be the case. He argued that such protestations of good faith, after the bestial persecutions

which had been endured, would debase the Germans without changing the attitude of the Poles. He was relieved to discover that Werner Lorenz, Chief of the Office for Ethnic Germans in the Reich, agreed with his analysis in a report on the Wiesner material on the evening of August 22, 1939.

The Wiesner episode aroused Forster to an unprecedented degree. The news of the approaching Russo-German pact was made public in Danzig at this time, and Forster urged that the time had come for Danzig to change her own policy to coincide with the implications of this treaty. He advocated a firm policy which would restrict the activities of Polish customs inspectors and frontier guards to the areas stipulated by the treaties. He proposed a policy of meeting force with force if the Poles reacted violently to this firm attitude. These discussions were relayed to Hitler, who supported Forster. The German Chancellor believed that the Danzig Government should make an effective gesture in support of the inauguration of this new policy. He advised the Danzig Senate leaders to proclaim the appointment of Forster as Chief-of-State in Danzig. This would make Forster the formal titular chief at Danzig, and Greiser would continue as de facto Premier in his capacity as President of the Danzig Senate. The suggestion of Hitler was approved by the Danzig leaders, and it was decided to proclaim Forster head of state at noon on August 23, 1939. The days of acquiescence in Polish encroachments at Danzig were nearly over, or at least until March 30, 1945, when the German forces at Danzig surrendered to the Red Army after the city itself had disappeared in rubble and ashes under the bombardment of Soviet artillery and aerial attacks. German Danzig by that time existed solely in the hearts of her surviving citizens. The ruined shell of the city was provisionally inherited by Poles who were the involuntary slaves of their tiny Communist minority, and of the powerful Soviet Union. The Polish refusal to permit the return of Danzig to Germany ended in indescribable tragedy for both Poland and Germany.

The Stiffening of Polish Anti-German Measures

The Poles responded to the announcement of the Russo-German pact by intensifying their propaganda campaign against Germany. Mistreatment of the German minority was encouraged by reckless charges that hundreds of acts of violence were occurring against the Polish minority in the Reich. A conflict of opinion between Forster and Greiser resulted at Danzig on August 24th when several Polish customs inspectors were arrested for disturbing the peace. Chodacki demanded that the men be released at once without preferment of charges. Greiser insisted to Forster that the Danzig Government capitulate. He had not favored action against the offending Poles in the first place, and he regarded any attempt to enforce the law in Danzig, when this was displeasing to the Poles, as completely futile. The major topic of discussion in Poland was the Russo-German pact. The more Beck considered this development, the greater his satisfaction became. He declared with amusement to Noël that "it is now Ribbentrop who is proving the bad faith of the Soviets." The official *Gazeta Polska* alleged on August 24th that the pact

was an unsuccessful bluff, because it had produced no effect on the nerves of Poles, Frenchmen, or Englishmen. The conservative *Czas* called the pact a bluff which had been produced by "the new comedy in Berlin." The *Ilustrowany Kurier* claimed that the Hungarian leaders had denounced Hitler's willingness to compromise with the Bolshevik peril. One Polish journalist assured the *New York Times* that the new pact was of no military value to Germany. The *Kurier Warszawski* announced triumphantly that the new agreement furnished conclusive proof of the weakness of both its partners.

The Poles took notice of the fact that the old restored German battleship and training ship, *Schleswig-Holstein*, was scheduled to visit Danzig on August 24th during a trip which had been announced much earlier. The Polish authorities had expressed no objection to the proposed visit, and it was concluded that the ship was too weak to present a military threat to Poland. The Danzig Government had selected Albert Forster to head the Free City administration, and the Poles were informed that he would take his oath of office on August 30, 1939. The Polish Government refused to approve this arrangement. Chodacki submitted an ominous protest note to Danzig on August 24th which declared that full responsibility for all ensuing measures taken by the Polish Government would fall on the Danzig Senate. Bonnet was alarmed by this development, and he instructed Noël to advise Beck to refrain from all military action in the event of a Danzig Senate proclamation on the return of the Free City to the Reich. Beck rejected this advice, and he declared that Poland would respond with military force to any German attempt to annex Danzig. He indicated that he was not opposed in principle to consultation with the French and British, but if action was initiated by the Danzig authorities, the Poles might be compelled by the pressure of circumstances to act unilaterally without consulting the Western Powers.

presented it to Noël. German Chargé d'Affaires Wühlisch reported from Warsaw that Polish confidence in assistance from Great Britain and France remained unshaken by the conclusion of the Russo-German pact. It was evident that the Pact had not prompted the Poles to adopt a more moderate policy toward Germany or the German minority in Poland. The German Foreign Office took stock of its huge file of specific reports of excesses against national and ethnic Germans in Poland. More than ten detailed reports were arriving each day, and more than 1500 documented reports had been received since March 1939. They presented a staggering picture of brutality and human misery. Albert Forster had discussed the fate of the Germans in West Prussia and Posen with Edmund Veesenmayer, the special representative of Ribbentrop, on the afternoon of August 23, 1939. It was difficult to decide what advice if any should be given to these unfortunate people in the event of war. It seemed to Forster that they should either be told to stay where they were and defend themselves when attacked, or they should be advised to conceal themselves. Neither prospect was promising, because they had no means by which to resist and little possibility of successful concealment. The German Government repeated its earlier pledge to the Slovak Government at Bratislava on August 23rd that the Slovak armed forces would not be required in the event of war or requested to operate

outside their own territory. Germany was prepared in case of war to facilitate the return of territories to Slovakia which had been seized by Poland in 1938. The German Government announced that it was willing to guarantee the 1938 Slovakian frontier against Hungary. The Polish Government on August 25th dealt with a German protest that three German civilian airplanes carrying passengers and flying over the Baltic Sea had been fired upon by Polish batteries on the Hela peninsula. The Poles admitted firing on only one German airplane on August 24th, and they claimed that it had been sighted flying over Polish territory prior to the Polish attack. The German press devoted increasing space to detailed accounts of incidents against the Germans in Poland. The *Völkischer Beobachter* announced that more than 80,000 German refugees had succeeded in reaching German territory by August 20, 1939, and that some of them had come from distant Volhynia near the Russian frontier. The Western diplomats in Berlin were aware that Poland was now making sweeping charges of German mistreatment of the Polish minority, but it was noted that specific individual incidents, which were common in the German press, were conspicuously lacking. The Polish diplomats in Berlin were asked confidentially why they did not make an effort to assemble exact and detailed information about alleged incidents in Germany. The Poles confided that such incidents were far and few between and hard to find. They claimed that this was not because of German magnanimity, but because Germany desired to preserve the Polish minority as a hostage for the German minority in Poland. This was a ridiculous charge, because the German authorities had concluded, and had made no secret of their opinion, that decent treatment of the Poles in Germany failed to produce the slightest effect on Polish mistreatment of the German minority.

11.11 US Involvement

The Secret Polish Documents

Much has already been written about Roosevelt's campaign of deception and outright lies in getting the United States to intervene in the Second World War prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Roosevelt's aid to Britain and the Soviet Union in violation of American neutrality and international law, his acts of war against Germany in the Atlantic in an effort to provoke a German declaration of war against the United States, his authorization of a vast "dirty tricks" campaign against U.S. citizens by British intelligence agents in violation of the Constitution, and his provocations and ultimatums against Japan which brought on the attack against Pearl Harbor – all this is extensively documented and reasonably well known.

Not so well known is the story of Roosevelt's enormous responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War itself. This essay focuses on Roosevelt's secret campaign to provoke war in Europe prior to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939. It deals particularly with his efforts to pressure Britain, France and Poland into war against Germany in 1938 and 1939. Franklin Roosevelt not only criminally involved America in

a war which had already engulfed Europe. He bears a grave responsibility before history for the outbreak of the most destructive war of all time. This paper relies heavily on a little-known collection of secret Polish documents which fell into German hands when Warsaw was captured in September 1939. These documents clearly establish Roosevelt's crucial role in bringing on the Second World War. They also reveal the forces behind the President which pushed for war.

When the Germans took Warsaw in late September 1939, they seized a mass of documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a letter of 8 April 1983, Dr. Karl Otto Braun of Munich informed me that the documents were captured by an SS brigade led by Freiherr von Kuensberg, whom Braun knew personally. In a surprise attack, the brigade captured the center of Warsaw ahead of the regular German army. Von Kuensberg told Braun that his men took control of the Polish Foreign Ministry just as Ministry officials were in the process of burning incriminating documents. Dr. Braun was an official of the German Foreign Office between 1938 and 1945. The German Foreign Office chose Hans Adolf von Moltke, formerly the Reich's Ambassador in Warsaw, to head a special Archive Commission to examine the collection and sort out those documents which might be suitable for publication. At the end of March 1940, 16 of these were published in book form under the title *Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* ["Polish Documents on the Pre-History of the War"]. The Foreign Office edition was subtitled "German White Book No. 3." The book was immediately published in various foreign language editions in Berlin and some other European capitals. An American edition was published in New York by Howell, Soskin and Company as *The German White Paper*. Historian C. Hartley Grattan contributed a remarkably cautious and reserved foreword.

The translation of the documents for the U.S. White Paper edition was inexcusably bad. Whole sentences and parts of sentences were missing and portions were grossly mistranslated. H. Keith Thompson explained to me why this was so during a conversation on 22 March 1983 and in a letter of 13 May 1983. A poor first draft English-language translation had been prepared in Berlin and sent to America. It was given to George Sylvester Viereck, a prominent pro-German American publicist and literary advisor to the German Library of Information in New York City. Thompson knew Viereck intimately and served as his chief aide and re-writer. Viereck had hurriedly redrafted the translation from Berlin into more readable prose but without any opportunity of comparing it to the original Polish text (which he could not read in any case) or even the official German-language version. In making stylistic changes for the sake of readability, the meaning of the original documents was thereby inadvertently distorted.

The matter was also discussed at a small dinner for Lawrence Dennis hosted by Thompson at Viereck's apartment in the Hotel Belleclaire in New York City in 1956. Viereck explained that he had been a highly paid literary consultant to the German government, responsible for the propaganda effect of publications, and could not be concerned with the translation groundwork normally done by clerks. Even the most careful translation of complicated documents is apt to distort the original meaning, and literary editing is

certain to do so, Viereck said. Thompson agreed with that view.

Media Sensation

The German Foreign Office made the documents public on Friday, 29 March 1940. In Berlin, journalists from around the world, including the United States, were given facsimile copies of the original Polish documents and translations in German. Journalists were permitted to examine the original documents themselves, along with an enormous pile of other documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry. The release of the documents was an international media sensation. American newspapers gave the story large front page headline coverage and published lengthy excerpts from the documents. But the impact was much less than the German government had hoped for. Leading U.S. government officials wasted no time in vehemently denouncing the documents as not authentic. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated: "I may say most emphatically that neither I nor any of my associates in the Department of State have ever heard of any such conversations as those alleged, nor do we give them the slightest credence.

The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or the policy of the American government." William Bullitt, the U.S. Ambassador to Paris who was particularly incriminated by the documents, announced: "I have never made to anyone the statements attributed to me." And Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador in Washington whose confidential reports to Warsaw were the most revealing, declared: "I deny the allegations attributed to my reports. I never had any conversations with Ambassador Bullitt on America's participation in war."

These categorical public denials by the highest officials had the effect of almost completely undercutting the anticipated impact of the documents. It must be remembered that this was several decades before the experiences of the Vietnam war and Watergate had taught another generation of Americans to be highly skeptical of such official denials. In 1940, the vast majority of the American people trusted their political leaders to tell them the truth.

After all, if the documents made public to the world by the German government were in fact authentic and genuine, it would mean that the great leader of the American democracy was a man who lied to his own people and broke his own country's laws, while the German government told the truth. To accept that would be quite a lot to expect of any nation, but especially of the trusting American public. Comment from Capitol Hill generally echoed the official government view. Senator Key Pittman, the Democratic Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, called the documents "unmitigated falsehood designed to create dissension in the United States." Senator Claude Peper, Democrat of Florida, declared: "It's German propaganda and shouldn't affect our policies in the least." Only a few were not impressed with the official denials. Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, the ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called for a Congressional investigation and declared in a radio address: "If

these charges were true, it would constitute a treasonable act. If President Roosevelt has entered into secret understandings or commitments with foreign governments to involve us in war, he should be impeached."

American newspapers stressed the high-level denials in reporting the release of the documents. The New York Times headline read: U.S. BRANDS AS FALSE NAZI DOCUMENTS CHARGING WE FOSTERED WAR IN EUROPE AND PROMISED TO JOIN ALLIES IF NEEDED. The Baltimore Sun headlined: NAZI DOCUMENTS LAYING WAR BLAME ON U.S. ARE ASSAILED IN WASHINGTON.

Although the book of Polish documents was labeled "first series," no further volumes ever appeared. From time to time the German government would make public additional documents from the Polish archives. These were published in book form in 1943 along with numerous other documents captured by the Germans from the French Foreign Ministry and other European archives, under the title *Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg: Geheimdokumente zur Kriegspolitik des Praesidenten der Vereinigten Staaten* ["Roosevelt's Way Into War: Secret Documents on the War Policy of the President of the United States"].

An important unanswered question is: Where are the original Polish documents today? Unless they were destroyed in the conflagration of the war, they presumably fell into either American or Soviet hands in 1945. In view of recent U.S. government policy on secret archival material, it is very unlikely that they would still be secret today if they had been acquired by the United States. My guess is that if they were not destroyed, they are now either in Moscow or at the East German Central State Archives in Potsdam. (Note: The original author of this text wrote it in 1983, Mark Weber) It is particularly important to keep in mind that these secret reports were written by top level Polish ambassadors, that is, by men who though not at all friendly to Germany nonetheless understood the realities of European Politics far better than those who made policy in the United States. For example, the Polish ambassadors realized that behind all their rhetoric about democracy and human rights, and expressions of love for the United States, the Jews who agitated for war against Germany were actually doing nothing other than ruthlessly furthering their own purely sectarian interests. Many centuries of experience in living closely with the Jews had made the Poles far more aware than most nationalities of the special character of this people.

The Poles viewed the Munich Settlement of 1938 very differently than did Roosevelt and his circle. The President bitterly attacked the Munich agreement, which gave self-determination to the three and a half million Germans of Czechoslovakia and settled a major European crisis, as a shameful and humiliating capitulation to German blackmail. Although wary of German might, the Polish government supported the Munich agreement, in part because a small Polish territory which had been a part of Czechoslovakia against the wishes of its inhabitants was united with Poland as a result of the Settlement. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the complexities of German-Polish relations between 1933 and 1939 and the reasons for the German attack against Poland at dawn on the first day of September 1939. However, it should be noted that Poland had refused

to even negotiate over self-determination for the German city of Danzig and the ethnic German minority in the so-called Polish Corridor. Hitler felt compelled to resort to arms when he did in response to a growing Polish campaign of terror and dispossession against the one and a half million ethnic Germans under Polish rule. In my view, if ever a military action was justified, it was the German campaign against Poland in 1939.

After the war the Allied-appointed judges at the International Military Tribunal staged at Nuremberg refused to admit the Polish documents as evidence for the German defense. Had these pieces of evidence been admitted, the Nuremberg undertaking might have been less a victors' show trial and more a genuinely impartial court of international justice.

Authenticity Beyond Doubt

There is now absolutely no question that the documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw made public by the German government are genuine and authentic.

Charles C. Tansill, professor of American diplomatic history at Georgetown University, considered them genuine. "... I had a long conversation with M. Lipsky, the Polish ambassador in Berlin in the prewar years, and he assured me that the documents in the German White Paper are authentic," he wrote. [8] Historian and sociologist Harry Elmer Barnes confirmed this assessment: "Both Professor Tansill and myself have independently established the thorough authenticity of these documents." In America's Second Crusade, William H. Chamberlin reported: "I have been privately informed by an extremely reliable source that Potocki, now residing in South America, confirmed the accuracy of the documents, so far as he was concerned." More importantly, Edward Raczyński, the Polish Ambassador in London from 1934 to 1945, confirmed the authenticity of the documents in his diary, which was published in 1963 under the title *In Allied London*. In his entry for 20 June 1940, he wrote: The Germans published in April a White Book containing documents from the archives of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisting of reports from Potocki in Washington, Lukaszewicz in Paris and myself. I do not know where they found them, since we were told that the archives had been destroyed. The documents are certainly genuine, and the facsimiles show that for the most part the Germans got hold of originals and not merely copies.

In this 'First Series' of documents I found three reports from this Embassy, two by myself and the third signed by me but written by Balinski. I read them with some apprehension, but they contained nothing liable to compromise myself or the Embassy or to impair relations with our British hosts.

In 1970 their authenticity was reconfirmed with the publication of *Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939*. This important work consists of the official papers and memoirs of Juliusz Lukaszewicz, the former Polish Ambassador to Paris who authored several of the secret diplomatic reports made public by the German government. The collection was edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, a former Polish diplomat and cabinet member, and later Pro-

fessor Emeritus of Wellesley and Ripon colleges. Professor Jedrzejewicz considered the documents made public by the Germans absolutely genuine. He quoted extensively from several of them. Mr. Tyler G. Kent has also vouched for the authenticity of the documents. He states that while working at the U.S. embassy in London in 1939 and 1940, he saw copies of U.S. diplomatic messages in the files which corresponded to the Polish documents and which confirmed their accuracy.

Two Key Diplomats

Two American diplomats who played especially crucial roles in the European crisis of 1938-1939 are mentioned often in the Polish documents. The first of these was William C. Bullitt. Although his official position was U.S. Ambassador to France, he was in reality much more than that. He was Roosevelt's "super envoy" and personal deputy in Europe. Like Roosevelt, Bullitt "rose from the rich." He was born into an important Philadelphia banking family, one of the city's wealthiest. His mother's grandfather, Jonathan Horwitz, was a German Jew who had come to the United States from Berlin. In 1919 Bullitt was an assistant to President Wilson at the Versailles peace conference. That same year, Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George sent him to Russia to meet with Lenin and determine if the new Bolshevik government deserved recognition by the Allies. Bullitt met with Lenin and other top Soviet leaders and upon his return urged recognition of the new regime. But he had a falling-out with Wilson and left diplomatic service. In 1923 he married Louise Bryant Reed, the widow of American Communist leader John Reed. In Europe Bullitt collaborated with Sigmund Freud on a psychoanalytical biography of Wilson. When Roosevelt became President in 1933, he brought Bullitt back into diplomatic life.

In France, the New York Times noted, Bullitt "was acclaimed there as 'the Champagne Ambassador' on account of the lavishness of his parties, but he was far more than the envoy to Paris: He was President Roosevelt's intimate adviser on European affairs, with telephone access to the President at any hour." Bullitt and Roosevelt were fond of each other and saw eye to eye on foreign policy issues. Both were aristocrats and thorough internationalists who shared definite views on how to remake the world and a conviction that they were destined to bring about that grand reorganization. The second most important American diplomat in Europe was Joseph P. Kennedy, Roosevelt's Ambassador at the Court of St. James. Like Bullitt he was a wealthy banker. But this Boston Catholic of Irish ancestry was otherwise a very different sort of man. Roosevelt sent Kennedy, an important Democratic party figure and father of a future President, to Britain for purely political reasons. Roosevelt disliked and distrusted Kennedy, and this sentiment grew as Kennedy opposed the President's war policies more and more vehemently. Moreover, Kennedy despised his counterpart in Paris. In a letter to his wife, he wrote: "I talk to Bullitt occasionally. He is more rattlebrained than ever. His judgment is pathetic and I am afraid of his influence on F.D.R. because they think alike on many things." (I wonder

if Kennedy told his son about the deceptions of the Allies which might have influenced his policies as President and ultimately led to his assassination).

The Documents

Here now are extensive excerpts from the Polish documents themselves. They are given in chronological order. They are remarkably lucid for diplomatic reports and speak eloquently for themselves.

On 9 February 1938, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki, reported to the Foreign Minister in Warsaw on the Jewish role in making American foreign policy: The pressure of the Jews on President Roosevelt and on the State Department is becoming ever more powerful The Jews are right now the leaders in creating a war psychosis which would plunge the entire world into war and bring about general catastrophe. This mood is becoming more and more apparent. In their definition of democratic states, the Jews have also created real chaos: they have mixed together the idea of democracy and communism and have above all raised the banner of burning hatred against Nazism. This hatred has become a frenzy. It is propagated everywhere and by every means: in theaters, in the cinema, and in the press. The Germans are portrayed as a nation living under the arrogance of Hitler which wants to conquer the whole world and drown all of humanity in an ocean of blood. In conversations with Jewish press representatives I have repeatedly come up against the inexorable and convinced view that war is inevitable. This international Jewry exploits every means of propaganda to oppose any tendency towards any kind of consolidation and understanding between nations. In this way, the conviction is growing steadily but surely in public opinion here that the Germans and their satellites, in the form of fascism, are enemies who must be subdued by the 'democratic world.'

On 21 November 1938, Ambassador Potocki sent a report to Warsaw which discussed in some detail a conversation between himself and Bullitt, who happened to be back in Washington: The day before yesterday I had a long conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, who is here on vacation. He began by remarking that friendly relations existed between himself and [Polish] Ambassador Lukasiewicz in Paris, whose company he greatly enjoyed. Since Bullitt regularly informs President Roosevelt about the international situation in Europe, and particularly about Russia, great attention is given to his reports by President Roosevelt and the State Department. Bullitt speaks energetically and interestingly. Nonetheless, his reaction to events in Europe resembles the view of a journalist more than that of a politician ... About Germany and Chancellor Hitler he spoke with great vehemence and strong hatred. He said that only force, and ultimately a war would put an end to the insane future German expansionism. To my question asking how he visualized this coming war, he replied that above all the United States, France and England must rearm tremendously in order to be in a position to oppose German power. Only then, when the moment is ripe, declared Bullitt further, will one be ready for the final

decision. I asked him in what way a conflict could arise, since Germany would probably not attack England and France first. I simply could not see the connecting point in this whole combination.

Bullitt replied that the democratic countries absolutely needed another two years until they were fully armed. In the meantime, Germany would probably have advanced with its expansion in an easterly direction. It would be the wish of the democratic countries that armed conflict would break out there, in the East between the German Reich and Russia. As the Soviet Union's potential strength is not yet known, it might happen that Germany would have moved too far away from its base, and would be condemned to wage a long and weakening war. Only then would the democratic countries attack Germany, Bullitt declared, and force her to capitulate. In reply to my question whether the United States would take part in such a war, he said, 'Undoubtedly yes, but only after Great Britain and France had let loose first!' Feeling in the United States was no intense against Nazism and Hitlerism, that a psychosis already prevails today among Americans similar to that before America's declaration of war against Germany in 1917. Bullitt did not give the impression of being very well informed about the situation in Eastern Europe, and he conversed in a rather superficial way.

Ambassador Potocki's report from Washington of 9 January 1939 dealt in large part with President Roosevelt's annual address to Congress: President Roosevelt acts on the assumption that the dictatorial governments, above all Germany and Japan, only understand a policy of force. Therefore he has decided to react to any future blows by matching them. This has been demonstrated by the most recent measures of the United States.

The American public is subject to an ever more alarming propaganda which is under Jewish influence and continuously conjures up the specter of the danger of war. Because of this the Americans have strongly altered their views on foreign policy problems, in comparison with last year.

Of all the documents in this collection, the most revealing is probably the secret report by Ambassador Potocki of 12 January 1939 which dealt with the domestic situation in the United States. This report is given here in full:

The feeling now prevailing in the United States is marked by a growing hatred of Fascism and, above all, of Chancellor Hitler and everything connected with Nazism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews who control almost 100 percent radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as black as possible – above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited – this propaganda is nevertheless extremely effective since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe. Right now most Americans regard Chancellor Hitler and Nazism as the greatest evil and greatest danger threatening the world. The situation here provides an excellent platform for public speakers of all kinds, for emigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia who don't spare any words to incite the

public here with every kind of slander. They praise American liberty which they contrast with the totalitarian states.

It is interesting to note that in this extremely well-planned campaign which is conducted above all against National Socialism, Soviet Russia is almost completely excluded. If mentioned at all, it is only in a friendly manner and things are presented in such a way as if Soviet Russia were working with the bloc of democratic states. Thanks to the clever propaganda the sympathy of the American public is completely on the side of Red Spain. Besides this propaganda, a war psychosis is being artificially created. The American people are told that peace in Europe is hanging only by a thread and that war is unavoidable. At the same time the American people are unequivocally told that in case of a world war, America must also take an active part in order to defend the slogans of freedom and democracy in the world.

President Roosevelt was the first to express hatred against Fascism. In doing so he was serving a double purpose: First, he wanted to divert the attention of the American people from domestic political problems, especially the problem of the struggle between capital and labor. Second, by creating a war psychosis and by spreading rumors about danger threatening Europe, he wanted to get the American people to accept an enormous armament program which exceeds the defense requirements of the United States. Regarding the first point, it must be said that the internal situation on the labor market is steadily growing worse. The unemployed today already number twelve million. Federal and state expenditures are increasing daily. Only the huge sums, running into billions, which the treasury expends for emergency labor projects, are keeping a certain amount of peace in the country. Thus far there have only been the usual strikes and local unrest. But how long this kind of government aid can be kept up cannot be predicted. The excitement and indignation of public opinion, and the serious conflict between private enterprises and enormous trusts on the one hand, and with labor on the other, have made many enemies for Roosevelt and are causing him many sleepless nights.

As to point two, I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever political player and an expert of the American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to conjure up a war menace hanging over the world because of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by babbling about an attack of the totalitarian states against the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a godsend. He portrayed it as a capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As people say here: Hitler compelled Chamberlain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace.

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German Nazism is further kindled by the brutal policy against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action, various Jewish intellectuals participated: for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; and others

who are personal friends of President Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-makers. These groups of people who occupy the highest positions in the American government and want to pose as representatives of 'true Americanism' and 'defenders of democracy' are, in the last analysis, connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to portray the President of the United States as the 'idealist' champion on human rights was a very clever move. In this manner they have created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a masterly manner. Roosevelt has been given the foundation for activating American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous military stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving very consciously. With regard to domestic policy, it is very convenient to divert public attention from anti-Semitism, which is constantly growing in the United States, by talking about the necessity of defending religion and individual liberty against the onslaught of Fascism.

On 16 January 1939, Polish Ambassador Potocki reported to the Warsaw Foreign Ministry on another lengthy conversation he had with Roosevelt's personal envoy, William Bullitt: The day before yesterday, I had a longer discussion with Ambassador Bullitt in the Embassy where he called on me. Bullitt leaves on the 21st of this month for Paris, from where he has been absent for almost three months. He is sailing with a whole 'trunk' full of instructions, conversations, and directives from President Roosevelt, the State Department and Senators who belong to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In talking with Bullitt I had the impression that he had received from President Roosevelt a very precise definition of the attitude taken by the United States towards the present European crisis. He will present this material at the Quai d'Orsay [the French Foreign Ministry] and will make use of it in discussions with European statesmen. The contents of these directives, as Bullitt explained them to me in the course of a conversation lasting half an hour, were:

1. The vitalizing of foreign policy under the leadership of President Roosevelt, who severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries.
2. United States preparations for war on sea, land and air will be carried out at an accelerated pace and will consume the colossal sum of 1.25 billion dollars.
3. It is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put an end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not get into any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes.
4. They have the moral assurance that the United States will abandon the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal.

The Polish Ambassador to Paris, Juliusz (Jules) Lukasiewicz, sent a top secret report to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw at the beginning of February 1939 which outlined U.S. policy towards Europe as explained to him by William Bullitt: A week ago, the Ambassador of the United States, William Bullitt returned to Paris after a three months' leave in America. Meanwhile, I have had two conversations with him which enable me to inform you of his views regarding the European situation and to give a survey of Washington's policy. The international situation is regarded by official circles as extremely serious and in constant danger of armed conflict. Those in authority are of the opinion that if war should break out between Britain and France on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other, and should Britain and France be defeated, the Germans would endanger the real interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain, naturally some time after the outbreak of the war. As Ambassador Bullitt expressed it: 'Should war break out we shall certainly not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall finish it.'

On 7 March 1939, Ambassador Potocki sent a remarkably lucid and perceptive report on Roosevelt's foreign policy to his government in Warsaw. This document was first made public when leading German newspapers published it in German translation, along with a facsimile reproduction of the first page of the Polish original, in their editions of 28 October 1940. The main National Socialist party newspaper, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, published the Ambassador's report with this observation:

The document itself needs no commentary. We do not know, and it does not concern us, whether the internal American situation as reported by the Polish diplomat is correct in every detail. That must be decided by the American people alone. But in the interest of historical truth it is important for us to show that the warmongering activities of American diplomacy, especially in Europe, are once again revealed and proven by this document. It still remains a secret just who, and for what motives, have driven American diplomacy to this course. In any case, the results have been disastrous for both Europe and America. Europe was plunged into war and America has brought upon itself the hostility of great nations which normally have no differences with the American people and, indeed, have not been in conflict but have lived for generations as friends and want to remain so.

This report was not one of the Polish documents which was released in March 1940 and published as part of the "German White Book No. 3" (or the German White Paper). However, it was published in 1943 as part of the collection entitled "Roosevelt's Way Into War." As far as I can determine, this English translation is the first that has ever appeared. Ambassador Potocki's secret report of 7 March 1939 is here given in full:

The foreign policy of the United States right now concerns not only the government, but the entire American public as well. The most important elements are the public statements of President Roosevelt. In almost every public speech he refers more or less explicitly to the necessity of activating foreign policy against the chaos of views and ideologies in Europe. These statements are picked up by the press and then cleverly

filtered into the minds of average Americans in such a way as to strengthen their already formed opinions. The same theme is constantly repeated, namely, the danger of war in Europe and saving the democracies from inundation by enemy fascism. In all of these public statements there is normally only a single theme, that is, the danger from Nazism and Nazi Germany to world peace. As a result of these speeches, the public is called upon to support rearmament and the spending of enormous sums for the navy and the air force. The unmistakable idea behind this is that in case of an armed conflict the United States cannot stay out but must take an active part in the maneuvers. As a result of the effective speeches of President Roosevelt, which are supported by the press, the American public is today being conscientiously manipulated to hate everything that smacks of totalitarianism and fascism. But it is interesting that the USSR is not included in all this. The American public considers Russia more in the camp of the democratic states. This was also the case during the Spanish civil war when the so-called Loyalists were regarded as defenders of the democratic idea.

The State Department operates without attracting a great deal of attention, although it is known that Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull and President Roosevelt swear allegiance to the same ideas. However, Hull shows more reserve than Roosevelt, and he loves to make a distinction between Nazism and Chancellor Hitler on the one hand, and the German people on the other. He considers this form of dictatorial government a temporary "necessary evil." In contrast, the State Department is unbelievably interested in the USSR and its internal situation and openly worries itself over its weaknesses and decline. The main reason for United States interest in the Russians is the situation in the Far East. The current government would be glad to see the Red Army emerge as the victor in a conflict with Japan. That's why the sympathies of the government are clearly on the side of China, which recently received considerable financial aid amounting to 25 million dollars.

Eager attention is given to all information from the diplomatic posts as well as to the special emissaries of the President who serve as Ambassadors of the United States. The President frequently calls his representatives from abroad to Washington for personal exchanges of views and to give them special information and instructions. The arrival of the envoys and ambassadors is always shrouded in secrecy and very little surfaces in the press about the results of their visits. The State Department also takes care to avoid giving out any kind of information about the course of these interviews. The practical way in which the President makes foreign policy is most effective. He gives personal instructions to his representatives abroad, most of whom are his personal friends. In this way the United States is led down a dangerous path in world politics with the explicit intention of abandoning the comfortable policy of isolation. The President regards the foreign policy of his country as a means of satisfying his own personal ambition. He listens carefully and happily to his echo in the other capitals of the world. In domestic as well as in foreign policy, the Congress of the United States is the only object that stands in the way of the President and his government in carrying out his decisions quickly and

ambitiously. One hundred and fifty years ago, the Constitution of the United States gave the highest prerogatives to the American parliament which may criticize or reject the law of the White House.

The foreign policy of President Roosevelt has recently been the subject of intense discussion in the lower house and in the Senate, and this has caused excitement. The so-called Isolationists, of whom there are many in both houses, have come out strongly against the President. The representatives and senators were especially upset over the remarks by the President, which were published in the press, in which he said that the borders of the United States lie on the Rhine. But President Roosevelt is a superb political player and understands completely the power of the American parliament. He has his own people there, and he knows how to withdraw from an uncomfortable situation at the right moment. Very intelligently and cleverly he ties together the question of foreign policy with the issues of American rearmament. He particularly stresses the necessity of spending enormous sums in order to maintain a defensive peace. He says specifically that the United States is not arming in order to intervene or to go to the aid of England or France in case of war, but rather because of the need to show strength and military preparedness in case of an armed conflict in Europe. In his view this conflict is becoming ever more acute and is completely unavoidable.

Since the issue is presented this way, the houses of Congress have no cause to object. To the contrary, the houses accepted an armament program of more than one billion dollars. (The normal budget is 550 million, the emergency 552 million dollars.) However, under the cloak of a rearmament policy, President Roosevelt continues to push forward his foreign policy, which unofficially shows the world that in case of war the United States will come out on the side of the democratic states with all military and financial power.

In conclusion it can be said that the technical and moral preparation of the American people for participation in a war-if one should break out in Europe-is preceding rapidly. It appears that the United States will come to the aid of France and Great Britain with all its resources right from the beginning. However, I know the American public and the representatives and senators who all have the final word, and I am of the opinion that the possibility that America will enter war as in 1917 is not great. That's because the majority of states in the mid-West and West, where the rural element predominates, want to avoid involvement in European disputes at all costs. They remember the declaration of the Versailles Treaty and the well-known phrase that the war was to save the world for democracy. Neither the Versailles Treaty nor that slogan have reconciled the United States to that war. For millions there remains only a bitter aftertaste because of unpaid billions which the European states still owe America.

Juliusz Lukaszewicz, Poland's Ambassador to France, reported to Warsaw on 29 March 1939 about further conversations with U.S. envoy Bullitt in Paris. Lukaszewicz discussed Roosevelt's efforts to get both Poland and Britain to adopt a totally uncompromising policy towards Germany, even in the face of strong sentiment for peace. The report concludes with these words: ... I consider it my duty to inform you of all the aforesaid

because I believe that collaboration with Ambassador Bullitt in such difficult and complicated times may prove useful to us. In any case it is absolutely certain that he agrees entirely with our point of view and is prepared for the most extensive friendly collaboration possible. In order to strengthen the efforts of the American Ambassador in London [Joseph Kennedy], I called the attention of Ambassador Bullitt to the fact that it is not impossible that the British may treat the efforts of the United States with well-concealed contempt. He answered that I am probably right, but that nevertheless the United States has at its disposal the means to really bring pressure on England. He would be giving serious consideration to mobilizing these means.

The Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński, reported to Warsaw on 29 March 1939 on the continuing European crisis and on a conversation he had with Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, his American counterpart. Kennedy's remarks to Raczyński confirmed Bullitt's reputation in diplomatic circles as an indiscreet big mouth: I asked Mr. Kennedy point blank about the conference which he is supposed to have had recently with [British Prime Minister] Mr. Chamberlain concerning Poland. Kennedy was surprised and declared categorically that a conversation of such special significance never took place. At the same time, and thereby contradicting his own assertion to a certain extent, Kennedy expressed displeasure and surprise that his colleagues in Paris and Warsaw [William Bullitt and Anthony Biddle] 'who are not, as himself, in a position to get a clear picture of conditions in England' should talk so openly about this conversation. Mr. Kennedy—who made me understand that his views were based on a series of conversations with the most important authorities here—declared that he was convinced that should Poland decide in favor of armed resistance against Germany, especially with regard to Danzig, it would draw England in its wake.

This concludes the excerpts from the Polish reports.

The Path To War

The secret policy was confirmed after the war with the release of a confidential diplomatic report by the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay. During his three years of service in Washington, the veteran diplomat had developed little regard for America's leaders. He considered Roosevelt an amiable and impressionable lightweight, and warned the British Foreign Office that it should not tell William Bullitt anything beyond what it wouldn't mind reading later in an American newspaper.

On 19 September 1938 – that is, a year before the outbreak of war in Europe – Roosevelt called Lindsay to a very secret meeting at the White House. At the beginning of their long conversation, according to Lindsay's confidential dispatch to London, Roosevelt "emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must know I had seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered not even the State Department." The two discussed some secondary matters before Roosevelt got to the main point of the conference. "This is the very secret part of his communication and it must not be known

to anyone that he has even breathed a suggestion." The President told the Ambassador that if news of the conversation was ever made public, it could mean his impeachment. And no wonder. What Roosevelt proposed was a cynically brazen but harebrained scheme to violate the U.S. Constitution and dupe the American people.

The President said that if Britain and France "would find themselves forced to war" against Germany, the United States would ultimately also join. But this would require some clever maneuvering. Britain and France should impose a total blockade against Germany without actually declaring war and force other states (including neutrals) to abide by it. This would certainly provoke some kind of German military response, but it would also free Britain and France from having to actually declare war. For propaganda purposes, the "blockade must be based on loftiest humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hostilities with minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property, and yet bring the enemy to his knees." Roosevelt conceded that this would involve aerial bombardment, but "bombing from the air was not the method of hostilities which caused really great loss of life." The important point was to "call it defensive measures or anything plausible but avoid actual declaration of war." That way, Roosevelt believed he could talk the American people into supporting war against Germany, including shipments of weapons to Britain and France, by insisting that the United States was still technically neutral in a non-declared conflict. "This method of conducting war by blockade would in his [Roosevelt's] opinion meet with approval of the United States if its humanitarian purpose were strongly emphasized," Lindsay reported.

The American Ambassador to Italy, William Phillips, admitted in his postwar memoirs that the Roosevelt administration was already committed to going to war on the side of Britain and France in late 1938. "On this and many other occasions," Phillips wrote, "I would like to have told him [Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister] frankly that in the event of a European war, the United States would undoubtedly be involved on the side of the Allies. But in view of my official position, I could not properly make such a statement." Carl J. Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner to Danzig, reported in his postwar memoirs on a remarkable conversation held at the end of 1938 with Anthony Drexel Biddle, the American Ambassador to Poland. Biddle was a rich banker with close ties to the Morgan financial empire. A thoroughgoing internationalist, he was an ideological colleague of President Roosevelt and a good friend of William Bullitt. Burckhardt, a Swiss professor, served as High Commissioner between 1937 and 1939. Nine months before the outbreak of armed conflict, on 2 December 1938, Biddle told Burckhardt with remarkable satisfaction that the Poles were ready to wage war over Danzig. They would counter the motorized strength of the German army with agile maneuverability. 'In April,' he [Biddle] declared, 'a new crisis would break out. Not since the torpedoing of the Lusitania [in 1915] had such a religious hatred against Germany reigned in America as today! Chamberlain and Daladier [the moderate British and French leaders] would be blown away by public opinion. This was a holy war! without instructions from Washington, and these I never received.'

The fateful British pledge to Poland of 31 March 1939 to go to war against Germany in case of a Polish-German conflict would not have been made without strong pressure from the White House. On 14 March 1939, Slovakia declared itself an independent republic, thereby dissolving the state known as Czechoslovakia. That same day, Czechoslovak President Emil Hacha signed a formal agreement with Hitler establishing a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech portion of the federation. The British government initially accepted the new situation, but then Roosevelt intervened.

In their nationally syndicated column of 14 April 1939, the usually very well informed Washington journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported that on 16 March 1939 Roosevelt had "sent a virtual ultimatum to Chamberlain" demanding that henceforth the British government strongly oppose Germany. According to Pearson and Allen, who completely supported Roosevelt's move, "the President warned that Britain could expect no more support, moral or material through the sale of airplanes, if the Munich policy continued." Chamberlain gave in and the next day, 17 March, ended Britain's policy of cooperation with Germany in a speech at Birmingham bitterly denouncing Hitler. Two weeks later the British government formally pledged itself to war in case of German-Polish hostilities. Bullitt's response to the creation of the German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia was to telephone Roosevelt and, in an "almost hysterical" voice, urge him to make a dramatic denunciation of Germany and immediately ask Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act.

In a confidential telegram to Washington dated 9 April 1939, Bullitt reported from Paris on another conversation with Ambassador Lukasiewicz. He had told the Polish envoy that although U.S. law prohibited direct financial aid to Poland, it might be possible to circumvent its provisions. The Roosevelt administration might be able to supply war planes to Poland indirectly through Britain. "The Polish Ambassador asked me if it might not be possible for Poland to obtain financial help and aeroplanes from the United States. I replied that I believed the Johnson Act would forbid any loans from the United States to Poland but added that it might be possible for England to purchase planes for cash in the United States and turn them over to Poland."

On 25 April 1939, four months before the outbreak of war, Bullitt called American newspaper columnist Karl von Wiegand, chief European correspondent of the International News Service, to the U.S. embassy in Paris and told him: "War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland has the assurance of the support of Britain and France, and will yield to no demands from Germany. America will be in the war soon after Britain and France enter it." In a lengthy secret conversation at Hyde Park on 28 May 1939, Roosevelt assured the former President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Edvard Benes, that America would actively intervene on the side of Britain and France in the anticipated European war.

In June 1939, Roosevelt secretly proposed to the British that the United States should establish "a patrol over the waters of the Western Atlantic with a view to denying them to the German Navy in the event of war." The British Foreign Office record of this offer

noted that “although the proposal was vague and woolly and open to certain objections, we assented informally as the patrol was to be operated in our interests.” Many years after the war, Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister in 1939, confirmed Bullitt’s role as Roosevelt’s deputy in pushing his country into war. In a letter to Hamilton Fish dated 26 March 1971, Bonnet wrote: “One thing is certain is that Bullitt in 1939 did everything he could to make France enter the war.” An important confirmation of the crucial role of Roosevelt and the Jews in pushing Britain into war comes from the diary of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense. In his entry for 27 December 1945, he wrote: Played golf today with [former Ambassador] Joe Kennedy. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and [British Prime Minister] Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain’s position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy’s view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for [William] Bullitt’s urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn’t fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939, the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain’s backside.

When Ambassador Potocki was back in Warsaw on leave from his post in Washington, he spoke with Count Jan Szembek, the Polish Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, about the growing danger of war. In his diary entry of 6 July 1939, Szembek recorded Potocki’s astonishment at the calm mood in Poland. In comparison with the war psychosis that had gripped the West, Poland seemed like a rest home. “In the West,” the Ambassador told Szembek, “there are all kinds of elements openly pushing for war: the Jews, the super-capitalists, the arms dealers. Today they are all ready for a great business, because they have found a place which can be set on fire: Danzig; and a nation that is ready to fight: Poland. They want to do business on our backs. They are indifferent to the destruction of our country. Indeed, since everything will have to be rebuilt later on, they can profit from that as well.”

On 24 August 1939, just a week before the outbreak of hostilities, Chamberlain’s closest advisor, Sir Horace Wilson, went to Ambassador Kennedy with an urgent appeal from the British Prime Minister for President Roosevelt. Regretting that Britain had unequivocally obligated itself in March to Poland in case of war, Chamberlain now turned in despair to Roosevelt as a last hope for peace. He wanted the American President to “put pressure on the Poles” to change course at this late hour and open negotiations with Germany. By telephone Kennedy told the State Department that the British “felt that they could not, given their obligations, do anything of this sort but that we could.” Presented with this extraordinary opportunity to possibly save the peace of Europe, Roosevelt rejected

Chamberlain's desperate plea out of hand. At that, Kennedy reported, the Prime Minister lost all hope. "The futility of it all," Chamberlain had told Kennedy, "is the thing that is frightful. After all, we cannot save the Poles. We can merely carry on a war of revenge that will mean the destruction of all Europe."

Roosevelt liked to present himself to the American people and the world as a man of peace. To a considerable degree, that is still his image today. But Roosevelt cynically rejected genuine opportunities to act for peace when they were presented. In 1938 he refused even to answer requests by French Foreign Minister Bonnet on 8 and 12 September to consider arbitrating the Czech-German dispute. And a year later, after the outbreak of war, a melancholy Ambassador Kennedy beseeched Roosevelt to act boldly for peace. "It seems to me that this situation may crystallize to a point where the President can be the savior of the world," Kennedy cabled on 11 September from London. "The British government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world ..."

But Roosevelt rejected out of hand this chance to save the peace of Europe. To a close political crony, he called Kennedy's plea "the silliest message to me that I have ever received." He complained to Henry Morgenthau that his London Ambassador was nothing but a pain in the neck: "Joe has been an appeaser and will always be an appeaser ... If Germany and Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow, Joe would start working on the King and his friend the Queen and from there on down to get everybody to accept it."

Infuriated at Kennedy's stubborn efforts to restore peace in Europe or at least limit the conflict that had broken out, Roosevelt instructed his Ambassador with a "personal" and "strictly confidential" telegram on 11 September 1939 that any American peace effort was totally out of the question. The Roosevelt government, it declared, "sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people [sic] of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and aggression."

Hamilton Fish Warns The Nation

In the months before armed conflict broke out in Europe, perhaps the most vigorous and prophetic American voice of warning against President Roosevelt's campaign to incite war was that of Hamilton Fish, a leading Republican congressman from New York. In a series of hard-hitting radio speeches, Fish rallied considerable public opinion against Roosevelt's deceptive war policy. Here are only a few excerpts from some of those addresses.

On 6 January 1939, Fish told a nationwide radio audience: The inflammatory and provocative message of the President to Congress and the world [given two days before] has unnecessarily alarmed the American people and created, together with a barrage of propaganda emanating from high New Deal officials, a war hysteria, dangerous to the peace of America and the world. The only logical conclusion to such speeches is another war fought overseas by American soldiers. All the totalitarian nations referred to by President Roosevelt ... haven't the faintest thought of making war on us or invading Latin America. I do not propose to mince words on such an issue, affecting the life, liberty and happiness of our people. The time has come to call a halt to the warmongers of the New Deal, backed by war profiteers, Communists, and hysterical internationalists, who want us to quarantine the world with American blood and money. He [Roosevelt] evidently desires to whip up a frenzy of hate and war psychosis as a red herring to take the minds of our people off their own unsolved domestic problems. He visualizes hobgoblins and creates in the public mind a fear of foreign invasions that exists only in his own imagination.

On 5 March, Fish spoke to the country over the Columbia radio network: The people of France and Great Britain want peace but our warmongers are constantly inciting them to disregard the Munich Pact and resort to the arbitrament of arms. If only we would stop meddling in foreign lands the old nations of Europe would compose their own quarrels by arbitration and the processes of peace, but apparently we won't let them. Fish addressed the listeners of the National Broadcasting Company network on 5 April with these words:

The youth of America are again being prepared for another blood bath in Europe in order to make the world safe for democracy. If Hitler and the Nazi government regain Memel or Danzig, taken away from Germany by the Versailles Treaty, and where the population is 90 percent German, why is it necessary to issue threats and denunciations and incite our people to war? I would not sacrifice the life of one American soldier for a half dozen Memels or Danzigs. We repudiated the Versailles Treaty because it was based on greed and hatred, and as long as its inequalities and injustices exist there are bound to be wars of liberation. The sooner certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty are scrapped the better for the peace of the world. I believe that if the areas that are distinctly German in population are restored to Germany, except Alsace-Lorraine and the Tyrol, there will be no war in western Europe. There may be a war between the Nazis and the Communists, but if there is that is not our war or that of Great Britain or France or any of the democracies. New Deal spokesmen have stirred up war hysteria into a veritable frenzy. The New Deal propaganda machine is working overtime to prepare the minds of our people for war, who are already suffering from a bad case of war jitters. President Roosevelt is the number one warmonger in America, and is largely responsible for the fear that pervades the Nation which has given the stock market and the American people a bad case of the jitters. I accuse the administration of instigating war propaganda and hysteria to cover up the failure and collapse of the New Deal policies, with 12 million unemployed and business confidence destroyed. I believe we have far more to fear from

our enemies from within than we have from without. All the Communists are united in urging us to go to war against Germany and Japan for the benefit of Soviet Russia.

Great Britain still expects every American to do her duty, by preserving the British Empire and her colonies. The war profiteers, munitions makers and international bankers are all set up for our participation in a new world war. On 21 April, Fish again spoke to the country over nationwide radio: It is the duty of all those Americans who desire to keep out of foreign entanglements and the rotten mess and war madness of Europe and Asia to openly expose the war hysteria and propaganda that is impelling us to armed conflict. What we need in America is a stop war crusade, before we are forced into a foreign war by internationalists and interventionists at Washington, who seem to be more interested in solving world problems rather than our own. In his radio address of 26 May, Fish stated: He [Roosevelt] should remember that the Congress has the sole power to declare war and formulate the foreign policies of the United States. The President has no such constitutional power. He is merely the official organ to carry out the policies determined by the Congress. Without knowing even who the combatants will be, we are informed almost daily by the internationalists and interventionists in America that we must participate in the next world war.

On 8 July 1939, Fish declared over the National Broadcasting Company radio network: If we must go to war, let it be in defense of America, but not in defense of the munitions makers, war profiteers, Communists, to cover up the failures of the New Deal, or to provide an alibi for a third term. It is well for all nations to know that we do not propose to go to war over Danzig, power politics, foreign colonies, or the imperialistic wars of Europe or anywhere in the world.

Powers Behind The President

President Roosevelt could have done little to incite war in Europe without help from powerful allies. Behind him stood the self-serving international financial and Jewish interests bent on the destruction of Germany. The principal organization which drummed up public support for U.S. involvement in the European war prior to the Pearl Harbor attack was the cleverly named "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies." President Roosevelt himself initiated its founding, and top administration officials consulted frequently with Committee leaders. Although headed for a time by an elderly small-town Kansas newspaper publisher, William Allen White, the Committee was actually organized by powerful financial interests which stood to profit tremendously from loans to embattled Britain and from shrewd investments in giant war industries in the United States.

At the end of 1940, West Virginia Senator Rush D. Holt issued a detailed examination of the Committee which exposed the base interests behind the idealistic-sounding slogans: The Committee has powerful connections with banks, insurance companies, financial investing firms, and industrial concerns. These in turn exert influence on college presidents and professors, as well as on newspapers, radio and other means of communication. One

of the powerful influences used by the group is the '400' and social set. The story is a sordid picture of betrayal of public interest. The powerful J.P. Morgan interest with its holdings in the British Empire helped plan the organization and donated its first expense money.

Some of the important figures active in the Committee were revealed by Holt: Frederic R. Coudert, a paid war propagandist for the British government in the U.S. during the First World War; Robert S. Allen of the Pearson and Allen syndicated column; Henry R. Luce, the influential publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines; Fiorella LaGuardia, the fiery half-Jewish Mayor of New York City; Herbert Lehman, the Jewish Governor of New York with important financial holdings in war industries; and Frank Altschul, an officer in the Jewish investment firm of Lazard Freres with extensive holdings in munitions and military supply companies. If the Committee succeeded in getting the U.S. into war, Holt warned, "American boys will spill their blood for profiteers, politicians and 'paytriots.' If war comes, on the hands of the sponsors of the White Committee will be blood-the blood of Americans killed in a needless war."

In March 1941 a list of most of the Committee's financial backers was made public. It revealed the nature of the forces eager to bring America into the European war. Powerful international banking interests were well represented. J.P. Morgan, John W. Morgan, Thomas W. Lamont and others of the great Morgan banking house were listed. Other important names from the New York financial world included Mr. and Mrs. Paul Mellon, Felix M. and James F. Warburg, and J. Malcolm Forbes. Chicago department store owner and publisher Marshall Field was a contributor, as was William Averill Harriman, the railroad and investment millionaire who later served as Roosevelt's ambassador in Moscow. Of course, Jewish names made up a substantial portion of the long list. Hollywood film czar Samuel Goldwyn of Goldwyn Studios was there, along with David Dubinsky, the head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. The William S. Paley Foundation, which had been set up by the head of the giant Columbia Broadcasting System, contributed to the Committee. The name of Mrs. Herbert H. Lehman, wife of the New York Governor, was also on the list.

Without an understanding of his intimate ties to organized Jewry, Roosevelt's policies make little sense. As Jewish historian Lucy Dawidowicz noted: "Roosevelt himself brought into his immediate circle more Jews than any other President before or after him. Felix Frankfurter, Bernard M. Baruch and Henry Morgenthau were his close advisers. Benjamin V. Cohen, Samuel Rosenman and David K. Niles were his friends and trusted aides." This is perhaps not so remarkable in light of Roosevelt's reportedly one-eighth Jewish ancestry. In his diary entry of 1 May 1941, Charles A. Lindbergh, the American aviator hero and peace leader, nailed the coalition that was pushing the United States into war: The pressure for war is high and mounting. The people are opposed to it, but the Administration seems to have 'the bit in its teeth' and [is] hell-bent on its way to war. Most of the Jewish interests in the country are behind war, and they control a huge part of our press and radio and most of our motion pictures. There are also the 'intellectuals,'

and the 'Anglophiles,' and the British agents who are allowed free rein, the international financial interests, and many others.

Joseph Kennedy shared Lindbergh's apprehensions about Jewish power. Before the outbreak of war he privately expressed concerns about "the Jews who dominate our press" and world Jewry in general, which he considered a threat to peace and prosperity. Shortly after the beginning of hostilities, Kennedy lamented "the growing Jewish influence in the press and in Washington demanding continuance of the war."

Betrayal, Failure, Delusion

Roosevelt's efforts to get Poland, Britain and France into war against Germany succeeded all too well. The result was untold death and misery and destruction. When the fighting began, as Roosevelt had intended and planned, the Polish and French leaders expected the American president to at least make good on his assurances of backing in case of war. But Roosevelt had not reckoned on the depth of peace sentiment of the vast majority of Americans. So, in addition to deceiving his own people, Roosevelt also let down those in Europe to whom he had promised support. Seldom in American history were the people as united in their views as they were in late 1939 about staying out of war in Europe. When hostilities began in September 1939, the Gallup poll showed 94 percent of the American people against involvement in war. That figure rose to 96.5 percent in December before it began to decline slowly to about 80 percent in the Fall of 1941.

Roosevelt was, of course, quite aware of the intensity of popular feeling on this issue. That is why he lied repeatedly to the American people about his love of peace and his determination to keep the U.S. out of war, while simultaneously doing everything in his power to plunge Europe and America into war. In a major 1940 re-election campaign speech, Roosevelt responded to the growing fears of millions of Americans who suspected that their President had secretly pledged United States support to Britain in its war against Germany. These well-founded suspicions were based in part on the publication in March of the captured Polish documents. The speech of 23 October 1940 was broadcast from Philadelphia to the nation on network radio. In the most emphatic language possible, Roosevelt categorically denied that he had ledged in some way the participation of the United States in some foreign war. I give to you and to the people of this country this most solemn assurance: There is no secret Treaty, no secret understanding in any shape or form, direct or indirect, with any Government or any other nation in any part of the world, to involve this nation in any war or for any other purpose.

We now know, of course, that this pious declaration was just another one of Roosevelt's many brazen, bald-faced lies to the American people. Roosevelt's policies were more than just dishonest-they were criminal. The Constitution of the United States grants authority only to the Congress to make war and peace. And Congress had passed several major laws to specifically insure U.S. neutrality in case of war in Europe. Roosevelt continually violated his oath as President to uphold the Constitution. If his secret policies had

been known, the public demand for his impeachment would very probably have been unstoppable. The Watergate episode has made many Americans deeply conscious of the fact that their presidents can act criminally. That affair forced Richard Nixon to resign his presidency, and he is still widely regarded as a criminal. No schools are named after him and his name will never receive the respect that normally goes to every American president. But Nixon's crimes pale into insignificance when compared to those of Franklin Roosevelt. What were Nixon's lies compared to those of Roosevelt? What is a burglary cover-up compared to an illegal and secret campaign to bring about a major war?

Those who defend Roosevelt's record argue that he lied to the American people for their own good – that he broke the law for lofty principles. His deceit is considered permissible because the cause was noble, while similar deception by presidents Johnson and Nixon, to name two, is not. This is, of course, a hypocritical double standard. And the argument doesn't speak very well for the democratic system. It implies that the people are too dumb to understand their own best interests. It further suggests that the best form of government is a kind of benevolent liberal-democratic dictatorship.

Roosevelt's hatred for Hitler was deep, vehement, passionate – almost personal. This was due in no small part to an abiding envy and jealousy rooted in the great contrast between the two men, not only in their personal characters but also in their records as national leaders. Superficially, the public faces of Roosevelt and Hitler were astonishingly similar. Both assumed the leadership of their respective countries at the beginning of 1933. They both faced the enormous challenge of mass unemployment during a catastrophic worldwide economic depression. Each became a powerful leader in a vast military alliance during the most destructive war in history. Both men died while still in office within a few weeks of each other in April 1945, just before the end of the Second World War in Europe. But the enormous contrasts in the lives of these two men are even more remarkable. Roosevelt was born into one of the wealthiest families in America. His was a life utterly free of material worry. He took part in the First World War from an office in Washington as UnderSecretary of the Navy. Hitler, on the other hand, was born into a modest provincial family. As a young man he worked as an impoverished manual laborer. He served in the First World War as a front line soldier in the hell of the Western battleground. He was wounded many times and decorated for bravery.

In spite of his charming manner and soothing rhetoric, Roosevelt proved unable to master the great challenges facing America. Even after four years of his presidency, millions remained unemployed, undernourished and poorly housed in a vast land richly endowed with all the resources for incomparable prosperity. The New Deal was plagued with bitter strikes and bloody clashes between labor and capital. Roosevelt did nothing to solve the country's deep, festering racial problems which erupted repeatedly in riots and armed conflict. The story was very different in Germany. Hitler rallied his people behind a radical program that transformed Germany within a few years from an economically ruined land on the edge of civil war into Europe's powerhouse. Germany underwent a social, cultural and economic rebirth without parallel in history. The contrast between the personalities

of Roosevelt and Hitler was simultaneously a contrast between two diametrically different social-political systems and ideologies. And yet, it would be incorrect to characterize Roosevelt as merely a cynical politician and front man for powerful alien interests. Certainly he did not regard himself as an evil man. He sincerely believed that he was doing the right and noble thing in pressuring Britain and France into war against Germany. Like Wilson before him, and others since, Roosevelt felt himself uniquely qualified and called upon by destiny to reshape the world according to his vision of an egalitarian, universalist democracy. He was convinced, as so many American leaders have been, that the world could be saved from itself by remodeling it after the United States.

Presidents like Wilson and Roosevelt view the world not as a complex of different nations, races and cultures which must mutually respect each others' separate collective identities in order to live together in peace, but rather according to a selfrighteous missionary perspective that divides the globe into morally good and evil countries. In that scheme of things, America is the providentially permanent leader of the forces of righteousness. Luckily, this view just happens to correspond to the economic and political interests of those who wield power in the United States. In April 1941, Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota prophetically predicted that one day the Second World War would be remembered as Roosevelt's war. "If we are ever involved in this war, it will be called by future historians by only one title, 'the President's War,' because every step of his since his Chicago quarantine speech [of 5 October 1937] has been toward war. The great American historian, Harry Elmer Barnes, believed that war could probably have been prevented in 1939 if it had not been for Roosevelt's meddling. "Indeed, there is fairly conclusive evidence that, but for Mr. Roosevelt's pressure on Britain, France and Poland, and his commitments to them before September 1939, especially to Britain, and the irresponsible antics of his agent provocateur, William C. Bullitt, there would probably have been no world war in 1939, or, perhaps, for many years thereafter." [46] In *Revisionism: A Key to Peace*, Barnes wrote:

President Roosevelt had a major responsibility, both direct and indirect, for the outbreak of war in Europe. He began to exert pressure on France to stand up to Hitler as early as the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, months before he was making his strongly isolationist speeches in the campaign of 1936. This pressure on France, and also England, continued right down to the coming of the war in September 1939. It gained volume and momentum after the quarantine speech of October 1937. As the crisis approached between Munich and the outbreak of war, Roosevelt pressed the Poles to stand firm against any demands by Germany, and urged the English and French to back up the Poles unflinchingly.

There is grave doubt that England would have gone to war in September 1939 had it not been for Roosevelt's encouragement and his assurances that, in the event of war, the United States would enter on the side of Britain just as soon as he could swing American public opinion around to support intervention. Roosevelt had abandoned all semblance of neutrality, even before war broke out in 1939, and moved as speedily as was safe and

feasible in the face of anti-interventionist American public opinion to involve this country in the European conflict. One of the most perceptive verdicts on Franklin Roosevelt's place in history came from the pen of the great Swedish explorer and author, Sven Hedin. During the war he wrote:

The question of the way it came to a new world war is not only to be explained because of the foundation laid by the peace treaties of 1919, or in the suppression of Germany and her allies after the First World War, or in the continuation of the ancient policies of Great Britain and France. The decisive push came from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Roosevelt speaks of democracy and destroys it incessantly. He slanders as undemocratic and un-American those who admonish him in the name of peace and the preservation of the American way of life. He has made democracy into a caricature rather than a model. He talks about freedom of speech and silences those who don't hold his opinion. He talks about freedom of religion and makes an alliance with Bolshevism. He talks about freedom from want, but cannot provide ten million of his own people with work, bread or shelter. He talks about freedom from the fear of war while working for war, not only for his own people but for the world, by inciting his country against the Axis powers when it might have united with them, and he thereby drove millions to their deaths. This war will go down in history as the war of President Roosevelt.

11.12 What the World Rejected

by Mark Weber

Even many people who consider themselves well-informed about Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich are ignorant of the German leader's numerous efforts for peace in Europe, including serious proposals for armaments reductions, and limits on weapons deployment, which were spurned by the leaders of France, Britain and other powers. Hitler's first major speech on foreign policy after taking office as Chancellor, delivered to the Reichstag on May 17, 1933, was a plea for peace, equal rights and mutual understanding among nations. So reasonable and persuasively argued was his appeal that it was endorsed even by representatives of the opposition Social Democratic Party. Two years later, in his Reichstag address of May 21, 1935, the German leader again stressed the need for peace on the basis of mutual respect and equal rights. Even the London Times regarded this speech as "reasonable, straightforward and comprehensive." Such appeals were not mere rhetoric. On March 31, 1936, for example, Hitler's government announced a comprehensive plan for strengthening peace in Europe. The detailed paper included numerous specific proposals, including demilitarization of the entire Rhineland region, a western Europe security agreement, and categorical prohibition of incendiary bombs, poison gas, heavy tanks and heavy artillery.

Although this wide-ranging offer, and others like it, were rejected by leaders in London, Paris, Warsaw and Prague, Hitler's initiatives were not entirely fruitless. In January

1934, for example, his government concluded a ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland. (Unfortunately, the spirit of this treaty was later broken by the men who took power in Warsaw after the death of Poland's Marshal Pilsudski in 1935.) One of Hitler's most important foreign policy successes was a comprehensive naval agreement with Britain, signed in June 1935. (This agreement, incidentally, abrogated the Treaty of Versailles, thereby showing that neither London nor Berlin still regarded it as valid.) For years Hitler sought an alliance with Britain, or least a cordial relationship based on mutual respect. In that effort, he took care not to offend British pride or sensibilities, or to make any proposal that might impair or threaten British interests. Hitler also worked for cordial relations with France, likewise taking care not to say or do anything that might offend French pride or infringe on French national interests. The sincerity of Hitler's proposals to France, and the validity of his fear of possible French military aggression against Germany is underscored by the immense manpower and funding resources he devoted to construction of the vast Westwall ("Siegfried Line") defensive fortifications on his nation's western border.

Over the years, historians have tended either to ignore Hitler's initiatives for reducing tensions and promoting peace, or to dismiss them as deceitful posturing. But if the responsible leaders in Britain and France during the 1930s had really regarded these proposals as bluff or insincere pretense, they could easily have exposed them as such by giving them serious consideration. Their unresponsive attitude suggests that they understood that Hitler's proposals were sincere, but rejected them anyway because to accept them might jeopardize British-French political- military predominance in Europe.

In the following essay, a German scholar reviews proposals by Hitler and his government – especially in the years before the outbreak of war in 1939 – to promote peace and equal rights in Europe, reduce tensions, and greatly limit production and deployment of armaments. The author, Friedrich Stieve (1884-1966), was a German historian and diplomat. During the First World War he served as press attaché with the German embassy in Stockholm. He represented Germany's democratic government as his nation's ambassador in Latvia, 1928- 1932. He then moved to Berlin where he headed the cultural- political affairs bureau of the German Foreign Office, 1932- 1939. He held a doctorate from the University of Heidelberg, and was a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Books by Stieve include *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes* (1939), *Wendepunkte europäischer Geschichte vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zur Gegenwart* (1941), and a collection of poems.

Here, below, is a translation of the lengthy essay by Dr. Stieve, *Was die Welt nicht wollte: Hitlers Friedensangebote 1933-1939*, issued by the "German Information Center" and published as a 16-page booklet in Berlin in 1940. Along with editions that were soon issued in French and Spanish, an Englishlanguage edition was published as a booklet, apparently in 1940, by the *Washington Journal of Washington, DC*. Hitler did not want war in 1939 – and certainly not a general or global conflict. He earnestly sought a peaceful resolution of the dispute with Poland over the status of the ethnically German

city-state of Danzig and the “Corridor” region, which was the immediate cause of conflict. The sincerity of his desire for peace in 1939, and his fear of another world war, has been affirmed by a number of scholars, including the eminent British historian A. J. P. Taylor. It was, of course, the declarations of war against Germany by Britain and France on Sept. 3, 1939, made with secret encouragement by US President Roosevelt, that transformed the limited German-Polish clash into a larger, continentwide war.

To justify its declaration of war, Britain protested that Germany had violated Polish sovereignty, and threatened Poland’s independence. The emptiness and insincerity of these stated reasons is shown by the fact that the British leaders did not declare war against Soviet Russia two weeks later when Soviet forces attacked the Polish Republic from the East. Britain’s betrayal of Poland, and the hypocrisy of its claimed reasons for going to war against Germany in 1939, became even more obvious in 1944-45 when Britain’s leaders permitted the complete Soviet takeover and subjugation of Poland. Germany’s six-week military campaign of May-June 1940 ended with a stunning victory over numerically superior French and British forces, and the rout of British troops from the European mainland. In the aftermath of this historic triumph, Hitler and his government made yet another important effort to end the war. (Because it was made in 1940, after Dr. Stieve’s essay was written and published, it is not included in the text, below.) In a speech delivered to the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, which was broadcast on radio stations around the world, the German leader said:

“... From London I now hear a cry – it’s not the cry of the mass of people, but rather of politicians – that the war must now, all the more, be continued ... Believe me, my deputies, I feel an inner disgust at this kind of unscrupulous parliamentarian destroyers of peoples and countries ... It never has been my intention to wage wars, but rather to build a new social state of the highest cultural level. Every year of this war keeps me from this work ... Mr. Churchill has now once again declared that he wants war ... I am fully aware that with our response, which one day will come, will also come nameless suffering and misfortune for many people ... “... In this hour I feel compelled, standing before my conscience, to direct yet another appeal to reason in England. I believe I can do this as I am not pleading for something as the vanquished, but rather, as the victor speaking in the name of reason. I see no compelling reason for this war to continue. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices it will claim ... Possibly Mr. Churchill again will brush aside this statement of mine by saying that it is merely an expression of fear and of doubt in our final victory. In that case I shall have relieved my conscience in regard to the things to come.”

Following up on this appeal, German officials reached out to Britain through diplomatic channels. But Winston Churchill and his government rejected this initiative, and instead insisted on continuing the war. – with, of course, horrific consequences for Europe and the world.

Hitler's Peace Offers, 1933 – 1939

By Friedrich Stieve, 1940

Germany's enemies maintain today that Adolf Hitler is the greatest disturber of peace known to history, that he threatens every nation with sudden attack and oppression, that he has created a terrible war machine in order to bring misery and devastation everywhere. At the same time they intentionally conceal an all-important fact: they themselves drove the leader of the German people finally to draw the sword. They themselves compelled him to seek to obtain at last by the use of force that which he had been striving to gain by persuasion from the beginning: the security of his country. They did this not only by declaring war on him on September 3, 1939, but also by blocking step by step for seven years the path to any peaceful discussion.

The attempts repeatedly made by Adolf Hitler to induce the governments of other states to join with him in a collaborative restoration of Europe are part of an ever-recurring pattern in his conduct since the commencement of his labors for the German Reich. But these attempts were wrecked every time due to the fact that nowhere was there any willingness to give them due consideration, because the evil spirit of the [first] World War still prevailed everywhere, because in London and Paris and in the capitals of the western powers' vassal states there was only one fixed intention: to perpetuate the power of [the imposed] Versailles [settlement of 1919]. When Adolf Hitler came to the fore, Germany was as gagged and as helpless as the victors of 1918 intended her to be. Completely disarmed, with an army of only 100,000 men meant solely for police duties within the country, she found herself within a tightly closed ring of neighbors all armed to the teeth and allied together. To the old enemies in the West – Britain, Belgium and France – new ones were artificially created and added in the East and the South: above all Poland and Czechoslovakia. A quarter of the population of Germany was forcibly torn away from their mother country and handed over to foreign powers. The German Reich, mutilated on all sides and robbed of every means of defense, at any moment could become the helpless victim of a rapacious neighbor.

It was then that Adolf Hitler for the first time made his appeal to the common sense of the other powers. On May 17, 1933, a few months after his appointment to the post of Reich Chancellor, he delivered a speech in the German Reichstag that included the following passages: "Germany will be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighboring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness. "... Germany is also entirely ready to renounce aggressive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their part, will destroy their aggressive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention. "... Germany is ready at any time to renounce aggressive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of non-aggression because she does not think of attacking anybody, but only of acquiring security." No answer was received.

The other powers heedlessly continued to fill their arsenals with weapons, to pile up their stores of explosives, to increase the numbers of their troops. At the same time the League of Nations, the instrument of the victorious powers, declared that Germany must first undergo a period of "probation" before it would be possible to discuss with her the question of the disarmament of the other countries. On October 14, 1933, Hitler withdrew from the League of Nations, with which it was impossible to reach an understanding. Shortly afterwards, however, on December 18, 1933, he came forward with a new proposal for the improvement of international relations. This proposal included the following six points:

1. Germany receives full equality of rights.
2. The fully armed states undertake among themselves not to increase their armaments beyond their present level.
3. Germany adheres to this agreement, freely undertaking to make only so much actual moderate use of the equality of rights granted to her as will not represent a threat to the security of any other European power.
4. All states recognize certain obligations in regard to conducting war on humane principles, or not to use certain weapons against the civilian population.
5. All states accept a uniform general supervision that will monitor and ensure the observance of these obligations.
6. The European nations guarantee one another the unconditional maintenance of peace by the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, to be renewed after ten years."

Following up on this, a proposal was made to increase the strength of the German army to 300,000 men, corresponding to the strength "required by Germany taking into account the length of her frontiers and the size of the armies of her neighbors," in order to protect her threatened territory against attacks. The defender of the principle of peaceable agreement was thus trying to accommodate himself to the unwillingness of the others to disarm by expressing a desire for a limited increase of armaments for his own country. An exchange of notes, which began with this and continued for years, finally came to a sudden end with an unequivocal "no" from France. This "no" was moreover accompanied by tremendous increases in the armed forces of France, Britain, and Russia. In this way Germany's position became even worse than before. The danger to the Reich was so great that Adolf Hitler felt himself compelled to act. On March 16, 1935, he reintroduced conscription. But in direct connection with this measure he once more announced an offer of wide-ranging agreements, the purpose of which was to ensure that any future war would be conducted on humane principles, in fact to make any such war practically impossible by eliminating destructive armaments. In his speech of May 21, 1935, he declared:

The German government is ready to take an active part in all efforts which may lead to a practical limitation of armaments. It regards a return to the principles of the Geneva

Red Cross Convention as the only possible way to achieve this. It believes that at first there will be only the possibility of a step-by-step abolition and outlawing of weapons and methods of warfare that are essentially contrary to the still-valid Geneva Red Cross Convention."

Just as the use of dum-dum [expanding] bullets was once forbidden and, on the whole, thereby prevented in practice, so the use of other specific weapons can be forbidden and their use, in practice, can be eliminated. Here the German government has in mind all those armaments that bring death and destruction not so much to the fighting soldiers as to non-combatant women and children. "The German government considers as erroneous and ineffective the idea of doing away with airplanes while leaving open the question of bombing. But it believes it possible to ban the use of certain weapons as contrary to international law, and to ostracize those nations which still use them from the community of humankind, and from its rights and laws. "It also believes that gradual progress is the best way to success. For example, there might be prohibition of the use of gas, incendiary and explosive bombs outside the actual battle zone. This limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawing of all bombing. But so long as bombing as such is permitted, any limitation of the number of aerial bombers is dubious in view of the possibility of rapid replacement.

"Should bombing as such be branded as barbaric and contrary to international law, the construction of aerial bombing planes will soon be abandoned as superfluous and pointless. If, through the Geneva Red Cross Convention, it proved possible to prevent the killing of defenseless wounded men or of prisoners, it ought to be equally possible, through an analogous convention, to forbid and ultimately to bring to an end the bombing of similarly defenseless civilian populations. "In such a fundamental way of dealing with the problem, Germany sees a greater reassurance and security for the nations than in all the pacts of assistance and military agreements. "The German government is ready to agree to any limitation that leads to abolition of the heaviest arms, especially suited for aggression. Such weapons are, first, the heaviest artillery, and secondly, the heaviest tanks. In view of the enormous fortifications on the French frontier, such an international abolition of the heaviest weapons of attack would automatically give France nearly one hundred percent security. "Germany declares herself ready to agree to any limitation whatsoever of the caliber-size of artillery, as well as battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats. In like manner the German government is ready to accept any international limitation of the size of warships. And finally it is ready to agree to limitation of tonnage for submarines, or to their complete abolition through an international agreement. "And it gives further assurance that it will agree to any international limitations or abolition of arms whatsoever for a uniform period of time."

Once again Hitler's declarations did not receive the slightest response. On the contrary, France made an alliance with Russia in order to further increase her predominance on the continent, and to enormously increase the pressure on Germany from the East.

In view of the evident destructive intentions of his adversaries, Adolf Hitler was there-

fore obliged to take new measures for the security of the German Reich. On March 3, 1936, he occupied the Rhineland, which had been without military protection since [the] Versailles [settlement of 1919], and thus shut the wide gate through which the Western neighbor could carry out an invasion. Once again he followed the defensive step which he had been obliged to take with a generous appeal for general reconciliation and for the settlement of all differences. On March 31, 1936, he formulated the following peace plan:

1. In order to give to future agreements securing the peace of Europe the character of inviolable treaties, those nations participating in the negotiations do so only on an entirely equal footing and as equally esteemed members. The sole compelling reason for signing these treaties can only lie in the generally recognized and obvious usefulness of these agreements for the peace of Europe, and thus for the social happiness and economic prosperity of the nations.
2. In order to shorten, in the economic interest of the European nations, the period of uncertainty, the German government proposes a limit of four months for the first period up to the signing of the pacts of nonaggression guaranteeing the peace of Europe.
3. The German government gives the assurance not to add any reinforcements whatsoever to the troops in the Rhineland during this period, always provided that the Belgian and French governments act in the same way.
4. The German government gives the assurance not to move during this period closer to the Belgian and French frontiers the troops at present stationed in the Rhineland.
5. The German government proposes the setting up of a commission composed of the two guarantor Powers, Britain and Italy, and a disinterested third neutral power, to guarantee this assurance to be given by both parties.
6. Germany, Belgium, and France are each entitled to send a representative to this Commission. If Germany, France, or Belgium think that for any particular reason they can point to a change in the military situation having taken place within this period of four months, they have the right to inform the Guarantee Commission of their observations.
7. Germany, Belgium, and France declare their willingness in such a case to permit this Commission to make the necessary investigations through the British and Italian military attaches, and to report thereon to the participating powers.
8. Germany, Belgium and France give the assurance that they will give the fullest consideration to the objections arising therefrom.
9. Moreover the German government is willing on a basis of complete reciprocity with Germany's two western neighbors to agree to any military limitations on the German western frontier.
10. Germany, Belgium, and France and the two guarantor powers agree to enter into negotiations under the leadership of the British government at once or, at the latest,

after the French elections, for the conclusion of a 25-year non-aggression or security pact between France and Belgium on the one hand, and Germany on the other.

11 . Germany agrees that Britain and Italy shall sign this security pact as guarantor powers once more.

12. Should special engagements to render military assistance arise as a result of these security agreements, Germany on her part declares her willingness to enter into such engagements.

13. The German government hereby repeats its proposal for the conclusion of an air-pact to supplement and strengthen these security agreements.

14. The German government repeats that should the Netherlands so desire, it is willing to also include that country in this West European security agreement.

15. In order to give this peace-pact, voluntarily entered into between Germany and France, the character of a conciliatory agreement ending a centuries-old quarrel, Germany and France pledge themselves to take steps to see that in the education of the young, as well as in the press and publications of both nations, everything shall be avoided that might be calculated to poison relations between the two peoples, whether it be a derogatory or contemptuous attitude, or improper interference in the internal affairs of the other country. They agree to set up at the headquarters of the League of Nations at Geneva, a joint commission whose function it shall be to lay before the two governments all complaints received, for information and investigation.

16. In keeping with their intention to give this agreement the character of a sacred pledge, Germany and France undertake to ratify it through a plebiscite of the two nations.

17. Germany expresses her willingness, on her part, to contact the states on her south-eastern and north-eastern frontiers, to invite them directly to the final formal signing of the proposed non-aggression pacts.

18. Germany expresses her willingness to re-enter the League of Nations, either at once, or after the conclusion of these agreements. At the same time, the German government once again expresses as its expectation that, after a reasonable time and through friendly negotiations, the issue of colonial equality of rights, as well as the issue of the separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its foundation in the Versailles Treaty, will be cleared up.

19. Germany proposes the setting up of an International Court of Arbitration, which shall be responsible for the observance of the various agreements and whose decisions shall be binding on all parties.

After the conclusion of this great work of securing European peace, the German government considers it urgently necessary to endeavor by practical measures to put a stop to the unlimited competition in armaments. In her opinion this would mean not merely an improvement in the financial and economic conditions of the nations, but above all

a lessening of psychological tension. The German government, however, has no faith in the attempt to bring about universal settlements, as this would be doomed to failure from the outset, and can therefore be proposed only by those who have no interest in achieving practical results. On the other hand it is of the opinion that the negotiations held and the results achieved in limiting naval armaments should have an instructive and stimulating effect. The German government therefore recommends future conferences, each of which shall have a single, clearly defined objective.

For the present, it believes the most important task is to bring aerial warfare into the moral and humane atmosphere of the protection afforded to non-combatants or the wounded by the Geneva Convention. Just as the killing of defenseless wounded, or of prisoners, or the use of dum-dum bullets, or the waging of submarine warfare without warning, have been either forbidden or regulated by international conventions, so it must be possible for civilized humanity to prevent the senseless abuse of any new type of weapon, without running counter to the object of warfare. The German government therefore proposes that the practical tasks of these conferences shall be:

1. Prohibition of the use of gas, poison, or incendiary bombs.
2. Prohibition of the use of bombs of any kind whatsoever on towns or places outside the range of the medium-heavy artillery of the fighting fronts.
3. Prohibition of the bombardment with long-range guns of towns or places more than 20 kilometers distant from the battle zone.
4. Abolition and prohibition of the construction of tanks of the heaviest type.
5. Abolition and prohibition of artillery of the heaviest caliber.

As soon as possibilities for further limitation of armaments emerge from such discussions and agreements, they should be utilized. The German government hereby declares itself prepared to join in every such settlement, in so far as it is valid internationally. The German government believes that if even a first step is made on the road to disarmament, this will be of enormous importance in relations between the nations, and thereby in reestablishing confidence, which is a precondition for the development of trade and prosperity. In accordance with the general desire for the restoration of favorable economic conditions, the German government is prepared immediately after the conclusion of the political treaties to enter into an exchange of opinions on economic issues with the other nations concerned, in the spirit of the proposals made, and to do all that lies in its power to improve the economic situation in Europe, and of the world economic situation which is closely bound up with it.

The German government believes that with the peace plan proposed above it has made its contribution to the building of a new Europe on the basis of reciprocal respect and confidence between sovereign states. Various opportunities for such a pacification of Europe, for which Germany has so often in the last few years made proposals, have been neglected. May this attempt to achieve European understanding succeed at last. The

German government confidently believes that it has opened the way in this direction by submitting the above peace plan." Anyone who today reads this comprehensive peace plan will realize in what direction the development of Europe, according to the wishes of Adolf Hitler, should really have proceeded. Here was the possibility of truly constructive work. This could have been a real turning-point for the benefit of all nations. But once more he who alone called for peace was not heard. Only Britain replied with a rather scornful questionnaire that avoided any serious consideration of the essential points involved. Incidentally, however, Britain revealed her actual intentions by setting herself up as the protector of France and by instituting and commencing regular general staff military consultations with the French Republic just as in the period before the [first] World War.

There could no longer be any doubt now that the western powers were following the old path toward an armed conflict, and were steadily preparing a new blow against Germany, even though Adolf Hitler's thoughts and endeavors were entirely directed towards proving to them that he wanted to remain on the best possible terms with them. Over the years he had undertaken numerous steps in this direction, of which a few more will be mentioned here. With Britain he negotiated the Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, which provided that the German Navy could have a strength of 35 percent of that of the British Navy. By this he wanted to demonstrate that the German Reich, to use his own words, had "neither the intention, the means, nor the necessity" to enter into any rivalry as regards naval power, which, as is well known, had had such a fateful impact on its relations with Britain in the years before the [first] World War.

On every appropriate occasion he assured France of his desire to live at peace with her. He repeatedly renounced in plain terms any claim to [the region of] Alsace-Lorraine. On the occasion of the return to the German Reich of the Saar territory as a result of plebiscite by its people, he declared on March 1, 1935: "It is our hope that through this act of just compensation, in which we see a return to natural reason, relations between Germany and France have permanently improved. Therefore, just as we desire peace, we must hope that our great neighbor is ready and willing to seek peace with us. It must be possible for two great peoples to join together and collaborate in opposing the difficulties that threaten to overwhelm Europe."

He even endeavored to arrive at a better understanding with Poland, the eastern ally of the western powers, although that country in 1919 had unlawfully incorporated millions of Germans, and had ever since subjected them to the worst oppression. On January 26, 1934, he concluded a nonaggression pact with her in which the two governments agreed "to settle directly all questions of whatever sort that concern their mutual relations." Thus on all sides he countered the enemy plans with his determination to preserve peace, and in this way strove to protect Germany. When however he saw that London and Paris were arming for an attack, he was once more obliged to undertake fresh measures of defense. The enemy camp, as we have seen above, had been enormously extended through the alliance between France and Russia. In addition to this the two powers

had secured an alliance line to the south of the German Reich through Czechoslovakia, which, already allied with France, then concluded a treaty with Russia, thereby making her a bridge between east and west. Moreover, Czechoslovakia controlled the high-lying region of Bohemia and Moravia, which Bismarck had called the citadel of Europe, and this citadel projected far into German territory. The threat to Germany thus assumed truly overwhelming form.

Adolf Hitler found an ingenious way of countering this danger. The conditions in German Austria, which under the terror of the Schuschnigg government were tending towards civil war, offered him the opportunity of stepping in to save the situation, and to lead back into the Reich the sister nation to the south-east that had been sentenced by the victorious powers to lead the life of a hopelessly decaying "Free State." After he had thus established himself near the line of connection between France and Russia mentioned above, a process of dissolution began in the ethnically mixed state of Czechoslovakia, which had been artificially put together from the most diverse national elements. Then, after the liberation of the [ethnically German] Sudetenland [region] and the secession of Slovakia, the Czechs themselves asked for the protection of the German Reich. With this the enemy's "bridge" came into Hitler's hand, while at the same time direct land connection was made established with Italy, whose friendship had been secured some time previously. While he was gaining this strategic success for the security of his country, Adolf Hitler was again endeavoring with great eagerness to reach a peaceable understanding with the western powers. In Munich immediately after liberation of the Sudeten Germans, which was approved by Britain, France, and Italy, he made an agreement with the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, the text of which was as follows:

"We have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement [of 1935] as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again. We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe. September 30, 1938. Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain."

Two months later, on Hitler's instructions, the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, made the following agreement with France:

"Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Georges Bonnet, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting in the name and by order of their governments, have at their meeting in Paris, on December 6, 1938, agreed as follows:

1. The German government and the French government fully share the conviction that peaceful and good-neighborly relations between Germany and France constitute one of the most essential elements for the consolidation of the situation in Europe and the maintenance of general peace. The two governments will in consequence use all their

efforts to ensure the development in this direction of the relations between their countries.

2. The two governments recognize that between the two countries there is no territorial question outstanding, and they solemnly recognize as final the frontiers between their countries as they now exist.

3. The two governments are resolved, while leaving unaffected their particular relations with other powers, to remain in contact with regard to all questions concerning their two countries, and mutually to consult should the later evolution of those questions lead to international difficulties.

In token whereof the representatives of the two governments have signed the present Declaration, which comes into immediate effect. Done in duplicate in the French and German languages at Paris, December 6, 1938. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, Foreign Minister”

It should have been entirely reasonable to expect that the way was clear for collaborative reconstruction in which all leading powers would participate, and that the Fuehrer's endeavors to secure peace would at last meet with success. But the contrary was true. Scarcely had Chamberlain reached home when he called for rearmament on a considerable scale and laid plans for a new and tremendous encirclement of Germany. Britain now took over from France the leadership of this further encirclement of the Reich, to more than make up for the loss of Czechoslovakia. She opened negotiations with Russia, and concluded guarantee treaties with Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey. These were alarm signals of the greatest urgency.

Just at this time Adolf Hitler was occupied with the task of finally eliminating sources of friction with Poland. For this purpose he made an uncommonly generous proposal by which the purely German Free City of Danzig would return to the Reich, and a narrow passage through the Polish Corridor, which since 1919 had torn asunder the north-eastern part of Germany to an unbearable extent, would be connected with the separated area. This proposal, which moreover afforded Poland the prospect of a 25-year non-aggression pact and other advantages, was nevertheless rejected in Warsaw, because there it was believed, conscious as the authorities were of forming one of the principal members of the common front set up by London against Germany, that any concession, however minor, could be refused. And that wasn't all. With this same attitude, Poland took an aggressive stance, threatened Danzig, and prepared to take up arms against Germany.

Thus the moment was close at hand for an attack against Germany by the countries that had aligned together for that purpose. Adolf Hitler, making a final extreme effort in the interests of peace, saved what he could. On August 23rd, Ribbentrop succeeded in reaching an agreement in Moscow for a nonaggression pact with Russia. Two days later the German Fuehrer himself made a final and truly remarkable offer to Britain, declaring himself ready “to enter into agreements with Britain that ... would not only, on the German side, safeguard the existence of the British Empire come what may, but if necessary would pledge German assistance for the British realm, regardless of where such

assistance might be required." At the same time he was prepared to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments, "in accordance with the new political situation and which are economically sustainable." And finally he assured once again that he had no interest in the issues in the west, and that "a revision of the borders in the west are out of any consideration."

The reply to this was a pact of mutual assistance signed that same day between Britain and Poland, which made the outbreak of war inevitable. Then a decision was made in Warsaw to mobilize at once against Germany, and the Poles began with violent attacks not only against Germans in Poland, who for some time had been the victims of frightful massacres, but against Reich German territory. But even after Britain and France declared war, as they had intended, and Germany had overcome the Polish danger in the east by a glorious campaign without a parallel, even then Adolf Hitler raised his voice once more in the name of peace. He did this even though his hands were now free to act against the enemy in the west. He also did this even though in London and Paris the fight had been proclaimed against him personally, in boundless hate, as a crusade. At this moment he possessed the supreme self-control to present, in his speech of October 6, 1939, to public opinion throughout the world, a new plan for the pacification of Europe. This plan was as follows:

"By far the most important task, in my opinion, is the creation of not only a belief in, but also a feeling for European security.

1. For this it is necessary that the aims of the foreign policy of each European state should be made perfectly clear. As far as Germany is concerned, the Reich government is ready to give a thorough and exhaustive exposition of the aims of its foreign policy. In so doing, it begins by stating, first of all, that it regards the Treaty of Versailles as no longer valid – in other words, that the German Reich government, and with it the entire German nation, no longer see cause or reason for any further revision of the Treaty, apart from the demand for adequate colonial possessions justly due to the Reich, involving in the first place a return of the German colonies. This demand for colonies is based not only on Germany's historical claim to her colonies, but above all on her elementary right to a share of the world's raw material resources. This demand does not take the form of an ultimatum, nor is it a demand that is backed by force, but rather a demand based on political justice and common sense economic principles.

2. The demand for a real revival of international economic life coupled with an extension of trade and commerce presupposes a reorganization of the international economic system, in other words, of production in the individual states. In order to facilitate the exchange of the goods thus produced, however, a new system of markets must be found, and a conclusive settlement of relations of the world currencies must be reached, so that the obstacles in the way of unrestricted trade can be gradually removed.

3. The most important condition, however, for a real revival of economic life in and outside of Europe is the establishment of an unconditionally guaranteed peace, and of

a sense of security on the part of the various nations. This security will not only be rendered possible by the final sanctioning of the European status, but above all by the reduction of armaments to a reasonable and economically tolerable level. An essential part of this necessary sense of security, however, is a clear definition of the legitimate use and application of certain modern armaments which could, at any given moment, strike straight at the heart of every nation, which therefore create a permanent sense of insecurity. In my previous speeches in the Reichstag I made proposals with this end in view. At that time they were rejected – presumably for the simple reason that they were made by me.

I believe that a sense of national security will not return to Europe until clear and binding international agreements have provided a comprehensive definition of the extent to which the use of certain weapons is permitted or forbidden. The Geneva Convention once succeeded in prohibiting, in civilized countries at least, the killing of wounded, the mistreatment of prisoners, war against non-combatants, and so forth. Just as it was possible gradually to achieve the universal observance of this prohibition, a way ought surely to be found to regulate aerial warfare, the use of poison gas, of submarines, and so forth, and likewise clearly to define contraband, so that war will lose its terrible character of a conflict waged against women and children and against non-combatants in general. The growing horror of certain methods of modern warfare will of its own accord lead to their abolition, and thus they will become obsolete.

In the war with Poland, I endeavored to restrict aerial warfare to objectives of military importance, or only to employ it to deal with resistance at a given point. But it must surely be possible to emulate the Red Cross in drawing up some universally valid international regulation. It is only when this is achieved that peace can reign, particularly on our densely populated continent a peace which, free of suspicion and fear, will provide the conditions for real growth and economic prosperity. I do not believe that there is any responsible statesman in Europe who does not in his heart desire prosperity for his people. But such a desire can only be realized if all the nations inhabiting this continent work together. To help bring about this collaboration must be the goal of everyone who is sincerely striving for the future of his own people.

To achieve this great goal, the leading nations on this continent will one day have to come together in order to draw up, accept and guarantee a statute on a comprehensive basis that will ensure for them a feeling of security and calm – in short, of peace. Such a conference could not possibly be held without the most thorough preparation, that is, without clearly specifying every point at issue. It is equally impossible that such a conference, which would determine the fate of this continent for many years to come, could carry on its deliberations while cannons are thundering, or when mobilized armies are bringing pressure to bear upon it. Since, however, these problems must be solved sooner or later, it would surely be more sensible to tackle the solution before millions of men are first pointlessly sent to their death, and billions of dollars' worth of property are destroyed.

The continuation of the present state of affairs in the west is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifices. Perhaps the day will come when France will begin to bombard and demolish [the city of] Saarbrücken. The German artillery will in turn lay [the French city of] Mulhouse in ruins. France will retaliate by bombarding Karlsruhe, and Germany in her turn shell Strasbourg. Then the French artillery will fire at Freiburg, and the Germans at Colmar or Sélestat. Long-range artillery will then be set up, and from both sides destruction will strike deeper and deeper, and whatever cannot be reached by the long-range artillery will be destroyed from the air. And while all that will be very interesting for certain international journalists, and very profitable for airplane, weapons and munitions manufacturers, and so forth, it will be appalling for the victims. And this battle of destruction will not be confined to the land. No, it will reach far out over the sea. Today there are no longer any islands. And the national wealth of Europe will be shattered by shells, and the vigor of every nation will be sapped on the battlefields. And one day there will again be a frontier between Germany and France, but instead of flourishing towns there will be ruins and endless graveyards.”

The fate of this appeal was the same as that of all the previous ones made by Adolf Hitler in the name of reason, in the interests of a true renaissance of Europe. His enemies paid him no heed. On this occasion as well no response was forthcoming from them. They rigidly adhered to the attitude they had taken up in the beginning. In the face of this series of historical facts is there any need for further details as to the question of why they did so? They had created the Versailles system, and when it threatened to collapse they wanted war, in order to follow it with an even worse Versailles. The reproaches they make today against Adolf Hitler and Germany, recoil one and all on those who make them, and characterize their actions. They are the disturbers of peace. They are the ones who contemplate the forcible oppression of other peoples, and who seek to plunge Europe into devastation and disaster. If that were not so, they would long ago have taken the hand that was stretched out to them, or at least they would have made a gesture of honestly wishing to cooperate in making a new order, and thus spare the nations an excess of “blood, tears and sweat.” World history is the world court; and in this case as always when it reaches its decision it will pronounce a just verdict.

11.13 The Views of Four Diplomats Close to Events

by Jason Collett

Joseph P. Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to Britain during the years immediately preceding WW2 was the father of the famous American Kennedy dynasty. James Forrestal the first US Secretary of Defense (1947-1949) quotes him as saying “Chamberlain (the British Prime Minister) stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war”.

Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, in a report to the Polish

Foreign Office in January 1939, is quoted approvingly by the highly respected British military historian Major-General JFC Fuller. Concerning public opinion in America he says "Above all, propaganda here is entirely in Jewish hands. . . when bearing public ignorance in mind, their propaganda is so effective that people have no real knowledge of the true state of affairs in Europe... It is interesting to observe that in this carefully thought-out campaign... no reference at all is made to Soviet Russia. If that country is mentioned, it is referred to in a friendly manner and people are given the impression that Soviet Russia is part of the democratic group of countries... Jewry was able not only to establish a dangerous centre in the New World for the dissemination of hatred and enmity, but it also succeeded in dividing the world into two warlike camps. . . President Roosevelt has been given the power. . . to create huge reserves in armaments for a future war which the Jews are deliberately heading for."

Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador in Berlin until 1938, the year before the war broke out, found anti-Semitism in Germany "understandable". This was because before the advent of the Nazis, "the stage, the press, medicine and law [were] crowded with Jews... among the few with money to splurge, a high proportion [were] Jews... the leaders of the Bolshevist movement in Russia, a movement desperately feared in Germany, were Jews. One could feel the spreading resentment and hatred."

Sir Neville Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin 'said further that the hostile attitude in Great Britain was the work of Jews and enemies of the Nazis, which was what Hitler thought himself'.

11.14 Who Broke the Disarmament Treaty of Versailles?

Declaration of the Government of the German Reich March 16, 1935

In November of 1918, when the German people - trusting in the assurances given in Wilson's Fourteen Points - surrendered after 4 and a half years of heroic resistance in a war whose outbreak they had never desired, they believed that in doing so they had done a service not only to tormented humanity but also to a great Idea per se. While they themselves were suffering the most under the consequences of this insane struggle, the millions of Germans trustingly reached out to the idea of a reconfiguration of international relations which was to be ennobled by the elimination of secret diplomacy as well as of the terrible means of war. Perhaps no other nation has welcomed the idea of a League of Nations as eagerly as the German one, deserted by all earthly happiness.

Only in this context is it understandable that the at times downright senseless conditions of destruction of each and every means of defense was not only accepted but also carried out by the German people. The German people and particularly their government at that time were convinced that meeting the disarmament stipulations set out by the Treaty of Versailles would initiate and guarantee the beginning of international, general disarmament, as promised by the Treaty. For only such a bilateral fulfillment of this

obligation imposed by the Treaty could justify a demand which, if imposed and carried out one-sidedly, could not but have turned into an eternal disparagement and thus a declaration of inferiority of a great nation. In light of this, however, such a peace treaty could never be the prerequisite for a true inner reconciliation of nations and thus a herald of global peace; it could only be the prerequisite for an eternally festering hatred.

According to the assessment of the inter-Allied Control Commission, Germany has met the disarmament obligations imposed on her. The following are the works of destruction of the German defense forces and their means, as confirmed by this Commission:

A. Army weapons that were destroyed: 59,897 artillery guns and barrels, 130,558 machine guns, 31,470 mortars and barrels, 6,007,000 rifles and carbines, 243,937 machine gun barrels, 28,001 gun carriages, 4,390 mortar carriages, 38,750,000 larger caliber shells, 16,550,000 hand and rifle grenades, 60,400,000 live fuses, 491,000,000 hand weapon munitions, 335,000 tons of cartridges, 23,515 tons of cartridge cases, 37,600 tons of gunpowder, 79,500 ammunitions dismantlers, 212,000 telephones, 1,072 flame throwers, 31 armored trains, 59 tanks, 1,762 surveillance vehicles, 8,982 wireless stations, 1,240 field bakeries, 2,199 pontoons, 981.7 tons of equipment for soldiers, 8,230,350 sets of equipment for soldiers, 7,300 pistols and revolvers, 180 machine gun sleds, 21 mobile workshops, 12 anti-aircraft gun carriers, 11 heavy-duty gun carriers, 64,000 steel helmets, 174,000 gas masks, 2,500 machines of the former war industry, 8,000 rifle barrels. B. Air force weapons that were destroyed: 15,714 fighter and bomber planes, 27,757 airplane engines. C. Naval weapons that were destroyed: 26 capital ships, 4 armored coastal patrol boats, 4 armored cruisers, 19 small cruisers, 21 training and special ships, 83 torpedo boats, 315 submarines.

Further, the following had to be destroyed: Vehicles of all kinds, means for gas warfare and some for protection from gas, propellants and explosives, floodlights, sighting devices, distance and sound range finders, optical instruments of all kinds, horse harnesses, narrow gauge railway equipment, field printing presses, field kitchens, workshops, cutting and stabbing weapons, steel helmets, materials for the transport of ammunition, standard and special machines of the war industry, as well as jigs, blueprints of the same, ship and airplane hangars, etc.

While Germany had fulfilled her obligations, the other parties to the contract neglected to fulfil their own. That is, the high contracting officials of the former victor nations unilaterally broke away from the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles. It was not enough, however, that any disarmament comparable in any way to the German destruction of arms was dispensed with; no: the arming process was not even halted. Quite the contrary, further escalation became evident in a whole number of nations. In terms of new machinery of destruction, what had been invented during wartime was now being perfected with methodical, scientific work during peacetime. Continual improvements were being made in the creation of powerful land tanks as well as new fighting and bombing machines. New and gigantic artillery was being built, new explosive, incendiary and gas bombs were being manufactured. In the midst of these nations heavily armed for

war and availing themselves increasingly of the newest motorized forces, Germany was a defenseless power void and at the mercy of any threat. The German people remember the misfortune and tragedy of 15 years of economic impoverishment and political humiliation. It was thus understandable that Germany began to urge that the other nations should keep their own promise of disarmament. For this much is clear: A hundred years' peace would have to be an immeasurable blessing for the world. A hundred years' split into victors and vanquished, however, is something the world cannot bear.

The urging of the people resulted in attempts to achieve, through conferences, a general decrease in the level of armament. In this way, the first proposals for international armament agreements developed, of which the Macdonald Plan was most significant. Germany was prepared to accept this plan and to make it the foundation for agreements. The Macdonald Plan failed because it was rejected by other nations. Since the equality that had been solemnly guaranteed the German people in the declaration of December 1932 did not come about under these circumstances, the new German government, in its role as the guardian of the German people's honor and natural rights, saw itself no longer able to participate in such conferences or to remain in the League of Nations. But even after leaving Geneva, the German government was still willing to not only consider proposals by other nations, but also to advance suggestions of its own. In doing so, it espoused the view coined by the other nations themselves, that the creation of short-term armies is unsuitable for attack purposes and is thus to be recommended for peaceful defense. Therefore the German government was prepared to change the long-term Reichswehr into a short-term army in accordance with the other nations' wishes. Its proposals of winter 1933/34 were feasible. However, their rejection, and the rejection of similar Italian and British outlines, showed that there was no longer any inclination among the other parties to the Treaty of Versailles towards even a belated fulfilment of the spirit of the disarmament stipulations of Versailles.

Under these circumstances, the German government saw itself compelled to take the initiative towards those necessary measures that could ensure an end to the no less degrading than dangerous condition of a great people's and nation's impotent defenselessness. It based this action on the same consideration that Minister Baldwin had expressed so aptly: "A nation that is not willing to take the necessary precautionary measures for its own defense will never have any power in the world, neither of the moral nor of the material kind." But the government of today's German Reich desires only one moral and material power, namely to be able to safeguard the peace for the Reich and thereby probably also for all of Europe. Thus, the German government has continued to do whatever was in its power and could serve to promote peace.

1. A long time ago already, the German government offered to conclude non-aggression pacts with its neighboring countries.
2. With its eastern neighbor, Poland, the German government has sought and reached a contractual settlement which, thanks to great accommodation and understanding, will hopefully have defused the menacing situation which the government was faced with

at the time it took power, and which it hopes will lead to a lasting understanding and friendship between the two peoples.

3. Finally, the German government has given France the solemn assurance that after the question of the Saarland has been settled, it will make no further territorial demands or requests of France. The government believes that through this great political and material sacrifice of a historically uncommon kind, it has created the prerequisite for ending a centuries-old quarrel between two great nations.

To its regret, however, the German government has seen that a continued escalation of the arms process is taking place in the rest of the world. In the creation of a Soviet-Russian army of 101 divisions, i.e. an admitted peacetime strength of 960,000 men, it discerns a danger that could not be anticipated at the time the Treaty of Versailles was drawn up. In the heightening of similar measures by the other nations, the German government sees further proof that these nations have rejected the once solemnly proclaimed disarmament contract. The German government does not wish to bring accusations against any one nation; but it must point out that by deciding to introduce a two-year period of military service, France has given up on the principle of short-term armies in favor of a long-term army. This principle, however, was one of the reasons for the earlier demand that Germany should relinquish her army.

Under these circumstances, the German government feels that it is impossible to continue to suspend the measures necessary for the security of the Reich, much less to keep the rest of the world from knowing of these measures. If, therefore, it complies with the British Minister Baldwin's wish and clarifies German intentions, this is done

1. in order to give the German people the conviction, and the other nations the understanding, that the preservation of the German Reich's honor and security is now again entrusted to the German nation's own power;
2. in order to refute, by declaring the extent of these measures, those assertions with which the German people are accused of striving for military supremacy in Europe.

The German government as guardian of the honor and interests of the German nation desires to secure the necessary extent of those instruments of power that are required to preserve the intactness of the German Reich and to ensure the international regard for and consideration of Germany as fellow guarantor of general peace. At this time the German government reaffirms, both to the German people and to the world, its determination that its rearming shall not be for military aggression, but a pledge for its defense and thus for the preservation of peace. The German government hereby expresses the confident hope that as the German people find their way back to their honor, they will - in the spirit of independent equality - be granted the chance to make their contribution to the pacification of the world in free and open co-operation with the other nations and their governments.

11.15 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The Russian Invitation of August 12, 1939

From "The Forced War":

The policy of Stalin and Molotov toward Germany in August 1939 was consistent with the foreign program outlined by the Soviet leaders at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party in March 1939, before the German occupation of Prague. The Russian leaders at that time had predicted that the Soviet Union would succeed in remaining neutral during the early phase of the conflict which they expected to occur in the near future between Germany and the Western Powers. The French believed that an alliance between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union might be a useful prelude to a policy of conciliation toward Germany which would prevent the outbreak of World War II. The British leaders hoped for Soviet assistance in the war against Germany which they considered inevitable. It is unlikely that the French leaders could have influenced the British to adopt a moderate policy even after an agreement with the Soviet Union had been achieved. It is extremely doubtful that a military pact with the Soviet Union would have been useful in preventing the outbreak of World War II. It has been argued that Russian neutrality was the real cause of the outbreak of World War II, but this paradoxical viewpoint has never been presented in a convincing manner. The contention has been made that the adherence of the Soviet Union to the coalition of Halifax would have created preponderant power sufficient to guarantee the peace. This does not take account of the fact that Halifax, unlike the French leaders, desired not peace but war, and that the British diplomats themselves did not believe that an alliance with the Soviet Union would preserve the peace.

The German leaders received a definite indication on August 12, 1939, that the Soviet Union had decided to arrive at an understanding with Germany and to reject the Anglo-French alliance offer. Russian Chargé d'Affaires Georgi Astakhov called at the German Foreign Office and announced that Stalin wished to reach an understanding with Germany about Poland and about Russo-German political relations. Astakhov suggested that negotiations could be advanced "by degrees," and that Moscow would be a suitable place for final talks. He had no suggestion to make about the selection of negotiators by Germany. His démarche did not mean that a Russo-German pact had become a certainty, but it was evident that successful negotiations were probable if desired by Germany. The Russians were not offering to conclude a pact which would ban the danger of war. They were hoping that Halifax would succeed in launching a major European war, without Russian participation. The Russians considered it worthwhile to gamble on this eventuality, because it would create the most favorable conditions for the expansion of Bolshevism in Europe. Hitler hoped that a Russo-German pact would be a decisive factor in preventing the outbreak of a new European war. He thought there was good reason to believe that the Western Powers would change their minds about war with Germany

after the defection of the Soviet Union. It seemed less likely that there would be a new European war if the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Germany instead of an alliance with the Western Powers. This was true despite the fact that many irresponsible Western journalists favoring war claimed that this step by Russia, which they disliked, made war more probable. They knew that arguing in this manner would increase the chances for war.

Italian Ambassador Bernardo Attolico, who had been stationed at Danzig by the League of Nations in the 1920's, revealed at the German Foreign Office on August 14, 1939, a compromise plan from private Polish sources friendly to Germany. Germany would receive the city of Danzig and slightly more than half of its territory, with the Mottlau tributary of the Vistula as the dividing line. The territory assigned to Germany would connect Danzig with East Prussia, whereas the Poles would receive territory in the direction of Gdynia, and the "sort of island," actually a peninsula, on which was situated the Polish Westerplatte arsenal in Danzig harbor. These private Polish circles were hopeful that Hitler would accept this solution, which would at least bring 300,000 Germans back to the Reich. They were less confident about the official Polish attitude, but they thought that it would be worthwhile to try a plan which offered a considerable German retreat from the October 24, 1939, offer, but which stopped short of a total capitulation to Poland. The plan was gratefully received by the German Foreign Office, and it was filed for future reference. More might have been heard about it later had Poland agreed to resume negotiations with Germany.

Ciano's Mission to Germany

The German Government agreed to invite Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano to Germany for conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop. Ciano was received in Salzburg by Ribbentrop, Mackensen, and Attolico on August 11, 1939. He was scheduled to confer with Hitler at the nearby Obersalzberg on the afternoon of the following day. The German leader was conferring with League High Commissioner Burckhardt when Ciano arrived, and it was decided that Ciano and Ribbentrop should engage in preliminary talks on the morning of August 12th. Hitler took the same line in his conversation with Burckhardt on August 11th that he intended to employ with Ciano on the following day. Hitler told Burckhardt that further patience with the Poles was becoming an impossibility, and that grave danger existed of a German-Polish war. He predicted that Germany would defeat Poland in about three weeks if war came. He requested Burckhardt to inform the French and British of this situation, and to remind them that Germany did not desire a conflict with the Western Powers under any circumstances. Burckhardt agreed to undertake this mission. Beck was nervous about this meeting, because he feared that Burckhardt would make a formidable effort to persuade the British and French not to attack Germany. He told Szembek that he was furious with Burckhardt for accepting an interview with Hitler at this juncture. The Burckhardt mission made an impression on Bonnet, but none

whatever on Halifax. The British Foreign Secretary, who sent Roger Makins to Basel as his personal representative to ascertain Hitler's views, received some plain language from Burckhardt about the atrocious mistreatment of the German minority by the Poles. Halifax responded by instructing Kennard that the Poles would have to improve their tactics if they hoped to avoid giving any impression that they were guilty of provoking the approaching war.

Halifax also advised the Poles to cease their provocations at Danzig and to restrain their press. Kennard responded with a purely formal *démarche* which could not possibly worry Beck. The Polish Foreign Minister was relieved to note that the Burckhardt mission had failed to modify British policy. He claimed to Kennard that there was no point in discussing the situation of the German minority with the British, and he also made the astonishing claim that the Germans, and not the Poles, had started the so-called press war. He added that it was always the Germans, and not the Poles, who provoked incidents at Danzig. It was evident that Beck was not inclined to engage Kennard in a serious discussion of these problems.

Ribbentrop discussed the Polish situation with Ciano at great length on the morning of August 12th. He described some of the worst recent atrocities against the German minority in Poland, including the mutilation of several Germans. Ciano later reported to Mussolini that Ribbentrop was very grave, and that he feared war between Germany and Poland might soon be inevitable. Ribbentrop admitted that Great Britain and France might attack Germany, despite the fact that they could offer no effective help to the Poles. The German Foreign Minister continued to hope that it would be possible to localize a German-Polish conflict by diplomatic action. Ciano had been instructed by Mussolini to convince the Germans that any risk whatever of a major war should be avoided, because such a conflict would be catastrophic for both Germany and Italy. Ciano accordingly took a strong stand against Ribbentrop's analysis of the European situation. He did not deny that Germany had ample justification under the existing provisions of international law to chastise the Poles. He argued instead that action by Germany against Poland would be inexpedient, because, in the opinion of both Mussolini and Ciano, the British and French would seize this as a pretext for military operations against Germany. Ribbentrop was surprised by Ciano's tenacity in arguing for this interpretation, and he was startled to note that his own analysis of Russian policy did not modify this opinion. The two diplomats debated the issue at great length, but nothing was said about the role of Italy in the event of war.

Ciano and Ribbentrop met with Hitler on the Obersalzberg in the afternoon for an intensive conference of more than three hours. Ciano insisted that a war with Poland should be avoided at any price, and he suggested that the Axis should issue an appeal for an international conference. The Italian Foreign Minister presented his arguments with energy and single-mindedness throughout this conference, and he succeeded in making a great impression on Hitler. The Chancellor agreed to consider the Italian viewpoint at length before discussing the matter again on the following day. The German Foreign

Office was impressed by the ability of Ciano to present his views and to counter the arguments offered by Hitler. Weizsäcker was convinced that Ciano would repeat this performance with still greater effect on the following day. He failed to realize that Ciano had also been influenced by Hitler during this lengthy discussion. He was astonished to note on August 13th that Ciano reversed his position, and declared that Hitler was probably correct in calculating that Great Britain and France would not attack Germany if the German-Polish crisis culminated in a local war. Hitler's reply to Ciano's arguments on August 12th is important because it reveals the thoughts which were deciding the course of German policy at this point. Hitler claimed that a few fanatics in Warsaw and Krakow were responsible for the tragedy in Poland because they had succeeded in stirring an otherwise indifferent Polish population into a frenzy of hatred against Germany. He stressed the obvious weaknesses of the Polish state with its large Ukrainian, Jewish, and German minorities.

Ciano reported to Mussolini that Hitler had recognized the validity of each point in support of the Italian position, provided one could assume that a general war would ensue. The doubtful policy of the Western Powers was the crux of the problem. Hitler insisted again and again that Great Britain and France would not attack Germany. Mussolini was also informed that Ciano told Ribbentrop, after the conference with Hitler on August 12th, that Italy would not enter the war if Germany was attacked by Great Britain and France. Ciano did not wish his disagreement with the German leaders to receive publicity. He had no objection on August 12th to a German protocol drawn up in French, which announced publicly that complete harmony was resulting from the Italo-German exchange of views. The German Chancellor was pleased to discover on August 13th that no elaborate statements were required to gain Ciano's support. Hitler stated his position very briefly, but he received no arguments whatever from Ciano. The Italian Foreign Minister assured Hitler instead that the German leader had often been right in his analysis of difficult situations in the past, and that his evaluation on this occasion was probably more accurate than the Italian one. A German observer later explained that Ciano folded up like a pocket knife. Ciano promised Hitler that Italy would maintain a common front with Germany. Italy had little to lose if Great Britain and France did not attack Germany. Everything was settled quickly, and the second conference between Hitler and Ciano, which terminated a basic disagreement of several weeks duration between Germany and Italy, was over in thirty minutes.

The Reversal of Italian Policy

Ciano had given Hitler his personal word that Italo-German solidarity would be maintained, but Italian Ambassador Attolico refused to accept this situation. He believed that Italy should separate from Germany if the Germans refused to retreat before Polish pretensions. He was irritated by the reports in the German press on August 15, 1939, which confirmed the Italo-German solidarity pledged by Ciano. He wished that Ciano had

not made this pledge, and he decided to do everything possible to reverse the course of Italian policy. Attolico requested and received permission to come to Rome on August 15, 1939, to present his case. He had prepared a careful report at Berlin on the Salzburg and Obersalzberg meetings. He criticized the foreign policy decisions of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano, and he argued that Italy should not come to the support of Germany in the event of a general European war. He turned over his Embassy at Berlin to Count Massimo Magistrati, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, with whom he enjoyed relations of close confidence. Magistrati reported to Rome, immediately after the departure of Attolico, that the Germans had informed him of the likelihood of a pact with Russia in the very near future. The purpose of this report was to convince Mussolini that the final crisis was close at hand, and that he had a last opportunity to reconsider the Italian commitment.

Attolico was delighted to discover at Rome on August 16th that Ciano regretted the commitment he had made to Hitler. Mussolini and Ciano agreed with Attolico that Italian support to Germany in a major war would be inadvisable. Mussolini expressed his hope that a negotiated settlement of the German-Polish dispute would relieve Italy of the distasteful prospect of canceling the pledge Ciano had made to Hitler. The Germans were alarmed by the mission of Attolico to Italy immediately after the conversations between Hitler and Ciano at Berchtesgaden. The negative attitude of Attolico toward the Italo-German alliance was well known at Berlin, and it was easy to deduce the purpose of his mission. He would not have left Germany had he been satisfied with the Ciano pledge at Berchtesgaden. Weizsäcker telephoned German Ambassador Mackensen on August 17th to inquire if he had seen Attolico, and if the Italian diplomat had departed again for Germany. Mackensen replied that Attolico had left Rome for Salzburg on the afternoon train the same day. He had failed to see the Italian diplomat, who was "detained at the Ministry" in seemingly continuous conferences. Weizsäcker replied with great concern that he would take the morning train to Salzburg to confer with Ribbentrop and possibly with Attolico.

A crucial telegram from Mackensen arrived in Berlin at 2:30 a.m. on August 18th before Weizsäcker departed for Salzburg. Ciano had informed the German Ambassador shortly before midnight on August 17th that Mussolini rejected the Berchtesgaden analysis of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano that a German-Polish war could remain localized. Mussolini insisted that a local war in Poland would be followed by an Anglo-French attack against Germany. He repeated the statement, agreed to by Hitler, that such a struggle would be exceedingly unfavorable for the Axis. Mussolini expressed his keen disappointment at the failure of Germany to respond favorably to the proposed Brenner meeting of the previous month, and to the Italian plan for a general diplomatic conference. He complained that such treatment from Germany deprived him of further inspiration for new creative suggestions. Ciano claimed that Mussolini was insisting that the decision for further steps "now lay solely with Berlin." Mackensen noted suspiciously that Ciano had a still later appointment the same night with the British Ambassador. The German diplomat was curious to know how much Ciano would choose to divulge to Sir Percy Loraine about the

Italian position.

The German leaders were exceedingly disturbed by the revelation of Mussolini's attitude. Weizsäcker knew that Attolico had gone to Rome with the express purpose of converting Mussolini to a different interpretation of the crisis from the one which had been agreed upon between Hitler and Ciano at the Obersalzberg. Mackensen did not deny the obvious purpose of Attolico's mission, but he argued that the Italian Ambassador had insufficient influence at Rome to accomplish this. It seemed to Weizsäcker that Ciano was revealing excessive weakness in this dispute, and the German State Secretary concluded that Ciano had failed to speak with *franchise brutale* on August 13th, although he had sought to convey this impression. Weizsäcker concluded that Mackensen was wrong about Attolico's influence. The Italian Ambassador had adopted a strong and consistent position, which contrasted with the vacillation of Ciano. Weizsäcker guessed correctly that this factor was decisive in influencing Mussolini.

Italy's Secret Pledge to Halifax

Ciano received Sir Percy Loraine a few minutes after midnight on August 18, 1939. He offered to discuss the conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler on August 12th and 13th. Ciano reminded Loraine that the Poles were violating the German frontier with great recklessness, and that he was receiving extensive information about this situation from exclusively Italian sources in Poland. Ciano explained that the German attitude in the Polish question was naturally very stiff under these circumstances. The Italian Foreign Minister pleaded with Loraine that peace could not be preserved indefinitely unless at least the Danzig problem was solved in the German sense. Loraine replied that it was a fixed British policy to apply no pressure on Poland to settle her differences with Germany. Ciano conducted himself correctly throughout this conversation, and Loraine hastily reported to Halifax that Italy had decided to stand solidly with Germany. It was unfortunate that Italian fear of a possible British military attack prompted Ciano and Mussolini to abandon their attitude of loyalty toward Germany. Loraine joyfully reported later on August 18th that a new discussion with Ciano permitted him to draw the opposite conclusion about Italian policy. Ciano had claimed that Italy "has not agreed" to support Germany in the event of war, and he intimated to Loraine that she had no intention of doing so. Ciano also confided that he was in serious disagreement with Ribbentrop about the Polish crisis. Loraine reported irresponsible rumors that Hungarian Foreign Minister Istvan Csacy was in Rome on a pro-Polish and anti-German mission. Loraine hoped that this was true, because it would magnify the great differences which separated the Axis allies. The rumor about the Csacy visit originated from a Russian source, and it apparently did not occur to Loraine that the Russians were encouraging the British to persist in their disastrous policy of challenging Germany.

Ciano's indiscretion produced an electric effect in London, and it greatly weakened the impact Hitler desired to produce with his surprise Russian agreement. The influence

on France was still more decisive. Indeed, it is reasonably certain that France, and consequently Great Britain, would not have attacked Germany had it not been for the disloyal indiscretion of Ciano to Lorraine on August 18, 1939. The French military leaders asserted later that they would never have advised the French Government to gamble on a Franco-German war had it not been for the advance pledge of Italian neutrality in such a conflict. It would have been a simple matter for Bonnet to continue his peace policy had the French military men declared that a war with Germany was not feasible. A firm Italian stand in support of Germany, as advised by Hitler, and accepted by Ciano on August 13, 1939, would have done much more for European peace and for the interests of Italy than the prostration of Italy on August 18, 1939, before the British military threat. The Germans at this time had no idea whether or not Italy would support them. They were suspicious about the conferences between Ciano and Lorraine, but they did not know that the British Government was receiving a promise that Italy would remain neutral if Great Britain attacked Germany. The message from Mussolini which Attolico presented to Ribbentrop at Salzburg on August 18, 1939, offered no indication of the true Italian position. Mussolini observed that a conflict between Germany and Poland would be difficult to localize, but he did not say that, in his opinion, this would be impossible. He mentioned that conditions did not appear favorable for Italian participation in a war of long duration, but he did not indicate that Italy would refuse to support Germany. It was natural for the Germans under these circumstances to conclude that Ciano had exaggerated the negative attitude of Mussolini in his conversation with Mackensen on August 17, 1939.

Ribbentrop explained to Attolico that the localization of a German-Polish war would probably depend upon the maintenance of a solid Italo-German front. The German Foreign Minister did not realize that this common front had been smashed by Ciano as the result of the initiative of the Italian diplomat to whom he was addressing his remarks. Ribbentrop explained that no prolonged war under modern conditions could be a "successful war" for any European Power, and he pointed out that Great Britain and France, after the conclusion of a Russo-German pact, could not hope for a quick success in a war against Germany. He had given much thought to Ciano's point about the re-election of President Roosevelt in the event of war. He and Hitler hoped that opposition to Roosevelt in the United States was sufficiently strong to hold the American President in check. Attolico declared that he was less optimistic about all these points, and he complained that the shortage of raw materials in Italy was a serious problem. Ribbentrop suggested that Attolico's analysis was not sufficiently imaginative. Russian raw materials would be available to Italy after the conclusion of a Russo-German trade agreement. Polish ore products from former German East Upper Silesia would be helpful to Italy in the event of war with Poland. Ribbentrop was satisfied with the outcome of this conference, because he received the delusive impression from Attolico that his remarks had allayed Italian fears.

Mussolini was encouraged on August 18th by a misleading report from Italian Amba-

sador Arone at Warsaw. The Italian diplomat was informed by the American journalist, John Gunther, that Beck was perfectly willing to negotiate with Germany for a peaceful settlement. The false report of Gunther was widely circulated, and it contributed to serious misunderstandings about Polish policy at a time when Beck was resolutely opposed to further negotiation with Germany.

The Personal Intervention of Hitler

Hitler personally took charge of the German negotiation efforts on August 20th. Schulenburg was instructed to present himself to Molotov at once and to hand him a telegram from Hitler to Stalin. Schulenburg managed to contact Molotov at 3:00 p.m. on August 21st to present the telegram. Hitler informed Stalin that Germany accepted the Russian draft for a non-aggression pact, and that "the tension between Germany and Poland had become intolerable. Polish demeanor toward a Great Power is such that a crisis may arise any day. In the face of this presumption, Germany is determined in any case from now on to look after the interests of the Reich with all the means at its disposal." Hitler proposed that Ribbentrop fly to Moscow on August 22nd, but he added that the 23rd would be acceptable. He informed Stalin that the tense international situation would prevent Ribbentrop from remaining in Russia more than one or two days. He concluded, "I should be glad to receive your early answer."

Stalin did not consider it worthwhile to protract the suspense by evading Hitler's direct proposition. The Soviet leader responded cordially to Hitler on August 21st. He invited Ribbentrop to come to Moscow on August 23, 1939, and he requested that a special communiqué be issued on August 22nd to announce the approaching pact. The Russian press on the evening of August 21st announced the conclusion of the trade pact with Germany, and the Soviet decision to conclude a political agreement with the Germans. Molotov informed Schulenburg that the Russians favored a formal joint communiqué announcing the pact for the morning of August 22, 1939. The die had been cast, and Ribbentrop organized an impressive staff of thirty advisers to accompany him to Moscow. The assault on German interests by Halifax had prompted Hitler, in the interest of preventing war and defending Germany, to deprive a number of the smaller states of Eastern Europe, including Poland, of German protection against Bolshevist expansion. It was obvious that Great Britain and France would do nothing to protect Eastern Europe against Bolshevism.

The Complacency of Beck

Beck (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland) was not worried by the prospect that Great Britain and France might desert Poland until several days after the announcement of the approaching Russo-German treaty. Kennard was amazed to discover at 1:30 a.m. on August 22nd that Beck was utterly complacent about the situation. Beck explained

that the pact made no difference to Poland, because, in contrast to Great Britain and France, she had not been counting on Soviet aid. He added that the understandable disappointment in Great Britain and France was the price these countries paid for having placed false hopes in the Soviet Union. Beck warned his subordinates at the Polish Foreign Office on August 23, 1939, that war with Germany would break out at any time, and he claimed without any foundation that the Germans were assigning nine-tenths of their military forces to ultimate operations in Poland. He confided that he would advise the Polish military leaders on the same day to mobilize the final twenty-one divisions of Polish reserve troops. This decision would be justified by his analysis that war in the immediate future was inevitable. It was decided at the Polish Foreign Office to inform Polish missions abroad that the approaching non-aggression pact exerted no effect on the fundamental situation other than to bring the inevitable war one step closer.

It was soon evident that the approaching pact exerted a greater influence on France than on Italy, Poland, or Great Britain. This is not surprising when it is recalled that the Russian move effectively undermined the existing Franco-Russian alliance. Paul-Emile Naggiar, the French Ambassador to Russia, complained bitterly to American Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt on August 23rd that the Poles were exclusively to blame for the failure of Western negotiations with Russia. It was obvious to Steinhardt that Naggiar favored French abandonment of the Poles. American Ambassador Kennedy at London obtained an entirely different reaction from the British Foreign Secretary. Kennedy suggested that it would be logical to respond to the situation in Russia by seeking a peaceful settlement with Germany, but Halifax replied stiffly that "my reason shows me no way out but war." This was because Halifax favored war with Germany at any price, and it was evident to Kennedy that he was impervious to reasonable proposals for peaceful negotiations.

Kennedy discussed the situation on the same day with Chamberlain, who had returned to London from his vacation. It was evident that Chamberlain was fatalistic and unprepared to exert a moderating influence on Halifax. Chamberlain admitted that Poland would not be encouraged to make any concessions to Germany. Kennedy personally hoped that Poland would finally agree to resume negotiations with Germany, and he was disappointed to discover that neither Halifax nor Chamberlain was prepared to urge the Poles to adopt this course. He was convinced that Warsaw rather than Berlin constituted the chief menace to peace. He suggested to the American State Department that if President Roosevelt "is contemplating any action for peace, it seems to me the place to work is on Beck in Poland and to make this effective it must happen quickly. I see no other possibility."

Ribbentrop's Mission to Moscow

Ribbentrop flew to Moscow on August 23rd in a large German Condor transport airplane with a staff of thirtytwo experts. He had received plenipotentiary powers from Hitler before departing for Moscow. The German team was received at Moscow with great

cordiality, and their Russian hosts proved to be extraordinarily communicative. Various important European issues, such as intimate Turkish diplomatic relations with the British, or the intrinsic value of French military power, were discussed with apparent frankness. The hospitable Russians did everything possible to encourage the Germans to feel comfortable and at ease. The Russians placed a request early in the evening of August 23rd for German toleration of their plans to establish military bases in Estonia and Latvia. The Russians insisted on a free hand in Finland, and on German neutrality in the conflict Russia intended to provoke with Rumania to recover Bessarabia. Ribbentrop, despite his plenipotentiary powers, telephoned Berlin to receive the consent of Hitler for German acquiescence in these aggressive Russian plans. He knew that the attitude toward Russia of the peoples of the former Russian Baltic provinces contrasted with the desire for union with Germany of the Germans of Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, and Danzig. The Baltic peoples did not desire the revisionist program implied by the Russian demand for bases in their countries. They were the tragic victims of the situation produced by the Anglo-German conflict of interests.

Ribbentrop had contacted Berlin at 8:05 p.m. on August 23rd, and the affirmative response of Hitler was received in Moscow at 11:00 p.m. Ribbentrop was sincere when he informed the Russians on August 23rd that Germany had made no irrevocable decision to respond to Polish provocations with a military campaign in Poland. Hitler's first secret announcement that there definitely would be war with Poland came on August 25, 1939, and even this was subsequently contradicted by a new order from the German Chancellor. Nevertheless, both the German and Russian negotiators were reckoning with the likelihood of immediate war between Germany and Poland. Ribbentrop also issued a statement on August 24th, after the signing of the pact, that Germany would take concrete steps to encourage a relaxation of tension between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Ribbentrop devoted August 24th in Moscow to the establishment of personal contacts with the Russian leaders. He told Stalin that the proverbial wit of the Berliners was quick to respond to any given situation. He had heard a story before he left for Moscow which carried the theme of Stalin's imaginary decision to join the anti-Comintern pact. Ribbentrop personally hoped for lasting peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, and he knew that the chances for peace would be improved if some means were found to modify the existing anti-Comintern pact, which was directed against international Communism. He hoped in vain that it might be possible eventually to persuade Stalin to abandon his plans for world revolution, and to concentrate on the realization of strictly national Russian interests. His joke about the anti-Comintern pact was an obvious but futile move to prepare the ground in this direction.

Hitler received the German military leaders at the Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939. He discussed the situation with them in morning and afternoon conferences, and he ordered the plans for possible military operations against Poland to be completed by August 26th. He refrained from issuing a final attack order. Hitler described German negotiations with Russia at great length, and he expressed the opinion that the Russo-German pact would

discourage Great Britain and France from intervening against Germany in the event of a German-Polish war.

One version of these conferences was presented by Louis P. Lochner of the American Associated Press to British diplomats at Berlin on August 25, 1939. This material was later cited by a number of historians as a valid record of the conferences, and it consciously or unconsciously influenced the thinking of British diplomats at the time. Otherwise, it would have been dismissed as something too ridiculous to receive serious consideration. The crass propaganda in the material would have been immediately discarded had people been permitted to think normally about important issues. Unfortunately, a furious and uninterrupted war propaganda campaign had been carried on in the West for more than five months, and nearly everyone, regardless of his mental caliber, had been seriously affected. Why would anyone believe that Marshal Göring danced on the table and shrieked like a savage before a group of austere German Generals? Why would Hitler blandly announce to his Generals that "Göring had demonstrated to us that his Four-Year Plan is a failure and that we are at the end of our strength, if we do not achieve victory in a coming war?" This sounded more like a leaf from the book of President Roosevelt, who, unlike Hitler, was still facing a catastrophic depression. The statement would be sheer nonsense when applied to war with poverty-stricken Poland. Every informed person, including Lord Halifax, knew that Göring was the last person in Germany who would deliver arguments in favor of a general war at this time.

The memorandum stated that Hitler told his Generals he planned to kill the Polish women and children. This would have been proper material for an American "comic book," and also for Hitler, if his purpose had been to goad his Generals into an immediate revolt against the German regime. The memorandum claimed that Germany could not hold out in a long war (Note: At least this is true), but added in the same paragraph that "Poland will be depopulated and settled with Germans." The memorandum also claimed that Stalin was very sick, and that Germany would dismember Russia after his death. Succinct and reliable references to the meetings of August 22, 1939, are available from the actual participants. The traditions of popular journalism cannot excuse people, from any country, who seek to precipitate wars by spreading lies when feeling is running high.

Hitler's Desire for a Negotiated Settlement

Hitler hoped to recover the diplomatic initiative through his Kremlin pact of August 23, 1939. The effort launched by Halifax on March 17, 1939, to build a formidable British alliance front in Eastern Europe had failed. Hitler also hoped that Great Britain and France would react to this situation by withdrawing their support from Poland. He knew that his pact with Russia placed him in a strong position to resume negotiations with the Western Powers. His recent success was too sensational to permit new negotiation efforts to be readily confused with weakness. The British Government gave Hitler an excellent opening for his new diplomatic campaign by commissioning Chamberlain to write to him.

The British leaders, of course, did not intend to embark on major negotiations, but Hitler had other plans. The presentation of the Chamberlain letter by Henderson on August 23, 1939, was the signal for a major German diplomatic offensive in Great Britain.

The situation would have been relatively simple for Hitler by August 23, 1939, had it not been for the unpardonable indiscretion of Ciano and the incredible conduct of General Gamelin (from France). The statement of Ciano on August 18th that Italy would not support Germany cushioned Halifax from the impact of the German treaty with Russia, and it gave General Gamelin an excuse to rationalize the unfavorable French military situation, which had been created by the Russian agreement with Germany. The action of Ciano was especially unwarranted because the Italian Foreign Minister knew that Hitler hoped to create the maximum effect of surprise with his Russian pact. Ciano knew that his own pledge to the British would greatly reduce the impact of Hitler's diplomacy. It was easy to argue in London that the position of Hitler would be insecure if the Italians refused to be loyal to their engagements with him. Italian loyalty to Hitler and a clear decision from France against war on behalf of the Poles would surely have pulled the teeth from the Halifax campaign to launch a preventive war against Germany. The absence of these contingencies made it exceedingly difficult for Hitler to capitalize on his Russian success in negotiations with the British leaders. He was not fully aware of this situation on August 23rd. He knew nothing of the Italian pledge to the British on August 18th, or of the crucial debate in the meeting of the French Defense Council. He failed to appreciate the adamant determination of Halifax for war. He knew that British Ambassador Henderson was opposed to war, and he hoped that the views of the British diplomat at Berlin were shared to some extent by his master at London. Hitler was more optimistic than the facts warranted, but this was mainly because he was not fully aware of the existing situation.

The Russians too were unduly optimistic about their prospects on August 23, 1939. They overestimated the military power of France, and they expected a hopeless military stalemate on the Franco-German front reminiscent of World War I. Stalin hoped to expand his position in Eastern Europe, and to intervene militarily against Germany in the latter phase of a European war, when both Germany and the Western Powers were exhausted. There was one notably great difference in the attitudes of Stalin and Hitler. The Soviet Dictator, like Halifax and Roosevelt, was hoping for the outbreak of a general European war. Hitler considered that a European war would be a great evil, and he was anxious to prevent it. It is ironical to anticipate that the leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States ultimately joined together in true Orwellian fashion, at Nuremberg in 1945-1946, to condemn the German leaders for deliberately seeking, as "aggressors," to destroy the peace of the world.

From "Truth for Germany":

It comes as a shock to discover that the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, on 23 August avails himself of the lie of alleging to London the Polish consent to Russian troops marching through Polish territory, and that Halifax recognizes this lie and, nevertheless,

forwards a note to the Head of the British delegation in Moscow, Admiral Drax, that he should endorse the statements of the French General Doumenc. (In July 1940, after resuming these contacts, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Cripps, at the suggestion of his government, was recommending to Stalin to also take possession of the Balkans and of some reservations in the Dardanelles). The British guarantee to Poland, which merely concerned the German-Polish border, was thereby exposed, in the light of the thus contrived state of affairs, as a wicked hypocrisy that camouflaged war-minded intentions. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, admitted to Lord Halifax in a letter of 22 August 1939 that Hitler had been forced by Britain into taking this step in Moscow:

“But I cannot say that I was surprised as I have always felt that our policy with Poland would only end by driving Germany and Russia together. At least one cannot blame Germany.”

Taking cognizance of these facts, Hitler cannot be blamed that the Non-Aggression Pact which he concluded with Moscow likewise made provisions for modifications, which in the secret additional protocol were expressed in the delimiting of the spheres of interest as “in the event of territorial changes”. Nevertheless, the Non-Aggression Pact with Stalin, unlike the allied venture, was not a military alliance. Furthermore, Hitler had not concluded it with the idea of unleashing a war. Hitler’s striving and the striving of the Reich Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, but also that of Field Marshal Göring in the unofficial diplomatic course of action taken from 23 August to 1 September 1939, continued to be focussed, taking advantage of Moscow’s change of course, on attaining amicable relations with Britain and a settlement with Poland, as the Reich government had informed Stalin as well as Mr. Chamberlain.⁷) Even the fact that Ribbentrop had asked the Soviets to mass troops along the Polish frontier is merely to be understood in that this display was to induce Poland into yielding and thus to an amicable settlement. Before the beginning of war, there were neither any plans for combined action against Poland, nor did the Reich government endeavour, until Britain’s and France’s declaration of war against Germany, to persuade the USSR into joining the German side in a conflict with Poland. These facts refute the hypothesis that the Non-Aggression Pact had as its aim, on Germany’s part, the destruction of Poland or the unleashing of a war in general. Zentner writes:

“For the sake of historical truth, one must clearly bear in mind that Stalin’s first attempt to chum-up on 10 March [1939], was well taken note of in Germany and, besides, was correctly understood, but that there was no reciprocal response from the German side. Only after the Anglo-French guarantee declaration to Poland and after the Polish excesses against everything German does Hitler come to regard Stalin as a possible ally.”

Former State Secretary Meissner explains Hitler’s motives as follows:

“At the conclusion of the Moscow Pact, Hitler was convinced, in so far as one can infer from his own demeanour and his own comments, of the necessity and of a long continuance of German-Russian co-operation, and he was ready to subordinate the ideological

differences between National Socialism and Bolshevism to reasons of political realism. I was witness to various discussions during which Hitler tried most insistently to convince leading party members of the soundness of his decision.”

The Pact from Stalins View

From “The Chief Culprit“:

Meanwhile, the tensions in Europe rose. Hitler demanded a review of the Versailles Treaty. In accordance with this treaty, Eastern Prussia was separated from the main part of Germany, and the city of Danzig was declared a free city. Hitler demanded to be given a corridor through Polish territory to build a highway and a railroad between Eastern Prussia and mainland Germany. Additionally, the city of Danzig was to become a part of Germany. The Polish government refused to satisfy Hitler’s demands. Great Britain guaranteed Poland’s safety. Treaties guaranteeing mutual aid were signed between Great Britain, France, and Poland. The governments of Great Britain and France decided to attract the Soviet Union to their side. This was a monstrous and fatal mistake. If the USSR had been interested in safeguarding peace in Europe, it would not have needed agreements with Great Britain and France. Stalin could have solved the problems of Europe’s safety on his own. He only had to make his position clear to Hitler: If Hitler were to begin a war against Poland, then he would not receive Soviet oil, grain, cotton, iron ore, magnesium, chrome, zinc, nickel, and tin. Without these things, Hitler could not have fought. It was possible to give an even harsher ultimatum: to declare independently of Britain, France, and Poland that the Soviet Union would defend Polish territory from German aggression as if it was its own, as it defended Mongolian territory from Japanese aggression. It would not matter that the Polish government might not wish to have Soviet troops on Polish territory. When Germany crushed the Polish army and dismantled the Polish government, the Red Army would step into Poland and fight Germany. An invasion of Poland by the Germans would be a signal for the Red Army to get ready for action. After the fall of the Polish state, the Polish people would continue resistance, and would accept any help which the Soviet Union would be willing to give in unlimited quantities.

In the summer of 1939 Hitler should have been reminded that Soviet pilots, sappers, tankers, artillerists, and saboteurs fought in Spain against German military specialists. There the war lasted almost three years. Sending soldiers and arms to Spain was difficult. Poland was not Spain. Poland was much nearer. The Soviet Union could send any number of “volunteers” to Poland, 5 or 10 million, plus any number of tanks, airplanes, and artillery. Hitler should have been told that in the event of aggression against Poland, the Soviet Union would give asylum to Polish refugees, would take in any number of Polish children, would offer training to Polish partisans and supply them with necessary equipment. In this case, war against Poland could not be a lightning war. It would be a war of attrition, and Germany did not have the resources for such a war. That is how Stalin should have behaved. But he, for some reason, insisted on having talks with Great

Britain and France. If a novice player sits down to play cards with a pro, he usually makes only one mistake: he picks up his cards. . . . On August 11, 1939, British and French delegations arrived in Moscow for talks about joint action against Germany. The governments of Great Britain and France repeated the mistake of novice card-players. They sat down at the table with Stalin's pros, and lost the talks. Neither the British nor the French envoys understood Stalin's intentions. Stalin's plan, in fact, was very simple: force France and Britain to declare war on Germany, or push Hitler to actions that would prompt France and Britain to declare war on Germany.

Having received approval from the British and French governments for talks, Stalin immediately found himself in a situation in which he could not lose. For Stalin, two options were open: either the Soviet delegation would set new demands and force Britain and France to start a war against Germany; or Britain and France would refuse to invade Germany, the talks would fail, and it would be possible to accuse Britain and France of being too lax on the aggressor, while Stalin himself could sign a pact with Hitler. The Soviet delegation set forth insatiable demands: We have no common border with Germany, so our troops need corridors through Poland! This demand was unacceptable for Poland, and unnecessary for the Soviet Union. It was unacceptable because the Polish government and people knew the nature of the Red Army and the Soviet secret police. In 1920, the Polish people saw the Red Army on their land, and understood that a new arrival of "liberators" would turn into occupation, mass shootings, and terror against all layers of society. Several months after these talks, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania allowed the placing of Soviet garrisons on their territories—and fell into Communist slavery, which lasted half a century. If Stalin wanted peace, why did he need corridors in Poland? K. E. Voroshilov, then a member of the Politburo, the People's Commissar for Defense, and a Marshal of the Soviet Union, declared at the talks: "Since the Soviet Union has no common border with Germany . . . there are no roads for engaging the aggressor."

The absence of common borders with Hitler's Germany was a great asset for the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union was thinking in terms of defense or neutrality in case of war, the Red Army needed no corridors to pass through Polish territory. But Stalin was not planning on defense, and certainly not planning on staying out of the war. He needed corridors through Polish territory on one hand in order to establish a Communist regime in Poland, and on the other hand because the corridors enabled him to deliver a surprise attack to Germany from the rear, in case it became engaged in a war against France and Britain. No other use for passages through Poland can be thought of. There were other proposals from the Soviet side: Let France and Britain start a war against Germany not only in the case of direct German aggression, but in case of "indirect aggression." What "indirect aggression" meant only Stalin and his diplomats knew. If the proposals of the Soviet delegation had been accepted, Stalin (justifiably) could have demanded that France and Britain start a war against Germany in response to any action by the German government. The wording was very loose, and anything can be labeled "indirect aggression." The scenario of war in this case was simplified: in answer to an action by

Germany, France and Britain, according to Stalin's demands, were forced to act against her. The Soviet Union would act against her as well, but on Polish territory not on its own—very convenient and safe.

In any event, the main theater of operations would unfold between France and Germany, and then fresh Soviet troops would carry out decisive strikes into the rear of German forces through the Polish territories. During the course of the talks, the French and British delegations, wishing to prove the seriousness of their intents, gave the Soviet side very important information that should not have come into Stalin's possession. Stalin knew that Great Britain and France had given their guarantees to Poland. But how serious was their word? The French and British delegations let him know that it was serious! If Hitler started a war against Poland, Great Britain and France would declare war against Germany. This was exactly the information Stalin was waiting for. Hitler thought that his invasion of Poland would go unpunished, like the entrance of German troops into the Rhineland demilitarized zone, like the Anschluss (union) of Austria and Germany, like the taking of Czechoslovakia. Stalin now knew that Hitler would be punished for invading Poland. The key to the ignition of World War II fell into Stalin's hands. It remained for Stalin only to give Hitler the green light: Attack Poland, I will not act against you (but France and England will declare war on you).

Half a century later, Soviet generals slowly started to admit that Stalin and the Red Army opened the way for Hitler to invade Poland. Army General A. Mayorov: "In planning the invasion of Poland, Germany feared most of all the Soviet Union, not England and not France. It is precisely why fascist leaders hurried to conclude a pact about [the] invasion with the USSR." The head of the GRU, Army General P. I. Ivashutin, expressed this sentiment more clearly: "With this pact, Hitler untied his hands for aggression."⁶ Simply stated, if Stalin had not signed a pact with Hitler, there would have been no invasion of Poland, and there would have been no World War II.

If Stalin had wanted peace, in August 1939 he had many opportunities to avert war. One of them was to follow the example of Britain and France and give a guarantee of safety to Poland. Or, he could simply have drawn out his talks with Britain and France, which would have served as a warning to Hitler: Invade Poland, but keep in mind that all of Europe is against you, we are gathered here in Moscow talking about something, and all we have to do is blockade Germany. But Stalin chose his own way. On August 12, 1939, the military delegations of the USSR, Great Britain, and France began talks in Moscow. Stalin's Marshal Voroshilov openly conducted with France and Britain the talks on "containing Hitler's aggression in Europe." Behind the scenes, however, things happened very differently: On August 11, even before the talks got started—Stalin made a decision to start negotiating with Germany for the partition of Poland.⁷ Stalin showed the world his willingness to stop Hitler's aggression, but simultaneously (and even beforehand) offered the German dictator a friendly and helping hand. Thus, Stalin safeguarded himself from failure, no matter what happened. Britain, France, and Germany were clearly about to engage in a massive struggle. Stalin kept up, openly or secretly, friendly relations with

all the participants in this struggle and at the same time incited them to act more and more aggressively.

On August 19, 1939, Stalin made a series of extremely important decisions, which had consequences for the course of world history. On that day, Stalin decided to stop the talks with Britain and France. On that same day, the German ambassador to Moscow, Friedrich von der Schulenburg, received Stalin's draft of the impending mutual agreement with the directions that "the agreement will be in force only given the simultaneous signing of the special protocol on points of interest to the Agreeing Parties, regarding foreign policy."⁸ Hitler didn't know that signing this agreement signified the start of World War II. Stalin did. On that same day, August 19, according to Stalin's orders the Soviet Union began a mobilization of the Red Army. Earlier, Stalin had given firm approval of conducting a sudden crushing operation to defeat the Japanese Sixth Army in Mongolia. On August 19, 1939, a coded cable from Zhukov informed Stalin that the main goal had been reached, that is, that the Japanese did not suspect the impending attack. Stalin gave his final approval, and Zhukov crushed the Japanese Sixth Army. Zhukov conducted a brilliantly sudden, quick, and audacious operation. The lightning-speed defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army was a prelude to World War II.

On that same day, August 19, 1939, a secret meeting of the Politburo took place, at which Stalin gave a speech. This meeting of the Politburo has never been reported. On the contrary, a lot of efforts were made to convince the whole world that such a meeting never took place. Stalin himself told the newspaper Pravda on November 30, 1939, that any report of a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, "is a sheer invention and lie." Years went by. The Soviet Union rotted and fell apart. Archives opened slightly. An advisor to the Russian president, Colonel General D. A. Volkogonov, published an article in the newspaper Izvestia on January 16, 1993: "There was a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939. The general had [the] protocols in his hands. General Volkogonov says that only secondary questions that were discussed at that meeting are preserved in the archives. But even this revelation meant an end to public lies. With one line in a newspaper article, general Volkogonov disclosed the lies of all Soviet leaders, including Stalin. In the meantime, more brave and more truthful scientists continued the search. And the document was found. It was kept in the Special Archives of the USSR, fund 7, index 1, document 1223. Tatyana Semenovna Bushueva, a talented Russian historian, found it. The document was first published in the December 1994 issue of Novyi Mir. This document finally proved that there was a meeting of the Politburo on that date. It turned out that Stalin did indeed speak on that date, and not about secondary problems, but about most vital ones. The document reveals that Stalin spoke of matters of primary, not secondary, importance.

The Russian historical community still denies the validity of this document, claiming it is unclear how and when the document was made. On the other hand, many recently declassified documents support the validity of this account. Let's look at, for instance, a record in the diary of the general secretary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, made on

September 7, 1939. In the company of Molotov and Zhdanov, Stalin explained his new line of foreign policy to the leader of the Comintern: “the war is between two groups of capitalist nations . . . but we are not against it, if they fight a bit and weaken each other. It would be good if Germany could destabilize the positions of the wealthiest capitalist nations (of England especially). Hitler, without knowing it, is weakening the foundations of the capitalist system. . . . We, in the meantime, are able to maneuver, to nudge one country on against the other, so that the fight will be more intense.”

Below, as a source of comparison, are several excerpts from Stalin’s speech at the Politburo session from August 19, 1939: “If we accept Germany’s proposal about the conclusion of a pact regarding invasion, she will of course attack Poland, and France and England’s involvement in this war will be inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious disorders and disturbances. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay on the sidelines of the conflict, and we will be able to count on our advantageous entrance into the war. . . . It is in the interest of the USSR—the motherland of workers—that the war unfolds between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French block. It is necessary to do everything within our powers to make this war last as long as possible, in order to exhaust the two sides. It is precisely for this reason that we must agree to signing the pact, proposed by Germany, and work on making this war, once declared, last a maximum amount of time.”

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Moscow about the destruction of the Polish state and the division of the Polish territories. Poland had mutual assistance agreements with France and the United Kingdom and, therefore, the attack by the Soviet Union and Germany automatically led to a European—and hence world—war. Indeed, in eight days, on September 1, 1939, World War II broke out. It was a direct and unavoidable result of the agreement reached in Moscow. The USSR-Germany agreement is traditionally called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Its moniker misleads and does not truly reflect the essence of what happened. The pact that was signed in Moscow was a plot between Hitler and Stalin to conduct an aggressive war in Europe together. Therefore, that agreement in effect was a Stalin-Hitler pact. Furthermore, in international practice it is much more common to use not the names of the statesmen that concluded the agreement, but the place where the documents were signed: the Munich Agreement, the Warsaw Pact, the Baghdad Pact, and the Geneva Agreement. Therefore, in accordance with common diplomatic practice, the more precise name of the pact would be the 1939 Moscow Agreement on the Start of World War II. Both parties received approximately equivalent shares—part of Poland went to Hitler, the other part went to Stalin. However, just eight days after signing the Moscow pact, Stalin violated it. Hitler started a war of aggression against Poland with hope that his ally Stalin would do the same. But Stalin cheated Hitler. On September 1 and in the subsequent two weeks the Soviet troops stood next to the Polish borders without conducting warfare and crossing the borders. The explanation of the Soviet government to the German counterpart was: the time has not come yet for action by the Red Army. As a result, the entire fault for the beginning

of the war fell upon Germany, upon Hitler and his entourage. They entered world history as the chief and only cause of World War II. Poland was divided not in the Imperial Chancellery, but in the Kremlin. Hitler was not present, Stalin was. But Hitler is at fault for the starting of the war, while Stalin is not. Stalin entered history as an innocent victim and the liberator of Europe.

The invasion of the German troops into Poland had other consequences too: on September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Already on the third day Germany was involved in a two-front war; that is, it wound up in an unwinnable situation. Since Germany practically lacked strategic raw materials, the two-front war was fatal for Germany. Lack of raw materials not only prohibited Germany from conducting a two-front war, but also a prolonged single-front war. The only hope was for blitzkrieg—instant defeat of the opponent. France could be defeated in a lightning war, but Great Britain is an island nation. To defeat Britain, long and serious preparation is needed, as well as a powerful navy that is equal to or exceeds the British navy, and air dominance is needed too. The German navy lagged significantly behind the British navy. German air power was insufficient to crush British industry and achieve air superiority. Therefore, on the third day the war already looked long and unpromising for Germany.

Furthermore, Britain had a special relationship with the United States. The United States could side with Britain at any moment that was convenient. Germany did not have such allies. Only while he was in a position of power could Hitler rely on Stalin's friendship. In a prolonged war against Britain and her allies, Hitler would inevitably exhaust his resources. In September 1939, the German government repeatedly reminded the government of the USSR about their obligation and demanded the Red Army's invasion of Poland according to the agreement. The Soviet government would refuse—not right away, but with a two-to three-day delay. For example, in response to the German demarche of September 3, the head of the Soviet government and its foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, responded on September 5: "We agree with you that concrete action has to be taken at an appropriate time. However, we consider that such [a] time has not come yet. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it appears to us that excessive haste could cause us harm and facilitate unification among our enemies."

The German government kept repeating its demands and kept getting refused. Red Army units started military action in Poland only after two and a half weeks—September 17. Stalin's troops committed similar, or maybe even worse, atrocities in Poland, but Great Britain and France did not declare war on the Soviet Union. Great Britain, France, and their allies were interested in preventing Germany from using Soviet strategic resources. To do so, it was necessary to keep Stalin at their side at any cost and, in case of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, to keep the Red Army from being defeated. As a result of the pact signed in Moscow in 1939 Stalin achieved a war, one which he desired and for which he had planned and prepared for a long time: The nations of Western Europe were mired in a destructive war, but the Soviet Union remained neutral. Now Stalin could wait for the total exhaustion and self-destruction of Central and Western

Europe. Hitler guessed Stalin's intentions and in 1941 suddenly and almost fatally struck the Soviet Union. In this critical situation, Stalin received free aid from the United States and Great Britain, which in volume and quality did not have a historical precedent. At the same time, the Soviet role in unleashing World War II was quickly and thoroughly forgotten. In the final count, Poland, for whose freedom the Western European states had entered World War II, did not gain its freedom, but was given, along with all of Central Europe and part of Germany, into Stalin's control.

It is customary to consider Britain and France among the victors. However, this is clearly a mistake. The purpose for which Great Britain and France entered World War II was ensuring Poland's independence. This aim was not achieved as a result of the war; therefore, there is no cause to celebrate victory. As a final result of the Moscow pact, Hitler committed suicide and Stalin became the unbound Red ruler of a huge anti-Western empire, created with the West's help. At the same time, Stalin managed to keep his reputation of a naïve, trustful simpleton, and Hitler entered history as a duplicitous villain. It is accepted that Stalin was not ready for war, but Hitler was ready. But the one who wins the war is the one who prepares for war by dividing his enemies and making them fight each other, not the one who makes loud pronouncements.

Contents of the Pact

The Government of the German Reich and The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April, 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following Agreement:

Article I. Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other Powers.

Article II. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third Power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third Power.

Article III. The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article IV. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of Powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

Article V. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts ex-

clusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

Article VI. The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not advance it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

Article VII. The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Secret Additional Protocol.

Article I. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.

Article II. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish States and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

Article III. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

Article IV. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich v. Ribbentrop

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R. V. Molotov

The not so secret Protocol

While the public was immediately informed about the official non-aggression part of the pact, the Secret Additional Protocol was also not as secret as some might believe. Charles Bohlen, who was the US Diplomat to the USSR in Moscow before and during World War 2, presented in his book "Witness to History: 1929-1969" the information that on the morning of August 24, 1939, he visited Hans von Herwarth (German Diplomat who was opposed to the Nazis) and received the full content of the secret protocol to

the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed only the day before. From the Memories of Hans von Herwarth, from the Book "German-Soviet relations 1939-1941 by Slawomir Debski" and from the book "Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow by Dennis J. Dunn", one also learns that the secret protocol was known to the US government as early as 24 August 1939. It was passed to US diplomat Charles Bohlen by Hans von Herwarth, a German diplomat. The US ambassador in Moscow Laurence Steinhardt passed that information to US secretary of state Cordell Hull on the same day. Hull immediately informed British minister of foreign affairs Edward Halifax, who in turn informed the French. But the French already learned about the secret protocol from another source on 25 August 1939 through the contacts of their embassy in Berlin. There is also evidence that the news was immediately known to Italians, Estonians and Latvians.

The Poles didn't know about the secret protocol and so they didn't expect the Soviet invasion of 17 September 1939. The fact that the British didn't pass that information to their Polish allies is a direct betrayal of Article 5 of the British-Polish alliance agreement from 25 August 1939:

"Contracting Parties ... will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation."

Would have Poland known the secret pact, they would have been forced into negotiations with Germany, which were the hopes of Hitler and which would have prevented the war. The information about the secret pact were leaked to the Allies through various channels on purpose but could not be relayed to Poland directly because they refused to talk at this point with the German government. German-Polish relations had to be mediated through British officials.

If one considers the information already presented in this book so far, how the US and Britain gave massive assurances of support to Poland, and how Poland was not informed about the secret pact (they had 1 week to deliver the information), one might get to the conclusion that Poland was led to the slaughterhouse on purpose.

11.16 The Foreign Policy of the Great Powers on the Eve of War

Great Britain

Winston Churchill describes to us in his memoirs with rare frankness the basic principles of British foreign policy before the Second World War. According to these, from the outset one thing is for certain for any Englishman and that is that any European Great Power – no matter at what moment in time or under what circumstances or in what system of government – was going to be "aggressive" and ruled over by "tyrants" as soon as it had

attained a certain degree of strength and internal stability. Upon these premises a “policy rule” is constructed, and Britain’s foreign policy is always conducted in conformity with it, thereby not only “guaranteeing” perpetual disagreement within Europe, but she has also been using it for administering justice among the nations. Yes indeed, Churchill even admitted that for him – and thus for British policy – there was no difference between the “Hitler regime” and the various other forms of government encountered in European history. This leading Englishman thus acknowledges that his own “crusader” role was devoid of any legal foundation and not bound to any ethical values. Over and above that he admits that the British foreign policy had, for the past 400 years, not been orientated towards rights and justice, nor humanitarian sentiments or international understanding, but was rather geared to an autocratic “principle”, whereby all other states would be declared, according to demand, tyrannical, aggressive and criminal. Churchill writes:

“For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent... Faced by Philip II of Spain, against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against William II of Germany, we joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led... Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it is Spain, or the French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German Empire, or the Hitler regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations, it is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. Therefore we should not be afraid of being accused of being pro-French or anti-German. If the circumstances were reversed, we could equally be pro-German and anti- French...”

No British historian, no British government has ever denied these observations made by Churchill. On the contrary! Lord Halifax, in his speech on 30 June 1939 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs expressed himself in a similar sense.²⁾ Exactly the same is said in the memorandum that the US State Department presented to President Truman before the start of the Potsdam conference (July 1945) in order to inform him about the British tradition of the “policy of balance”. Lord Vansittart, for many years the highest civil servant in the Foreign Office and later Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the government, also confirms:

“If such a domination [of a continental power] were established we should be confronted with a position which we have for centuries endeavoured to prevent with the instinctive knowledge that any lasting hegemony in Europe must of necessity reduce this country [Britain] to a second-class power.”

Churchill’s statement demonstrates to the world that also in the Second World War ethical principles such as “protection of the small nations”, “international justice”, the “struggle for freedom and democracy”, “safeguards against tyrants” were nothing but propaganda slogans for Britain. It is grotesque for a country such as Britain that in 1939 still had at her disposal 40 million square kilometres, was ruling over a large number of foreign nations

and, moreover, was claiming the ocean for herself, that she should pose as “defender of the rights of small nations” and of the “free world”. It is no less grotesque that these British politicians should accuse a nation that had only 600,000 square kilometres to call her own, that is to say 1.5 per cent of that of the British landholding, of “striving for world domination” – and, furthermore, that they were believed!

Even on the occasion, when Churchill becomes still more explicit and calls the Second World War a “British war” (with this line of reasoning, as used on the BBC, London, he refused the peace negotiation proposals from the Belgian King and from the Queen of the Netherlands made after the campaign of Poland in 1939) and declares as its aim the “annihilation of Germany”.

Even a diplomat from Churchill’s own Conservative Party admitted:

“To the world at large, Churchill appeared to be the very embodiment of a policy of war. To have brought him into the Government when the balance between peace and war was still quivering, might have definitively tilted the scales on the side of war.”

A pretext for justifying their antagonistic attitude has always been found in British politics. The Versailles diktat had put a noose around the neck of the Weimar Republic and had plunged the German nation into strife and economic chaos, although they had willingly made the democratic form of government their own. The liberal constitution did not offer even the smallest hint of clemency and consideration. But when this gave way to dictatorship, that change served as the pretext for a new war. In the words of the Englishman, William H. Dawson:

“The fact that there was in 1933 a completely different Germany from what her enemies had planned, can be explained in that the Allies had done their utmost to weaken and destroy Germany – physically by dismembering her, financially with the reparations, in her reputation with misrepresentations and defamation, in her spirit with a heap of insults and humiliations of every conceivable means. . . . Therefore, in view of the misery that the Weimar Republic had to suffer from 1919 to 1932, researchers arrived at the conclusion that it was a miracle to have survived those years of distress and disgrace.”

When the Germans could see a way out of this chaos, National Socialism simply had to be made into the “villain”, from this time onward, so that again the treatment of the Germans as inferior beings and outcasts could be justified. Once again British, French and American politicians and newspaper publishers, in conjunction with the Soviets, got worked up over the “eternal trouble-maker”. They put the responsibility for the looming war unto the German government “should they continue rearming”, even at a time when Germany, in contrast to her neighbours, was totally defenceless.⁷) They were the ones who, with an enormous outpouring of propaganda, got to work on classifying the nations into good ones and bad ones, into peace-loving and aggressive systems of government and, by means of alleged secret information, were feigning an “imminent danger” that was threatening different countries. The British Foreign Secretary Eden was already quite blunt during a talk with the Polish Marshal Pilsudski in the year 1935 by asking him:

“Do you think, Monsieur le Maréchal, we should remain on our little island?”

Similarly the highest civil servant in the Foreign Office, Vansittart, in the year 1933:

“If Hitler fails, his successor will be Bolshevism [power-political depreciation of the German area]; if he succeeds, he will have a European War in five years.”

At the same time, that is to say in the year 1933, this same Vansittart had already drawn up a memorandum that had but one purpose: Germaniam esse delendam (Germany must be destroyed).

This man had for years held the highest civil servant position in the Foreign Office, and also in the Chamberlain government he continued exercising his influence, in spite of the fact that Chamberlain removed him from his post in 1938 and tried to put him on ice with the appointment of Chief Diplomatic Advisor of the British government. While the German unity was objectionable to these people anyway, so the power that was becoming more and more noticeable in the regeneration of Germany, eventually had to serve once again as the pretext for interfering on the grounds that it was disturbing the “balance of power”. This, despite the fact the Reich at this time – in contrast to the period before the First World War – had not participated in the armament race, and Germany’s foreign trade was not about to create havoc on the world market. Yet Germany had become too powerful for their liking, although they had managed to create an armaments lead of several years and to put a cordon of alliances, formed by the victorious nations, around the vanquished one. The British Defence Committee – and this is characteristic – had already decided as early as the spring of 1934, at a time when it was a verifiable fact that Germany did not have the military might on a par with Great Britain and was not making any territorial demands, that the “ultimate potential enemy” in a general war would be Germany. Countless prominent personalities in Britain, France and the United States explained their anti-German attitude with the mere fact of a Germany having become too powerful.

Foreign Secretary Eden declared in 1943, at a farewell breakfast for Soviet Ambassador Maisky, who was leaving London to take up the post as Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Moscow:

“During the last century and a half England and Russia have always been in the same camp when any serious crisis arose in Europe. That is what happened in the time of Napoleon, it was the same in the years of the First World War and it has happened now in the days of the Second World War. What is the explanation? It is that Britain and Russia are two great and powerful States at opposite ends of Europe who cannot reconcile themselves to the creation in Europe of the unquestioned domination of any third power. Such an excessively powerful third State becomes a menace both to Britain and to Russia – and as a result they unite against it and ultimately bring about its downfall.”

Even when among his friends, Mr. Eden was not in the habit of dwelling on the particularly abysmal depravity of National Socialism in comparison with other forms of government

and different epochs in Europe. He too held the view of his Prime Minister that there was “no difference between Philip II of Spain, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler”. What alone was crucial was the “Balance of Power in Europe”! Winston Churchill, who “after a brilliant political career had been exchanging a long list of ministerial seats up to the highest that the British governmental hierarchy has to allocate, that of Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-1929)”, told the Soviet Ambassador in London, Maisky, at the end of July 1934:

“‘The British Empire’, said Churchill, ‘is my be-all and end-all. What is good for the British Empire is good for me too; what is bad for the British Empire is bad for me. . . . In 1919 I considered that the greatest danger to the British Empire was your country, and therefore I was an enemy of your country. Now I consider that the greatest danger for the British Empire is Germany, and therefore now I am an enemy of Germany. At the same time I consider that Hitler is making ready to expand not only against us but also to the east, against you. Why should we not join forces to combat our common enemy? I have been an adversary of Communism, and remain its adversary, but for the sake of the integrity of the British Empire I am ready to co-operate with the Soviets.’”

This distrust of Germany did not only apply to German might as a political factor, but equally to her economic potential and to her intellectual prowess. Already in the year 1919 “The Times” had written:

“If Germany were to start trading within the next 50 years, then we would have fought this war [First World War] for nothing... It is in the envies, greeds and fears of men that the roots of war are to be found.”

The British historian and General, J.F.C. Fuller, said in retrospect that it was not Hitler’s political teachings that provoked the war; the cause, this time, was his successful endeavour to construct a changed economy. On 18 January 1945 and again in Fulton after the war, in March 1946, in the presence of President Truman, Churchill said:

“It was [the Second World War] also about the acquisition of the German markets.”

The simple fact that a great and competent people had found themselves again was to be used as an exaggerated propaganda slogan of “excessive encroachments” (at the beginning of 1937!) by utilizing the rumours that the selfsame London central office was circulating throughout the world. The aim was obvious: the forming of an alliance system for smashing Germany to pieces. American General Robert E. Wood stated at a Senate committee that Churchill had said to him in November 1936:

“Germany is getting too strong, and we must smash her.”

Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, opened the Commons debate on the outcome of the Munich conference on 3 October 1938:

“He insisted that she [Great Britain] would have been fighting for the balance of power, which was precious to some British hearts. He believed that it was his mission and that of his country to prevent Germany from achieving a dominant position on the continent.”

The following day, Halifax was meeting his Prime Minister returning from Munich at London Airport. While accompanying him back to the City, Halifax recommended that he should take this man – Churchill – back into the Cabinet, along with some particularly belligerent officials from the Labour Party, as well as Eden, the former Foreign Secretary, who had resigned in February 1938 because of the course of appeasement.³¹) The manner in which Churchill intended to solve the “German problem” was well known in London. If this man could state to the press adviser at the German embassy, Fritz Hesse,

“If a mad dog is about to attack me, I shall shoot it down before it can bite me,”

– he would have expressed himself in an even blunter way to his colleagues. One of these, Lord Vansittart, did not consider it any the less moral to be saying:

“But my dear Hesse, you will not be able to prevent a war between Germany and Britain. You see, Mr. Hitler wants to make Germany the supreme power in Europe (what it was before WW1, not world conquest), and I believe that my information about this is correct. You understand that we cannot allow this to happen.”

Winston Churchill never did agree with German “equality of armaments” and – as he was to admit, at least later, in all openness – had been recommending to permanently “prevent the re-armament of Germany” . When he was travelling all over in 1936, trying to get all the countries of the League of Nations into “ganging up” against Germany, these travels were, at that time, not as successful as he would have wished. Although of similar mind, most of the Versailles politicians, moreover, did not want to grant Germany after 1933 the principles of equal rights and the right to self-determination, just as it had also been refused when it was the Weimar Republic. It had to be made clear to the German nation that the fighting of the Allies – ostensibly against the German Monarchy – was directed against the German Nation as such, despite initial assurances to the contrary. The victors of Versailles wanted to uphold by force – irrespective of the historical research findings to the contrary – the theory of it being exclusively a German war guilt, in order to support their systems of reorganization from 1919. Winston Churchill was announcing still in 1933 that Germany alone had been responsible for the war and that the Versailles Treaty was just. He never renounced this fundamental basis of his agitation throughout his life; rather he went beyond his thesis in hysterical fashion as the later War Premier, in that he spoke in February 1944 of a “Thirty-Years’ War fighting German aggression starting in 1914”. Churchill waged war – with weaponry or with words – on the German Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. But at the same time he was speaking of peace, justice and equality amongst the nations and of an unselfish and peaceloving Britain that would protect the small nations.

Important party followers of the Churchillian “European politics” had positions in the Foreign Office, the Civil Service and were at the helm in the media. They too belonged to that “minority” in Britain who, from 1935,

“were determined to crush Germany by means of another war, and considered it not only morally justified but also the only correct policy! I was especially astonished at the

time that even some Americans – whose names I have forgotten, but among them was also the Ambassador – supported this view fervently.”

So it is hardly surprising to find that Lord Halifax was already early on working along lines exactly in accordance with this “Politics of the Balance of Power”. Already in August/September 1938 he was interfering in the German-Polish relations with his promise to Foreign Minister Beck that Great Britain would support Poland at Danzig “as much as possible” – at a time, then, when Hitler had not as yet taken into consideration talks with Poland about that matter. Halifax made that pledge to the Poles, although he himself liked to describe the Danzig solution, produced at Versailles, as “an absurdity” , and despite the fact of being informed by his Ambassador in Warsaw to the effect that

“It is fairly clear that it is only a question of time before Danzig becomes wholly German and that M. Beck would have great difficulty in inducing the Polish people to swallow this without some quid pro quo.”

A Czech historian put these matters into the following words:

“The German documents reveal that Hitler derived special encouragement from Lord Halifax’s visit in November 1937. Lord Halifax was then Lord President of the Council, ranking second in the Cabinet to the Prime Minister. According to the document recording the interview, he gave Hitler to understand that Britain would allow him a free hand in Eastern Europe. Halifax may not have meant as much, but that was the impression he conveyed – and it proved of crucial importance. Then, in February 1938, Mr. Eden was driven to resign as Foreign Minister after repeated disagreements with Chamberlain, and Halifax was appointed to succeed him at the Foreign Office. A few days later, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, called on Hitler for a confidential talk – in continuation of Halifax’s November conversation – and conveyed to him that the British government was much in sympathy with his desire for ‘changes in Europe’ to Germany’s benefit. As the documents show, these events precipitated Hitler’s action.”

An Englishman:

“At the Munich conference Chamberlain was fully aware that his Foreign Secretary, Halifax, and Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty and Member of Parliament, had encouraged the Poles in the summer of 1938 to adopt in Danzig a confrontational attitude towards Germany, in spite of the fact that Halifax had convinced the German leadership during his visit to Germany in 1937 that Great Britain considered the return of Danzig to the Reich as right and proper. The British Prime Minister knew perfectly that this deceitful policy, practised by his own ministers, would very quickly lead Europe into another war, but he lacked the courage to discuss this situation with Hitler.”

During the period following the Anschluss of Austria, Hitler was again encouraged by Great Britain. This time he was “to make demands” on Czecho-Slovakia, which “took him by surprise”.⁴⁶⁾ The same course of events was repeated during the Sudeten crisis, which was not even of Hitler’s making. From then on Hitler was portrayed by the Anglo-

American world press as the “culprit”, the “aggressor” and “imperialist”, and a coalition of powers was subsequently formed against him.

It was in this fashion that the “Policy of the Balance of Power” was pursued; an approach against which Henderson was to caution his Foreign Minister on 18 July 1939 most urgently, albeit without success. Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister at the time, had originally wanted peace, even if it was only for the reason of gaining more time to facilitate a more extensive rearmament programme. But the peace and friendship declaration on 30 September 1938 in Munich was his last independent foreign policy act. Any subsequent important decisions, whilst they all bear his signature, were taken against his will, prompted by the urgings of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, some highly-placed senior officials at the Foreign Office, a considerable number of Members of Parliament from the Conservative Party, but, above all, also from the Labour Party, from the influential shapers of public opinion – and President Roosevelt. After the Munich conference, there gained acceptance in Britain the demand “to restore the European equilibrium, unbalanced by Munich”.⁴⁸) That the starting point of meddling in foreign affairs on the basis of a “complete about-turn to a readiness for war” was not solely to be found in London became evident, after Chamberlain had made his outrageous claim that “America and the world Jews had forced England into the war.”

Anybody who is familiar with this earlier history cannot fail but reach the conclusion that the British decision in the spring of 1939 to refuse the people of Danzig – to say nothing of West Prussia – the right to self-determination and then do everything that was bound to aggravate German-Polish tensions, was neither based on ethical principles nor on a preference for the status quo. Great Britain tolerated, yes, even supported, unreservedly in 1939 the activities of Polish chauvinism, designed to change the status quo, the Great Power aspirations at the expense of Germany, but also the Soviet expansion at the expense of Poland and the Baltic States. Naturally, no legal maxims were required when it came to the “westwardly moving of the Polish frontier”. One did not even try to keep up the pretence that all this was done for the sake of the dear Poles. Winston Churchill at the Yalta conference in February 1945:

“As for the river Neisse ... in previous talks I had always qualified the moving of the Polish frontier westwards by saying that the Poles should be free to take territory in the west, but not more than they wished or could properly manage. It would be a great pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it died of indigestion.”

Britain’s Policy on Germany from “Munich” to 15 March 1939

British politics after the Munich conference was determined to devalue the declaration of peace and friendship signed by Chamberlain and Hitler on 30 September 1938 and – to say the very least – to form anew those alliance agreements of France (and thus of Britain) in Eastern Europe that had been created by the Versailles settlement, though having become rather uncertain since then. The means, as used by London for this,

were extremely questionable. The domestic and foreign policies, the mass media and the economy were now geared to a warlike development instead of being orientated towards peace and friendship. "The City is itching for war" – that is how a French historian in the year 1958 defined the situation at that time in London. Churchill admitted that from October 1938 onwards he had been determined "to come to blows with Hitler", and he was most definitely not only speaking for himself.

The parliamentary debates from the 3 to the 5 October 1938 on the Munich conference, in their lengthy and extensive polemics, highlighted the following developments:

- a) The Cabinet that in mid-September had decided that the Sudetenland be returned to Germany, no longer stood by its decision unequivocally;
- b) these debates confirmed the press in their conviction that it was open season on Germany;
- c) Chamberlain did not confront the agitators, who were unrestrained in their attacks on the Munich agreement and – as, for example, Churchill – would describe the Chancellor of the Reich as "highwayman" and "gangster" and the Munich agreement as "German extortion". But, little by little, he went along the same line, and he strengthened the position of his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, who had also suddenly threatened with his resignation with reference to the Munich settlement, in a way so that gradually sole responsibility for British foreign policy was passed to Halifax.
- d) Chamberlain announced – under the pretext of the "German danger" – the hitherto biggest rearmament programme;
- e) the policy of the "inevitability of war" was launched energetically by means of every media outlet widely spreading fictitious alarming reports, by coalition arrangements with other powers, by encouraging an uncompromising stance towards Germany, by repeating inflammatory slogans (Germany = "aggressor nation") and by the deliberate withholding from the general public the German endeavours for peace;
- f) the pressure on France to set the French defences in order became stronger, whereby "pressure" is to be understood to mean, at the very least, the unremitting zeal of the British government in suggesting to the French ally the need for a greatly increased rearmament;
- g) the preparation for a national auxiliary service and the public promotion of the preliminary groundwork, making ready for the introduction of universal conscription, was vastly speeded up.

"Chamberlain's policy was also attacked by leading Conservatives in Parliament, such as Eden and Churchill, with phrases which clearly revealed that they also would have preferred war to the Munich Declaration. But it was the leaders of the Labour Party that formed the most united pro-war group. . . Chamberlain received a vote of confidence, albeit with a relatively small majority. The Liberal and Labour members all voted against Chamberlain, and at least half of the more prominent Conservatives pointedly refrained

from voting for Chamberlain and his policy.”

On 17 November 1938, Winston Churchill made a long speech recommending the setting up of a Ministry of Supply. On 30 November 1938, the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, R.S. Hudson, was emphasizing in the House of Commons, for no apparent reason, the threat of commercial competition from Germany and the supposed need for economic and political countermeasures. On 4 December 1938, the British Minister of Education stated that in Britain the opinion was growing that a conclusive agreement with Germany could no longer be reached.

On 7 December 1938, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, M. McDonald, gave a brusque rebuff to Germany in his speech on the question of colonies, without this having been raised by Berlin. On 16 December 1938, the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, reported to his Minister for Foreign Affairs on the “phraseology with which public opinion is regularly fed here”:

“The situation after Munich is described here as one which is neither peace nor war. Prime Minister Chamberlain’s statement that a new era has begun which will ensure ‘peace in our time’ is seen by all as an illusion which will quickly vanish when confronted with reality.”

On 11 January 1939, Chamberlain and Halifax with an advisory staff of six civil servants flew to Rome, in order to intimidate Italy and to make known the discord between Germany and Poland, but also with the USSR. During the months of December 1938 and January 1939, Lord Halifax and other British public figures reinforced President Roosevelt’s stance with a number of false alarmist reports and a flood of corresponding articles in the press: Hitler was planning to establish an independent Ukraine (“this information came from Western Europe”); he intended to destroy the Western Powers in a surprise attack, before turning to the East; he might seek to push Italy into war in the Mediterranean to find an excuse to fight; he was amassing German troops near the Czecho-Slovak border; Germany was facing an economic and financial crisis, which forced Hitler to use aggressive measures; “Hitler’s mental condition, his insensate rage against Great Britain (this is the most obvious of the lies, Hitler always expressed he wished peaceful coexistence with Britain) and his megalomania” are seen as a direct hazard. London, in the meantime, also felt encouraged by the much increased, since autumn 1938, contact-seeking endeavours of the secret German Opposition, who were nurturing hopes that a British show of strength or, rather, a “preventative war”, would trigger off a military putsch in the German Reich.

Another British initiative to be mentioned is the puzzling diplomatic game directed against Germany, arising from the “fear, Poland might choose the German side” and, thereby, break the ring of encirclement. By discussing British “fears” about an agreement or even an alliance between Poland and Germany, the historians hereby admit themselves, albeit unintentionally, that Germany had not been threatening her Eastern neighbour but, on the contrary, was seeking co-operation with Poland. Lord Halifax admitted to

his Ambassador in Paris on 1 November 1938:

“... Poland ... can presumably only fall more and more into the German orbit.”

On 6 February 1939, Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that Great Britain, in the event of “the vital interests” of France being threatened, would unconditionally back France militarily, and that French Foreign Minister Bonnet had already given an identical assurance to London. This reciprocal promise referred specifically to the “eventuality of a war” and not to “an attack by Germany”. Already in this alliance – as indeed later in the guarantee to Poland – “the question of the aggressor was ignored”! Great Britain entered this far-reaching and unconditional commitment despite the fact that France, because of her many alliance obligations (for example towards Poland, the USSR, Czecho-Slovakia), was likely to be dragged into every conceivable European trouble spot.

After Neville Chamberlain had already attended a reception at the Soviet embassy on 1 March 1939, the Prime Minister again paid the Soviet Ambassador a visit on 9 March 1939 – for a Prime Minister a most unusual attitude! – and with that was expressing, according to Churchill’s statement,

“... the new interest which Great Britain is taking in the possibilities of increased trade and co-operation with Russia.”

In the Documents on British Foreign Policy there is the evidence that, besides Chamberlain, the Secretary of the Overseas Trade Department, Mr. Hudson, had also on the same 9 March tried to press a British credit on the Soviet Union in a way that Maisky had become very concerned and worried at this and could only explain this move from some hidden, political motives. Britain’s effort to enlist the Soviet Union against Germany is thereby already established at a time, when there was not even a pretext available. The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia was six days later! Chamberlain wrote in October 1939, looking back over his time in office, he did not believe

“that it was possible for me to do more than I did to prepare the country for war after Munich.”

Even if this later vindictory remark from Chamberlain might have been perhaps exaggerated, it really bears witness to the pressure that was exerted on the Prime Minister from his own ranks during those months. All these measures reflect the British drive after the Declaration, signed by Hitler, of Peace and Friendship – at a time, when Hitler was indisputably abiding by this declaration. The British government could not rightfully seek to justify itself by claiming that this course had become necessary within the context of European peace and of European security, as it signified really an obvious break with the principles of peaceable conduct as agreed on with Germany. It had to be obvious to any reasonable person that with the British action the fires of war were being fanned. Winston Churchill declared on 10 March 1939 to Bernard Baruch, Roosevelt’s chief advisor, who was not without knowledge of the internal situation within the British leadership:

“War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you [the United States] will be in it.”

The British government was aware that Germany was not looking for a fight with Britain, and that she was also making efforts towards peace and friendship with regard to other countries.

Clean Slate to Poland on 31 March 1939

Mid-March 1939 onwards, the British government had begun to clearly outline their policy of intervention on the Continent and to increase, without any regard to the legal position, the likelihood of an outbreak of war, if not making war altogether unavoidable. Lord Halifax put Poland into a state of alarm, and he suggested to change the Polish-Rumanian Alliance, which was directed against the Soviet Union, into an anti-German pact. Actually, neither Poland nor Rumania was prepared for such a change,¹) yet, all the same, Warsaw was again being instructed herewith that Britain was resolved to do battle against Germany, and that Poland could be certain of the unconditional assistance from London. Identical assurance had already come in from the United States, anyway. The British and French "fears", which had surfaced on the occasion of Ribbentrop's amicable meeting in Warsaw at the end of January 1939, but previously in evidence in November 1938 with regard to a possible German-Polish arrangement over Danzig³), were finally checked with the perception that had already been indicated on 15 November 1938 by Kennard:

"Such a policy (that Poland would have eventually come in on the German side [wrote Kennard]), would have been so unpopular in Poland that I do not think it could have been carried out so long as there were a good chance of the Western Powers' defeating Germany. I believe that Poland would have remained neutral as long as possible but that, when it became clear that Germany was losing, public opinion would have forced the Government to join the Western Powers unless some previous action of Soviet Russia had compelled Poland to commit herself to repelling the advance of Bolshevik troops through Polish territory."

At a time, when the French Foreign Minister "had gained the impression that in the view of the Polish government, there was no imminent danger of an attack by Germany upon Rumania, by Hungary upon Rumania or by Germany upon Hungary,"

Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Bonnet tried on 22 March 1939 "to secure her [Poland's] participation in the organization which we were trying to build up for the defence of Rumania." Chamberlain stated at this London conference:

"The object in view was to prevent the expansion of Germanism. In order to do this, Germany must be made to feel that she would meet with resistance in the east. If Poland and Rumania gave the impression that they were not favourable to any scheme for the organization of defence against Germany, it would be impossible to produce such an impression on Germany."

The Soviet Union was to be integrated into this system afterwards. Both Chamberlain and

Bonnet agreed that neither Rumania nor Poland felt themselves threatened, that these two countries did not see any indications of an "expanding Germanism", and that both countries (apart from the tiresome minority question in Poland) were living in perfectly peaceable relations with Germany. But at the same time Chamberlain and Bonnet were also in full agreement that one only needed to make these countries aware of this "threat" with enough persistence, over and over, to have them eventually do what Paris and, principally, London, wanted. As neither the Tielea lie nor the many rumours had made any impression up to now, when even the establishment of the Protectorate over Bohemia-Moravia by Hitler failed to produce the slightest change in the Polish and Rumanian policies, London now felt obliged to state things somewhat more plainly.

"M. Bonnet agreed with this conclusion, and thought that something might be done on these lines. He had gained the impression that the Poles did not like vague obligations, but, if something precise could be put before them, they would probably accept."

On the same day that this discussion in London was taking place, with Chamberlain and Bonnet agreeing to "try this new tactic", the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Kennard, sent a telegram to the Foreign Secretary:

"Mr Beck would clearly not achieve one of our objects, namely to give public warning to Herr Hitler. But publication with Poland's consent might be possible after Poland had been assured in secret discussion that effective and immediate steps to resist German aggression were contemplated by Western Powers. Difficulty about Danzig is that it is not in itself a good *casus belli* and while Mr Beck would be glad to know (though he could not admit it) that he was not without backing in the event of negotiations with Germany taking a nasty turn, yet he is naturally thinking more of what he can get than what he can give in the way of collective security; the occupation of Memel has brought him a step nearer to our ideas and his offer of secret discussions should not, I feel, be rejected out of hand but used to complete his conversion."

Still on that same 22 March, there arrived information in London, parallel to the Kennard dispatch, that Beck felt himself obliged "to lean more towards Germany" and would not "greatly care for a British declaration of aid" against the Reich.⁶) Yet even this did not induce the British government to abandon their plan. In the meantime, the American Ambassador extraordinary in Paris was particularly busy. On 23 March 1939, Bullit urged President Roosevelt "that 'some nations in Europe' should stand up to Germany quickly"

On 24 March 1939, the British government was informed by the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia, Prince Paul,

"that the Polish Government will in no circumstances commit themselves in advance to fight against Germany in hypothetical circumstances."

Not only did the Polish, British and French governments have no grounds whatsoever for claiming that Germany was threatening Poland, but the secret dispatches of British military experts suggested, on the contrary,

“that purely from the military aspect the present moment was the best to go to war.”

In these actual words, the British Air Attaché, J.L. Vachell, informed the Foreign Office via the British embassy in Berlin on 6 April 1939:

“As you know I returned last evening from a brief visit to Poland, during which I had an opportunity to discuss the situation with a number of different people in Warsaw, and on my way back paid a visit to Danzig, where, owing to the kindness of Mr Sheppard, our Consul-General, I was able to get an insight into the local situation. During my stay in Warsaw the Ambassador showed me a dispatch which he had received from Berlin which expressed the opinion that, from the army point of view, the present was a most favourable opportunity for a preventive war to be undertaken against further German ambitions, and that it would even be to our advantage to provoke such a war.”

That strategic points of views such as these were not just a consequence, but rather the basis, of the British guarantee to Poland is revealed conclusively in the British documents.

Thus did Neville Chamberlain hand over, on the 31 March 1939, unconditionally, without having been beseeched or pushed, without any need, the decision making for the deployment of the might of the British Empire, with all the consequences, to the Polish government, indeed, even to subordinate Polish representatives. This fullness of power was conferred in a manner that “ignored the question of the aggressor”. Chamberlain gave this clean slate to a country, which

- a) had clearly demonstrated, by their partial mobilization of only a few days previously and by the lack of restraint shown by their populace towards the German Reich and the German Minority groups, their lust for war;
- b) by no means could be ranked among the close allies of Britain, but was formerly and still in the year of 1938 regarded by the British government with much scepticism and had been judged as unreliable (Sudeten crisis);
- c) had since 1918 continually and absolutely, in the Minorities question as in her foreign policy attitude, disregarded the principles of the League of Nations and who had, during the years of 1938/1939 as well, never given any indication to the world at large of a new direction for reconciliation with her Minority groups and her neighbours;
- d) had, ever since 1919, been proclaiming her expansionist aims and had been striving for them;
- e) had a dictatorial government;
- f) could not be at all protected by Britain;
- g) was not threatened by Germany.

“This binding by Britain to every Polish action, of whatever nature, represents a unique event in the annals of diplomacy.”

The British government extended the blank cheque in a unilateral commitment against Germany, while ignoring the dangers for Poland looming from the USSR,

which were known to every Western politician, as the many diplomatic communications of the pre-war period verify. The awareness of these dangers was fundamental knowledge for every European politician. However, the British guarantee was not in respect to the Polish-German national frontier, but was taken up rather for the permanent fixing of the territories in West Prussia and Eastern Upper Silesia that had been stolen by Poland in 1918 from Germany, as well as for retaining the unacceptable special status of Danzig. That no rights were guaranteed here, and that subsequently it was a working against peace, is plainly evident. This "spontaneous act" even surprised the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski:

"It is not certain who was responsible, but probably it was Halifax. In particular, I do not know how the British government learnt that the situation was ripe for such a guarantee. At all events it was not we who told them."

The British guarantee statement was not even made known beforehand to the Polish Ambassador, despite the fact that on 30 March 1939 he had been in extensive talks with Lord Halifax. Possibly this is to be attributed to the fact that Raczynski was refusing to acknowledge that Poland was threatened by Germany, since Raczynski had affirmed again during these talks that such a danger was non-existent. But this was not exactly news for Lord Halifax; he had sufficient proof to hand of Hitler's desire for an understanding with Poland. The French government, as well, did not, "apprehend any imminent coup against Poland". On the day of the guarantee announcement, Chamberlain emphasized what Lord Halifax on 3 April, shortly before the arrival in London of the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck, was reiterating in the House of Lords:

"His Majesty's Government have no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack and they must not, therefore, be taken as accepting them as true."

These plain facts did not, however, prevent Lord Halifax from informing, with deceitful intent, the world at large – as in the following case telling the Rumanian government

". . . that we [the British government] have been led to take this interim action regarding Poland alone in view of the information in our possession, which seems to indicate the possibility of immediate action against that country."

The motives that were underlying the guarantee when conferred by the British government can both be derived from the verifiable fact that London was not worried about any German aggressive intentions and also from the fact that Halifax, despite the available reassuring news, informed the world of "German aggressive intentions". After all, the motives can also be deduced from the text of the guarantee itself. Prime Minister Chamberlain said in the already mentioned speech of 31 March 1939:

"Any change in the legal facts of the case between Poland and Germany, or rather Danzig, will unleash a war from Britain against Germany, if, according to the views of the Poles, a restriction of their rights should be present."

Great Britain "spontaneously" placed herself under the obligation to give military as-

sistance for war, should Poland describe an action as a “threat to her independence”, requiring a military “response”. Not facts, therefore, were the decisive factor for determining the likelihood of war, but rather random “grounds” that Poland might choose as pretext for a resolve for war. These included – as was to be demonstrated – also German negotiation proposals, even German offers of a compromise, though these were always rejected by the Polish side as being a “veil to cover our capitulation”.

In this connection it is to be emphasized that Ambassador Kennard, to whom a draft of the British guarantee had been forwarded for his observations, had expressly asked the British Foreign Secretary, with reference to the Polish war psychosis at that time, that the word “unprovoked” (in the event that “unprovoked” action were taken) be inserted into the intended guarantee.²⁵) Equally expressly, Lord Halifax refused this, as

“the German technique of aggression is so varied and so insidious that it might well be that Poland might in certain circumstances be driven in selfdefence to commit a technical act of provocation.”

Winston Churchill was the one who called the British guarantee to Poland in March 1939 a “milestone to disaster”, yet who, nevertheless, approved of this decision, was indeed “glad” about it, as he expressed himself at the Teheran conference in 1943 – without giving a thought to the foaming Polish chauvinism in the spring and summer of 1939. In particular, this is what the British wartime Premier wrote about the guarantee to Poland:

“History... may be scoured and ransacked to find a parallel to this sudden and complete reversal of five or six year’s policy of easy-going placatory appeasement, and its transformation almost overnight into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war on far worse conditions and on the greatest scale. Our guarantee to Poland [was]... milestones to disaster... Here was a decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground, which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people.”

Winston Churchill admits further that not only he himself, but also “every politician who understood the situation”, had been or should have been aware, at the time when the agreement was concluded, of the warlike explosive force of the guarantee to Poland:

“But no one who understood the situation could doubt that it [giving the British guarantee to Poland] meant in all human probability a major war in which we should be involved...”

This same Winston Churchill declared on 3 April 1939 in the House of Commons:

“Having begun this new policy there can be no turning back... To stop here with a guarantee to Poland would be to halt in No-man’s Land under fire of both trench lines and without the shelter of either... We must go forward now until a conclusion is reached. Having begun to create a Grand Alliance against aggression, we cannot afford to fail. We shall be in mortal danger if we fail ... It has become a matter of life or death.”

From this time on, Winston Churchill applied himself vigorously along these lines, that is

to say, along the lines of a hardening of positions and of finalizing an unconditional pact of alliance with the Soviet Union. The State Secretary and member of the resistance in the German Foreign Office, E. von Weizsäcker, writes:

“In a normal pact of alliance the partners agree to mutual military assistance in the event of an unprovoked attack by a third party. Whether such a case exists is naturally determined by the partner, who is asked to help. But here it was the opposite. Warsaw had it in their hands to drag the British Empire into war.”

Duff Cooper, the British Minister for Economic Warfare:

“Never before in history have we ever given the decision, on whether Great Britain was to interfere in a war or not, to another power. Now the decision rests with a handful of men, whose names – possibly with the exception of Colonel Beck – are completely unknown to our nation [as were their deeds which they were to commit in the year 1939 – author’s note]. Therefore these strangers can by tomorrow demand the outbreak of a European war.”

A Frenchman, Professor Henri Lebre, gives his opinion in 1958:

“History teaches that Poland and her leading personalities, whose megalomania was well known and whose courage or rather foolish boldness left no room for common sense, would be the last people that could be entrusted with such a responsibility, unless one wanted to hurtle towards a catastrophe.”

The British blank cheque – apart from the fact that it legalized the mistreatment of the German minority in Poland – also violated the wishes of the people of the German city of Danzig which, as is well known, was not under Polish sovereignty. Every attempt from the population of Danzig to free themselves from the bonds that were put on by Versailles and that were, in the years following, constantly pulled tighter by Poland (economic pressure, expanding the Polish sphere of authority), was now seen as the trigger for Britain’s decision for war. Every independent country is allowed to conclude alliances with whomever it wishes and for whatever issue; it is allowed to join any military, economic and political union it may consider necessary. But when, on the other hand, a “free” German city wants to reunite with Germany, not wishing any longer to be economically ruined by a foreign power and to let herself be conquered step by step, this then is seen as resulting in a British declaration of war against Germany!

A few days after the announcement of the guarantee, the Polish Foreign Minister travelled to London. After the talks held there from 4 to 6 April 1939, even Colonel Beck “was much surprised” about the way he was “worked on” and was made into the hero of the resistance against Germany. Beck disappointed the hopes of the British “with his usual great-power arrogance, . . . he was not likely to be moved by gentle promptings from Chamberlain and Halifax.” The British hopes, which Beck disappointed, and the promptings, which he resisted, were – just like the unfounded rumours of German troop movements towards the Polish frontier, which had been, similar to the “rumours of German movements”

from the "21 May 1938", on schedule and intentionspecific, circulated throughout the world – solely aimed at one thing: to leave Poland holding the baby. Beck had well noted these Foreign Office endeavours; he regarded the negotiations, according to the view of Joseph Potocki, Head of the Western Department at the Polish Foreign Ministry, as a means of intimidating the Germans "and was not interested in the precise terms of [the] agreement." To put it more aptly: He was not interested in the preconditions from London, which were considerably more extensive.

"He [Beck] 'had not noticed any signs of dangerous military action on the part of Germany'; 'no negotiations were proceeding' over Danzig; 'the German Government had never contested Polish rights in Danzig, and had recently confirmed them'; 'if he were to go by what the Germans themselves said, he would say that the gravest question was the colonial question'."

Neville Chamberlain acknowledged on 3 April 1939 in the House of Commons that he was trying to encircle Germany, albeit with defensive intentions. Just how "defensive" was this encirclement is revealed by casting a glance at the two countries invited by Britain for this purpose: Poland had been offering repeatedly since 1919 to strike at Germany from the East. In spite of that – or just because of that, Poland became an important piece in the British game. The Soviet Union had openly threatened all non-Communist states with destruction. In spite of that – or just because of that, Britain was trying to secure their military assistance against Germany.

The Extension of the Blank Cheque on 25 August 1939

After the failure of the British-French-Soviet military talks and the startling conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact – it was not an "alliance", such as the one the Western Powers had hoped to conclude! – an accumulation of circumstances happened in Europe, which none of the parties had foreseen. How did the leading British politicians, Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, view this new situation, and how did they react? The American Ambassador in London, Kennedy, reported to his Secretary of State, Hull, on 23 August 1939, on his recent talk with the British Prime Minister, in which Chamberlain had said that there was nothing he could do in getting the Poles to make any concessions, and Kennedy had added these words:

"If the President [of the USA] is contemplating any action for peace it seems to me the place to work is on Beck in Poland, and to make this effective it must happen quickly. I see no other possibility."

Kennedy a few days later:

"Frankly he [Chamberlain] is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans. He feels there is a great body of public opinion in England, headed probably by Eden and Churchill, who will suggest to the Poles that they give up nothing and that they have Hitler on the run. This, of course, will mean war, but in the meantime

he is urging Henderson to keep telling Hitler that, after all, the Danzig situation is a small item and that what really needs to be done is to work out the whole European economic political problem.”

On 24 August Neville Chamberlain admitted in the House of Commons that he had not as yet tried to get a factual assessment of the German grievances about Poland's treatment of the minority Germans [Volksdeutschen].³) Having put herself in this position, it would have been vital for Great Britain to have made intensive efforts at objective mediation of disagreements and to curb all threats (mobilization, malicious press campaigns and suchlike). None of that happened. Neither did Chamberlain restrain the British press, having acknowledged that their course of action “of course, will mean war”, nor even made the attempt to restrain. On the contrary! On this memorable 24 August 1939, Chamberlain, for his part, did also deliberately give false information to the Members of Parliament in the House of Commons and, therefore, has once again leaked to the press inflammatory slogans, which “of course, will mean war”. He said in his speech:

“The international position has steadily deteriorated until today we find ourselves confronted with the imminent peril of war... The German press declared that Danzig could not be the subject of any conference or any compromise and that it must come back to the Reich at once and unconditionally... They [the German press] published circumstantial accounts of the alleged ill-treatment of Germans living in Poland. Now we have no means of checking the accuracy of those stories, but we cannot help being struck by the fact that they bear a strong resemblance to similar allegations that were made last year in respect of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia... But I think it will be agreed that, in face of this campaign [of the German press?] declarations by Polish statesmen have shown great calm and selfrestraint. The Polish leaders, while they have been firm in their determination to resist an attack upon their independence, have been unprovocative. They have always been ready, as I am sure they would be ready now, to discuss differences with the German Government, if they could be sure that those discussions would be carried on without threats of force or violence, and with some confidence that, if agreement were reached, its terms would be respected afterwards permanently, both in the letter and in the spirit... In Berlin the announcement [of a German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact] was hailed, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great diplomatic victory which removed any danger of war since we and France would no longer be likely to fulfill our obligations to Poland. We felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.”

“The steady deterioration of the international situation” during the past few months did not, however, induce Chamberlain to readjust British policy, rather he warned against such “dangerous illusions”. While Chamberlain was exclusively quoting the “German press” and equating it with “Berlin”, he concealed from the Members of Parliament the fact that up to this date Hitler had made no demand for an immediate “unconditional return of Danzig to the Reich” and, altogether, had shown “considerable calm and restraint”. Whereas Lord Halifax on 24 August 1939 in the House of Lords still made a crucial distinction between

the “aggressive Polish press” and the “attitude of the Polish government”, Chamberlain no longer recognized the difference between the German government and the German press, despite the fact that Poland had an equally authoritarian government and that the Polish press – even though from a different basic position than that in Germany – was strictly censored. Chamberlain was continuing along the same path when he informed the Members of Parliament in the House of Commons about military preparations in Germany but not, on the other hand, about those in Poland. It was untruthful to maintain that the Polish leaders had been unprovocative and had always been ready, “as they would be ready now”, “to discuss differences with the German government”. Certainly! Poland had been willing up to January 1939 to hold such discussions – that is, until the British government intervened, when they “feared that Poland might draw closer to Germany”.⁴) The obvious consequence of the unconditional guarantee, pushed upon the Poles and originally not even requested, was that from this time on Poland was no longer prepared “to discuss differences with the German government”! This connection was so obvious that Chamberlain, having had five months to study it thoroughly, must have been aware of it on 24 August. That Poland, by the end of March 1939, was refusing under threat of war all talks with the Reich government, must have been equally known to Chamberlain, as well as the fact that the German press reports from September 1938 about the ill-treatment of the Sudeten Germans were factually correct; this had long since been confirmed by Ambassador extraordinary Runciman.

Falsehoods were bound to lead to further aggravation of the international situation. This all the more, as in his speech Chamberlain had not even considered how one could, with the help of political or diplomatic efforts, “patch matters up” again. On the contrary, he claimed,

“...that the time had come when they [the government] must seek the approval of Parliament for further measures of defence.”

What did his Foreign Secretary do on this memorable 24 August 1939? Lord Halifax had given the Polish Ambassador to understand his clear determination for war in such a way that Raczynski, at that time, “was still terrified of such an attempt”. Halifax,

“did not doubt for a moment that any attempt to patch matters up had been out of the question since the conclusion of the German-Soviet agreement.”

His Prime Minister had conceded only just previously – without, however, taking up the opportunity – that in Berlin the German-Soviet agreement was hailed as a pact removing the danger of war, and that Britain had been asked to do her part for the avoidance of war. However, Halifax believed, according to the motto:

“My reason shows me no way out but war...”,

“that the Poles are not inclined to do this”, although “it was absolutely essential for the Poles to get in touch with the Germans... even if they were not ready to discuss Danzig, to start a discussion on minorities or some other subject”. In the same communication,

the American Ambassador stated more precisely:

“that England will definitely go to war if Poland starts to fight,”

but not, therefore, when Poland is being attacked!

By 25 August 1939, already months of steadily accumulating tension resulting from the attitude of the Poles had passed, and President Roosevelt had by now addressed an official note to Warsaw in these words:

“The President expresses the belief that, in the interest of public opinion in the United States, as well as public opinion in other parts of the world, it is in the highest degree important that history should not record, in the event that any military crisis results from the Danzig issue, that the first act of aggression of a military character was brought about by Poland.”

On 23 August Lord Halifax had learnt from the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, that Poland was not going to negotiate, that is to say, he [the Ambassador] “was very sceptical of the value of such action”, as long as “we were still engaged in the technique of the nerve war”, which might well continue for some little time yet.¹⁸) One day later he heard from Warsaw that the Polish government had taken “very serious military measures involving mobilization of practically two-thirds of the Polish army”.¹⁸) In spite of this alarming news, the British government extended on 25 August, on their own initiative, the guarantee to Poland to cases of “any action which threatened indirectly the independence” and “threatened the neutrality” of the countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – naturally only by Germany. A few days before, they had still been prepared to sell Poland, or rather Eastern Poland and, consequently, also the Baltic States, to the USSR; thus, it was not at all a genuine British concern to secure the independence or neutrality of these states. Therefore, also this passage in the extended Poland guarantee must be serving another purpose than the one professed. Furthermore, the Treaty carried the obligation not to conclude a separate armistice or peace – a clause that until now was only customary in treaties between warring parties.

Novel in this agreement of 25 August was the fact that Chamberlain and Halifax were promising Britain’s unconditional support also in the case of an “indirect threat” without, however, clarifying in the published text the precise meaning of this. In the supplementary Secret Protocol, however, Poland had it confirmed that this was directed at the “Free City” of Danzig.

“Hitler could not know of it, and assumed that Britain would not oppose the return of Danzig to Germany. Beck knew of it, and was able to refuse to discuss the future of Danzig with Germany, knowing that a German move to seize the Free City would be followed by British action in support of Poland. Beck knew that the Secret Protocol was precise and final: ‘The case contemplated by Article Two of the Agreement is that of the Free City of Danzig.’ Even an indirect threat to Danzig would bring the Treaty into operation.”

What has decisively contributed to this British desire for war were the suggestive hints from members of the German Resistance. Through the secret contacts, already established in the year 1934-35, among members from German Ministries (Goerdeler, Erich and Theo Kordt, State Secretary von Weizsäcker and others), who, for their part, had already been arranging conspiracy plans with officers from the Armed Forces and figures from the German Economy and Administration sphere and British politicians (Churchill, Vansittart, Halifax), was the British leadership reinforced in their belief that “firm language”, a determination for war and, at any rate, war itself would bring down the “Hitler-Regime” by a revolution from within Germany. It is also a contributory factor, in that Chamberlain, attacked by many circles in Britain and in the USA, believing himself to be facing the downfall of his premiership, considered the now opening possibility of an easy victory over Germany and went along with war. Only when looking at it from these viewpoints, could the Poles, too, become entrapped by the delusion that within a few days of the outbreak of war they would be marching into Berlin, and that the Soviet forces, because of the expected rapid German collapse, would not have enough time to cross the East Polish frontier. But, on the other hand, these illusions prove that one was aware in London, Washington and Warsaw, just how much the decision “war or peace” was in one’s own hands.

The Annihilation of Germany as a War Aim

Britain, the “protector of small nations”, had been trying, already from spring 1939 onwards, to coordinate with guarantees, false reports spreading alarm, probings and encouragements the resolve of the small nations, in a manner that was bound to increase the insecurity and dangers. Why did Paris and London, for the sake of joining in with Moscow, virtually offer the Baltic and East Poland as a prize to Stalin? Halifax did “fully appreciate the disadvantages and risks of allowing Soviet troops on Polish soil”.¹⁾ The unilateral declaration of war on Germany in the course of the Poland campaign, which had already been decided on in a secret supplementary clause of the Anglo-Polish Agreement [of Mutual Assistance] showed that it was not about ethical principles. The later stance of the British government, in particular their joining forces, militarily, with the Soviet Union and the refusal to face up to Stalin at the conferences of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, amplified further the extent of this moral uprooting. One only needs to compare the scale of the unopposed transference to the Soviets by the Western Allies (absolute sole domination over all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, participation in controlling the Mediterranean and the Near East) with that of Danzig’s desire of returning to the German Reich, which was used by these same Powers as an opportunity to a Second World War!

Despite this background, Lord Halifax professed to be fighting for human rights, for peace, for ideal principles, and he stated on the BBC-London on 7 November 1939:

“The new world that Britain is trying to make come true would bring about cooperation

among all nations, based on equality, on self-respect and on tolerance of the human race. Britain would have to try everything within her means to combine the necessary revisions in a continuously changing world with safeguarding against upsetting the general peace by use of force.”

It is exactly the application of these principles that he refused to Germany. “Justice”, “equality”, “self-respect” was called in London that which served the “European balance”, ergo, British power interests. A comparison between the war aims, as proclaimed later, and the facts comes automatically to mind. No sooner had it been openly stated that going to war against Germany was precisely because of her style of government, than it was laid down in the Atlantic Charter that “all peoples” could choose the form of government under which they would live. Every postulate drawn up during the Allied War Conferences was disregarded when matters concerned Germany, but also Poland and the other nations of Eastern Europe. Vansittart, the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the Foreign Secretary, declared to a member of the German resistance on 31 August 1939, thus the day before the start of the Poland campaign, “trembling with excitement”:

“Britain will be fighting this war to the outmost, and like Samson in the Bible, we will tear down the pillars of the palace and bury all underneath that... A timely ending of the war [this is likely to be an intended misprint – it reads in German ‘Kriegsabbruch’ instead of ‘Kriegsausbruch’ – which, however, does not make any sense either in this played-down form, and which has to be: ‘Kriegsausbruch’ = outbreak of the war], though it might mean, it is true, the death of thousands, it would not mean the death of millions.”

Winston Churchill admitted in November 1939, a few days after Belgium and the Netherlands had made mediation proposals, on the British radio:

“This war is a British war and its aim is the destruction of Germany.”

If Hitler had set himself as the target of his policy to liberate “the whole world” from the “pestilence of British tyranny” and the “defence of all that is most sacred to man”, what kind of accusations would have been levelled at him? The British Field Marshal, Lord Milne, warned a few weeks after the beginning of the war

“against the dangerous theory that we are not fighting the German people. The war in Poland is typical of the inborn brutality of the German Nation on the whole. War is war... I do hope that our striking is tough, manifold and absolutely merciless.”

As a “peace-loving politician”, Prime Minister Chamberlain made a rather curious admission in a letter of October 1939: “In 3 days last week I had 2,450 letters, and 1,860 of them were ‘stop the war’ in one form or another... I was, I confess, anxious when I read Hitler’s clever speech [Hitler’s peace offer after the Poland campaign], and especially when the first American reaction was reported that he had made a very attractive series of proposals...”

Just how much the British government was at pains to sabotage every possibility for peace, in pursuit of their war aims, is also clearly shown, among other things, by the

reaction to the trip to Europe made by the American Under- Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in February-March 1940. The American Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote about this:

“The rumors [about the mission of Sumner Welles in Europe] filled the Allies and small neutrals with dismay lest the President, on Welles’ return, should make a move for peace. Accordingly, on March 16 [1940] , Mr. Roosevelt broadcast from the White House to dispel these fears. [Along the same lines,] I had made it clear to the press. Before leaving Rome, Welles issued a press statement that he had not received or conveyed any peace proposals. British Ambassador Lothian came on March 22 [1940] to thank the President and me for what he called the prompt way in which our Government had acted to check and dispel the spread of the ‘peace at any price’ sentiment based on all sorts of rumors about what Welles might do in Europe to bring about a negotiated peace, which would be the equivalent of a German victory. He said that efforts directed towards bringing about a negotiated peace might injure the British and French war situation.”

Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty and Minister for Economic Warfare, stated at the St. George’s celebration on 25 April 1940, when toasting England:

“The coming peace-treaty must be much harsher and more merciless than Versailles. We can make no distinction between Hitler and the German Nation. After victory we must not allow ourselves to be moved by the claims of the Germans that only a few, only the members of the Hitler regime, committed the crimes. We must take Hitler at his word that he is the German Nation.”

Lord Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the Foreign Office, 1941:

“Hitler is no accident. He is the natural and continuous product of a breed which from the dawn of history has been predatory and bellicose... By the grace of God and for the salvation of man, we shall rescue the earth from Germany and Germany from herself.”

Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on 15 February 1942:

“This [bringing of the United States into the war] is what I dreamed of, aimed at and worked for, and now it has come to pass.”

Russell Grenfell wrote on Churchill’s war aims and thereby about those of Great Britain:

“What was left as a war object for Mr. Churchill? There [They] were our previous friends, the extirpation of Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism... The tyranny, as such, was not oppressing the British people. That being so, what business was it of theirs if the Germans liked to live under a tyrannical form of Government? Did not the Atlantic Charter declare that the British ‘respected the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live’? Therefore, if the Germans did not choose to throw off their Nazi tyranny for themselves, why should a lot of Englishmen have to die in throwing it off for them? Assuming, however, that the forcible suppression of tyrannies in foreign countries was a British duty, how came it that another tyranny was made a partner of the British in that process? The Communist tyranny in Russia was

worse than the Nazi tyranny in Germany; the general condition of the Russian people was far inferior to that of the Germans; slave labour in Russia was on a gigantic scale compared to anything of the sort in Germany... Yet Mr. Churchill hailed Russia as a most welcome ally when she was brought into the war. One tyrant to help beat another. Clearly, tyranny of itself was no aim of Mr. Churchill's to destroy. He did not even show much interest in the overthrow of Nazi tyranny itself when a prospect of achieving it was brought to his notice [with the help of the German resistance] . . . Mr. Churchill's threat to extirpate Nazi tyranny [did not] convince the Germans that such tyranny was bad for them. On the contrary, they would regard it as so successful that Germany's foes were determined to destroy it."

What was it that Winston Churchill said in his memoirs, after the war had ended, about his own and his Allies' blind-rage objectives?

"My principal reason for opposing, as I always did, an alternative statement on peace terms, which was so often urged, was that a statement of the actual conditions on which the three great Allies would have insisted, and would have been forced by public opinion to insist, would have been far more repulsive to any German peace movement than the general expression 'unconditional surrender'. I remember several attempts being made to draft peace conditions which would satisfy the wrath of the conquerors against Germany. They looked so terrible when set forth on paper, and so far exceeded what was in fact done, that their publication would only have stimulated German resistance. They had in fact only to be written out to be withdrawn."

It was from England that for the first time the annihilation of a people was announced as a war object. At that time in Germany there was no programme for the "final solution of the Jewish question" and no programme "for the annihilation of the Polish people". Furthermore, no German speakers or Statesmen have ever put forward the destruction of Britain or any other nation as a war aim, or even hinted that this would be their wish. For a state of affairs, not directly affecting British interests, Great Britain declared war on Germany, demanded her annihilation and did everything possible for widening and brutalizing the war. Any historian, dealing with the background to the dividing-up of Germany, would have to admit that the plans for the partition of Germany had been already "discussed in politics and in the media long before the diplomatic considerations attended to these plans". The resulting notions were supporting and recommending a "permanent weakening of German principal power in Central Europe".¹⁶⁾ Mr. Eduard Benes, immediately after his resignation as President of Czecho-Slovakia in October 1938, went so far as to suggest that a minimum of 800,000 to 1 million Sudeten Germans, mainly the intellectual classes and the bourgeoisie, should be driven from their homeland.

Germany was no longer to be allowed to lay claims to any legal title of international law. Churchill interpreted this goal thus:

"By 'unconditional surrender' I mean that the Germans have no rights to any particular form of treatment. For instance, the Atlantic Charter would not apply to them as a

matter of right. There will be, for instance, no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right and barring territorial transferences or adjustments in enemy countries.”

Three post-war media items from Britain are given as an example of how this policy from that time is smugly upheld and to this day [1965] is still found praiseworthy:

Lord Beaverbrook’s Sunday Express from 23 March 1958: “One has to remember that the last war was aimed at destroying Germany.”

British historian A.J.P. Taylor, also in the Sunday Express, in October 1957: “The Germans certainly would not like the partition [of their country], but it is ‘great’ for all the others. Britain has waged two wars against Germany, triggered off by different motives. Fundamentally it was always about the same: there are too many Germans and Germany is too strong. If one allows all Germans to unite, they will overshadow Europe. Now a solution is handed to us on a plate, for which we should be grateful; instead of that we declare that Germany must be reunified.”

The same historian, A.J.P. Taylor, “who is one of the most violent Germanhaters” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), 21) gave in the spring of 1965 a series of lectures on BBC television, in the course of which he conducted “a general attack against lending any British support for the reunification of Germany” 21) and stated:

“The British people are not interested in reunifying Germany. On the contrary. The large majority is delighted about the happy chance that has divided Germany and has deprived her of all her power... Wilson’s [Prime Minister 1965 and Leader of the Labour Party] strongest supporters are also those most opposed to German reunification.”

11.17 Psychological Preparations for War

What form did the anti-German propaganda take? Winston Churchill would begin his agitating, by making false statements against his better judgment, as soon as he touched upon his favourite theme of “German rearmament”. Then these assertions of his, proven to be falsified, were not only taken up by world-wide propaganda – “a free press” – but also by governments, that used them for their own ends: principally Britain, France, the United States and the USSR. So, for example, in a speech to his constituent on 27 August 1938:

“But the danger to peace will not be removed until the vast German armies which have been called from their homes into the ranks have been dispersed. For a country which is itself not menaced by anyone, in no fear of anyone, to place over fifteen hundred thousand soldiers upon a war footing is a very grave step ... It seems to me, and I must tell it to you plainly, that these great forces have not been placed upon a war footing without an intention to reach a conclusion within a very limited space of time...”

For those weak with figures, fifteen hundred thousand is 1.5 million. Several pages further Churchill informs us that the Czechs alone in May 1938 had called 1.5 million men to the colours; however, this fact is not embellished with a similarly tinted commentary. When the Czecho-Slovakian multinational state with a population of 15 million (of these, only 7 million are Czechs) mobilizes 1.5 million men, then this, apparently, is considered to be quite all right. When Poland with her population of 35 million (of these, 15 million are foreign minorities) likewise mobilizes 1.5 million men, then this, too, is considered to be quite right. But for Germany and her 80 million people to have, in the face of an intensifying crisis, just a self same size army of 1.5 million, which is in proportion to the population only a fifth part of the Czech contingent – this then is seen by Churchill and the people who share his views as a peace-threatening crime and a proof of her striving for world-domination. Churchill in a speech in 1936:

“Germany, on the other hand, fears no one. She is arming in a manner which has never been seen in German history. She is led by a handful of triumphant desperados. Money is running short, discontents are arising beneath these despotic rulers. Very soon they will have to choose on the one hand between economic and financial collapse or internal upheaval, and on the other a war which could have no other object and which, if successful, can have no other result than a Germanized Europe under Nazi control. Therefore it seems to me that all the old conditions present themselves again [the striving for hegemony of a Continental Power that must be eradicated] and that our national salvation depends upon our gathering once again all the forces of Europe to contain, to restrain, and if necessary to frustrate German domination.”

“In 1938-39”, Churchill frankly states in his memoirs,

“British military expenditure of all kinds reached £304 millions, and [the] German was at least £1,500 millions. It is probable that in this last year before the outbreak, Germany manufactured at least double, and possibly treble, the munitions of Britain and France put together, and also that her great plants for tank production reached full capacity. They were therefore getting weapons at a far higher rate than we.” “The French forty-hour week could not rival the output of a Germany working harsh hours under wartime conditions. ... The German munitions plants were working at high pressure. The wheels revolved and the hammers descended day and night in Germany, making its whole industry an arsenal, and welding all its population into one disciplined war machine.”

What Churchill was proposing to arrange with the help of his agitating about the German rearmament, he explained in the House of Commons debate on 16 March 1939 quite openly:

“It must be remembered that Germany, like all countries, is now at full extension in armament production, groaning and straining in that tremendous effort. Already she is spending 26 per cent of her national income on warlike preparations. All labour, skilled and unskilled, is employed to the utmost. The park railings and even iron crosses in the graveyards are being melted down as scrap.... Therefore, I was very glad to hear Lord

Chatfield yesterday lay down the sound doctrine that it is the duty of the Royal Navy to 'seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet'. That is the true note to strike."

To be any more prejudiced and provocative is all but impossible! But even the fact that this man, in one and the same book, was contradicting himself with such frequency, even when discussing the matter of German armament and that here, too, "Winston could produce this sort of schoolboy rhetoric by the yard," did not seem to bother anyone:

"The German war machine had lumbered falteringly over the frontier [German-Austrian frontier, March 1938] and come to a standstill near Linz. In spite of perfect weather and road conditions the majority of the tanks broke down. Defects appeared in the motorized heavy artillery. The road from Linz to Vienna was blocked with heavy vehicles at a standstill. General von Reichenau ... was deemed responsible for a breakdown which exposed the unripe conditions of the German Army at this stage in its reconstruction."

On the occasion of a meeting at the War Ministry, the leading German generals drew up a memorandum, which was presented to the Reich Chancellery on 27 September 1938. Churchill confirms:

"Emphasis is laid on the shortage of officers. No fewer than forty-eight thousand officers and a hundred thousand N.C.O.s were necessary to bring the [German] army up to war strength, and in the event of a general mobilization, no fewer than eighteen divisions would find themselves devoid of trained subordinate commanders."

Also "anti-Fascist historians" need to be tied down to the question of the German rearmament, so that they must discuss their assertions in some detail. Thus, a book published under US-licence in the year 1947 contains the following brief reference:

"The vast majority of the population knew nothing of secret meetings and secret orders."

Here too, not a single word is to be found about the subject matter or about questions relating to work and to personnel matters of the alleged secret meetings and orders in connection with the German rearmament. But such empty pronouncements are historically worthless. The author continues:

"The number of firms that was working on certain armament projects was a limited one before 1939, the work itself was 'screened off'."

Here, likewise, no amount, no locality and no product is mentioned. Important, however, is the admission that the number of German firms engaged in rearmaments was until 1939 a limited number, a statement contradicting all of the inflammatory theories of propaganda. Continuing (one needs to pay close attention to the line of reasoning):

"There are grounds for the supposition that the stated economic programme of the party was designed according to the demands of rearmament and war; in this the 'autarky' of the German economy was to be all-important. . . . New industrial plants of vast dimensions emerged, which were to produce BUNA as a substitute for rubber, make

petrol from coal and, allegedly, manufacture the Volkswagen, so as to free the German economy from dependency on foreign countries. . . The financing [of the thought-out plan for these large-scale measures], which was assuming gigantic proportions, was a job in itself that was solved by increasing the volume of currency in circulation and by increasing the deficit spending of the Reich.”

So when these measures that any country in the world would catalogue under national economy and not under political armament and that were “devouring sums of gigantic proportions needed for the financing”, then, by all accounts, there should not have been much space and financial strength left over for the actual rearming. What in fact was the reality?

“The expansion of the ‘four-year plan factories’ which were to reduce the dependency on imports had been planned to be fully developed only in 1943. Their present capacity in output [1939] was of no consequence.”

No matter which historical research we look at, everywhere we find the very low German armaments level confirmed – just as we find the systematic inciting of other nations with lies about the “feverish rearming of the Third Reich from 1933 onwards”, and that the “ending of the economic crisis in Germany (1933) was accomplished by a fully developed armament programme, thereby threatening the peace of the nations”. In the opinion of these moralists, what might a sovereign state be allowed at all? Should it be permitted to rearm for self-defence? As we can see, all the others “may” do so – but not the Germans. Germany was encircled by hostile nations that were expertly equipped and better armed, bound to each other by military alliances. During the whole period that the Reich government was in office, “not one single new munitions factory was built”. Nonetheless, those self same powers that were exploiting empires, were accusing Germany of aspiring to world domination, of conspiring against peace and of being guilty of criminal planning. Any of the facts that stand in contradiction to the thesis of a “conspiracy against world peace” are, without further ado – one is never at a loss for “reasons” and slogans – clarified as the “amateurism” of the conspiracy. Perhaps Hitler could have avoided being reproached of “amateurism”, if he had been – emulating the United States after the Second World War – stockpiling 75% of all strategical material reserves for 3 to 5 years, and if he had taken up position in 69 countries of the globe or rather in over 2,200 individual bases throughout the world – never mind the even more awe-inspiring example of the Soviet Union.

The powers surrounding Germany were not, incidentally, filled with dread because of a “Third Reich armed to the teeth”, but instead were cherishing the illusion to be standing in Berlin within a matter of days after the outbreak of war, aided by their “friends” as well as the power of resistance from within the Reich. Had the Poles, the French, the British or the Soviets been in fear of German armaments or the German determination for attack, then in the year 1939 the Polish public and the Polish authorities would not have behaved with such unconcealed aggression, recklessness, prejudice and hatred towards the German minorities at their mercy and towards the Reich. Likewise, the French, the British, the

US-American and the Soviet press organs would not have dared any such provocations. Whoever fears the other side because of greater strength would not deliberately trample upon the other's legitimate rights, but would carefully weigh them in the balance, because then, within the bounds of all human probability, the threat of arms-use has vanished.

In the British Cabinet one was fully aware of the true level of the German armament; after all, reliable sources of information were at London's disposal. That is why it is all the more unforgivable, when influential men in Britain – to say nothing of the “free press” and the BBC – during the thirties should have employed inflammatory agitation about “German rearmament fever”, but who would in private assess the German armament and military forces potential as realistically as did, for example, Robert Hudson, Secretary of the Department for Overseas Trade, on 9 March 1939 during lunch with the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski:

“As for the Germans, they were bound to come to terms since they were on the verge of bankruptcy, having no gold or foreign currency and being increasingly short of raw materials.”

The Swedish mediator Birger Dahlerus, certainly above suspicion, was writing with regard to the assessment of the German Wehrmacht made by the Polish propaganda during midsummer 1939:

“The German Panzers [tanks] were said to be only cardboard dummies. The German soldiers were said to be deserting in their hundreds. Their uniforms were only barely said to be held together with cords.”

There is not a single document to verify that Poland in 1939 believed in a supposed armaments fever or in a striving for world-domination in Germany! Polish diplomats even used to regard the signing of the German-Soviet Non- Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 as clear evidence of “the desperate situation in which the Reich found itself”.

“Adding to this (the unleashing of anti-German feelings because of measures taken by the Polish authorities) was the ever worsening war-mongering in the Polish press and on the radio, where one could not publicize the reports fast enough about the alleged manifestations of the German condition of exhaustion to be observed within the Reich, in the sphere of foodstuffs, in the inadequately equipped Wehrmacht and suchlike. The Poles, however, were portrayed as ‘the best soldiers in the world’, thereby arousing in them a feeling of infinite superiority compared with the Reich. It was believed that the structure of the Polish army, their fighting spirit and their technical equipment, to be ‘immeasurably better’ whereas the situation of the Reich, in contrast, was hopeless since the encirclement was complete. Poland considered herself a Great Power. . . .”

These words were not written in the period from 1933 to 1945. It is the result of a historical research by an expert who, in his book on the German minority in Poland published in 1954, entitled the relevant chapter “Warmongering in Poland” (“Die Kriegshetze in Polen”). Paul Reynaud, the former French Finance Minister (Prime Minister from March

to June 1940), said in the Chamber of Deputies on 26 February 1938:

“Is it not common knowledge that the Germans do not have half the officers required for the formation of their divisions?”

Likewise, in the year 1938 (November), a manifesto of the Comintern was published, stating:

“Hitler-Germany is neither in the military nor in the economic sense ready for war. She is short of raw materials, foodstuffs, money. . . Her army does not have enough trained units. . .”

These are statements made by influential and well informed politicians – one year before the allegedly since 1933 “planned war to win world domination”! The Soviet Ambassador in London recalled the diplomatic talks between the representatives of the Soviet Union, Britain and France in the months before the outbreak of war, and he drew the conclusion that was equally familiar to all the participants of the talks:

“It will be seen that the armed forces of the anticipated signatories of the triple pact were very impressive, and far surpassed the then forces of Germany and Italy.”

How did the French Foreign Minister assess the situation?

“We were expecting an easy and quick victory. It must be admitted that much information from abroad led us to believe that our adversary was quite badly off indeed. I received such bits of news either directly or from our ambassador, who, as was his duty, sent them to us with due reservation. Apart from the usual old tales of striking German workers and soldiers who refused to fight, we were periodically provided with the hope of an imminent assassination, already prepared, which would bring about the downfall of National Socialism.”

And the British Foreign Minister?

“It became more and more apparent to one as Halifax talked ... that what Britain depends on more than anything else to end the war before the world collapses, is the internal collapse inside of Germany. They had definite confidence in their secret service reports that the oil and gasoline supply is definitely not over four months and that there is a definite feeling in Germany against war and if it got too tough economically, Hitler would be out.”

The former Foreign Minister of the Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop, in his closing remarks to the IMT in Nuremberg, pertinently outlined the situation of the Reich:

“If I deny that this German foreign policy planned and prepared for a war of aggression, that is not an excuse on my part. The truth of this is proved by the strength that we developed in the course of the Second World War and the fact how weak we were at the beginning of this war. History will believe us when I [Ribbentrop] say that we would have prepared a war of aggression immeasurably better... What we intended was to look after our elementary necessities of life, in the same way that England looked after her

own interests in order to make one-fifth of the world subject to her, and in the same way that the United States brought an entire continent and Russia brought the largest inland territory of the world under their hegemony. The only difference between the policies of these countries as compared with ours is that we demanded parcels of land such as Danzig and the Corridor which were taken from us against all rights, whereas the other powers are accustomed to thinking only in terms of continents.”

11.18 The Armament Level in the Year 1939

Great Britain

Great Britain in 1939 was by no means as scantily provided with armaments or, indeed, orientated to a defensive policy, as one is always led to believe. This is established by the fact alone that “British production of airplanes and tanks equalled or exceeded that of National Socialist Germany” – not to mention the navy, unsurpassed in strength and capacity. Before 1914, as well as before 1939, the British Admiralty had to hand plans of attack devised for the destruction of the German fleet and for invasion across the Channel. Already at the close of 1937 Churchill stated,

“that the navy was strong and that ‘even during the years of disarmament at least £50,000,000 sterling was spent every year upon keeping in order the plant and organization already stabilized on the largest scale’.”

On 3 October 1938, three days after signing the German-British declaration of peace and friendship, N. Chamberlain was unexpectedly announcing rearmament at all costs. “For a long period now we have been engaged in this country in a great rearmament programme, which is daily increasing in pace and volume.”

On 22 February 1939, one month before “Prague”, in Blackburn:

“The figures (of our rearmament) are indeed staggering. Perhaps they have got so big that people have ceased to be able to take them in.”

Even assuming that he was exaggerating, one has to take into consideration that such statements, coming from the mouth of a Prime Minister, would make a lasting impact on the nations “affected”. Indeed, they were intended to goad the French ally into an intensified arms built-up. Their effect was to spread the armament fever and a war psychosis to all sides and push towards a crisis. I.M. Maisky writes:

“Britain had ready six divisions, could, ‘in the shortest possible time’ transfer another 10 to the Continent, and ‘in the second echelon’ add another sixteen divisions – in all, therefore, thirty-two divisions. The air forces of Great Britain comprised more than 3,000 first-line aircraft.”

With her many Dominions and England-friendly nations in all parts of the world, ocean-ruling Albion was able to procure raw materials and armaments even in time of war. In

1939, the volume of armament of the British Isles was already roughly on a par with that of the level of Germany. Proportionate to the population (Germany = 80 million, England = 50 million people), it was even twice as much. In addition, in the case of war, Germany was left at the mercy of an effectual blockade. Britannia, on the other hand, ruled the waves. If one wants to assess the armament potential of Britain, France and Germany in the year 1939, one has to take these political, strategical and geographical factors into account. Likewise, one has to bear in mind that the British War Cabinet had based their strategy on a lengthy war. England was using a minimum of her own forces, at least at the beginning of the war, while she was proposing to enter into the fray the armies of her allies instead. Furthermore, this is not inconsistent with Chamberlain's initial notion that Hitler could be defeated easily and quickly with the support of the resistance within his own ranks: in this case also, Britain would not require an overpoweringly large army contingent on the continent. D.M. Projektor writes:

“At the beginning of September 1939, the British War Cabinet stated that the war would go on for three years, and prepared a plan of mobilization for the reserves, based on this time scale. This plan proposed an increase of the fleet, the creation of 55 divisions by the autumn of 1941, as well as the expansion of the fleet of aircraft to 12,000 planes by spring 1940. Germany's situation with regard to the essential kinds of strategical raw materials was considered to be extremely serious: According to British plans there were stocks for only 6 months. . . . The principal method of economic warfare against Germany, for which plans had been drawn up since spring of 1939, was the naval-blockade. It was to be translated into action by the Home Fleet in the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and in parts of the Baltic.”

Already several years before the war, “an advisory committee for trade enquiries in wartime” was set up in Britain. These so-called “blockade-planners” had, in 1937 already, worked out plans for a blockade against three hypothetical opponents: Germany, Italy and Japan.⁸¹) The world-wide scale of these measures bears an impressive testimony to the balance of power at a time, when the real concern in Germany was how to achieve good housekeeping of raw materials (as there was much too little of it, not too much), and other countries had already begun cancelling trade agreements with Germany, particularly those covering nonferrous metals. In 1937, the Association of German Heavy Industries had written a memorandum, the contents of which were secretly passed on to the British government by Dr. Goerdeler, estimating that Germany fell short of her requirements for raw materials by 40-60%, had a shortage of 25-30% in food stuffs and animal feeds, and her exports had shrunk by one-third.

France

In August 1939 France's mobilization was practically completed. Winston Churchill spoke of 5 million trained French soldiers.⁸²) On 28 August, the British Ambassador in Paris, Phipps, reported to London a conversation with French Foreign Minister Bonnet:

“M. Bonnet was calm and seemed not altogether unhopeful of the possibility of maintaining peace. He thinks it curious that Hitler should have allowed the mobilization of about 2,700,000 French combatants without striking beforehand. Of the total of about 5,500,000 men that general mobilization would produce, there would be little more than half a million more combatants, the remainder being composed of persons fulfilling war services in the rear, etc.”

The Soviet Ambassador in London was well informed of the French fighting strength:

“France [in 1939] had at her disposal 110 divisions without reckoning its anti-aircraft forces, its coastal defence forces and its troops in Africa. In addition there were about 200,000 soldiers of Republican Spain, who had taken refuge in France after the victory of Franco and had asked to be incorporated in the French forces. The French Army possessed 4,000 modern tanks and 3,000 large-calibre guns of 150 mm and higher (without reckoning divisional artillery). The French Air Force consisted of 2,000 first-line aircraft, of which about two-thirds were modern as then understood – namely, aircraft with a speed of 450-500 km. per hour in the case of fighters and 400-450 km. in the case of bombers.”

France had at her disposal in June 1940 – not counting Britain, Holland and Belgium – a much stronger tank force than Germany had.⁸⁴) Before their entry into the war, England and France had spent – each country individually – as much or more on rearmaments than had Germany. P.H. Nicoll writes:

“The total war expenditure for Britain and France, having been standardized along military points, in accord with the existing agreements and obligations, were in the year 1939 much above those of Germany. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, France had a considerably bigger army than Germany, well equipped and securely entrenched behind the famous, imposing and, as was believed, impregnable Maginot Line.”

Czecho-Slovakia (1938)

W. Churchill writes:

“Between thirty and forty Czech divisions were deploying upon Germany’s eastern frontier, and the weight of the French Army, at odds of nearly eight to one, began to lie heavy on the Western Wall. A hostile Russia might operate from Czech airfields and Soviet armies might wend their way forward through Poland or Rumania.”

The Czech army, whose peacetime footing amounted to 120,000 men, had in midsummer 1938 a million and a half men under arms in the thirty to forty divisions (twenty-one regular divisions, fifteen or sixteen second-line divisions already mobilized), equipped “by a highly organized and powerful industrial machine”, standing “behind the strongest fortress line in Europe”.

“To break the Czech Army and pierce or turn the Bohemian fortress line would require

practically the whole of thirty-five divisions – the main strength of the mobile and fully-trained German Army... Thus at the moment of attacking the Czechs only five effective and eight Reserve divisions would be available to protect the whole of Germany's western frontier against the French army, which could mobilize a hundred divisions."

A.J.P. Taylor writes:

"The Czechoslovak army was a formidable force, its well-equipped 34 divisions probably a match in themselves for the half-trained German army of 1938."

Poland

The strength of the Polish army at the beginning of war was estimated, as is generally acknowledged, at about 55 infantry divisions, 12 cavalry brigades and two motorized units. In autumn 1939 Poland had at her disposal 1.5 million soldiers. Having reached the already quite sizeable number of 200,000 (211,000 men) in the Polish peacetime army, a comparison of the figures clearly demonstrates the aggressive intentions of the Polish army, whose gradual mobilization had been underway since spring 1939; especially when considering that this mobilization was undertaken without having been threatened or, indeed, having been made to feel threatened by Germany. In spring, on 25 March 1939, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Kennard, told his Foreign Minister that according to confidential information from competent persons, 750,000 men had already been called up. The Polish air force had more than 1,200 planes at its disposal in autumn 1939.

Without a doubt, the Polish military was still set fast in outdated strategical and technical ideas: they were attaching too much importance to the cavalry, underestimated the enemy's capabilities, had at their disposal insufficient tanks, anti-tank guns, artillery, aircraft and anti-aircraft units. Furthermore, their strategical immovability, the absence of any defensive strategy whatsoever, the poor fighting spirit of the many foreign-nationality members of the minorities in the Polish army (only 52.7% of the population of the State of 'Poland' were Polish) and, not least, the illusion being entertained by Warsaw regarding their "friends" France, Britain and the United States, have all contributed considerably to the catastrophe of September 1939. All the same, the fact remains that in an evaluation of Poland's military potential before the outbreak of war the German leadership could not have taken all of these deficiencies into account while, on the other hand, the Polish leadership had not been aware of these shortcomings. The Polish leadership had geared their policy towards the deployment of a strong military force – and expressed in figures it was considerable for this state! – and any German Chancellor would have had to respond bearing this policy in mind – and not any perchance weaknesses of the Polish army.

The Soviet Union

While the German Reich in 1939 had 75 divisions, 1,000 operational aircraft (tactical air force) and 3,000 tanks at her disposal, the Soviet Union alone could boast, in the summer of 1939, that she could deploy at a moment's notice, for the fight against Germany on her western front, 136 divisions, 5,000 medium and heavy guns, 9,000 to 10,000 tanks and more than 5,000 (according to some sources 5,500) aeroplanes.

This was no mere showing-off: The Soviet Union had formally volunteered these forces during the British-French-Russian military convention in July/August 1939 to the Western Powers for immediate fighting against Germany – which also reveals a lot about the attitude of mind of the Soviets, who were undertaking the completion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact at the same time, on 23 August 1939. Not because of the refusal by Britain or France, but mainly because of the Polish and the Rumanian refusal to allow passage of the Red Army across their territory, did these negotiations founder, so that the enormous might of the Red Army did not go into action in Europe in the year 1939. That this offer of deployment of arms was proposed in earnest is also confirmed by Soviet historians. They affirm that the Soviet government “during the whole course of the pre-war period was prepared to use armed force against Germany (the ‘aggressor’).” D. Hoggan writes:

“The Red Army had been vastly increased in recent months... The incorporation of reserve units in the Red Army in late 1938 had increased the Russian peacetime army to two million men, which was nearly triple the number of peacetime German soldiers.”

During the years from 1934 to 1938 the Red Army had doubled their manpower and their fighting strength, according to a statement made by the former Soviet Defence Commissar, Voroshilov, on 13 March 1939. The vast USSR, the most militant country in the world, had for years been shifting the main emphasis of the industrial output onto the heavy and armaments industries, and already since the year 1937 was spending about 25% of the total Soviet national income on military purposes (Germany 1937 = 10%, 1938/39 = 15%).

Germany

In the assessment of the military potential of the European powers, many historians nowadays “overlook”, when debating the German rearmament, the strategic plans of the Polish, the French but also of the Soviet Armed Forces. However, leaving aside these plans, the actually existing war potential of the individual European powers will attest to whether or not there could have been the intention present in a nation for an “intensive and criminal rearming aiming at a world conspiracy”. What are the results of the six years of rearming in the Third Reich from 1933-1939? Professor Michael Freund, the much quoted historian after 1945, wrote in factual plain language in the year 1944:

“Germany’s struggle to get back on her feet and the German armament took place against the backdrop, and as a consequence, of a feverishly pursued world-wide arms race and of a revolution in military policies on a global scale.

30-07-1934: The reason for the British air-armament programme was given by the Lord President of the Council in the British House of Commons, Stanley Baldwin, with these sensational words: ‘Britain’s frontier is on the Rhine!’

24-09-1934: Introduction of the auxiliary service in Poland.

28-11-1934: Escalation of the British air-armament.

06-12-1934: Military service is to be extended in Switzerland.

01-01-1935: Military service of two year duration in force in Czecho- Slovakia.

30-01-1935: Announcement that the strength of the Red Army had already reached one million men under arms.

January-March 1935: The announcement of the Franco-Russian Entente resulted in quite considerable armament measures on France’s part, in particular the restructuring of the French Air Force.

When in the British White Paper of 1 March 1935 the British armament measures are justified on the grounds of Germany’s rearming, The Times declared that the argument given for the British armament measures ‘could have been presented more objectively’.”

Not only did Germany have to take account of the armament measures of the other powers, but she also had to take note of the threatening posturing – especially Poland’s – aiming at military invasion. H. Roos writes:

“Furthermore, the Field Marshal [Hindenburg] retained discretionary powers over the German army and foreign politics when Hitler came to power, and this was respected by Hitler until the death of Hindenburg. For the moment, all obvious violations of Versailles – for example to exceed the 100,000 men-limit – would be avoided; Hitler kept strictly to the armament negotiations. However, the constant threat of a preventive war eventually became a very effective argument for the German armament demands.”

In the opinion of the Chief of the German General Staff, General Adam, there was done “during the whole of the year 1933 practically nothing to increase the army”. This was at the time when, for example, it was pointed out by the Chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, that, compared with Germany, France had an armament’s lead of 20 billion francs. Furthermore, this came at a moment when France was rejecting the German proposals for disarmament with the kept hidden opinion:

“You are wasting your time! The convention which you favour will never be concluded for we shall never be a party to it! Hitler won’t last much longer, his fate is sealed! Any convention with him would consolidate his power. Should war break out, not a week would elapse before he would be deposed and replaced by the Crown Prince.”

The highest official in the [British] Foreign Office, Lord Vansittart, was then also enter-

taining similar ideas, that is, to keep Germany down through economic pressure. "We can ill afford to let Hitlerite Germany prosper. The Trade Union Congress is also of this opinion, though for different motives – see their recently announced boycott of German goods."

In his view one should aim for the destruction of 'Hitlerism' and make every effort to keep Germany in such an enfeebled and miserable condition that not even the Communists would want to become involved there.⁵) How persistently these and similar views were influencing the development of an informed opinion in the British military and the British government is demonstrated by the example of a report from March 1934 by the Defence Requirements Committee assigned to the government: This report takes it naturally for granted that the potential foe was Germany. Of course, this report, too, goes back to prior events and into a time when Hitler had not yet assumed power and Germany was as yet without an air force and without National Socialism. Already in November 1932 British statesmen were discussing plans which envisaged air deterrence that would enable Britain to have 'some military influence in Europe' without having to maintain a large army on the Continent.

" 'The only defence is in offence,' said Baldwin then, considering the role of bomber aircraft, 'which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves.' "

So what efforts did this German opponent make? In the fiscal years 1933-34 and 1934-35 no increase in the armament expenditure was recorded. An expenditure representing 4% of the national income has to be regarded as positively moderate compared to the neighbouring countries (Great Britain 3%, France – 1932 – 8.1%, Soviet Russia 9%). The armament expenditure was only increased in the financial year 1935-36, in view of the changes taking place in foreign affairs politics (the collapse of the disarmament negotiations, the French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact). For two years foreign politicians and the foreign media had been accusing Hitler of sabre-rattling to get into a "criminal war of aggression" and thereby destabilizing peace by spreading terror and instability around the world. In the end, he saw no other alternative but to strengthen the German Armed Forces as a protection against the tendencies displayed by the other powers of forming various blocs against the Reich. Spreading lies about the German rearmament became a necessary requirement in order to find a justification for the refusal to disarm, for continuing the arms build-up, for the forming of military alliances, for the building of fortifications, for the General Staff meetings and, also, to continue lending some semblance of right and necessity to the policies of Versailles. The foreign military attachés as well as the foreign secret services in Germany had precise information of the quite moderate level of the German armament. There is an abundance of documents confirming that the foreign governments (Poland, Great Britain, France and USA) felt emboldened into taking tough actions against Germany when they realized the inadequately developed state of the German military defence. This reality, however, did not stop those governments from inflaming their population by feeding them false data and fake arguments through

the media. The British historian A.J.P. Taylor stated:

“The French had fired the starting-pistol for the arms race... Germany, for instance, was little more prepared for a great war between 1933 and 1936 than she had been before Hitler came to power. The difference was that he had strong nerves and his predecessors had not... Many of the early alarms about German rearmament were false alarms... Even in 1939 the German army was not equipped for a prolonged war; and in 1940 the German land forces were inferior to the French in everything except leadership... The Nazi secret was not armaments production; it was freedom from the then orthodox principles of economics... Under Hitler's direction, Germany was equipped to win the war of nerves – the only war he understood and liked; she was not equipped to conquer Europe.... In considering German armament we escape from the mystic regions of Hitler's psychology and find an answer in the realm of fact. The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.”

The German level of armament was compared their level in 1944 during the war: 1937 = 9%, 1938 = 16%, 1939 = 18%. Another source gives, compared to the armament level of 1943 (when total war was declared):

1933 = 2%

1934 = 2%

1935 = 4%

1936 = 6%

1937 = 9%

1938 = 20%

1939 = 25%

1940 = 44%

General Jodl stated at the IMT in Nuremberg on 4 June 1946:

“In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank construction was in its earliest stages... Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty per cent of our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. Our supplies of ammunition and bombs were ridiculously low. We had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat... And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.”

Moreover, these divisions were “ equipped with very little artillery and almost no means at their disposal of any anti-tank defence”; furthermore, they were immobile. Even if

the territorial and the reserve divisions of the third and fourth "wave" are also added to the count, the American military historian T. Taylor arrives at only 106 German divisions in the year 1939, while the French army alone, including trained reserves and colonial troops, comprised an equal number of divisions at the outbreak of war, but due to the level of training was stronger than the German army. Moreover, to this have to be added the British, the Belgian (23 divisions = 550,000 men) and the Dutch divisions which, combined with the French divisions on the German front, came to 156, or rather, 142 divisions.

The German leadership had to consider that these troops, in case of conflict with Poland, would be deployed for an advance on the Reich. Besides the approximately 2.6 million German soldiers (including reserves) 20), grouped into "102 divisions"19), there were in the autumn of 1939 a further 500,000 men in para-military organizations.21) Nonetheless, only 52 divisions "could be considered fully fit for action".19) In the year 1914 there were almost one million more men under arms in Germany than there were in 1939.

"In contrast to 1914, when the German Reich had at her disposal 25 agegroups of trained reservists, in 1939 she could only call to arms 5 age-groups."19) "In 1935, France, unaided by her previous allies, could have invaded and reoccupied Germany almost without serious fighting. In 1936 there could still be no doubt of her overwhelmingly superior strength. We now know, from the German revelations, that this continued in 1938... In the year after Munich, [1939], which we are now examining, the German army, though still weaker in trained reserves than the French, approached its full efficiency. The German army was not capable of defeating the French in 1938 or 1939. ... when the German Army could scarcely put half a dozen trained divisions on the Western Front, the French with nearly sixty or seventy divisions could most certainly have rolled forward across the Rhine or into the Ruhr."

In this connection, one ought to compare the size of population of the two countries: Germany had 80 million people, France 42 million people. Burton Klein, an American scientist (Harvard University), supplements in his thorough study on the German economical war preparations the previous data with the following words:

"Up to the time of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in the spring of 1936, rearmament was largely a myth. ... The armed forces did not even have a central economic agency which could review the various demands for materials and formulate some sort of a reasonable requirements picture. It was a cardinal policy of Hitler that war strategy was not a concern of economic planners... Supplies of important items like copper, iron ore, gasoline, and rubber were, in August 1939, in sufficient supply for only 3 to 6 months of contemplated war needs. ...in 1939 Germany's steel economy was dependent on foreign sources for 65 per cent of the ore supplies and practically all of the ferroalloys. In the expansion of imports in 1937 and 1938, however, food imports increased faster than raw material imports, with the result that the composition of imports was almost the same in 1938 as it had been in 1929... It can be said that German manpower was fully mobilized in 1939 only in the sense that there was no unemployment... The distribution

of the labour force over this fourteen year period was surprisingly stable. Pronounced shifts occurred in only two of the occupational groups – agriculture and public employment... There were large sectors of the economy in which manpower was unaffected by war mobilization... In 1939 the civilian economy still possessed large reserves of labour... There was no pronounced concentration of investment in those activities associated with economic preparations for war. In the pre-war period, the German economy produced both ‘butter’ and ‘guns’ – much more of the former and much less of the latter than has been commonly assumed. By 1937, civilian consumption, investment in consumer goods industries, and government non-war expenditures equalled or exceeded previous peak levels. There is no question, therefore, of a rearmament program so large that it prevented a substantial recovery of civilian production. The volume of munitions production and the number of divisions which Germany mobilized were, by comparison with published appraisal, small. Investment in those industries comprising the war potential was not much larger than the volume reached in the prosperous years of the previous decade and was small in relation to total investment.” “The government’s disinclination to ask for civilian sacrifices was demonstrated in a number of instances. One of these was its refusal to consider higher taxes as an alternative to deficit spending; another was its unwillingness in 1937 to cut food imports in favour of increased raw material imports; still another was its failure to transfer workers out of unessential occupations; another example [was] inefficient economic administration... When Schacht [President of the Reichsbank] attempted to cut expenditures for municipal improvements, he was invariably opposed by some prominent party members. When, on numerous occasions, he tried to reduce the budget of the German Labour Front, the issue was taken to Hitler, who invariably decided in favour of the latter. Because it was contradictory to its ideology, the party also opposed measures to force a larger number of women into the labour force. Public nonwar expenditures in 1937 and 1938 were much above any previous peak... The factors which prevented the Nazis from having a larger rearmament were:

- a) the fear of larger deficits;
- b) the government’s unwillingness to ask for civilian sacrifices;
- c) Hitler’s inability to subordinate various private interests to his aims;
- d) a lack of efficiency in the direction of the programme.”

In another statement it is confirmed by W. Hofer:

“It was shown that the precision mechanism of National Socialist militarism was working neither according to a planned overall strategy nor according to a long-term planning of an armament programme.”

On 5 May 1938, General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff, had diagnosed the military-political situation, and he also cited this as one of the reasons for his opposition to Hitler:

“... Germany’s military situation, when considered in its entirety, bears no comparison to the impotence of former years. However, when viewed in relative terms, it cannot be

regarded as strong as in 1914, because for years all of the powers that would possibly be against Germany have also been rearming to a substantial degree, sometimes to the fullest extent. Furthermore, as is generally known, Germany will have, for years to come, only a deficient armed forces."

In the period after the Poland campaign, Platanova (Soviet author) writes:

"the German government started the switch-over of the country's industry onto the tracks of war and began to expand hurriedly production for war."

Hereby even the Communists concede that Germany's industry, at least in its essential components, at the outbreak of war had not been "switched-over onto the tracks of war and war production had not yet been expanded"

He further states:

"The main reason forcing the German High Command to postpone the date of the offensive [against France] several times was the fact that the Germans were not able to accomplish the formation of the essential army units in time."

If the Reich had been building-up armaments for an offensive purpose for years and had been drilling and training, then it should have been in a position, at least several months after the outbreak of the war, "to form its army units in time"! Soviet sources also confirm that the German campaign in France was carried out not with superior, but rather with numerically inferior forces:

"The armed forces of Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, taken altogether, totalled 142 divisions (according to other sources, even 156 divisions); they were confronted by 136 German-fascist divisions... Given this power balance and the resources available, there is no basis for asserting the vulnerability of the Allies or their being ill-prepared for war in the technological field and to be talking about the decisive superiority of the fascist aggressor. It became evident already during the campaign of Poland that the German artillery was not equal to the task of returning fire under the conditions of the rapid tempo of the fighting, not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. The German High Command was compelled to re-enforce the effectiveness of the artillery fire with the assistance of the air force... The miscalculation of Hitler's generals in regard to the artillery were to bear grave consequences for the German-fascist army in the course of the Second World War."

"American military experts have revealed the fact that Churchill's criticisms of alleged British and French lag in armament and his allegations about overwhelming German superiority and activity in armament were utterly without foundation... An official report submitted to the Secretary of the Army of the United States in October, 1947, entitled 'Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods', exposed the gross inaccuracy of Churchill's figures and charges."

This report can be found in a publication of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It had been transferred there, without any protest, from an official survey of the American War

Department. We are dealing here with an admission from the western opponent that was validated as correct by the eastern opponent³¹):

“In 1938 Germany produced only 3,350 combat planes or 5,235 military aircraft of all types – very few indeed with which to wage a long war. In 1939, on the eve of the war, Germany produced 4,733 combat planes or 8,295 military aircraft of all types, England – 8,000 military planes of all types... In the last four months of 1939 (that is, in the first four months after the war had started), Germany produced only 247 tanks and self-propelled guns, while the British produced 314 tanks.”

“In September 1939, the sum total of all tanks produced in Germany amounted to about 3,000, of which only 300 were medium-heavy. Until 1939 not a single new armament factory had been built in Germany... When Germany invaded Poland, the Hitler-army was equipped for only six weeks of combat! The German air force could count on only 1,000 aircraft for tactical aerial fighting (the first line), also the supply of bombs was sufficient for only 3 months of war (calculated according to the quota used in the Poland campaign); the ground forces had in total only three Panzer divisions, while the reserve of Panzers numbered 600; the navy had 53 submarines at its disposal. Therefore, Hitler-Germany could only wage a short war and, in fact, concurrently against only a single opponent.”

One would do well to read this quotation more than once and to pay attention to the source (US War Department in 1947). One page further on it is stated that Germany was only able to increase her output of aircraft, tanks and all the other remaining armaments many times over, because she had managed to crush France and to drive off the British Army from the Continent and, thereupon, help herself to the rich sources of occupied Europe. Accordingly, Germany in 1939 had at her disposal in aircraft, tanks and munition, proportionate to her population (80 million), only slightly more than half of the armaments compared to what Britain had, just one of Germany's main opponents (50 million). What is not taken into account here is the Canadian industry that was working to supply British armaments, as well as the facts that the American President Roosevelt had promised wide-ranging assistance to England and France already months before the outbreak of war and, furthermore, England was militarily protected owing to her island position. E. Hughes writes:

“In their pro-Ally and anti-revisionist volume *The Challenge to Isolation* [concerning the treaties dictated by the victors after the First World War], the American professors William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason offer the final refutation of Churchill's absurd charges of overwhelming German armament in 1939: ‘There can now be little doubt that the Germans in 1939 were far from being prepared for a long war on a large scale. Their current war production was inferior to that of the combined British and French and they had remarkably little in the way of reserves. Of the hundred divisions they put into the field against Poland only three were mechanized and none completely motorized. In a word, the Germans were equipped for a two-month Blitzkrieg, such as they waged in Poland. They were by no means equipped for the type of war in which they became

involved.’”

A further admission from a Soviet source by D.M. Projektor:

“One of the weak spots of the Hitlerite war organization is, above all, the totally inadequate preparation of the technological-material foundation of the Reich, which was not geared in its economy for a war of global proportions against the coalition of the great powers. This was mainly caused by insufficient supplies and stocks of several of the most essential types of strategical raw materials, the dependence of the armed forces on the importing of these raw materials from abroad, and the continual restrictions involved that were placed upon this import. The general cuts in exports and Germany’s enormous national debt caused many economic problems which had a direct bearing on war production output and the condition of the armed forces. It is also necessary to point out that when measured against the demands of a world war the Wehrmacht had at its disposal a limited arsenal with regard to armoured vehicles and, especially, to war stock piles. The lack of an essential fleet of medium and heavy tanks, the predominance of light tanks, which, as practice was soon to show, did not fulfil the protection requirements because of their date of construction, imposed a limit to the size of the tank units and made it necessary to improvise their formation ... The Hitlerite State could not withstand the burden of a long war against the coalition of European states.”

In the last year of peace (from 1 January to 5 September 1939), Germany had obtained war materials to the value of 23, 000 (23 thousand) dollars, France to the value of 16, 000, 000 (16 million) dollars and Great Britain to the value of 21, 000, 000 (21 million) dollars, from the USA.⁴⁶) It can be proved that Germany ranked in a decidedly bottom position by far with regards to purchasing armaments from abroad. This fact too demonstrates that Hitler had not been drafting any hastily prepared plans or, indeed, armament programmes geared to 1939, as he was dissuading his generals from any arms escalation even in the summer 1939. He was not anticipating the likelihood of a decisive crisis before 1943-1945, so that the construction of roads and the urban development still occupied the central position of his economic policy.

There was no German plan of operation at the outbreak of the war, neither against the western neighbour France, nor against the sea power Great Britain⁴⁷⁾⁺⁴⁸); until the spring of 1939 there was merely a plan for the protection of the eastern border. The drafting of an operational plan against Poland (Operation “White”) was only ordered on 3 April 1939 ⁴⁹) and, in fact, with the explicit explanation, “in case of need, to eliminate any threat from this direction”. This was done at the time when an armed conflict was becoming plainly evident, brought about by the announcement of the British letter of licence, in conjunction with the chauvinistic and warlike posturing of the Poles, “when their own excessively overestimated strength apparently blinded them to the deadly peril”. Even immediately after the campaign of Poland, no plans for an offensive against the West had been drawn up in Germany.

On the German Air Force: Britain’s and France’s combat-ready airfleets alone com-

prised 7,300 aircraft. In 1939, Britain had 2,327 aircraft of first line capabilities at her disposal of which 1,715 were based at home ports (comprising 855 bombers, 560 fighters, 300 reconnaissance planes), 222 were with the navy and 354 were overseas. Up to the beginning of the war the German Reich had not even been developing any long-range strategic assault bomber-aircraft, whereas Britain had done so since 1934 and the United States since 1935. Thus it was discovered [by British and American economists] that her [Germany's] aircraft production in the autumn of 1939 had been 675 a month, no more than that of Great Britain; her tank production was less; she had started the war with only three months' supply of aviation petrol." E. Spetzler writes:

"It was Britain placing the strongest emphasis on strategic aerial warfare, having already on 1 April 1918 created the RAF as an independent part of the armed forces, their command clearly separated from that of the army and the navy. Britain had already at that time formed several bomber units into an 'Independent Air Force' for a strategic air war and had been continuing this development since 1925. The aircraft best suited to this purpose was considered to be the heavy, strongly armed long-range bomber, which it had been developing since 1934 and which had been in series production since 1936, so that by 1941 it was available, at long last, in sufficient number for aerial warfare. Long before 1939, Britain's purposeful groundwork was geared to this task, and it incorporated in its plan for an aerial war against Germany a fixed sequence for striking targets and which, from its inception, allowed for a considerable time outlay to ensure success."

A.J.P. Taylor writes: "The Germans had never planned for independent [of the front line troops] bombing. Their bomber-force was an auxiliary for the army on the ground, and they had to improvise the air-attack on Great Britain in the summer of 1940."

The following statement also deserves attention (US Navy, August 1956, Lieutenant Commander Richard G. Alexander):

"Britain was making studies of German industry with a view to strategic aerial attacks for the first time in the mid-twenties. The United States had prepared for entering the European air war with a list which contained 124 targets from the field of electrical power stations, transport systems and the fuel industry, as well as 30 targets from the aviation and light metals industries! Details for the particular bomber units appointed to carrying out the attacks were already set down in 1932 in the United States and Britain."

About the German Navy: The German fleet was significantly decreased compared to 1914 and thus was inferior to the French and, faced with the "overwhelming Anglo-French superiority... could not venture on the high seas..." There were no aircraft carriers; there were 57 U-boats of which only 42 were "of any real military value". If one takes into account that less than a third of the total number of U-boats [submarines] can be "on mission" [enemy engagement], while the remaining ones are either outward-bound or on their return journey or at the shipyard for overhauling or are assigned to training purposes, then the small number of German U-boats in 1939 diminishes even further. However, not more than half were large enough and sufficiently broken in for action in the Atlantic.

In fact, eighteen [U-boats] were sent into action against England at the start of war, and three others put to sea in the Baltic to support the operations against Poland.

Compared with the 57 very much smaller German U-boats, Britain and France had 135 submarines at the beginning of the war.⁶⁷) Admiral of the Fleet Raeder had this to add:

“Our two battleships and 3 armoured cruisers were facing a total of 22 British and French battleships. We had no aircraft carriers. The enemy, on the other hand, had seven aircraft carriers. We had two heavy cruisers as compared to 22 of the other side. The ratio for the light cruisers was 6:61 and for the destroyers and torpedo boats 34:255.”

Winston Churchill stated on 16 March 1939 in the House of Commons:

“The German Navy in the next few years will not be able to form a line of battle for a general engagement.”

Winston Churchill in his memoirs:

“Now [1939] the Germans had only begun rebuilding their navy and had no ability even to form a line of battle. . . Thus there was no challenge in surface craft to our command of the seas. There was no doubt that the British Navy was overwhelmingly superior to the German in strength and in numbers, and no reason to assume that its science, training or skill was in any way defective. . . It had to face enormous and innumerable duties, rather than an antagonist.”

A Soviet source (Platanova):

“The German Fleet Air-Arm was totally inadequate in 1939 in Germany.”

Admiral Erich Raeder declared before the Nuremberg tribunal on 17 May 1946:

“There is manifold proof to show that I was not expecting a war in the autumn [1939] at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in Swinemünde that we could not count on it.”

Author's note: This was the state of the military of the nation you are usually told wanted to conquer the world... while the US and Britain already looked for strategic targets in 1932 within Germany, France tried to have a small entente of encirclement against Germany, the direct neighbor Poland had imperialistic desires and the USSR was on their way for further revolution in Europe (and then the World).

11.19 Did Hitler Want War?

On Sept. 1, 1939, 70 years ago, the German Army crossed the Polish frontier.

On Sept. 3, Britain declared war.

Six years later, 50 million Christians and Jews had perished. Britain was broken and

bankrupt, Germany a smoldering ruin. Europe had served as the site of the most murderous combat known to man, and civilians had suffered worse horrors than the soldiers.

By May 1945, Red Army hordes occupied all the great capitals of Central Europe: Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Berlin. A hundred million Christians were under the heel of the most barbarous tyranny in history: the Bolshevik regime of the greatest terrorist of them all, Joseph Stalin.

What cause could justify such sacrifices?

The German-Polish war had come out of a quarrel over a town the size of Ocean City, Md., in summer. Danzig, 95 percent German, had been severed from Germany at Versailles in violation of Woodrow Wilson's principle of selfdetermination. Even British leaders thought Danzig should be returned.

Why did Warsaw not negotiate with Berlin, which was hinting at an offer of compensatory territory in Slovakia? Because the Poles had a war guarantee from Britain that, should Germany attack, Britain and her empire would come to Poland's rescue.

But why would Britain hand an unsolicited war guarantee to a junta of Polish colonels, giving them the power to drag Britain into a second war with the most powerful nation in Europe?

Was Danzig worth a war? Unlike the 7 million Hong Kongese whom the British surrendered to Beijing, who didn't want to go, the Danzigers were clamoring to return to Germany.

Comes the response: The war guarantee was not about Danzig, or even about Poland. It was about the moral and strategic imperative "to stop Hitler" after he showed, by tearing up the Munich pact and Czechoslovakia with it, that he was out to conquer the world. And this Nazi beast could not be allowed to do that.

If true, a fair point. Americans, after all, were prepared to use atom bombs to keep the Red Army from the Channel. But where is the evidence that Adolf Hitler, whose victims as of March 1939 were a fraction of Gen. Pinochet's, or Fidel Castro's, was out to conquer the world?

After Munich in 1938, Czechoslovakia did indeed crumble and come apart. Yet consider what became of its parts. The Sudeten Germans were returned to German rule, as they wished. Poland had annexed the tiny disputed region of Teschen, where thousands of Poles lived. Hungary's ancestral lands in the south of Slovakia had been returned to her. The Slovaks had their full independence guaranteed by Germany. As for the Czechs, they came to Berlin for the same deal as the Slovaks, but Hitler insisted they accept a protectorate. Now one may despise what was done, but how did this partition of Czechoslovakia manifest a Hitlerian drive for world conquest? Comes the reply: If Britain had not given the war guarantee and gone to war, after Czechoslovakia would have come Poland's turn, then Russia's, then France's, then Britain's, then the United States. We would all be speaking German now.

But if Hitler was out to conquer the world — Britain, Africa, the Middle East, the United States, Canada, South America, India, Asia, Australia - why did he spend three years building that hugely expensive Siegfried Line to protect Germany from France? Why did he start the war with no surface fleet, no troop transports and only 29 oceangoing submarines? How do you conquer the world with a navy that can't get out of the Baltic Sea?

Contrary to the mythology created by those who had an opposing ethnic agenda, he had no plans or desire for a larger war of conquest. Professor AJP Taylor showed this in his book, *The Origins of the Second World War*, to the disappointment of the professional western political establishment. Taylor says, "The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all" (p.267), and "Even in 1939 the German army was not equipped for a prolonged war; and in 1940 the German land forces were inferior to the French in everything except leadership".

If Hitler wanted the world, why did he not build strategic bombers, instead of two-engine Dorniers and Heinkels that could not even reach Britain from Germany?

Why did he offer the British peace, twice, after Poland fell, and again after France fell?

Why, when Paris fell, did Hitler not demand the French fleet, as the Allies demanded and got the Kaiser's fleet? Why did he not demand bases in French-controlled Syria to attack Suez? Why did he beg Benito Mussolini not to attack Greece?

Because Hitler wanted to end the war in 1940, almost two years before the trains began to roll to the camps. Hitler had never wanted war with Poland, but an alliance with Poland such as he had with Francisco Franco's Spain, Mussolini's Italy, Miklos Horthy's Hungary and Father Jozef Tiso's Slovakia.

Indeed, why would he want war when, by 1939, he was surrounded by allied, friendly or neutral neighbors, save France. And he had written off Alsace, because reconquering Alsace meant war with France, and that meant war with Britain, whose empire he admired and whom he had always sought as an ally.

As of March 1939, Hitler did not even have a border with Russia. How then could he invade Russia?

Winston Churchill was right when he called it "The Unnecessary War" — the war that may yet prove the mortal blow to our civilization.

11.20 The Last Days of Peace

The Activities of the British Government from 25-28 August

The reaction from the British government to the German-Soviet Non- Aggression Pact and the news that Italy would stay away in case of a conflict was such that it could only lead to an intensification. Instead of trying for negotiations on the conflictual matters needing to be dealt with – which most certainly would have prompted Hitler to withdraw the marching orders immediately, since “Hitler did not want war with Poland” – London hardened positions by extending the guarantee to Poland, inclusive of vast contingencies, and failed to initiate mediation. The British government judged the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact incorrectly as a war pact and got “ into position”, i.e. prepared for an armed conflict. On the 23 August 1939, the Chief Political Advisor to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Vansittart, “referring to the statement about the Cabinet meeting”, told the Hungarian Minister in London:

“Britain would not yield in any event. Even if violence were not offered to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Poland, Britain would immediately mobilize and go into action.”

Winston Churchill writes impressively in his memoirs about these military measures, which were taken both by the British leadership and the Dominion governments and the Colonies at the news of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. It was a question of a world-wide mobilization – against Germany, not for instance (also) against the Soviet Union. Therefore, not morals and humanitarianism could have been London’s motives. London failed to take into account that it was only the British-Soviet military negotiations which moved Hitler to come to an arrangement with the Soviet Union. One may accept extenuating circumstances for the British reaction to the 23 August – from the blame of having provoked the Stalin-Hitler Pact really in the first place, London cannot be acquitted. The British reaction made the situation even more hopeless and emboldened those powers that had an interest in a military conflict against Germany. Peaceful means of reconciliation were not at all considered.

On 26 August, on Hitler’s advice, Ambassador Henderson took the German alliance offer of 25 August to London. There he was detained until 5.00 p.m. of the 28 August, a time span, which led to a “stagnation” of the talks.³⁰) When on that 28 August Henderson presented to Hitler at 10.30 p.m. the British reply to his alliance offer to Britain and to his request for assisting him in settling the German-Polish differences (from the 25 August), Hitler was bound to believe that the British government had utilized the three days for intensive talks with Warsaw and had influenced Poland to negotiate now, under the patronage of Great Britain and France. Emphasizing that the situation was “extremely urgent”, Hitler was informed that the British government would be ready, “to proceed as soon as practicable to such discussions... His Majesty’s Government have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter

into discussions on this basis.”

In expectation of this mediation, thus confirmed, and of the now existing Polish readiness for negotiations, Hitler would now draw up his negotiation proposal, which he handed to Ambassador Henderson on 29 August. Hitler, however, had no knowledge of what had really taken place during those three days (26-28 August) in London. He was unaware that Lord Halifax had not taken advantage of these three days for making an effort at mediation, and that he had this, the most important *démarche* before the outbreak of war that was forwarded to Hitler on 28 August, falsified with intent to defraud. The Polish readiness for negotiations, as asserted, did not at all exist and, furthermore, the British government was not willing to mediate, as there was now, according to the statement made by the British Foreign Secretary to the Polish Ambassador on the 25 August “any attempt to patch matters up... out of the question.” 32) This deception by Halifax, hitherto veiled in various ways, had also not been realized for a long time by historians, since they too had been fooled by several falsified documents, or rather, documents based on false reports (one of them in the Documents on British Foreign Policy, the others in the “Polish White Book”, the “British Blue Book”, and the “French Yellow Book”).

On 28 August Halifax fabricated an alleged telephone message coming from Kennard at 4.00 p.m., the subject matter being the Polish readiness to negotiate, and smuggled it into the British documents. For the historian today, it makes its appearance as doc. 420 in the Documents on British Foreign Policy. This “document” cannot be genuine and it is thanks to the historical contribution of a German man to have discovered this, twenty years after the end of the war, and to have drawn the historian's attention to it.

Step by step proof:

1. The “British Blue Book”, published immediately after the start of the war, contains no evidence for this Polish assent for negotiations, although Prime Minister Chamberlain asserted to the House of Commons on 1 September 1939 that the “British Blue Book” (which, strangely enough, had been almost fully completed already before the outbreak of the German-Polish conflict) 34) included all the important documents.
2. The “Polish White Book”, put together by the Polish government in exile at the beginning of 1940 in Britain, has under No. 96 a notification from Beck to his Ambassadors in London and Paris of 28 August 1939:

“The British Ambassador has consulted me on the question of an answer to M. Hitler. I agreed to inform the German government that Poland was ready to negotiate, and asked him to define what the British government understood by the conception ‘international guarantee’. Please treat the entire question of the consultation as strictly confidential.”

This “document”, too has evidently been fabricated subsequently, “in consultation” with the British government: Beck could never have chosen, on 28 August, this kind of formulation for the British government, because a “consultation” about the note to Hitler simply does not correspond to the facts. But to mention this misleading basis in this “note”, moreover, not only once but twice, makes the falsification even more obvious. —

Halifax had the British note presented in Berlin, without having notified Poland beforehand, never mind asking for requests to be conveyed to Hitler.

3. On 27 August, Lord Halifax was sent this message at 10.46 p.m. from Warsaw:

“Mr Beck has just informed me (Kennard) that in view of the nature of Herr Hitler’s language regarding Poland in his conversation with Sir N. Henderson (25 August) the Polish government have decided on full mobilization which is to take place at once.”

Only on the 28 August (one day later) at 7.00 p.m. – three hours after the ostensible Polish assent for negotiation! (doc. 420 – 4.00 p.m.) – and only after the arrival of a further communiqué on mobilization measures from Warsaw (doc. 424) did he check back,

“I am at a loss to know what precisely in Hitler’s language to Sir N. Henderson led the Polish Government last night to take these measures of mobilization.”

Halifax did not endeavour to check, how the Polish government was to reconcile these measures with the assent for negotiations, given (allegedly) meantime.

4. The manifold evidence in the British documents, showing the intensive efforts made by the British Foreign Secretary for gaining a favourable “world opinion” with regard to the Polish attitude, sheds light on the drastic remedy that was used eventually – the deliberate false report – by a man, who had described, since the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, “any attempt to patch matters up” as being “out of the question”.

“Colonel Beck was apprehensive of negotiations, not because they seemed hopeless, but for fear lest Hitler really consented to a compromise, and also lest Britain perhaps show an inclination to impose the compromise on Poland.”

“There was no chance of extracting concessions from the Poles once the danger of war was removed, and the British knew it.”

5. Halifax arranged the facts according to his objective:

a) Although Henderson, as already mentioned, was staying in London for three days, Halifax asked Poland for their consent for negotiations only then (28 August – 2.00 p.m.), when it was quite certain that Poland would not be able to reply before Henderson’s return flight to Berlin. It was not possible, within two hours, that Kennard could have been informed, could have had an audience with Beck and to have already forwarded his answer to the Foreign Office. The (alleged) answer, however, is already back again in London in two hours – at 4.00 p.m. (doc. 420). Kennard’s task stated clearly (doc. 411) to “endeavour to see” M. Beck, which was in accordance with diplomatic practice – though this could never have facilitated such a speedy reply. The actual answer from Beck to this British step was then only made on the 31 August. This delaying, on the other hand, would appear inexplicable, if Beck had answered immediately – already on 28 August – as the “Polish White Book” doc. 96 and the British doc. 420 claim.

b) The German government was to be given the impression that the Polish consent for negotiations was available unconditionally. For this it required an ambassador, who himself believed this to be so. Now, Henderson was critical, having urgently demanded, still on 24 August, the immediate dispatch of a Polish plenipotentiary. He now was sent to Berlin at 5.00 p.m. on the 28 August, convinced that the British government had been sounding things out in Warsaw and was expecting, any minute, the Polish consent for negotiations. This was the reason why Halifax did not give him the British note to take to Hitler, but sent it to him in a telegram one hour later. Once he was back in Berlin, he could neither question nor check his Foreign Secretary's assertion that the Polish consent for negotiations had arrived in the meantime.

c) The general disposition within the three days (26-28 August) was absolutely strange during that critical time and has never been explained.

6. Ambassador Kennard was received by Beck in the evening of the 28 August. Only in the early morning of the 29 August was the British leadership to learn of the outcome of the talks.⁴³) Thus, they could not have been in possession of this answer already on the 28 August at 4.00 p.m. For the rest, Kennard did not have any comment on the Polish consent for negotiations, nor could he intimate a "new course" in Warsaw, and he could neither give an indication that one was now awaiting Hitler's diplomatic reaction. But on the contrary, it was Beck to advise Kennard that for tonight a *fait accompli* was to be expected in Danzig, "in the event of not receiving a satisfactory reply" from the Danzig Senate. Thereupon Kennard felt himself obligated to warn Beck.

7. On the 28 August at 2.00 p.m.,⁴⁴) Halifax had asked Kennard in Warsaw to convey the outcome of his talk with Beck not only to London, but also, simultaneously, to Berlin, Paris and Rome. In the reply, (allegedly) transmitted two hours later, Kennard "confirms" (allegedly) the implementation of this task. The subsequent smuggling in of this telegram⁴⁵) is also proved in that in reality neither Henderson (Berlin) nor Phipps (Paris) nor Loraine (Rome) learnt about it. Also, none of the Polish Ambassadors in these cities ever received this piece of news from Warsaw. All of Henderson's urging upon Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, right into the last hours of peace, turned into the realization, or rather proof, that the latter was so tightly restrained by instructions from Warsaw to the point that he was not to display any interest in any note whatsoever from the Reich government and was not authorized to enter any definite negotiations. So that this fraudulent manoeuvre should not be noticed by the nations of the world at the start of the war, the concluding part of the task was not printed in the "British Blue Book" (doc. 73).

8. On the 28 August at 6.00 p.m., Lord Halifax telegraphed Kennard that he has informed the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, of the substance of the British note sent at 2.00 p.m. to Warsaw, with the request for the Polish consent for negotiations. Continuing, Halifax mentions: "If a favourable answer to this is received in time..." Halifax could really only put this passage into this telegram at 6.00 p.m., if the Polish consent for negotiations was not in hand at this stage. So, this doc. 420, according to which this

consent had already come in two hours earlier, can therefore not be genuine. Halifax, in his deceitful conduct, had made a slip – just two hours after smuggling in the false note. This has likewise occurred to the editors of the Documents on British Foreign Policy, because they provided doc. 430 with a footnote (5) that “this telegram was evidently drafted before the receipt of No. 420”, yet, an explanation for this they did not give.

9. Halifax informed his Ambassador in Warsaw on the 29 August retrospectively on the kind of talk with Raczynski (28 August). Halifax stated that Raczynski “appeared to be somewhat out of touch with his government [and] did not have any comment to make”. No mentioning that perchance he had announced or confirmed the Polish consent for negotiations. Neither was he interested to know what Britain meant by an “international guarantee”. On the other hand, Raczynski did inquire about the British reply to Hitler and

“whether His Majesty’s Government would make any demand for a truce. I replied that there was nothing in the reply to this effect, but that His Majesty’s Ambassador in Berlin might be asked to impress on Herr Hitler the necessity for the cessation of provocation if discussions were to commence. Count Raczynski thought that this would be helpful, as it was important to avoid any impression of weakness.”

Halifax had made no demands of Poland for a truce, but he did, on the other hand, name Berlin as the address which had to be influenced for provocation to end. Neither in his conversation with Raczynski nor in his note to Warsaw did Halifax enjoin the Poles to talks with Germany, but instead he underlined:

“Failure to secure a just settlement of German-Polish differences would ruin hopes of Anglo-German understanding, and might lead to war, with untold suffering and loss to many countries.”

In view of this and similar statements from the British Foreign Secretary at this stage, the following sentence could only have been written for the files:

“His Majesty’s Government have made representations to the Polish Government that they should express willingness to enter into discussions on this basis.”

Truth is: Poland’s conduct was once again sanctioned unreservedly for the past, the present and the future.

10. For an explanation, what the British government understands by an “international guarantee”, Minister for Foreign Affairs Beck only asked on the 31 August, which he would not have done, if

- a) he had already (according to doc. 420) asked about it on the 28 August,
- b) Halifax had answered this question, which the Poles (according to doc. 420) apparently considered to be urgent, and which Beck called on the 31 August, “this fundamental question [of] the Polish government”, in the meantime.

Halifax should have answered this question post haste, having, at the same time, made

Hitler aware of the “matter of the utmost urgency”. If one imputes doc. 420 (28 August – 4.00 p.m. – Polish consent for negotiations, plus the question about the “international guarantee”) to be genuine, one must then conclude that Halifax was working towards war, because he refused to give the Polish partner an answer to this pressing question. Either way, this doc. 420 proves Halifax’s policy for war. It is most strange to find that precisely those places in the doc. 609 (Beck’s reply of the 31 August), which could give information about whether Beck’s enquiry (“international guarantee”) concerns a question asked for the first time or whether it was just being reiterated, are not printed, since, according to the editors of the Documents on British Foreign Policy, “the text is here uncertain”.

11. On the 28 August, Halifax transmits, likewise at 6.00 p.m., the gist of the British note to Hitler (doc. 431) to the Ambassadors in Washington, Warsaw, Paris and Rome. He did state, it is true, that His Majesty’s government had made endeavours for the Polish consent for negotiations (which factually is correct, but the Ambassadors had the extremely late stage of this attempt kept from them). The telegrams, however, contain no comment about the (ostensibly received two hours before) Polish consent, which should have been announced, after all the incidents and the months of refusal to negotiate from Warsaw, as a sensation precisely in this telegram. Only a day later, on the 29 August at 10.50 a.m.,⁵¹) did Halifax inform his Ambassadors in Washington and Rome – of all people only these! – that in view of the Polish consent for negotiations having arrived in the meantime, the British note to Hitler was altered. This communication was a lie, since

- a) the Polish consent for negotiations, as has been shown, was not at all in hand,
- b) the note to Hitler was not at all altered, but instead of giving it to Henderson to take with him to Berlin, as everyone must have expected, it was forwarded to him by telegram,
- c) it is not comprehensible why – with Beck supposedly having agreed to negotiate at 4.00 p.m. – Halifax should not have added this important communication to the already outgoing dispatches at 6.00 p.m.

Lord Halifax undertook a further step towards war on this 28 August: Early at 9.30 a.m., he was informed by the Chargé d’Affaires of the British embassy in Berlin, Ogilvie-Forbes, of the outcome of a talk between Field Marshal Göring and the Swedish industrialist, Birger Dahlerus, whose good offices for mediation between Germany and Britain had been called upon by Göring already since July 1939. Point 5 of this report to the Foreign Office reads:

“Field-Marshal Göring, after consultation with Herr Hitler, requests that the British reply should neither be published nor communicated to Parliament until Herr Hitler has had time to comment on it and possibly suggest modifications.”

In the afternoon of this self-same day – Henderson was on his flight back to Germany – Halifax conveyed to his Ambassadors in Washington, Warsaw, Paris and Rome the gist

of the British reply to Hitler – without the additional remark that the Polish consent for negotiations was in hand. However, Kennard in Warsaw received a separate advance notice telling him, among other things, that the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, had already been apprised of the substance of the reply made to Hitler – but was asked not to transmit it to Warsaw in cypher. While it was already unusual to steer this British reply along two different routes to Warsaw (it would have sufficed for Raczynski to have received just a copy for his own information), so it had to be even more unusual to induce the Polish Ambassador into an action that was quite uncommon – and not only could cause a public sensation, but was bound to do so. For the recipient of this information (Raczynski) did thereby not consider himself obliged to maintain secrecy; the receivers of his information, on the other hand (the journalists), naturally took up this piece of news immediately and made a big splash of this “sensation”. These journalists (“the press”) could hardly fail to notice the sphere of responsibility, the Prime Minister, who was carrying the responsibility of the government, on the other hand, knew nothing of the arrangement. Inquiries into the source of the information would have led, in fact, to Raczynski but, as a result of the now rapid succession of events, no further.

Again, Halifax had outplayed the “appeasement politicians” in Britain, as far as they would still have been in leading positions, but also those abroad. How this manipulation even outraged Mr. Chamberlain – shown clearly in letters to his sister – though without recognizing the initiator and, by that time, no longer being one of the “appeasement politicians”, is attested by his speech in the House of Commons on the 29 August 1939:

“There is one thing that I would like to say at this moment with regard to the press. I think it is necessary once more to urge the press to exercise the utmost restraint at a time when it is quite possible for a few thoughtless words in a paper, perhaps not of particular importance, to wreck the whole of the efforts which are being made by the Government to obtain a satisfactory solution. I have heard that an account purporting to be a verbatim description of the communication of the British government to Herr Hitler was telegraphed to another country last night or this morning. Such an account could only be an invention from beginning to end. It is, I think, very unfortunate that journalists in the exercise of their profession should take such responsibilities upon themselves, responsibilities which affect not only themselves, but the inhabitants, perhaps, of all the countries in the world... I should be glad if I could disclose to the House the fullest information as to the contents of the communications exchanged with Herr Hitler, but hon. members will understand that in a situation of such extreme delicacy, and when issues so grave hang precariously in the balance, it is not in the public interest to publish these confidential communications or to comment on them in detail at this stage.”

The French government, too, did not keep, on the 27-28 August, to their promise to Hitler of maintaining secrecy on the exchange of letters between the Chancellor of the Reich and Daladier, but gave the press fresh ammunition to play with in the form of possible distortions and aggravations. Thereupon Hitler felt compelled to publish his exchange of letters with the French Prime Minister.

The Polish government knew, though, what this “guide line” 57) indicated, and in what direction the leading forces in Britain and France were heading. Furthermore, since the version that was sent on to Raczynski and subsequently published by the British press did not contain the passage that the Polish consent for negotiations was in hand, whereas, on the other hand, it was precisely on the basis of this passage Hitler was persuaded to agree to negotiations at the earliest possible moment, Poland was bound to regard it as a cause for intensifying their provocations. Just how dishonestly Halifax was pursuing this game can also be seen by the fact that he had not informed Warsaw of having asserted to Hitler Poland’s readiness for negotiations and that on Germany’s part negotiations would be welcomed. This was all the more serious, since, at the same time, Halifax was passing on to Poland further alarming military news, apparently gleaned from German resistance people (28 August) 58), and he stated on the 29 August that he

“could not take the responsibility of advising the Polish Government against any action which they consider necessary for their security.”

The result was the Polish general mobilization, for which London made no reproach to the Polish partner, not even subsequently. Count Szembek apprised on the 29 August at 4.00 p.m. the British and French Ambassadors of the just then decided Polish general mobilization, which, “however, only completed the military measures already taken at an earlier stage”. The Polish government referred specifically, as pertaining to this step, to the warning, forwarded from London the day before, about German troop movements and about Germany’s intention “to make a surprise attack on Poland”. The general mobilization was to have been announced early in the morning on the following day. Because of the diplomatic exchanges between London and Warsaw it was postponed for several hours, until the afternoon on the 30 August (2.30 p.m.).

The Meeting between Hitler and Henderson on 29 August

Hitler, meanwhile, had learnt through the intelligence service about the further Polish mobilization on the 28 August and about the concentration of Polish units at the border, but also, in addition, about the internal decree for a general mobilization taken in the afternoon of the 29 August. Hitler did not even try to hide from British Ambassador Henderson the fact that he had such far-reaching secret sources to Warsaw. Cognizant of these military and political happenings behind the scenes in Warsaw that required immediate German counter-measures, Hitler, two and three quarters of an hour later, at 6.45 p.m. asked for, in his reply to the British government, “in consideration of the urgency of the fact that two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face and the Germans living in Poland were being subjected to atrocious and barbarous ill-treatment” *), a Polish representative invested with plenipotentiary powers to arrive for the 30 August. Hitler stated specifically in this communication that Germany had no intention of attacking vital Polish interests or of questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. At the same time, Hitler gave to understand that proposals for a solution would

be drawn up immediately.

But what was the attitude and behaviour of the British Ambassador at this audience on the 29 August? Had he been inspired by the resistance faction from the German Foreign Office, who were trying hard, during this “August crisis”, to prevent “another Munich or Prague”? State Secretary von Weizsäcker had often influenced him in this way. Henderson was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the importance of this meeting with Hitler, i.e. of Hitler’s response to the delayed British note. He himself admitted, in view of his meeting with Hitler the day before, that he was not “without hope” that Hitler would let reason prevail. Nevertheless, before these talks on the 29 August, that is without knowing how Hitler was going to react at all, and how the German reply to the British note of the 28 August would turn out, he “had decided after careful prior consideration”, to let himself “go with Hitler” and to shout at the German Chancellor, since “Hitler is an abnormality [and it] might do good [to] be given a dose of his own medicine”. Henderson elaborated on these talks in a private letter to Lord Halifax:

“So when he gave me the opportunity on a minor point, namely our utter disregard for Germans murdered in Poland, I did fairly let him have it... He [Hitler] did not react in any noticeable way, but I have no doubt that it was a disagreeable and unusual surprise... I must add that after the worst of it I started to get up to go, but he would not budge.”

In another letter about these talks Henderson adds:

“I therefore proceeded to out-shout Herr Hitler. I told him that I would not listen to such language [reference: the murdering of Minority Germans in Poland] from him or anybody. Such a state [sic: ‘statement’?] was intolerable and an example of all his exaggeration... He made no response and I continued to use the same forcible language throughout the interview...”

Ribbentrop recorded that Henderson had even banged the table.⁶⁷) With regard to the conduct of the British Ambassador, three different points need to be established:

1. The assertion made by Hitler – this “minor point”! – “that I or His Majesty’s Government did not care a row of pins whether Germans were slaughtered in Poland or not” was factually correct. After all, Britain really was not concerned about that but had instead, already in spring of 1939, given Poland expressly to understand that, regarding the guarantee, they would ignore the question of the aggressor. During these decisive days, too, the British government had not even made any enquiries into the German grievances, let alone induce the Poles to yield, although, undoubtedly, they were fully informed by their secret service sources about the prevailing conditions. Anyone who takes – “after careful prior consideration”! – factually correct statements as an opportunity to “shout” henceforth during a politically important discussion, puts himself in the wrong and pronounces himself guilty.

2. The persecution of the Volksdeutschen [Minority Germans] in Poland, which Henderson now trivialized as a “minor point”, had been commented on by him in telegrams

during previous days as follows: On the 21 August to Halifax:

"... fact remains that there are now probably at least 10,000 refugees in Germany, that German institutions are systematically being closed, German workmen dismissed, etc., etc. It must be realized that the conflict has now gone beyond Danzig. Patience can be urged on Hitler in respect of the Free City but it would serve the opposite purpose to preach it in respect of the persecution of the German minority. I am not attempting to apportion blame but to state facts. For a settlement of the minority question direct and immediate contact between Warsaw and Berlin seems to me essential."

Also on 21 August to Halifax:

"I had tea with a friend of mine yesterday (X or if you like W) [meant was resistance-adherent E. von Weizsäcker] and he earnestly harped on immediate action. While he admitted press exaggeration he assured me that what was taking place was a form of enforced German migration from Poland, where no Germans were being allowed to find a living. That is the urgent question. I spoke of patience and he said at once the very mention of that word would send Hitler into a frenzy. The crux of the question today is not Danzig but the minorities...The Times correspondent here has just told me that he telephoned yesterday to his opposite number in Warsaw who told him that the Poles were being 'incredibly foolish'."

On the 24 August to Halifax:

"Herr Hitler's reply clearly indicates that the immediate question is not so much Danzig and the Corridor, which by implication can wait for a later solution, as the persecution of the German minority. . . . there is no doubt that there is much ground for German complaints in this respect. The expropriation law referred to in the Warsaw telegram no. 271 is to me, I submit, the basic indication of a very understandable but equally inopportune effort to get [rid of] the German population in Poland under cover of guarantees of the Western Powers."

On the 28 August, Henderson receives a circular dispatch from Halifax, which was sent simultaneously to Washington, Warsaw, Paris and Rome:

"His Majesty's Government agree that one of the principal dangers in the German-Polish situation is reports of the treatment of minorities."

Thus Henderson had been put in the picture about the state of affairs by quite dissimilar and trusted informants of his. That he should then choose to trivialize as a "minor point" precisely this of all subject matters and to take it as an opportunity for provoking the Head of the German government, makes the intended purpose of his provocation even more obvious and irresponsible.

3. To illuminate even more thoroughly the previously given explanations for Henderson's conduct during his talk with Hitler on the 29 August, one should call to mind the atmosphere in which the talk between Hitler and Henderson had taken place the day before, on the 28 August late in the evening. Henderson himself wrote of it as follows:

“At 10.30, fortified by half a bottle of Champagne, I drove down the Wilhelmstrasse to the main entrance of the Reichskanzlei. A good many people were waiting outside the Embassy and a considerable crowd outside the Chancery. No hostility so far as I could see, absolute silence, possibly uneasiness. I was received by a guard of honour in full state as if I had been presenting my letters of credence. I was ushered in at once, Ribbentrop being in attendance and the inevitable Dr Schmidt. The Chancellor looked well, was absolutely calm and normal. No fireworks or tirades of any kind... Hitler registered no emotion on reading the German text [of the British note]... I am not unhopeful that Hitler’s answer may not be too unreasonable... The general atmosphere was quite friendly even on Ribbentrop’s part... Another point in my conversation was Hitler’s insistence on the value to Britain of German friendship.”

In the face of Hitler’s composure, Henderson’s behaviour on the evening of the 29 August can only be described as irresponsible provocation, and it is irrelevant as to whether the British Ambassador was acting on his own accord, on the orders of his government, on the advice of the war-mongers in London or whether he was lending his ear to the whisperings of the German resistance adherents in the Foreign Office. It is worth observing that Henderson had no success with this, because Hitler “made no response” and “would not budge”.

Collaboration between London and Warsaw from 29 to 31 August 1939

Whether it was Henderson, as is claimed in the “French Yellow Book” under No. 285 and No. 287, or another British or French diplomat, who passed on to Paris false information concerning Hitler’s demands (all of the Corridor, East Upper Silesia) made during the talks with Hitler on the 28 August, is an open question. All the same, this example also shows clearly, how foreign forces, just in the last days of peace, had been adding high-handedly, but with the encouragement and safeguarding from their government, to the powder-keg for war.

Even more decisive, however, was to be the conduct of the British government. It fully backed their Ambassador Henderson in his talks with Hitler on the 29 August. On top of this: The Foreign Office informed the French Ambassador in London, Corbin, on 29 August, in an equally inflammatory way, about the meeting between Hitler and Henderson on 28 August. The reason why this is not excusable is precisely because during this discussion Hitler never did give, and never could have given, a reply to the British note, since he had only just received it. There is also another reason making this inexcusable: In this communication to Corbin references were included, which were deliberately war-mongering:

“After adding Silesia to his former claims, the Chancellor gave clearly to understand that what remained of Poland could not count upon an independent future... He let it be understood that he would negotiate with Poland only if he were sure in advance that the Polish Government would accede to all his wishes.”

It is to be gathered from the Documents on British Foreign Policy that it was Henderson who sent the false information to London. Whether this is true, must remain an open question; it is possible that Henderson had received secret instructions to act in such a way that the German-British talks, and consequently Germany's efforts about Poland, were bound to fail. All the same, Henderson did not report anything about these alleged demands from Hitler to his French counterpart in Berlin, Coulondre. In the German documents of the Foreign Ministry is, in any case, not one single reference to these alleged demands from Hitler. These documents, in this instance, would merit all the more trust considering they were published by the victors. Yet, notwithstanding whose brainchild was Hitler's alleged demands ("all of the Corridor and East Upper Silesia"): Halifax was the one who went beyond this, spreading information with ever more aggravating emphasis, without any documentary proof whatsoever. Moreover, he knew that the Polish Foreign Minister was

"...most anxious to know the upshot of Herr Hitler's remarks by midday [of the 28 August]."

Besides, he knew that Beck had already taken "Hitler's language" as grounds for the Polish mobilization (did the phrase "Mobilization means War" from World War 1 still hold true?). Chamberlain, likewise, spiced the communication to Paris with the purposeful reasoning:

"The Führer cannot fail to realize the 'disgust' which has been provoked in the whole civilized world by the conclusion by Germany of an agreement with a Power, which, on the very day before this agreement, was regarded by Germany as her worst enemy."

Chamberlain did not ask to consider how much "disgust in the civilized world" the British and French political efforts over many months, which were to effect an expansionist military alliance with the USSR directed against Central Europe, had aroused. Such pangs of conscience the British leadership at the time did not suffer. The attempt by Lord Halifax to play through to the end the deceitful manoeuvre with the British note to Hitler on 28 August and, for his part, to build in additional provocations, is demonstrated anew by this communication to Corbin, but also in his subsequent conduct: Notwithstanding the, in the meantime, confidentially to London transmitted information about the already decreed Polish general mobilization and, notwithstanding that Hitler's reply of 29 August was in accordance with London's expectations from Berlin, i.e. the request for "immediate talks" – "the British government refused to be in a hurry". Not once did they – not even at this stage – make the Polish consent for negotiations a condition for British assistance. Henderson outlined correctly the state of affairs, when he wrote to his Secretary of State on 29 August:

"It is not without interest that whereas every other diplomat has asked to see me I have so far no sign of any interest whatsoever from the Polish Ambassador, though my relations with him personally are excellent." "If we allow the latter [Poland] to talk all the time of their 'amour propre', prestige and signs of weakening, we shall not be guiltless of some of the responsibility for disaster."

The British Ambassador in Warsaw, Kennard, on the other hand, was of the opinion:

“... that it would be impossible to induce the Polish Government to send Colonel Beck or any other representative immediately to Berlin to discuss a settlement on the basis proposed by Herr Hitler. They would certainly sooner fight and perish rather than submit to such humiliation, especially after the examples of Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania and Austria.”

This point of view from Kennard did not at all refer to the short notice of the German proposal or its contents, had he, after all, already on the 26 August, told his Under-Secretary of State, Cadogan:

“I am sorry that I cannot agree with Henderson’s proposal that Lipski should seek an interview with Hitler... Had Lipski been able to see Weizsäcker something might have been done but for Lipski or Beck to seek an interview with Hitler or Ribbentrop would be too much like Canossa.”

Kennard did not keep this opinion a secret from the Polish government officials. Furthermore, all throughout this decisive month, he never even once gave a strong warning to his government about Poland’s mulish attitude. Yet he was as much aware as his American colleague Biddle of the Polish fondness for war. It is true, Kennard did occasionally convey Lord Halifax’s repeated reminders that Poland was to conduct herself in such a way that she would not take up the position of an aggressor, as this could have a negative effect in world opinion, yet he thought it quite appropriate to try to convince his Foreign Secretary that Poland’s action was right. Kennard also knew quite well that it was useful for Poland, who “saw her vital interests in Danzig threatened”, to negotiate about an international guarantee protecting those interests, but with his stance he was reinforcing Beck’s determination that if officially invited to go “to Berlin, he would of course not go.” Kennard was further aware how anxiously Minister for Foreign Affairs Beck was awaiting information on steps taken by London, as Polish policies would be governed in line with them, yet he spared every effort to exert pressure in the direction of a peaceable settlement. True, Kennard did point out, after the announcement of the Polish general mobilization on the 29 August at 4.00 p.m.,

“that the word ‘mobilization’ would create the impression all over the world that we are embarking on war.”

Yet in spite of this, he, as well as his French colleague, Noel, gave this piece of advice to the Polish Under-Secretary of State, Count Szembek:

“...Poland should take all military measures to meet any surprise attack, but we suggested, above all, that no publicity should be given to any extreme measures that they might feel it necessary to take.”

One and a half hour later, Beck confirmed this ‘wink’ by telephone. Lord Halifax limited his further activities on the 29 August to recommending, without pressurizing, a postponement of the Polish general mobilization and was satisfied straight away with

Colonel Beck's promise to delay the posting of mobilization notices for "a few hours". For the rest, Halifax was supplying the Polish government constantly with "secret information from Germany", according to which German troops were well on the way to attack Poland from all sides. At 11.55 p.m. Halifax ordered his Ambassador in Warsaw to clarify that, although the German reply "does not appear to close every door", he could not "take the responsibility of advising the Polish Government against any action which they consider necessary for their security". With that statement, he thus condoned, already on the very same day, the Polish general mobilization and was clearly contributing to furthering a warlike development.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck, complained on the evening of the 29 August – that is, at a time when Warsaw, because of the British delaying tactics, neither knew the contents of the German basis for negotiations nor the deadline limitation – to Kennard not about the urgency behind the German readiness for talks, but merely that Hitler would not renounce Danzig. Beck adhered to the viewpoint that the resumption of talks with Germany on the basis of the proposals made in March still meant war. Should Hitler within the next few hours of this night [29-30 August] not give a "reply [that] was positively favourable" (that is, a definite disclaimer both of Danzig and of improving the transit regulations through the Corridor), then it would be necessary, so Beck warned the British and French Ambassadors, "to proceed with the general mobilization". As this general mobilization – especially in view of Poland's strategic aims – constituted a decisive step in the advancement to war, Beck's demand clearly clarifies the question of culpability. Considering that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, two days later called the German proposal "a sign of weakness", how then would a German renunciation of Danzig have been evaluated on the Polish assessment scale?

Every sign of "German weakness" was seen by the Polish government as a "victory", while making sure, at the same time, that their own actions could not be regarded as a "sign of weakness". In the process, they would go to such lengths that many times they would even incur the displeasure of prudent British diplomats. In fact, the visit to Moscow by "the author of the anti-Comintern Pact", Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and the signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact were described in the Polish press as "a sign of weakness" and showed, "how the ground burnt under Germany's feet". The Polish Ambassador in Moscow, too, is optimistic:

"He is of the opinion that the German proposal and Ribbentrop's visit are evidence of the desperate situation in which the Reich presently finds itself."

For the 29 August, there is another occurrence, slightly more removed, to be mentioned: While already previously the president of the World Jewish Congress, Goldmann, had told the League of Nations High Commissioner, Carl J. Buckhardt:

"Your appeasement-manoeuvres in Danzig are damaging. Public demonstrations against conditions in Danzig are necessary for the good of the whole, because of the general situation of the Jewish people,"

so the Zionist leader and later president of Israel, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, wrote to the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, on the 29 August:

“I wish to confirm, in the most explicit manner, the declarations which I and my colleagues have made, that the Jews stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies. We therefore would place ourselves, in matters big and small, under the coordinating direction of His Majesty’s Government. The Jewish Agency is ready to enter into immediate arrangements for utilizing Jewish manpower, technical ability, resources, etc.”

Hereby did a force, whose immense power certainly cannot be measured in divisions, announce their readiness to fight before the outbreak of war and, in fact, did so likewise without any reservations, that is, ignoring “the question of the aggressor” (This note from Weizmann was not made public until the 5 September 1939).

complete agreement of the Polish general mobilization, the British Foreign Secretary did not – and this was bound to have a fateful effect! – inform the Polish government on the 29 August about Germany’s willingness for negotiations, but had this notification only passed on very late in the evening of the 30 August. While Halifax was transmitting information to Warsaw about a German plan for advance, even as late as the evening of the 29 August, so for the 30 August, too, the motto remained the same: not to advise Poland “against any action which they consider necessary for their security”. Having already delayed the forwarding of the German proposal for negotiation until 7.00 p.m. of the 30 August, Halifax then ordered Kennard to place this information into Beck’s hands only around midnight, i.e. to delay it again. In the course of this, he was to indicate that Great Britain considered the German presentation [of the case] as “indefensible and misleading”, and “have made an express reservation in regard to statement of the particular demands put forward in the German note” (telegram from Halifax of 30 August, 7.00 p.m.; implemented around midnight).

The British government never did press for the Polish government to negotiate, not until the evening of the 30 August, after the Polish general mobilization had already been announced since 2.30 p.m. Thus Poland could not send a plenipotentiary to Berlin on the 30 August, at any rate not as a result of a British mediation effort. However, it has to be said in this connection, that the British Ambassador, Henderson, even as late as the night from the 29 August to the 30 August (shortly before midnight on the 29 August), after the discussion with Ribbentrop, had called on the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, and had told him that Poland should send a plenipotentiary for the 30 August. In this way the Polish government, therefore, had already been informed of Hitler’s reply to Britain by midday on the 30 August. But here, too, the British Ambassador was to encounter the increased hardening in Lipski’s attitude:

“The French, Americans and Italians have been on my doorstep since I got back, but not a sign from the Polish Ambassador, in spite of the fact that I am on quite good terms with him! Poland also has got to make her contribution to world peace and it is

in her interests more than anyone else's to remove as thoroughly as she can any possible causes for friction in the future between herself and her powerful neighbour."

The British government has suppressed in the "British Blue Book" this supplementary communication of the 29 August from Henderson; not without reason! Likewise, in the "British Blue Book", they have deleted points 5, 6 and 7 from Henderson's report of the 29 August to London:

"5) I have communicated substance of German reply to French Ambassador and urged him strongly to recommend to French Government that they advise Polish Government to propose immediate visit of Mr Beck as constituting in my opinion sole chance now of preventing war. Herr Hitler is not bluffing and at any moment clash may occur. I expressed opinion that Polish Government by so doing would not only convince the world that they had done their utmost but that, since others would suffer hardly less than themselves, it was their duty as well as in their interests to make this last attempt.

6) Italian Ambassador who saw Hitler immediately after me also came to see me. Herr Hitler was, he said, quite calm and gave him substance of German reply to His Majesty's Government. Italian Ambassador also undertook to suggest to Italian Government that they should make representations to Polish Government in similar sense.

7) I trust that His Majesty's Government will see their way to do likewise. Repeated to Paris, Rome and Warsaw." (cf "British Blue Book" No. 80)

These suggestions, apparently, did not fulfil the British purpose, since London took no such step and even tried to hide the fact that her Ambassador was recommending taking just such a step. This should be proof, too, that the British government had neither done "the utmost" nor had they been guiding their partner towards doing "the utmost", in order for the world to be convinced of their desire for peace. Likewise did the British government suppress the fact that Hitler had answered in the affirmative Henderson's question of whether he was ready to discuss with Poland "an exchange of populations", which was to have been exclusively to Germany's disadvantage. This dishonest game was continued with regard to the British people and, yes indeed, the entire world:

In the early hours of the 30 August, at 2.00 a.m., Henderson received the instruction from Halifax to notify the Reich government that it was unreasonable to expect Great Britain to "produce a Polish representative in Berlin today and the German Government must not expect this."

Initiatives of the German Government

A few hours later, Henderson sent a telegram to London, announcing that Birger Dahlerus – a Swedish industrialist, who, on German initiative, had been active as a German-British mediator already since July 1939 – was ready to fly to London, bypassing Ribbentrop, to discuss further possibilities for negotiation. Dahlerus, who had still been conferring with Göring during the night, was received by Chamberlain and Lord Halifax on the 30

August in the morning. Dahlerus expounded, leaving aside the renewed frontier incidents and other Polish provocations, already the essence of the German proposals. A telephone conversation with Göring during this talk confirmed the accuracy of the statements made by Dahlerus.

“He [Göring] affirmed at once that the note was ready and that it offered Poland conditions still more favourable than those of which he had told me during the night.”

Hitler’s proposal was to be “in the form of a ‘Diskussionsgrundlage’ (basis for discussion)”, but it was an absolute condition that a Polish negotiator vested with plenary powers was to receive them. The German documents confirm that Hitler did not wish to present Poland with an ultimatum but rather that he was considering for the negotiations to take place over a more extended period, since their most urgent point is named as being the cessation of the persecution of the Germans in Poland.

At 3.15 a.m. on the 30 August, thus even before Dahlerus had arrived in London, Lord Halifax already knew that “the 30 August is not an absolutely unconditional date”. As a result of the discussion with Dahlerus, Lord Halifax advised the Polish government in the evening of the 30 August (5.30 p.m.):

- “a) not to fire on fugitives or members of the German minority who cause trouble, but to arrest them;
- b) to abstain themselves from personal violence to members of German minority;
- c) to allow members of the German minority wishing to leave Poland to pass freely;
- d) to stop inflammatory radio propaganda.”

The reason given for this advice was the intention to deprive Hitler of the “pretext... to justify immoderate action”. Since Britain’s written guarantee covered without reservation any Polish action of whatever nature, and since Halifax had stated on the previous day his essential approval of the Polish general mobilization, one could hardly expect a change for the better to come from such a lukewarm recommendation as given on the evening of the 30 August. The reaction from Beck was to be expected (30 August, 7.15 p.m.):

“The Polish Foreign Minister... enjoins the British government to refrain from pronouncing its views and positions on purely Polish matters unless expressly empowered to do so by the Polish government. It is the most rude sovereign-great power standpoint. The evaluation of Polish questions is the sole and exclusive decision of the Polish government.”

Poland’s position now was much more rigid than in March 1939, before the British guarantee. If, over the five months from October 1938 to March 1939, she had shown readiness to negotiate, now she no longer need “fear negotiations”, even less so, since the Polish military leadership was convinced of their forces’ superiority over the Wehrmacht. Even with his allies, Beck kept his cards close to his chest.

“The Polish government... , cold, haughty, rigid and fatalistic... , had been... tight-

lipped for four months, only answering all urging from the Western Allies with empty promises. To them – fools of mad-cap heroism – the others are fools of faint-heartedness. Even on the eve of war, the British government is still not clear, whether the Polish government's support for their negotiation effort is only somewhat feigned."

On 30 August the British government had further aggravated the situation by not informing the Polish government of the German readiness for negotiations until the late hour of around 12 o'clock midnight. Poland, for her part, used the 30 August for worsening the situation by announcing in the afternoon general mobilization, which had been decreed the day before, and by stopping rail services to East Prussia at first in parts, then on the 31 August stopping it completely by blowing up the bridge at Dirschau.

On the 30 August at approximately 12 o'clock midnight – 10 hours after the public announcement and 34 hours after the secretly decreed general mobilization by Poland – Henderson presented to the Reich Foreign Minister a memorandum from the British government, which stated that while the German government "must obviously... with all urgency" endeavour direct talks with Warsaw "it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as today". By this move it was indicated to Hitler that the British government, contrary to their assurance, was not at all making any attempt at mediation, had not even impelled Poland to the negotiation table and was not able to suggest avenues of how the German government might move Poland to initiate a discussion, for their part, having since March 1939 concluded negotiations with a threat of war. Lord Halifax even rejected the German suggestion that he might advise Poland to send a representative for immediate German-Polish negotiations. With emphasis, but without an explanation, Halifax had instructed Henderson to schedule the meeting only for this late hour, although the details of the intended move had already been with the embassy in Berlin since 7.40 p.m.

In his reply, Ribbentrop read aloud to the British Ambassador the German negotiation proposals intended for Poland. He was later criticized for not having handed over the proposals in written form, having only conveyed them "at top speed" and unintelligibly. One cannot fabricate a case of wrongdoing from this oral presentation. The Minister Plenipotentiary and chief interpreter, Dr. Paul Schmidt, disputed the claim that Ribbentrop had been reading too fast and indistinctly. For the rest, there is the memorandum of Minister Plenipotentiary

Schmidt in the German documents; it is stated therein that Ribbentrop "had read... slowly and clearly, and had even given explanations on the main points". The proposals were ready. Their content matter had been known to the British government since the morning of the 30 August (cf. Dahlerus's talks in London). Hitler, though, had declined handing over these proposals in writing, since he wished to present them first to the Polish government as the actual negotiations partner; as Great Britain had up to now not been making any attempts at mediation, she could hardly expect to be given them beforehand. For the rest, had not Great Britain just this moment given to understand, London is not prepared to mediate, even at this stage? The Foreign Office was displaying

no sign of urgency during these last days. Just then, Henderson had conveyed during the same discussion his government's view as set down in a memorandum that "it would be impracticable to establish contact as early as today" between Germany and Poland. It was known everywhere, just how sensitive was Poland's reaction, particularly in regards to the question of her sovereignty. For this reason alone, Hitler could hardly have passed over the German proposals to British hands. Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop later wrote about this:

"The British government, it is true, had undertaken to use its good offices to effect such negotiations, not, however, to take the place of a Polish plenipotentiary. . . . that an official handing over of a document that was meant for a Polish negotiator – yet before having been received by the government addressed herewith – could have provided the pretext for not sending a Polish emissary and to cover the sequence of events for the Polish general mobilization, with regard to time, 'in the undergrowth of delaying tactics'."

The proposal for negotiations to be discussed, as drafted on the 30 August by the Reich government, contained the following points:

- a) the return of Danzig to the Reich ("Nobody in Poland denies that Danzig is a German city from a national standpoint").
- b) a plebiscite on the affiliation of the Corridor territory (West Prussia), under international control, not before a period of twelve months. If, as a result of this vote, the Corridor were to return to the Reich, then Poland would receive the harbour of Gdingen and an extra-territorial road through West Prussia. If, on the other hand, the population of the Corridor voted in favour of Poland, then the Reich would claim the right to an extra-territorial road to East Prussia.
- c) a guarantee of non-aggression extended to a period of 25 years, indeed, a guarantee of the Polish state and thus of Poland's frontiers in general. The proposal, or rather claim, thus put by Hitler did neither contain the reintegration of the province of Posen nor the valuable industrial areas of Eastern Upper Silesia, arbitrarily and unlawfully detached from the Reich in 1921, nor any other rectification.

Furthermore, such rectification demands have never been brought into any talks held by the German leadership, but this did not stop French or British diplomats or other forces, remaining anonymous, from including such false reports as "authentic documents" in the "French Yellow Book", or to spread the rumours from London. The German proposal, a "veritable League of Nations proposal", was based on the people's right of self-determination and, in respect to these two areas, it even relinquished the application of this principle. The extent of the area involved in Hitler's proposal amounted to only one-tenth of the region that was appropriated unlawfully by Poland in 1919. That this eleventh-hour proposal had been an extremely generous one was realized by each and every expert, in 1939, too. It did not really require historians first to discover this and to make a comparison with the claims advanced by the Weimar democrats. In no way could this proposal be regarded, from a Polish point of view, as inferior to the plan which initially had even been discussed by Colonel Beck for five months, since Poland

was expecting a plebiscite victory in the disputed territory, or rather, was propagating this belief in victory.

Shortly before his conversation with Ribbentrop, Henderson wrote to his Foreign Secretary, warning him:

“If there is to be any genuine peace in future between Poland and her powerful neighbour grievances of latter which are not of Herr Hitler’s making but national must be eliminated. In my opinion in order to achieve this end City of Danzig as distinct from port must revert to Germany; there must be direct and extra-territorial communication between Reich and East Prussia; and German minority in Poland must be got rid of by means of some exchange of population. On no other basis can there ever be genuine and lasting peace between the two countries. No diplomatic compromise has a hope of surviving indefinitely. If we are ever to get German army and nation to revolt against the intolerable government of Herr Hitler it can only be so far as Poland is concerned on some such basis, since whole of nation itself and even most of moderate sections of it would not regard any other basis as fair to Germany... In the meantime I can only urge once more importance of Poland accepting at once proposal for direct negotiations and thereby putting herself right in the eyes of the world.”

Having only just written that Hitler “would refuse such a basis”, so Henderson must have been rather surprised in his talk with Ribbentrop that the German proposal contained precisely that which he himself had outlined as being the German minimum demands. Hitler, after all, did accept this “basis”, and Henderson even described, straight after the meeting with the Reich Foreign Minister, the German offer as “not unreasonable”.

On August 28. 1939, Hitler issues an open peace letter to the president of France. He writes:

“My dear Minister President:

I understand the misgiving to which you give expression. I, too, have never overlooked the grave responsibilities which are imposed upon those who are in charge of the fate of nations. As an old front line fighter, I, like you, know the horrors of war. Guided by this attitude and experience, I have tried to remove all matters that might cause conflict between our two peoples.

As you could judge for yourself during your last visit here, the German people, in the knowledge of its own behavior held and holds no ill feelings, much less hatred, for its one-time brave opponent. On the contrary, the pacification of our western frontier led to an increasing sympathy.

I am deeply convinced that if, especially, England at that time had, instead of starting a wild campaign against Germany in the press and instead of launching rumors of a German mobilization, somehow talked the Poles into being reasonable, Europe today and for twenty-five years could enjoy a condition of deepest peace.

As things were, Polish public opinion was excited by a lie about German aggression.

The Polish government declined the proposals. Polish public opinion, convinced that England and France would now fight for Poland, began to make demands one might possibly stigmatize as laughable insanity were they not so tremendously dangerous. At that point an unbearable terror, a physical and economic persecution of the Germans although they numbered more than a million and a half began in the regions ceded by the Reich.

May I now take the liberty of putting a question to you, Herr Daladier: How would you act as a Frenchman if, through some unhappy issue of a brave struggle, one of your provinces severed by a corridor occupied by a foreign power? And if a big city - let us say Marseilles - were hindered from belonging to France and if Frenchmen living in this area were persecuted, beaten and maltreated, yes, murdered, in a bestial manner?

I see no way of persuading Poland, which feels herself as unassailable, now that she enjoys the protection of her guarantees, to accept a peaceful solution. If our two countries on that account should be destined to meet again on the field of battle, there would nevertheless be a difference in the motives. I, Herr Daladier, shall be leading my people in a fight to rectify a wrong, whereas the others would be fighting to preserve that wrong."

Even the New York Times agreed in their headline from August 28. that "Berlin thinks door is left open to peaceful solution".

The Lethargic Polish Ambassador

That Henderson had understood and had also retained the gist of the contents follows from the fact that in the early hours of the 31 August, at 2.00 a.m., he informed his Polish counterpart, Lipski, of the basic outlines of the German proposal and recommended, "in the very strongest terms", a discussion between Smigly-Rydz and Göring, but also direct contact with Ribbentrop: Lipski, for his part, should at least make an attempt for the preservation of peace and to sound out the Reich Foreign Minister on the possibilities for negotiations. But in vain! In a note to London he gave vent to his exasperation:

"The German proposals certainly do not endanger the independence of Poland...The German acceptance of a plebiscite in the Corridor is curious... The Poles must put themselves in the right by making a gesture of some kind, or else we must all fight."

Henderson reported on the talk with Lipski:

"I then gave him following advice in very strongest terms. He should at once ring up Minister for Foreign Affairs and say he had heard from me that detailed proposals had been individually elaborated and that he would like to call on Herr von Ribbentrop with a view to learning and communicating them immediately to Polish Government. I suggested he should do this tonight on his own responsibility."

Lipski, however, did nothing at all, as Henderson reports:

“Polish Ambassador promised to telephone at once to his Government but he is so inert or so handicapped by instructions of his Government that I cannot rely on his action being an effective palliative.”

At 5.15 a.m. on 31 August, Henderson sent a telegram with the main points of the German proposal to London (received at 9.30 a.m.). In the meantime the Swedish intermediary, Dahlerus had, in the early hours of the 31 August, at between 1.00-2.00 a.m., passed on by telephone the contents of the German proposal to the Counsellor of the British embassy, Ogilvie-Forbes. At 8.00 a.m. Henderson gave Polish Legation Secretary Malhomme the complete text of the German proposal. Warsaw received it at 10.55 a.m. on 31 August. By 9.05 a.m. Henderson knew with certainty that the time period had been extended from the 30 August to the 31 August, as he was now informing his French colleague Coulondre of this news. But in the meantime he had learned from Göring via an intermediary that it would even be enough if Lipski could declare, within this extension, “that a negotiator will be sent shortly”. At 11.00 a.m. in the morning of 31 August, Birger Dahlerus, accompanied by the Counsellor of the British embassy, Ogilvie-Forbes, went to see the Polish Ambassador, Lipski. Dahlerus wrote of this meeting:

“Upon arrival one already sensed very strongly the gravity of the situation. Boxes were lined up in the hall and everywhere the personnel was busy preparing for departure. Lipski received us in his office, from which part of the furnishings had already been removed... Forbes... asked me to read the German note addressed to Poland, and I did so. But Lipski soon said that he was unable to understand the contents. Forbes then put down the main points himself and handed the note to Lipski, who took the paper, hands shaking, and looked at it for a moment – but then stated that he could not understand what was written, whereupon I offered to dictate the note immediately to his secretary... While I was dictating to the secretary, Lipski had told Forbes that he had no reason to interest himself in any notes or offers from the Germans. He had had many years experience of Germany... he stated his conviction that unrest would break out in this country in the event of war and that the Polish army would march triumphantly on Berlin.”

Lipski described the German proposals offhandedly as “a sign of weakness”. Polish leading circles were ridiculing the German readiness for negotiations, and it was not only Warsaw radio that expressed such an attitude. Lukaszewicz in Paris:

“They [the German proposals] are so immoderate that the German government must have gone mad, or else is now pursuing an out-and-out provocation to goad the Polish government.”

Such a misinterpretation of Germany's willingness to negotiate embodied the very opposite of a peaceable attitude. Even Lord Halifax voiced his irritation – albeit too late – on 1 September:

“On the other hand, I do not see why the Polish Government should feel difficulty about authorizing Polish Ambassador to accept a document from the German Govern-

ment, and I earnestly hope that they may be able to modify their instructions to him in this respect. There was no mention of any ultimatum in the report on the German proposals which has been furnished to us, and the suggestion that the demand for the presence of a Polish plenipotentiary at Berlin on August 30 amounted to an ultimatum was vigorously repudiated by Herr von Ribbentrop in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador. If the document did contain an ultimatum, the Polish Government would naturally refuse to discuss it until the ultimatum was withdrawn. On the other hand, a refusal by them to receive proposals would be gravely misunderstood by outside opinion. I should have thought that the Polish Ambassador could surely be instructed to receive and transmit a document and to say

(a) if it contained anything like an ultimatum, that he anticipated that the Polish Government would certainly be unable to discuss on such a basis and

(b) that, in any case, in the view of the Polish Government, questions as to the venue of the negotiations, the basis on which they should be held, and the persons to take part in them, must be discussed and decided between the two Governments."

The "Line" of Lord Halifax

Of course, it seems reasonable to suspect that Halifax did not mean what he had said there, because 24 hours earlier he had passed on to the Polish government Hitler's basis for negotiations from the 29 August in the evening only in the early hours of the 31 August, subject to numerous provisos, by which he practically invited Poland's refusal. In this telegram to his Ambassador in Warsaw (30 August – 7.00 p.m., implemented in the early hours of the 31 August) Halifax admitted "the line we have taken", regarding it as important that Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck, "will see the line". This is to be understood in the light of the delay in the passing on of the German proposal and London's provisos regarding the contents, but no less in the deceitful conduct of the British Foreign Secretary since the 25 or rather the 28 August, with the unreserved approval of the Polish general mobilization included. To make his purpose still clearer for the Polish Foreign Minister, he added that he recommended discussions in view of "the internal situation in Germany and of world opinion". From the Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939:

"So long as the German Government profess themselves ready to negotiate, no opportunity should be given them for placing the blame for a conflict on Poland."

After the delay mentioned, i.e. from the evening of the 29 August to the early hours on 31 August, Halifax told the Poles that the German proposals did not constitute "an ultimatum", although having just previously for precisely those reasons refused to advise the Polish government in good time (24 hours after the Polish general mobilization!) that she should send an emissary with full powers to Berlin. Colonel Beck confirmed right away, early in the morning of the 31 August, that he had taken cognizance of "the line" taken by London. He seemed "greatly relieved", as Ambassador Kennard reported:

“... and he [Beck] fully realized the main importance which His Majesty's Government attaches to the necessity of not giving the German Government any opportunity for placing the blame on Poland in any refusal to enter into direct negotiations.”

At 11.00 a.m. on the 31 August, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Attolico, and the head of the Italian government, Mussolini, were taking action independently of one another. Both of them advised London

- a) that Lord Halifax must press the Polish government, for war to be avoided, to authorize Ambassador Lipski to hold negotiations with the German government;
- b) that an international conference should be convened for the 5 September

“with the object of examining the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are the cause of present disturbance in the life of Europe.”

Mussolini decided to put this suggestion to Hitler only after obtaining the British and French assent to this. No light has been shed upon the reason why State Secretary von Weizsäcker, who was informed of it by Attolico, did not pass on this proposal. In this way, as well as for the reason that the French Prime Minister Daladier called for

“convening the conference only after direct talks between Germany and Poland had failed”,

neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop heard about these suggestions on the 31 August, but only on the 2 September in the morning. On the 2 September, in the afternoon, Hitler accepted the plan of a general conference and the suspension of German military operations in Poland and agreed to have proposals for it completed within 24 hours. Hitler's willingness to use the mediator Dahlerus to the last and to send even on the 3 September, i.e. within the running-time of the British ultimatum to Germany, Göring with full powers to London, is proof that he must have accepted Mussolini's suggestion for a ceasefire-conference for the 5 September.

At 12.50 p.m. on the 31 August, Chamberlain's first reaction was already (hardly two hours after Mussolini's suggestion) to refuse, “under the threat of mobilized armies”, to agree to such a conference. In the afternoon of the 31 August, Chamberlain “now was much less in a hurry.” 142) He was not to change his mind again. Britain, while not accepting Mussolini's proposal, stipulated, after the outbreak of war, the unrealistic precondition of immediately withdrawing the German forces from Poland, before a conference could be contemplated. This was tantamount to a refusal, particularly, since even in the event of this happening, no improved likelihood for negotiations, compared to the conditions on 31 August, was proffered. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs has, on the 2 September at 2.47 a.m., likewise rejected the plan for a conference.

When passing judgment on these series of events it should be remembered that British politics in the year 1939 had been focussed on actually creating, in the first place, a “threat of mobilized armies” – courtesy of President Roosevelt's “methods short of war,” having been advocated and adopted by him since January 1939. A conference, even

with these preconditions not evoked by Hitler – since spring 1939 Poland had begun this unfounded mobilization! – would have been a far greater act of peace than to refuse all negotiations and consequently accept a military conflict. Hitler, for his part, had not refused to negotiate, even with the already months-long “threat of mobilized armies”, namely of the Polish as well as the French!

But back to the events in Berlin, London and Warsaw on 31 August. Both the British and Polish government were, in the morning of the 31 August, in possession of the German proposals (London had received them 24 hours earlier than Warsaw), and had knowledge, or rather, should have had knowledge, of the extension for the negotiations. The two governments, however, did nothing to ease the tension, making no effort for talks or a further extension of the deadline. The British government neither reproached Warsaw for provocations against the Minority Germans, nor for actions against Danzig, nor for the demands made for East Prussia and the Oder regions as voiced by Polish public opinion, nor for rejecting all negotiations, nor for the general mobilization, and, therefore, did indeed “ignore the question of the aggressor”. In addition, British government members were, in their policy regarding the press, adopting a deliberately warpromoting stance, particularly on this 31 August, spreading news they knew to be lies. Thus, The Daily Telegraph of the 31 August carried – how else but on official instruction? – the false report that

- a) Poland’s general mobilization was only a consequence of “demands from Hitler for territorial claims” or rather “of the newly put forward demands from Hitler”;
- b) the British government had immediately passed on to Warsaw Hitler’s reply of the 29 August;
- c) Great Britain had sent to Hitler, with all possible speed on the 30 August, a note by “a special courier by plane”;
- d) the German Army commanders in the border regions had been given special powers. Not one of these accounts was true, but they were all calculated so as to provoke agitation and to demonstrate anew, especially to the Poles, the position of the British leadership.

“When the British government realized the inherent dangers of this publication, they arranged for this issue to be withdrawn. In the revised edition, the statements on German military measures take up three quarters of the article, the reports on how Henderson had been received and the Cabinet debates are missing, and the following untrue news item is repeated: ‘After receiving a communication from London that indicated the kind of newly put forward demands from Hitler, the Polish government announced extraordinary defence measures.’”

At the same time (31 August, midday), Sir Horace Wilson at the Foreign Office was refusing to give Dahlerus the opportunity – as had been approved by Henderson – to get in touch with London on the embassy line of the British embassy in Berlin. When Dahlerus was relating Lipski’s refusal to take cognizance of the German willingness for negotiations or the German proposals, and he was stressing the direct consequences this mulish stubbornness would have on the peace in Europe and suggesting that London

influence Poland, Wilson put down the receiver with the words “shut up!”. The pretext that German intelligence might be listening in was without any foundation, given the topic of the conversation and the neutral position of Dahlerus as mediator. For Lipski’s stance was bound to become known to the Reich government via a different route anyway. On the other hand, to break off a conversation so abruptly – especially in the case of German security services listening in – was apt to confirm the leadership of the Reich in the conviction that in reality London does not want talks. But even given the case of no Germans listening in, the putting down of the receiver on this neutral mediator while talking was bound to give the clear signal that Britain did not want mediation.

The mediator Dahlerus had not been impeded by Hitler or Göring or doomed to failure in his mission, but rather by the British government that – reiterating the words of Halifax – “since the conclusion of the German-Soviet agreement” of 23 August was no longer willing “to patch matters up”. August the 31 was the day when Lord Halifax sanctioned Beck’s “standing firm” and his decision, not to expose Lipski to “extreme pressure and blackmail” in Berlin, but, at the same time, was reprimanding Henderson for having taken matters into his own hands, when he, once again, had been putting Lipski under pressure through Dahlerus. August the 31 was the day when the Polish government, as Beck told French Ambassador Noel, arrived at the decision that as

“we are in the thick of war, it was time not to talk of conferences but of mutual aid in resistance to aggression.”

This was the basic position in Warsaw, to label Germany that had not acted aggressively towards Poland as the “aggressor”, so as to use this pretext to become militarily active while banking on foreign support. Göring’s Research Department picked up at 12.40 p.m. an enciphered telegram from Warsaw to Lipski in Berlin, the gist of which was that the Ambassador was to seek an interview with Ribbentrop, but under no circumstances was to get involved in pertinent talks. That this telegraphic directive, which is withheld from the “Polish White Book”, is authentic, should be shown by the following:

1. Lipski’s subsequent talk with Ribbentrop at 6.30 p.m., 150) when Lipski’s attitude was in conformity with the telegram, and he had not been provided with plenary powers;
2. Beck told Kennard in Warsaw on the 31 August that Lipski would not be authorized to negotiate in Berlin;
3. Poland has never rejected this account in the “German White Book” and neither has Lipski himself.
4. In direct correlation with this note stood the arrival in Warsaw of Prince Lubomirski, sent by Lipski as a kind of special courier. This Counsellor of embassy arrived in Warsaw before noon on the 31 August. Apparently, basing it on this initiative, Lipski was still too active for the liking of his Minister for Foreign Affairs.
5. For a man such as Beck, for whom already “we are in the thick of war”, was this telegram, which practically revoked the ambassadorial powers of his representative in Berlin, merely logically consistent. Field Marshal Göring showed the text of the Polish telegram to Dahlerus and asked him to convey the information immediately to the British Ambassador, Henderson, which meant

that he was voluntarily divulging that the Polish secret code was known to Germany.

A.J.P. Taylor writes:

“Göring wanted to avoid war if this were at all possible. . . He liked to act as the mouthpiece of the German generals, themselves fearful of war; and maybe, as the supposed director of German economics, he grasped that Germany was not prepared to face a general war. The German approaches to both Soviet Russia and Great Britain came from economic experts – striking proof that the second World war did not have economic causes.”

While London let also pass by the afternoon of the 31 August unexploited, the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in accordance with the instruction sent from Warsaw at 12.40 p.m., asked to be received for talks with Ribbentrop. The Reich Foreign Minister did check back, first of all, whether Lipski wanted to see him “as a special plenipotentiary or in some other capacity”.

“This was a clear sign and offered a new chance to the Polish government: now they did not have to send a negotiator but merely give ‘special authority’ to Lipski so as to yet bring about direct talks at the eleventh hour. Lipski understood the significance of this query, because at 3.15 p.m. he had the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed by telegram and communicated to him that he personally had replied ‘that he was asking for an interview in his capacity of Ambassador to remit a communication from his government’. So now it was up to Beck to extend this ‘communication’ in the sense that Lipski could act as special plenipotentiary! Ribbentrop took advantage of this opportunity also. So as to allow time for the Polish government to make suchlike arrangements, he set the appointment for the Polish Ambassador to come to the Foreign Ministry not before 6.30 p.m.”

Beck, however, did not respond. Thus, the Polish Ambassador presented himself at 6.30 p.m. – as mentioned before – without plenary powers. He also refused, in accordance with his instructions from Warsaw, to engage in pertinent talks, stating that he “had no direct information on the subject”, and that he could not accept any proposals. Beck considered himself, even yet on the evening of the 31 August, “apparently neither asked nor requested”. Even for the British government the Poles were going too far this time; they regarded the position of the Reich government – at least to a certain degree – as justified, as is clearly shown in the already mentioned telegram sent during the night by Halifax to Kennard.

At 6.40 p.m., after the talks between Ribbentrop and Lipski had come to nothing – not, as in many cases historians have been copying from one another without giving any references, at 12.40 p.m. or 4.20 p.m. – Hitler issued the attack order to begin operations on 1 September 1939 at 4.45 a.m. For him it was a question of making use of the few hours that were possibly still left him – after more than 48 hours since the Polish general mobilization! – to forestall an evidently impending Polish attack that – as must be suspected in Berlin – could well be aligned with a French advance, and to guard

against the military disadvantages arising from this. At 9.15 p.m. of the 31 August, the German radio broadcast to the world Hitler's offer. Hereby was the Polish government given once more the opportunity by Berlin to reconsider.

But at 11.00 p.m., the Polish Broadcasting Service at Warsaw called it instead an "impudent proposal", rejected each and every negotiation, found words of derision to describe the waiting in vain of the "new Huns" and declared that Poland's reply could only be in military terms and, anyway, Poland's answer upon the German willingness to negotiate from the days before had already been "given" with "the military orders". This broadcast was done at a time, when the Polish government did not yet know of Hitler's attack order, but did have information, however, already for days as admitted, about the German willingness to negotiate and about the extremely tense situation. The Polish decision for war is, therefore, proven also with this declaration of war via the radio. Poland decided on war at a time, when Hitler was attempting to resolve the biggest territorial violation of the law of the Versailles diktat without bloodshed, with a fair compromise and, in fact, with renunciation of a kind no government of the Weimar Republic had ever been willing to make. Hitler had not attached any deadline or any ultimatum to Poland to the claim upheld for Danzig and an extra-territorial transit way into East Prussia. It is true that the Reich Chancellor had, since April 1939, set the date of completion to be the 1 September at the latest for "Operation White", the military planning against Poland, but he did not link this plan to any definite offensive purpose or to an aggressive order against Poland. This plan had been worked out, in accordance with orders, on the presupposition that Poland might "adopt a threatening attitude towards the Reich" and with the objective, "in case of need, to eliminate any threat from this direction." Whereas Hitler – as already described – during the summer months in 1939 was making numerous minor "diplomatic retreats", the wave of oppression of the German Minority welled up to such a degree – as, in fact, the resistance adherent Weizsäcker stated – that it submerged the original problem: Danzig and the passage through the Corridor. The ever-worsening crisis leading up to this date – 1 September 1939 – did not stem from Hitler's initiative, as can be proved, but rather from the initiatives on the part of Poland and Britain. It was these two countries that in August 1939 left the leadership of the Reich with the only alternative of either choosing between humiliation beyond all reasonable demand – also in the form of relinquishment of Danzig for all times and the expulsion of the rest of the Minority Germans from German territory in Poland – or the struggle for Germany's rights to existence. The Polish General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Minister without portfolio in the Cabinet in exile, revealed on 31 August 1943 to allied representatives of the press:

"Poland's decision on 30 August 1939, which was based on the decree for general mobilization, marks a turning point in the history of Europe. Hitler was now confronted with the inevitability to wage war at a time when he was hoping to achieve further victories without bloodshed."

It is not a punishable crime attempting to win bloodless victories in the political sphere – to say nothing when it concerns the re-establishment of the law according to the

principle of self-determination! – and neither can it be a question, in this specific case, of it being Hitler's irrevocable determination to a bloodless "victory" in the height of summer in 1939; after all, the Polish question has not been intensified by him: "Hitler contributed little to the course of diplomacy between April and August 1939." (AJP Taylor) General Sosnkowski, as well as the Polish government, were fully aware that Hitler did not wish to go to war over the Polish question. Therefore, the creation of "necessities" was undertaken, which would force him into war. That it was not the "fear of a strongly armed Germany", but, on the contrary, rather a misplaced belief in a rapid internal collapse of Germany, which was the guiding notion – principally in Warsaw, London and Washington – requires no detailed proof, since all documents testify to this. The British Ambassador in Berlin was also aware of these facts:

"It is a horrible thought to think that Polish readiness to negotiate may save the [National Socialist] régime. If one considered only oneself, one would say 'Don't lift a finger but just see the whole thing through'. But it is a terrible responsibility."

When Hitler issued the attack order against Poland at 6.40 p.m. on 31 August, to be carried out 4.45 a.m. on the 1 September, he still wanted to keep open the channel of a British mediation:

"In the statement about the 16-point proposal that was broadcast over the [German] radio, it did not say that the German proposals had lapsed owing to the non-arrival of the Polish negotiator within the time-limit set for the day before, but it says that 'under these circumstances', meaning all those as described in the statement, as well as the negating attitude of the Polish Ambassador in the afternoon, the German government cannot but regard their proposals as having been virtually rejected, which was then, of course, confirmed by the Polish reply at 11.00 p.m."

The German press was instructed not to talk of "war", but rather about "shooting back". What is more, everything was being done to confine the conflict, once broken out, to Poland. On the 1 September at 9.50 a.m., or rather at 10.45 a.m., the British government was again informed by the Swedish mediator, Dahlerus, that

- a) Field Marshal Göring had received orders, in view of the Dirschau bridge having been blown up, resulting in an unavoidable suspension of the transit route through Poland into East Prussia, and in view of the fighting having taken place in the Danzig area the day before (31 August), to drive back the Polish army from the border region and to destroy the Polish Air Force along the frontier;
- b) Poland's refusal to negotiate with Germany was seen by the government of the Reich as proof that single-handedly nothing else could be done on their part; c) he, Dahlerus, had

"arranged with permission of the Führer a very friendly discussion with the British Ambassador and the Polish Ambassador."

Even the Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 state:

"These pieces of information were opening up once more possibilities to intervene."

Notably absent here was any mentioning of the "destruction of Poland", but instead mention is made only of the border area, of the hopeless situation, as it was regarded in Germany, and of the intention to bring about negotiations. While, for this reason, no steps were taken on the German side that would cause the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, to leave Berlin, so that, indeed, he remained in the capital of the Reich for several more days after the 1 September, Halifax replied to the mediation and discussion proposals, which had just been put forward by Dahlerus, five hours later (1 September at 4.45 p.m.) with a "warning" to Hitler. The next stage would be, if the German reply was unsatisfactory, and if the German troops were not promptly withdrawn from Polish territory, an ultimatum with a time limit or an immediate declaration of war. In this communication the British government made no mention of openings for negotiations in case of German compliance.

Hitler had never taken any action, during his entire period in office, that were directed against British vital interests – unless, of course, the unification and strengthening of Germany was interpreted in London as a "violation of British vital interests" (Note: and also a "violation of US interests"). Great Britain, on the other hand, had done everything to meddle in affairs, which did not at all affect her interests. They went so far as to announce Germany's annihilation, when Germany was no longer going to be humiliated by Poland, when Germany was no longer going to put up with Danzig being starved out, and when the Reich government was not going to wait until the first Polish military blow was struck, which was to be expected at any moment, with the sights on Berlin, Danzig and East Prussia, and one would have to presume that it would be synchronized with the advance of the French army.

Neville Chamberlain did, once again, deliberately misinform the House of Commons on the 1 September, when he stated:

"We never got a copy of those proposals [Hitler's from the 30 August] and the first time we heard them – we heard them – was on the broadcast last night."

It was just as misleading, when he asserted that Ribbentrop had read these proposals to the British Ambassador "at top speed" – meaning unintelligibly – and had "proved" with this that they were not at all meant to be taken seriously. This speech by Chamberlain, which once again contained thus (compare his speech of 25 August) deliberate distortions, did not only expose the power structures within British democracy, according to which the people were not consulted on matters of vital importance to their existence, were not even given correct information, but it also exposed London's anti-peace orientated policy. Because – as stated – honesty is a precondition for a policy of peace! But the British government was not honest in the last days of peace:

1. They did, without having been unconditionally authorized by Poland, dupe Hitler about Polish willingness to negotiate and the British desire to mediate, asking the Reich Chancellor to draw up his basis for discussions. But Halifax, in fact, was not taking any action commensurate with an intermediary; indeed, he was fully cognizant, "...that Polish

Government have not looked with favour on the possibility of mediation" [this referred to the Roosevelt message of 25 August 1939] 169), yet, nevertheless, he extended on this 25 August the unconditional guarantee to this Poland in a war-mood, in accordance with his determination that "any attempt to patch matters up had been out of the question since the conclusion of the German-Soviet agreement."

2. As can now be proved, Halifax fabricated on the 28 August a Polish assurance of readiness to negotiate, he deceived his Ambassador, Henderson, and he added to his subterfuge manoeuvre concerning the Note to Hitler of 28 August so much explosive matter by way of giving false news accounts to diplomats and the press that he had made it impossible thereby to reach a peaceable settlement.

3. At the same time, Halifax was sending alarming messages to the Polish government, without, however, informing them in good time of the steps they had taken in Berlin and of Hitler's reaction. He thought it important that they should perceive in Warsaw his guiding principle, i.e. his "line".

4. London did not protest about the Polish general mobilization, which had to be attributed in part to the Halifaxian alarmist news from the day before. 5. Lord Halifax violated his own preconditions, which he had conveyed to Hitler two days before (28 August), when he did not, for one single moment, take any action whatsoever as intermediary, not even at this point or beyond.

6. The British government thwarted Hitler's expectation of a Polish plenipotentiary by delaying, from the evening of the 29 August to the early hours of the morning on the 31 August, and they made so many provisos in the communication that was eventually transmitted to Warsaw that they were thereby provoking a rejection from Poland. They frustrated, thereby, a direct German-Polish contact that they themselves had recommended from becoming realized, and they made the – blown out of all proportions – "question of procedure", i.e. how should the German proposals be imparted to the Polish government, insoluble. The British government, therefore, was using these three days from 28-31 August for advancing the war, while simultaneously keeping Hitler in the belief that they were continuing with intensive mediation efforts.

7. Lord Halifax also made use, during the last discussions between Hitler and Henderson, of unproved rumours according to which Germans in Poland were committing acts of sabotage. In this way he deliberately set out to also aggravate these last talks.

8. Chamberlain and Halifax – to mention just the men responsible – did mislead and did incite the House of Commons and world opinion on many particulars.¹⁷¹) This stance cannot be explained by saying that London took their bearings from Italy's secret affirmation to stay out of a war (18 August and 1 September 1939), as well as from the information supplied by German resistance adherents, according to whom the majority of the German people was against Hitler and requiring only a display of firm language from the British government to bring about a putsch within the Reich.*) The pushing by the conductors of "public opinion" in Britain and the USA, as well as that of the advisers in the Foreign Office, but also the position and ultimate objective of the British government, had been decided before these pieces of information were known. Concerning

the atmosphere in London during the last days of peace, there is a range of documents produced for the historian to see. Here are just a few:

Chamberlain in a private letter to his sister of 10 September 1939:

“The final long-drawn-out agonies that preceded the actual declaration of war were as nearly unendurable as could be. We were anxious to bring things to a head, but there were three complications – the secret communications that were going on with Göring and Hitler through a neutral intermediary, the conference proposal of Mussolini, and the French anxiety to postpone the actual declaration as long as possible, until they could evacuate their women and children, and mobilize their armies. There was very little of this that we could say in public.”

The Polish Ambassador, Raczynski, wrote:

“Later that evening [2 September 1939] Duncan Sandys came to see me at the Embassy. He told me that he, Churchill and their friends would not give way and that they could count not only on moral support from the Labour Party, but on a large section of the Conservatives. All were resolved not to capitulate, and if Chamberlain were to weaken once again, he would be overthrown.”

Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's closest collaborator, on 2 September 1939 to the press Counsellor of the German embassy in London, Dr. Fritz Hesse:

“England is resolved upon war, and is no longer keen on a compromise.”

That was the reply to a compromise request, which the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had transmitted by telephone on the 2 September to the press Counsellor of the German embassy in London:

“The Führer is prepared to withdraw from Poland and to offer compensation for damage done thus far, on the condition that we get Danzig and the road through the Corridor, provided Britain takes on the role of mediator in the German-Polish conflict. You are authorized by the Führer to submit this proposal to the British Cabinet and to take up negotiations on this immediately.”

The British historian, A.J.P. Taylor:

“Ministers, led by Halifax, warned Chamberlain that the government would fall unless it sent an ultimatum to Hitler before the House met again...In this curious way the French, who had preached resistance to Germany for twenty years, appeared to be dragged into war by the British, who had for twenty years preached conciliation. Both countries went to war for that part of the peace settlement which they had long regarded as least defensible... Such were the origins of the second World war, or rather of the war between the three Western Powers over the settlement of Versailles; a war which had been implicit since the moment when the first war ended.”

The British Foreign Secretary, shortly after the ultimatum to Germany:

“We have now forced Hitler into war, so that he can no longer cancel one part after the other of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means.”

The diplomat, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, being in the immediate vicinity of Lord Halifax, could add his own witty remark:

“Lord Halifax seemed relieved that we had taken our decision [of the 3 September]. He called for beer, which was brought down by a sleepy Resident Clerk in pyjamas. We laughed and joked. . .”

BBC - London shortly after the outbreak of war:

“Hitler has started the war but he cannot bring it to an end.”

Or to put it another way: One would not allow it that he should bring it to an end, no matter what the existing state of affairs! Had not Lloyd George been expounding, already on the 19 May 1939 in the House of Commons, the strategy of a lengthy and ever widening war? He was not alone amongst the British parliamentarians in holding this view:

“‘The main military purpose and scheme of the dictators is to produce quick results, to avoid a prolonged war. A prolonged war never suits dictators’. And in order not to permit a quick victory of the dictators Lloyd George thought it extremely necessary to bring into being as quickly as possible a triple agreement against them.”

In conformity with this strategy, Chamberlain and Halifax showed a complete disregard, both before and after the start of the war, for the Baltic States, for Poland, for Italy – to say nothing of Germany – but also treated France, willing for peace, in the same manner, when they

- a) caught France unaware at the end of March 1939 with the guarantee to Poland;
- b) rejected immediately and with finality the mediation attempts on Mussolini’s part from the 31 August and the 2 September – for the convening of a conference for the 5 September – and, thereby, rendered ineffective the approval for this plan from Paris;
- c) on the 3 September, high-handedly, without consulting the ally, sent a twohour ultimatum to Germany and were urging Paris shortly after that to follow suit.

Ten minutes before this ultimatum from London expired, at 10.50 a.m. (3 September), Dahlerus in Berlin announced to the British Foreign Office that Göring had received formal permission from Hitler to fly to London in order to reach a rational resolution (suspension of all hostilities on the condition that the troops remain at their current fronts for the duration of the talks).

“Mr Dahlerus telephoned to the Foreign Office at 10.50 a.m. to say that the German Government had drafted their reply, which was on its way to us. It should reach us by 11, though he could not guarantee that. As a last resort, might he suggest that Field-Marshal Göring should fly over to London to discuss matters? The Secretary of State sent a reply to the effect that our position had been known to the German Government for some time, and we could not now delay our procedure.”

This telephone conversation took place half an hour after a previous telephone call, in which Dahlerus had told an official of the Foreign Office, Mr. Roberts, that the German side were most anxious to give satisfactory assurances to the British government not to violate the independence of Poland. "However, never in world history had an army withdrawn before negotiations".¹ Shortly after that Great Britain declared war on Germany, and at 5.00 p.m. France did likewise. Hereby was the Poland conflict turned into a European war. The same coterie, but also Stalin, the world-revolutionary, would see to it that there would be a war of world-wide dimensions, that there would be an all-out war and that there would be an unbelievable brutalizing in the conduct of the war. On this 3 September 1939, however, Winston Churchill announced to his country and to the world:

"In this solemn hour it is a consolation to recall and to dwell upon our repeated efforts for peace. All have been ill-starred, but all have been faithful and sincere... This moral conviction alone affords that ever-fresh resilience which renews the strength and energy of people in long, doubtful and dark days. Outside, the storms of war may blow and the lands may be lashed with the fury of its gales, but in our own hearts this Sunday morning there is peace. Our hands may be active, but our consciences are at rest."

As far as Lord Halifax is concerned, who, already on the 21 July had rejected Henderson's suggestion of stopping or, rather, restricting press polemics, there exists a further incriminating quotation from the last day of peace:

"There was disquiet in the British House of Commons. A Member of Parliament from the Labour Party met the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in the lobby on 2 September. 'Are you still hopeful?' he asked. 'If you mean hopeful for war,' answered Halifax, 'then your hope will be fulfilled tomorrow'. 'Thank God!' replied the representative of the Labour Party."

12. World War 2

On September the 1st at midnight the Polish radio broadcasting proclaimed that their troops were on a triumphant advance towards Berlin and that they'll reach it by the end of the week. Hitler spoke nervously in front of the Reichstag without a prepared speech. He presented the events of the last months and emphasized that Germany has no interest in the west. He uttered the words: "As recently in a single night there happened 21 border raids, there happened another 14 in the current night with 3 serious ones. This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our own territory. We have now been returning the fire since 5 : 45 a.m." His speech also included: "Our goals: I am determined to resolve 1. the question of Danzig and 2. the question of the Corridor, and to see to it that 3. a change of tone comes about in German-Polish relations, so as to warrant peaceful coexistence."

On one side it was Germany with 75 divisions with 1.1 million soldiers and "three weeks worth of ammunition" and on the other side the Polish army with 1.7 million soldiers, which was defeated after 18 days by the Wehrmacht. The German soldiers came across many graves and dead bodies within Polish territory, known as the Bromberg Massacre of September the 3rd, where over 5000 Germans were killed. British historian A.J.P. Taylor writes: "The state of the German armament at the beginning of the war shows without doubt that Hitler did not desire general war, but most likely no war at all." The British military-historian Sir Lidell Hart ascertains: "Hitler did not want world war ... We acquired the relevant German archives after the war and we can draw a precise picture of the extraordinary degree of fear of a coming war within German leading circles."

Also on September the 3rd Britain and France declared war on Germany. British foreign minister Halifax proclaimed in the lower chamber: "Now we have forced Hitler into war, so that he can no longer neutralise one part of the Versailles Treaty after another by peaceful means." Shortly after Churchill proclaimed via radio broadcast: "This war is an English war and its goal is the destruction of Germany." Marshall Rydz-Śmigły abandoned his military on the second day of war and hid in the Warsaw underground, where he died in 1941. Polish foreign minister Beck died a little bit later as an alcoholic in Rumania. The Soviet offensive against Poland started on September the 17th and was not answered by Britain and France with a declaration of war.

Australia, India, South-Africa and Canada also declared war on Germany in September 1939 while Yugoslavia allowed France to use their territory for war shipments. A British-Turkish alliance was created on October the 3rd. Greece, which was highly agitated

thanks to Allied propaganda, requested immediate support from Britain and France with airforce units. In return, Britain demanded and received half of Greece's merchant fleet.

By November 1939 Adolf Hitler had faced up to the fact that the war would go on. When Alfred Rosenberg came to him with nebulous reports of fresh peace moves within the British air ministry, the Führer belittled the prospects: while he himself would still favour a German-British rapprochement, he said, London was in the grip of a Jewish-controlled, lunatic minority. Hitler said he failed to see what the British really wanted. "Even if the British won, the real victors would be the United States, Japan, and Russia."

12.1 Introduction

From 1966:

The history of the Second World War is a very complex one. Even now, after hundreds of volumes and thousands of documents have been published, many points are not clear, and interpretations of numerous events are hotly disputed. The magnitude of the war itself would contribute to such disputes. It lasted exactly six years, from the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 to the Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945. During that period it was fought on every continent and on every sea, in the heights of the atmosphere and beneath the surface of the ocean, and fought with such destruction of property and lives as had never been witnessed before. The total nature of the Second World War can be seen from the fact that deaths of civilians exceeded deaths of combatants and that many of both were killed without any military justification, as victims of sheer sadism and brutality, largely through coldblooded savagery by Germans, and, to a lesser extent, by Japanese and Russians, although British and American attacks from the air on civilian populations and on nonmilitary targets contributed to the total. The distinctions between civilians and military personnel and between neutrals and combatants, which had been blurred in the First World War, were almost completely lost in the second. This is clear from a few figures. The number of civilians killed reached 17 millions, of which 5,400,000 were Polish; while Poland had less than 100,000 soldiers killed or missing in the Battle of Poland in 1939, Polish civilians to the number of 3,900,000 were executed, or murdered in the ghetto, subsequently.

The armies which began to move in September 1939 had no new weapons which had not been possessed by the armies of 1918. They still used infiltration tactics, with columns of tanks, strafing airplanes, and infantrymen moving in trucks, but the proportions of these and the ways in which they cooperated with one another had been greatly modified. Weapons for defense were also much as they had been at the end of the previous war, but, as we shall see, they were not prepared in proper amounts nor were they used in proper fashions. These defensive weapons included antitank guns, antiaircraft guns with controlled fire, minefields, mobile artillery on caterpillar tracks, trenches, and defense in depth. Germany used the offensive weapons we have mentioned in the new fashion, while

Poland in 1939, Norway, the Low Countries, and France in 1940, the Balkan countries and the Soviet Union in 1941 did not use the available defensive tactics properly. As a result, Hitler advanced from one astounding victory to another. In the course of 1942 and 1943, new weapons created by democratic science and new tactics learned in Russia, in North Africa, and on the oceans of the world made it possible to stop the authoritarian advance and to reverse the direction of the tide. In 1944 and 1945 the returning tide of Anglo-American and Soviet power overwhelmed Italy, Germany, and Japan with the superior quality and the superior quantities of their equipment and men. Thus the war divides itself, quite naturally, into three parts: (1) the Axis advance covering 1939, 1940, and 1941; (2) the balance of forces in 1942; and (3) the Axis retreat in 1943, 1944, and 1945.

The Germans were able to advance in the period 1939-1941 because they had sufficient military resources, and used them in an effective way. The chief reason they had sufficient military resources was not based, as is so often believed, on the fact that Germany was highly mobilized for war, but on other factors. In the first place, Hitler's economic revolution in Germany had reduced financial considerations to a point where they played no role in economic or political decisions. When decisions were made, on other grounds, money was provided, through completely unorthodox methods of finance, to carry them out. In France and England, on the other hand, orthodox financial principles, especially balanced budgets and stable exchange rates, played a major role in all decisions and was one of the chief reasons why these countries did not mobilize in March 1936 or in September 1938 or why, having mobilized in 1939 and 1940, they had totally inadequate numbers of airplanes, tanks, antitank guns, and motorized transportation.. There was another reason for the military inadequacy of the Western Powers in 1939. This, of even greater significance than the influence of orthodox finance, arose from conflicts of military theories in the period 1919-1939. Several violently conflicting theories held the stage during the twenty years of armistice, and paralyzed the minds of military men to the point where they were unable to provide consistent advice on which politicians could base their decisions. In Germany, on the other hand, decisions (not necessarily correct ones) were made, and action could go on.

One theoretical dispute raged around the role of tanks in combat. The tank had been invented to protect advancing infantry against machine-gun fire by its ability to put machine guns out of action. Accordingly, tanks were originally scattered among the infantry, to advance with it, both moving at a rate of speed no greater than that of a man on foot, consolidating the ground, yard by yard, as both moved forward. This view of the tactical function of tanks continued to be held in high military circles in France and England until too late in 1940. It was sharply challenged, even a decade earlier, by those who insisted that tanks should be organized in distinct units (armored brigades or divisions) and should be used, without close infantry support, moving as perpendicular columns rather than in parallel lines against the defensive formations, and should seek to penetrate through these formations at high speed and without consolidating the ground

covered, in order to fan out on the rear of the defensive formations to disrupt their supplies, communications, and reserves. According to these new ideas, the breakthrough made by such an armored column could be exploited and the ground consolidated by motorized infantry, following the armored division in trucks and dismounting to occupy areas where this would be most useful. In France, the new theory of armored warfare was advocated most vigorously by Colonel Charles de Gaulle. It was generally rejected by his superior officers, so that De Gaulle was still a colonel in 1940. This theory was, however, accepted in the German Army, notably by Heinz Guderian in 1934, and was used very effectively against the Poles in and against the Western Front in 1940.

At full strength a German panzer (armored) division had two regiments of tanks and two regiments of motorized infantry plus various specialized companies. This gave it a total of 14,000 men with 250 tanks and about 3,000 motorized vehicles. In September 1939, Germany had six of these panzer divisions with a total of 1,650 tanks of which one-third were 18-ton models with a 37-mm. gun (Mark III), while two-thirds were 10-ton models (Mark II). By May 1940, when the attack was made in the west, there were 10 armored divisions with a total of 2,000 tanks, some of which were the new Mark IV model, a 23-ton conveyance carrying a 75-mm. gun. No major increase occurred in the next year, but the number of armored divisions was doubled by splitting the ten which existed in May 1940. Thus in June 1941, when Germany attacked Russia, it had 20 armored divisions with a total of 3,000 tanks, of which several hundred were Mark IV but 1,000 were still Mark II. In opposition to these, Poland had only a handful of tanks in 1939, France had over 3,000 in May 1940, and the Soviet Union had, in June 1941, about 15,000 scattered tanks, almost all light or obsolescent models. (Note: As seen in a later Chapter with post-1990 sources, it was closer to 22000-24000 tanks which were far from obsolete, on the contrary. Even in 2016, the use of this Soviet post-war propaganda about an "obsolete" military is widely spread.)

A second theory which paralyzed the Western Powers in the years before World War II was concerned with the superiority of defensive over offensive tactics. This defensive theory, of which the Englishman Basil Liddell Hart was the most voluble proponent, assumed that attack would be made in lines, as the Western Powers themselves were trained to attack, and that such an attack would be very unlikely to succeed because of the great increase in firepower of modern weapons. It was argued, on the basis of the experience of World War I, that machine guns could hold up advancing infantry indefinitely and that artillery fire, carefully placed and ranged so that it could cover the field, could prevent tanks from silencing the defensive machine guns to allow infantry to advance. The Maginot Line was based on these theories. As such, it was not a defense in depth (which would seek to break up offensive columns by allowing them to penetrate to varying depths, thus separating tanks, infantry, and artillery so that each could be dealt with by proper weapons as impetus was dispersed), but was a rigid line (which sought to stop the offensive lines in front of it, as a whole). The theory of defensive superiority left the military forces of the Western states with inadequate offensive training, poor offensive morale, and unable to

come to the help of distant allies (like Poland); it put a premium on a passive, indecisive, inactive military outlook (such as shown by Pétain or Gamelin in the years leading up to 1940) and left them unable to handle any real offensive when it came against them. The theory of continuous defensive lines, which must be kept intact or instantly reestablished whenever they are breached, created a psychology which was incapable of dealing with an assault which came at it in columns and inevitably must breach any defensive line at the point of impact. When this occurred in 1940, French military units threw down their arms or tried to make a precipitous retreat to some point where a new continuous line could be established. As a consequence, the Poles in 1939 and, to a greater extent, the French in 1940, were constantly abandoning positions from which they had not been driven, until units were too broken up to allow hope of reestablishing any continuous line, and France proved to be too small to permit continued retreat. The only alternative seemed to be surrender. As we shall see later, another, highly effective, alternative was discovered, mostly in Russia, by 1942.

In the inter-war period there was a third theory, violently disputed, about the effectiveness of air power. In its most extreme form, this theory held that the chief cities of Europe could be destroyed almost completely in the first twenty-four hours of a war, devastated by high-explosive bombs and rendered uninhabitable by gas attacks from the air. This theory, frequently associated with the name of the Italian General Giulio Douhet, was much more prevalent in civilian circles than in military ones, and played an important role in persuading the British and French peoples to accept the Munich Agreement. Like most farfetched ideas, it was supported more frequently by slogans than by logic or by facts, in this case by mottoes like, "The bombers will always get through." The chief facts to support the theory were to be found in the Spanish Civil War, notably in the German destruction of Guernica in 1937 and the ruthless Italian bombardment of Barcelona in 1938. No one paid much attention to the fact that, in both of these cases, the targets were totally undefended. The military advocates of such air bombardment, most of them considerably more moderate than General Douhet, concentrated their attention on what was called "strategic bombing," that is, on the construction of long-range bombing planes for use against industrial targets and other civilian objectives and on very fast fighter planes for defense against such bombers. They generally belittled the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery and were generally warm advocates of an air force separately organized and commanded and thus not under the direct control of army or naval commanders. These advocates were very influential in Britain and in the United States.

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were very influential in Britain and in the United States. The upholders of strategic bombing received little encouragement in Germany, in Russia, or even in France, because of the dominant position held by traditional army officers in all three of these countries. In France, all kinds of air power were generally neglected, while in the other two countries strategic bombing against civilian objectives was completely subordinated in favor of tactical bombing of military objectives immediately on the fighting front. Such tactical bombing demanded planes of a more flexible character, with shorter range than strategic bombers and less speed than defensive fighters, and under the closest control by the local commanders of ground forces so that their bombing efforts could be directed, like a kind of mobile and longrange artillery, at those points of resistance, of supply, or of reserves which would help the ground offensive most effectively. Such "dive-bombers," or Stukas, played a major role in the early German victories of 1939-1941. Here, again, this superiority was based on quality and method of usage and not on numbers. In the three major campaigns of 1939-1941 Germany had a first-line air force of about 2,000 planes, of which half were fighters and half were tactical bombers. On the other side, Poland had 377 military aircraft in 1939; France and Britain had about 3,000 in 1940; while the Soviet Union had at least 8,000 of very varying quality in 1941.

12.2 The Battle of Poland

The German invasion of Poland began with powerful air attacks at 4:40 A. M. on September 1. These attacks, aimed at airfields, assembly points, and railroads, wiped out the Polish air force of 377 planes, mostly on the ground, and, in combination with the rapidly advancing German armored spearheads of tank divisions, made it impossible for Poland to mobilize completely, crippled Polish reconnaissance, destroyed any centralized system of communications, and reduced Polish resistance to numerous fragments of uncoordinated fighting units. The Poles had 30 infantry divisions, a motorized brigade, 38 companies of tanks, and large masses of cavalry, but could bring only a portion of these into action. Germany struck at Poland with 2,000 planes (of which 400 were dive-bombers) supporting 44 divisions (of which 6 were armored or panzer divisions and 6 were motorized). These forces were organized into 5 armies. The Fourth Army drove down from Pomerania in the northwest while the Eighth and Tenth armies drove upward from Saxony, the three converging in a pincers movement at a point west of Warsaw. At the same time, a much larger pincer converging on the Bug River, a hundred miles east of Warsaw, was formed by the German Third Army, advancing from the Polish Corridor and East Prussia, and the German Fourteenth Army driving northeastward from Galicia and Slovakia. The armored divisions, supported by dive-bombers, raced ahead of their supporting infantry and disrupted all Polish plans, communications, and supplies. The Polish forces, caught in too advanced positions, vainly tried to fight their way eastward to the Vistula and the Bug rivers but were broken up, isolated, and destroyed. Violent but hopeless fighting continued in the pockets, but by September 15th, when Guderian's tanks entered

Brest-Litovsk in eastern Poland, the country had been destroyed.

Although Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3rd, it cannot be said that they made war during the next two weeks in which fighting raged in Poland. British airplanes roamed over Germany, dropping leaflets for propaganda purposes, and French patrols ventured into the space between the Maginot Line and the German West-wall, but no support was given to Poland. Although France had three million men under arms and Hitler had left only eight regular divisions on his western border, no attack was made by France. Strict orders were issued to the British Air Force not to bomb any German land forces, and these orders were not modified until April 1940; similar orders by Hitler to the Luftwaffe were maintained for part of this same period. When some British Members of Parliament, led by Amery, put pressure on the government to drop bombs on German munition stores in the Black Forest, the air minister, Sir H. Kingsley Wood, rejected the suggestion with asperity, declaring: "Are you aware it is private property? Why, you will be asking me to bomb Essen next; Essen was the home of the Krupp munitions factories.

Similar efforts to force the French to take some action against Germany were rejected on the ground that this might irritate the Germans so that they would strike back at the Western Powers. To quiet the English parliamentary group which was demanding action, its leading figure, Winston Churchill, was made first lord of the Admiralty, but the British Navy went into action so slowly that the German "pocket" battleships were able to escape from their ports and from the North Sea out on to the high seas where they could become commerce raiders. Blockade of Germany was established in such a perfunctory fashion that large quantities of French iron ore, as well as other commodities, continued to go to Germany through the neutral Low Countries in return for German coal coming by the same route. These exchanges continued for weeks. On his part Hitler issued orders to his air force not to cross the Western frontier except for reconnaissance, to his navy not to fight the French, and to his submarines nor to molest passenger vessels and to treat unarmed merchant ships according to the established rules of international prize law. In open disobedience to these orders, a German submarine sank the liner *Athenia*, westward bound in the Atlantic, without warning and with a loss of 112 lives, on September 3rd.

As Poland was collapsing without a hand being raised to help it, the Soviet Union was invited by Hitler to invade Poland from the east and occupy the areas which had been granted to it in the Soviet-German agreement of August 23rd. The Russians were eager to move, in order to ensure that the Germans stop as far as possible from the Soviet frontiers, but they were desperately afraid that if they did enter Poland the Western Powers might declare war on Russia in support of their guarantee to Poland and would then wage war against the Soviet Union while not fighting Germany or even while allowing economic and military aid to go to Germany. Accordingly, the Kremlin held up its invasion of Poland until September 17th. On that day the Polish government petitioned Romania to be allowed to seek refuge in that state. The Soviet Union felt that it could not be accused of aggression against Poland if no Polish government still existed on Polish soil.

The Soviet leaders sought to justify their advance into Polish territory with the excuse that they must restore order and provide protection for the Ruthenian and White Russian peoples of eastern Poland. The Soviet and Nazi armies met without incidents. On September 28th a new agreement was made between Molotov and Ribbentrop, dividing Poland. Accordingly, Lithuania was shifted into the Soviet sphere, while in Poland itself the German sphere was extended eastward from the Vistula to the Bug River along the old Curzon Line because Russia wanted to follow the nationality boundary.

12.3 The Fall of France

The German forces which attacked on May 10th were inferior in manpower to the forces which faced them but were much more unified, used their equipment in an effective fashion, and had a single plan which they proceeded to carry out. Amounting to about 136 divisions, they were opposed by 156 divisions, but the defenders were divided into four different national armies, were arranged improperly, were given tasks too difficult for their size and equipment and, in general, were so managed that their weakest points coincided completely with the most powerful German attacks. The French plan of campaign was dominated by two factors: the Maginot Line and Plan D. The Maginot Line, an elaborate and expensive system of permanent fortifications, ran from Switzerland to Montmédy. Behind this line, where they could not be used in the great battle drawing near, were stationed 62 of 102 French divisions on this frontier. From Montmédy to the sea, France had 40 divisions, plus the British Expeditionary Force of 10 divisions.

Originally the German plans were, as the French anticipated, a modified version of the Schlieffen Plan of 1905, involving a wide sweep through the Low Countries. The false alarms of a German attack in the winter of 1939-1940 revealed to the Germans, however, that the Allies would meet this attack by a rapid advance into Belgium. Accordingly, at the suggestion of General Erich von Manstein, the Germans modified their plans to encourage the Allied advance into Belgium while the Germans planned to strike with their greatest strength at Sedan, the pivot of the Allied turning movement. Such an assault at Sedan made it necessary for the German forces to pass over the narrow, winding roads of the Ardennes Forest, then to cross the deep and swift Meuse River, and to break between Corap's and Huntziger's forces, but, if this could be done and Sedan taken, excellent roads and a railroad ran from Sedan westward across France to the sea.

Under the "Manstein Plan" the German attack from the North Sea to Sedan was organized in four armies. In the north, the Netherlands was attacked by the German Eighteenth Army (one panzer and four infantry divisions); in the middle, Belgium was attacked by the German Sixth Army (two panzer and 15 infantry divisions) and the German Fourth Army (two panzer and 12 infantry divisions); farther south, in the Ardennes area, France was attacked by the German Twelfth Army (five panzer and four other divisions); from Sedan to Switzerland, although Germany had about 30 divisions, all were infantry formations

and no major offensive was made. The "Manstein Plan" was a total surprise to the French. They were so convinced that the Ardennes were impassable for large forces, especially for tanks, that everything was done to make the German task easier: Corap and Huntziger placed their poorest forces (six Series B divisions, undermanned, with little training) on either side of Sedan and their best forces on their fronts most remote from the Ardennes (that is, from Sedan). In Huntziger's case these better divisions were behind the Maginot Line itself. Because of the Ardennes, Corap gave his four poor divisions near Sedan no antitank guns, no anti-aircraft guns, and no air support.

The German attack began at 5:35 on May 10th. Two days later the panzer division with the German Eighteenth Army broke through the Dutch defenses and began to join up with parachute and airborne forces which had been dropped behind these; the Netherlands collapsed. The Dutch field forces surrendered on May 14th, after much of the center of Rotterdam had been destroyed in a twenty-minute air attack. The Netherlands royal family and the government moved to England to continue the war. The great mass of the German attack fell on Belgium, and was greatly aided by the failure of many ordinary defensive precautions. Vital bridges over the Meuse and the Albert Canal were destroyed only partly or not at all. The defenders on the Albert Canal were attacked from the rear by parachutists and glider forces which had been landed behind them. The powerful fort of Eben Emael, covering the canal bridges, was captured by airborne volunteers who landed on its roof and destroyed its gun apertures with explosives. Belgium's forces fell backward toward the Dyle as the French and British units, according to Plan D, wheeled northeastward, on Sedan as a pivot, to meet them. As the Belgian forces withdrew northwest, while the German attack swung southwest, the main burden of the German assault now fell on the French First Army, to pin it down and thus prevent it from reinforcing Corap farther south. In this the Germans were successful.

The attack through the Ardennes on Corap's Ninth Army was made by a special German force of five panzer and three motorized divisions under General Paul von Kleist. These passed through the forest and crossed the Meuse to fling themselves on the right side of Corap's inexperienced divisions. By the evening of May 15th, Corap's army had been "volatilized," and the German spearhead was racing forward thirty-five miles west of Sedan. The misplaced French Sixth Army, in reserve 300 miles south near Lyon, began to move toward the breach, while General Giraud, with three divisions from the Seventh Army, was ordered from the extreme northwest, and seven other divisions were taken from the forces behind the Maginot Line. All these arrived too late, because von Kleist's advance units crossed France and reached the sea at Abbeville on May 20th, having covered 220 miles in eleven days. No coordinated attack was ever made on this thin extended line, although orders were issued for it to be attacked both from the north and the south.

The Allied forces retreating southward from Belgium were greatly hampered by masses of refugees clogging the roads, were constantly harassed by Stukas, and had lost communication between units. There was almost no contact or cooperation between the

French, British, and Belgians in the north, or between these and the French forces south of Kleist's breakthrough. Panic swept Paris. On May 17th Reynaud replaced Daladier as minister of national defense and generally shook up the government, replacing many weak men by defeatists, appeasers, and Fascist sympathizers. The chief new face was that of Marshal Pétain, eighty-three years old, the man chiefly responsible for the inadequacy of French military planning in the inter-war period. On May 27th, King Leopold of Belgium made an unconditional surrender of his armies to the Germans, over the objections of the Belgian civil government and without making certain that the Allied Command had been informed. The British Expeditionary Force at once began to evacuate the Continent through Dunkerque. In seven days, using 887 water craft of all types and sizes, 337,131 men were taken off the beaches at Dunkerque under relentless air bombardment (May 28th-June 4th). By Hitler's direct order, no intensive ground attack was made on the Allied forces within the Dunkerque perimeter, as Hitler was convinced that Britain would make peace as soon as France was defeated, and wished to save his dwindling armored forces and munitions for the attack on the rest of France.

The Battle of France began on June 5th with German attacks on the western and eastern ends of the "Weygand Line." By June 8th the western end had been broken, and German forces began to move to the rear of the Somme defenses. As the line collapsed and the military forces fell back, they disintegrated among packed masses of civilian refugees, hurried onward by German dive-bombers. Paris and later all cities of France were declared open cities, not to be defended. Just as in Kleist's original breakthrough, no effort was made to hold up the Germans by road obstacles, civilian resistance, house-to-house fighting, destruction of supplies, or (above all) destruction of abandoned gasoline. The German armored units roamed at will on captured fuel. On June 12th Weygand requested the French government to seek an armistice; Reynaud refused to permit any civilian surrender, since this was forbidden by an Anglo-French agreement of March 12, 1940. Instead, he gave permission for a military capitulation, if the civil government continued the war.

There was also considerable pressure behind the scenes from anti-democratic French industrialists in monopolistic lines such as chemicals, light metals, synthetic fibers, and electrical utilities. These industrialists, together with politicians like Laval and private or commercial banks, like the Banque Worms, or the Banque de l'Indochine, had been negotiating cartel and other agreements with Germany for ten years, and felt an armistice would offer a splendid opportunity to complete and enforce these agreements.

As the military collapse continued, piteous appeals for help were sent to London and to Washington. Reynaud sent eighteen messages to Churchill asking for more air support, but could obtain none, as the British War Cabinet wished to save all the planes it still had for the defense of Britain after the French collapse. Appeals to Roosevelt were no more successful.

The chief concern in London and Washington was over the fate of the French fleet and of French North and West Africa, especially Dakar. If Hitler obtained the French fleet or

any considerable portion of it, British and American security would be in acute jeopardy. The French fleet was of high quality and included two new battleships (Richelieu and Jean Bart) which had just been built but were not yet in service. Such a navy, in combination with the German and Italian navies, might destroy Britain's sea defenses and force a British surrender. This would place America in great danger, as American security in the Atlantic had been preserved by the British fleet since 1818 and, by 1940, the whole American battle fleet had to be kept in the Pacific to face Japan. Only less immediate than these dangers was the threat to both British and American security from a German occupation of French North and West Africa. This would close the British route through the Mediterranean immediately and allow the Italian forces in Libya to invade Egypt with relative impunity. The possession of Dakar by German forces would provide a base from which submarines could attack the British route to the East by way of South Africa and might permit an attack on Brazil, only 1,700 miles west of Dakar.

With these considerations in mind, Washington and London did all they could to dissuade Mussolini from attacking France and to persuade the French to avoid any armistice which might yield either French Africa or the French fleet to Hitler. Eventually Britain gave permission to France to seek an armistice if the fleet sailed to British ports. This was rejected by the French military and naval authorities. As a final effort, Churchill, on June 16th, offered France a political union with Britain, involving joint Anglo-French citizenship and a joint Cabinet. This was never considered by the French. Before France could officially surrender, Churchill tried to convince his War Cabinet to attack the French Fleet. The War Cabinet refused. There were several concerns on the table. For one, the attack would surely result in the loss of British troops and ships. Second, although getting beaten by Germany and showing eagerness to throw in the towel, France was still an ally. On June 24, France and Germany signed an armistice. Part of that agreement was the French could keep their ships, but Germany would gain control over items such as passports and tickets. Hitler treaded lightly concerning the ships and did not push for full ownership. He feared such aggression would inspire the French to keep fighting. Hitler's concerns were not known to England. However, on July 1, Churchill was finally able to get the backing of the War Cabinet to sink the ships if they would not be surrendered. On July 3, the British surrounded the French Fleet at the port of Mers-el-Kebir right outside Oran, Algeria. Churchill's message was clear: sail to Britain, sail to the USA, or scuttle your ships in the next six hours. At first, the French refused to speak to negotiators. Two hours later, the French showed the British an order they had received from Admiral Darlan instructing them to sail the ships to the USA if the Germans broke the armistice and demanded the ships. Meanwhile, the British intercepted a message from the Vichy Government ordering French reinforcements to move urgently to Oran. Churchill was done playing games and ordered the attack to his commanders, "Settle everything before dark or you will have reinforcements to deal with." An hour and a half later, the British Fleet attacked. In less than ten minutes, 1,297 French soldiers were dead and three battleships were sunk. One battleship and five destroyers managed to escape.

The armistice negotiations were conducted in the same railway carriage at Compiègne in the forest of Rethondes where Germany had surrendered in 1918; they took three days, and went into effect on June 25th. Hitler was so convinced that Britain would also make peace that he gave surprisingly lenient terms to France. In spite of Mussolini's demands, France did not have to give up any overseas territory or any ports on the Mediterranean, no naval vessels or any airplanes or armaments to be used against England. Northern France and all the western coast to the Pyrenees came under occupation, but the rest was left unoccupied, ruled by a government free from direct German control and policed by French armed forces.

12.4 US at the Start of the War

On September 1, President Roosevelt issued an appeal to Britain, France, Germany, and Poland to refrain from bombing civilian populations in unfortified cities. Unless such a procedure were followed, thousands of innocent human beings "who have no responsibility for the hostilities which have broken out will lose their lives." Hitler immediately replied that he "unconditionally endorsed" the President's plea, and this action was followed by Poland on the same day. On September 2 the British and French governments issued a declaration stating that they were "entirely in sympathy with the humanitarian sentiments" which inspired the President's appeal.

The American military attache in Berlin was equally optimistic with regard to checking the progress of the German military machine. The Poles were following a preconceived plan that envisaged "delaying the German advance with covering forces and stubbornly holding fortified areas. . . . They are making the Germans pay dearly for every kilometer gained and are exhausting the best German divisions." The Polish defense was "being carried out as planned by the Poles and the French and British missions, and appears to be succeeding." These dispatches from Berlin read like chapters from Alice in Wonderland, and in 1939 it appeared as though Neville Chamberlain was assuming the role of the Mad Hatter when he could not send even token assistance to the hard-pressed Poles. Nowadays it seems evident that the real Mad Hatter was Franklin D. Roosevelt who pressed Chamberlain to give promises to the Poles when there was no possibility of fulfilling them. According to some reports, it was William C. Bullitt who cast Roosevelt in this grotesque role.

I recently received from Mr. Verne Marshall, former editor of the Cedar Rapids Gazette, a letter in which he made the following significant statements:

"President Roosevelt wrote a note to William Bullitt [in the summer of 1939], then Ambassador to France, directing him to advise the French Government that if, in the event of a Nazi attack upon Poland, France and England did not go to Poland's aid, those countries could expect no help from America if a general war developed. On the other hand, if France and England immediately declared war on Germany [in the

event of a Nazi attack upon Poland], they could expect "all aid" from the United States. F.D.R.'s instructions to Bullitt were to send this word along to "Joe" and "Tony," meaning Ambassadors Kennedy, in London, and Biddle, in Warsaw, respectively. F.D.R. wanted Daladier, Chamberlain and Josef Beck to know of these instructions to Bullitt. Bullitt merely sent his note from F.D.R. to Kennedy in the diplomatic pouch from Paris. Kennedy followed Bullitt's idea and forwarded it to Biddle. When the Nazis grabbed Warsaw and Beck disappeared, they must have come into possession of the F.D.R. note. The man who wrote the report I sent you, saw it in Berlin in October, 1939."

After receiving this letter from Mr. Marshall I wrote at once to Mr. Bullitt and inquired about this alleged instruction from the President. He replied as follows: "I have no memory of any instruction from President Roosevelt of the nature quoted in your letter to me and feel quite certain that no such instruction was ever sent to me by the President." Mr. Joseph Kennedy sent to me a similar negative answer with reference to this alleged instruction from the President, but the Forrestal Diaries would indicate that Bullitt did strongly urge President Roosevelt to exert pressure upon Prime Minister Chamberlain and that Roosevelt responded to this pressure. The following excerpt has far-reaching implications:

"27 December 1945: Played golf today with Joe Kennedy (Joseph P. Kennedy, who was Roosevelt's Ambassador to Great Britain in the years immediately before the war). I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's (William C. Bullitt, then Ambassador to France) urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside. Kennedy's response always was that putting iron up his backside did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not. . . . What Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain should have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt's request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon. Looking backward there is undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy's belief that Hitler's attack could have been deflected to Russia."

Mr. Kennedy is known to have a good memory and it is highly improbable that his statements to Secretary Forrester were entirely untrustworthy. Ambassador Bullitt was doing a lot of talking in 1939 and he was regarded as the mouthpiece of the President. In January 1939 he had a long conversation with Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, and left him with the impression that "he [Bullitt] had received from President Roosevelt a very detailed definition of the attitude taken by the United States towards the present European crisis. He will present this material at the Quai d'Orsay. . . . The contents of these directions . . . were: (1) The vitalizing foreign policy, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries; . . . (2) it is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put [an] end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries."

In February 1939, Bullitt had a conversation with Jules Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador in Paris, and once again he seemed to speak with authority. He confided to Lukasiewicz that Washington official circles were greatly concerned about the outbreak of war in Europe. If Britain and France were defeated, Germany "would become dangerous to the realistic interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain. . . . One thing . . . seems certain to me, namely, that the policy of President Roosevelt will henceforth take the course of supporting France's resistance . . . and to weaken British compromise tendencies."

These excerpts from the dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and in Paris afford a clear indication of the fact that President Roosevelt, through Bullitt, was exerting steady pressure upon Britain and France to stand up boldly to Nazi Germany. When this policy led to a war in which Nazi armed forces easily crushed French resistance, it is easy now to understand the poignancy of Premier Reynaud's pleas to Roosevelt for prompt assistance. He and Daladier had taken the assurances of Bullitt seriously and the hysterical tone of Reynaud's repeated wires to the White House indicates a feeling of betrayal. From the battered walls of Warsaw there were loud murmurs about broken British promises. When their muted echoes reached London, Neville Chamberlain must have remembered the constant "needling from Washington" in favor of a more resolute stand against Hitler, and Joseph Kennedy must have had reluctant recollections of the many occasions when the President "kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside." Germany had been baited into a war with Britain and France when she would have preferred a conflict with Russia over the Ukraine. Chamberlain got plenty of iron up his backside, but it was Nazi hot metal that seared him and all Britain and helped to break into bits a proud empire that all the King's horses and all the King's men can never put together again.

The President Promises Peace for the U.S.

IMMEDIATELY after the outbreak of World War II, President Roosevelt made a radio address in which he reminded the American people that they should master “at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations. When peace has been broken anywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.” This theme of a “one world” he emphasized again and again: “Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the American future.” In order to relieve the apprehensions that millions of Americans must have felt as a result of this stress upon the one-world concept, he then glibly gave the following assurance: “Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality.” This assurance was followed by a reference to the “historic precedent that goes back to the days of the administration of President George Washington.” America would remain “a neutral nation.” But he closed his address with a curtain line that had an ominous implication: “As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no blackout of peace in the United States.”

The Mission of William Rhodes Davis to Berlin

One way to prevent a blackout of peace in the United States was to bring the war in Europe to a close. This might be effected through American mediation. In the early part of September 1939, William Rhodes Davis, an independent oil operator of large wealth, decided to ask President Roosevelt to approve a mission to Berlin and Rome for the purpose of arranging American mediation. Davis was a close friend of John L. Lewis who had bought Roosevelt’s good will by a half million dollar contribution to the campaign fund of 1936. Davis himself had made a modest contribution of \$300,000 to the same fund. Through his intimate connections with Dr. Hertslet, representing German banking and industrial interests, and with President Cardenas of Mexico, Davis had arranged large sales of oil to Germany. Inasmuch as a European war would put an end to these sales, Davis was extremely anxious to promote peace. After the outbreak of the war he hurried to Washington where, with the assistance of John L. Lewis, he arranged for a conference with President Roosevelt. On September 15 a meeting was held in the White House with the President, “Steve” Early, John L. Lewis, Adolf Berle, Cordell Hull, and Mr. Davis in attendance. It was decided to send Davis to Rome and Berlin in order to see if there was any possibility of arranging terms for American mediation in the war that had just broken out.

After some difficulty at Bermuda which required State Department intervention to permit him to continue on his trip, Davis finally arrived in Berlin for some important conferences with General Goring. At the first conference he made the following statement to Goring.

"It is my opinion that immediate settlement would return to Germany . . . Danzig, the Corridor and the former provinces in Poland which were taken away from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, and that the question of the colonies formerly owned by Germany, prior to 1914 . . . could be compromised. If Mr. Hitler would set forth a reasonable basis of settlement and the assistance of Mr. Roosevelt requested as mediator, he would give it serious consideration. The President, I am sure, believes that a new economic arrangement should be arrived at by the contesting nations which would provide each nation with raw materials, goods and commodities essential to maintain its economic integrity and well-being. The Field Marshal replied: "These statements are very surprising as the impression in Germany is that Mr. Roosevelt's feelings are now against Germany and that he is sympathetic to England and France." . . . Regarding the question of peace, the Field Marshal stated: "Germany is and always has been ready to work for peace in Europe on sound equitable lines. The views . . . which you have conveyed to me correspond substantially to the views of Mr. Hitler and his Government. A world conference appears under the circumstances to be the only practical medium through which these mutual hopes for peace can be achieved. Germany will welcome the aid of Mr. Roosevelt in bringing about such a conference. . . . The fundamental and motivating purpose of such a conference must be to establish a new order in the world designed to secure an enduring peace. A pre-requisite to that aim is the complete liquidation of the Versailles system. . . . Germany is prepared to accept any method and to welcome any suggestion, consistent with its inalienable right as a nation to live on a basis of equality with other nations, which will guarantee enduring peace for itself and the smaller European nations."

On October 3, Davis had another meeting with Goring who remarked:

"You may assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish State and a new Czechoslovakian independent government would come into being. However, this information is for him alone and to be used by him only if necessary to bring about a peace conference. . . . As for myself and my Government, I would be glad to attend and in the event of such a conference I would represent Germany. I agree that the conference should be in Washington."

In conclusion, Goring informed Mr. Davis that Hitler would speak on October 6 and his remarks would, in spirit and content, "be of a nature which impartial analysis must accept as a basis for negotiation."² After these conferences with Mr. Davis, Goring talked with Chancellor Hitler concerning this proposed American mediation. The Chancellor apparently took the matter very seriously and on October 6 he made a speech which he thought would lay the basis for a world conference. He emphasized the importance of an early calling of a conference of the "leading nations" on the European continent. It should be held "before millions of men are . . . uselessly sent to their death and billions of dollars' worth of property destroyed. The continuation of the present state of affairs in the West is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifices."

After this introduction Hitler indicated the bases of an enduring peace: (1) th« foreign

policies of European states should frankly recognize the liquidation of the Treaty of Versailles; Germany's colonial possessions before 1914 should be returned to her; (2) there should be a reorganization of the international economic system which would include a new system of markets and a final settlement of currencies; (3) **the most important item in a program for the abolition of future wars was "the establishment of an unconditionally guaranteed peace and of a sense of security on the part of individual nations. . . . An essential part of this necessary sense of security, however, is a clear definition of the legitimate use and application of certain modern armaments which can at any given moment strike straight at the heart of every nation and hence create a permanent sense of insecurity."**

While Hitler was presenting to the world this sane and moderate program, Davis was flying back to Washington with a record of the conciliatory conversations with Goring. At this same time Roosevelt commenced his momentous correspondence with Winston Churchill.⁴ Its influence cannot be judged until it has been carefully read and all the implications given extended consideration. But at any rate, something did change Roosevelt's mind in October 1939. When Mr. Davis returned to Washington he phoned to Miss LeHand and indicated his readiness to report to the President on his Berlin trip. After a brief pause she informed him that "the Chief" was "in conference" and could not be disturbed. When this conference continued indefinitely, Davis wrote a long letter to the President (October 11) and told him in detail of his conferences with Goring and the fact that Hitler's address on October 6 had been conciliatory in tone and an indirect assurance that the Fiihrer would support the idea of American mediation. He received no answer to this letter and there was no invitation to the White House. A mission that seemed so bright with promise had suddenly ended in a dismal failure. Did one of the famous "sealed letters" from Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt cause a rejection of this Hitler "feeler" for American mediation? Did American foreign policy thereafter follow British suggestions?

The Barriers Preserving Neutrality Are Broken Down

Two days after Britain and France declared war against Germany, the President (September 5) issued two proclamations. The first closely followed the language of the neutrality proclamation issued by President Wilson after the outbreak of World War I. It emphasized the role America would play as a neutral, reminded American citizens of their duties under international law, and warned the belligerents against infringing upon American rights. The second proclamation implemented the Neutrality Act of 1937 and imposed an embargo upon the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerent powers. This embargo checked the shipment to Britain and France of some \$79,000,000 worth of war materials for which export licenses had already been issued. Allied victory, as in World War I, depended upon an uninterrupted flow of munitions to British and French ports. Would the President be able to secure amendments to the Neutrality Law

that would permit these shipments?

His first step in this direction was to issue on September 13 a summons to Congress to meet in special session on the twenty-first. When they met they listened to a Presidential message that was filled with inaccuracies designed to justify some radical changes in neutrality legislation. He contended that existing legislation altered the foreign policy of the nation in such a way as to impair peaceful relations with other nations. Our policy with respect to belligerent countries had, with one notable exception, been "based upon international law." The exception had been the non-intercourse and embargo laws of the Napoleonic period and their effect upon the economy of the nation had been disastrous. These economic limitations had been the prelude to war. The Neutrality Act of 1935 had been another lamentable exception because some of its provisions had been "wholly inconsistent with ancient precepts of the law of nations." He regarded the ban on arms shipments as "most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security and American peace." In the proposed new legislation he wished provisions that would (1) forbid war credits to belligerents; (2) prohibit travel by American citizens on belligerent vessels; (3) provide for a license system for the import and export of munitions of war; (4) restore the cash-and-carry provision which had expired on May 1; (5) authorize the exclusion of American shipping from combat areas.

The President's message aroused a tremendous debate in the press, over the radio, and in Congress. According to a poll conducted by the Christian Science Monitor, editorial opinion in the country was strongly in favor of the repeal of existing neutrality legislation.⁷ But letters and telegrams soon began to pour into the offices of senators and representatives in a veritable deluge. In these communications the ratio against repeal was reported to be five to one.⁸ Under the impact of this pressure a bill was reported on September 30 from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Its provisions reflected much isolationist sentiment: (1) when the President or Congress found a state of war existing between foreign countries, the President was required to name the belligerents and apply the act; (2) no United States vessel could lawfully carry passengers or goods to any port of the belligerent nations; (3) the cash-and-carry system was restored and made mandatory for all goods. They could be shipped only after the title and interest of American citizens had been extinguished; (4) a ban was placed upon the arming of merchant vessels of the United States; (5) the prohibition of travel by American citizens on belligerent ships was continued; (6) the President was authorized to forbid the entry of American ships into combat areas; (7) the President might bar the entry of foreign submarines or armed merchantmen into American ports; (8) belligerents were limited to ninety-day credit transactions with reference to the purchase of American goods.

On November 4th 1939, the President signed the bill and at once issued two proclamations to implement the neutrality law. One delimited the waters off the British Isles and the coasts of Western Europe as a combat area which no American vessel could enter "except under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed." Under the law they could not carry cargo or passengers to any of the belligerent ports in Europe and Africa as far south

as the Canary Islands, and under the proclamation they were prohibited from entering the neutral ports of Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway south of Bergen. On September 5 an embargo was applied to the shipment of munitions of war and military equipment to belligerents except on a cash-and-carry basis. This restriction did not seriously affect the exports of war materiel to the Allies. In September 1939 the shipments of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to France amounted to \$4,429,323; in December the value of these shipments rose to \$17,857,281. The value of shipments to Britain did not rise so abruptly. In September 1939 they amounted to \$1,422,800; in December they rose to \$4,184,377.²³ It should be remembered that the title, right, and interest in this war materiel had to be extinguished before it could be exported. During the period from 1914-1917 there were no restrictions on belligerent borrowing. Loans to the Allied governments had financed huge shipments of munitions of war to their ports. Under the Neutrality Act of November 4 belligerent borrowing was prohibited.

Hitler Adopts a Conciliatory Policy towards the U.S.

The outbreak of World War II came as an unpleasant surprise to the German Admiralty which had hoped the conflict might be postponed until 1944. Admiral Raeder promptly advised an all-out war against Britain in the form of unrestricted submarine warfare, but Hitler immediately rejected this counsel. He was deeply shocked at the news of the sinking of the *Athenia*, and upon the advice of the Naval Staff he denied German responsibility. Later when it was learned that the U-30 had torpedoed the liner, the commander, Lieutenant Lemp, was severely reprimanded. On September 7, during a conference with Admiral Raeder, Hitler insisted that "in order not to provoke neutral countries, the United States in particular, it is forbidden to torpedo passenger steamers, even when sailing in convoy. Warfare against French merchant ships, attacks on French warships and mine laying off French ports is prohibited."³⁹ These orders were partially modified on September 10 so that mixed British-French convoys, if escorted by French or French and British forces, might be attacked north of Brest. On October 16 there was a further modification: "All merchant ships definitely recognized as enemy ones (British or French) can be torpedoed without warning. Passenger steamers in convoy can be torpedoed a short while after notice has been given of the intention to do so." Passenger ships were already being torpedoed when "proceeding without lights."

Hitler now made a conciliatory gesture towards the United States. On October 9, the American freight steamer, *City of Flint*, bound for a British port, was captured by the German pocket battleship, *Deutschland*. After a brief visit to the Norwegian port of Tromsø and the Russian port of Murmansk, the *City of Flint* with a German prize crew put into another Norwegian port where the authorities interned the German crew and returned the vessel to its American commander. On November 10, Admiral Raeder submitted a report to which Hitler agreed: "The *City of Flint* case has been mismanaged. . . . It

appears advisable to allow the City of Flint to return to the United States unmolested. The Fuehrer agrees with the Commander in Chief, Navy; no further action is to be taken against the City of Flint." At the end of December 1939 the rules controlling submarine activity were formulated as follows: "The following ships are subject to submarine attack without warning: (1) All merchant ships recognized as enemy; (exceptions are passenger ships sailing alone which are definitely unarmed); (2) all neutral ships sailing in enemy convoy; (3) all ships sailing without lights; (4) all ships refusing to stop or making use of radiotelegraph; (5) American crews are [to be] treated with the greatest consideration."

Thus, at the close of four months of warfare on the high seas, German anxiety to conciliate America had resulted in exceptional treatment of United States vessels. Ninety ships carrying neutral flags had been sunk but not one of the ninety had flown American colors. Only four American ships had been stopped at sea by German naval vessels; none had been compelled to enter a German port for search and none had been attacked by commerce raiders. Thanks to pressure from the Fuhrer the German Navy was on its good behavior.

The Mission of Sumner Welles

In the early days of January 1940, President Roosevelt sent for Sumner Welles and discussed with him the advisability of sending a representative to Europe to canvass the "possibilities of concluding a just and permanent peace." The President had no interest in a "temporary or tentative armed truce." Something more fundamental would have to be achieved. Perhaps Welles himself would be the man of the hour who could open the portals of peace. At any rate, in February 1940 the President decided to send him to Rome and Berlin, and from there to Paris and London. Conversations with Mussolini and Hitler might offer some hint as to peaceful procedures that would prevent the dreaded spring offensive. From Germany there had come certain whispers of a desire for peace. Under the proper encouragement these whispers might gain significant volume.

Welles arrived in Rome on February 25 and had an interview with Ciano on the following day. He found Ciano "always cordial and entirely unaffected," with an evident desire to be helpful.⁶⁰ In the Ciano Diaries, Welles is described as "distinguished in appearance and manner," and the tone of the conference was "very cordial."⁶¹ Ciano made no attempt to conceal his detestation of von Ribbentrop and his "underlying antagonism toward Hitler." When Welles brought up the matter of a "just and permanent peace," Ciano outlined the terms that Hitler would have accepted in October 1939, but he was uncertain about the Fuhrer's present viewpoint.

The interview with Mussolini was quite a different affair and Ciano regretted its "icy atmosphere." The Duce appeared to Welles as a man laboring "under a tremendous strain." He was "ponderous and static rather than vital," and during the interview sat most of the time with his eyes closed. As soon as the formalities of introduction were completed, Welles handed to Mussolini a letter from President Roosevelt. It was an interesting mis-

sive which emphasized the "satisfaction which the United States government would derive from a continuation of Italian neutrality," and which indicated the President's strong desire "to meet personally with the chief of the Italian government." In the event of such a meeting the President believed he could "persuade Mussolini that the best interests of Italy could be served only if he refused to prostitute the Italian people to the greater glory of Hitler." The Duce seemed pleased with the suggestion of a meeting with Roosevelt. He had hoped for a long time that "this meeting . . . would really take place." When he remarked that there were so many miles of ocean between Italy and America that it would be difficult to arrange for a conference, Sumner Welles quickly interjected with the statement: "There are halfway points which would halve that distance." The Duce responded: "Yes, and there are ships to take us both there."⁶³ But no plans were actually made for this meeting which might have changed the history of the world. Instead, Welles and the Duce merely talked of the importance of breaking down economic barriers between countries and the necessity for a program of real disarmament. The conversation then shifted to the terms of peace Germany might accept and concluded with a direct question from Welles: "Do you consider it possible at this moment for any successful negotiations to be undertaken between Germany and the Allies for a lasting peace?" "Yes," answered the Duce with emphasis, and Welles was now ready for his journey to Berlin.

Welles indicated to von Ribbentrop that he had been sent to Europe to canvass the possibility of establishing a permanent peace, Ribbentrop took his cue and commenced a turgid oration that lasted over two hours. In conclusion, he insisted that Germany wanted peace but only on condition that "the will on the part of England to destroy Germany is obliterated once and for all." The only way that objective could be accomplished was "through complete and total Germany victory."

The interview with Hitler on March 2 was less of an ordeal. He greeted Welles "pleasantly" and was "dignified, both in speech and in movement." When Welles remarked that his conversation with Mussolini had instilled the hope that the "foundations of a durable peace might still be laid," Hitler began to discuss the basic importance of some general agreement upon a program of disarmament. He had long been in favor of disarmament but had received no encouragement from Britain or France. He agreed with Welles that "a liberal, unconditional most-favored-nation international trade relationship" was an ideal "toward which the nations of the world should strive." Under "more normal conditions Germany would gladly co-operate toward that end." He then outlined Germany's objectives. They were historical, political, and economic. Germany had no aim other than the return of the "German people to the territorial position which historically was rightly theirs." Germany's political aims emphasized national security. There was no real desire to dominate non-German peoples. If such peoples adjacent to her boundaries did not constitute a threat to German security, there was no intention to interfere with their independence. From the economic standpoint Germany claimed the right to profit through trade with the nations close to her in central and southeastern Europe. She would no longer permit the Western powers of Europe to infringe or impair her preferential position

in that respect. Germany would also insist that "the colonies stolen from her at Versailles be returned to her." In conclusion, he repeated the words of Ribbentrop: "I can see no hope for the establishment of any lasting peace until the will of England and France to destroy Germany is itself destroyed. I feel that there is no way by which the will to destroy Germany can itself be destroyed except through a complete German victory."

Welles now clearly realized that his mission to Germany was in vain, but he felt obliged to have a frank talk with General Goring at Karinhall. Goring's manner was "simple, unaffected and exceedingly cordial." He quickly assured Welles that Germany had "no ambitions of any kind . . . which could affect the Western Hemisphere," and he challenged the assertion that a war in Europe would profoundly affect America. Welles then shifted the conversation to the topic of German discriminations against the Jews. This evoked the reply that racial discriminations were in effect in a large portion of the United States with regard to Negroes. In conclusion, Goring repeated the comments of Ribbentrop and Hitler with special reference to the desire of Britain and France to destroy Germany. If they succeeded in that objective they would create a community of "Bolsheviks and Communists." From Berlin, Welles went at once to Paris for conversations with important French officials. He regretted that President Lebrun did not have the driving force of Poincare who had guided French destinies during World War I. While talking with Senator Jeanneney, President of the French Senate, he was reminded of a trenchant saying of Clemenceau anent the Germans: "There is only one way in which to deal with a mad dog. Either kill him or chain him with steel chains which cannot be broken." But France lacked both the will and the ability to forge those chains.

In England he found the will to forge chains that would keep Germany in subjection for a long period. This will was vehemently expressed by Winston Churchill. He was certain that no solution of the European crisis would be found "other than outright and complete defeat of Germany, the destruction of National Socialism, and the inclusion, in the new peace treaties, of provisions which would control Germany's course in the future in such a way as to give Europe and the world peace and security in the days to come, at least for a hundred years." He still adhered to the pattern of Versailles. It is significant that Churchill had no words of criticism of Russia even though it was apparent that Hitler could not have gone to war in 1939 without some assurance of Soviet support. The menace of bolshevism gave Churchill little concern in 1940. In the following year when Hitler attacked Russia, Churchill worked feverishly to send her armed assistance. A real statesman would have recognized the dual threat of both nazism and communism and would have welcomed them with bloody hands to hospitable graves.

Sumner Welles apparently agreed with this British viewpoint. The "pencil with two ears"⁶⁸ made no adverse comment upon such dangerous blindness. To him, as well as to Churchill, the only real enemy was Nazi Germany. This made it all the more necessary for him to hurry back to Rome and try to separate Mussolini from Hitler. But Ribbentrop had preceded him with a long letter from Hitler. Ribbentrop was not as successful as he had hoped he would be in his conversations with Mussolini. The Duce was still opposed

to a German spring offensive against Britain and France, and it would take a personal conference between the two dictators to change Mussolini's mind. This should be held, according to Ribbentrop, at Brenner Pass on the morning of March 18. While Ribbentrop was making these preparations for the meeting at Brenner Pass, Welles arrived in Rome on March 16 and had conferences with both Ciano and Mussolini. There he was informed about alleged German military plan and that "Germany was determined to undertake an all-out military offensive in the near future." She was "not considering any peace solution short of a military victory." This it was believed could be accomplished "within five months. . . . France would crumble first and England shortly after." Ciano himself was by no means convinced of a German victory. After other conversations equally fatuous, Welles returned to Washington with a full budget of misinformation for the President.

12.5 Norway

The German ship *Altmark* had taken refuge in a Norwegian fiord with several hundred British sailors on board as prisoners. A search by Norwegian gunboats had failed to disclose the presence of these sailors, but the British Admiralty had information concerning their detention on the *Altmark*. On February 16, Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, ordered Captain Vian to proceed in H.M.S. *Cossack* to Norwegian waters and liberate the prisoners. In effecting this rescue Captain Vian deliberately violated the neutrality of Norwegian coastal waters and the Norwegian Government sent a prompt protest to London. The Prime Minister excused this violation on the ground that previous German infractions of international law had compelled the British to take similar action.

This *Altmark* incident was merely one expression of the intention of the British Government repeatedly to violate the neutrality of Norwegian waters for the purpose of adversely affecting the German war effort. As early as September 19, 1939, Winston Churchill, after consulting the British War Cabinet, brought to the notice of the First Sea Lord and others the importance of stopping the transportation of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany. Inasmuch as the German ore ships kept within the Norwegian three-mile limit the only way they could be stopped would be by mining those marginal waters. In 1918 this had been done and Churchill suggested that Britain "should repeat this process very shortly." The first German memorandum with reference to action in Norwegian waters was written on October 3, 1939. Thus, as Lord Hankey clearly shows, "the British Government began to plan their major offensive in Norway a fortnight before the Germans." It is significant that the Nuremberg Tribunal purposely overlooked the memorandum of Winston Churchill and contended that the idea of attacking Norway "originated with Raeder and Rosenberg. . . . The omission to mention this part of the story in the Judgement is the more inexplicable because the whole story was told to the House of Commons by Mr. Churchill in April 1940, and it was a matter of public knowledge."

On December 16, 1939, Mr. Churchill prepared another memorandum which he presented

to the Cabinet six days later. The subject was once more the stoppage of iron ore from Narvik to Germany. He regarded such a stoppage as "a major offensive operation of war," and it could be accomplished by laying "a series of small minefields in Norwegian territorial waters at the two or three suitable points on the coast, which will force the ships carrying ore to Germany to quit territorial waters and come onto the high seas." This action would compel Germany to "undergo a severe deprivation, tending to crisis before the summer." This mining of Norwegian waters was a mere technical infringement of international law. No evil effect would be produced in the United States by such an infringement where it would be looked upon "in the way most calculated to help us."

As Lord Hankey points out, the judgment at the end of the Nuremberg Trial made much of German plans against Norway in mid-December 1939, but it did "not contain a word of Mr. Churchill's Memorandum to the War Cabinet dated December 16. . . . Any detached person would think this is a supremely important piece of evidence for the Tribunal, for it places the British plan on the same level of importance as the German plan, which is so severely condemned as a crime in law in the Judgement." Although the War Cabinet refused to accept the reasoning of this Churchill memorandum, it did permit "the preparation of plans for landing a force at Narvik for the sake of Finland. . . . These proceedings also show the pressure the War Cabinet was under from their most powerful colleague . . . to persuade them to a technical act of aggression liable to set all Scandinavia ablaze—a 'crime,' to use Nuremberg's extravagant language, for which the Germans were destined to be so severely condemned by the Tribunal. Not a single word of it appears in the Nuremberg Judgment."

The judgment is completely silent on the action of the Supreme War Council of the Allies when (on February 5, 1940) it "approved plans for the preparation of three or four allied divisions for service in Finland, and for persuading Norway and Sweden to permit the passage of supplies and reinforcements to the Finns and 'incidentally to get hold of the Gallivare ore field.' From then on the preparations for despatch of allied troops to Norway were intensified." By the beginning of April 1940 the preparations "for the major offensive in Norway had been completed by both camps. . . . The actual landing, that is to say the German major offensive did not take place until April 9. Twenty-four hours before that, namely between 4:30 and 5 A.M. on April 8, the British minefields had been laid in the West Fjord near Narvik." Needless to say, these facts were not given any place in the Nuremberg Judgement. While the Norwegian Foreign Office was drafting a note of protest to London, word came that German warships were approaching Oslo. On the following day Norwegian batteries sank the German heavy cruiser Blucher and seriously damaged the cruiser Emden. This spirited defense merely postponed the fall of Oslo.

A German attack upon the iron ore port of Narvik was successful in spite of heroic resistance by Norwegian warships, and Hitler's plans for the occupation of Norway proceeded according to schedule. British plans for the stoppage of ore shipments to Germany were completely defeated. At the same time (April 9), German troops crossed the Danish frontier and thus another northern neutral came under Nazi control.

12.6 Rossevelt double-crossing Britain

At the beginning of October an influential American oil tycoon arrived in Berlin on a peace mission for which he had apparently received a ninety-minute personal briefing from Roosevelt. He was William Rhodes Davis, whose own personal interest lay in preventing any disruption of his oil business with Germany. He had been brought into contact with Roosevelt by John L. Lewis, leader of the CIO, the United States labor federation whose fourteen million members represented a political force no president could afford to ignore. Lewis was originally both anti-Fascist and anti-Communist, but he had, said Davis, been impressed by the significant rise in the living standards of the German worker under National Socialism. Anxious about the effects of a long war on American export markets, Lewis had obliged Roosevelt to entrust this unofficial peace mission to Davis. In Berlin the oilman met Göring, and a seven-page summary of the discussion of the alleged Roosevelt proposals survives. It was evidently given wide confidential circulation in Berlin, for sardonic references to Roosevelt's sudden emergence as an "angel of peace" bent on securing a third term figure in several diaries of the day.

President Roosevelt is prepared to put pressure on the western powers to start peace talks if Germany will provide the stimulus. President Roosevelt asks to be advised of the various points Germany wants to settle, for example, Poland and the colonies. In this connection President Roosevelt also mentioned the question of the purely Czech areas, on which however a settlement need not come into effect until later. This point was touched on by President Roosevelt with regard to public opinion in the United States, as he must placate the Czech voters and the circles sympathizing with them if he is to exercise pressure on Britain to end the war.

Davis assured Göring that Roosevelt's main strategic concern was to exploit the present situation to destroy Britain's monopoly of the world markets. "In his conversation with Davis, Roosevelt explained that he was flatly opposed to the British declaration of war. He was not consulted by Britain in advance." Roosevelt suspected that Britain's motives were far more dangerous and that they had nothing to do with Poland ; he himself recognized that the real reason for the war lay in the one-sided Diktat of Versailles which made it impossible for the German people to acquire a living standard comparable with that of their neighbors in Europe. Roosevelt's proposal, according to the unpublished summary, was that Hitler be allowed to keep Danzig and all the now Polish provinces taken from Germany by the treaty of Versailles, that all Germany's former African colonies be restored to her forthwith, and that the rest of the world give Germany financial assistance in establishing a high standard of living.

This was not all. If Daladier and Chamberlain refused to comply, then President Roosevelt would support Germany — Davis reported — in her search for a just, tolerable, and lasting peace : he would supply Germany with goods and war supplies "convoyed to Germany under the protection of the American armed forces" if need be. John L. Lewis had privately promised Davis that if some such agreement could be reached between Germany and the

United States his unions would prevent the manufacture of war supplies for Britain and France.

Göring outlined Davis's message in detail to the Führer immediately after the meeting, and on October 3 the field marshal announced to the American that in his important speech to the Reichstag on the sixth Hitler would make a number of peace proposals closely embodying the points Davis had brought from Washington. (Hitler's more detailed proposals as described by Göring indeed went so far that their sincerity is open to question.) Göring told Davis : "If in his [Roosevelt's] opinion the suggestions afford a reasonable basis for a peace conference, he will then have the opportunity to bring about this settlement.... You may assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake this mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish state and an independent Czechoslovak government would come into being. However this information is for him [Roosevelt] alone and to be used only if necessary to bring about a peace conference." Göring was willing to attend such a conference in Washington. When Davis went back to the United States with the five detailed points Hitler proposed, he was accompanied by a German official, a "special ambassador" appointed to settle any details. Hitler hoped for an interim reply from Roosevelt by the fifth. (As Rosenberg wrote : "It would be a cruel blow for London to be urgently "advised" by Washington to sue for peace!") But something had gone wrong with the mission : when Davis reached Washington he was not readmitted to the President, and they did not meet again.

A different aspect of Roosevelt's policy was revealed by the Polish documents ransacked by the Nazis from the archives of the ruined foreign ministry building in Warsaw. The dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and Paris laid bare Roosevelt's efforts to goad France and Britain into war with Germany while he rearmed the United States and psychologically prepared the American public for war. In November 1938, William C. Bullitt, his personal friend and ambassador in Paris, had indicated to the Poles that the President's desire was that "Germany and Russia should come to blows," whereupon the democratic nations would attack Germany and force her into submission ; in the spring of 1939, Bullitt quoted Roosevelt as being determined "not to participate in the war from the start, but to be in at the finish" — the United States without doubt would fight, but "only if France and Britain kick off first." Bullitt was said by the Poles to have carried with him to Paris a "suitcase full of instructions" outlining the pressure he was to put on the Quai d'Orsay not to compromise with the totalitarian powers ; at the same time Washington was applying "various exceptionally significant screws" to the British. Washington, Bullitt had told the Polish diplomats, was being guided not by ideological considerations but solely by the material interests of the United States. The Warsaw documents left little doubt as to what had stiffened Polish resistance to German demands during the August 1939 crisis. On Friday October 6, Hitler spoke to the Reichstag. His "appeal for peace" was addressed to the British in more truculent and recriminatory language than many of his more moderate followers would have wished. He singled out Churchill — who was then First Lord of the Admiralty — as a representative of the

Jewish capitalist and journalistic circles whose sole interest in life lay in the furtherance of arson on an international scale.

On the ninth, he issued to his commanders in chief a formal directive to prepare for "Yellow" with all haste, in the event that "Britain and, under her command, France as well" were not disposed to end the war. His soldiers were, however, full of optimism. General Rommel wrote from Berlin on the seventh: "The reaction of the neutrals [to the Führer's speech] seems very good. The others will be able to think it over during the weekend. There is not much going on here otherwise. If the war ends soon, I hope I will soon be able to go home..."

Hitler had sent Dahlerus to London for talks with Chamberlain. Late on October 9 the Swede reported to him the conditions Britain was attaching to peace negotiations: in addition to insisting on a new Polish state, Britain wanted all weapons of aggression destroyed forthwith; and there must be a plebiscite in Germany on certain aspects of her foreign policy. These were hard terms to swallow, for in public Hitler was still claiming that the future of Poland was a matter for Germany and Russia alone to decide, and Britain was blithely ignoring the growing armed strength of the Soviet Union and her expansionist policies. Nevertheless, on the tenth, Dahlerus was instructed to advise London that Hitler would accept these terms on principle. The Swedish negotiator saw Hitler twice that day before he departed for a promised rendezvous with a British emissary at The Hague. He took with him a formal letter from Göring and a list of Hitler's proposals — which included a new Polish state; the right for Germany to fortify her new frontier with Russia; guarantees backed by national plebiscite; nonaggression pacts between Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and the Soviet Union; disarmament; and the return of Germany's former colonies or suitable substitute territories.⁽⁵⁾ Dahlerus noted to one German officer after meeting Hitler that "Germany for her part was able to swallow even tough conditions, provided they were put in a palatable form." He said he was taking with him to Holland more than enough to dispel Britain's smoldering mistrust of Hitler.

In Holland, however, Dahlerus waited in vain for the promised British emissary. The British foreign office asked him to describe Hitler's proposals to their local envoy and to remain at The Hague until he heard from London. Berlin optimistically viewed this request as a positive token of British interest and agreed that he should wait there. But Chamberlain's eagerly awaited speech to the House of Commons the next day, October 12, exploded Hitler's confident expectation that peace was about to descend on Europe after five weeks of war. Chamberlain dismissed Hitler's public offer (of the sixth) as "vague and uncertain" — he had made no suggestion for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and Poland. If Hitler wanted peace, said Chamberlain, "acts — not words alone — must be forthcoming." That same evening Hitler sent for Göring, Milch, and Udet of the Luftwaffe and instructed them to resume bomb production at the earliest possible moment. "The war will go on!" Dahlerus was asked to return from The Hague to Berlin forthwith. Edouard Daladier's reply to Hitler was no less abrupt. "Before these answers came," Weizsäcker wrote two days later, "the Führer himself had indulged in

great hopes of seeing his dream of working with Britain fulfilled. He had set his heart on peace. Herr von Ribbentrop seemed less predisposed toward it. He sent the Führer his own word picture of a future Europe like the empire of Charlemagne.”

To the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin a few days later Hitler voiced his puzzlement at Britain’s intransigence. He felt he had repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and each time they had blacked his eye in reply. “The survival of the British Empire is in Germany’s interests too,” Hitler noted, “because if Britain loses India, we gain nothing thereby.” Of course he was going to restore a Polish state — he did not want to gorge himself with Poles ; as for the rest of Chamberlain’s outbursts, he, Hitler, might as well demand that Britain “right the wrongs” done to India, Egypt, and Palestine. Britain could have peace any time she wanted, but they — and that included that “brilliant moron” Eden and the equally incompetent Churchill — must learn to keep their noses out of Europe. And in a fit of anger Hitler complained to Dahlerus about “the unbelievable behavior of Mr. Chamberlain”; from now on Germany would fight Britain tooth and nail — he did not propose to bargain with her any longer. Dahlerus left the Chancellery in a huff at the failure of his peace effort, but was later soothed by Göring, who sent an important German decoration around to him that same evening.

12.7 How Britain Pioneered City Bombing

The Blitz on London in 1940 came in response to the initiation of city bombing by Britain some months earlier. Few now accept this rudimentary fact, central to Britain’s role in initiating World War II. Britons nowadays – or, all of them that I ever talk to – just see the Blitz as proof of Hitler’s wickedness and do not acknowledge the cause-and-effect connection. Winston Churchill and the War Department set up a situation where London would be blitzed, without telling the people that Britain had started the process several months earlier. This had the effect of getting Britons into a mood for total war, without the traditional restraints of civilised ‘laws’ or conventions, restraints which had hitherto established that civilians would not as such be targeted:

‘The exclusion of non-combatants from the scope of hostilities is the fundamental distinction between civilised and barbarous warfare.

Britons should take a more responsible attitude, and understand that it was their country and no other which pioneered the bombing of cities in a way that was not mere ‘collateral damage’ but was the deliberate targeting of workingclass homes. Lies are always created by those who wish to wage war and the worst one here ought surely to have become clear to the British people sixty years after the event. But no! One finds today as historian A.J.P. Taylor remarked,

‘... the almost universal belief that Hitler started the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, whereas it was started by the directors of British strategy, as some of the more honest among them have boasted.’ One thing the British people do really, really enjoy is their

hate-and-fear enemy image. Britain is one of the most militaristic nations which has ever existed and for its 'moral' well-being it always has to demonise whoever it is making war upon.

One thing the British people do really, really enjoy is their hate-and-fear enemy image. Britain is one of the most militaristic nations which has ever existed and for its 'moral' well-being it always has to demonise whoever it is making war upon. I here wish to argue that, if civilised life existed on earth, then the Nuremberg trials from 1946 onwards would have focussed primarily upon Britain's role in initiating city bombing – town-and-village eradication with over one million tons of bombs dropped on Germany – as well of course as the US nuclear incineration of two Japanese towns, which were a kind of logical development of what Britain had pioneered. Mortality of those two A-bombs was of a far smaller magnitude than what Britain had inflicted upon German cities. existed and for its 'moral' well-being it always has to demonise whoever it is making war upon.

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Hitler repeatedly sought to secure a truce in city bombing, and that in any future conflicts bombing should be confined to the narrow zone of military operation. Existing conventions and laws of war did not specifically allude to air bombardment, and therefore he repeatedly made offers to restrict the conduct of war by 'confining the action of war to the battle zones.' The war of 1939 was 'less wanted by nearly everybody than almost any other war in history,' wrote A.J.P. Taylor. In September 1939 a state of war had been declared, but not much was happening, because Germany in no way desired war against Britain. On 15th February, 1940, PM Neville Chamberlain in the House of commons affirmed, 'Whatever the length to which others may go, H.M.Government will never resort to deliberate attack on women and children, and other civilians, for the purpose of mere terrorism,' in a reply to Captain Ramsey This reaffirmed his position given on 14th September. City bombing, he emphasised, 'was absolutely contrary to international law'.

1940: Churchill ousts Chamberlain as Prime Minister on May 10th, and on May 11th city-bombing begins. On that night, the day after Churchill's election, Bomber Command was first permitted to fulfil the purpose for which it was built. Newspapers merely

reported that, that night, 'eighteen Whitley bombers attacked railway installations in Western Germany.' Winston Churchill and his advisors extended the definition of 'military objectives', which had been accepted for two and a half centuries to include factories, oil plants and public buildings – as, would include any town or village. They rendered the definition meaningless. 'This raid on the night of May 11th, 1940, although in itself trivial, was an epoch-marking event since it was the first deliberate breach of the fundamental rule of civilised warfare that hostilities must only be waged against enemy combatant forces.'

For 12th May, the War Cabinet minutes noted on 'Bombing Policy,' that the Prime Minister was 'no longer bound by our previously-held scruples as to initiating "unrestricted" air warfare.

On 25 August, 81 bombers made their night raids over Berlin, then on 6th September the Luftwaffe replied. Only after six surprise attacks upon Berlin in the previous fortnight did the Blitz begin, and thus Germany justifiably called it a reprisal. 'The British people were not permitted to find out that the Government could have stopped the German raids at any time merely by stopping the raids on Germany,' to quote professor Arthur Butz. They still have not found this out. Winston Churchill never gets the credit he deserves for establishing The Blitz. . . The German bombs took some one-tenth of the lives of civilians as compared to the British offensive, and Britons do not seem very aware of this ten-to-one ratio.

The testimony of J.M. Spaight, who was principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Air during the war, is here crucial. His 1944 book *Bombing Vindicated* proudly defended city-incineration as pioneered by the RAF (Royal Air Force):

'Because we were doubtful about the psychological effect of the distortion of the truth that it was we who started the strategic bombing offensive, we have shrunk from giving our great decision of May 11th 1940 the publicity which it deserved. That surely was a mistake. It was a splendid decision.'

He emphasised that Hitler would have been willing at any time to have stopped the slaughter should the Brits agree: 'Hitler assuredly did not want the mutual bombing to go on. . . . Again and again the German official reports applauded the reprisal element in the actions of the Luftwaffe. . . . 'If you stop bombing us, we'll stop bombing you.'

On 16th December 1940 a moonlight raid by 134 planes took out the defenceless city of Mannheim, focussing on its charming town centre. Flying high enough to be safe from the anti-aircraft flak, the night-time bomber pilot releasing his cargo never hears the mother's scream, nor sees the child's burning flesh. That was the real Holocaust, a word meaning, death by fire. RAF pilots would return home announcing the destruction of assigned 'military' targets. This charade continued until August 1941 when a shocked British Cabinet was shown aerial photographs of the undamaged targets. 'Of all the aircraft credited with having bombed their targets only one-third had in fact bombed within five miles of them'.

Air Marshall Arthur Harris took over Bomber Command at High Wycombe on 22nd February 1942, a week after its primary focus had been defined as 'the morale of the civilian population, and in particular industrial workers' by an Air Staff directive. Harris was wont to boast, "I kill thousands of people every night." The Blitz 'failed', on his view, due to the 'short-sightedness of the Luftwaffe chiefs in not providing themselves in peacetime with long-distance bomber planes designed for attacks on an enemy civilian population', as had Britain, an omission which, he declared, 'lost Germany the war.' Thus in September 1940 the Germans found themselves with "almost unarmed bombers." Germany lost the war because it had not planned for city bombing!

In March 1942 Churchill's War Cabinet adopted the 'Lindemann plan', whereby civilian targeting became official. Working-class homes were preferred to upper-class because they were closer together, and so a greater flesh-incineration-per-bomb could be achieved. The Jewish German émigré Professor Frederick Lindemann, Churchill's friend and scientific advisor had by then become Lord Cherwell. He submitted a plan to the War Cabinet on March 30th urging that German working-class houses be targeted in preference to military objectives, the latter being harder to hit. Middle-class homes had too much space around them, he explained. He was not prosecuted for a ghastly new war-crime, hitherto undreamt-of. Thereby all cities and towns over 50,000 inhabitants could be destroyed, or at least brought to ruin. The War Cabinet realised that no inkling of this must reach the public.

The Lindemann plan swung into action on 28th March 1942 when the old port of Lubeck was attacked by 234 aircraft of Bomber Command. It had no military or industrial importance but was chosen because, as Air Marshall 'bomber' Harris remarked, the city was 'built more like a firelighter than a human habitation.' Its old mediaeval houses and narrow streets and its cathedral were erased, by 'a first class success' of the RAF. On 30 May 1942 a thousand aircraft dropped high explosive and incendiaries on the medieval town of Cologne burning it from end to end. The devastation was total. Other 'first class-successes' followed, culminating in the incinerations of Hamburg and the beautiful, baroque city of Dresden.

On July 27, 1943, 'that night when the most densely populated parts of Hamburg became a roaring furnace in which thousands of men, women and children were throwing themselves into the canals in order to escape the frightful heat.'

Seven hundred Allied bombers arrived over the city at one o'clock in the morning, and dropped ten thousand tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs on several districts of the city. That night in this one raid alone, more than 45,000 men, women, and children were killed. It was bombed round the clock for four days, American planes by day and British by night. A firestorm of an intensity that no one had ever before thought possible arose. More than a million Germans fled into the surrounding countryside. These were people who had never voted for Hitler, nor had any means of removing him. Spaight writing in 1944 enthused about how 'today great four-engine bombers are tearing the heart out of industrial Germany' and added, 'Germany had nothing approaching them'

France and Germany had not prepared for city-bombing as had Britain. After Spaight's perhaps unduly candid book,

'... it was impossible for anyone, however credulous, to accept the repeated and solemn assertions of His Majesty's Ministers in Parliament that the bombing of Germany was being carried out with strict regard to the dictates of humanity in accordance with the rules of civilised warfare'.

Ministers had been lying through their teeth to Parliament, but this was no ordinary lie. It was the betrayal of the core principal on which civilised life depends – that civilians and civilian buildings shall not be as such subject to attack. Instead, terror was now coming from the sky, terror beside which the deeds of ordinary killers paled into insignificance. A thousand-year-old urban culture was annihilated, as great cities, famed in the annals of science and art, were reduced to heaps of smouldering ruins.

In the year 1940, British bombers 'only' unloaded five thousand tons of bombs onto German cities, whereas by 1944 they were sometimes exceeding that total in a single day. In the spring of '44 German cities were being pounded with over one hundred thousand tons a month. German civilian deaths from British and American bombing of German cities have been estimated to have been around 600,000, and some 61 cities were turned to virtual rubble, while some 60,000 civilians were killed in the UK. Those cities had an estimated population of 25 million' Germany was thereby reduced to a worse state than that produced by the 30 years' war. In return the centres of London, Coventry and Portsmouth were attacked by German planes. While this was going on, it was imperative to stifle public discussion, the Secretary for Air explained, lest public outrage undermined the morale of the bomber pilots. But, despite official denials, anti-war protesters were gleaning some idea of what was happening. Vera Brittain declared in a wartime booklet that Britain's present policy would 'appear to future civilisation as an extreme form of criminal lunacy.' Thus, one person managed to find adequate words for Britain's war-policy.

What was the purpose of city-bombing? Its primary purpose was to goad the German people into reprisals – or, so an official HMSO document of 1953 averred:

If the Royal Air Force raided the Ruhr, destroying oil plants with its most accurately placed bombs and urban property with those that went astray, the outcry for retaliation against Britain might prove too strong for the German generals to resist. Indeed, Hitler himself would probably head the clamour. The attack on the Ruhr, in other words, was an informal invitation to the Luftwaffe to bomb London.' The purpose was get their war on, which neither the German people nor the British wanted. Germany never wanted war against Britain and Hitler always professed his great admiration for Britain and the British Empire. Germany sought and was refused peace-negotiations in July 1940. The British view 'surviving the Blitz' as their finest hour, and have imagined that it was part of a plan to invade and occupy Britain. It would be better to say that the cause of the Blitz lay in the British ardour for war, whereby they set out to generate the conditions that

produced it. After the war, terror-bombing was not a recognised term, it had officially never happened, still less had anyone heard of the Lindemann plan. The truth was suppressed for two decades, even though there was no legal machinery of censorship, and only emerged when it was mere 'past history,' in 1961. This posed a serious problem for the 'trials' held at Nuremberg: If the most obvious of Hitler's crimes was his initiation of indiscriminate bombing in the Blitz, why was there no mention of this at Nuremberg? The truth, that this was a mere tiny fraction of what had been visited on Germany, and only came months later as a legitimate 'reprisal,' clearly could not be told to the British people.

Not until 1961 did C.P.Snow reveal in his Harvard Lectures on Science and Government the existence of the Lindemann plan, and that it was 'put into action with every effort the country could make:' C.P.Snow's explanation, about a diabolical plan which concentrated on working-class homes, 'caused a sensation throughout the civilised world', becoming immediately translated into every language on earth. Later that year, the official account of how the UK had developed terror-bombing in accord with the Lindemann plan revealed the shocking death total of 60,000 RAF lives so lost. These disclosures induced widespread horror. In 1961 Labour MP Richard Crossman remarked upon the 'screen of lies' behind which the 'terror bombing was carried out' such that the War cabinet 'felt it necessary to repudiate publicly' the policy of their order to bomb. Ministers had proclaimed with absolute mendacity 'We were not bombing women and children wantonly for the sake of so doing' (Under-Secretary of Air), when that is precisely what they were doing – hundreds of thousands of women and children.

'The stock apology then put forward was that it [British policy] was only a reprisal for the German bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam. Mr Spaight dismisses this argument with the contempt it reserves. "When Warsaw and Rotterdam were bombed," he points out, "German armies were at the gates. The air bombardment was an operation of the tactical offensive." Captain Liddell Hart accepts the same view. "Bombing did not take place, he writes, until the German troops were fighting their way into these cities and thus conformed to the old rules of siege bombardment.'" 'Bombardment' was not illegal under the terms of Article 25 of the 1907 Hague convention. Nine hundred died with the tragically mistaken air raid on Rotterdam. Citizens of Warsaw were given time to evacuate their city before any general bombardment. To quote Dr Wesserle, who was in Prague when the US and UK bombed it,

"There can be no comparison between the brutality of the Anglo- American bomber offensive, on one hand, and the minimality of the German-Italian efforts, on the other."

The Hague Convention of 1923 (Articles 22, 23) proposed to outlaw indiscriminate urban bombing ('aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population') but alas, the five organising powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the US) never signed it[49]. Britain's Prime Minister affirmed to the House of Commons in 1938 that any such bombing would be an "undoubted violation of international law," then a resolution passed by the League of nations in September 1938, 'The intentional bombing of civilian

populations is illegal' had been proposed by the British government and passed without dissent – who could object to such a self-evident truth? '... we have no intention of attacking the civil population as such' said the British representative during an Anglo-French staff conversation on August 14, 1939, just before war broke out. Shortly after, the League of Nations unanimously passed a resolution affirming that such bombing was illegal. And yet, by 1943 Britain with America signed the Treaty of Casablanca, which encouraged the stepping up of city bombing – 'morale bombing' as it was called.

The dilemma, the schizophrenia, the failure of Nuremberg is summarised by three dates, dates engraved rather unforgettably in the memory of mankind: August 6th, August 8th and the 9th, 1945. The Nuremberg Charter, defining norms of international law relevant to warfare ('planning and preparing a war of aggression'), was signed as the London Agreement on August 8th, 1945. They blow up one city, they blow up another city, and in between they sign the Nuremberg Charter!

In a radio broadcast of 1st September 1939, two days before war broke out, Roosevelt called upon the European powers to make a promise, that 'armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of undefended cities. Alas the Americans were unable to take their own advice: the fire-bombing of Japan of March 9-10, 1944 killed near 100,000 Japanese civilians, more than died the next year at Hiroshima. In the war overall, the bombing of Japanese cities might have killed about 337,000.

When, after the war, Churchill suggested to Stalin that they find 'some unshattered town in Germany' at which to meet, for the Potsdam conference in July 1945, that was not easy. Then, rather swiftly in March, 1946, Churchill discerned a newly-looming threat, at his Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri, and this he affirmed warranted the stockpiling of America's newlydeveloped nuclear weapons. One might have thought that the British War Ministry would have felt some shame over initiating the most frightful crime in the annals of recorded history, but apparently not: in 1946 a report on 'Future Developments in weapons and Methods of Warfare' was handed to the British Chiefs of Staff. 'The most profitable objects of attack by the new weapons will normally be concentrations of population' it recommended, including a blueprint of 58 large Soviet cities having populations of over 100,000. Henceforth it was to be a normal, bureaucratic activity to discuss and refine methods of cityextermination. In the next year, 1947, the first US Strategic Air Command forces came to Britain. Thus Britain contributed to the encirclement of Russia with nuclear bombers when the latter was still a smouldering wreck from WWII, having suffered a mortality of somewhere around twenty million, years before Russia was in a position to threaten anyone in return.

Of the Korean war 1950-53, the former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay recalled that he asked if the Pentagon would let him 'burn down' five of the biggest cities in North Korea, claiming that it could be done in a few days. 'Its too horrible,' he was told. 'Yet over a period of three years or so...we burned down every town in North Korea.' Three million Koreans died, to protect the world against an alleged 'Yellow peril.' Thus did the

legacy of British city-bombing pass over to America.

Thus it was not without reason that notable Romans denounced the Jews — among these Seneca (“an accursed race”), Quintilian (“a race which is a curse to others”), and Tacitus (a “disease,” a “pernicious superstition,” and “the basest of peoples”). Prominent German historian Theodor Mommsen reaffirmed this view, noting that the Jews of Rome were indeed agents of social disruption and decay: “Also in the ancient world, Judaism was an effective ferment of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition.”

Throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, their negative reputation persisted. John Chrysostom, Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther all condemned Jewish usury — a lending practice often trading on distress, and a frequent cause of social unrest. In the 1770s, Baron d’Holbach declared that “the Jewish people distinguished themselves only by massacres, unjust wars, cruelties, usurpations, and infamies.” He added that they “lived continually in the midst of calamities, and were, more than all other nations, the sport of frightful revolutions.” Voltaire was struck by the danger posed to humanity by the Hebrew tribe; “I would not be in the least bit surprised if these people would not some day become deadly to the human race.” Kant called them a “nation of deceivers,” and Hegel remarked that “the only act Moses reserved for the Israelites was. . . to borrow with deceit and repay confidence with theft.”

Thus both empirical evidence and learned opinion suggest that Jews have, for centuries, had a hand in war, social strife, and economic distress, and have managed to profit thereby. Being a small and formally disempowered minority everywhere, it is striking that they should merit even a mention in such events — or if they did, it should have been as the exploited, and not the exploiters. And yet they seem to have demonstrated a consistent ability to turn social unrest to their advantage. Thus it is not an unreasonable claim that they might even instigate such unrest, anticipating that they could achieve desired ends.

12.8 The warmongering Drunkard

In September 1939, Britain went to war with Germany, pursuant to the guarantee which Chamberlain had been panicked into extending to Poland in March. Lloyd George had termed the guarantee “hare-brained,” while Churchill had supported it. Nonetheless, in his history of the war Churchill wrote: “Here was decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people.” With the war on, Winston was recalled to his old job as First Lord of the Admiralty. Then, in the first month of the war, an astonishing thing happened: the president of the United States initiated a personal correspondence not with the Prime Minister, but with the head of the British Admiralty, by-passing all the ordinary diplomatic channels.

The messages that passed between the president and the First Lord were surrounded by

a frantic secrecy, culminating in the affair of Tyler Kent, the American cipher clerk at the US London embassy who was tried and imprisoned by the British authorities. The problem was that some of the messages contained allusions to Roosevelt's agreement — even before the war began — to a blatantly unneutral cooperation with a belligerent Britain. On June 10, 1939, George VI and his wife, Queen Mary, visited the Roosevelts at Hyde Park. In private conversations with the King, Roosevelt promised full support for Britain in case of war. He intended to set up a zone in the Atlantic to be patrolled by the US Navy, and, according to the King's notes, the president stated that "if he saw a U boat he would sink her at once & wait for the consequences." The biographer of George VI, Wheeler-Bennett, considered that these conversations "contained the germ of the future Bases-for- Destroyers deal, and also of the Lend-Lease Agreement itself." In communicating with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Roosevelt was aware that he was in touch with the one member of Chamberlain's cabinet whose belligerence matched his own.

In 1940, Churchill at last became Prime Minister, ironically enough when the Chamberlain government resigned because of the Norwegian fiasco — which Churchill, more than anyone else, had helped to bring about. As he had fought against a negotiated peace after the fall of Poland, so he continued to resist any suggestion of negotiations with Hitler. Many of the relevant documents are still sealed — after all these years — but it is clear that a strong peace party existed in the country and the government. It included Lloyd George in the House of Commons, and Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, in the Cabinet. Even after the fall of France, Churchill rejected Hitler's renewed peace overtures. This, more than anything else, is supposed to be the foundation of his greatness. The British historian John Charmley raised a storm of outraged protest when he suggested that a negotiated peace in 1940 might have been to the advantage of Britain and Europe. A Yale historian, writing in the *New York Times Book Review*, referred to Charmley's thesis as "morally sickening." Yet Charmley's scholarly and detailed work makes the crucial point that Churchill's adamant refusal even to listen to peace terms in 1940 doomed what he claimed was dearest to him — the Empire and a Britain that was non-socialist and independent in world affairs. One may add that it probably also doomed European Jewry. It is amazing that seventy-five years after the fact, there are critical theses concerning World War II that are offlimits to historical debate.

Lloyd George, Halifax, and the others were open to a compromise peace because they understood that Britain and the Dominions alone could not defeat Germany. After the fall of France, Churchill's aim of total victory could be realized only under one condition: that the United States become embroiled in another world war. No wonder that Churchill put his heart and soul into ensuring precisely that.

After a talk with Churchill, Joseph Kennedy, American ambassador to Britain, noted: "Every hour will be spent by the British in trying to figure out how we can be gotten in." When he left from Lisbon on a ship to New York, Kennedy pleaded with the State Department to announce that if the ship should happen to blow up mysteriously in the

mid-Atlantic, the United States would not consider it a cause for war with Germany. In his unpublished memoirs, Kennedy wrote: "I thought that would give me some protection against Churchill's placing a bomb on the ship."

Kennedy's fears were perhaps not exaggerated. For, while it had been important for British policy in World War I, involving America was the *sine qua non* of Churchill's policy in World War II. In Franklin Roosevelt, he found a ready accomplice. That Roosevelt, through his actions and private words, evinced a clear design for war before December 7, 1941, has never really been in dispute. Arguments have raged over such questions as his possible foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. In 1948, Thomas A. Bailey, diplomatic historian at Stanford, already put the real pro-Roosevelt case: Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor. . . . He was like a physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own good. . . . The country was overwhelmingly noninterventionist to the very day of Pearl Harbor, and an overt attempt to lead the people into war would have resulted in certain failure and an almost certain ousting of Roosevelt in 1940, with a complete defeat of his ultimate aims.

Churchill himself never bothered to conceal Roosevelt's role as co-conspirator. In January, 1941, Harry Hopkins visited London. Churchill described him as "the most faithful and perfect channel of communication between the President and me . . . the main prop and animator of Roosevelt himself": I soon comprehended [Hopkins's] personal dynamism and the outstanding importance of his mission . . . here was an envoy from the President of supreme importance to our life. With gleaming eye and quiet, constrained passion he said: "The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him — there is nothing that he will not do so far as he has human power." There he sat, slim, frail, ill, but absolutely glowing with refined comprehension of the Cause. It was to be the defeat, ruin, and slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes, loyalties and aims.

In 1976, the public finally learned the story of William Stephenson, the British agent code named "Intrepid," sent by Churchill to the United States in 1940. Stephenson set up headquarters in Rockefeller Center, with orders to use any means necessary to help bring the United States into the war. With the full knowledge and cooperation of Roosevelt and the collaboration of federal agencies, Stephenson and his 300 or so agents "intercepted mail, tapped wires, cracked safes, kidnapped, . . . rumor mongered" and incessantly smeared their favorite targets, the "isolationists." Through Stephenson, Churchill was virtually in control of William Donovan's organization, the embryonic US intelligence service.

Churchill even had a hand in the barrage of pro-British, anti-German propaganda that issued from Hollywood in the years before the United States entered the war. Gore Vidal, in *Screening History*, perceptively notes that starting around 1937, Americans were subjected to one film after another glorifying England and the warrior heroes who built the Empire. As spectators of these productions, Vidal says: "We served neither

Lincoln nor Jefferson Davis; we served the Crown." A key Hollywood figure in generating the movies that "were making us all weirdly English" was the Hungarian émigré and friend of Churchill, Alexander Korda. Vidal very aptly writes:

"For those who find disagreeable today's Zionist propaganda, I can only say that gallant little Israel of today must have learned a great deal from the gallant little Englanders of the 1930s. The English kept up a propaganda barrage that was to permeate our entire culture ... Hollywood was subtly and not so subtly infiltrated by British propagandists."

While the Americans were being worked on, the two confederates consulted on how to arrange for direct hostilities between the United States and Germany. In August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met at the Atlantic conference. Here they produced the Atlantic Charter, with its "four freedoms," including "the freedom from want" — a blank-check to spread Anglo- American Sozialpolitik around the globe. When Churchill returned to London, he informed the Cabinet of what had been agreed to. Thirty years later, the British documents were released. Here is how the New York Times reported the revelations:

"Formerly top secret British Government papers made public today said that President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August, 1941, that he was looking for an incident to justify opening hostilities against Nazi Germany. . . . On August 19 Churchill reported to the War Cabinet in London on other aspects of the Newfoundland [Atlantic Charter] meeting that were not made public. . . . "He [Roosevelt] obviously was determined that they should come in. If he were to put the issue of peace and war to Congress, they would debate it for months," the Cabinet minutes added. "The President had said he would wage war but not declare it and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces. . . . Everything was to be done to force an incident.""

On July 15, 1941, Admiral Little, of the British naval delegation in Washington, wrote to Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord: "the brightest hope for getting America into the war lies in the escorting arrangements to Iceland, and let us hope the Germans will not be slow in attacking them." Little added, perhaps jokingly: "Otherwise I think it would be best for us to organize an attack by our own submarines and preferably on the escorti' A few weeks earlier, Churchill, looking for a chance to bring America into the war, wrote to Pound regarding the German warship Prinz Eugen: "It would be better for instance that she should be located by a US ship as this might tempt her to fire on that ship, thus providing the incident for which the US government would be so grateful." Incidents in the North Atlantic did occur, increasingly, as the United States approached war with Germany.

But Churchill did not neglect the "back door to war" — embroiling the United States with Japan — as a way of bringing America into the conflict with Hitler. Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador to Tokyo, like the American ambassador Joseph Grew, was working feverishly to avoid war. Churchill directed his foreign secretary, Anthony

Eden, to whip Craigie into line: He should surely be told forthwith that the entry of the United States into war either with Germany and Italy or with Japan, is fully conformable with British interests. Nothing in the munitions sphere can compare with the importance of the British Empire and the United States being co-belligerent.

Churchill threw his influence into the balance to harden American policy towards Japan, especially in the last days before the Pearl Harbor attack. A sympathetic critic of Churchill, Richard Lamb, has recently written:

“Was [Churchill] justified in trying to provoke Japan to attack the United States? . . . in 1941 Britain had no prospect of defeating Germany without the aid of the USA as an active ally. Churchill believed Congress would never authorize Roosevelt to declare war on Germany. In war, decisions by national leaders must be made according to their effect on the war effort. There is truth in the old adage: “All’s fair in love and war.”

But what of the American Republic? What does it mean for us that a president collaborated with a foreign head of government to entangle us in a world war? The question would have mattered little to Churchill. He had no concern with the United States as a sovereign, independent nation, with its own character and place in the scheme of things. For him, Americans were one of “the English-speaking peoples.” He looked forward to a common citizenship for Britons and Americans, a “mixing together,” on the road to Anglo-American world hegemony.

But the Churchill-Roosevelt intrigue should, one might think, matter to Americans. Here, however, criticism is halted before it starts. A moral postulate of our time is that in pursuit of the destruction of Hitler, all things were permissible. Yet why is it self-evident that morality required a crusade against Hitler in 1939 and 1940, and not against Stalin? At that point, Hitler had slain his thousands, but Stalin had already slain his millions. In fact, up to June, 1941, the Soviets behaved far more murderously toward the Poles in their zone of occupation than the Nazis did in theirs. Around 1,500,000 Poles were deported to the Gulag, with about half of them dying within the first two years. As Norman Davies writes: “Stalin was outpacing Hitler in his desire to reduce the Poles to the condition of a slave nation.” Of course, there were balance-of-power considerations that created distinctions between the two dictators. But it has yet to be explained why there should exist a double standard ordaining that compromise with one dictator would have been “morally sickening,” while collaboration with the other was morally irreproachable.

Early in the war, Churchill, declared: “I have only one aim in life, the defeat of Hitler, and this makes things very simple for me.” “Victory — victory at all costs,” understood literally, was his policy practically to the end. This points to Churchill’s fundamental and fatal mistake in World War II: his separation of operational from political strategy. To the first — the planning and direction of military campaigns — he devoted all of his time and energy; after all, he did so enjoy it. To the second, the fitting of military operations to the larger and much more significant political aims they were supposed to serve, he devoted no effort at all. Stalin, on the other hand, understood perfectly that the entire

purpose of war is to enforce certain political claims. This is the meaning of Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. On Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941, with the Wehrmacht in the Moscow suburbs, Stalin was ready with his demands: British recognition of Soviet rule over the Baltic states and the territories he had just seized from Finland, Poland, and Romania. (They were eventually granted.) Throughout the war he never lost sight of these and other crucial political goals. But Churchill, despite frequent prodding from Eden, never gave a thought to his, whatever they might be. His approach was: "First beat Hitler, then start thinking of the future of Britain and Europe." Churchill put in so many words: "the defeat, ruin, and slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes, loyalties and aims."

Churchill's policy of all-out support of Stalin foreclosed other, potentially more favorable approaches. The military expert Hanson Baldwin, for instance, stated:

"There is no doubt whatsoever that it would have been in the interest of Britain, the United States, and the world to have allowed — and indeed, to have encouraged — the world's two great dictatorships to fight each other to a frazzle. Such a struggle, with its resultant weakening of both Communism and Nazism, could not but have aided in the establishment of a more stable peace. Instead of adopting this approach, or, for example, promoting the overthrow of Hitler by anti-Nazi Germans — instead of even considering such alternatives — Churchill from the start threw all of his support to Soviet Russia."

Franklin Roosevelt's fatuousness towards Joseph Stalin is well-known. He looked on Stalin as a fellow "progressive" and an invaluable collaborator in creating the future New World Order. Roosevelt's nauseating flattery of Stalin is easily matched by Churchill's. Just like Roosevelt, Churchill heaped fulsome praise on the Communist murderer, and was anxious for Stalin's personal friendship. Moreover, his adulation of Stalin and his version of Communism — so different from the repellent "Trotskyite" kind — was no different in private than in public. In January 1944, he was still speaking to Eden of the "deep-seated changes which have taken place in the character of the Russian state and government, the new confidence which has grown in our hearts towards Stalin." In a letter to his wife, Clementine, Churchill wrote, following the October 1944 conference in Moscow: "I have had very nice talks with the old Bear. I like him the more I see him. Now they respect us & I am sure they wish to work with us." Writers like Isaiah Berlin, who try to give the impression that Churchill hated or despised all dictators, including Stalin, are either ignorant or dishonest.

Churchill's benign view of Stalin and Russia contrasts sharply with his view of Germany. Behind Hitler, Churchill discerned the old specter of Prussianism, which had caused, allegedly, not only the two world wars, but the Franco Prussian War as well. What he was battling now was "Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism," the "two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed." In October 1944, Churchill was still explaining to Stalin that: "The problem was how to prevent Germany getting on her feet in the lifetime of our grandchildren." Churchill harbored a "confusion of mind on the subject of the Prussian aristocracy, Nazism, and the sources of German militarist

expansionism . . . [his view] was remarkably similar to that entertained by Sir Robert Vansittart and Sir Warren Fisher; that is to say, it arose from a combination of almost racist antipathy and balance of power calculations." Churchill's aim was not simply to save world civilization from the Nazis, but, in his words, the "indefinite prevention of their [the Germans'] rising again as an Armed Power."

Little wonder, then, that Churchill refused even to listen to the pleas of the anti-Hitler German opposition, which tried repeatedly to establish liaison with the British government. Instead of making every effort to encourage and assist an anti-Nazi coup in Germany, Churchill responded to the feelers sent out by the German resistance with cold silence. Reiterated warnings from Adam von Trott and other resistance leaders of the impending "bolshevization" of Europe made no impression at all on Churchill. A recent historian has written, "by his intransigence and refusal to countenance talks with dissident Germans, Churchill threw away an opportunity to end the war in July 1944." To add infamy to stupidity, Churchill and his crowd had only words of scorn for the valiant German officers even as they were being slaughtered by the Gestapo.

In place of help, all Churchill offered Germans looking for a way to end the war before the Red Army flooded into central Europe was the slogan of unconditional surrender. Afterwards, Churchill lied in the House of Commons about his role at Casablanca in connection with Roosevelt's announcement of the policy of unconditional surrender, and was forced to retract his statements. Eisenhower, among others, strenuously and persistently objected to the unconditional surrender formula as hampering the war effort by raising the morale of the Wehrmacht. In fact, the slogan was seized on by Goebbels, and contributed to the Germans' holding out to the bitter end. The pernicious effect of the policy was immeasurably bolstered by the Morgenthau Plan, which gave the Germans a terrifying picture of what "unconditional surrender" would mean. This plan, initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec, called for turning Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country; even the coal mines of the Ruhr were to be wrecked. The fact that it would have led to the deaths of tens of millions of Germans made it a perfect analog to Hitler's schemes for dealing with Russia and the Ukraine.

Churchill was initially averse to the plan. However, he was won over by Professor Lindemann, as maniacal a German-hater as Morgenthau himself. Lindemann stated to Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician: "I explained to Winston that the plan would save Britain from bankruptcy by eliminating a dangerous competitor. . . . Winston had not thought of it in that way, and he said no more about a cruel threat to the German people." According to Morgenthau, the wording of the scheme was drafted entirely by Churchill. When Roosevelt returned to Washington, Hull and Stimson expressed their horror, and quickly disabused the president. Churchill, on the other hand, was unrepentant. When it came time to mention the Morgenthau Plan in his history of the war, he distorted its provisions and, by implication, lied about his role in supporting it.

War Crimes Discreetly Veiled

There are a number of episodes during the war revealing of Churchill's character that deserve to be mentioned. A relatively minor incident was the British attack on the French fleet, at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), off the coast of Algeria. After the fall of France, Churchill demanded that the French surrender their fleet to Britain. The French declined, promising that they would scuttle the ships before allowing them to fall into German hands. Against the advice of his naval officers, Churchill ordered British ships off the Algerian coast to open fire. About 1500 French sailors were killed. This was obviously a war crime, by anyone's definition: an unprovoked attack on the forces of an ally without a declaration of war. At Nuremberg, German officers were sentenced to prison for less. Realizing this, Churchill lied about Mers-el- Kebir in his history, and suppressed evidence concerning it in the official British histories of the war.

But the great war crime which will be forever linked to Churchill's name is the terror-bombing of the cities of Germany that in the end cost the lives of around 600,000 civilians and left some 800,000 seriously injured. (Compare this to the roughly 70,000 British lives lost to German air attacks. In fact, there were nearly as many Frenchmen killed by Allied air attacks as there were Englishmen killed by Germans).

The plan was conceived mainly by Churchill's friend and scientific advisor, Professor Lindemann, and carried out by the head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris ("Bomber Harris"). Harris stated: "In Bomber Command we have always worked on the assumption that bombing anything in Germany is better than bombing nothing." Harris and other British airforce leaders boasted that Britain had been the pioneer in the massive use of strategic bombing. J.M. Spaight, former Principal Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry, noted that while the Germans (and the French) looked on air power as largely an extension of artillery, a support to the armies in the field, the British understood its capacity to destroy the enemy's home-base. They built their bombers and established Bomber Command accordingly.

Brazenly lying to the House of Commons and the public, Churchill claimed that only military and industrial installations were targeted. In fact, the aim was to kill as many civilians as possible — thus, "area" bombing, or "carpet" bombing — and in this way to break the morale of the Germans and terrorize them into surrendering. Harris at least had the courage of his convictions. He urged that the government openly announce that:

"...the aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive ... should be unambiguously stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany."

The campaign of murder from the air leveled Germany. A thousand-year-old urban culture was annihilated, as great cities, famed in the annals of science and art, were reduced to heaps of smoldering ruins. There were high points: the bombing of Lübeck, when that ancient Hanseatic town "burned like kindling"; the 1000-bomber raid over Cologne, and

the following raids that somehow, miraculously, mostly spared the great Cathedral but destroyed the rest of the city, including thirteen Romanesque churches; the firestorm that consumed Hamburg and killed some 42,000 people. No wonder that, learning of this, a civilized European man like Joseph Schumpeter, at Harvard, was driven to telling “anyone who would listen” that Churchill and Roosevelt were destroying more than Genghis Khan.

The most infamous act was the destruction of Dresden, in February 1945. According to the official history of the Royal Air Force: “The destruction of Germany was by then on a scale which might have appalled Attila or Genghis Khan.” Dresden, which was the capital of the old kingdom of Saxony, was an indispensable stop on the Grand Tour, the baroque gem of Europe. The war was practically over, the city filled with masses of helpless refugees escaping the advancing Red Army. Still, for three days and nights, from February 13 to 15, Dresden was pounded with bombs. At least 30,000 people were killed, perhaps as many as 135,000 or more. The Zwinger Palace; Our Lady’s Church (die Frauenkirche); the Bruhl Terrace, overlooking the Elbe where, in Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons*, Uncle Pavel went to spend his last years; the Semper Opera House, where Richard Strauss conducted the premiere of *Rosenkavalier*; and practically everything else was incinerated. Churchill had fomented it. But he was shaken by the outcry that followed. While in Georgetown and Hollywood, few had ever heard of Dresden, the city meant something in Stockholm, Zurich, and the Vatican, and even in London. What did our hero do? He sent a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff:

“It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed. Otherwise, we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. . . . The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives . . . rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.”

The military chiefs saw through Churchill’s contemptible ploy: realizing that they were being set up, they refused to accept the memorandum. After the war, Churchill casually disclaimed any knowledge of the Dresden bombing, saying: “I thought the Americans did it.”

And still the bombing continued. On March 16, in a period of 20 minutes, Würzburg was razed to the ground. As late as the middle of April, Berlin and Potsdam were bombed yet again, killing another 5,000 civilians. Finally, it stopped; as Bomber Harris noted, there were essentially no more targets to be bombed in Germany. It need hardly be recorded that Churchill supported the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in the deaths of another 100,000 or more civilians. When Truman fabricated the myth of the “500,000 U.S. lives saved” by avoiding an invasion of the Home Islands — the highest military estimate had been 46,000 — Churchill topped his lie: the atom-bombings had saved 1,200,000 lives, including 1,000,000 Americans, he fantasized.

The eagerness with which Churchill directed or applauded the destruction of cities from

the air should raise questions for those who still consider him the great “conservative” of his — or perhaps of all — time. They would do well to consider the judgment of an authentic conservative like Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, who wrote: “Non-Britishers did not matter to Mr. Churchill, who sacrificed human beings — their lives, their welfare, their liberty — with the same elegant disdain as his colleague in the White House.”

By 1946, Churchill was complaining in a voice of outrage of the happenings in eastern Europe: “From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended over Europe.” Goebbels had popularized the phrase “iron curtain,” but it was accurate enough. The European continent now contained a single, hegemonic power. “As the blinkers of war were removed,” John Charmley writes, “Churchill began to perceive the magnitude of the mistake which had been made.” In fact, Churchill’s own expressions of profound self-doubt comport oddly with his admirers’ retrospective triumphalism. After the war, he told Robert Boothby:

“Historians are apt to judge war ministers less by the victories achieved under their direction than by the political results which flowed from them. Judged by that standard, I am not sure that I shall be held to have done very well.” In the preface to the first volume of his history of World War II, Churchill explained why he was so troubled:

“The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security, and that we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those we have surmounted.”

With the balance of power in Europe wrecked by his own policy, there was only one recourse open to Churchill: to bring America into Europe permanently. Thus, his anxious expostulations to the Americans, including his Fulton, Missouri “Iron Curtain” speech. Having destroyed Germany as the natural balance to Russia on the continent, he was now forced to try to embroil the United States in yet another war — this time a Cold War, that would last 45 years, and change America fundamentally, and perhaps irrevocably.

Why won't you come?

From “Churchill’s War”:

“War is a game to be played with a smiling face”, Churchill had once declared. The new prime minister (he became Prime Minister on May 10th 1940, the same day when the German offensive started in France) smiled as he blamed the defeat in Norway on traitors like Vidkun Quisling and on his compatriots who had failed to destroy tunnels and viaducts to prevent German reinforcements reaching Trondheim. As Hitler opened his western offensive, Winston smiled again, blamed the overrunning of the Low Countries once more on traitors, and relied on his friend General Georges and his indomitable Army of the North-East for victory in France. For the time being he remained at Admiralty House as an act of charity to Mr Chamberlain, but also because he knew how fragile

were the buildings in Downing-street. The staff at No. 10 feared it was the end of an era all the same. Chamberlain's secretary dourly hoped that his old master would soon be back in office. Overseas reactions to Winston's assumption of power were equally mixed. Canada's Mackenzie King cabled support, but Roosevelt did not: when the news irrupted into his own cabinet he remarked that, though Churchill was the best man that England had, he was drunk half of the time. Winston was, he could not forget, one of the few public men who had ever been rude to him. After being elected, Churchill was busy filling his cabinet of ministers.

Having learned in Norway belated lessons about air power, Churchill created a ministry of aircraft production and gave it to this potent Canadian one of the more inspired appointments in his cabinet. This process of cabinet-making distracted him until three A.M. on the thirteenth, when he grew bored with the process. My government, he told Macmillan, is the most broad based that Britain has ever known. He summoned them to the admiralty that afternoon. I have nothing to offer, he told them, but blood, toil, tears and sweat. He rather liked the sound of that. Glancing up as though the skies might fill with Hitler's bombers at any moment, he commented to Dalton afterwards, not without pleasurable anticipation, 'I expect all these buildings will look a bit different in two or three weeks time'.

Why would Churchill expect to see German bombers over London? Just because he has become Prime Minister a few days prior?

Irving pointed out that Churchill rejected Hitler's peace offers in 1939, 1940, and 1941. (Irving supports the thesis that Rudolf Hess's flight to Scotland was ordered by the Führer). Irving pinpointed one critical moment, and supplied the background:

"The crucial moment when he managed to kill this peace offensive in England was July 1940. If we look at the one date, July the 20th, this I think was something of a watershed between the old era of peace, the greatness of the British Empire and the new era, the new era of nuclear deterrent and the holocaust, the nuclear holocaust. July 20, 1940: Mr. Churchill is lying in bed that Sunday out in Chequers, when he gets a strange message. It's an intercept of a German ambassador's telegram in Washington to Berlin. It's only just been revealed, of course, that we were reading all of the German codes – not only the German Army, Air Force and Navy Codes, but also the German embassy codes. And if you're silly enough to believe everything that's written in the official history of British Intelligence, you will understand that the only reason that they released half of the stories is to prevent us from trying to find out the other half. And what matters is that we are reading the German diplomatic codes as well. On July 20th, the German ambassador in Washington sent a message to Berlin saying that the British ambassador in Washington had asked him very quietly, very confidentially, just what the German peace terms were. This, of course, was the one thing that Churchill could never allow to happen, that the British find out what Hitler's peace terms are. He sends an immediate message to the foreign office, to Lord Halifax, saying, "Your ambassador in Washington is strictly forbidden to have any further contacts with the German ambassador, even

indirectly." They were communicating through a Quaker intermediary.

Now, on the same day, Churchill sent a telegram to Washington ordering Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, to have nothing to do with the German ambassador. And the same day, he takes a third move to ensure that the peace moves in Britain are finally strangled at birth. He orders Sir Charles Portal to visit him at Chequers, the country residence of British prime ministers. Sir Charles Portal was Commander in Chief of Bomber Command. Now what is the significance? Well, the significance is this. Up to July 1940, not one single German bomb has fallen on British towns. Hitler had given orders that no British towns are to be bombed and, above all, bombing of London is completely forbidden and embargoed. Churchill knows this, because he's reading the German code. He's reading the German Air Force signals, which I can now read in the German files. Churchill is reading the signals, and he knows that Hitler is not doing him the favor.

Hitler is still hoping that this madman in England will see reason or that he will be outvoted by his cabinet colleagues. So he's not doing Churchill the favor of bombing any English towns. Churchill is frantic because he thinks he's being outsmarted by Hitler. On July the 20th he sends for Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of Bomber Command, and he says to Sir Charles Portal, as we know from records from Command to the Air Ministry, "When is the earliest that you could launch a vicious air attack on Berlin?" Sir Charles Portal replies to Winston, "I'm afraid we can't do it now, not until September because the nights aren't long enough to fly from England to Berlin and back in the hours of darkness. September, perhaps, and in September we will have the first hundred of the new Sterling bombers ..." But he also says, "I warn you, if you do that, the Germans will retaliate. At present they're not bombing English targets, they're not bombing civilian targets at all and you know why. And if you bomb Berlin, then Hitler will retaliate against English civilian targets." And Churchill just twinkles when he gets this reply, because he knows what he wants.

We know what he wants because he's told Joe Kennedy, the American Ambassador - Joseph P. Kennedy, father of the late President - "I want the Germans to start bombing London as early as possible because this will bring the Americans into the war when they see the Nazis' frightfulness, and above all it will put an end to this awkward and inconvenient peace movement that's afoot in my own Cabinet and among the British population." I've opened Kennedy's diary. I've also read Kennedy's telegrams back to the State Department in Washington. They're buried among the files. You can't find them easily, but they are worth reading, and you see in detail what Churchill was telling him. What cynicism. Churchill deliberately provoking the bombing of his own capital in order to kill the peace movement. He's been warned this would be the consequence, but he needs it. And still Hitler doesn't do him the favor."

Hitler not retaliating at first made Churchill angry. From the memories of Charles de Gaulle we know that when Charles de Gaulle visited him 2 weeks later, on August 4th 1940, Churchill stands in the middle of his lawn, striking his fist angry into the sky shouting

'WHY WON'T YOU COME?' and de Gaulle did not understand what this scheme was all about. On August 24th however, Churchill finally gets his chance: A single German plane flying in from the West along the Themse flying one loop too far on the Themse and drops his bombs not on Rotherhithe (where the Oil refineries were) but on the east end of London, just in sight of greater London, killing large numbers of Chickens and damaging some buildings. Churchill gets the news on the following day, on the morning on August 25th 9:10 A.M.. He then personally telephones the Headquarters of Bomber-Command and he speaks with the Deputy-Commander in Chief telling him "I want a minimum of 100 bombers attacking Berlin tonight in retaliation for this savage raid on London". This is Mr. Churchill, using a direct telephone link to Bomber-Command, bypassing Cabinet, bypassing Parliament, and bypassing the Air-Ministry. This air raid is continued 6 or 7 times during the following 10 days and Hitler still refuses to respond and on Sept. 4th 1940, Hitler sends a lawyer to the Stockholm embassy of the British and tell the British Ambassador there what the German peace offer is. The lawyer is told by the Ambassador that his order are to not accept any information given to him by a German Emissary or listen to any German offers, "Mr. Churchill's personal orders". At this point, the mission of Rudolf Hess for peace with Britain is being planned, because Hess had contacts in Scotland and he shall make personal contact to deliver German desires for peace.

In a speech on Sept. 4th 1940, Hitler declares to finally retaliate and thus, making Churchill's "dreams" come true:

"It is a wonderful thing to see our nation at war, in its fully disciplined state. This is exactly what we are now experiencing at this time, as Mr Churchill is demonstrating to us the aerial night attacks which he has concocted. He is not doing this because these air raids might be particularly effective, but because his Air Force cannot fly over German territory in daylight. Whereas German aviators and German planes fly over English soil daily, there is hardly a single Englishman who comes across the North Sea in daytime. They therefore come during the night — and as you know, release their bombs indiscriminately and without any plan on to residential areas, farmhouses and villages. Wherever they see a sign of light, a bomb is dropped on it. For three months past, I have not ordered any answer to be given, thinking that they would stop this nonsensical behaviour. Mr Churchill has taken this to be a sign of our weakness. You will understand that we shall now give a reply, night for night, and with increasing force. And if the British Air Force drops two, three or four thousand kilos of bombs, then we will now drop 150,000, 180,000, 230,000, 300,000 or 400,000 kilos, or more, in one night. If they declare that they will attack our cities on a large scale, we will erase theirs! We will put a stop to the game of these night-pirates, as God is our witness. The hour will come when one or the other of us will crumble, and that one will not be National Socialist Germany. I have already carried through such a struggle once in my life, up to the final consequences, and this then led to the collapse of the enemy who is now still sitting there in England on Europe's last island."

And thus, Germany retaliated against Britain bombing civilians.

The corrupt Drunkard

Churchill however, had for years been barracking Parliament, calling for a war on Hitler, earning himself the reputation as a “war monger”. Why?

Winston Churchill enjoyed a lavish lifestyle, for example, smoking expensive cigars, and drinking a bottle of champagne for breakfast every morning (even during the war when the British people were struggling with rationing). During his “wilderness years”, he had become bankrupt, and as well as struggling to finance his luxury lifestyle, he was about to lose Chartwell, his family stately home. Between 1930 and 1939 he was financed by a slush fund emanating from a secret pressure group known as the Focus. British historian David Irving has investigated, and in his book on Churchill, “Churchill’s War” details who the Focus group were and their arrangement with Churchill. Irving on the Focus Group:

“The Focus was financed by a slush fund set up by some of London’s wealthiest businessmen — principally, businessmen organized by the Board of Jewish Deputies in England, whose chairman was a man called Sir Bernard Waley Cohen. Sir Bernard Waley Cohen held a private dinner party at his apartment on July 29, 1936. This is in Waley Cohen’s memoirs . . . The 29th of July, 1936, Waley Cohen set up a slush fund of 50,000 pounds for The Focus, the Churchill pressure group. Now, 50,000 pounds in 1936, multiply that by ten, at least, to get today’s figures. By another three or four to multiply that into Canadian dollars. So, 40 times 50,000 pounds — about \$2 million in Canadian terms — was given by Bernard Waley Cohen to this secret pressure group of Churchill in July 1936. The purpose was — the tune that Churchill had to play was — fight Germany. Start warning the world about Germany, about Nazi Germany. Churchill, of course, one of our most brilliant orators, a magnificent writer, did precisely that. For two years, The Focus continued to militate, in fact, right through until 1939. And I managed to find the secret files of The Focus, I know the names of all the members. I know all their secrets. I know how much money they were getting, not just from The Focus, but from other governments. I use the word “other governments” advisedly because one of my sources of information for my Churchill biography is, in fact, the Chaim Weizmann Papers in the State of Israel. Israel has made available to me all Churchill’s secret correspondence with Chaim Weizmann, all his secret conferences. It is an astonishing thing, but I, despite my reputation, in a kind of negative sense with these people, am given access to files like that, just the same as the Russian Government has given me complete access to all of the Soviet records of Churchill’s dealings with Ivan Maisky, Joseph Stalin, Molotov and the rest of them. I am the only historian who has been given access to these Russian records. It is a kind of horse trading method that I use when I want access to these files, because it is in these foreign archives we find the truth about Winston Churchill. When you want the evidence about his tax dodging in 1949 and thereabouts, you are not going to look in his own tax files, you’re going to look in the files of those who employed him, like the Time/Life Corporation of America. That’s where you look. And when you’re looking for evidence about who was putting money up for Churchill when he was in the

wilderness and who was funding this secret group of his, The Focus, you're not going to look in his files. Again, you're going to look in the secret files, for example, of the Czech government in Prague, because that is where much of the money was coming from."

Irving then revealed further details of Churchill's financing by the Czechs, as well as the facts of Churchill's financial rescue by a wealthy banker of Austro-Jewish origins, Sir Henry Strakosch, who, in Irving's words, emerged "out of the woodwork of the City of London, that great pure international financial institution." When Churchill was bankrupted overnight in the American stock market crash of 1937-1938, it was Strakosch who was instrumental in setting up the central banks of South Africa and India, who bought up all Churchill's debts. When Strakosch died in 1943, the details of his will, published in the London Times, included a bequest of £20,000 to the then Prime Minister, eliminating the entire debt. Irving dealt with Churchill's performance as a wartime leader, first as Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty and then as Prime Minister. The British historian adverted to Churchill's "great military defeat in Norway, which he himself engineered and pioneered," and mentioned the suspicion of Captain Ralph Edwards, who was on Churchill's staff at the time, that Churchill had deliberately caused the fiasco to bring down Neville Chamberlain and replace him as prime minister, which subsequently happened.

From Irving we also learn about his alcoholism:

"His alcoholism was a family heirloom. His father had been an alcoholic; there was the same problem in Clementine's family, and it was an affliction inherited in turn by their offspring. It would lead to Sarah's arrest for disorderly conduct in California and to her remand in a women's prison in London. It plagued Randolph all his life. An F.B.I. agent informed J. Edgar Hoover in July 1942 that Randolph Churchill was in El Morocco until four A.M. today [and] . . . was tight. A pretty picture. Randolph stormed out of a New York television interview when questioned about his drinking. When Winston's grandson was only three so Beaverbrook tut-tutted to the little boy's mother he ran down the hall to ask me to have a cocktail with him. Churchill settled his substantial London liquor bills with Hatch Mansfield, his wine merchants, on the morning he became prime minister. One bill he would never pay, however, recalled Ralph Mansfield to the Daily Telegraph, was his wife's gin bill. Clementine always had to settle that herself. The family made light of this curse. Writing to her mother about a raging toothache, Sarah would add humorously, so far, the only relief has been obtained by an old-fashioned treatment of which Papa will approve! Holding neat whisky in my mouth. Oh delicious anæsthesia! Local, then total!! Winston would quaff 28 and 34 Pol Roger champagne throughout a meal rather than any wine, and he made light of that as well. Several times he called upon the Prof. to compute his total consumption assuming he had drunk half a bottle a day for the last half century. The Prof. made the slide-rule calculation once on the way over for the Atlantic meeting with Roosevelt in 1941 and gave him the result in liquid tons of champagne. Churchill was disgruntled to find that it would not even half fill the dining saloon. Ten years later Churchill was still inquiring the total."

Churchill also was in permanent correspondence with high ranking Zionist Jews, such as Chaim Weizmann (Zionist leader and Israeli statesman who served as President of the Zionist Organization and later as the first President of Israel). The letters exchanged between these two individuals can be easily found with a quick online search, but they are too long to be presented in full here. Some excerpts:

Transcript of Sept. 10, 1941 Letter from Chaim Weizmann to Winston Churchill that asserts that "The Jews" helped to put the U.S. into World War 1 (Balfourt Declaration) against Germany, and would be keen to do it again:

"I have spent months in America, traveling up and down the country, and clearly searching the American scene. Forces over there are finely balanced; the position is uncertain. There is only one big ethnic group which is willing to stand, to a man, for Great Britain, and a policy of "all-out-aid" for her: the five million American Jews. From Secretary Morgenthau, Governor Lehman, Justice Frankfurter, down to the simplest Jewish workman or trader, they are conscious of all that this struggle against Hitler implies. It has been repeatedly acknowledged by British Statesmen that it was the Jews who, in the last war, effectively helped to tip the scales in America in favour of Great Britain. They are keen to do it - and may do it - again . But you are dealing with human beings, with flesh and blood, and the most elementary feeling of self respect sets limits to service, however willing, if the response is nothing but rebuffs and humiliations. American Jewry waits for a word - a call - from His Majesty's Government. The formation of a Jewish fighting force would be that signal. Equipment cannot be the determining factor; there will always be some alternative use for whatever equipment is available; and fresh recruits are all the time being called up in the British Commonwealth by their hundreds of thousands, while we are being told to wait for one single division because of lack of equipment. If the spirit of American Jewry is roused, the influence which this will exercise on America's rather sluggish production will return to you that equipment with manifold gains."

Weizmann also said in a Speech on December 3, 1942, in New York:

"We are not denying and are not afraid to confess that this war is our war and that it is waged for the liberation of Jewry... Stronger than all fronts together is our front, that of Jewry. We are not only giving this war our financial support on which the entire war production is based, we are not only providing our full propaganda power which is the moral energy that keeps this war going. The guarantee of victory is predominantly based on weakening the enemy forces, on destroying them in their own country, within the resistance. **And we are the Trojan horses in the enemy's fortress.** Thousands of Jews living in Europe constitute the principal factor in the destruction of our enemy. There, our front is a fact and the most valuable aid for victory."

12.9 Stalins War

Note: There might be many grammar errors in this chapter due to the copy-paste function not recognizing “Th” correctly.

Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation

Stalin could have averted World War II with one stroke of his pen. He had many such opportunities. Here is one of them: In 1936, the Soviet Union developed the heavy high-speed, high-altitude bomber TB-7. Air Force Major General V. Shumikhin: “At altitudes above 10,000 meters the TB-7 could not be reached by the majority of existing fighters at that time, and the ceiling of 12,000 meters made it untouchable even by anti-aircraft artillery.” cannons and 12.7-mm heavy machine guns. Bombs of the largest caliber could fit in the large bomb compartment. . . . [It was] unreachable at maximum altitude of its flight by anti-aircraft cannons and fighters of that time. The TB-7 was the most powerful bomber in the world.”⁴ “A record-setting plane. . . . Now, we have every reason to assert that the TB-7 was more powerful than the American flying fortress B-17.”

Molotov flew on a TB-7 from Moscow to Britain over occupied Europe. One must remember who ruled the skies above Europe in the spring of 1942, in order to appraise the level of trust of Soviet leadership in this airplane. Molotov did not fear landing on the defendant’s bench in Nazi court, and Stalin did not fear letting Molotov fly. The TB-7 proved itself. It flew over all of Europe, stopped in Britain, flew to America, and returned by the same route, once again flying over German holdings undisturbed. After the war, a commission of the Soviet government conducted an analysis of the German anti-aircraft defenses at the time of Molotov’s flight. It turned out that, along the flight path, German fighters did not go up to intercept the enemy aircraft, there was no alert sounded at the anti-aircraft batteries, the observation posts did not register the flight of the TB-7 at all. Simply put, the German anti-aircraft defenses not only could not take down the TB-7, they could not detect its presence in their air territory. So, long before the war the Soviet Union had created an untouchable bomber, and a government order was prepared to produce a thousand TB-7s by November 1940. What remained to be done? All that was left to do was to sign the order with seven letters: J. STALIN.

With a thousand untouchable TB-7s, any invasion could have been averted. All that had to be done was to invite delegations of certain countries and in their presence somewhere in a remote steppe drop at least one thousand tons of bombs from astounding altitudes. Then follow up with an explanation: it has nothing to do with you, this is a surprise we hold for the capital city of that country which ventures to attack ours. Precision? There is no precision. Why would there be? We drop the bombs from incredible heights. The lack of precision will be corrected through repeated drops. Every day several hundred tons will rain on the capital of the aggressor, until we reach the desired outcome, and then other cities will get a taste of this hailstorm as well. Do you understand what

will happen to the opponent before he has a chance to reach Moscow? The TB-7 is untouchable when in the air, and cannot be attacked by the opponent on land: our bases are hidden far from the borders, and our probable enemies have no strategic aviation to speak of. . . . And now, gentlemen, let us drink to eternal peace. Such a speech could have been given by Stalin's diplomats, if the Soviet Union had several hundred or even a thousand TB-7s. But Stalin decided not to build a thousand TB-7s. Is it possible to understand Stalin's motives? Yes, it is possible. If we compare a thousand TB-7s to a game of chess, this situation is the equivalent of being able to declare checkmate to the opponent's king before the start of the game, and if the partner still ventures to play, one can call checkmate after his first move. If one thousand tons of bombs, which several hundred TB-7s could deliver in one trip, are to be translated into contemporary strategic terms, it is equivalent to one kiloton. This is the language of the nuclear age. If one kiloton is insufficient, in two sorties twice this amount can be delivered. Twenty kilotons equals what (without much precision) was dropped on Hiroshima. A thousand TB-7s is like a nuclear missile, aimed at the enemy's capital. The power is such that, for a potential aggressor, war loses all sense.

In the late 1930s Stalin had the capacity to create an instrument that would serve as a severe warning to Hitler. With one stroke of Stalin's pen on an order to produce a series of TB-7s, the German invasion of Soviet territory could have been averted. Of course, in August 1939 Stalin could not have had a thousand TB-7s. But he could have had two, three, four, or maybe even five hundred. If only Stalin had in due time signed an order for the serial production of the TB-7. To do him justice, it must be noted that Stalin did sign such an order—but then he canceled it. And signed it again! And repealed it again, and again. Four times the production of TB-7s started, and four times it was canceled.¹² After each order, the industry had time to put out three or four TB-7s, and then the order was reversed. Everything started anew, and once again was interrupted. By June 22, 1941, the TB-7 series was not in production.

A question arises: If Stalin had issued the order to produce a thousand TB-7s and did not cancel it, could the Soviet industry have fulfilled such an order? Could it have put out, by the end of 1940, a thousand such airplanes? The creator of the TB-7, Vladimir Petliakov (after Petliakov's tragic death the TB-7 was renamed Pe-8), did not doubt this for a minute. Alexander Mikulin, creator of the engines for the TB-7, was completely certain that Soviet industry could meet such a demand. Professor L. Kerber, the deputy to the airplane designer A. Tupolev, and experts in the air industry S. Eger, S. Leshchenko, E. Stoman, chief engineer of the factory that produced the TB-7s I. Nezval, head technologist of the factory E. Shekunov, and many others on whom production of the TB-7 depended—all thought the task could be accomplished by the designated deadline. Airplane designers V. Shavrov and A. Tupolev held that one thousand TB-7s could be ready by November 1940.

But starting in 1930, they produced a massive amount of other aircrafts. Soviet industry broke its own records—in a short period it put out 819 TB-3s. Air regiments and brigades

were no longer enough. On March 23, 1932, the Soviet Union became the first country in the world to create a heavy bomber corps. In January 1936, the first aviation army was created, a second army in March, and a third aviation army a bit later. No other nation at the time had either an aviation army or even a corps of strategic aviation. A fleet of a thousand heavy bombers is a strategist's dream, and this dream materialized first in the Soviet Union. But that is not all: the plans were for rearming three aviation armies with the newest bombers and additionally deploying three more armies in the Byelorussia, Kiev, and Leningrad military districts.

By the time the TB-7 appeared, production of heavy bombers was as perfected in the Soviet Union as Henry Ford's production of automobiles had become in the United States. The question is not whether or not there would have been enough time to build a thousand TB-7s before the beginning of the war. The question is: why did they not try? By the time the TB-7 came onto the scene, the Soviet Union had created design bureaus capable of creating airplanes that were ahead of their time, and an industry capable of a mass output that surpassed the demand of peacetime. Air academies, pilot schools, and technical schools were opened, the theory of military use was developed, and combat experience was obtained in local conflicts and grandiose training exercises. Air bases, learning centers, and test sites were built; personnel from command staff to machine-gun operators, from navigation officers to engineers to photo-decipherers were trained. Pilots, meteorologists, aviation medics, and others were all ready. Collectives formed, traditions were born, theorists and practitioners were raised. After all this, the country that was the leader in the field of strategic aviation entered World War II without strategic aviation. On Stalin's orders, in November 1940, the Soviet air armies were disbanded. On June 22, 1941, Soviet strategic aviation did not have any armies in its ranks. Only five corps and three separate divisions remained. they were mostly equipped with the DB-3f, which is a magnificent bomber, but not a strategic bomber. they also still had TB-3s, which could be used to transport cargo, but as bombers they were obsolete. As we already know, there were only eleven TB-7s, not even enough to outfit one squadron.

Since it was not Stalin's goal to prevent war, but to destroy the enemy army, he focused on the production of other types of aircraft (with more precision) which would not destroy bridges and roads which would hinder ground forces from taking over enemy territory quickly.

Stalin's Preparations for War: Tanks

Stalin's goal was to develop and mass-produce the best tanks in the world. Tanks were to be the spearhead for the Soviet offensive against Western Europe, and Stalin set about developing them as he built Soviet industry. In 1933, the Red Army adopted the T-28 tank. A variation of this model was designed in 1937—the T-28 PKh (Podvodny Khod—"underwater traversing" tank). Tests showed that if necessary, all series of T-28s could be converted to cross water barriers underwater, at a depth of up to 4.5 meters and

width of up to one kilometer with a stream speed up to one m/s (meter per second).¹ Not a single German, British, American, French, or Japanese tank from the 1930s could compete with the T-28 in terms of weapons, armor, or engine power.

At the end of 1937, the Germans started producing the Pz-IVA, the most powerful German tank of the first half of World War II. It had 15-mm armor.³ The T-28's armor was of higher quality and twice as thick—30 mm. The most powerful German tank had a 250-horsepower engine. The T-28's was twice as powerful: 500 horsepower. The German tank had two machine guns, while the T-28 had four or five. The gun on the German tank was approximately equal to the Soviet one. The T-28 had a 76-mm KT-28 gun, while the German tank had a gun of slightly smaller caliber—75 mm; therefore, the shells were slightly lighter. The T-28 fired shells with an initial speed of 381 m/s. The German Pz-IVA had a slightly longer barrel (16.5 caliber); therefore the speed of the shells was slightly higher—385 m/s. As the muzzle energy of both guns was practically the same, Soviet designers could not reconcile themselves to the fact that the Germans had caught up with them at least in one parameter. In response, starting in 1938, the Soviet T-28 tanks were produced with a new L-10 gun. Its barrel length was 26 calibers. The muzzle velocity of its shells was 555 m/s. The Germans did not catch up with this innovation until 1942. The L-10 Soviet tank gun in 1941 was unrivaled in Germany or anywhere else in the world. "In terms of arms, the T-28 absolutely surpassed all German tanks. The L-10 gun (as well as the KT-28, by the way) could effectively destroy the tanks of the Wehrmacht Heer at distances out of range for their weapons."⁴ The Germans installed the HL-120TR 300-horsepower engine on the later models of their most powerful tank, the Pz-IV. But they still did not catch up with the Soviet 500-horsepower engines. The Germans enhanced the armor to 30 mm. The Soviet response was the T-28 E, with a maximum thickness of 80 mm. The T-28 had sufficient allowances in its design to permit the installation of the 85-mm F-39 gun with a 52-caliber length.⁵ The tank successfully passed all tests with that gun model. However, at that time, the Soviet tank industry made another breakthrough: it created the T-34. Its classic design became the sire of the future development of tanks worldwide. Further modernization of the T-28 was unnecessary. After the war, Soviet generals and historians called the T-28 obsolete. But the T-28 was obsolete only by Soviet standards, only compared to the T-34. In comparison with all foreign tanks, the T-28 was still outstanding. If in the summer of 1941 a foreign tank had had a 76-mm gun with muzzle velocity of 555 m/s and four or five machine guns, it would have been the national pride of that country. But nobody had such a tank. If a foreign tank had had a frontal armor of 80 mm, it would have been considered an outstanding design achievement.⁶ If anyone in the world in 1941 had had a 500-horsepower tank engine, this would have been a world record. The "obsolete" Soviet T-28 was a combination of three world records, each of which even taken independently would have been the national pride in any other country.

After the war, the Soviet historians excluded all T-28 tanks (and many others) from the statistics, and put them in the "obsolete and worn-out" category. However, the

“obsolete” T-28 tanks captured by Finland in 1939 and 1941 were used by the Finnish army, served until the very end of the war, and were successfully used against the Red Army. On December 19, 1939, the Red Army enlisted in its ranks the T-34. Following are German reviews of its performance. General Field Marshal von Kleist said: “The T-34 was the best in the world.” Major General von Mellentin agreed: “We had nothing equal to the T-34.” General Field Marshal von Rundstedt also thought that the T-34 was the best tank in the world. Colonel General Guderian remembered: “A large number of T-34 tanks were used in battle [Guderian is referring to the hostilities in October 1941 near Mtsensk, northeast of Orel], causing significant losses among our tanks. Previously existing hardware superiority of our tank forces was now lost and shifted to the opponent. Therefore, a prospect for rapid and continuous success disappeared.”⁷ “Our 50-mm and 37-mm anti-tank guns were completely useless against the T-34.”

I could endlessly quote German soldiers, officers, generals, and even field marshals; entire volumes of rave reviews of the T-34 have been published. Its debut caused a sensation at the beginning of the war. Sixty years after the T-34 first appeared, British professor Richard Ogarkovets, world famous as the leading authority in the field of designing armored technology, believes that the world tank-building industry still remains fully under the influence of ideas incorporated into the design of this remarkable tank. The T-34 was the only tank in the world created before the beginning of World War II that was not obsolete by its end. The T-34 fought for decades after World War II. Not a single other tank in the world had such a long lifespan. In June 1941, the Red Army suffered a crushing defeat, which had to be explained. Communist historians acknowledged the remarkable qualities of the T-34, but added that these tanks were very few in number; there were only 967 of them. Many educated and honest historians repeated that on June 21, 1941, Stalin only had 967 T-34s. Even if this had been true, the word “only” was disputable—the rest of the world had none. In the five western border military districts, which constituted the first strategic echelon of the Red Army, there really were 967 T-34 tanks. But the forces of the second strategic echelon were being secretly transferred to the western regions of the country. They also had T-34 tanks. In total, the Red Army had 1,225 of them on May 31, 1941. By June 21, the factories shipped out and unloaded another 138 T-34s. On top of this, another 37 T-34s were produced, tested, but not yet shipped. Overall, at the time of the invasion, the Soviet Union had exactly 1,400 T-34s. However, even this was not all. The T-34 was produced in series. Meanwhile, the attempts to create an equal or superior tank in Germany began only on November 25, 1941. In June, July, August, September, and October 1941, Germany had not yet begun attempts to create an analogous tank, while the Soviet factories continued producing the T-34. During the second half of 1941, Soviet industry put out another 1,789 T-34s in addition to the 1,400 that existed on June 22. In 1942, the production of T-34s went at a rate of thirty-five a day. In 1942, 12,520 T-34 tanks were produced. Very few, I agree. But in Germany, the production of an analogous tank had not yet begun. The German equal of the T-34 was the Panther, which first appeared in the summer of 1943 during the great tank battle at Kursk. The Panther was a magnificent tank. Some experts

considered it the best tank of World War II, and claimed that the Panther surpassed the T-34 in all aspects. Oddly enough, after the war, practically all designers in the world copied the best aspects of the T-34, while nobody copied the Panther. Its tank did not leave any descendants behind.

The Germans were unable to design a good tank for mass production. Therefore, until almost the very end of the war Germany had to produce obsolete models to supplement the Tigers and Panthers and compensate for the losses incurred in battle. The American tank expert Steven Zaloga went so far as to consider the production of Panthers a mistake: "The decision to enlist among weapons such a large, heavy, and complex tank as the Panther in the category of medium tanks was one of the factors that limited the German tank production to a level much lower than the Soviet."

In 1941, only two armies in the world recognized the necessity of heavy tanks. Obviously, they were the German and the Soviet armies. The order to begin project development of the first German heavy tank was given on May 26, 1941. The project was called MK4501: 45 tons, model one. The project resulted in the Tiger. In contrast, work on creating a heavy tank in the Soviet Union began in 1930. In 1933, the first Soviet heavy tank, the T-35, was produced in series and entered the ranks of the troops. It was a five-turret giant, weighed 45 tons. The last series of T-35 joined the troops in 1939. But the tank was improved even after the production was completed: after the war in Finland, all T-35s were returned to the factories and their armor was reinforced to 80 mm. The weight of the tanks reached 50 tons. Germany and the USSR shared the two first places in heavy tank production. There was nobody in third place. Elsewhere around the world, generals and designers did not even think of drafting a heavy tank on paper. The situation was such that while Germany had a heavy tank just on paper, other countries did not have heavy tanks even on their minds, while the Soviet Union was the only country in the world that in 1941 had heavy tanks both in experimental stages and in series production. The Red Army was the only army in the world that had heavy tanks among its units.

Nonetheless, Western and Soviet historians claim that Germany was ready for war, and the Soviet Union was not (when in reality, it was the complete opposite). They pronounced the T-35 tank obsolete and didn't mention it in statistics, even though the rest of the world had nothing comparable to the T-35 tank. The T-35 surpassed everything other countries had in terms of weapons, armor, and engine power—all the main characteristics. Moreover, the T-35, despite its size and weight, exerted less pressure on the ground than the German tanks, which meant it had much greater mobility, did not sink in snow, mud, and soft ground, where twice- and three-times-lighter tanks of other armies sank. If the T-35 were declared obsolete, all other tanks around the world had to be declared obsolete as well, and excluded from statistics. This was true for many other Soviet tank models (like the KV) and thus, removing all these tanks from the statistics was used as propaganda to portray Hitler as the only person who wanted war.

When Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, the German armed forces had zero

tanks, while the Red Army had 4,000 tanks. In the whole of 1933, not a single tank was produced in Germany; in contrast, 3,819 tanks of all types and modifications were produced in the Soviet Union.¹ The production of tanks in Germany began in 1934: in the next five years, German factories produced 2,683 tanks.² Soviet factories in the same time period produced 14,283 tanks.³ On January 1, 1939, the Red Army was equipped with 21,100 battle-ready tanks.⁴ In 1939, Hitler started World War II with 3,195 tanks, the same number that Soviet factories produced per year in peacetime.

In 1941, the German army, by a crushing blow, defeated gigantic gatherings of Soviet troops in the border regions. Thousands of Soviet tanks were destroyed or simply abandoned by the troops. This catastrophe had to be explained somehow. Communist historians explained what happened very simply: the tanks were obsolete, and therefore useless. The whole world laughed at Stalin and at his “obsolete” tanks. But how many of them were there?

Many tanks of the Soviets were of the “BT” design, —the BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, BT-7A, and BT-7M. BT stood for *bystrokhodnyi* (high-speed) tank. The shape of the BT was simple and rational. Not a single tank in the world during the prewar period and the early period of World War II had an armor of such a shape. The best tank of World War II, the T-34, was a direct descendant of the BT. The shape of its body was a development of the idea of the great American designer. After the T-34, the principle of a sloped location of the frontal armor sheets was used on the German Panther, and later on tanks around the world. In the 1930s, practically all tanks around the world were produced according to one design: the engine in the rear, the transmission in the front part. The BT was an exception: its engine and transmission were both in the rear. Twenty-five years later, the entire world understood the advantages of the BT design. The BT tanks were heavily armed for their time. The 45-mm cannon could penetrate the armor of any foreign tank. Great Britain and the United States began installing such cannons on their tanks only a decade later, in 1942 and 1943. In addition to thousands of BT tanks, armed with 45-mm cannons, 154 BT-7As were manufactured and armed with 76-mm KT-26 cannons.⁵ At the beginning of World War II, no tank in the world outside the borders of the Soviet Union had weaponry of comparable caliber. What about the armor? The BT had just bullet-proof armor. At that time, most of the world had tanks with the same kind of bullet-proof armor. The engine is the heart of the tank. The BT-2, which was made operational in the Red Army in 1932, had a 400-horsepower M-5 engine. German tanks began having engines of equal power only by the end of 1942. The specific power of the BT was 36.4 horsepower per ton of mass.⁶ Not a single tank in the world had such a high specific power, which allowed the tank to do unbelievable things: “BT units could jump over obstacles to a distance of 15 to 20 meters; a few could do it to a distance of 40 meters.”

In April 1941, Germany began producing in series the T-IIIJ tank. In the German army it had the highest specific power—13.9 horsepower per ton of mass. How could the BT-2 be obsolete, if its specific power was almost three times higher than that of the best

German tank? The first BTs had a speed of 69 mph, that is, over 110 km/h.⁸ Seventy years later any tank would still be envious of such high speed. The main advantage of the BT tank was its speed. This quality dominated all its other qualities to such an extent that it even had a bearing on the tank's name—high-speed tank. The BT tank was a weapon of aggression. All of its characteristics make the BT resemble a small, but extremely mobile, horseback warrior from the undefeatable hordes of Genghis Khan, the great world conqueror who vanquished all his enemies through a sudden attack of colossal masses of extremely mobile warriors. He destroyed his enemies mainly not by powerful weapons, but through decisive maneuvers. He did not need heavy, clumsy knights, only light, quick, mobile troops, capable of traversing vast territories, crossing rivers, and going deep into the enemy's rear. The BT tanks were exactly the same. At the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 6,456 BT tanks—that's as many as all operational tanks of all types in the rest of the world.

Soviet commanders clearly understood that BT tanks were not good for conventional warfare, but they were great in situations when the Red Army suddenly broke into enemy territory. "High speed tanks [by] their nature are a weapon of sudden attack. Their full effect (and success in general) can be obtained only if their use is sudden." In other words, if we suddenly attack the enemy, we will have success, but if the element of surprise is not on our side, we will not. The BT tanks could only be used in aggressive warfare, only in the enemy's rear, and only in a decisive aggressive operation, when hordes of tanks suddenly broke through onto enemy territory and bypassed points of opposition, thrusting deep behind enemy lines, where there were no enemy troops, but where all cities, bridges, factories, airports, ports, storage facilities, command posts, and communication units were located. The amazing aggressive characteristics of the BT were achieved by using a unique landing gear. On field roads, the BT moved using caterpillar tracks, but when it found itself on good roads, it shed the heavy tracks and sped forward on wheels like a racecar. It is well known that speed and cross-country ability are a trade-off: either we have a racecar that only rides on good roads, or a slow tractor that can ride anywhere. The Soviet marshals chose in favor of the racecar, so the BT tanks were not good for the bad roads of Soviet territory. In the battles fought on Soviet territory, thousands of BT tanks were abandoned. Off the roads, even with the caterpillar tracks they were difficult to use.

Seventy years ago, there were no highways on Soviet territory. And in 1939, not a single immediate Soviet neighbor had an autobahn either. But in the following year, through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin divided Poland and established common borders with a nation that had autobahns. This nation was Germany. They say that Stalin's tanks were not ready for war. This is not true. They were not ready for a defensive war on their own territory. They simply were prepared to fight on different territories. Here is another family of Soviet tanks: T-37A, T-38, and T-40. The T-37A was received by the Red Army on August 11, 1933. It weighed 3.2 tons, its crew consisted of two men, and it had bullet-proof armor. It was armed with one DT machine gun, had a 40-horsepower

engine and a maximum speed of 36 to 40 km/h on paved roads and 6 km/h in the water. The T-37A was a light tank—but light does not mean bad and obsolete. The T-37A was the first amphibious tank in the world to be regularly used by troops.¹⁴ Even if the T-37A really was a bad tank, its inclusion in the armed forces still meant a technological breakthrough of historical importance, because there was nothing comparable or close in the armies of other countries at the time. The Japanese actively pursued amphibious tank warfare in the 1920s and 1930s. they even tested a few prototype models. But not one of the models was massproduced as a part of the Japanese armed forces before 1941. The German Pz-I was accepted by the army a year later—in 1934. It had almost the same weight—3.5 tons, the same crew—two men, the same bulletproof armor, and the same caliber machine gun. Only it could not float. When the high-minded scholars laugh at the T-37A that could float, I offer to compare the characteristics of the oldest, lightest Soviet amphibious tank with the characteristics of the best, most powerful German amphibious tank. Here, the laughter stops.

France did not have amphibious tanks at that time. Britain also had none before or during the war. The birthday of American tank forces is July 10, 1940. When the Wehrmacht Heer crushed with its tanks Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, and the British army on the continent, the Red Army tanks were crushing the Japanese Sixth Army at Khalkhin-Gol and were “liberating” Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. America at that time had no tank troops at all. After the defeat of French and British troops on the continent, American generals realized that it was time to get off horses and to think of creating tank troops. A year later, in June 1941, the United States had less than four hundred tanks.

The number of Soviet amphibious tanks was kept secret for half a century. Later, it slowly began to become clearer. So, how many of them were there? The answer is: there were 2,627 T-37A tanks produced.¹⁷ In local conflicts the T-37A was rarely used, and they were rarely sent abroad. So in 1941, they were almost all fully functioning. In 1936, production of a perfected T-38 amphibious tank began. is tank continued to be produced in series until 1939. Overall, 1,375 tanks of this type were produced.¹⁸ The Kremlin historians called this December 19, 1939, is the brightest and the most remarkable day in the history of world tank design. On this day the Red Army received and enlisted an entire spectrum of new armor-tank weaponry—the three newest tanks: the light amphibious T-40, the medium T-34, and the heavy breakthrough KV tank. The T-34 is the best tank of all time. The KV was the most powerful tank in the world during the first half of World War II, right up until the Battle of Stalingrad. But the T-40 was no worse than these. In its class, it was also the best in the world and also had no equal. It is interesting that the Kremlin historians remember the T-34 and the KV, but forget about the T-40. Meanwhile, the T-40 had a new, never-before-seen body shape, weighed 5.5 tons, and was armed with two machine guns: the large-caliber DShK and the regular DT. A variant of this model, the T-40S, was armed with 20-mm automatic cannon instead of the DShK. By June 21, 1941, a total of 277 T-40 tanks were built.¹⁹ By June 22, 1941,

Hitler had on the eastern front 180 tanks in the under-six-ton category. 20 Not one of them was amphibious and not one of them could compete with the Soviet light tanks. Stalin, on the other hand, had more than 4,000 tanks in this weight category. All of them were amphibious. Among them were 277 T-40s, which not only were amphibious, but also were capable of using their large-caliber DShK machine guns (and of course the 20-mm cannons) to pierce the armor of the German Pz-I tanks. Moreover, German Pz-I production was stopped in 1938, and these tanks not only were obsolete but also heavily worn-out, while the T-40 tanks were still in production, the paint not yet dried on many of them.

By overcoming stormy Lake Ilmen, even the oldest of Soviet amphibious tanks proved the possibility of crossing the English Channel. But these tanks were designed for action on lakes and rivers. For crossing the English Channel, Stalin had other designs in the works for the future—the amphibious tank PT-1 and its variants. It weighed 14 tons, had a 500-horsepower engine, a speed of 6 km/h in the water and could reach 62 km/h on land, and 90 km/h when it shed its caterpillar tracks.²¹ It was a hybrid of a highway and an amphibious tank, a cross between a reconnaissance and a lightning battle tank. It was armed with a 45-mm cannon and four machine guns. It had a crew of four men. The PT-1 had a large body and impeccable floatability. This tank was designed and tested, but was not launched into series, for now sailing across the channels was not in the plans. When it would become needed, it could be launched into series.

The fate of Soviet amphibious tanks is a sad one: they were of no use in defensive war. Where would they sail? Upon orders from the People's Commissar for Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, and the chief of the general staff, General of the Army Zhukov, tens of thousands of tons of spare parts for the tanks, hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition and fuel, were brought out to the very borders of the country. In the first hours of the war, all this fell under fire or in the hands of the enemy. Soviet tanks were left without fuel, ammunition, or spare parts. Four thousand light amphibious tanks demanded a large amount of fuel and had little use in defensive war. Therefore, commanders easily parted with them: they ordered what was left of the fuel to be pumped into the medium and heavy tanks. The light ones were blown up, burned, broken, sunk, or just abandoned. The best (and only) in the world, Soviet amphibious tanks in 1941 became unnecessary and played no role in the war. But why does nobody ask the question: why then were they developed and built? What were they prepared for? Why did Stalin need four thousand amphibious tanks, which he could not use in defensive war? Where was comrade Stalin planning to sail?

In December 1927 Tukhachevski, on top of everything else, suggested to Stalin to produce during the course of 1928 alone 50,000 to 100,000 tanks. In 1928, Hitler was not in power in Germany. Nobody could even imagine that he would ever come to power. Germany at that time did not have one single tank. The entire German army consisted of 100,000 soldiers, officers, and generals—all of them infantry and cavalry. Tukhachevski proposed to have one Soviet tank for every German general, officer, and infantry soldier

in the ranks, as well as for every German messenger and cook in the field kitchen. On September 1, 1939, Hitler entered World War II with 2,980 tanks, among which there were no amphibious tanks and no medium or heavy tanks. We are told that it is clear: if Hitler had such a huge number of tanks, it must have meant they were not for defense.

What did Tukhachevski plan to do with armadas of 50,000 to 100,000 tanks? The 2,980 German tanks were built not during one year, but during all the prewar years. Tukhachevski, on the other hand, proposed to build 50,000 to 100,000 tanks in just one year. It is interesting to compare Tukhachevski's plans for 1928 with real production of tanks (not including self-propelled guns—see below) in Germany during the course of World War II:

YEAR TANKS

1939 743

1940 1,515

1941 3,113

1942 4,276

1943 5,663

1944 7,975

1945 956

In total, during the prewar months of 1939 and all the subsequent years of the war, Germany produced 24,241 tanks. Japan built 5,085 tanks, most of them light. We have been taught a formulaic phrase: "the German fascists and Japanese militarists." Indeed, if they produced such a large number of tanks, 24,241 and 5,085 respectively, it is clear to everybody that this is fascism and militarism. But the question arises: Who was Tukhachevski, in the context of these fascists and militarists striving for world domination? After the war the Soviet Union, already a much more powerful industrial giant, had 50,000 tanks, or even slightly more. But these tanks were not produced in one year; they had accumulated for decades. Why did Tukhachevski need so many weapons in 1927? Hundreds of times more than all potential aggressors put together. Who threatened us then? Who could attack us in 1928? Romania? Finland? Estonia in alliance with Latvia, and egged on by Lithuania? Disarmed Germany? Perhaps Japan? But Japan is an island nation, and to fight her, in order to avert the landing and supplying of Japanese troops on the continent, we would have needed to build a strong fleet in the Far East. But Tukhachevski was opposed to the idea of building a strong fleet and spoke against it publicly. And so, what were the 100,000 tanks for? Tukhachevski's defenders say that everything in his proposals is correct, only the numbers had to be clarified. But if numbers are clarified nothing remains of Tukhachevski's proposals at all. Aside from insane numbers, they contained nothing. Meanwhile, Tukhachevski advanced more and more new projects. "The USSR's industry had to reach by the year 1938 a production capacity that would be capable during the course of one year to put out 53,000 guns, 90,000 tanks, and 60,000 airplanes. The views about the production possibilities

were formed under the influence of M. Tukhachevski." is is quoted in a Soviet military textbook!

Winged Genghis Khan

In the summer of 1941, the Red Army suddenly employed completely unusual weapons: the multiple-launcher rocket weapons BM-8 and BM-13. they entered history under the name "Stalin's Pipe Organs" or "Katyusha." Many German soldiers, officers, and generals remember that this was a terrible weapon. General Field Marshal Albrecht von Kesselring: "The terrible psychological effect of 'Stalin's Pipe Organs' is a highly unpleasant memory for any German soldier who was on the Eastern front."

The statistics are as follows: on June 1, 1941, the Red Army had seven BM-13 rocket launcher vehicles. One month later, there were seventeen such vehicles. Some were destroyed in battle, but others were produced, and by September 1 there were forty-nine of them. Production of the BM-8 began at the same time. By October 1, 1941, the Red Army, despite its losses, had 406 BM-8s and BM-13s. Later on, the count would mount into the thousands, and soon this weapon became a mass weapon. Despite losses of industrial and raw material bases, the Soviet Union managed to quickly supply its army with a principally new system of weapons. In 1940 the Red Army's Air Force received into their inventory the newest airplane, the "Ivanov" Su-2. "The codename 'Ivanov' was given according to Stalin's order. It was his telegraph address."³ There was no airplane yet, the designers had not even picked up their pencils, but Stalin had already given his name to the plane. The eventual production was planned for about 100,000 to 150,000 planes of this type. The Su-2 had many uses: it could be a light bomber, a tactical reconnaissance plane, and an attack plane. Its design was extremely simple and rational. The Su-2 was better suited for mass production than any other airplane in the world. It possessed great firepower.

On June 22, 1941, the German army delivered a sudden crushing blow to the Red Army. is happened at the point of time when the Su-2s were just beginning to be delivered to the troops en masse. By June 22, 1941, about six hundred Su-2s were produced and delivered to eight air regiments located in the western border military districts. However, many aircraft were still parked at the plant airports and on their way to the places of deployment. On November 19, 1941, a decision was made to stop Su-2 production.⁴ An output of 100,000 to 150,000 was planned, but only about eleven hundred were produced. After the war, historians explained this by saying that the Su-2 was obsolete, so production was stopped. is explanation is surprising. How could it be that the outstanding designer Sukhoy created an airplane that became obsolete in the following year? How could a plane become obsolete if there is no other plane in the world that can compare to it in terms of firepower?

If Stalin was preparing for a truly defensive war to protect the Motherland, then he should have ordered his designers to create the best fighter in the world, capable of defending the

skies over the Soviet Union. But this did not interest Stalin either. Nikolay Polikarpov was among those present at Stalin's dacha. He was a great designer of fighters: he had already created the I-15 and I-16 fighters. The I-15 was unequalled in its horizontal maneuverability. It was this aircraft that pilot Vladimir Kokkinaki used to set a world altitude record of 14,575 meters on November 21, 1935. And the I-16 opened a new page in the world development of aviation: it was the first mass-produced high-speed monoplane in the world. In 1936 Polikarpov was already working on even more powerful machines: he had the lead in the world race for the best fighter. Stalin should have left Polikarpov alone, not bothered him and not distracted him. Polikarpov knew how to make fighters; his pace should not have been interrupted. There was a race on, and every hour, every minute was worth its weight in blood. But no: Stalin ordered Polikarpov to drop all his work on creation of a fighter and start developing a light bomber, the Ivanov. Stalin was not very interested in fighter planes for a defensive war.

So, what was the ideal combat plane that Stalin had in mind, for the development of which he engaged all his best designers, all the creators of fighters as well as bombers? Stalin himself explained the demand thus: "samolyot chistogo neba [a clean sky aircraft]"—a light bomber designed to operate free of enemy resistance. From the creators of the Ivanov plane Stalin demanded neither record speed, nor record altitude, nor record range. Stalin was satisfied with the speed of 375 km/h near ground and 460 km/h up in the sky. Record-breaking characteristics were not required. Stalin demanded only simplicity, durability, and firepower. Stalin's plan was to create a plane that could be produced in numbers surpassing all warplanes of all types in all countries of the world combined. The name of the plane, Ivanov, had one more significant feature. Ivanov was not only Stalin's secret nickname, but also the most common Russian name. "Stalin formulated the task in the following way: the plane must be very simple to produce, so that there could be as many planes as there are people in our country with the name Ivanov."⁶ So, Stalin planned to produce the largest series of planes in human history. But this was not a plane for defensive war. It was an aggressor airplane. Stalin planned, literally, to build as many light bombers as there were small but mobile horsemen in the hordes of Genghis Khan.

A question arises: If on Stalin's orders 100,000 to 150,000 light bombers had been built, would not all the neighbors have been frightened? Stalin foresaw such a danger. Therefore, he did not plan the mass production of the Ivanov in peacetime. During the secret mobilization of 1940 through the first half of 1941, a small (in Soviet terms) series was produced—only several hundred of these planes. The objective of this series was to open the production line, gain experience, fly the planes, and test them in small conflicts. These first several hundred were meant to be used in the first strike, especially in secondary locations or combined with other aircraft that had higher speed. After the first sudden strike, it was planned to begin a mass production of the Ivanov, by the thousands. The Ivanov was almost an exact copy of the Japanese air aggressor. In the summer of 1936, nobody could have predicted what would happen at Pearl Harbor five years later. In the summer of 1936, the Nakajima B-5N did not yet exist. There were only plans, which the

Japanese did not announce. Therefore, it was impossible to suppose that Soviet designers were copying the Japanese. In the summer of 1936 the Nakajima B-5N had not yet flown once, and there was little information known about it. There was nothing record-breaking about the design of the new Japanese airplane, nothing that could have attracted Stalin's attention. But in 1936 Stalin was already thinking in the same terms as the Japanese admirals. In 1936, Stalin ordered his designers to create the same type of airplane that one beautiful morning would suddenly appear above the enemy, at a moment when the enemy does not anticipate an attack. This was the exact same scenario Stalin planned to use to enter World War II.

The planes for sudden attack did not need record-breaking characteristics. Stalin's logic is clear and simple: if a sudden attack can take care of the enemy's air bases and clear the sky of enemy planes, we will need a simple airplane with powerful weapons that can be mass produced; the most important of its designated uses is to give support to our advancing waves of tanks and paratroops, creating an air terror above defenseless territories. This was exactly the sort of airplane Stalin ordered from his designers. The Su-2 had a tragic fate. In terms of firepower and speed it surpassed both the German Ju-87 and the Japanese Nakajima. But both the Ju-87 and the Nakajima B-5N got a chance to prove themselves in sudden attacks and gain fame. Hitler did not permit the Ivanov to do the work it was primarily designed to do. Hitler carried out a preemptive strike on Soviet air bases, so the Su-2 was left without the work for which it was created. The Su-2 was not needed in a defensive war. Some factories that were preparing the mass output of Su-2s (for example the Kharkov aviation factory) fell into enemy hands. Although some of the production equipment was evacuated, the production pace was lost. The Su-2s produced earlier suffered great casualties: they had little speed and could not escape the enemy when chased. They had weak defense weapons and could not fight off the fighters. Also, there were no Soviet fighters to give the Su-2 cover.

The same propaganda of "obsolete planes" was used after the war to make it look like the USSR was not ready for war, when in reality, they had the largest war industry in the world working towards an aggressive war trying to conquer Europe and more if possible. Nazi Germany attacking the USSR in 1941 prevented these hordes of war from sweeping over European mainland.

Blitzkrieg in Poland and Mongolia

In August 1939, on the river Khalkhin-Gol in Mongolia, aside from a crushing blow there were other possible choices for action. Soviet troops could have, for example, taken defensive positions and postponed the prepared attack. Aggression is always risky. In the event of Soviet success, Japan would receive a lesson to last for years to come. In the event of failure, the entire world would talk of Stalin's army purges and accuse him of making the army unfit for fighting. In the event of failure, Zhukov could be executed, but his blood would not wash away the military's disgrace. Khalkhin-Gol was the first

lightning war of the twentieth century; it was blitzkrieg in the purest form. It was the first time in history that large masses of tanks were used correctly: to strike in depth. It was the prime example of unseen concentration of artillery in tight areas of the front. It was an example of absolute surprise attacks—during the first hour and a half of battle, the Japanese artillery did not fire a single shot and not a single Japanese plane rose into the air.

At the time that the Soviet army was conducting its operation at Khalkhin-Gol, the German army had no experience of conducting lightning-speed offensive operations and was not even conducting any large-scale training operations using tank masses for sudden breakthrough into the depth of the enemy's defenses. The German command planned to conduct the first of such training exercises in the fall of 1939.² Due to Germany's invasion of Poland and the beginning of World War II, these training exercises were never conducted. On August 29, 1939, Stalin gave Zhukov the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his lightning defeat of the Japanese Sixth Army. On September 1, Germany attacked Poland. It is interesting to compare the two lightning operations: the Soviet one in Mongolia, and the German in Poland. The difference lay in the fact that the whole world witnessed the German actions in Poland. Embassies from all over the world were located in Warsaw; there were many foreigners in Warsaw and other Polish cities, many journalists in particular. They all witnessed the war and described it in their newspapers and magazines. Hitler's propaganda demonstrated to the entire world the amazing successes of German troops. The whole world saw the menacing footage on their screens: dive-bombers roaring wildly as they flew toward the ground, dropping their deadly loads, and soaring back into the clouds, tanks breaking Polish barricades, letting through hordes of cheerful motorcyclists. The Red Army's operation in Mongolia, on the other hand, was carried out on hot desert steppes, where there were no international observers and journalists. Few people knew about the operation at the time. For obvious reasons, the Japanese government did not rush to tell the world about the defeat of the Sixth Army in Mongolia. Surprisingly, the Soviet propaganda also did not rush to announce its victory.

All Soviet propaganda was extremely and severely centralized. Stalin's empire ran the most powerful and perfected system of censorship. In Stalin's empire, any printed product could be published only after a censor gave permission. Without the permission, even bus tickets could not be printed. The principle of selection of information was extremely simple: hide any defects, catastrophes, and mistakes and praise any accomplishments. The farms produced slightly more milk, dug slightly more potatoes, a new factory was built—those were the reported news. But here we have a true accomplishment: the defeat of an entire Japanese army. It was an unprecedented historical event. Nobody had ever beaten the Japanese. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5 Russians had especially suffered from the hands of the Japanese. Here came a remarkable revenge, huge trophies! The Red Army opened a new chapter in the art of war. The defeat was achieved by a new, previously unseen method. Yet, Stalin ordered silence. Why? Because

he was preparing the same sort of defeat, only on a much grander scale, for all of Europe. Stalin's interest lay in concealing the might of the Red Army, keeping silent its capability for delivering crushing surprise attacks. Stalin's interest lay in letting the whole world believe in the backwardness of the Red Army and its inability to conduct modern warfare. Stalin's interest lay in catching Hitler off-guard, in not scaring him.

At first glance, the Red Army's lightning operation in Mongolia and the German blitzkrieg in Poland are not comparable in scale. the German troops participating in the invasion of Poland numbered 1.6 million soldiers and officers. the Soviet group in Mongolia numbered only 57,000 men. In numbers of people, the German operation surpassed the Soviet one twenty-eight times. However, if one looks at the number of tanks and airplanes, the numbers are comparable. the German operation against Poland had the participation of four times more airplanes, and six times more tanks, than the Soviet operation in Mongolia. The numbers are quite on the same scale. An analysis of the quality of weapons is even more interesting. the Red Army used long-range bombers in Mongolia; Germany had no such planes. If one examines the quality of tanks, the picture also favors the Red Army.

In 1939, the same arms gap could be seen between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in terms of artillery. Germany entered World War II with field artillery developed in the time of World War I, while the Red Army had the best cannons, howitzers, and mortars in the world, developed right on the eve of World War II. For every thousand German soldiers during the blitzkrieg in Poland there were less than two tanks. For every thousand Soviet soldiers in Mongolia there were almost nine much more powerful tanks. In other words, Soviet troops at Khalkhin-Gol formed a relatively small army, but were equipped to the limit with the most modern and sophisticated weapons. ere was also a big difference in the conditions under which the operations were conducted. In September 1939, the conditions for conducting a lightning war in Poland were superb. A continuous defense by the Polish army along the perimeter of the country was impossible. Poland, to its misfortune, was an ideal location for the demonstration of tank capabilities. Western Poland formed a wide protrusion, surrounded on three sides by German territory. Its border with Germany stretched two thousand kilometers; after German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the German-Polish border increased by another eight hundred kilometers.

The German army did not have to break through defenses. Ahead of it lay flat terrain, ideal for advance and totally unfit for defense. the river Vistula flows through Poland, but there was no need to cross it. Hitler's troops were located on both sides of the Vistula. ere were no other serious water barriers. An attack on Warsaw could be carried out from any direction. the distance from mainland Germany to Warsaw was 230 kilometers, and from the border of Eastern Prussia to Warsaw was 110 kilometers. is meant that there was no need to relocate supply bases—troops could be supplied from stationary bases built during peacetime. There was no need to transfer thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, and other equipment. In theory, a thrust on Warsaw could be carried out without refueling tanks. Fill up the tanks in Germany, and go! There were no defenses ahead, since they

were impossible. There was no need to set up field hospitals, because the wounded could be taken to stationary. However, not everything in Poland went as smoothly as shown in Goebbels's propaganda and as described by some modern followers of Hitler. For some reason it is not popular to speak of this, but the German blitzkrieg in Poland failed. On September 15, 1939, two weeks after the start of World War II, the activity of the German air force substantially dropped; the German army was almost completely out of fuel. This was the level of Hitler's and his generals' understanding of modern warfare.

Forget all the tales by Soviet marshals and academics that the Red Army entered Poland in 1939 out of fear that the Germans might go straight for Moscow. Hitler did not have such strength. Even if he headed for Moscow in October 1939, the same exact thing would have happened to his valiant army that happened in October 1941: it would have sunk in the mud. The Wehrmacht lacked the fuel, bombs, and ammunition necessary to wage war against the Soviet Union. In 1939 the Red Army entered Poland for different reasons. Most importantly, there was the fear that Hitler's blitzkrieg would stop. It was already slowing down. Stalin's offensive in Poland allowed Hitler to transfer his forces from the eastern to the western front with maximum efficiency. Imagine the situation: all German tanks and cars are stopped, airplanes do not fly. The German army has many horses, though they are load-bearing horses, not cavalry. In this situation, the Polish cavalry could have shown what it means to have superiority in strategic mobility . . . but once again, Stalin saved Hitler. From the standpoint of grand strategy the operation in Poland was a total failure for Hitler and his generals. It was the first suicidal act of Hitler's Germany: they entered a war having one enemy—Poland, and in two months brilliantly ended that war having Britain, France, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and potentially the United States as enemies. A blitzkrieg cannot be used to win a war against all these nations, and Hitler had no other options. As a result of the blitzkrieg in Poland, Hitler obtained a common border with the "neutral" Soviet Union. Being at war with everyone, Hitler would have been better off having a border with Poland than with the Soviet Union—anything could be expected of comrade Stalin.

One more thing: Poland was not at all crushed by the blitzkrieg. Immediately after the fall of the government in Warsaw, the Polish government in London was created, and it was acknowledged by most nations of the world and by the League of Nations. According to Polish tradition, underground local governments and an underground state formed on occupied territory. Armed forces were revived. Using the most cautious methods, the Polish Army counted 350,000 soldiers and officers, well trained, organized, and armed. Moreover, Poles fought against Hitler on all fronts: in Britain, France, Italy, Africa, Holland, and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1939, the number of Polish formations fighting Hitler constantly was around one million people. The blitzkrieg started in 1939 in Poland, and ended in 1945 with the storming of Berlin, in which the Polish First and Second armies took part.

The Red Army command not only understood the extreme importance of supplying troops, but had the unique experience of doing it in the extreme conditions at Khalkhin-

Gol. The Soviet troops counted 57,000 soldiers, 498 tanks, 500 guns, 385 armored cars, 515 airplanes, artillery transport, automobiles, etc. If everything necessary for life and battle was to be brought to Mongolia from the supply bases in the Baikal military district, the distance to be covered was roughly 1,500 kilometers. But not everything was in storage in the Baikal region. If supplies were to be brought from factories and central storages the distance to be covered was seven to eight thousand kilometers. the last stretch of railroad had very limited load-bearing capacity and ended in a deserted steppe. For the next 650 to 700 kilometers trucks were needed. the most common truck of that period could cover the round-trip of 1,300 to 1,400 kilometers, in good conditions, in roughly five days. the conditions were: heat, dust, no water. People might get by in these conditions, but automobile radiators need water. the troops needed to be supplied with everything. For example, wood to burn in field kitchens. Technology wear and tear was tremendous, as was fuel expenditure. Cars needed to be refueled several times along the way. Once the car had dropped off its cargo at Khalkhin- Gol, it needed to make its way back—and once again, it had to be refueled, so it turned out that the cars had to take away what they had just brought. To this desert location the Soviets needed to supply by truck 25,000 tons of ammunition, 15,000 tons of fuel and lubricants, 4,000 tons of foodstuffs, 7,000 tons of fuel, and a lot of other cargo. All this was supplied in such a fashion that the enemy did not even suspect preparations for a sudden crushing attack. After such an operation, Soviet command quite clearly understood the meaning of supplies in war.

Nevertheless, Khalkhin-Gol played a mean joke on Stalin and the entire Red Army. In May 1940, Stalin introduced the titles of “general” and “admiral” into the Red Army. Approximately one thousand top Red Army commanders became generals. But only three of them received at that moment the top general rank—General of the Army. At that time, this meant five-star lapels. the first of these men was Zhukov. Zhukov became the first of all Soviet generals. Upon Zhukov’s return from Mongolia, Stalin entrusted Zhukov with the most powerful of his military districts—the Kiev district. In February 1941 he appointed Zhukov to the position of Chief of General Staff. In this position Zhukov prepared for the war against Germany. On the German border (only on a much grander scale) he was to repeat everything he had implemented against the Japanese army. Zhukov created two mighty mobile flank attack groups at the L’vov and Belostok bulges, and one group for an attack in Romania.

Zhukov moved air bases to the very borders, with one hundred—sometimes two hundred— planes in each location. Zhukov moved hospitals, supply bases, command posts to the borders. Zhukov moved to the border thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts for tanks and planes. Zhukov forbade almost all use of radio communication. Zhukov kept his plans in complete secrecy, and very few people in the Red Army knew what was to be done. Upon the surprise enemy attack, all this had catastrophic consequences. All of Zhukov’s activity in 1941 has been attributed to a series of mistakes and miscalculations. But these were not mistakes. In 1941, he was preparing against

Germany exactly what he had prepared in August 1939 against the Japanese army at Khalkhin-Gol.

Mobilization

From time to time we find a lot of interesting materials in the archives, but we will not find what is most important. Here is why: “How many times have I told you—do whatever you want, but do not leave behind any documents, do not leave any traces.” These are the words of Stalin himself. He uttered them publicly at the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party. The records here note the “Homeric laughter of the entire audience.” The congress laughed heartily—comrade Stalin had made a joke. Understandably, Stalin was not talking of himself, but of his opponents, who apparently were guided by the principle of leaving behind no traces or documents. But the congress laughed in vain. Stalin always ascribed his own intentions, principles, and methods to his enemies. Soon after, Stalin executed all his enemies, as well as almost all the delegates present at the Sixteenth Congress who had laughed so heartily. He left a very minimal number of documents about these executions. Not a single dictator can match Stalin in his ability to cover up the traces of his personal involvement in crimes. Anastas Mikoyan, who beat all records of political survival, tells us how well Stalin kept secrets. Mikoyan was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1923 until 1976—that is, for fifty-three years, for forty years of which he was a candidate or member of the Politburo, the most important power organ of the country, which governed the entire Soviet Union and its satellites. Mikoyan describes a meeting held by Stalin: “Most often there were five people. We met late in the evening or at night, rarely in the afternoon, usually without preliminary notice. There were no protocols or records kept during the course of such meetings.”

Air Force Colonel General A. S. Yakovlev: “During the meetings of Stalin’s inner circle there were no stenographers, no secretaries present, no records or protocols were kept.” Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov was the People’s Commissar of Arms during the course of the war: “During the meetings and conferences conducted by Stalin, discussions of problems and the making of decisions frequently occurred without records, and often without the corresponding paperwork marking the decision made.” In other words, decisions were made but were not fixed on paper, just like in the Mafia. Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov during the course of the war was deputy to the Commander in Chief, that is, to Stalin: “Many political, military, and general government questions were discussed and solved not only at the official meetings of the Politburo and in the Central Committee Secretariat, but also in the evening at dinner in Stalin’s apartment or at his dacha, where the Politburo members closest to him were usually present.”⁴ Colonel General B. Vannikov was the People’s Commissar of Ammunition: “At the meetings and conferences Stalin had a habit of discussing questions and making decisions without protocols or records. . . . From this it is clear that the understanding of many events just

based on documents is incomplete and unclear, and in many cases incorrect.”

Hitler’s meetings were known for being held in the presence of large crowds. Everything said by Hitler was fixed for history by three stenographers and a personal historian. Stalin’s meetings on the other hand were simply secret gatherings of plotters and conspirators, in spirit and in essence. No documents and no traces were left of these meetings. Therefore, as Stalin taught us, we will look not at the words, which are hidden from us, but at the actions, which are in the open. It is possible that World War II could have not occurred. The choice was up to Stalin. He himself told this to his colleagues at the Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939: “If we make a pact of mutual aid with Great Britain and France, Germany will give up Poland and . . . the War will be averted.” Stalin did not make a pact with Great Britain and France; thereby he did not try to avert a war. This day—August 19, 1939—was a long, difficult day. It was a day filled with hopes and worries. It was the day when Stalin cast his fishing rod into the brown swamp that was Hitler’s Germany. His hook had bait for Hitler: Danzig and half of Poland. Take it! And as a free gift Germany got war against Great Britain and France. It was the day when doubts crawled into the hearts of Stalin’s colleagues. Stalin had decided to trick Hitler. Would Hitler believe him? Stalin could not possibly always win. Vyacheslav Molotov worked on the scene as the head of the Soviet government and the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs. When Molotov received the German ambassador von der Schulenburg in his cabinet in the Kremlin, Stalin, Shaposhnikov, Beria, and Malenkov did not show themselves—they were behind the curtains, in Stalin’s cabinet. Molotov’s conversation with the German ambassador was transmitted to Stalin’s office. Molotov worked brilliantly. The most important thing was not to let the ambassador see Stalin’s interest in the issue of German-Polish relations. Molotov did not reveal this interest; his attitude to the ambassador was: “All right, let Ribbentrop come, perhaps we will agree on something, perhaps we will find a solution to the question of Danzig and Poland.”

At dawn on September 1, 1939, the German army began war against Poland. But in the twentieth century, a war in Europe automatically meant a world war. The war quickly engulfed all of Europe and practically the entire world. A strange coincidence of events, it was precisely on this day—September 1, 1939—that the fourth emergency session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the universal military draft. There had been no such law in the history of the USSR. A surprising thing: while children and adults were taught to fear Hitler, while Hitler was considered to be a tyrant and monster, the country could do without a draft. But as soon as a non-aggression pact was signed, a universal mandatory draft all of a sudden became necessary. Why did the Soviet Union need it? Soviet historians stated that the USSR took measures of precaution. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov is one of the many of those who assert that the law had a huge significance and was adopted “in the conditions when World War II had already begun.” Let us imagine the Polish-German border on that tragic morning: darkness, fog, fire, motors roaring. Very few people in Poland understood what was happening, whether this was a provocation or an unsanctioned border conflict that arose on its own. But the

representatives at the USSR Supreme Soviet already knew that this was no provocation, no conflict, and no German-Polish or even European war—this was the beginning of a world war. they knew that they, the representatives, must meet in Moscow and take the corresponding measures. Why did these representatives not act so efficiently when a similar thing happened on the Soviet-German border in 1941?

On the morning of September 1, 1939, it was not only the Polish government and the governments of the Western countries that did not know that World War II had started. Hitler himself did not know it either. He started the war against Poland hoping that it would be a local fight, like the taking of Czechoslovakia. As Colonel General of the Air Force A. S. Yakovlev (at that time an aircraft designer, deputy people's commissar of aviation industry, and personal advisor to Stalin) concluded: "Hitler was sure that England and France [would] not fight for Poland." When, on September 3, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, this was an extremely shocking and unpleasant surprise for Hitler. He had not anticipated this. For him, a "strange" war against Great Britain and France began on September 3. In the same month, an equally strange peace began in the East.

Any attempt to establish the exact date of the beginning of World War II and the time that the USSR entered into it brings us to the date of August 19, 1939: Stalin stretched a hand of friendship out to Hitler and signed the non-aggression pact, while on the same day he issued an order to gather the representatives of the Supreme Soviet, so that at the time World War II began they were already sitting in the Kremlin and unanimously voting in favor of everything put before them. What a strange coincidence: the road to Moscow is long—for some it takes ten to twelve days. In order to adopt the law on September 1, 1939, the order to gather the representatives was issued on August 19, meaning that on August 19, 1939, someone in Moscow already knew that in a couple of weeks World War II would begin and a new draft law would be needed. Chief of General Staff and Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov created the theory of mobilization. He authored the book *Brain of the Army*. the third and final volume was published in 1929, and while the Soviet Army existed, this book served as a manual for every Soviet officer and general. On Lenin's desk, a copy of the book *Mob Psychology* by Gustav le Bon had always been present, and on Stalin's desk it was Shaposhnikov's *Brain of the Army*. the key to the success of Shaposhnikov's book was in the simplicity with which the material was presented, in the crystal-clear argumentation, and in the ability to explain the most complex problems in terms understandable by anybody. the third, concluding part of the book is the most powerful. In the third volume Shaposhnikov examines the questions of mobilization.

The theory was simple, understandable, logical, and unquestionably correct. Stalin understood it, appraised its worth, and added it to the base of his own strategy. it is why reading Shaposhnikov's works (as well as those of his supporters and opponents) and understanding the course of their thought helps us understand Stalin's actions, which at first glance seem illogical and unexplainable. the theory of mobilization, condensed and

explained in layman's terms, consists of the following:

1. To achieve victory in a war, not only efforts of the entire army but full efforts by the entire nation, the people, industry, transport, agriculture, etc., are necessary.
2. the nation cannot exist in a constant state of preparedness for war, just as a man cannot constantly hold a gun in each hand. If he is always holding two guns, he cannot do anything else. Similarly a nation cannot constantly expend all its resources on preparations for war. Constant concentration of forces and expenditure of social resources on war preparations ruin the nation. Therefore, during peacetime the army and the military industry must operate at a minimal level. However, the nation, its people, government apparatus, industry, transport, agriculture, communication channels, ideological apparatus, and so forth must be prepared for a maximally quick and full transition from a peacetime to a wartime regime.
3. Mobilization is the transition of the entire country from a peacetime to a wartime regime. Mobilization cannot be curbed or turned back. Metaphorically speaking, mobilization is similar to thrusting one's arm down, unlatching a holster, and aiming the gun at the enemy with one's finger already on the trigger.
4. Mobilization and war are inseparable. If you take out a gun and aim it at the enemy with your finger on the trigger, you have to shoot. As soon as you begin to mobilize, the enemy will mobilize as well. You take aim, and the enemy does the same, trying to be faster than you by at least a fraction of a second. If you are a tiny bit of a second late, he will kill you.
5. You cannot play games with mobilization: if you often brandish guns and aim them at your neighbors with your fingers on the trigger, the outcome will not be a good one for you.
6. Once the path of mobilization has been chosen, you have to follow it up to the end—start a war.
7. Mobilization cannot be partial. Mobilization is a process similar to pregnancy. A woman cannot be a little bit pregnant—the answer is always “yes” or “no.” the same is true for mobilization in a country: either the entire government apparatus, industry, transport, armed forces, population, and all the national resources are mobilized toward war, or not.

In modern conditions, a mobilizing country must make a firm decision ahead of time to conduct war. . . . In a general mobilization, it is understood that there can be no more return to peacetime positions. . . . We maintain that only a general mobilization has value, the concentration of all resources and forces necessary for achieving victory.” the book ends with a decisive declaration: “Mobilization is war, and we cannot understand it in any other way.”

Stalin not only shared Shaposhnikov's views, but he had the same beliefs. Stalin did not make any distinctions between the process of taking power in his country or in the neighboring ones. He knew how to take power in his own country, and he planned to do

the same in the neighboring ones. Stalin did not keep his art a secret. On the contrary, he made it into a display for the masses. In his book *On the Foundations of Leninism*, Stalin proved that games are not permissible in the quest for power. We either take control or we do not. Once the task is attempted, it must be carried out to the end. It goes along with the teachings of Niccolò Machiavelli: either you deliver a lethal blow or you do not attack at all; no in-between decisions can exist in politics or in strategy. It also goes along with Shaposhnikov's ideas: we can either not mobilize at all or we can conduct a full mobilization and enter the war—no partial, in-between positions can be adopted. There was another problem: mobilization had to be concealed. Long before World War II, Stalin and Shaposhnikov worked out a way to conceal mobilization. For this reason, there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939. The army was very selective and did not take in just anybody. It was to show what a peace-loving people we were. The age requirement for entering the armed services was twenty-one. It is strange. Why not draft at eighteen or nineteen, right out of school—let the boy serve his term and be free? By age twenty-one a man could have found a job and started a family, while his future remained uncertain: would they draft him or not? Nobody could really explain why the army had to take men at age twenty-one and not younger.

There was, however, a lot of thought put into this system. It was like a dam on a river: not everyone was let through (that is, drafted), only some, while the rest amassed on the other side. At the necessary moment a universal draft could be instituted (only the pretext had to be invented), and all those who did not earlier serve in the army could be called in. During the intervening years, there were many of them saved up. The moment came—September 1, 1939. On this day, a universal military draft was instituted, and all those who had not served earlier began to be taken in. In every separate case the calling of a mature man to the army did not raise suspicion that a big war was looming: every man must serve his country, so this or that Ivan had to do now what his friends did before.

Stalin had another tactic in reserve: according to the new law, the draft age was reduced from twenty-one to nineteen, and in some categories to eighteen. My own father was among this group—he had just turned eighteen at the time. The simultaneous draft of three age groups (never seen before), and the draft of all those who had not served earlier, placed a double burden on the shoulders of the nation. On the one hand, the economy was deprived of all these workers; on the other hand, they all had to be clothed, fed, equipped, and housed somewhere (try to find a place for at least one million new soldiers!). It was an explosive development of military might. After 173,000 reservists were drafted in the second half of July 1939 to support the troops of the Trans-Baikal military district and the 1st Army Group in Mongolia, the Red Army adopted on September 1, 1939, allowed for an increase in the ranks of the Red Army from 1.5 million men in the spring of 1939 to 5.7 million in the spring of 1941 without declaring mobilization and alarming the neighbors. Additionally, this law allowed for the preparation of 18 million reservists, so that at any moment they could fill the ranks with the desired number of soldiers. It

army development had a time limit, because Stalin called several age groups into the Red Army at the same time—in essence, all the young men in the country. the duration of army service for the majority of the population—privates in ground forces and NKVD (Political Police) forces—was two years, so the country had to enter a major war before September 1, 1941. If not, all the young people would go home on September 1, 1941, and then there would be almost nobody left to draft. All these new armies—assault and mechanized corps, tanks, air force, and all other divisions—would have to be disbanded. It is impossible to maintain an armed force of this size without a war: it does not produce anything and it consumes everything produced by the country. the creation of such an army could only lead to war. the modern Russian ministry of defense acknowledges this. “No nation can maintain a mobilized army with any intent other than war: the economy cannot stand the strain, and the mobilized but unused army begins to decay.” is was said about the mobilization conducted by Stalin starting on August 19, 1939.

When he made the decision to launch a secret mobilization, Stalin firmly knew that in two years, in the summer of 1941, the Soviet Union must enter into a large war. Without war, no terror could suffice to keep five million soldiers, who have already served their two required years, in their barracks. It would be impossible to retain them in the army after their terms in the army expired. To put it more simply, the decision to enter a large war was made in the Kremlin in August 1939 and the deadline for entering the war was set—the summer of 1941.

Mobilization of the Economy

For many years, the People’s Commissariat of Defense Industry was in charge of arms production in the USSR. On January 11, 1939, it was dismantled, and four new People’s Commissariats were created instead: one for the shipbuilding industry, one for weapons, one for the aviation industry, and one for ammunition. The Shipbuilding Commissariat was unofficially called the Submarines Narkomat (short for People’s Commissariat). In theory, this commissariat produced both civilian and military ships. But in practice, the facts were such that “by 1935 all major shipyards were redesigned for production of military ships.”¹ In 1939, Germany entered into World War II with fiftyseven submarines. We are assured that the Soviet Union had no intentions of entering into the war, but in September 1939 it possessed 165 submarines. the submarines matched up to the best world standards.² Some of the submarine designs were developed in Nazi Germany on Soviet orders by the company Deschimag AG Wesser. they say that Stalin trusted Hitler. theyshould look more carefully into who trusted whom.

In the Soviet Union, the most modern American technology and renowned American engineers were used in the process of submarine production. they say that Stalin was too trustful, but I think Roosevelt possessed more of that particular quality. Aside from American, German, British, Italian, and French accomplishments, the Soviet shipbuilding industry also made its own technological advances. We also had some talented engineers.

From the moment of its founding, the Shipbuilding Narkomat undertook strictly military projects. Moreover, many ships that had earlier been built for civilian needs were now armed and given over to the navy. With just one directive by the Soviet government, on May 25, 1940, the following numbers of civilian ships were handed over to the military: 74 to the Baltic fleet, 76 to the Black Sea fleet, 65 to the North fleet, and 101 to the Pacific fleet. At the same time, the shipyards of the Narkomat all began to operate on two extended shifts, which practically meant a regime of wartime production. the result of this was that by June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union possessed 218 submarines in its ranks and 91 more in shipyards. Surface warships were also being built, as well as bought from abroad.

Italy was not the only country that sold warships to Stalin. On May 31, 1940, the unfinished German cruiser *Lutzow*, renamed the *Petropavlovsk*, arrived in Leningrad and was delivered to the shipyard of shipbuilding plant #189. A cruiser is a huge and complex structure, the building of which would have taken several years to complete, and there was not enough time to introduce changes into its design and to equip it with Soviet weapons. It was decided to build it completely according to German designs and equip it with German weapons, and Germany supplied the weapons. All this seems unbelievable: May 1940, the heat of the German blitzkrieg in Western Europe, the British fleet blockading the German navy. Hitler had only two options left— either to fight against Britain, for which he needed a powerful fleet, or to seek peace with Britain, for which he also needed a powerful fleet: an enraged Britain would obviously not negotiate with a weak Germany, but instead would demand its immediate withdrawal from all occupied territories. Hitler lagged far behind Britain in the number of above-water ships, and in this critical time he was selling his unfinished, most modern ship to Stalin! Stalin's behavior is also surprising: he declared neutrality, but continued to build a gigantic fleet and, moreover, bought warships from countries already at war. the answer to this riddle is simple: in 1940 Germany was already suffering from a terrible deficit of raw materials because her naval routes were blockaded, so Hitler could only buy large enough quantities and assortments of materials from Stalin. In exchange for this, Hitler was forced to sell his technology and weaponry, including his newest planes, cannon, ships, communications devices, firearms, and so forth.

Stalin knew that the German economy was facing a crisis, and he could have chosen not to sell raw materials to Hitler. In that case, the war in Europe would have quickly died down. But Stalin wanted the war to gain strength, so that France, Britain, Germany, and all the other countries would expend themselves. Stalin planned to use their weakened position and establish his own regime in Europe. For this Stalin was building up his fleet, buying military technology from everywhere possible, and feeding Hitler the raw materials he needed.

Some might ask why Stalin's two hundred submarines and the rest of his navy could not give the kind of resistance that was to be expected from the most powerful underwater fleet in the world. the answer is simple—this was an attack fleet. It was an instrument

created for aggressive warfare. It was very difficult, nearly impossible, to use it in defensive war. "During the course of the war the fleet had to solve problems that were completely unforeseen during its construction. Instead of coordinating their actions with the deep offensive operations of the ground forces, acting near the shores, as the military doctrine dictated, the fleet was forced to secure the naval bases under enemy attack from land and sea and to evacuate troops, population, and property from shoreline cities."

In March 1939, at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, the commander of the Pacific fleet, 2nd Rank Flagman N. G. Kuznetsov declared: "The fleet must transform itself, and it will, just like the entire Worker-Peasant Red Army, into the most powerful attack fleet." Stalin rewarded him for such words by promoting him to People's Commissar of the Navy. Kuznetsov kept his word—he did his best in order to prepare the Soviet fleet to launch surprise attacks. But entirely different ships with entirely different characteristics are needed for defense: submarine hunters, picket boats, minesweepers, and net-layers. According to Kuznetsov's orders, all reserves of shells, mines, torpedoes, and ship fuel were transported to the German borders in Liepaja and to the Romanian borders in the river ports of the Danube. Here, these reserves were quickly seized by the Germans. The port of Liepaja was located so close to the German border that the battles for the city had already begun on June 23, 1941.

Nobody had prepared to defend Liepaja from a land attack. Aside from everything else, in Liepaja were concentrated (and lost) three quarters of the Baltic fleet's fuel reserves. Not only was the basing system of the Soviet navy geared toward aggressive warfare, and its personnel trained to attack, but the armament of the ships was designed exclusively for participation in a war of aggression. Soviet ships, while armed with powerful artillery, mine, and torpedo equipment, had quite weak anti-aircraft armament. The Soviet ships did not have powerful anti-aircraft defenses because Soviet generals had planned to begin the war with a crushing surprise air attack against the enemy's air bases and the annihilation of his aviation. Contrary to the plans, the war turned out to be of a defensive character, and the Soviet armies and fleets were not the ones to carry out the first attacks. The enemy had air superiority, and the Soviet troops and ships had very weak anti-aircraft defenses. The Shipbuilding Narkomat had been building ships with maximal attacking power and minimal defenses, in order to make the Soviet navy the most aggressive in the world.

If Stalin had planned to carry out a sacred defensive war, if he planned to hold down his borders, the new ammunition factories should have been built behind the Volga River. Here they would have been fully secure—the enemy tanks and airplanes could not reach so far inland. If Stalin was not sure of his strength, if, as we have been told, Stalin was afraid of Hitler and had reservations about the Red Army's ability to hold the borders, if there had been a belief that it might be forced to retreat—in that case the new factories should have been built not behind the Volga but even farther inland, in the Ural Mountains, where there are raw materials, a sufficient industry and energy base, and where the factories would have been completely secure. Let the enemy take huge territories, but our industrial

base would remain whole—then Hitler would have a taste of what a wounded bear is like. But neither the first nor the second option was even briefly discussed; there was no need for them. the Red Army had no plans to retreat, just as it had no plans of holding down the borders of its country. According to Stalin's plans, the Red Army had to advance forward into a war-devastated and weakened Europe. If the Red Army crossed the borders and advanced, the ammunition factories along with all the other ones (tank, artillery, etc.) would be left behind farther and farther in the rear. Let us imagine that the Red Army needs to be supplied with a small quantity of ammunition, for example 100,000 tons, or 200,000 tons. How could they be transported from the Urals to the western borders? A standard military train could carry nine hundred tons. Imagine how many trains would be needed, how many railroad cars, how many locomotives. Estimate how many workdays would be spent by all the railroad personnel, how much coal would be burned, how many train guards would be needed for how many days. the ammunition factories put out more and more production, while the voracious Ammunition Narkomat consumed the nation's metal resources, including copper, nickel, chromium, lead, tin, and mercury. the more nonferrous metals went to producing ammunition, the less there was left for all the other areas of industry. the question arose as to how long this could be expected to last.

There was another question: what to do with all the ammunition that was produced? The holding capacity of the artillery storages was known, as was the amount of ammunition used by the army. rough a simple arithmetic calculation it would be easy to determine when there would be no more space to hold all that was produced. What could be done then? Should new storage facilities be created? at is not quite so simple. Imagine that you have been given the task to build storage facilities that are to hold one million tons of ammunition. If the humidity levels at the facility rise above the norm, the metals will be corroded and the gunpowder will become wet. What would comrade Stalin and his loyal disciple comrade Beria do to you in that case? And if the temperature rises slightly above the norm or if the air is slightly too dry the storages cannot be close together or close to cities and factories—they must be far away from everything that could be harmed by their explosion. To make it short, additional storage facilities are not a valid solution. No matter how many are built, they will become too full if more ammunition pours in than pours out—and more and more was pouring in every day. In the border regions of the Soviet Union the Red Army lost an unthinkable amount of artillery shells that were laid out on the ground. An equally unthinkable amount of shells was lost in railroad trains. In Byelorussia alone 4,216 railroad cars full of artillery shells were left at the border stations.⁷ Why were shells kept in railroad cars? Where were they going to be taken? If defense was being prepared, the shells should have been issued to the troops. If retreat was prepared, there would have been no need to concentrate the shells in the border regions.

But this is not what is most important. the most important is the fact that at the very beginning of the war almost all industry capable of producing new ammunition was lost.

“From August to November 1941, the German troops took 303 Soviet gunpowder, shell, and missile factories, which had a production capability of supplying 101 million artillery shells, 32 million mines, 24 million air bombs, [and] 3,600 tons of TNT. is constituted 85 percent of all output from the Ammunition Narkomat.”⁸ In addition to all this, the mobilization reserves of the most valuable raw materials were concentrated in those factories, including lead, forged steel, and tin. All this went to Germany and was used against the Red Army. But Stalin’s prewar potential was so great that he was able to rebuild his industries during the course of the war behind the Volga River and in the Urals, and produce all that later was used to defeat the German army.

The Soviet General Staff, the government, and Stalin himself were not very afraid of German aggression in early 1939. There was no common border with Germany back then, so Germany could not attack suddenly. the creation of the Ammunition Narkomat in January 1939 could not be a response to German war preparations. Soviet intelligence knew that at that moment German industry was operating on a peacetime regime. In June 1939 the chief of the GRU, Ivan Proskurov, reported to Stalin that Germany was unprepared for a largescale war: if Germany invaded Poland, it would use up its air-bomb supplies within ten days. Germany had no reserves. After the war, the book *Results of World War II* came out in Germany. Field Marshal K. Kesselring, Colonel General H. Guderian, Colonel General L. Rendulic, Lieutenant General E. Schneider, Admiral E. Godt, and others were among the authors of the book. When comparing the analysis made by Soviet intelligence and the actual events, we must acknowledge that Soviet military intelligence was mistaken. the German supply of bombs ran out not after ten days of war, but on the fourteenth day after the attack against Poland. Apparently the best studies of the development of the German army during the reign of the ird Reich were done by Major General B. Muller-Gillebrand.⁹ the general said that in 1939 the German High Command of the land troops demanded that a reserve of ammunition be created that could last for four months of war. However, such reserves were never created. If a four-month supply is taken as 100 percent, then there was in actuality only 30 percent of pistol cartridge reserves, enough for 36 days of war; 15 percent of ammunition for mountain guns; 12 percent of mortar shells for light mortars, and 10 percent for heavy ones. The best supplies were for the heavy field howitzers—there were enough shells to last for two months of war. the worst case was with the tank shells. In September 1939 the main tank of the German Wehrmacht was the Pz-II, equipped with 20-mm cannon. There was only 5 percent of the needed supply of shells required for four months of war, meaning only enough for six days of combat.

Despite all this, Hitler was not eager to mobilize the country’s industry toward war. The German army waged a war, which began as a European conflict and turned global, but German industry remained operating on a peacetime regime. For fifty years the Soviet government has been persuading us that in 1939 war was unavoidable, the world was headed for war, and Stalin could do nothing but sign a nonaggression pact with Germany. An analysis of the conditions of German industry in general, and in the area of ammunition

production in particular, allows us to assert that the situation was not at all so critical. the world was not headed for inevitable war, and a war could have been averted, if Stalin had wanted to avert it. And what is more, if in September 1939 the Red Army had intervened on the side of Poland, Stalin would not have lost anything, while Hitler could have suffered a devastating defeat simply because he did not have enough ammunition. But Stalin did not capitalize on the German weakness. When the war began, the German situation regarding ammunition did not improve, but in May 1940 Hitler delivered a fatal blow to France. There were enough shells and missiles to carry out the attack, but if Stalin had attacked Germany in 1940, there would have been nothing left for Germany to use in fending off his attack, because her industries had still not been mobilized. After this followed the Battle of Britain, and once again the German air force was engaged in a war but German industry was not. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. Here, he had tremendous luck—at the very border he was able to take huge quantities of Soviet supplies. Without these supplies he would not have been able to reach Moscow.

The seizure of Stalin's supplies was a tremendous achievement for Hitler, but he had to also think of shifting his own industry to a wartime regime. Hitler, however, was in no hurry to do this. the war in Russia was serious business, and the German army had to spend more shells than ever before. the production of ammunition did not in any way correspond to the expenditures required by the army. Major General B. Muller-Hillebrand cites entire pages of clear-cut statistics. Here are some figures randomly chosen from many thousands like them. In October 1941, the German army engaged in ferocious battles with the Red Army and used 561,000 75-mm shells, while the industry during that period produced only 75,000 of those shells. In December, 494,000 were used and 18,000 received from the factories. In December 1941, Stalin carried out powerful attacks against the German army near Moscow. In December, Hitler declared war on the United States of America. It would seem to be the perfect time to shift industry from a peacetime to a wartime regime. But Hitler still waited. Only in January 1942 did he make the decision to gradually begin the shift of German industry to fulfill wartime needs. the difference between Stalin and Hitler was that Hitler first waged a war against the entire world, fought for over two years—and only then began to mobilize his industries. Stalin, on the other hand, acted in the exact opposite manner. Stalin tried with all his powers to delay the moment when the Soviet Union would have to enter into the war, but he began mobilizing the industries and setting them on a wartime regime back in January 1939.

During the course of World War II, the Red Army had the most powerful artillery in the world. the artillery was used correctly, meaning that it was secretly concentrated in masses on narrow strips of territory and used in sudden, intense strikes. In the Stalingrad operation, the Don front under Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky broke through defenses on a narrow strip of land—only twelve kilometers. Here, besides the tanks, twenty-four rifle regiments supported by thirty-six artillery regiments led the breakthrough. Rokossovsky concentrated 135 guns on every kilometer, and 167 weapons per kilometer

in the primary locations. During the course of the war, the concentration of artillery, tanks, infantry, and aviation constantly increased. By the end of the war, the Soviet staffs began to use kilotons as units of measurement for calculating the power of artillery attacks. Soviet artillery began to speak the language of the atomic age.

In the Vistula-Oder operation, the Soviet command used 34,500 guns and mortars. they were not evenly distributed throughout the force, but rather concentrated on the strips where the breakthrough was to occur. In the strip covered by the 3rd Guards Army, the concentration reached 420 weapons per kilometer. Even more artillery was used in the Berlin operation—over 42,000 guns and mortars. Along the breakthrough areas, huge quantities of ammunition were concentrated, as well as huge quantities of weapons. Marshal Ivan Konev broke through thirty-six kilometers of front line, and used 8,626 weapons to do it. the record was set in the area occupied by the 381st Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock Army, during the course of the East Prussian operation: 468 guns and mortars on one kilometer of front line, not counting the Katyusha salvo-fire installations. During the course of the war the Red Army used 427 million shells and artillery mines and 17 billion cartridges. Just divide this by the number of German soldiers and determine how many shells that makes per soldier. To this you can add the number of hand grenades, land mines, and air bombs. Who could resist such a mighty army?

Here we must also remember that in the war the Soviet Union used only 15 percent of the prewar potential of the Ammunition Narkomat; all the rest was lost during the early periods of the war. Hitler's surprise attack not only annihilated tens of divisions of the Red Army and destroyed the strategic reserves; he also occupied the territories where the newest ammunition factories were located. the Red Army destroyed its own factories or simply abandoned them as it retreated. Some machines were evacuated, but try to move at least one furnace for thousands of kilometers. . . . Try to transport even one thousand tons of ammunition from the border forests to the railroad stations, load them into trains, and evacuate them under enemy fire.

Hitler delivered a surprise blow to Stalin. Stalin lost almost all his ammunition factories. He had to fight back using only 15 percent of the might of the Ammunition Narkomat.¹³ The results of the war are well known. Try to imagine what could have happened if Hitler had stalled with his attack and would have, instead, himself been attacked by Stalin. In that case, Stalin would have been using not 15 percent of his ammunition, but the full 100 percent. What would the outcome of World War II have been then?

The Winter War: Finland

In October of 1939, immediately after the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, Stalin's diplomats addressed the government of Finland, demanding the cession of the Karelian Isthmus.¹ In exchange, they offered the Finns a piece of territory twice the size of the isthmus. Upon first glance, the proposition seems alluring—Finland sacrifices 2,761 square kilometers, and receives 5,528 square kilometers in return. How-

ever, the proposition was not alluring, but rather contemptuous. the Karelian Isthmus is a direct gateway to the capital of Finland, the largest ports and most populated regions. the geographical disposition of Finland is such that any aggression could come only from the Soviet Union, and only through the Karelian Isthmus. Precisely for this reason, the Finnish army, starting in 1918 (after winning its independence fighting against Russian and local Bolshevik troops during the Russian civil war), began an extensive buildup of defenses on the Karelian Isthmus. Starting in 1929, the scope of the buildup expanded significantly. On the Karelian Isthmus emerged a solid strip of fortifications and obstructions, which became known as the Mannerheim Line, named for the country's commander-in-chief, who had won the war of independence in 1918. Finland spent practically all of her military budget for the ten years preceding the war on the creation of this line of fortifications. Military experts from all countries of the world unanimously agreed that no army, taking any amount of time, could break through the Mannerheim Line. Nevertheless, Stalin's envoys demanded from Finland the cession of her main and only defense structure, meaning they wanted the Finns to put down their arms and hand over to the Red Army, without a fight, the road to their country's unprotected internal regions

The "exchange" of territories was the first step in the plan. Stalin had prepared a second step as well—a revolution in Finland and takeover by the Communists. Already in October 1939 the 106th Rifle Division of the Red Army was supplemented with Finnish Communists who lived in the Soviet Union.² When necessary, this division could be declared the "national army of Finland" and used as a weapon against the legal government. Stalin had prepared a new Communist "government" as well, which was strengthened with officers from the NKVD and the military intelligence. is "government" could at any moment, in accordance with "the will of the Finnish people," be sent to Helsinki. Stalin had started the formation of this "government" already in June 1939.

Three months before the start of the war in Finland, in August of 1939, the Red Army in a surprise attack obliterated the Japanese Sixth Army in Mongolia. Logic would lead us to the conclusion that if the Red Army had the capacity to destroy an entire Japanese field army, Finland could not possibly present any difficulties. Stalin knew the strength of the Red Army, and was certain that Finland would accede without a fight to all his demands. For this reason he did not conduct any serious preparations for war. However, the people and the government of Finland turned out to be unwilling to bend to Stalin's requests.

Stalin issued an order to crush Finland. For an attack, the Soviets needed a pretext. As if on demand, on November 26, 1939, seven artillery shells allegedly flew in from the Finnish side and exploded on the Soviet side, killing three privates and one junior officer.⁴ Finland's government declared that no shell could have come from Finnish territory, because Finland had no artillery near the border. Finland furthermore declared immediate willingness to invite experts from neutral countries or to create a joint committee of Finnish and Soviet experts for further investigation of the incident. But Stalin did not

need any investigation. Since Finland “attacked” the Soviet Union, the Red Army must “strike in retaliation.”

On November 30, 1939, after a brief but intense artillery softening-up, the Red Army crossed the Finnish border, having as its objective taking Helsinki by December 21, 1939—Stalin’s sixtieth birthday. the main strike was carried out on the Karelian Isthmus; secondary strikes were carried out along the entire Finnish-Soviet border, from the Baltic Sea to the Barents Sea. Radio Moscow declared that the Finnish people rose up against capitalists and the Red Army was heading forward to assist the uprising. Units of the Red Army occupied the small village of Terioki. Immediately, Kuusinen’s “government” arrived from Moscow to this village and went to work. All the “ministers” of the new Communist Finland for some reason spoke Russian. Kuusinen’s son kept the records and protocols, also in Russian. the “government” established diplomatic ties with the USSR on December 1, and on December 2 it signed an “agreement on mutual help and friendship between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic.” the agreement was signed by comrades Molotov and Kuusinen and printed in two copies, but in only one language—Russian. Comrade Kuusinen also signed in Russian, using the Cyrillic alphabet.

However, a victory march on Helsinki did not happen. the Mannerheim Line was not located on the immediate border, but deeper in the territory behind the “security pale.” is pale was a strip of land that started at the border and stretched from twenty-five to sixty-five kilometers deep into Finnish territory.⁵ the security pale was a strip of land full of traps, barricades, obstacles, and minefields. the entire space was filled with granite boulders and concrete blocks, forest blockages, scarps and counterscarps, and anti-tank trenches. In this strip for many years, on purpose, there had been no industrial or transportation buildup. Finland did not keep any large military formations or any large amounts of supplies here. All existing bridges on this strip were wired with explosives and ready to be blown up or burned, along with everything else in sight, by the Finnish border patrol in the event of retreat.

As a result of these actions, it took the Red Army two weeks to reach the main line of defense, having already suffered heavy losses, with a broken morale and without ammunition, fuel, or supplies. their maneuvering capability was strictly limited: any step off the main path could become the last step. the rear had lagged behind and was constantly under threat of repeated attack by the light squads of Finnish soldiers, who had flawlessly memorized the area and knew secret safe passages through all the minefields. Having overcome the security pale, the Red Army found itself halted by the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. the line was in fact a brilliantly camouflaged defense structure, well integrated into the surroundings, and stretching 135 km in width and up to 30 km in depth. Its right flank met the shore of the Baltic Sea; its left flank bordered Lake Ladoga. All in all, the Mannerheim Line counted 2,311 concrete, ironclad, and wooden defense structures. The fighting on the Mannerheim Line was especially tenacious. the Red Army succeeded in breaking through the Mannerheim Line only on March 12, 1940,

in the process sustaining colossal casualties, in both men and arms: 126,875 soldiers and officers were either killed in action, or disappeared without a trace, or died from wounds and disease. Additionally, the army counted 188,671 wounded, 58,370 ill, and 17,867 frostbitten.

On March 13, 1940, the war between Finland and the Soviet Union was ended. The war lasted 105 days and became known as the Winter War. the Soviet Union received the Karelian Isthmus, but Finland kept her independence. The whole world was shocked by the unbelievable weakness of the Red Army. the giant Soviet Union could not take care of Finland, whose population was only slightly more than 3.5 million. All around the world, newspapers were filled with caricatures and reports of the Soviet Union's utter lack of readiness for any war, no matter how small.

A conviction arose among military men, writers, historians, and politicians that the Red Army had demonstrated in Finland complete and utter lack of capacity to wage war. For many decades this idea has been taught in military academies, schools, and universities. However, the actions of the Red Army during the Winter War do not demonstrate weakness. they exhibit tremendous strength. First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Red Army acted in conditions that no army had previously faced. It was conducting an attack in an average temperature of 21 to 24 degrees Celsius below zero. Sometimes it was warmer, but frequently it was colder. On the very first night of the war, the temperature was registered at minus 39 degrees Celsius. Some nights had been even colder. Action was taking place not only on the Karelian Isthmus, but also a thousand kilometers to the north, up to the Arctic Circle and even farther. the cold there was even more severe. Not a single army in the world had conducted an offensive operation, even a failed one, under a temperature of minus 20 degrees Celsius. In such temperatures, no one had even attempted to conduct massive attacks, because it is impossible. Nevertheless, the Red Army conducted successful offensive operations in temperatures of minus 30 degrees Celsius and colder. Stalin ordered the army to act in impossible conditions, and the Red Army did the impossible.

The military experts of the West should have recognized the amazing warfare capabilities of the Red Army and the fallacy of their assumptions. From the actions in Finland, there could be only one logical conclusion: nothing is impossible for the Red Army. If it was capable of advancing in such conditions, then it was capable of advancing in any other conditions—there could be no worse conditions than those in Finland in the winter. If the Red Army had broken through the Mannerheim Line, then it was ready to crush Europe and whoever got in the way. In Finland the Red Army proved that it could accomplish any task, even an “impossible” one. the victorious Red Army accomplished what the strategists of the West had deemed unfeasible. But the strategists did not accept the fallacy of their predictions. Instead they declared the Red Army to be unfit and unprepared for war.

However, all who had followed the developments of the Winter War did not pay attention to certain inconsistencies. the first strange thing happened on March 12, 1940, after

the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line. After this, a completely defenseless Finland spread out before it. Finland could now be taken by bare hands, like a turtle whose shell has been ruptured. But the Red Army, having broken through the impenetrable defense system of the Finns, stopped its advance. Why? In December 1939, already having premonitions of the strength of the Mannerheim Line, the Red Army should have stopped its advance and not gone to storm it. But if the Red Army did storm the line and, at the cost of unimaginable casualties, managed to break through it, it should have used what it gained. Stalin broke into the safe, but then did not take anything from it. Where was Stalin's logic? The second inconsistency: all leading military experts before the Winter War declared that breaking through the Mannerheim Line could not be done by any army. the Red Army did the impossible. Furthermore, it broke through the line impromptu, for it had not prepared for such limiting conditions. the Red Army broke through the line in only three months, when all the military experts of the West had maintained that it could not be done in any time frame. And now, all of a sudden these same experts began talking of the Red Army being completely unfit for war. The third inconsistency: the first and loudest reports of the Red Army's poor performance in Finland came in newspapers funded by Stalin. Stalin's court poet, Alexander Tvardovsky, suddenly began speaking of the "infamous war." For some reason he was not executed. For some reason, he was awarded Stalin's praises. Stalin was wise enough to end his "liberation crusade" after the Mannerheim Line was broken and Finland was deprived of her security barrier.

Military operations in Finland were ended on March 13, 1940, and only three months later the three Baltic states, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, surrendered to Stalin without a fight and became republics of the Soviet Union. the governments and military leadership of these countries had carefully watched the war in Finland and drew from their observations a frightening, but correct conclusion: the Red Army was capable of carrying out impossible orders, and it would not be stopped by any number of casualties. If Stalin commanded the Red Army to annihilate somebody, it would sustain whatever losses it took to accomplish the order. Therefore, the three states surrendered without firing a single shot. they understood that resistance was futile. Meanwhile, Stalin issued an ultimatum to the leadership of Romania: give up Bessarabia. Remembering the experience of Finland, the Romanian government did not even organize lengthy talks: it handed over Bessarabia, and on top of it Northern Bukovina.

The Red Army conducted in Finland a unique and unparalleled operation. the Red Army performed in a fashion unrivaled and unrepeated by any army in history, but for some reason Hitler concluded that it had performed poorly. German generals were watching wonders unfold before their eyes, but did not understand the significance of what they were seeing. German generals were unable to appreciate what they observed. us, the people surrounding and counseling Hitler made strange deductions concerning Stalin's readiness for war. Goebbels's diary from those days is full of remarks of this sort: "November 11, 1939: The Russian army presents no value. the army is poorly commanded, and it is

even more poorly armed. . . . December 4, 1939: the Russian Army is of little value. . . . January 23, 1940: The military strength of Moscow is almost insignificant.”¹³ Goebbels wrote down not only his own opinion, but also Hitler’s: “He once again notes the catastrophic state of the Russian army. It can hardly be used for military action.”

For the Red Army, the war in Finland was a vaccine against hubris, boastful dispositions, and underestimating the enemy. the war in Finland taught the Red Army a lot: in 1941 near Moscow and in 1942 near Stalingrad, German troops met the Red Army, which by then knew how to fight in the winter. the German army, however, was not at all taught by the war in Finland. is war played a dirty trick on Hitler. He did not understand this war, did not correctly assess its hardships, and therefore made disastrous miscalculations. He suddenly decided that the Red Army was not ready for war and was unfit for any kind of action. Hitler turned out to be wrong. No conclusion about the strength of the Soviets follows out of the fact that the Red Army did not reach Helsinki. On the contrary, it follows that the Red Army was capable of reaching Berlin. Many German generals realized that the Red Army, according to the results of the fighting in Finland, was assessed incorrectly. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Goering had publicly declared that the war the Soviet Union had launched against Finland was “perhaps one of the biggest cover-ups in world history.” Goering believed that Stalin deliberately “sent to Finland a few divisions, equipped with obsolete weaponry, in order to hide the creation by the Soviet Union of an unprecedented war machine.”¹⁵ In closed circles, Hitler himself admitted the mistake. is occurred on April 12, 1942. Hitler said the following: “The entire war with Finland in 1940, just as the Russian advance into Poland with obsolete tanks and weapons and poorly clothed soldiers, was nothing other than a grandiose disinformation campaign, because Russia at that time controlled arms which made it, in comparison with Germany and Japan, a world power.” He also said, on June 22, 1942: “Back home in Russia, they created an extremely powerful military industry . . . and the more we find out what goes on in Russia, the more we rejoice that we delivered the decisive blow in time. the Red Army’s weaponry is the best proof that they succeeded in reaching extremely high achievements.”

Germany’s Strategic Resources and Stalin’s Plans

Germany, France, Belgium—all have powerful steel-casting industries, but they do not have much iron ore. Too many things on the front and in the rear, from the soles of soldiers’ boots to battleships, are made of steel. Due to steel shortages, German leaders—as high-ranking as Goering—seriously considered the possibility of building locomotives of concrete instead of steel.¹ Due to steel shortages, damaged bridges were repaired using wooden logs instead of steel beams. Due to steel shortages, railroad rails from spare tracks were used to repair the damaged sectors of primary tracks. Railroad tracks with two-way traffic were transformed into one-track roads. is slowed the entire rhythm of production in Germany and in the countries Germany occupied.

In any case, Hitler could not have counted on a quick victory—he had too many enemies. A long war was a path to suicide for Hitler, in the most literal sense of the word. In order to maintain for just a few years what he wanted to establish, he needed to gain iron ore supply. the richest ore mines in Europe, with high iron readings of up to 60 to 65 percent, were located in the area of Kiruna-Ellivare in the very north of Sweden, and arrived at German ports through the Baltic Sea. One of the weakest links of the German economy was the loading of iron ore in the Swedish port of Lulea, followed by the long trip along Finland's coast through the Gulf of Bothnia, past the Åland Islands, past the islands Gotland, Oland, Bornholm, and then the unloading in the German ports. the iron ore was loaded almost at the Arctic Circle and was transported across the entire Baltic Sea from the northernmost to the southernmost ports. Neither the British, nor the French, nor any other fleets posed any threat to the transport of iron ore across the Baltic. For a foreign fleet, breaking into the Baltic Sea was like breaking into a mousetrap and staying trapped there. But the Soviet Navy did not need to break into anything. It was already there, in its bases, peacefully awaiting the right opportunity.

For defending the Soviet Union a fleet in the Baltic Sea is not needed at all. Prior to 1940, the Soviet Union held a very small piece of seashore there. For more than two hundred years St. Petersburg (known as Leningrad in the Soviet era) was the capital of the empire, and for that reason along this stretch of shoreline all the Russian tsars, beginning with Peter the Great, had erected fortifications. Aside from coastline batteries and forts, the Leningrad region had a rather impressive concentration of naval cannons on railroad platforms. Three naval fortified regions protected the direct gateways to Leningrad: the Kronstadt, Izhorsk, and Luzhsk, so the routes to the city could be shelled by powerful crossfire from all directions. Each battery, each fort, each fortified region, and each naval base had ammunition and supplies enough to last them for the entire four years of the war.

If the Soviet Union meant to defend itself, it did not need battleships in the Baltic Sea. In case of need, even without battleships, it was possible to quickly unload barges full of mines at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and thus to cut off the approach to Leningrad. In defensive warfare a Soviet Baltic fleet was unnecessary. In fact, that is what happened—the Soviet Baltic fleet stayed without action for the entire duration of the war. In the event of attack by an aggressor, the Soviet Baltic fleet was extremely vulnerable. the aggressor could simply block the Soviet fleet by laying a couple of hundred mines on the shallow accesses to the naval bases. Indeed, that was done by the German fleet in June 1941.

In 1939 Hitler launched World War II against the rest of the world, having in his possession only fifty-seven submarines. His opponents were the almighty British and French fleets and, potentially, the U.S. navy. Hitler's navy had to lead an uneven battle in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In the Baltic, Hitler had almost nothing left. In the summer of 1941 in the Baltic Sea, the German navy had only five training submarines and twenty-eight torpedo motorboats, some of which were also used for training. the rest were

secondary forces: mine blockers, various motorboats, and minesweepers.⁵ But peace-loving comrade Stalin watched the struggle between Germany, France, and Britain and beefed up the might of his Baltic fleet. What for? In 1933 Stalin had already said: "The Baltic Sea is a sealed bottle, and we can't open it."⁶ Nevertheless, out of every three battleships, Stalin kept two in the Baltic, as if in a corked bottle. In 1941 on the Baltic Sea alone Stalin had sixty-nine submarines.⁷ No one in the world had such a number of submarines collected in one place. What task could Stalin set before his battleships and submarines in the closed aquarium of the Baltic Sea? Only one: to sink German transports of iron ore. There was no other work there for them.

At any moment, the Soviet fleet could have raised anchor, reached the German and Swedish ports, blocked them with thousands of mines, and sunk the defenseless transports. It would have ended the war for Germany, and this must have been known and understood in Berlin from the start. Hitler fought against Britain and France, while behind his back Stalin held up high a glittering ax. At the end of November 1939, Stalin made a huge mistake—he launched a war against Finland. The victory in Finland was a second warning to Hitler that Stalin was approaching the Swedish sources of ore. The Red Army, acting on Stalin's orders, got through the Finnish fortifications and halted its advance. Finland without the fortifications was defenseless. At any moment, Stalin could have given another order and renewed the advance of the Red Army. From Finnish territory it could have bombed Swedish ore mines and railroads unhindered. No one could have impeded this. The seizure of the Åland Islands alone would have been enough to close off the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, which would have meant an end to World War II with a Soviet victory.

And that was not all. In the part of Europe that was occupied by Hitler there are no forests. The forests are in Finland and Sweden. Any possible cessation of the shipment of lumber across the Baltic Sea carried with it a multitude of consequences, and all were negative. The wood was needed for building and restoring railroad ties and for mining coal, which was needed for forging steel. No wood meant no transport along the railroads. During peacetime in Germany there was already a yearly timber shortage of about 6 million tons. Instead of wood pulp they had to use potato foliage. The Fuehrer himself attests to that.¹⁰ But that was just during peacetime, when no one hindered the transport of timber across the Baltic Sea. As soon as Stalin's submarines struck German timber carriers, Germany would have wound up without wood at all. On top of everything else, Germany had no nickel. It was impossible to fight without nickel—but the nickel supplies were in Finland. At the beginning of 1940, during the course of the war against Finland, the Red Army had seized control of the nickel mines in Petsamo, and then in the spring of 1940, according to the peace treaty, returned them. But now nickel was obtained according to joint Soviet-Finnish shareholding companies with the participation of Soviet engineers and workers. The Soviet government insisted that the director of the entire operation be a Soviet man. Nickel from Petsamo went to both Germany and the Soviet Union. Germany was receiving 70,000 tons from this area, or

70 percent of Germany's annual demand of this strategic mineral.¹¹ However, the nickel supply could be stopped at any moment. the Soviet 104th Rifle Division, under Major General Morozov (of the 42nd Rifle Corps of the 14th Army) stood right outside the nickel mines.

German strategists did not fear a new Soviet invasion of Finland in vain. On November 25, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, and Chief of General Staff of the Red Army General K. A. Meretskov signed a directive to the staff of the Leningrad military district. Only one copy of the document was produced, and it was labeled top secret and especially important. Let's remember the date—November 25, 1940—we will return to it later on. The document begins by saying:

“In the conditions of war only against Finland, the USSR establishes, for convenience of control and material supply, two fronts: the Northern front for action on the shoreline of the Barents Sea and in the direction of Rovaniemi, Kemi and Oulu; the Northwestern front for actions directed toward Kuopio, Mikkeli and Helsinki. The leadership of the Northwestern front falls on the shoulders of the command and staff of the Leningrad military district. It is ordered to start the development of plans for operations opening up the Northwestern front. . . . the main objectives of the Northwestern front are set: destruction of Finland's armed forces, gaining control of her territories within the boundaries, and gaining access to the Gulf of Bothnia by the forty-fifth day of the operation. . . . On the right, the Northern front (its staff in Kandalaksha) on the fortieth day of mobilization moves to assault, and on the thirtieth day of the operation gains control of the regions of Kemi and Oulu. . . . the Red-Flag Baltic fleet, subordinate in all operations to the Military Council of the Northwestern front, is issued the following tasks: Working jointly with the air force, destroy the active navy of Finland and Sweden (in case of involvement by the latter). Assist the ground forces, acting on the Finland Gulf shore and from the Hanko peninsula, by supplying their flanks and destroying the coastal defenses of the Finns. Provide the transfer of two rifle divisions during the first few days of the war from the northern shore of the Estonian SSR to the Hanko peninsula, as well as transporting and launching an amphibious assault on the Åland Islands. rough cruiser operations of submarines and air forces, interrupt Finnish-Swedish naval communications (in the event of the latter's interference against the USSR) in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea.”

This plan of action was given the name “S.3-20.” the plan was to be put into action at the moment of receipt of a coded telegram with the signature of the chief of the general staff and the following contents: “Commence execution of plan ‘S.3-20’.” In this plan there was no mention of the fact that the Soviet Union would fight for the “guarantee of safety to the city of Lenin,” that is, Leningrad. And there were no hints that military actions must be initiated only in response to enemy aggression. the usual words “if the enemy wages war upon us . . .” were absent. Here, it was much simpler: at any moment, the Leningrad staff would receive a telegram from Moscow, and Soviet armies would advance

to the Gulf of Bothnia, to the Swedish border, to the Åland Islands! the trusted comrades at the right moment would set up a new “provocation of the Finnish war machine on our frontier,” and those whose job it was to do so would explain to the workers of the world the meaning of the “peace-loving global politics of the USSR” and the necessity of our “counterblows to the Finnish aggressors.”

The plan “S.3-20” allowed the armies of the Leningrad and Arkhangelsk districts, together with the Baltic fleet, to deliver blows to Finland before the Red Army hit Germany, simultaneously, or slightly later. But in any case, the blow to Finland was also a blow to Germany. In the event of putting plan “S.3-20” into action, Soviet troops were to seize the nickel mines in Petsamo and the Åland Islands, and make their way to the city of Kemi. It was not a coincidence that in 1940, on the Baltic Sea, the first marine infantry brigade was formed under the leadership of the Soviet saboteur Colonel Parafilo. It remained only to send to the Leningrad headquarters the coded message: “Bring plan into execution.” There is no need to search for a plan for war against Germany. If plan “S.3-20” had been realized, it meant a deadly blow not only to Finland, but to Germany as well.

In the summer of 1940, Stalin committed another error: he brought Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, organized on their territory the Baltic special military district, and concentrated all the forces of that region on the border of Eastern Prussia. This was completely unnecessary, and even harmful, for defense. Some say that Stalin moved his border to the West and thus strengthened the safety of the USSR. But in fact the situation was exactly the opposite. Before the occupation of the Baltic states, the Red Army had a divisive barrier in this region. Consequently, in the event of aggression Hitler’s armies had to crush the armed forces of three independent states before meeting the Red Army. Even if he had to spend only a few days in order to crush the armies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, a surprise attack on Soviet airbases in this direction would have been out of the question. The Red Army would have had the chance to put its forces on high alert and take its positions. After the destruction of the three states’ armies Hitler’s forces would have approached Lake Chudskoe, which is impossible to cross. If they had tried to go around the lake, Hitler’s armies would have come straight into Soviet fortified areas. But everything unfolded according to a different scenario. The Red Army came out of its fortified areas to the front lines in Lithuania, right up to the German border, and transferred there its air bases, staff headquarters, communication centers, and strategic supply resources. For the people of the three Baltic states, Stalin’s army became the aggressor and occupant, and Germany, if it decided to attack the USSR, would have become the liberator.

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army suffered a surprise attack from the German armies along the entire stretch of the border, including the Baltic states. The command centers were disrupted and Soviet aviation suffered significant losses on border air bases. Moreover, a widespread popular uprising in the Baltic states flared up against the Red Army. The Soviet “liberators” were shot at from every rooftop. The Red Army was left in the Baltic

region without any fortified regions, and behind their backs, on Russian territory, remained empty fortified areas without any troops. German troops led by General Field Marshal von Manstein seized them immediately.

Skeptics disagree: if Stalin had not occupied the Baltic states, Hitler could have seized them without war, by simply moving his troops there as he did in Czechoslovakia. To this theory, there is a rebuttal. It should have been explained to Hitler clearly that if German troops attempted to enter the Baltic states area, the Soviet Union, without warning, would begin sinking German transports of ore and wood in the Baltic Sea, setting up mines in the entryways of German ports.

In August 1939 the Soviet Union's position was announced loud and clear: Mongolian territory will be defended from Japanese aggression as if it was our own. And that was done! is position was correctly understood in the entire world, including Japan. As a result of this decisiveness and strictness, Japanese aggression against the Soviet Union was averted. Why did the Soviet Union, in 1939, not take the same position regarding the Baltic states? The occupation of those states by the Red Army made sense only if there were plans for an aggressive war against Germany. the Red Army came right up to the German border and transferred its air bases to the very front edge of that border. From the bases in Lithuania it could support the advance of Soviet troops right up to Berlin. Additionally, the Soviet navy received naval bases in Tallinn, Riga, and Liepaja. the primary forces of the navy and reserves were immediately transferred there. From Liepaja to the routes taken by caravans carrying ore, nickel, and wood to Germany, there was a very small distance. A strike from this area could be sudden and crippling. For Hitler, this would have been the curtain call. Hitler understood that at any moment the Soviet fleet could cut the only tie binding the faraway Swedish ports with the metalforging bases in Germany.

The Carving Up of Romania, and its Consequences

Adolf Hitler on May 18 1942: "Had we not succeeded in halting Russian troops during their entrance into Romania and forcing them to be content with obtaining only Bessarabia, they would have taken the Romanian oil fields, and no later than that same spring they would have crushed us, for we would have lost all sources of fuel."

Stalin strove to persuade Hitler that he wanted peace. At the same time, Stalin very persistently crawled toward the vital life-sustaining resources of Germany. For Stalin, it was not enough that the Red Army and fleet had under their control all the routes through which Germany got her iron ore, timber, and nickel. Stalin decided to move his divisions right up to the regions from which Germany received its petroleum supplies. In August 1939, Stalin (with Molotov's hand) signed a pact, according to which Hitler got a war on two fronts, and according to which the British fleet blocked Germany and did not allow petroleum shipments to come in by sea. Germany had only one possible source of oil significant enough to be noted—Ploiesti in Romania. the loss of this source of oil

would have put a complete stop to German production, army, aviation, and navy.

Stalin ordered Zhukov to use threats or battle to obtain Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania, and to secure arm's-length access to Romania's undefended oil fields, which were two hundred kilometers from the border. Zhukov's Southern front was ready to crush Romania, but in the summer of 1940 he did not have to fight. Romania's leaders had witnessed the brilliant victories sustained by the Red Army in Finland and had a clear understanding that it was better to accede to Stalin's wishes without battle. The sides agreed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. At the end of June 1940 Romanian troops retreated from and Soviet troops entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. These territories were added to the constituency of the Soviet Union.

In June 1940 three paths were open before the Southern front commanded by General Zhukov: two were correct, one was deadly. The first correct path: deliver a blow to Bessarabia and continue to advance toward the oil fields of Ploiesti. Three thousand Soviet tanks and two thousand airplanes were more than enough to reach the oil fields and ignite a fire. This would have meant the end for Germany. If the Southern front in June 1940 had dealt a blow to Romania, World War II would have ended in 1940 with a victory by the Soviet Union and an establishment of Communist regimes over the entire European continent. If the events had unfolded in such a manner, giant colonies of the French, Belgian, and Dutch empires would have been transferred to Stalin's control.

The second path was more risky, but promised even more victories: in June 1940 Stalin could have simply done nothing. He could have waited. He would not have had to wait much longer. After defeating France, Hitler could have delivered a blow to Britain. The risk for Stalin lay only in the fact that after the defeat of France, Britain and Germany could have concluded peace. In that case, Stalin would have been left one-on-one against Germany. However, if Hitler, as he planned, landed his troops in Britain, the task of "liberating" Europe became much simpler: Zhukov would have struck the Romanian oil fields, then the Red Army would have begun its "liberating operations" in Europe, all while the best German troops were off the continent, in Britain, from where they could return immediately. The third path was deadly. In June 1940 Zhukov's Southern front took over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina—then halted halfway to the oilfields of Ploiesti. Hitler said in 1942 that he was able to force Stalin to be satisfied in 1940 with Bessarabia alone. This was not so. Firstly, in the summer of 1940 Stalin had not yet set for Zhukov the objective of crushing Romania. Secondly, in 1940, in the heat of the fighting in France, Hitler had no means of exerting influence over Stalin. If Stalin had ordered his troops to crush Romania in the summer of 1940, nobody would have been capable of stopping the advance of Zhukov's Southern front.

As a result of the "liberation crusades" the distance from the new Soviet frontier to the oil fields of Ploiesti was now just 180 km. This was a clear, open area. Troops from the Odessa military district were concentrated at the very border, ready as soon as they got the first order to continue the "liberation" right up to the oil wells. Soviet tanks numbered over three thousand; the Romanians had sixty tanks. The Soviet "obsolete" BT-7M tank even

officially had a speed of 86 km/h (in reality it was faster). the Romanian tanks opposing it were FT-17s, and had a maximum speed of 9 km/h. Therefore, the Soviet tanks could just disregard their Romanian opponents, ignore them and bypass them at their will. Even if one were to set one thousand Soviet tanks against sixty Romanian ones, even then the remaining two thousand could advance to Ploiesti unhindered, without leaving the main road and without maneuvers.

A seizure of Ploiesti by Soviet troops, or just a fire in the oil production areas, would have meant paralysis for Germany. In the event of Ploiesti falling to the Soviets, all German tanks, automobiles, cruisers, battleships, submarines, and airplanes would have been stopped in their tracks. Who cares that you have talented generals, officers, soldiers, pilots, and artilleryists? Without fuel all their talents would be completely useless. A freeze on oil supply to the German war machine opened up the way for thousands of other Soviet tanks. From Brest and Lvov, from Belostok and Grodno, the road to Berlin was now very short. If the German army and aviation were paralyzed, and no one offered resistance, then on good roads the tank units could reach not only Berlin and Munich, but Paris and Marseille as well.

In May and June of 1940 Hitler was crushing the armies of Britain, Belgium, Holland, and France. German tank units headed for the Atlantic Ocean, making a huge detour around Paris. Practically the entire Germany army fought in the West. Hitler victoriously crushed France and British troops on the continent. Against France and Britain, Hitler threw his entire naval fleet, air force, all his tanks, and all his heavy artillery. the best German generals fought there. And in the rear, on the borders of the Soviet Union, Hitler left only ten weak infantry divisions. Here, there was not a single tank, a single airplane, a single heavy artillery weapon. Most importantly, the ten infantry divisions were all in Poland and Slovakia. In Romania, there were no German troops. In June 1940 neither Hitler nor his generals had any intentions or plans to attack the Soviet Union. the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH—German Army High Command) and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW—Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) had neither rough drafts nor preliminary designs for a war against the USSR. they had no orders from Hitler in this regard. Not a word was said about war against the USSR. After the defeat of France, Hitler ordered a drastic reduction in German armed forces. is reduction was widespread and intense, for there were no plans, hints, or foresight indicating that a war against the Soviet Union might be approaching. And all at once came the Soviet strike against Romania. Oil is the blood of war. Without oil, fighting becomes impossible. Stalin's axe was raised over the oil production in Romania.

In Berlin, it was finally recognized that the Soviet threat to Germany was lethal. Soviet tanks advanced to Romania, causing chaos in German headquarters: if the tanks did not stop, if they advanced another 180 km, then Germany would capitulate within the next few months. Romanian troops made no resistance and put up no obstacles to the Soviet advance.

Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and stopped. Berlin breathed

a sigh of relief. However, what would have happened if, the next day, Stalin had ordered the advance to continue? A solution was found: in case of an emergency, it would be necessary to deliver a warning blow to the Soviet Union, using ten divisions in another location, thereby creating for the Red Army a diversion from Romania. After conducting the battles on maps, the German high command understood that ten divisions would be insufficient. they decided to use twenty, and saw the same result. they increased the number of divisions, again and again. In the end, it was decided: in order to not allow Stalin to seize or destroy the oil industry in Romania, it was necessary to deliver a blow to the Soviet Union with the might of the entire German armed forces. On July 21, 1940, Hitler for the first time in a very tight circle uttered the idea of the "Russian problem." On July 21 the head of ground forces, General Field Marshal W. Brauchitsch, received an order from Hitler to begin developing a specific plan for war in the East. the next day, Brauchitsch entrusted Halder, the head of general staff for ground forces, with fully evaluating all the different potentialities "in a military operation against Russia." Major General Erich Marcks was then appointed to Halder's staff as an aide for developing the specifics of the eastern campaign. On July 29 Marcks began planning a military campaign against Russia.

For the Soviet Union, the consequences of a bloodless victory in Romania were catastrophic. First of all, neutral Romania was faced with a terrible choice: whose side should it take? Stalin had suddenly demanded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and Romania was forced to give them up. What would Stalin demand tomorrow? Hitler, on the other hand, did not demand anything. the choice was simple, and Romania got Hitler's protection. the result: the Soviet Union obtained another hostile country along its border; the front, that was supposed to protect the USSR in case of war, stretched for almost another eight hundred kilometers; and Hitler received an ally that held oil. Without oil, Germany could not fight. In other words, having Romania in his arms, Hitler could attack the Soviet Union. Without this new alliance the attack would have been impossible. But the most important effect lay in something else. Stalin frightened Hitler. It was precisely the "liberation" of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina that acted as the last warning for Hitler. A direct Soviet threat arose over the oil fields of Romania, and precisely because of this threat Hitler ordered his commanders to prepare a strike against the Soviet Union.

In Stalin's career there were few errors. One of the few, but the most significant one, was the occupation of Bessarabia in 1940. He could have taken Bessarabia and continued on to Ploiesti, which would have meant the destruction of Germany. Or, he could have waited until Hitler landed troops in Britain, and after that he could have taken over all of Romania. is too would have ended the "thousand-year Reich." Stalin, however, made one step in the direction of oil, took over the launching ground for the next attack—and stopped to wait. rough these actions, he showed interest in Romanian oil and alarmed Hitler, who before this had concentrated on the West, North, and South, without paying much attention to "neutral" Stalin in the East.

Why did Stalin need Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina? Here is the official answer of

the Soviet historians to that question: "From the Bessarabian territory, the Soviet air force could keep Romanian oil industry, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany, under constant threat. Northern Bukovina was needed because through its territory went a railroad of strategic importance, which stretched from Odessa through Kishinev, Chernovtsi, to Lvov, and which had a European track which enabled it to allow usage by railroad cars from all over Europe." Here is what Hitler had said regarding the same matter, but half a century earlier:

"It is absolutely obvious that the Soviets were determined to direct the unfolding of events in the Balkans in the direction necessary to them, and in that manner to transform the area into launching grounds for an attack on us and the remaining countries of Europe. And, doing everything possible to achieve this goal, they simultaneously declared readiness to sign trade agreements with us, which would seem to be favorable to us but would in fact cut us off from our oil sources as soon as their preparations for the decisive coup were finished. In the summer of 1941 they intended to deliver a crushing defeat to Romania, for it was the only country, except Russia, that delivered us oil."

A question arises: are we not giving too much importance to the role played by Romanian oil? Did not Germany establish her own production of synthetic fuel? Such an industry did indeed exist, but the problem of fuel was still not resolved. First of all, it is important to keep in mind that synthetic fuel can never compete in quality with fuel made from petroleum. The use of synthetic fuel significantly lowers the tactical and technical characteristics of weaponry, most of all airplanes, tanks, and ships. Your designers can create a wonderful aircraft, your factories can have the best technological capabilities in the world, your workers and engineers can put into the building process of the plane all their talent and effort, but with low-quality fuel the plane will still be slow, weak, and clumsy. On top of all this, synthetic fuel is also expensive. With timber, if there was a shortage, Hitler's Germany used potato stalks. Even though they were lower in quality than wood, at least they were cheap. But the production of synthetic fuel costs seven to twelve times as much as the production of fuel from petroleum. Hitler's decision to use synthetic fuel was not born out of good fortunes. Very few would be willing to repeat his experiences. The following facts enable us to judge the quality and costs of synthetic fuel. In the second half of the twentieth century the world suffered from an oil crisis more than once. At the beginning of the new millennium, the global chemical industry is far more powerful than the chemical industry of Germany in 1941. And still, for some reason there is no rush to produce synthetic fuels today.

Destruction of the Buffer States between Germany and the Soviet Union

It is a fact of history that on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, suddenly and treacherously. However, it is a very strange fact. Before World War II, Germany had no common border with the Soviet Union and therefore could not attack it, especially in a sudden fashion. Germany and the Soviet Union were separated by a solid barrier

of neutral countries. In order for the Soviet-German war to take place, it was necessary to create the right conditions: to destroy the barrier of neutral countries and establish common Soviet- German borders. Everyone interested in the date June 22, 1941, before cursing Hitler and accusing him of treachery, has to answer at least two questions: who destroyed the buffer row of neutral countries between Germany and the Soviet Union and what for?

Communist historians invented explanations for the deeds of the Soviet Union. The first explanation: having bloodied and ripped apart Poland, the Soviet Union moved its frontiers to the west, and thus fortified its security. What a strange explanation. Soviet frontiers were indeed moved two to three hundred kilometers, but at the same time Germany moved its frontiers two to three hundred kilometers to the east. Its move decreased, rather than increased, the Soviet Union's security. Furthermore, the completely new factor of a common Soviet-German border arose, which carried as a consequence the possibility of sudden war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Explanation number two: having axed Poland in the back at the moment of her desperate fight against the Nazis, Stalin attempted to delay the moment the Soviet-German war would start. This explanation stems from the old pretext: we started a fire in the neighbor's house, hoping that the fire will reach and destroy our house later than it destroys his. The third explanation: France and Great Britain did not want to make a deal with the Soviet Union. It is a blatant lie. France and Great Britain did want an anti-Hitler treaty with the USSR and started negotiations in Moscow. The negotiations were suddenly stopped by the Soviets who immediately signed the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact with Germany.

Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and Romania were natural allies of the USSR. Unlike France and Britain, these countries were potential victims of Hitler's Drang Nach Ost (Drive towards the East). With them, the USSR should have sought an alliance against Hitler. But Stalin was not seeking such an alliance, and in the cases where pacts did exist, the Soviet Union did not act in accordance with them. Stalin could have remained neutral, but instead he stabbed in the back those who fought against Hitler.

In 1939 conditions for defense were much more favorable: forests, rivers, swamps, few roads, and lots of time. Soviet troops could have created a powerful barrier on the new Soviet-German border, especially since the opening was not wide. But at that moment the Soviet Union stopped producing anti-tank and anti-aircraft cannon. Instead of making the area impassable, it was quickly made more penetrable. The Red Army built bridges and roads, expanded and improved the railroads. Previously existing fortifications were torn down and buried under mounds of ground. One participant of those events, professor and Colonel I. G. Starinov of the GRU, candidly described what went on: "A stupid situation arose. When we faced weak armies of small countries, our borders were truly locked. But when Nazi Germany became our neighbor, the defense structures along the former border were abandoned and even partly dismantled."¹ And: "Engineering command of the Red Army sent a request for 120,000 railroad mines of delayed action. In the event of an invasion, this amount would have sufficed to paralyze the German army's supply routes

from the rear, on which it entirely depended. But instead of the requested amount, they sent . . . 120 mines.”² By the way, a mine is the most simple, most inexpensive, and highly effective weapon. The Soviet Union had huge land mine production, but after the new borders with Germany were established this production was curbed.

What did Stalin do aside from dismantling his own defenses? He also tore to pieces the barrier of neutral countries. For Hitler, one hole in the wall was enough. For Stalin, it was not. Hitler (with Stalin’s help) demolished the leadership of only one country in the dividing barrier—Poland. Stalin (without outside help) did the same in three countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), tried to do it in a fourth country (Finland), and actively prepared for doing it in a fifth country (Romania), having first ripped from it a huge chunk of land. Hitler strove to force only one opening in the wall, Stalin tried to demolish the entire wall.³ And Stalin accomplished his goal. Only ten months after the signing of the non-aggression pact the dividing barrier was completely destroyed, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, by Stalin’s efforts. There remained no neutral countries between Stalin and Hitler, and thus the conditions for attack were set.

During this short time all of Stalin’s neighbors to the west became his victims. Aside from nations sharing borders with the Soviet Union, Lithuania, which did not have any common borders with the USSR at all, also fell under Stalin’s domination. the appearance of Soviet troops in Lithuania meant that they had truly reached Germany’s real borders: from September 1939 the Soviet-German border passed through the conquered Polish territories, and from the summer of 1940, Soviet troops came to the border of Eastern Prussia. Here it cannot at all be said that the monstrous Hitler was hacking corridors to the east, and the stupid Stalin was assisting him. No, Stalin hacked corridors to the west without any outside help.

Did the Red Army plan to stop at the borders it attained? the answer was given by the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko: “In Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia we destroyed a power of landowners and capitalists hateful to the workers. the Soviet Union grew significantly and advanced its borders to the west. the capitalist world was forced to tremble and cede to our will. We, the fighters of the Red Army, should not be content and stop at what has been attained!”⁴ is was not the speech of a politician and not the announcement of a journalist. It was an official decree for the Red Army. But to the west of Soviet borders there was only Germany, or her allies; and a pact had been signed with Germany Stalin made no secret of how a true Communist should view promises and pacts: “The question of struggle . . . needs to be examined not from the standpoint of fairness, but from the standpoint of demands of the political moment, from the standpoint of the political demands of the [Communist] Party at each given moment.”⁵ “A war can turn upside down each and every pact.”⁶ Here are the “political demands”: “History says that when any country wants to fight against another country, even one that it does not neighbor, it begins to seek out borders, through which it could reach the borders of the country it wants to attack,”⁷ Stalin wrote.

Stalin needed a situation in which “capitalists gnaw at each other like dogs.”⁸ The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact created precisely that situation. Pravda’s tone was excited: “Each war like this one brings us closer to that happy period, when there will be no more killings among people.”⁹ Lieutenant General S. M. Krivoshein describes a conversation with his deputy, P. M. Latyshev (at that time Krivoshein commanded the 25th Motorized Corps): “We made a deal with the Germans, but this does not mean anything. . . . Now is the best time for a final and constructive resolution to all of the world’s problems.”

Before the war, the main Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, did not call upon the Soviet people to build defenses. Pravda’s tone was different: soon the entire world will belong to us. “Our country is great. the globe itself needs to rotate nine hours in order for our huge Soviet country to enter the new year of its victories. There will be a time when it will need for this not nine hours, but a whole twenty-four. . . . And who knows where we will be greeting the New Year in five or ten years: along what time belt, on what new Soviet meridian?”¹¹ With the date of the Soviet break-in into Europe approaching, Pravda became more and more straightforward: “Divide your enemies, temporarily satisfy the demands of each of them, and then crush them one by one, without giving them an opportunity to unite.”¹² Hitler decided that he should wait no longer. He made the first move without waiting for the blow in the back from the liberating axe.

But even having started the war in the most favorable circumstances that had ever existed for an assailant, he was unable to win. Even in the most unfavorable of circumstances, the Red Army managed to “liberate” half of Europe and dominate Eastern Europe for half a century. One wonders what the outcome would have been if the best German forces had left the European continent to go to Africa and the British Isles, and, behind their back, the Red Army had destroyed the only German oil source in Romania?

Destruction of the Security Pale on the Eve of the War

To prevent a sudden enemy attack, a country preparing for defense deploys its troops not on the very border, but deeper in its territory. Between the border and the main line of defense, it creates a continuous zone of obstacles and barriers. This zone is called the security pale. Its purpose is to wear down the aggressor before he meets the main forces of the defense. In the 1920s, during their attempt to occupy Poland, commanders of the Red Army saw the effectiveness of the Polish security pales for the defense of Poland and had the bitter experiences of advancing through such pales.

In September 1939 the border of the USSR was moved 200 to 300 km to the west. The depth of their security pale increased greatly. Moreover, the railroad system on the territories acquired after the division of Poland was poorly developed. Out of 6,696 km of tracks, only 2,008 were two-way, and even they had a low capacity. In case of emergency, it was very easy to make them completely unusable. In November 1939, the Red Army in Finland learned the hard way that a security pale could ease the position of the defense and complicate the position of the aggressor. Crossing the Finnish security pale required

a huge expenditure of time, strength, resources, and blood.

In 1939, Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union. Some rivers became borders. Bridges on those rivers that were not used were still kept intact. In the line held by the 4th Army alone, there were six such bridges. The former Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel General L. M. Sandalov, asked: "Why, to ask frankly, were so many bridges across the Bug [river] kept intact in the line of the 4th Army?"⁵ The German command hoped to use the bridges in an aggressive war, and thus did not ask for their destruction. But what did the Soviet command hope for? At the beginning of the war, a huge number of German troops went across those bridges, crushing the Soviet 4th Army in a surprise attack. The defeat of the 4th Army opened the way to the rear of the really powerful 10th Army, which also suffered unimaginable devastation. Without encountering any more barriers, Guderian's tanks headed straight for Minsk in Belarus. The German troops advanced without complications, taking bridges on the rivers Daugava, Berezina, Nieman, Pripiat, and Dnepr.

In January 1941, Stalin replaced Chief of General Staff K. A. Meretskov for not being sufficiently active in the construction of new roads, bridges, and air bases in the new regions. On February 1, 1941, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov replaced Meretskov as Chief of the General Staff. The work began at a truly Zhukov speed. Before 1941, the Red Army had five railroad brigades. Zhukov immediately increased this number to thirteen, ten of them in the west of the country. Each brigade consisted of one regiment, two separate battalions, and supply units. Almost all railroad troops were concentrated in the western border regions and worked intensively to modernize old railroads and build new ones right up to the border. Simultaneously with the construction of railroads, automobile roads were built in the western regions. What were those roads built for?

During preparations for a defensive war, roads parallel to the front line are laid down, so that reserves could be moved from passive areas of defense to dangerous areas. These roads must not be near the border, but much deeper in the country, leaving the border regions as clear of roads and bridges as possible. But the Red Army was building roads and railroads from east to west, which was usually done when preparing for advance, for a quick transfer of reserves from the depths of the country to the borders, and for further supplying the troops after they crossed the borders.

Zhukov remembered: "The web of automobile roads in Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine was in poor condition. Many bridges could not hold the weight of the medium tanks and artillery." Zhukov should have rejoiced at that fact. He should have commanded his men to covertly weaken the support beams on those bridges and thus lure the attacking enemy to send his tanks to those weakened bridges, to their sure demise. Instead, he built roads and replaced old bridges with new ones, so that any tank and any artillery could pass through.

The official History of the Kiev Military District stated: "In early 1941, Hitler's forces began to build bridges, railroads, and field air bases." Obviously, these were signs of

preparations for attack. the Soviet railroad forces were doing exactly the same: "Railroad troops in Western Ukraine worked to develop and strengthen the railroads." Railroad brigades, created by Zhukov's order, completed a tremendous amount of work on the Soviet territory, but their main job was planned to be on enemy territory: they had to follow the advancing army and quickly get through the enemy's security pale, repair enemy roads and bridges, and change the European narrow gauge to the broad Soviet standard one. Right on the borders, they piled huge reserves of railroad tracks, demountable bridges, construction materials, and coal.

On the eve of the war, the USSR launched a gigantic campaign to modernize and widen its road network in the western regions. All that work harmed the USSR very soon. Hitler used the roads, bridges, stocks of coal, rails, and the sectional bridges that the Soviet leadership prepared in the western regions of its country. As we know, all that did not help the invading German army: its advance was not as fast as planned. But even this advance could have been stopped if Zhukov had not built roads on the eve of the war, had not created huge reserves of railroad tracks, bridges, and construction materials. He should have introduced an effective system of defense: all bridges should have been blown up, all materiel reserves liquidated, railroads and trains evacuated, roads destroyed, drowned, turned into swamps and saturated with mines. On Soviet territory, all mines were disarmed and the barriers taken down. On the eve of the German invasion, General of the Army D. Pavlov, a commander of the Western Special Military District (then already secretly transformed into the Western Front), said that the Soviet sappers were not paying enough attention to preparing themselves properly for removing mines and other obstacles on enemy territory.

If the Soviet marshals had known better, they would have started their war on June 21: then they would not have needed to take down German obstacles, because the German army was doing on the German territory exactly what the Red Army was doing on Soviet territory. In early June, German troops were disarming mines, evening out barricades, and concentrating troops right on the border, without keeping in front of them any security pale. Soviet Marshal K. S. Moskalenko, who in 1941 commanded the First Artillery Anti- Tank Brigade, counted those German actions as an unquestionable piece of evidence that the Germans would attack soon. At the same time, the NKVD border troops were dismantling their own barbwire on the very border to clear the way into enemy territory for the "liberation" army. they had cut barbwire in exactly the same way before the "liberation" of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina. Now it was Germany's turn.

Destruction of the Stalin Line

From 1926 to 1937, thirteen fortified regions were constructed along the western borders of the USSR. at chain of fortifications was unofficially known as "the Stalin Line." A fortified region (FR) was an area prepared for defense; at the same time, it was also

a military formation, equal to a regiment or a brigade in number but equal to a corps in firepower. Each FR had a command and staff, from two to eight machine-gun and artillery battalions, an artillery regiment, several separate heavy artillery batteries, a tank battalion, a communications battalion, an engineering-sapper battalion and other formations. Each FR occupied an area from 100 to 180 km long and 30 to 50 km deep. the region was equipped with a complex system of concrete and armored military and supply buildings, mostly subterranean. Within the FR, there were underground concrete storage units, electricity stations, hospitals, command centers, and communication quarters. the underground constructions were connected through a sophisticated system of tunnels, galleries, and covered passageways. ere was also an intricate web of railroads for bringing in materials, maneuvering armored trains, and quickly transferring reserves to the troops. Each FR could independently conduct military operations during a long period of time and in isolated conditions.

Each FR consisted of “pillboxes,” each equipped with its own defenses and each capable of independently defending itself if fully encircled by the enemy, diverting to itself significant enemy forces and attention. Construction of the Stalin Line was not publicized like the construction of the French Maginot Line. the Stalin Line was built in secrecy. During the construction of each field stronghold, NKVD units put cordons around several areas. the construction went on simultaneously in all areas, but it was the real thing only in one—the rest were decoys. Not only the local population but also the construction workers had a very vague understanding of what was being built and where.

Unlike the Maginot Line, the Stalin Line wasn't built at the very border, but deeper into Soviet territory. A line of fortified regions in the depth of the country means that the first enemy artillery strike will be carried out against an empty space rather than the defending army. Therefore, during a surprise attack, defending garrisons have a minimum of several days to take their places in the casemates and prepare their arms and defense. If the fortified regions are in the depth of the country, the enemy, before beginning the storming, must cover from 20 or 30 to 100 or 150 km of territory saturated with minefields and other unpleasant surprises. the aggressor will have to cross many rivers and streams whose bridges have been destroyed. Before the storming, enemy troops will already have suffered significant casualties in the hundreds of ambushes along the way.

The thirteen fortified regions on the Stalin Line came at a tremendous cost in effort and money. In 1938 it was decided to strengthen all thirteen regions by building within them heavy artillery installations. the construction of eight more regions started. In one year, the new fortified regions counted 1,028 armed field strongholds. en, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. the pact created a common border between Germany and the USSR. In such a threatening atmosphere, Stalin could have done any number of things to increase the safety of the western Soviet borders and guarantee the USSR's neutrality in the war. Instead, in the fall of 1939, at the beginning of World War II, he ordered further construction of fortified regions to stop.⁷ Garrisons in fortified regions on the Stalin Line were the first to be cut back in numbers, and then completely disbanded.

Soviet factories lowered the output of arms and special materials for field stronghold structures. The existing fortified regions were disarmed; their ammunition, weapons, observation instruments, and communication lines were put in storage.⁸ Some buildings were given to the farming associations for use as crop silos. Most were just buried in soil. In addition to lowering the production of arms for fortified regions, Soviet industry, after the start of World War II, stopped producing other defense weapons. For example, the production of anti-tank cannon stopped completely, as well as the 76-mm division cannon, which could be used against tanks.⁹ Anti-tank rifles were taken out of production and out of the supply of the Red Army. they were taken away from all formations and put in storage.¹⁰ Everything connected with defense was mercilessly dismantled and destroyed. At the same time, the Red Army was fighting in Finland, where Stalin and his marshals saw that fortified regions and security pales had tremendous value for defense.

In the summer of 1941, the tragedy of the Stalin Line reached its climax. Wrote General Grigorenko:

“I do not know how future historians will explain this crime against our people. . . . The present ones bypass this occurrence with complete silence, and I myself do not know how to explain it. Many billions of rubles (according to my calculations, more than 120) were taken by the Soviet government from the people to build impassable barriers on the border, from sea to sea, from the grtheyBaltic to the blue Black Sea. And on the eve of the war, the spring of 1941, loud explosions boomed across the 1,200 km of fortifications. The formidable concrete structures, triple, double, and single embrasure firing points, command and observation points—tens of thousands of long-term defense structures were blown up according to a personal order from Stalin.”

Soviet generals and marshals, after Stalin's death, unanimously expressed their anger. Here are the words of Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov: “How could our leadership, without building the necessary defenses on the new western borders of 1939, decide to liquidate and disarm the fortified regions on the old borders?”¹³ In addition, as Marshal M. V. Zakharov declared, it was decided to severely limit or even stop the production of all FR-type weaponry. is is a “red herring” argument used by pro-Communist historians to distract us. theywant us to bemoan the folly of breaking the old fortifications line before the new one was ready. But the relevant question is: why break the old one at all? Two lines surely provide better defense than one. Another pretext is that old fortifications were destroyed in order to move their weapons to the new ones. is is just another set of fallacies. Firstly, the weapons could have been left in the old line, and there had been enough time to order the Soviet industry to supply FRtype weaponry for the new line. But we know that the production of this type of weaponry was reduced immensely in favor of offensive-type arms. Secondly, one does not demolish his old house just to move the furniture to the new one, unless the old house is not needed. With weapons in the fortifications it is exactly the same. irdly, pro-Communist historians hope that we do not remember the chronology of the events: Stalin started to demolish the old line in September 1939, and decided to build the new one only on June 26, 1940. they want us

to believe that the cause came after its consequence. The dates demonstrate that there was no connection between those two events, except for the fact that the Stalin Line was built for a defensive war and the Molotov Line (which they started building in 1940 on the new German-Soviet border) was built for an aggressive war against Germany, as we shall show further on.

The Molotov Line drastically differed from the Stalin Line in design and in detail. There were four main differences between the field strongholds torn down near the old borders and those created near the new ones: the Molotov Line was built so that the enemy could see it; it was built on secondary locations; it was not covered by a security pale, minefields, or other engineered obstacles; and the builders did not use many opportunities available to them to fortify the line, and did not rush to complete their work. Unlike the Stalin Line, the fortified regions of the Molotov Line had very little depth. All that could be built on the very edge of the border was built there. According to Lieutenant General V. F. Zotov, rear defenses were neither built nor planned.¹⁶ New fortifications weren't built on locations tactically valuable for defense, but along the state border, following its twists and bends. New military buildings were not defended by barbwire fences, mines, trenches, or tetrahedrons. There were no engineered obstacles in the construction area. The new constructions were not camouflaged.

At the same time, the German generals were doing the same. Between 1932 and 1937, mighty field strongholds were built on the shores of the Oder River, shielding Germany from strikes from the east. These were first-rate military structures, blended with the landscape and brilliantly camouflaged. I will not describe them in detail, but they are a formidable example of the German preciseness, accuracy, and industriousness. Fortified regions in the area between the Oder and the Warta rivers could serve as examples of the highest achievement of military engineering of the early twentieth century. As soon as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in Moscow and the German army invaded Poland, the magnificent field strongholds near the old German border were abandoned and never again occupied by armies.

Having advanced and met with the Red Army in mid-Poland, the German troops began constructing a new line of fortified regions. They were built on secondary locations and pushed right up to the Soviet borders. In front of the new fortified regions, there were no minefields and no obstacles. The Germans worked night and day, and the Soviet border patrol saw that very clearly.¹⁸ German construction continued until May 1941, after which, to use Soviet language, "construction was rated as a second-class priority." Just like the Red Army! It was because both sides did not plan to defend their new borders for long. In August 1939, Zhukov brilliantly used these rules in Khalkhin-Gol: "With these actions, we strove to make the enemy believe in the absence of any sort of preparations for advance from our side, and to show that we [were] conducting widespread defensive works, and only for defense."¹⁹ The Japanese believed in Zhukov's "defensive" works and paid dearly for their folly. Later, on a much grander scale, Zhukov staged the same deception on the German border. However, he did not fool the German generals.

they had their own identical experience with Poland.

The Stalin Line was universal: it could be used either for defense or for attack—the wide passages between the fortified regions were left intact to let through masses of troops advancing west. When the border was moved a few hundred kilometers west, the Stalin Line completely lost its use as a fortified launching ground for attack, and Stalin did not need it for defense after he signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As a result, the Stalin Line was disarmed and then dismantled: Stalin was not planning to fight on his territory. After Germany got bogged down in a war against Great Britain, Stalin no longer needed the fortified regions in the depths of Soviet territory.

Trotsky Murdered, Molotov in Berlin

Hitler will send his main forces west, and Moscow will want to use the advantages of her position. -Trotsky, June 21, 1939

On August 21, 1940, in Mexico, Leon Trotsky was gruesomely murdered. An agent of the NKVD, Spanish Communist Ramon Mercader (also known as “Jacques Mornar Vandrenin” and “Ramon Ivanovich Lopez”) posed as an idealistic Trotskyite and penetrated Trotsky’s inner circle. Trotsky liked the essays Mercader wrote and the pleasant young admirer became a fixture at Trotsky’s home. On the day of the murder, the two of them were alone in Trotsky’s office. Trotsky was bent over his desk reading an article by Mercader when his guest pulled out an ice-pick from inside his trench coat and crushed Trotsky’s skull with a monstrous blow. Mercader was arrested at the scene of the crime; but he refused to testify. the Mexican court sentenced him to twenty years in prison. On May 6, 1960, three months short of completing his term, he was released for good behavior. Mercader returned to the USSR and was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the “Golden Star,” and the highest governmental award, the Order of Lenin. He was given a position as a researcher at the Marxism- Leninism Institute of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party. At that time, people joked that, after becoming a staff fellow at such a respectable academic institution, Mercader was writing a multi-volume dissertation on the topic of “Alternative Uses for Ice-Picks.”

Some said that Trotsky’s murder had no meaning, that Trotsky had few followers, lived in remote Mexico, and posed no threat. It was said that the murder was Stalin’s personal vendetta and a manifestation of his paranoia. But some ambiguities remained. Why was Trotsky in Mexico in the first place? Trotsky reached the peak of his career in October 1917. Under his leadership, the Bolsheviks engineered the state coup and the takeover of Petrograd (St. Petersburg), the former Russian capital. Trotsky was effectively the founder and leader of the Red Army during the entire Civil War. However, already during the Civil War, he was not the most important man. He shared the top powers with Lenin. Gradually, Trotsky was relegated to secondary roles. His slide from the top accelerated and turned into a rapid fall. By 1923, Trotsky was the head of a leftist opposition within the Communist party, meaning that he was in the minority. By 1927, Trotsky was ousted

from all his posts and deprived of all duties and privileges. On November 7, 1927, Trotsky tried to give a speech in front of a column of demonstrators headed for Red Square, but he was pelted with empty bottles and stones. Killing Trotsky was not a challenge. There would have been plenty of volunteers. Why didn't Stalin kill Trotsky then?

In early 1928, Stalin exiled Trotsky to Kazakhstan. A year later, he sent Trotsky to Turkey. Again, we ask: what for? In Kazakhstan, Trotsky was completely isolated and fully monitored by Stalin's secret police. The Soviet Union's borders were hermetically sealed, and running out of the country was extremely difficult. For Trotsky, it would have been completely impossible, since he was under constant surveillance. He could not run away from Stalin. He did not even exhibit any desire to do so. As a political opponent, Trotsky was completely disarmed. He had no power strings, no influence, no money, and no means of communication. No one published anything he wrote. His letters were checked, detained for several months, and in most cases simply disappeared.

Human nature is such that people befriend those who are rich and powerful, but when someone falls from the top to the bottom of the power ladder, the number of his friends and supporters falls drastically. Suddenly volunteers appear to kick yesterday's boss. Stalin exterminated millions whom he considered to be his enemies or potential enemies. Stalin sent his opponents to Siberia, to the Far East, to Kazakhstan, to Sakhalin and Kolyma, or directly to the execution cellars. Only one enemy, Trotsky, the most significant one, Stalin brought out of Kazakhstan and sent to the heavenly islands in Turkey's Sea of Marmara. If Trotsky had been dangerous, Stalin could have isolated him the same way he isolated Lenin in the last years of his life.¹ Trotsky could have perished on the operating table, like Michael Frunze, who replaced Trotsky as the leader of the Red Army, in 1925. Trotsky could have drowned in a lake, like Efraim Skliansky, Trotsky's deputy commander of the Red Army during the Civil War, in 1925.

In Kazakhstan, Trotsky could not publish anything. By letting Trotsky go free, Stalin gave him the opportunity to say and write anything he wanted, including the most horrible things about Stalin. Why did Stalin postpone Trotsky's murder for so long? In the 1930s, Stalin accused all his enemies in the country of being Trotskyites. Trotskyites and those who were branded Trotskyites were executed by the thousands or sent to the camps by the thousands. Meanwhile, Trotsky himself was free. He lived on islands of fantastic beauty in Turkey, then in the south of France, in Norway, and finally in Mexico. Then, all of a sudden, the hunt for Trotsky began.

Did Stalin's paranoia increase? No. On the eve and at the very beginning of World War II, Trotsky presented a clear and imminent danger not only to Stalin, but to the entire Soviet leadership. Trotsky fanatically supported the World Revolution. Once he realized that it had failed in Germany and throughout the world he warned that Soviet Russia could not survive encircled by capitalist states. The only hope was to turn Soviet Russia into a military camp and use its forces to aid revolutions whenever and wherever an opportunity appeared. Stalin insisted that Trotsky was wrong and the Soviet Union first had to build "Socialism in One Country," the Soviet Union would not export revolution.

When Stalin took more radical measures than Trotsky had proposed to turn the Soviet Union into a military camp. He carried out forced collectivization and industrialization, and built the GULAG camps for forced labor. Under Stalin the Soviet Union became an industrial power and the military base for World Revolution. Summing up, Trotsky loudly called for the World Communist Revolution. Stalin acted to achieve the same goal, but said that Trotsky's slogans were wrong.

Stalin's rhetoric was successful and duped Trotsky, who thought he was exposing Stalin when he declared to the world that Stalin had betrayed the cause of Communism and World Revolution. Trotsky did not understand that criticism was necessary for Stalin and was part of his plan. With his accusations, Trotsky dulled the fears of the West that Stalin would pursue World Revolution. Trotsky claimed that there was no reason to fear Stalin, that Stalin was "the greatest mediocrity in power," and that his regime would implode from within. "Stalin's personal dictatorship clearly nears its sunset," Trotsky said in November 1931. us, with Trotsky's dubious endorsement, the West helped Stalin to create a powerful military industry, and to prepare his country and army to crush Western civilization.

Trotsky's opinion had credibility for Western politicians; after all, he had played a key role in the revolution, the Civil War, and the establishment of the Red Army. Trotsky launched the World Revolution, but he lost power. Stalin, if one believed Trotsky, was not instigating revolution but building socialism in one country, the Soviet Union. Stalin let Trotsky leave the Soviet Union and provided him with publicity around the world. Contact with Trotsky was a standard accusation against so called "enemies of the people" at every political trial in Moscow. Stalin could have called his enemies any number of names, but he stubbornly called them Trotskyites, giving Trotsky additional political weight. If Trotsky had asserted the opposite, if he had said that Stalin was preparing for aggression, if he had warned the West of the dangers of Stalin's malice, he would have been murdered as early as 1927.

Gradually, Trotsky sensed Stalin's true intentions. He stopped writing that Stalin had betrayed the cause of the World Revolution and started writing that Hitler had come to power with Stalin's help. "Without Stalin, there would be no Hitler," said Trotsky. "Hitler was preparing for war. . . . the strike against the West in the near or far future could only be realized in the conditions of a military alliance between Fascist Germany and Stalin."

On September 4, 1939, Trotsky reminded the world that "the Kremlin had fed oil to the Italian campaign into Abyssinia," and now it fed oil to Hitler's war against Europe. Trotsky asked why the pact of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Germany had turned into war. "Is it unclear why Hitler began the advance on Poland immediately after the embraces between Ribbentrop and Molotov? Stalin knew very well what he was doing. For an attack against Poland and a war against England and France, Hitler needed favorable "neutrality" from the USSR, plus Soviet raw materials. the political and economic agreement provides Hitler with one and the other."

At that point Trotsky stopped being useful to Stalin, and Stalin decided to get rid of him. Moreover, Trotsky had become dangerous. He warned Great Britain and France that the root of all evil was not Hitler, but Stalin. Without Stalin's "neutrality" toward Hitler, without Soviet petroleum, chrome, tin, nickel, platinum, iron ore, cotton, grain, manganese, copper, vanadium, molybdenum, and tungsten, Hitler could not have unleashed the war in Europe. But Trotsky warned Hitler as well. Back in June 1939, when very few people in the world had any idea that in a couple of months World War II would start, Trotsky exhibited amazing foresight when he wrote: "Hitler is going to strike to the west with his main forces and Moscow will be eager to fully take advantage of the situation."

On November 12, 1940, Soviet foreign minister Molotov arrived in Berlin and presented to Hitler a long list of territorial claims on behalf of the Soviet Union. These demands were repeated on November 25, 1940, when the Soviet Union proposed a peace pact between Germany, Italy, Japan, and the USSR. The Soviet Union demanded:

From Finland: Pechenga, the only Finnish port on the Barents Sea, and Porkkala-Udd, the strategically located peninsula on the Baltic Sea controlling the entrance to the Gulf of Finland;

- naval bases on the Danish side of the straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak, controlling access to the North Sea and to the Baltic Sea;
- from Yugoslavia: a naval base on the Adriatic Sea;
- from Greece: a naval base in the Greek port of Saloniki;
- from Romania: the province of Southern Bukovina, a strategic foothold in the Carpathian Mountains to control access to the Ploesti oil fields;
- from Bulgaria: a pact of alliance with the Soviet Union including Bulgaria in the Soviet sphere of influence;
- from Turkey: bases in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits;
- from Iran: bases in the Persian Gulf;
- the transfer of territories south of the Baku-Batumi line (in eastern Turkey, north of Iraq and Iran) to the Soviet sphere of influence;
- from Japan: the renunciation of its oil concessions in the province of Northern Sakhalin.

Hitler and his officials were dumbfounded by such extraordinary demands and did not respond. On November 13, 1940, Molotov asked Stalin for instructions "about China, Turkey, and our interests regarding the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea."⁷ Stalin advised Molotov: "Do not expose our interest in Persia. . . . If the Germans suggest a division of Turkey, you can show our cards."⁸ In this correspondence, Stalin "suggested" to Molotov to obtain Germany's consent for another self-serving step to be taken by the Soviet Union. He told Molotov to advise Hitler that the Soviet proposal for an alliance with the Axis powers would "not be possible without a guarantee of our control of Bulgaria and the passage of our troops into Bulgaria."

For a drawn-out war, Hitler needed tremendous quantities of strategic raw materials,

which Stalin could provide. During the meeting, Molotov repeatedly reminded Hitler that without Soviet raw materials German victories in Europe would have been impossible: "The current status would not have been achieved without the influence of the German-Russian agreement [of August 1939] on the great German victories." "As far as Germany is concerned, these [1939] agreements secured a safe rear for Germany and played a major role in the development of a military campaign in the West, including France's defeat."¹ "Germany, not without the help of the pact with the USSR, was able so quickly and with military glory to execute its operations in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, and France."

Stalin twisted Hitler's arms. Trotsky predicted that Stalin "would want to fully use the advantage of his position." at was precisely what Stalin did. Hitler told Molotov that Germany had conquered so much territory in one year of war that it would need a hundred years to develop it. He offered: if space was needed, Germany and the Soviet Union could both move to the south of their borders. Molotov agreed with the proposal, but added that they had to discuss the issue of the Danish straits Store Baelte and Lille Baelte, as well as the straits between Denmark and Sweden and Norway, Sund, Kattegat, and Skagerrak. For the Germans, these straits were a strategic necessity, since they already occupied Denmark. Why would the Soviet Union need them? Hitler told Molotov: "While the war is going on, Germany is extremely interested in receiving nickel and timber from Finland." Hitler wanted to know whether the Soviet Union was preparing a war against Finland. If so, could it be postponed to a later date? Molotov answered that Finland was in the Soviet sphere of influence and that Germany had to remove its troops from Finland. Molotov "did not understand why Russia had to postpone the realization of its plans by six months or even a year. After all, the German-Russian pact did not contain any time limits and within their respective spheres of influence neither of the countries had its hands tied."

The Soviet Union had enough oil for both internal consumption and export. the Soviet Union did not need Romanian oil, while Hitler talked about Germany's complete dependency on Romanian petroleum, asserting that Germany would defend the Romanian oil industry at any cost. Hitler hinted that the Soviet Union should move away from Romanian oil. The Soviet Union had already taken over Northern Bukovina. With that invasion, the Soviet Union violated the pact about the division of the spheres of influence. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union did indeed take something from Romania, and did indeed violate the previously reached agreement with Germany. But the Soviet Union would not give up what it got; moreover, Stalin wanted Southern Bukovina and Bulgaria. "The fate of Romania and Hungary also interests the Soviet Union, and under no condition can it ever be indifferent to it."

Hitler reminded Molotov that they had agreed about the division of Europe back in August 1939. Molotov responded that it was time for a new division of Europe that would give an advantage to the Soviet Union. "The USSR considers last year's agreement fulfilled, with the exception of the question of Finland. . . . Now it is time to talk about a

broader agreement between the USSR and Germany.”¹⁴ Further discussions were in the same tone. During the course of the talks, Molotov did not raise questions about the security of the Soviet Union. Hitler brought up questions of safety from a Soviet invasion of territory crucial to Germany, but he did not receive any satisfactory reply. On the morning of November 14, 1940, Molotov left for Moscow. On November 25, the German ambassador to Moscow was told that Germany had to withdraw its troops from Finnish territory immediately. In addition, all the claims Molotov had made in his talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop were confirmed, even the demand to create Soviet bases on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.¹⁵ On the same day, November 25, 1940, the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, and the Chief of General Staff of the Red Army, General K. A. Meretskov, wrote a directive to prepare a plan for a new war of aggression against Finland.

Hitler was preparing for a big war against Great Britain when Stalin demanded new territories in Europe—territories on which Germany’s economy and armed forces depended completely. If a war against Britain weakened Germany, what would Stalin demand? Hitler found an answer to all of Stalin’s demands. “After Molotov’s departure, Hitler gathered his most trusted subordinates and clearly let them understand that he planned to invade Russia.”

Kremlin Games

A conference of the High Command of the Red Army began on December 23, 1940. It lasted nine days and ended on the evening of December 31. The highest-ranking leaders of the Red Army—274 marshals, generals, and admirals—attended. Zhukov delivered the first and most important lecture on new tactics of sudden attack. Furthermore, most of the other speakers discussed only that subject. For example, Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov, Chief of Staff of the Baltic special military district, who spoke following Zhukov’s lecture, talked about special operations: “These will be operations of the starting phase, when the enemy’s armies have not yet completed their concentration and are not prepared for deployment. These are operations of invasion, for carrying out a whole chain of special tasks. . . . This is use of large air and, perhaps, mechanized forces, while the enemy has not yet prepared for decisive action. . . . The mechanized forces will have to be used independently, and they will solve the tasks of invasion into enemy territory.”

Colonel General of Tank Troops D. G. Pavlov, commander of the Western special military district, delivered the lecture titled “The use of mechanized units in contemporary offensive operations and breakthrough by mechanized corps.” The lecture titled “The Character of Contemporary Defensive Operations” was given by General of the Army I. V. Tulenev, commander of the Moscow military district. So, the questions dealing with defense were examined after all! Here is what Tulenev had to say in his lecture: “We have no established contemporary defense theory.”⁵ This was the truth. Until December 1940, Soviet military theory did not work on questions of defense. After December, it

did not work on them either. Tulenev said that such a theory was unnecessary. The goal was to conduct grandiose sudden offensive operations on enemy territory, and therefore to amass huge forces in narrow areas.

In the conclusive speech, the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko reminded his audience to keep in mind "the possibility of the simultaneous conduct of two, maybe even three, offensive operations on different fronts in the theater of war, with the purpose of strategically shaking up the enemy's defense capabilities as widely as possible."⁷ Defense at the primary locations was not foreseen, even theoretically.

The conference of the High Command of the Red Army ended at 6 PM on December 31, 1940. Most of the participants were urgently and secretly sent back to their posts. Only the most important generals remained in Moscow. Even before the conference was over, at 11 AM on December 31, a group of forty-nine of the highest-ranking generals received instructions for a strategic staff game on maps. The maps denoted battles between the "Easterners" and "Westerners." The scope and importance of this game was the largest of all the prewar years.⁸ Pavlov, the Commander of the Western special military district, commanded the "Easterners," or the Soviet troops. Zhukov, Commander of the Kiev special military district, led the "Westerners," meaning the German troops. Pavlov's group had twenty-four generals, one rear-admiral, one navy captain of the first rank, one navy captain of the second rank, and one colonel. Zhukov's group, which played the role of the German command, had twenty generals, admirals, and officers besides Zhukov. The first strategic game began on the morning of January 2, 1941, at the General Staff of the Red Army. The scenario of the future war was being played out. The supervisor of the game was Timoshenko, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. The referees of the game consisted of twelve top commanders of the Red Army, including four Marshals of the Soviet Union. The observers included Joseph Stalin and the entire Politburo. A colossal battle raged on the giant maps. For the time being just on the maps, the two most powerful armies on the planet clashed. For several days and nights, without rest or sleep, the staffs of the two opposing sides evaluated situations, made decisions, gave orders and directions. For now just on paper, thousands of tanks and airplanes, tens of thousands of guns and mortars, and millions of soldiers were brought into battle. Hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, and engineering and medical equipment were dispatched from the rear. Divisions, corps, and entire armies were going for the breakthrough. Soviet strategists were not working on any defense plans and not making any plans for rebutting a possible German aggression. They were thinking of a way to take Koenigsberg, Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, Krakow, and Budapest. Soviet preparations for the invasion of Europe neared their final stage.

The game was called "Offensive Operation of the Front with Breaks through the Fortified Regions." The theme was not simply an attack, but an attack on Germany and more precisely on Eastern Prussia, which was defended by a line of fortified regions. The attacker was the Soviet troops on the northwestern front, under Pavlov's leadership. Pavlov delivered the blow to Eastern Prussia, to Koenigsberg, and Zhukov defended it.

The Communist leaders openly said that the war would be conducted only on enemy territory, as the popular Soviet antebellum song said: "And on enemy land we will crush the enemy, shedding little [of our] blood and by a powerful blow." they had in mind a "deep penetration," that is, a blitzkrieg. But this frankness always followed the condition that the enemy would force us into war. the Field Statute clearly stated that if the enemy attacked, the Red Army would transform itself into the most ferocious attacker of any aggressive armies.

It happened that Germany attacked precisely when the Red Army had everything ready to invade it. In November 1939, Stalin concentrated five armies on the Finnish border, got them ready, and then the Finns, as if on command, supposedly fired several cannon shells. Soviet newspapers exploded with rage: "We will repel the Finnish invasion!" "We will respond to the aggressor's blow with a threefold one!" "We will destroy the band of pests!" Preparations for attacking Germany followed the same rules. Stalin's strategists, with a mysterious smile on their lips, said that if the enemy forced them into war, they would have to retaliate on enemy territory.

The tasks for the strategy game were designed according to that principle:

1. On July 15, 1941, Germany attacks the Soviet Union.
2. German troops force their way 70 to 120 km into Soviet territory, but . . .
3. . . . by August 1, 1941, they are thrown back to their original positions.⁹

The scenarios of how the "Westerners" attacked, how the Soviet army managed to throw them back and get them off Soviet territory, were not played in the game. It was just mentioned that the Germans attacked and then the Red Army drove them back to the state border. the strategic game began precisely then, when there were no enemy troops on the Soviet soil. the "retaliatory actions" of the Red Army in Eastern Prussia began from that point. the German invasion of Soviet territory and the repelling of aggression did not interest Stalin, Zhukov, and the rest. they were interested in the conduct of assault operations from the border. the leadership concluded that "unfolding the main forces of the Red Army in the West and grouping the main forces against Eastern Prussia and in the direction of Warsaw brings about serious fears that the struggle on this front can turn into protracted fighting."

The actions of German and Soviet generals were almost mirror images of each other. One month earlier, the Germans played the same games. the gap in time between the actions of Soviet and German commanders was slowly decreasing. On November 29, 1940, a large strategic game on maps began in Berlin. the supervisor of the game was Major General Friedrich Paulus, the First Ober-Kvartirmeister of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. In Moscow, there had been two games, in Berlin only one, but it was divided into three stages: first, the invasion by German troops of Russian territory, and battles on the border; second, the German advance to the Minsk-Kiev Line; third, the conclusion of the war and destruction of the Red Army's last reserves, if such were found to the east of the Minsk-Kiev Line. The Germans didn't work out how they would

reach Kursk, Moscow, and Stalingrad. the generals thought that one blow would bring down the entire Soviet Union and send the Red Army on the run. In Berlin, a debriefing followed each stage of the game. the main debriefing of all stages of the game ended on December 13, 1940. Nineteen days later, the strategic games in Moscow began, the second of which, as we know now, ended on January 11, 1941.

History is written by the victors. the Red Army seized the archives of the Wehrmacht Heer, and Soviet historians demonstrated the aggressiveness of German imperialism to the rest of the world, exposing their terrible plans. Meanwhile, Soviet archives were carefully locked. is gave the Communist propagandists and agitators the opportunity to say that Soviet generals, admirals, marshals, and Stalin himself suffered from a chronic love of peace.¹¹ However, that love of peace was only pretence. the Soviet generals did not sleep. Like their German peers, they prepared an invasion.

We need Oil!

Hitler and Stalin both understood perfectly well what the expression “oil is the blood of war” meant. Colonel General A. Jodl testified that, in an argument with Guderian, Hitler declared: “You want to invade without oil—well, we shall see what comes out of this.” As early as 1927, Stalin took seriously the problems of the impending World War II. On December 3, 1927, he said: “It is impossible to fight without oil, and he who has the advantage in terms of oil has the chance of victory in the impending war.”³ In June 1940, when nobody was threatening the Soviet Union, tens of Soviet river military ships appeared in the Danube delta. at step had no defensive value, but was a threat to the unprotected Romanian oil routes and consequently a deadly threat to Germany. In July 1940, Hitler conducted intensive consultations with his generals and concluded that it was not at all easy to defend Romania: the supply routes extended all over and passed through the mountains. If a huge number of German troops were transferred to defend Romania, western Poland and eastern Germany, including Berlin, would be exposed to a Soviet attack. If a lot of troops were concentrated in Romania and tried to keep it at any cost, it would not help: the territory perhaps would be retained, but oil fields would still burn up from bombings and artillery fire. In July 1940, Hitler for the first time said that the Soviet Union could be dangerous, especially if German troops left the continent for the British Isles and Africa. On November 13, 1940, in a conversation with Molotov, Hitler indicated the necessity to retain a huge number of German troops in Romania, obviously hinting that the Soviet military posed a threat to Romanian oil.⁴ Molotov ignored the hint. After Molotov’s departure in December, Hitler issued a directive for the preparation of Operation Barbarossa.

In June 1940, when the German army was fighting in France, Zhukov, on Stalin’s orders and without consulting the German allies, brought river warships to the Danube delta. Hitler asked the head of the Soviet government to divert the Soviet threat from the oil heart of Germany. Stalin and Molotov refused.

A fortnight after Hitler's invasion of the USSR, on July 7, 1941, Stalin sent a telegram to the commander of the southern front, General I. V. Tulenev. In the telegram, Stalin demanded that the Soviet Union retain Bessarabia at any cost, "having in mind that we need the Bessarabian territory as a springboard for organizing our invasion."⁵ Hitler had already delivered his sudden blow, but Stalin still did not think of defense—his main concern was organizing an invasion from Bessarabia, meaning an attack on the Romanian oil fields. The invasion of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union and the concentration there of powerful aggressive forces, including the paratroops corps and the Danube flotilla, forced Hitler to look at the strategic situation from a completely different perspective and to take preemptive measures. But it was already too late. Even the sudden attack of the Wehrmacht Heer on the Soviet Union could not save Hitler and his empire.

Mountain Divisions on the Steppes of Ukraine

In the declaration made by the German government to the Soviets at the start of the war, reasons were listed for the German attack against the Soviet Union. Among them was the unjustified concentration of Soviet troops on Romanian borders, which presented a clear danger to Germany. Let's pay attention to the mountain rifle divisions in the 9th Army. the 9th Army was located on the Romanian border, and its headquarters was in Odessa. There are no mountains in the Odessa military district. the 30th Irkutsk Mountain Rifle Division of the 9th Army could be used only in Romania. There were plenty of mountains there. It is not at all coincidental that this division (commanded by Major General S. G. Galaktionov) was part of the 48th Rifle Corps of Major General Malinovsky, the most aggressive corps commander on the entire southern front. the 48th Rifle Corps was in the flank of the 9th Army which was closest to the front. If the 9th "Shock" Army moved to Romania, then most of the army would be fighting on flat land, while its right flank would scratch at the mountain chain.⁵ For this situation, it was most reasonable to have one mountain-rifle division, and precisely on the rightmost flank, which was exactly what was done. Let's examine another army, which was a carbon copy of the 9th Army. Formally, it was called just the 12th Army. It had one mechanized and two rifle corps, and other units. It had nine divisions, including two tank divisions and one motorized division. It was indistinguishable in number, name, and composition from other similar invasion armies. It had been set up specifically for the "liberation crusade" of the Red Army into Poland.⁶ It then had a tank corps, two cavalry corps, and two rifle divisions. It had little artillery and infantry, because there was no need here to break through a powerful defense. To the contrary, it had mobile troops necessary for a fast advance.

Its subsequent fate was also typical. After the "liberation" campaign in Poland, the army stayed on the German border. Later, the 12th Army underwent the same transformation as all adjacent invasion armies. Its main strike mechanism was no longer called a tank corps, but a mechanized corps, to allay the fears of the leaders of neighboring countries. the deletion of the word "tank" from the corps' name was followed by an increase in

the number of tanks in the army. the cavalry was taken away from it. Its capacity for disrupting the enemy's defenses was increased.

The unusual feature of the 12th Army was its ethnic composition. When Stalin was preparing to invade Poland in 1939, he filled the 12th Army with Ukrainians, apparently bearing in mind the long-standing animosity between Poles and Ukrainians. the army was formed in Ukraine. Therefore, the reservists were also drawn from there, and they formed a solid majority in the 12th Army. Far-reaching changes had already taken place in 1940. Ethnic Russians were appointed to ktheyposts to mask the army's unusual ethnic composition. Marshal of the Soviet Union Bagramian, then a colonel responsible for planning the military operations of the 12th Army, said: "When I was studying the operational plans, I was struck by the following fact—our frontier army had neither a deployment nor a border-protection plan." The colonel's words demonstrate that the safe of the operations branch of the 12th Army contained plans. they were complex documents that had to be studied. Yet among those war plans there were none for defense.

Bagramian also described training exercises of the 12th Army attended by General Zhukov. Only offensive tactics were worked on, and on the maps the war took place on German territory. the game began with Soviet troops crossing the border river San. The military game was against a real enemy and it involved top secret intelligence information. Differences arose between Zhukov and the army commander. Commander of the 12th Army General Parusinov insisted: "We must do our best to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy with our first strike."

Zhukov wasn't interested in the mountain passes because of defense. If he had wanted to make the passes impassable to the enemy, he would have sent his troops to the mountains, dug up all mountain paths and roads, and built reinforced concrete fortifications near the passes, instead of right alongside the border river. It would have been more economical; the enemy could not have observed the construction work and would have been unable to cross the passes. But would anyone really attack the Soviet Union across mountain ranges when there were plenty of open spaces? The mountains were exceptionally important to the Soviet command. Germany was separated from her main source of oil by a double barrier of mountains, in Czechoslovakia and Romania. A Soviet strike across the passes in Czechoslovakia or Romania would effectively cut the oil artery. Marshal Zhukov wrote: "Germany's weak spot was oil supply, but it made up for this to some extent by importing oil from Romania."⁹ the experiments in the mountains continued. the capabilities of each kind of troops and every type of combat and transport vehicle, operating in the conditions which prevailed in the Carpathian passes, were carefully studied. Standards were established and carefully checked, and guidance was compiled for the troops. the time taken by various types of vehicle to negotiate these mountain passes was carefully recorded and analyzed. the collected information, of course, was crucial for the planning of offensive operations, especially lightning operations.

The mountain rifle divisions were reinforced with specially selected and trained soldiers. ese divisions were transferred to a special personnel composition, very different from the

regular rifle divisions; they received special weapons and equipment. Just before the war began, a school for mountain training was established in the Caucasus. It trained the best Soviet mountain sportsmen and climbers to be military instructors. Once fully trained, these instructors were sent to the Soviet western frontier, since it was precisely here, and not in the Caucasus or Turkestan, that in June 1941 a great number of mountain rifle troops were concentrated. It is time to ask: for which mountains? There is only one comparatively small mountain range on the Soviet western frontier. The eastern Carpathians resemble gently sloping hills rather than mountains. There was no point in having a powerful defense in the eastern Carpathians in 1941. First, that area of the Carpathians was dangerous and unfavorable for an aggressor coming from west to east. The enemy would come down from the mountains to the plains, and its army would have to be supplied across the whole of the eastern Carpathian, the Tatry, the Erzgebirge, and the Sudeten mountains. Second, the northern slope of the eastern Carpathians formed a blunt wedge on the enemy's side of the frontier.

If many Soviet troops were concentrated there for defensive purposes, even in peacetime, they would be surrounded by the enemy on three sides. By using the plains farther to the south, and especially more to the north of the eastern Carpathians, the enemy could strike at any time at the rest of the troops deployed on the mountains, thereby cutting their supply lines. Third, in 1941, there were too few enemy troops in the Carpathian Mountains to carry out an aggression, and the Soviet High Command was fully aware of this.

The concentration of two Soviet mountain armies in the eastern Carpathians had catastrophic consequences. Nobody attacked these armies in the mountains. The German 1st Tank Group carried out its strike in the plain to the north of the eastern Carpathians, bypassing the mountains and cutting off the Soviet mountain armies from the main forces. The Soviet command confronted a dilemma: should they leave the two mountain armies in the Carpathian Mountains, where they would perish without a supply of ammunition and food, or should they urgently be led out of that mousetrap? They made the second choice. The two mountain armies, unprepared to fight in the plains, having light weapons and a lot of equipment useless in a flat area, fled from the mountains and immediately fell under attack from the German tank units. Having easily destroyed the fleeing Soviet mountain armies, the 1st Tank Group of the German army went ahead full speed and reached the rear of the Soviet 9th Army and defeated it. Once the German troops had dealt with those armies, the road opened to the totally undefended bases of the Soviet navy, to the Don basin, Kharkov, Zaporozhie, and Dnepropetrovsk. These were industrial regions of great importance. Once they were lost to the Germans, the Soviet Union produced only 100,000 tanks for the rest of the war, which was much more than Germany, but without the losses of these regions, the Soviet tank production could have been several times higher. When the Germans broke through to the south of Ukraine, the Soviet troops around Kiev found themselves in a very dangerous position. The Germans had cleared the road to the Caucasus and to Stalingrad—the heart of Soviet oil production.

Stalin in May

On May 4, 1941, Stalin became chairman of the Soviet government, replacing Molotov who became deputy chairman. At that time, many British and American politicians and diplomats were confused by that turn of events. For the first time in Soviet history, the top party and government leadership was officially concentrated in one man's hands. In 1922, having assumed the position of general secretary of the Communist Party, Stalin refused to take any government positions. Stalin elevated his command post above the government and above the country. Officially, he was responsible for nothing. All successes were attributed to Stalin. All failures were attributed to his enemies, careerists who took advantage of and distorted the orders of Stalin the genius. the "victory of the collectivization" was a creation of Stalin's genius, while millions perished from hunger because of the mistakes of regional level functionaries. Stalin officially had no ties to the Great Purge— Ezhov, the People's Commissar for Interior Affairs, shouldered the whole blame. at period was derogatorily called Ezhovshchina. It wasn't Stalin who signed a pact with Hitler. the treaty entered history as the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact. In Germany, the responsibility for the pact was borne not so much by Ribbentrop as by Adolf Hitler, the chancellor, though he was not present when the pact was signed. But Stalin, who was present at the signing, had no government position at that moment. On April 13, 1941, a pact was signed with Japan: Stalin was present, but again, did not shoulder any responsibility. Hitler many times invited Stalin to a personal meeting in a friendly atmosphere. But Stalin sent Molotov to meet Hitler.

Then, when the victors were clearly defined, Stalin, of course, personally met with Churchill and Roosevelt. During the course of talks at the highest level, Stalin never said no. Molotov did it for him. He even received the nickname "Mr. No." All demands came from Molotov, all concessions from Stalin. Simply put, Stalin did good with his hands, and evil with the hands of others. ose who did evil on Stalin's orders carried the responsibility, while Stalin remained clean.

The Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov testified: "When Stalin took on the duties of Chairman of the People's Commissars Council, the system of leadership practically did not change."² If practically nothing changed, why did Stalin need the new title? "Meanwhile, all of Stalin's deeds and crimes were focused, logical and calculated."

What could Stalin, using his new official title of head of the government, undertake regarding Germany? There were three possibilities: establish an unshakeable peace with Germany; officially lead an armed struggle against German aggression; or officially lead a sudden attack on Germany. The first possibility can be ruled out immediately, because Molotov had already signed a peace pact with Germany. Stalin continued to use Molotov for peace talks. It is known that even on June 21, 1941, Molotov tried to meet with German leaders, while Stalin made no such attempts. The second possibility also doesn't withstand examination. Stalin could not have assumed leadership in anticipation of a German attack, simply because he did not foresee it. In the first day of the war, the head

of the government should have addressed the people and told them the terrible news. But Stalin avoided fulfilling his duties, and on June 22 Molotov spoke to the people. Why would Stalin sit in Molotov's chair in May, only to hide behind his back in June? In a defensive war, Stalin used his well-tested method of ruling the country: he took all important decisions, but the responsibility for them was borne by Molotov, Malenkov, Timoshenko, and Zhukov. Only a month later did the members of the Politburo force Stalin to take the official post of People's Commissar for Defense, and on August 8 the post of Supreme Commander in Chief. Would Stalin, "foreseeing a defensive war," have taken a high leadership position, just to shun all responsibility as soon as such a war started? We are left with the third explanation: Stalin had crushed Europe using Hitler's hands, and was preparing a sudden attack against Germany. Stalin planned to personally lead the "liberation" as the head of the government of the USSR.

The Communist Party prepared the Soviet people and army for the fact that the command to begin a "war of liberation" in Europe would be given personally by Stalin. Pravda wrote on August 18, 1940: "And when the Marshal of the Revolution comrade Stalin gives the signal, hundreds of thousands of pilots, navigators, [and] paratroopers will descend upon the enemy's head with all the might of their arms, the arms of socialist justice. the Soviet air force will bring happiness to mankind!" Similar statements filled the pages of Krasnaya Zvezda and all other Soviet newspapers and magazines.

Upon entering into office, every head of state declares his agenda. Stalin did so as well. Only Stalin gave his speech, which could be counted as an agenda, in the tight inner circle of the highest Red Army commanders, behind closed doors. On May 5, 1941, the day after his appointment as head of state, Stalin spoke in the Kremlin at a reception in honor of graduates from the military academies. the audience in the convention hall of the Great Kremlyovski Palace, where he gave the speech, consisted of graduates, professors, and teachers from sixteen academies of the Red Army and nine faculties of civilian universities, as well as representatives of the Red Army and the Fleet High Command (including the People's Commissars in both organizations and the Chief of General Staff). Stalin arrived, followed by members, actual and potential, of the Politburo (except for N. S. Khrushchev, who was holding a Central Committee plenary meeting in Kiev). the audience numbered two thousand people. Stalin spoke for forty minutes. Considering Stalin's capability for silence, forty minutes was an extraordinarily long time. Stalin did not speak before graduates of military academies every year. There were only two such occasions. the first time had been in 1935. the Great Purge was secretly being planned when Stalin told the graduates of military academies that "cadres determine everything." The meaning of Stalin's words was simple: for great feats, the country needed good teams; good commanders would solve all problems, but without them, everything would be lost. It is doubtful that anyone at the time understood the meaning of Stalin's words. But Stalin had in mind nothing less than the complete extermination of almost all of the Communist hierarchy—state, party, military, technical, scientific, cultural, and all others. Stalin planned almost a complete transformation of the leading layer of the country.

Almost everyone who listened to Stalin's speech in 1935 in two years landed in torture chambers and execution cellars.

In May 1941, Stalin for the second time spoke before graduates of military academies. Now, a more serious and dark deed was being planned, because this time Stalin's speech was given in secrecy. Stalin spoke about the situation in Europe, the war, and Germany. In his usual manner, Stalin posed questions and then answered them. Was it true that the German army was invincible? is question was repeated in Stalin's speech three times. Stalin's answer was no. Stalin said that Germany fought under the flag of conquering other nations. Under that flag, Germany would not be successful. Stalin asked why Germany lost World War I. Because it fought on two fronts, he answered. is was a very direct hint. Stalin led his audience to a logical conclusion: Germany fought Great Britain, which was backed by the United States. If the Soviet Union opened a second front, Germany would be defeated, just as it was during World War I.

I have in my possession the unpublished memoirs of Major General of the Air Force M. V. Vodopianov, who was the very first Hero of the Soviet Union. According to Vodopianov's memoirs, the listeners correctly understood Stalin's hints, and the room was filled with applause and cheer. the General Secretary of the Comintern, the Bulgarian Communist Georgyi Dimitrov, wrote in his diary that Stalin at that moment was in an extremely good mood. During the banquet that followed his speech, Stalin twice made a toast: the first was to the commanders and the professors from the military academies, the second to the health of artillerymen, tankers, and aviators.⁵ A third toast deserved special attention. It was given by Lieutenant General A. K. Sivkov, who toasted Stalin's peaceful foreign policy. Stalin intervened:

"Allow me to make a correction. A peaceful foreign policy secured peace in our country. A peaceful foreign policy is a good thing. For a while, we drew a line of defenses until we re-armed our army [and] supplied it with modern means of combat. Now, when our army has been rebuilt, our technology modernized, [now that we are] strong [enough] for combat, now we must shift from defense to offense. In conducting the defense of our country, we are compelled to act in an aggressive manner. From defense we have to shift to a military policy of offense. It is indispensable that we reform our training, our propaganda, our press to a mindset of offense. the Red Army is a modern army, and the modern army is an army of offense."

On May 5, 1941, Stalin made it perfectly clear to his generals that there would be a war with Germany and that the Soviet Union would be the aggressor. It is interesting to note that a few days after the celebration in the Kremlin, Lieutenant General Sivkov, who made a toast to Stalin's peaceful foreign policy, was discharged.

In March 1939, Stalin publicly accused Great Britain and France of wanting to draw all of Europe into war, while they stayed on the sidelines and would later "enter the scene with fresh forces, fight, of course, 'in the interests of peace,' and dictate their terms to the weakened participants of the war."⁸ In the same speech, Stalin for the first time declared

that the international arena needed to prepare for “surprises.” In August 1939, Stalin presented the first “surprise,” which stunned not only the Soviet people, but the entire world, the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact. On September 1, 1939, a week after this pact, Germany invaded Poland. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army suddenly attacked the rear of the Polish army. the following day, the Soviet government proclaimed on the radio the cause for the attack: “Poland [has become] a convenient staging ground for any unanticipated events that might create a threat to the USSR. . . . the Soviet government can no longer hold a neutral position towards these facts. . . . In light of such a situation, the Soviet government [has] issued orders to the High Command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the border and take under their defenses the lives and property of the population.”

Stalin’s propaganda could not conceal its joy that Germany was destroying more and more countries, governments, armies, and political parties. the Soviet leadership was ecstatic: Pravda declared it “[m]odern warfare in all its terrible glory!” A description of Europe at war read: “a pile of corpses, a pornographic sight, where hyenas eat hyenas.” On the same page of Pravda, there was a friendly telegram from Stalin to Hitler. Suddenly, everything changed. May 1941 saw a sharp turn in all Soviet propaganda. Here is Pravda’s tone on the day after Stalin’s secret speech: “Beyond the borders of our Motherland burns the flame of the Second Imperialist War. All the burden of its countless calamities falls on the shoulders of the workers. the people do not want war. their eyes are looking toward the land of socialism, which reaps the fruits of peaceful labor. they rightfully see in the armed forces of our Motherland—in the Red Army and Fleet—a reliable bulwark of peace. In the current tumultuous world situation we must be ready for all surprises.” The same tone and the same words were used in September 1939, when the Red Army suddenly attacked the rear of the Polish army and “helped the Polish people to get out of the war.”

June 13, 1941

On May 5, 1941, in the Kremlin, Stalin in essence told the graduates of the military academies to disregard official propaganda and to prepare for war.¹ On June 13, 1941, Moscow radio broadcast a rather unusual announcement of the Soviet Union Telegraph Agency (TASS). It claimed that “Germany was following the conditions of the Soviet-German pact as flawlessly as the Soviet Union,” that the rumors of an impending German attack on the USSR “were clumsily fabricated propaganda by the enemies of Germany and the USSR, interested in broadening and prolonging the war.” the following day, central Soviet newspapers published that announcement; a week later, Germany invaded the USSR. Everyone knew the author of the TASS announcement. Stalin’s characteristic style was recognized by generals in Soviet staffs, inmates in the labor camps, and Western experts. Many of those who spoke out on the subject laughed at Stalin. the TASS announcement was sometimes described as a sign of nearsightedness. However, the June

13, 1941, TASS announcement was more mysterious and inexplicable than ridiculous. Only its author is clear, while the rest is a puzzle.

It has been said that the ability to keep silent is much less common among people than any other talent. From that standpoint, Stalin was a genius—he knew how to keep silent. It was not only the strongest point of his character, but his most powerful weapon. With his silence, he disarmed the vigilance of his enemies; Stalin's attacks were always sudden and therefore fatal. Why then did he speak on June 13, 1941, and to a mass audience? Whom did Stalin address? Stalin's empire was highly centralized, and the mechanism of state government, especially after the Great Purge, was so perfected that any order was immediately communicated from the highest ranks to the lowest executors, and was immediately carried out. If in June 1941 Stalin had some concerns that had to be related hastily to millions of executors, why not use the perfect power structure that communicated all orders without distortion or delay? If the TASS announcement of June 13, 1941, was serious, it would have been repeated on all the secret channels. But Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vassilevsky testified that after the announcement was published in print it "was not followed by any directives regarding the armed forces or reexamination of previously adopted policy."² He also said that nothing changed in the agendas of the General Staff or the Narkomat (People's Commissariat for Defense), "and nothing was supposed to change. . . . But because no directives followed it, we quickly realized that it was irrelevant both for the armed forces and for the country as a whole."

Not only was the TASS announcement not repeated through secret military channels, but at the same time as the announcement came out, an order was issued to the troops in certain military districts, for example, in the Baltic district, that was in meaning and spirit quite the opposite of the TASS announcement.⁴ While the TASS announcement was broadcast on the radio, the military newspapers that were inaccessible to outsiders began to publish radically different ideas. It was reported, for instance, by Vice Admiral I. I. Azarov.

The Soviet system of secret classification had four levels of secrecy: "For Official Use Only," "Secret," "Top Secret," and "Top Secret, Special Importance." There was one more level, established by Stalin: "Top Secret, Special File." Documents in this category were produced only in one copy and could not leave the premises of the Kremlin. "Top Secret, Special Importance" was the highest level of secrecy that could have been used beyond the Kremlin. Such a document arrived at the staff headquarters of the Kiev special military district while the radio was broadcasting the strange TASS announcement. The directive ordered the "transfer [of] all deep-rear divisions and corps commands with the corps formations to new camps closer to the state border."

The moving of troops to the border under the pretext of training exercises was done on orders from Moscow. Marshal Zhukov said: "The Narkom [People's Commissar] for Defense S. K. Timoshenko recommended to the commanders of military districts to conduct tactical exercises in the direction of state borders, with the effect of bringing troops closer to the regions of planned deployment for the purpose of cover." As was

previously done prior to the Finnish campaign of 1940, “covering the state borders” was a code expression meaning “preparing to cross the borders.” This recommendation was brought into effect by the districts, but with a significant difference: “a significant part of artillery did not take part in the move.” Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskii (at that time Major General, commander of the 9th Motorized Corps) explains that the artillery had been ordered to the border slightly earlier. This was a brief description of the events of this day in one of the five border military districts. On the eve of the broadcast of the TASS announcement, the commander of that same Kiev special military district received another directive, with the same signatures and same level of secrecy—“Top Secret, Special Importance.” The directive of June 12, 1941, stated:

“During the time period June 15 to July 10, 1941, the 16th army with the following components will arrive on the territory of the Kiev special military district: the command of the army with service personnel, 5th Mechanized Corps (13th and 17th Tank, and 109th Motorized Divisions); 57th Tank Division; 32nd Rifle Corps (46th and 152nd Rifle Divisions, 126th Corps Artillery Regiment). . . . I forbid all open telephone and telegraph communication in connection with the arrival, unloading, and placement of the new troops. Nobody except you, members of the Military Council, and the chief of staff in the district, can know about this. . . . All units arriving to the territory of the district have been issued false names, listed below. The false name is to be used in all correspondence, including on envelopes of top secret documents.”

Even before June 13, 1941, troops flowed from the central regions of the Soviet Union to the five border military districts. Just three armies from among these troops required 939 railroad trains—the 22nd Army from the Ural military district, the 21st Army from the Volga military district, and the 16th Army from the Trans-Baikal military district. The 57th Tank Division of the 16th Army came from Mongolia. Preliminary relocation of the armies began in May 1941; other troops were moving as well. The former deputy of the People’s Commissar for State Control, I. V. Kovalev, wrote that “in May [and] early June, the transportation system of the USSR had to complete [the] transportation of nearly 800,000 reserve troops. . . . these moves had to be conducted secretly.”

The relocation of the 16th Army from the region beyond Baikal to Ukraine began on May 26, 1941, and was scheduled to end on July 10. Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin, commander of the Trans-Baikal military district, personally supervised the dispatching of trains. We can find many testimonials to this massive railroad operation, among them the memoirs of Major General A. A. Lobachev, who at that time was a member of the military council of the 16th Army: “The chief of staff reported that an important cable came in from Moscow, concerning the 16th Army. . . . the order from Moscow proposed to relocate the 16th Army to a new place. M. F. Lukin was to immediately appear before the General Staff to receive directions, and Colonel M. A. Shalin and I were to organize the dispatch of trains.” Only three people—the Commander of the Army General Lukin, Lobachev, and the Chief of Staff of the 16th Army Colonel M. A. Shalin—knew that the 16th Army was being transferred west, but they did not know precisely where. All the

other generals of the 16th Army were “secretly” informed that the army was headed for the Iranian border, and that the junior commanders were to be told that the reason for the transfer was training exercises; the wives of the command staff were to be told that the army was leaving for training camps.

I have interviewed hundreds of people from that generation, and they all had forebodings of the war. Where did they come from? they could not have known about Hitler’s preparations. They must have seen the preparations of the Red Army and understood that war was unavoidable. General Lobachev described the extraordinary level of secrecy with which the 16th army was transferred: the trains were sent only by night and they did not stop at large and medium stations; the staff of the 16th Army was moved in cargo railroad cars with the doors and windows completely shut; at small stations, where the trains stopped, everyone was forbidden to exit the train. At that time, a passenger train covered the Trans-Siberian route in more than eleven days, while cargo trains were even slower. One could transport soldiers and officers in fully closed cars, but here we are talking about the high-ranking staff of an army. Such level of secrecy was unusual even by Soviet standards. In 1945, a flow of troops going in the opposite direction travelled on the Trans-Siberian railroad, heading for a surprise attack on Japanese troops in Manchuria and China. For the purposes of secrecy, all the generals wore officers’ uniforms, with many fewer stars than they had earned, but they still traveled in passenger trains. In 1941, on the other hand, generals were being transported in cargo trains. What for?

On June 14, the military council of the Baltic special military district approved a plan for the relocation of a row of divisions and regiments to the border zone. Major General S. Iovlev (at the time commander of the 64th Rifle Division of the 44th Rifle Corps, 13th Army) recounted: “On June 15, 1941, the commander of the Western special military district, General D. G. Pavlov, ordered the divisions of our corps to prepare for relocation in complete formation. . . . We were not told our destination.” Not only armies, corps, and divisions were transferred to the borders. We have hundreds of testimonies of much smaller units being transferred as well. Lieutenant General V. F. Zotov (at the time a major general, and chief of the engineer troops of the Baltic special military district) remembered: “The sapper battalions were mobilized according to wartime regulations . . . ten battalions, which arrived from the Far East, were completely armed.”²⁹ Colonel S. F. Khvaley (at the time deputy commander of the 202nd Motorized Division of the 12th Mechanized Corps of the 8th Army) recounted: “During the night of June 18, 1941, our division left for field training.”³⁰ As the colonel put it, “it so happened” that the units found themselves right at the border before the war began, in the immediate vicinity of the state frontiers.

A small fragment is known from the military order received on that same day by Colonel I. D. Cherniakhovsky, commander of a tank division in that same 12th Mechanized Corps: “Upon the receipt of this order, commander of the 28th Tank Division Colonel Cherniakhovsky is to bring all units to battle condition in accordance with plans of high alert, but without declaring a state of alert. All work is to be conducted quickly, but without

noise, without panic and talk; have the necessary norms of portable and transportable reserves needed for life and battle.”

Trophy German documents indicate that the Germans' first encounter with the 28th Tank Division occurred near Siauliai. However, as Marshal P. P. Poluboyarov testified, the division was supposed to come out of Riga to the Soviet-German border. the German invasion found this division, like so many others, still on its way, because it simply did not have enough time to reach the border. the memoirs of Major I. A. Khizenko begin with the chapter “Marching toward the Border.”³³ He wrote about the 80th Rifle Division of the 37th Rifle Corps: “In the evening of June 16, General Prokhorov gathered all staff personnel for a conference. He declared an order from the commander of the Kiev special military district to move the divisions to a new region of concentration. . . . There are talks that the impending march will be an unusual one.”

Overall, the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army had 170 tank, motorized, cavalry, and rifle divisions. Fifty-six of them were located right on the border. they could not move any farther ahead. But even of these, everything that could move was moving forward and hiding in the border forests. General I. I. Feduninsky, commander of the 15th Rifle Corps of the Fifth Army, testified that he led four regiments from the 45th and 62nd Rifle Divisions “into the woods, closer to the border.”³⁵ the remaining 114 divisions of the First Strategic Echelon stayed in the deeper territories of the western border districts, and could be moved to the border. How many of the 114 divisions began to move toward the border in the wake of the reassuring TASS announcement from June 13, 1941? the answer is: all of them! “Between June 12 and June 15, all the western military districts were issued an order to move all deeply located divisions closer to the state borders.”

Now, let's look at what was happening on June 13, 1941, in the inner military districts of the Soviet Union, in the far inland Urals, and in the Siberian and Altay provinces. Lieutenant General N. I. Birukov, commander of the 186th Rifle Division of the 62nd Rifle Corps of the Ural military district, recounted: “On June 13, 1941, we received an order of special importance from staff headquarters, which stated that the division had to move to a ‘new camp.’ the address of the new quarters was not given even to me, the division commander. Only when passing through Moscow did I find out that our division was to concentrate in the forests west of Idritsa.” In peacetime, a division receives “secret,” but very rarely “top secret,” documents. A document of “special importance” can appear in a division only during wartime and only in extreme cases, when an operation of great importance is prepared. Many Soviet divisions did not receive a single document with this label of top secrecy during the four years of the war. Yet, it was peacetime when the commander of the 186th Rifle Division received a document of such an exceptionally high level of secrecy. the document's contents were ostensibly trivial: send the division to a new camp. General Birukov, however, placed the words “new camp” in quotation marks. He and the superior officials who had sent the document knew perfectly well that they were not talking of a “new camp,” but of something much more serious. All divisions in the Ural military district received similar orders. is mass of staffs and troops moved

from the Urals toward the Belorussian forests under the cover of the reassuring TASS announcement. Why didn't all eight armies move simultaneously? In February, March, April, and May, a grandiose secret transfer of Soviet troops—from the inner regions to the borders—was conducted. It was concluded in time, but thousands of railroad cars had to return thousands of kilometers back inland. Therefore, on June 13, when the new, giant, secret movement of troops began, there were not enough cars for all the armies. the Second Strategic Echelon contained seventy-seven tank, motorized, and rifle divisions, not counting tens of separate regiments and hundreds of separate battalions. they all began their secret movement toward the western borders of the USSR under the cover of the TASS announcement. To the 114 divisions of the First Strategic Echelon, we must add seventy-seven divisions of the Second Strategic Echelon that began to move toward the western borders from the central regions of the country, from Siberia, and even from the Far East.

Everything that Soviet officers, generals, and marshals wrote about in their memoirs was fully confirmed by reports of German intelligence to their commanders in the spring and early summer of 1941: the Red Army was heading in giant surges toward the western borders. Many independent sources confirm the same fact. the massive Red Army movement toward the western borders was felt even in Soviet prisons. G. Ozerov, one of the deputies of airplane designer A. N. Tupolev, at that time was in prison, together with Tupolev and his entire design bureau. they received an order to create the best dive-bomber in the world. ey were told that if they designed the plane, they would be let out of prison. they designed behind bars, but had constant contact with engineers from airplane and automobile factories, and with officials from the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry. Former inmate Ozerov recounted: "Inhabitants of dachas along the Belorussian and Vindavsk roads complain that they cannot sleep at night [because] trains with tanks and cannon are being herded through!"

Thus, "right before the war, in accordance with orders from the General Staff of the Red Army, certain units of the western special military district began to move to the state border."⁴³ Having crushed the First Strategic Echelon and broken through its defenses, the first German units suddenly stumbled across new divisions, corps, and armies (for example, the 16th Army near Shepetovka in late June), about whose existence the German commanders had no idea. the plan for the blitzkrieg was built on calculations of lightning-speed destruction of the Soviet troops right along the borders. But having completed this plan, the German army discovered a new wall of armies, which was coming out of the Northern Caucasus, Volga, the Urals, Siberia, Trans-Baikal, and the Far East.

Thousands of railroad cars are needed for the transfer of even one army. they have to be sent to the station of departure, loaded with the army, heavy weapons, and reserves, and then cross thousands of kilometers. If the German troops encountered Siberian, Ural, and Trans-Baikal armies at the end of June, then their transfer to the west had not begun on June 22, but earlier. Simultaneously with the transfer of ground troops and navy, an intensive relocation of aviation was taking place. During the dark early

hours of the day, aviation divisions and regiments were transferred in small units to air bases, some of which were less than ten kilometers from the border. In addition to operational air force units, a rigorous transfer of the newest airplanes to these units was under way. Colonel General L. M. Sandalov recounted: "From June 15, we began to receive new combat technology. Kobrinsky and Pruzhansky fighter regiments received the Iak-1 fighters, armed with cannon; the ground attack regiment got the Il-2 plane, the bomber regiments [got] the Pe-2."

Besides the fighter planes, a mighty stream of tanks, artillery, ammunition, and fuel was also flowing in. At dawn on June 22, a trainload of heavy artillery regiments came into the Siauliai station. There were endless rows of trains full of ammunition. the Krasnaya Zvezda noted: "On the evening of June 21, 1941, the supervisor of the railroad station at Liepaja was told: 'Receive a special train. It carries ammunition. It must be sent to its destination as a matter of priority.'" Liepaja at that time was very close to the border, but the train was in transit, meaning it was going to the border lines. Railroad cars on all fronts were full of ammunition, which was usually done in preparation for an offensive of great depth. In a defensive war, it was easier and cheaper to store ammunition in previously prepared storage depots. Having used up all the ammunition from one storage depot, the troops easily retreated to another, where ammunition awaited them, then to a third, and so on. But before an invasion, ammunition was loaded onto mobile transport, which was very risky and expensive. For example, the southwestern front had 1,500 railroad cars of ammunition at the small Kalinovka station alone.⁵² Colonel General I. I. Volkotrubenko reported that in 1941, after the German attack, the western front alone lost 4,216 railroad cars of ammunition. There were five fronts, and it is incredible how much ammunition was stored on all fronts. Some of it fell into German hands; some of it was successfully rescued. In the middle of June, that incredible number of troops and ammunition—under the cover of the TASS announcement—was rolling toward the German borders in railroad cars.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Kurkotkin reported that in the beginning of June the "Soviet government, following a proposal by the General Staff, approved a plan to move 100,000 tons of fuel from the inland regions of the country." In addition, "about 8,500 railroad cisterns with fuel [were] amassed at railroad intersections." If the smallest 20-ton cisterns were being used, this would have meant much more than 100,000 tons. the most frequently used cistern in 1941 was the 62-ton. These 8,500 containers were at the stations waiting to be unloaded in the first days of the war. We also have to take into account all that was destroyed by enemy air raids at the railroad stations in the first minutes and hours of the war. Colonel General I. V. Boldin, deputy commander of the Western Front, related that the 10th Army (the most powerful army on the Western Front) had sufficient supplies of fuel in storage and in railroad containers, but lost everything in the first minutes of the war.⁵⁶ On the eve of the war, this mass of cisterns was moving toward the borders, together with troops, military equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

June 13, 1941, marked the beginning of the biggest organized movement of troops, arms, ammunition, and other military supplies in history. Now is the right time to look once again at the TASS announcement of June 13. Many historians for some reason focus their attention on the introduction of this announcement, which speaks of German intentions. But the TASS announcement also speaks of Soviet intentions, and the most interesting information is contained there: "Rumors that the USSR is preparing for war against Germany are false and provocative. . . . the gathering of air forces and reserves of the Red Army and the impending maneuvers have as their objective nothing but [the] training of reserves and [the] testing of railroad functioning; they are conducted, as is known, yearly, so to imagine that these events are hostile to Germany is ridiculous." Comparing the announcement with what occurred in reality, we find a big discrepancy between words and deeds.

The TASS announcement talked about the "testing of railroad functioning." is is questionable. the movement of Soviet troops began in February, in March it intensified, in April and May it reached grandiose proportions, and starting on June 13, 1941, it reached an all-encompassing character. the only divisions that did not participate in the move were those already at the border, those that remained in the Far East, and those that were preparing to invade Iran. the full concentration of Soviet troops along the German border was planned for July 10.⁵⁷ For almost half a year, railroad transportation, the main means of transportation in the country, was paralyzed by secret troop transfers. In the first half of 1941, the government plan for industry was only fulfilled for the military requirements. the main reason was that transportation was almost exclusively used for secret military transfers. the second reason was the secret mobilization of the male population to the newly formed armies. The disruption of the government plan could hardly be called "testing." The TASS announcement described it as "usual training," but Soviet marshals, generals, and admirals contradicted that claim. Major General S. Iovlev said: "The unusual aspect of the gatherings, not foreseen by plans of war readiness, alerted people." Vice Admiral I. I. Azarov remembered: "Usually, training was conducted closer to the fall, but here they were beginning in the middle of the summer." Colonel General I. I. Ludnikov said: "Usually, reserves are called in after the crops have been harvested. . . . In 1941, this rule was broken."

Major General M. I. Kazakov at that time was at the General Staff headquarters. here, he encountered the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General M. F. Lukin, and other generals. their armies were secretly being transferred by train; the commanders of the armies moved ahead of their troops and arrived in Moscow by airplane. In Moscow, they received their last instructions. General Kazakov said: "It was clear that it was not maneuvers they were going to. It was something else."

Did Stalin have a premonition and concentrate troops along the borders for defense? at explanation is implausible. the massive operation described above couldn't be defensive. Troops preparing for defense dig themselves into the ground. they take over the largest fields that the enemy will have to cross, close off roads, establish barbwire barriers,

dig anti-tank trenches, and prepare covers behind the barricades. the Red Army did nothing of the kind. However, Soviet divisions, armies, and corps destroyed all previously constructed defensive structures. Troops were concentrated not behind water barriers, in a fashion convenient for defense, but in front of them, which was convenient for offense. Soviet troops did not take over vast fields that the enemy would need to cross, but hid in the woods, just like the German troops preparing for invasion. Perhaps all this was just a demonstration of might? Of course not—a demonstration has to be visible to the enemy. the Red Army, on the contrary, tried to hide its preparations. the TASS announcement was not written to scare Germany, but to allay its fears.

On June 13, 1941, Molotov summoned the German ambassador and related to him the text of the TASS announcement.⁹ the announcement stated that Germany did not want to attack the USSR, and the USSR did not want to attack Germany, but “enemies of Germany and the USSR interested in unleashing and broadening war” were trying to make them quarrel and were spreading provocations and rumors of imminent war. In the announcement, these “enemy forces” are listed by name: “the British ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kripps,” “London,” and “the English press.” Our exploration of the day would not be complete if we do not turn to London on June 13, 1941. It is reasonable to suppose that on June 13 there was a meeting in London between the Soviet ambassador I. M. Maysky and the British foreign minister Anthony Eden. Indeed, the meeting was held, and, surprisingly, in a friendly atmosphere. Discussion revolved around a serious issue: measures Britain would take to aid the Red Army “if in the near future a war between the USSR and Germany begins.” Among other specific measures were military operations by the British air force, the transfer of military supplies, and the coordination of command between the two countries.

On June 13, 1941, Stalin’s diplomats were laying the foundation of what would soon be called the “Anti-Hitler Coalition.” From the British point of view, there was nothing wrong with this picture: at that moment, Britain was involved in a war against Hitler, and had full rights to talk with anyone about joint efforts against him. But the Soviet Union had signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany, and immediately after that an agreement of friendship. If Soviet leadership thought that these documents no longer suited the situation at hand, they should have had them annulled. But Stalin did not do this; he assured Hitler of friendship and in the TASS announcement denounced the British ambassador and press for “wanting to broaden the war.” At the same time, talks in London were under way concerning a military alliance with Germany’s enemy, and about specific military measures against Germany.

It is surprising that at the talks in London both sides used the phrase “if war begins” instead of “if Germany attacks.” In other words, those talking did not exclude the possibility that the war would start not with German aggression, but in some other way.

On June 22, 1941, Deputy Commander of the Volkhov front Lieutenant General Andrey Vlassov, was a major general in command of the 4th Mechanized Corps in the Lvov bulge. In 1942 he was ordered to command the 2nd Shock Army, which found itself in a hopeless

position. Vlassov was ordered to complete an operation that he had not prepared, had not started, and that had already failed. the 2nd Shock Army could not be saved. It perished, and Vlassov was taken prisoner. In a protocol from questioning on August 8, 1942, it was recorded: "Regarding the question of whether Stalin had intentions to attack Germany, Vlassov declared that such intentions, undoubtedly, existed. the concentration of troops in the Lvov region points to the fact that a strike against Romania was being planned in the direction of the petroleum sources. . . . the Red Army was not prepared for the German invasion. Despite all the rumors about the operations conducted by Germany, in the Soviet Union nobody believed in such a possibility. During preparations, the Russians meant only their own offensive."

Forty-nine years later the same explanation was given by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Military Forces, General Makhmut Gareev: "A main blow to the flank in the main alignment of the enemy's troops, delivered in the direction of Krakow, would have allowed us to cut Germany off from the Balkans in the very beginning of the war, to deprive her of the Romanian oil, and to separate the allies. On the other hand, carrying out the main blow on the joint flanks of the western and northwestern fronts led to a frontal attack in difficult conditions against heavily fortified defense positions in East Prussia, where the German army could offer fiercer resistance. And totally different conditions, and consequently different objections, could have arisen if the strategic plans were to lead defensive operations to deflect aggression early in the war. In this case, no doubt, it was more advantageous to have main forces in the strip of the western front. But such a course of strategic actions was not planned."

Let's compare the opinions of the two generals. they are saying the same thing: there was no preparation for defense, only offense, moreover, an offensive in the southwestern direction (that is, from the Lvov bulge) with the objective of cutting Germany off from her oil suppliers and main allies. If someone places on the map the Soviet Shock armies, mechanized and airborne corps, air bases, staffs, and Zhukov's generals, he will be forced to acknowledge, even without Vlassov and Gareev's testimonies, that such positioning of troops in the bulges directed toward the enemy could only lead to catastrophe in the event of an invasion by the enemy, while it would lead to a brilliant victory in the event that the Red Army was first to deliver its sudden crushing blow.

Red Army, Black Gulag Uniforms

Immediately after the partition of Poland in the fall of 1939, a large number of Soviet troops were transferred from their permanent stations to the new borders. But the new territories were not adapted to the permanent deployment of large quantities of troops, especially troops with a lot of military equipment. The History of the Second World War tells us: "The troops in [the] western border districts experienced many difficulties. Everything had to be built and equipped anew: bases and supply points, airfields, systems of roads, lines of communication."¹ the official history of the Byelorussian military district

says: "Movement of units from the district to western parts of Byelorussia caused considerable difficulties. . . . the personnel of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies . . . were busy with repair work and building barracks, storages, [and] camps, [and] furnishing training sites, shooting ranges, and tank depots. the troops were under considerable strain."² Colonel General L. M. Sandalov: "The movement of district troops here encountered huge difficulties. the barracks were miserably few. . . . For troops not provided with barracks, dugouts were being built."³ But troops kept arriving. General Sandalov says that in order to house all the troops in 1939–40, storages, barracks, and any kind of space was being used.

At the cost of tremendous effort, in 1939 and 1940 the troops of the First Strategic Echelon were set up and quartered. But from February 1941, at first slowly, then faster and faster, the seven armies of the Second Strategic Echelon began pouring into the same areas. At that moment, a change occurred that has not been noticed by historians: Soviet troops stopped caring about how they would spend the coming winter. the troops of the First Strategic Echelon abandoned their dugouts and unfinished barracks and entered the border zone. We are talking of all the troops.

Troops of the Second Strategic Echelon, moving from within the country, did not use the unfinished barracks and camps abandoned by the First Strategic Echelon. the arriving troops were not planning to spend the winter in these locations, and made no preparations for winter. they were not making dugouts or building training facilities and shooting ranges; they were not even digging foxholes. Many official documents and memoirs of Soviet generals and marshals attest to the fact that now the armies were lodged in tents. In March 1941, the 118th Division of the 16th Rifle Corps of the 11th Army was formed in the Baltic region. In May, reserves arrived. The division put up a temporary summer camp made of tents in the Kozlovo Ruda region (45 to 50 km from the state border). Safe under the cover of the TASS announcement, the division abandoned this camp and headed for the border. Any attempt to find even a hint of preparations for winter is doomed to fail—the division was not preparing to spend the winter here. In all tank divisions, all newly formed rifle divisions, the attitude toward winter changed—nobody feared winter any longer.

Where were they planning to spend the winter? Staying in tents in the Russian winter? Wasn't Central and Western Europe more comfortable? Major General A. Zaporozhchenko gives the following description: "The final phase of the strategic deployment was the secret movement of attack groups to staging grounds for invasion. It was carried out during the course of several nights before the attack. the cover of the movement was organized by reinforced battalions that had previously been moved to the border and, before the arrival of the main forces, controlled the areas of the front pre-assigned for the divisions. Transfer of aviation began in the last days of May and ended by June 18. Fighter and ground-attack planes concentrated at air bases up to 40 km from the border, and the bombers were no further than 180 km." In this description, we can be surprised only by the date of June 18. Soviet aviation did not complete its relocation

then; it only started it on June 13 under the cover of the TASS announcement. Why is the general mentioning June 18? the thing is, he is talking not of the Red Army, but of the German Wehrmacht, where the same exact thing was occurring— troops were also moving toward the borders at night. Reinforced battalions were sent ahead. Arriving divisions took predesignated areas for attack, or simply put, hid in the forests. The actions of the two armies are mirror images of each other. the only difference is the dates.

At first, the Soviet troops were ahead, but then Hitler got two weeks ahead of them—he had fewer troops, and they had less distance to cover. It is interesting that in the beginning of June the German army was in a very unfavorable position: it had troops in railroad trains. Guns were in one train, shells in another. Battalions were unloaded where there were no staffs, staffs where there were no troops. There were no communication lines, since for safety reasons usage of many radio frequencies was banned. German troops also did not prepare dugouts and build training ranges. But the most important similarity was the huge quantity of supplies, troops, aviation, hospitals, staffs, air bases—all this right on the Soviet borders, and very few people knew the plan of action, which was kept in extreme secrecy. All that we see in the Red Army and discount as stupidity was done, two weeks prior to that, in the German Wehrmacht. is is not stupidity, but preparation for invasion.

What was supposed to happen after the gathering of the Second Strategic Echelon of Soviet troops in the western districts of the country? the answer to this question was given long before the beginning of World War II. General V. Sikorsky: “Strategic waiting cannot last after all forces have been mobilized and concentration of troops achieved.” is was said by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish army, in the 1936 book the Future War. However, according to a decision of the Soviet General Staff, the book was published in Moscow for Soviet commanders. the book was published because Soviet military science had earlier reached the same conclusion: “In modern conditions the worst idea in the beginning stages of the war is to attempt to use a tactic of waiting.” The advancement of the Second Strategic Echelon was not a reaction to Hitler’s actions. The creation of the Second Strategic Echelon began before the massive movements of German troops to the Soviet borders. the movement of the Second Strategic Echelon was a railroad operation that required lengthy preparations and extensive planning. Marshal S. K. Kurkotkin said that the General Staff transferred all necessary documents concerning the troop movements to the People’s Commissariat of Transportation on February 21, 1941.

The process of creating troop formations in inner districts and moving them to western border districts began on August 19, 1939. It originated with a decision by the Politburo; it was never stopped, and slowly gained momentum. Here is just one example: the Ural military district. At the end of August 1939 the 85th Division was formed; in September 1939, the 159th Division was formed. We see the 85th Division on June 21, 1941, right at the German borders in the region of Augustow, where the NKVD is cutting through barbwire. the 159th Division we find right on the border as well, in the Rava-Russkaya

region, in the 6th Army. In the same month of September 1939, in the same Ural district, the 125th and 128th Rifle Divisions were created, and each of them we can later find on the German borders. Moreover, according to Soviet sources, the 125th was “on the immediate borders” of East Prussia. The Ural district formed many other regiments and divisions, and all of them quietly crawled closer to the borders.

After the German invasion, the Second Strategic Echelon (as well as the first) was used for defense. But that does not at all mean that it was created for that purpose. General M. I. Kazakov says of the second echelon: “After the beginning of the war, radical changes to the plans for its use had to be made.” Major General V. Zemskov speaks more precisely: “We were forced to use these reserves not for attack, as planned, but for defense.”

From experience, as well as from theory, the Soviet High Command knew that not even one division could be left for a winter in the woods, unprepared. A soldier can spend the winter under any conditions—that was not the problem. the problem was that near the western borders there were no shooting ranges, no training camps, no tank depots, and no conditions for battle training. Troops must either immediately enter combat, or inevitable degradation of the level of battle readiness would ensue. the Soviet High Command knew that the culprits would be found, and they knew what the fate of the culprits would be—yet they took practically the entire Red Army into places where there were no conditions for battle training. the Soviet High Command did not fear Stalin’s ire, because the move forward did not endanger the troops’ combat readiness. Stationing them under such poor conditions was planned for a very short time only, after which the Red Army would attack westward. Stalin had no choice. He could not turn his armies around. Many armies and corps created in the first half of 1941 had nowhere to turn back to. Another troop transfer would have required many more months, would have paralyzed the entire railroad system, and would have meant economic catastrophe.

If the Red Army could not turn back and could not stay in the border regions for long, what was left for it to do? In order to answer this question one needs to bring up the opinion of Stalin: “In the condition when we are surrounded by enemies, a sudden attack from our side, an unanticipated maneuver, quickness, decides everything.”¹⁸ In every grandiose process, there is a critical moment, after which events cannot be turned back. For the Soviet Union, this moment came on June 13, 1941. After this day, war for the Soviet Union became inevitable, and it was to be in the summer of 1941, regardless of Hitler’s actions.

In the Second Strategic Echelon, which Stalin was secretly transferring to the borders, there were entire divisions, sometimes even corps, of soldiers dressed in old black uniforms. ere were enough of these soldiers for the German military intelligence to notice and unofficially dub these divisions and corps “black.” One example was the 69th Rifle Corps of the 20th Army. is corps was not the only one. the 63rd Corps of the 21st Army also figures in German documents as the “black corps.” the commander of the 63rd Rifle Corps was Komkor (Corps Commander) L. G. Petrovsky. During the war Komkor Petrovsky fought with dignity and courage, proving his ability as a great strategist in battle. On

July 31, 1941, he received the rank of lieutenant general and was promoted to command the 21st Army while the 63rd Rifle Corps, after heavy fighting, was encircled by the enemy. Stalin ordered him to leave the 63rd Corps encircled and to take command of the 21st Army. Petrovsky asked to delay the order of entering his post as army commander for a couple days, and the plane sent for him returned with critically wounded soldiers on board. Petrovsky brought his “black corps” out of encirclement and once again returned to the rear of the enemy, in order to bring another division out of encirclement, the 154th Rifle Division (under the command of Major General. S. Fokanov). During the breakout from encirclement, Petrovsky was fatally wounded. German troops, upon finding and recognizing Petrovsky’s body on the battlefield, gave the Soviet general a funeral with all military honors. A huge cross was placed on his tomb, with an inscription in German that read: “Lieutenant General Petrovsky, commander of the ‘black corps.’”

The armies of the Second Strategic Echelon, which included the “black” divisions and corps, began forming in June 1941. These divisions and corps began their movement west on June 13, 1941. German troops encountered the “black” divisions and corps in early July 1941. Every army of the Second Strategic Echelon was created specifically for the purpose of a surprise arrival at the western borders. Each army was located on a major railroad route. Each was formed in the vicinity of concentration camps: men there were used to order, didn’t ask for much, and it was easier to take them out of the camps than out of the villages—all were already gathered in one place, organized into brigades, and, most importantly, it was impossible to take men out of the villages without stirring rumors about mobilization and war. Stalin needed everything to proceed quietly, without rumors. That was why he wrote the TASS announcement. That was why men were in due time taken to concentration camps, trained and disciplined, and then sent to the front without fuss. If in early July the German army met divisions and corps filled with inmates, in the armies coming from the faraway Urals and from the Siberian and Trans-Baikal provinces, it means that Stalin handed weapons to the inmates before June 22, 1941. The main question that German command had to answer was: If we do not attack, what will Stalin do? Take away the weapons from the inmates, return them to the GULAG, or send them home? Or perhaps Stalin had some other options for using the armed inmates that were secretly gathering at the German borders?

Churchill’s Warning and Stalin’s Reaction

For more than half a century, historians have been saying that Churchill warned Stalin about the impending German invasion, but Stalin ignored his warnings. Perhaps we should ask a different question: Why should Stalin have believed Churchill? Churchill was one of the most powerful political leaders who had understood the great threat posed by Communism back in 1918. From the Soviet point of view, Churchill could have had only one political motive: to deflect the German attack to anywhere other than Britain. Even before World War II began, on March 10, 1939, at the Eighteenth Congress of the

Communist Party, it had been openly declared that Great Britain wanted to trigger a war between the Soviet Union and Germany, while it remained on the sidelines of this fight. We do not know whether that was indeed Churchill's intention, but it was exactly how Stalin interpreted every action of British leadership and diplomacy.

To understand Stalin's suspicion of Churchill's letters, we must also examine the strategic situation in Europe. The concentration of power against weakness was the main principle of strategy. Germany was unable to apply this principle in World War I, because it was fighting on two fronts. Attempts to concentrate great efforts on one front automatically led to the weakening of the other front, and the enemy immediately exploited it. As a result, Germany had to renounce a strategy of destruction in favor of the only other alternative, a strategy of attrition. But Germany's resources were limited, in contrast to the resources of its enemies. A war of attrition could only end in catastrophe for Germany.

In 1940, in terms of strategy, Churchill could only have dreamt that the war Germany was fighting would transform from a one-front war into a two-front war. It was the only way to save Great Britain. In May 1940, the British army suffered a crushing defeat unprecedented in history. The German tank divisions broke through to La Manche, and trapped forty British, French, and Belgian divisions against the coastline in the region around Dunkirk. Belgium capitulated on May 28. France fell on June 22, 1940. Hitler's troops reached the shores of the Atlantic Ocean and took over naval bases of tremendous strategic value. From this time, the piracy of German U-boats increased sharply on the sea routes. Britain, an island nation, faced the threat of a naval blockade and the most acute crisis in trade, industry, and finance. Worse still, the German military machine, which at that point seemed invincible, was making intensive preparations to land on the British Isles. It was in this environment that Churchill wrote to Stalin on June 25, 1940. On June 30, the German armed forces captured Guernsey, one of the Channel Islands. In almost a thousand years of British history, this was the first time since 1066, meaning after the Norman conquest of Britain, that an enemy had captured a part of the British Isles. What would follow—a German occupation of mainland Britain? Guernsey was taken without resistance. For how long could Britain resist? Stalin received Churchill's message the day after Germany had seized Guernsey. What were Churchill's interests? Did he want to save the British Empire or the dictatorship in the Soviet Union? For Stalin, Churchill was not an unbiased observer who, out of friendly sentiments, was warning of danger, but a man who desperately needed help and allies in a conflict against a fearful enemy. Stalin therefore was very suspicious of Churchill's letters.

Churchill wrote several letters to Stalin. But unfortunately they all reached Stalin at times when Churchill was in dire straits. Churchill wrote his first long letter to Stalin on June 25, 1940, when neither Hitler nor the German generals had any intention of invading the Soviet Union. The plan for Operation Barbarossa or any other plan for war against the Soviet Union simply did not exist. Churchill's letters were not based on knowledge of German plans, but on sound calculations. He simply directed Stalin's attention to the

situation in Europe: today Britain had problems with Hitler; tomorrow it would inevitably be the Soviet Union's turn. Churchill urged Stalin to unite with him against Hitler, and to lead the Soviet Union into the war on the side of Great Britain and all of vanquished Europe.

The text of Churchill's message received in Moscow on April 19, 1941, can be found in hundreds of Soviet books and articles. Here it is: "I have received reliable information from a trustworthy source that the Germans, after deciding that Yugoslavia had fallen into their clutches on 20 March, began to transfer three armoured divisions, of the five stationed in Romania, into the southern part of Poland. As soon as they learnt of the Serbian revolution, this transfer was cancelled. Your Excellency will easily appreciate the significance of these facts." All Soviet sources publish Churchill's message in this form, insisting and assuring that it was a "warning."

I see no warning here. Churchill was talking about three tank divisions—many by Churchill's standards, but by Stalin's, it was not a great deal. Stalin himself at the time was secretly setting up sixty-three tank divisions, each of which was stronger than a German division both in number and in quality of tanks. Having received a report about three German divisions, why should Stalin have guessed that there would be an invasion? If the report about the three tank divisions was sufficient "warning" about preparations of aggression, we should not accuse Hitler of being the aggressor: German intelligence gave Hitler reports about tens of Soviet tank divisions grouping along the German and Romanian borders.

Churchill's letter had tremendous significance, but it absolutely couldn't be regarded as a warning. It was more of an invitation to Stalin: the Germans wanted to transfer their divisions to Poland, but changed their minds; therefore, the Soviet Union had nothing to fear, especially since the German tank divisions in Romania had their backs turned to Stalin. Churchill wanted Stalin to evaluate these facts and act on them. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the British military historian, made a brilliant analysis of the strategic situation of that time as seen from Hitler's standpoint. According to General Jodl, to whom Liddell Hart referred, Hitler repeatedly told his generals that Britain's only hope was a Soviet invasion of Europe.⁵ Churchill himself wrote on April 22, 1941, that "the Soviet government knows full well . . . that we stand in need of its help." the only way Stalin could help Britain was by attacking Germany.

Stalin knew that war on two fronts spelled suicide for Hitler. He calculated that Hitler would not commit suicide by starting a war in the east without first finishing the war in the west. Stalin was patiently waiting for the German tank corps to land in Britain. Meanwhile, he did everything possible to convince Hitler of his desire for peace. It was why Soviet anti-aircraft guns were not firing on German aircraft crossing the Soviet borders, and Soviet newspapers and TASS proclaimed that there would be no war between the Soviet Union and Germany. If Stalin had succeeded in convincing Hitler that the Soviet Union was neutral, then the bulk of German forces would have been engaged in fierce battles trying to land on the British Isles and leaving practically all Europe defenseless

and ripe to be “liberated” by the Red Army. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, France, Greece, and Albania no longer had armies, governments, parliaments, or political parties.

Stalin had helped Hitler come to power and transformed him, in Stalin’s words, into a real “Icebreaker” that would trigger the world revolution in Europe. Stalin pushed along that Icebreaker of the revolution. Stalin demanded from the French and from other Communists that they let the Icebreaker crush Europe. Stalin supplied the Icebreaker with everything needed for a victorious advance. Stalin closed his eyes to all the crimes committed by the Nazis. But Hitler guessed Stalin’s design. That was why World War II ended catastrophically for Stalin: he only got half of Europe.

A Blitzkrieg against Russia?

We are so accustomed to thinking of Hitler and his armies as remarkably superior that we accept without question that Stalin was afraid of Germany. However, why should Stalin have feared Hitler? Everyone, including Hitler himself and his generals, knew that Germany lacked the resources to fight a prolonged war. Hitler’s only chance was a lightning war, a blitzkrieg. But a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was impossible, because it stretched more than ten thousand kilometers from west to east. The challenges for the Germans wouldn’t end there. Even in the supercritical conditions of the summer of 1941, the Soviet system of mobilization worked perfectly, and an additional 5.3 million people joined the ranks of the Red Army within one week of the war, before July 1, 1941. After one week of the war, the Red Army consisted of over 10 million people. Even if Hitler continued to destroy a million per month, the war would still last a year. But the Soviet mobilization continued in July, August, September . . . “Our forces are innumerable,” Stalin once said. The mobilization resources of the Soviet Union were almost 20 percent of the population, meaning 34.5 million people. This resource was fully used during the war. It was even surpassed. How long would it take to destroy such an army?

A blitzkrieg is a tank war. On September 1, 1939, Germany only had 2,977 tanks. How did it happen that out of this number almost half (1,445 Pz-I tanks) had no cannon? How come the other half (1,223 Pz-II tanks) had only pathetic 20-mm cannons? How come they only had 98 Pz-III tanks with their useless 37-mm cannon, and only 211 Pz-IVs, which had 75-mm short-barreled cannon, not designed and not useful for war against other tanks? By June 1941, Hitler had in his invading army 3,332 tanks,⁵ all of them light and all of them obsolete—not one single heavy tank. There were medium ones, which were simply light tanks covered with an extra layer of armor plates. Their defenses increased from this, but their mobility decreased: their speed, maneuverability, and ability to pass through rough terrain—all of which were necessary for maneuvers in large open spaces. Hitler didn’t have a single amphibious tank, or one with anti-projectile armor, nor one with powerful cannon. Stalin, on the other hand, had 23,925 tanks, including

the best models in the world that had the best tank-building innovations of the time: powerful long-barrel cannons, wide caterpillar tracks, anti-tank defenses, diesel motors, and so on. Moreover, Stalin possessed almost endless means for producing these tanks. Stalin had more amphibious tanks than Hitler had tanks in total.

Tanks alone do not ensure strength. A lone tank that ventures far ahead is vulnerable. A tank must be supported by infantry. "In 1941, the German army still consisted mostly of plain infantry divisions, which moved on foot, and used animal transport," said German General Guenther Blumentritt.⁸ On June 22, Hitler had on the eastern front 750,000 horses. A convoy of 220 horses with carts followed each German tank. Was it on carts that they planned to carry out the blitzkrieg? Out of 153 divisions launched by Hitler against the Soviet Union, only seventeen were tank divisions. There was not a single tank in the thirteen German motorized divisions at the beginning of World War II, while each Soviet rifle division had its own tank battalion of T-26 tanks. We have been taught to laugh at this tank. But the German infantry did not have tanks at all!

The German army relied heavily on cars and motorized transportation. the plethora of such machinery—more than 500,000 cars in the invading army—played a cruel trick on the Germans. While on the European front, which was heavily road-linked, such an abundance of motorized transportation was more than sufficient, but the German cars on the Russian front (along its so-called roads) often turned into a setback. First, the Germans needed specialized, road-tolerant cars, wheel-track and track-based transport vehicles and tractors. Second, the chronic lack of fuel led to frequent halts in the general mass of automobiles. Field artillery was the main tool of the Red Army for breaking through enemy defense lines. First were the howitzers. A howitzer, compared to cannon of the same weight, had a slower initial shell speed and a smaller range. But its shells were more powerful and its fire trajectory was curved, which was useful for firing upon an enemy dug into the ground. Marshal Kulik commanded the Red Army artillery for many years. During his leadership, the best artillery systems in the world were created, primarily the howitzers. By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 15,464 howitzers of all types.¹³ the most powerful ammunition factories were created for supplying them. the German army had 10,810 howitzers by June 1, 1941. However, those howitzers had to be divided among several fronts, including the African one. Furthermore, Germany had too few non-ferrous metals to manufacture artillery shells in such quantities as were being produced in the Soviet Union. Finally, the German howitzers were obsolete, developed during World War I or even before it.

Stalin had long-range bombing aviation, which Hitler did not have. In 1940 and 1941, Germany was already being bombed by British strategic aviation. Stalin was ready to add his forces to this effort. Hitler, meanwhile, planned to "bomb Britain out of the war," but that plan failed, because he had no strategic aviation at his disposal. Later on, Hitler decided to take over the European part of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, and everything east of that line he was going to leave to the bombers. the problem with this plan was that Hitler had almost no long-range bombers.

When he received reports that the German army was preparing to invade, Stalin simply did not believe them. Molotov said before the invasion: "One must be an idiot to attack us." According to Stalin's calculations, an attack on the USSR would have meant suicide for Hitler and his empire. His calculation was entirely confirmed by the results of the war. The question is not whether Stalin was afraid of Hitler or not. Stalin had no reason to be afraid. Stalin considered Hitler and his generals to be reasonable people, and reasonable people would not embark on such an adventure, with Britain on their back. Reasonable people could not plan to crush the Ural and Siberian industrial complexes using long-range bombers, especially when they had no such bombers. Here we must ask a different question: why did Hitler attack the USSR?

Hitler signed Open Directive No. 21 ordering Operation Barbarossa—the attack on the Soviet Union—on December 18, 1940: "The end goal of the operation is the creation of a protective barrier against Asian Russia along the line Volga-Astrakhansk. In this manner, in case of need the last industrial region the Russians have left in the Urals could be paralyzed using aviation." Since Germany invaded the USSR on June 22, it was impossible to reach the Volga line before the autumn rains. If Hitler had been able to build air bases on the right bank of the Volga River, he still would not have been able to bomb the industry centers of the Urals. The German Do-17, Ju-88, and He-111 bombers were created for completely different tasks. Their missions had been the destruction of small-scale, mostly mobile targets in the area of battle and in the enemy's near rear. These bombers were created for short-range flights, had a small bomb-carrying capacity, and could act only at low and medium altitudes. To reach the Urals and return, the bombers Hitler had in 1941 had to take with them plenty of fuel and no bombs at all. If Hitler's bombers had a sufficient radius of action, even then they could not have bombed the Urals. Germany was running out of fuel. In August 1941, it already had so little fuel that it had to halt large-scale operations.

In December 1940, when Hitler signed the directive for the attack on the Soviet Union, it was perfectly clear that the light single- and dual-engine bombers had too small a radius and too pathetic a bomb load, and were not fit for destroying industrial targets. At the same time, German bombers were flying from the excellent air bases in northern France, across the Channel, and bombing the industrial and military targets of London, Bristol, Coventry, Plymouth, and Southampton. Supplying fuel and ammunition from Germany to the airports of northern France was no problem. The targets were nearby, just across the Channel, and the planes could take less fuel and more bombs. Nonetheless, even in these most favorable circumstances, in nine months of intense bombing raids, from August 12, 1940, to May 12, 1941, all of Germany's aviation was still unable to "bomb British industry out of the war." If the entire German aviation could not in nine months destroy the industry of nearby Britain, how many months did Hitler plan to spend trying to destroy the industry centers of the remote Urals?

To destroy industrial regions situated in the deep rear of the enemy, an aggressor needs long-range bombers with a radius of action of several thousand kilometers and a bomb-

carrying capacity of over five tons. the long-range bomber must also be a high-altitude bomber, otherwise it would be vulnerable to the enemy's anti-aircraft artillery. Also, is necessary a minimum of one thousand such bombers. Hitler had none.

Intelligence Reports and Stalin's Reaction

Stalin had three separate independent espionage services: the First Directorate of the NKGB; the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (in 1942 it became Chief Directorate); and Stalin's personal intelligence service, concealed under the name "Special Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party." The total power of these agencies was colossal. Sufficient information is available about the penetration into leading German military and political organs by Stalin's espionage services. A group under the code name "Viking" worked in the staff of the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces); seven high-ranking German officers and generals supplied information straight from Hitler's cabinet to Stalin's agents. In Germany, the Soviet military intelligence managed to gain access to the most secret information from the highest levels of power.

Several networks of agents simultaneously worked for Stalin, completely independent of each other. the lies of one were immediately exposed by information provided by the others. A group under the code name "Alta" worked in the German embassy in Moscow. Its members included Gerhard Kegel and Else Stoebe. the entire embassy was wrapped up in the web of Stalin's espionage. is group of agents "was supplemented by a man who had, in essence, unrestricted access to all [the] state secrets of Germany."² the German embassy in Moscow had ties to Goering's staff, to the science and technology organs of the ird Reich, and of course to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Among these agents, there was even one of the closest associates of the foreign affairs minister, Ribbentrop. He was recruited in Poland to work for the British and in his convictions he was an adamant enemy of the Soviet Union."³ is agent, like many others, thought he was working against Stalin, when in reality he was working for him.

We must remember the friend of Goering's wife, the first-rate Nazi movie star Olga Tschechowa. is woman dazzled Berlin with her blinding beauty and her cruelty, which was inexplicable, unusual, and unseen even for that time. In 1936, on Hitler's orders, Olga Tschechowa was awarded the title People's Actress of Germany. She was often seen next to Hitler at receptions. en, in 1945, the popular ird Reich actress was befriended by Stalin and given the highest Soviet marks of distinction.

Testimonies about the might of Stalin's espionage abound. For example, Air Force Major General P. M. Stefanovsky recounted, as if it were something utterly insignificant, that in July 1941 he was summoned by Stalin and told: "In three days, the Germans will bomb Moscow." Stefanovsky described the measures that were taken, and in three days the first massive air raid on Moscow was deflected. But we can pause on this seemingly insignificant episode. How could Stalin have known that in precisely three days the

Germans would bomb Moscow? the pilots at the air bases did not know what they would be doing the following day. It was always a secret. the success of the upcoming operation, the lives and safety of the pilots, depended on that secret. A very small group of people knew the plans for air war. Commanders of formations and pilots found out the targets they had to bomb only at the last moment. Yet Stalin knew not only what the German pilots would be doing the following day, but also what they would be doing in three days.

Stalin was constantly peeking at Hitler's cards. During the development of German operations in the Kursk region, all details and all changes in the plan were immediately reported to Stalin. Before the beginning of the operation, German generals, who were the immediate executors of the plans, received the appropriate directives and the final draft of the operation. Stalin had received this draft six days earlier.

Hitler, whom Stalin had driven into a strategic impasse by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, suddenly realized that he had nothing to lose and that inevitably Germany had two fronts: if he did not attack Stalin, Stalin would stab him in the back. Therefore, Hitler attacked first. Neither Golikov nor Stalin anticipated this. It was a suicidal decision, but Hitler had no choice. Stalin simply could not understand that having found himself in a strategic impasse, Hitler would take such a suicidal step.

Stalin also had military intelligence officers whose achievements were truly outstanding, but precisely because they were so successful, they remain unknown to us. One Soviet intelligence officer had access to some of Hitler's real secrets. According to Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, "eleven days after Hitler approved the final plan for the war against the Soviet Union (December 18, 1940), this fact and the basic details of the decision taken by the German High Command became known to our intelligence organs."

With these preparations it was not possible for Germany to begin the war. When the war broke out, Stalin sent Golikov on a trip to Britain and the United States and briefed him personally. Golikov was then put in command of armies and fronts. In 1943, Stalin appointed him to the crucial post of Deputy People's Commissar for Defense, which was deputy to Stalin himself, to deal with cadre matters. Stalin allowed only his most trusted men to handle the delicate task of selecting and placing cadres. Golikov continued to rise in rank after Stalin's death, and eventually became a Marshal of the Soviet Union. Golikov's impunity for obviously wrong intelligence had been worrying me personally for a long time, until I attended a lecture in the Academy of the GRU. Later, when I was working in the central apparatus of the GRU, I found confirmation to this answer. Golikov used to report to Stalin that Hitler was not preparing for war against the Soviet Union. It turned out that Golikov was reporting the truth to Stalin, since Hitler was not making such preparations. Golikov knew that Stalin did not trust documents. Golikov did not trust them either. He therefore looked for other indicators which would unerringly signal the moment when Hitler began his preparations for war with the Soviet Union.

All GRU agents in Europe were ordered to infiltrate organizations directly or indirectly connected with sheep farming. Over a few months, intelligence was gathered and carefully

processed on the number of sheep in Europe, on the main sheep-breeding centers and slaughterhouses. Golikov was informed twice a day about mutton prices in Europe. In addition, Soviet intelligence began to hunt for dirty cloths and oil-stained pieces of paper left behind by soldiers cleaning their weapons. There were many German troops in Europe. the troops were stationed in field conditions. Each soldier cleaned his weapon at least once a day. Cloths and paper which have been used for weapon cleaning were usually either burned or buried, but of course this rule was not always obeyed. the GRU had ample opportunity to collect an enormous quantity of dirty cloths. A large number of these dirty cloths were sent across the frontier wrapped around various iron implements, so as not to arouse suspicion. Larger-than-usual quantities of kerosene lamps, primus stoves, and lighters were sent across the border, by both legal and illegal means. Every piece of information was analyzed by hundreds of Soviet experts, and the results reported immediately to Golikov. He immediately informed Stalin that Hitler had not yet begun preparations to invade the Soviet Union, so there was no need to pay attention to every buildup of German troops or German General Staff documents. Golikov believed, with good reason, that a country needed serious preparation to fight the Soviet Union. One of the vital things Germany would need, if it were to be ready to fight such a war, was sheepskin coats—no fewer than six million of them. As soon as Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union, his General Staff would have to order industry to begin producing millions of sheepskin coats. is would be reflected immediately on the European markets. In spite of the war, mutton prices would fall because of the simultaneous slaughter of millions of animals, while sheepskin prices would rise sharply.

Golikov also calculated that the German army would have to use a new type of lubricating oil for its weaponry. the usual oil used by Germany would congeal in the frost, component parts would freeze together, and the weapons would not work. Golikov waited for the German army to change the type of oil it used in weapon-cleaning. the Soviet experts' examination of dirty cloths showed that the German army was still using its usual oil, and there were no signs of a change to a new type. Soviet experts also watched motor fuel. In heavy frost, the normal German fuel broke down into incombustible components. Golikov knew that if Hitler decided to open a second front, he would have to order the mass production of a fuel which would not disintegrate in heavy frost. Soviet intelligence was sending samples of German liquid fuel across the border in lighters and lamps. There were many other indicators, which the GRU followed closely for warning signals.

But Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa without making any preparations. Stalin, therefore, had no reason to punish Golikov. Golikov had done all that was humanly possible to discover German preparations for war. He told Stalin that no preparations were taking place, and this was the truth. There had only been a great buildup of German troops. Golikov gave instructions that not all German divisions had to be targets of attention, but only those that were ready to invade; those were divisions that had 15,000 sheepskin coats in their depots. ere were simply no such divisions ready for war in the entire Wehrmacht. The GRU chiefs knew where, what quantities, and what kinds

of liquid fuel and lubricating oils were produced in Germany and the occupied territories. the quantities of liquid fuel possessed by Hitler were not at all sufficient to conduct deep offensive operations. But the most attention was paid to the type of fuel they produced. Analysis showed that Germany was not conducting intensive research in the field of creating frost-resistant fuels and oils; German industry was not producing them in any significant quantity; the rear units of the Wehrmacht Heer and the Luftwaffe were not storing such fuel and oil for a grand-scale war.

The temperature at which pure benzene crystallizes is 5.4 Celsius. In Germany, fuel was obtained by the hydrogenation of low-quality coal. Into this fuel, large quantities of benzol had to be added to raise the levels of octane. Benzol has high anti-detonation qualities. However, it drastically reduces low-temperature qualities. the temperature of crystallization for the main kinds of German fuels ranged between -9.6 and -14.5 Celsius. Only a madman could begin a war with such fuel against a country where in the winter a temperature of -20 Celsius was the norm. Soviet intelligence did not consider the German generals to be madmen, and it concluded that Germany was not preparing for war.

Colonel General H. Guderian, commander of the 2nd Tank Group, recounted: "When they unfolded a map of Russia before me, I could not believe my eyes. Everything that I considered impossible I was supposed to make into reality?" Guderian knew that Germany couldn't defeat the Soviet Union. Defeat was impossible not only in three months, but in general. "Just look at these vast territories," said General Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt, Commander of Army Group South. "We cannot crush the enemy and occupy all of western Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea in just a few months." Stalin and Golikov reasoned in a similar manner. they all expected Hitler and his field marshals to behave reasonably—in other words, to prepare for a prolonged war, including a war in winter. But reasonable actions were not being taken.

The War Has Begun

Only now did we realize how well the Russians had been prepared for war. —ADOLF HITLER, RADIO ADDRESS, OCTOBER 1941

In his memoirs, the German pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel described the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union. He flew a Ju-87 and completed 2,430 battle missions. He wrote:

"By the evening of the first day I had completed four trips beyond the frontline to the area between Grodno and Vokovysk. We saw huge masses of tanks and trucks here. We mostly saw KV-1, KV-2, and T-34 tanks. We bombed tanks and anti-aircraft guns. . . . The next day, we first flew out at 3 AM, and finally returned at 10 PM. One had to forget about normal rest during the night, so we made use of every available minute to fall down on the grass by our airplanes and to sleep. . . . Even on my first mission,

I noticed innumerable fortifications built along the borderlines. they stretched for many hundreds of kilometers deep into Russian territory—and yet, they were partly unfinished. We flew over unfinished airbases: in some places, the concrete landing strips were just being constructed. Even at such airbases, however, one could find a few aircraft waiting. We saw, for example, along the road to Vitebsk, which our troops were advancing upon, one such almost-finished airbase with many “Martin” bombers. they either did not have enough fuel or enough crews. While flying over these numerous airbases and fortifications, we all had the same thought in our heads—how lucky we were to have struck first. It seemed that the Soviets were feverishly readying the groundwork for an attack against us. And which other Western country could Russia have attacked? If the Russians had completed their preparations, there would have been almost no hope of stopping them. . . . The highway [from] Smolensk [to] Moscow was the target of many raids; it was packed with huge amounts of Russian military equipment and supplies. Trucks and tanks were lined up one after another almost without any intervals, often in three parallel columns. If all this massive machinery had attacked us. . . . There were no difficulties in attacking so enticing a target. In a few days, the entire road was transformed into piles of rubble.”

In the German pilot’s description, there is one phrase about the construction of defense structures that might create some confusion. Perhaps the Red Army was preparing defenses? No, it was not. If it had been preparing for defense, the arriving troops would not have been kept in columns along the roads, they would have been sent immediately to the trenches. Rudel also mentioned the “Martin” bombers. Indeed, military supplies from the United States and Great Britain began to arrive in the Soviet Union long before June 22, 1941.

“Strategic defense was born out of necessity during combat, it was not planned ahead of time,” says official Soviet military-historical research. the defensive operations of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 were pure improvisation. Before the war, the Red Army neither prepared for defense nor conducted any training in defensive operations. Soviet field manuals don’t contain a word about defense on a strategic scale. Not only did the Red Army not have any defense plans, but even in a purely theoretical sense the issues involved in conducting defense operations were never worked out or discussed. Moreover, the Soviet people and army were not ready for defense, even psychologically. “It is precisely the interests of defending the USSR that will demand the conduct of broad offensive operations on enemy territory, and this does not in any way contradict the character of defensive war,” wrote Pravda on August 19, 1939. From the first moments of the German invasion, the Red Army tried to go on the offensive, or carry out counterattacks and counteroffensives. But this was also improvisation. Counteroffensives were not worked on at any of the prewar training exercises; they were not even discussed in theory: “The question of counteroffensive . . . was not posed before the Great Patriotic War.”

Something else is unclear. If the Red Army entered the war without any plans, then Stalin, upon finding out about this, should have shot the chief of general staff and all

those who participated in developing the plans. It did not happen. On the contrary, those who participated in developing Soviet plans—Vassilevsky, Sokolovsky, Vatutin, Malandin, Bagramian, Shtemenko, and Kurassov—began the war as major generals or even lieutenant colonels, and ended it as marshals or at least with the four stars of army generals. During the war, they all proved to be truly great strategists. They were all devoted, even pedantic, staff officers, who could not imagine life without a plan. If Soviet staffs worked very hard and developed war plans before the war, but those were not defense or counteroffensive plans, what kinds of plans could they be?

The Soviet Black Sea fleet had the following military objective before the war: “active military actions against enemy ships and transports near the Bosphorus and on the passageways to the enemy’s bases, as well as cooperation with land troops during their movement along the Black Sea coast.”⁶ Admiral S. Gorshkov remembered that the Baltic and Northern fleets, as well as the Black Sea fleet, had purely defensive objectives, but they were to be achieved through aggressive methods. The actions of the Soviet fleet during the first minutes, hours, and days of the war showed with sufficient clarity that they had plans, but these were not plans for defense. On June 22, 1941, Soviet submarines from the Black Sea fleet immediately sailed into the sea toward the shores of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. On that same day, the submarines of the Baltic fleet sailed toward the shores of Germany with the objective of “sinking all enemy ships and vessels according to the rules of unrestricted submarine warfare.” The order made no exceptions, not even for medical vessels sailing under the Red Cross flag.

Starting on June 22, the Black Sea naval air force conducted open military actions in the interests of the Danube military flotilla with the objectives of opening the way for it to advance upward along the river. The garrison of the Soviet naval base Hanko, located on Finnish territory, did not switch to a defensive regime after the start of hostilities, but instead began intensive assault operations, taking over nineteen Finnish islands in the course of several days. On June 25, despite losses suffered by Soviet air forces during the first days of the war, airplanes of the Northern Front carried out a surprise bombing raid. The staff of the Northern Front reported on that morning: “The air force of the front and of the armies started on 6:20 AM to carry out, by bomber formations, the task of exterminating the enemy’s air force on his airfields.” On June 23, the 1st Long-range Bomber Aviation Corps carried out a massive attack against military targets in Königsberg and Danzig. It was no improvisation. On the morning of June 22, at 6:44 AM, the Soviet long-range bomber air force received orders to act according to the plans.

On June 26, 1941, the 4th Long-Range Bomber Aviation Corps began to bomb the Ploiesti oil fields in Romania. After just a few days of raids, the amount of oil obtained in Romania was reduced almost in half. On June 22, 1941, the 41st Rifle Division of the 6th Rifle Corps of the 6th Army, without waiting to hear orders from higher commanders, acted according to prewar plans and crossed the state border in the Rava-Russkaya region. The 102nd Rifle Regiment of this division crossed the border on a front line of eight kilometers and penetrated four to six kilometers into enemy territory. In the

morning of June 22, 1941, the commander of the Northwestern Front, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, without awaiting orders from Moscow, issued an order to his troops to attack Tilzit in Eastern Prussia.

The High Command also ordered the neighboring Western Front to carry out a powerful attack on the Polish city of Suwalki. It was no surprise to the Western Front commander General D. G. Pavlov. He knew the objectives of his front long before the directives from Moscow arrived, and had already issued the orders to advance on Suwalki. However, because the German air force had not been destroyed in a surprise raid but, on the contrary, the entire Soviet Western Front had lost 738 planes during the first hours of the war, advancing was not at all the best option.

Soviet generals never concealed the fact that strictly offensive objectives were set before them. General K. Galitsky, when talking about the concentration of Soviet troops in the Augustow region, stressed that the Soviet command did not believe in the possibility of a German attack, while the Soviet troops were being prepared to conduct an offensive operation. The Soviet fronts directed against Eastern Prussia and Poland, as well as the fronts positioned against Romania and Hungary, were preparing strictly for an offensive. Major General A. I. Mikhalev acknowledged that the Soviet command did not plan to use the Southern and Southwestern fronts for defensive or counteroffensive actions. "The strategic goals were planned to be attained through the troops' switching to a decisively offensive course of action."

Meanwhile, from June 13 to 20, the NKVD troops were relocating by force the population of the border regions from the White Sea to the Black Sea. The Germans relocated people from a strip of land twenty kilometers in width, while the Soviets removed people from land one hundred kilometers wide. The Germans relocated the population. The Soviets relocated some people and sent others to the GULAG. On June 19, the day described by Sviridov, the NKVD operation to clear the front strip entered its bloodiest stage. After the forced deportation of the population, the border guards dismantled all mines and barbed wire obstacles on the Soviet border, and left the borders themselves. On strips tens of kilometers long, in the places where the Soviet assaults were being prepared, the border was opened, and the border guards had left, having handed the borders over to the Red Army. The reconnaissance battalions of the Soviet divisions came out right up to the borders.

The Red Army was not separated from the enemy even by a thin line of NKVD border guards. Neither Zhukov, nor Timoshenko, nor Shaposhnikov had the power to order the guards to leave the borders. The guards were not under their jurisdiction. The guards were subordinate to Beria, the NKVD commissar. But Beria did not have the power to order the army units to replace his people on the borders. Only one man, Stalin, could have ordered the NKVD commissar to remove the border guards and the Defense commissar to move the army divisions to the borders.

Then, the unexpected happened. The German army attacked. During the war, especially

in the beginning, the Red Army suffered many defeats. In August and September of 1941, a military catastrophe of historical proportions occurred in the region around Kiev: 665,000 Soviet troops were encircled and captured by the German army. Near Smolensk, 310,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were surrounded. In 1942 on the Crimean front: Soviet troops were encircled near Khar'kov; the 2nd Shock Army, headed by General Vlasov, was surrounded and exterminated. This kind of information was considered classified. Soviet historians and generals never wrote about these events. But there was an exception to the rule: June 22, 1941. The Soviet propaganda described without mercy everything related to that day, and denounced the Red Army before the entire world. Why was it allowed to talk about the lack of readiness for war? In the library of the Military-Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army, I stumbled across a very small book. It was titled *A Brief Russian-German Military Phrase Book for Soldiers and Junior Commanders*. The booklet was published in Moscow on May 29, 1941, and additionally on June 5 the same booklet was published in Leningrad, Minsk, and Kiev. In total, five million copies were printed. In all Soviet books, including military textbooks, the price was on the last page. The price was not printed only on those books and instructions that related to the conduct of battle. These publications were treated like ammunition, and were handed out to the troops during training exercises, and, when necessary, before and during battle. No price was stamped on the little book I found. It was a battle document; it proved that the USSR was preparing for the war with Germany.

The phrase book was composed very simply and intelligently: a question in Russian, followed by the same question in German written in Russian letters, then in German in Latin letters. The answers were also printed in Russian and German with Latin and Cyrillic letters. It is quite simple to speak according to the booklet—if you do not know how to pronounce the needed German phrase, simply point to the corresponding lines in the book and the Germans can read them themselves. The phrases are very interesting. For example: "Where is the water? Is it drinkable? Drink it first yourself." Imagine the situation: the Soviet soldiers are fighting, defending their motherland, enter a Russian village, take out the phrase book from their packs and read syllable by syllable: "Trinken Sie zuerst man selbst!" But they would be taken for Germans in Russia! Here is another example: "What is this station called? Stop the broadcast, or I will shoot you! Bring the conductor! Where is the fuel? Where is the garage? Gather and bring here [so many] horses [farm animals], we will pay!" To communicate with the local populations, it is not a bad idea to know phrases such as: "Where are the German soldiers hiding? Where is the burghermeister? Is there an observation point on the steeple?" But, there was not one burghermeister or steeple in the Soviet Union. Another very important question: "Where are the stores?" The most important phrases are the following: "You do not need to be afraid! The Red Army will come soon!"

A former Soviet diplomat, Nikolai Berezkhov, who accompanied Molotov to Berlin in 1940, wrote in his memoirs *With a Diplomatic Mission in Berlin* that a German printing press worker once brought to the Soviet embassy a German-Russian phrase book of the

same kind. For the Soviet embassy, the book was solid proof that the German army was preparing to invade the USSR. But in the USSR they were printing the same exact phrase books. Soviet soldiers and officers were preparing for a victorious march on Berlin, but the war against Germany in 1941 didn't run according to plan. As a result, when Soviet commanders were captured, the Germans found quite interesting maps and curious orders in their bags. Thousands of soldiers had Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books. Many simply did not think of the necessity to get rid of this compromising evidence.

The commander of the 5th Battery of the 14th Howitzer Regiment of the 14th Tank Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps, Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili, son of Stalin, was no exception. He was taken prisoner, but at first he was not recognized. The senior lieutenant was betrayed by his subordinates. Stalin's son was searched and questioned. A letter was found in his pockets, from a certain junior lieutenant in the reserves named Victor: "I am at the training camps, I would like to be home by fall, but the planned walk to Berlin might hinder this." The letter is dated June 11, 1941. The contents of this letter were reported to Hitler personally; he mentioned it on May 18, 1942.¹⁵ In June 1941, German intelligence officers showed the letter to Yakov Dzhugashvili and asked him to clarify the statement about the "planned walk to Berlin." The questioning protocol recorded Stalin's son's reaction. He read the letter and quietly muttered: "Damn it!"

During questioning, Stalin's son was asked why the Soviet artillery, which had the best cannon and howitzers in the world, and in incredible numbers, fired so poorly. Stalin's son answered: "The maps let the Red Army down, because the war, contrary to expectations, unfolded to the east of the state border."¹⁶ Stalin's son told the truth. In 1941, the Red Army fought without maps. There simply weren't any. But the artillery couldn't fire without maps. Direct aiming and firing was just a small fraction of the work done by artillery in war. Most of the time artillery fired beyond the horizon. "It turned out that in Soviet Russia a map-making industry was created that surpassed everything that had ever been done before in its size, organization, volume, and quality of work," concluded the Germans about the Soviet topographic services.¹⁷ How do we reconcile the best map-making industry in the world with the complete absence of maps? Lieutenant General A. I. Lossev explained: "Storages of topographic maps, located unreasonably close to the border, were either seized by the enemy, or destroyed by the enemy during the first bomb raids. As a result, the troops lost 100 million maps."

This is a modern-day evaluation, and the numbers are lowered. Lieutenant General M. K. Kudryavtsev, who under Stalin was director of the topographic services of the Red Army, said that during the first days of the war, and only in the Baltic, Western, and Kiev military districts, the Soviet troops destroyed during retreat over two hundred railcars of their own topographic maps.¹⁹ The smallest cargo railcar in the Soviet Union in 1941 could carry twenty tons. Even if we supposed that the smallest cars were used to store the maps, four thousand tons of maps were destroyed in the three districts. Kudryavtsev said that, on average, every railcar contained 1,033,000 maps. Two hundred cars equaled

200 million maps. Which of the two generals is right? they both are. One talked about what the German troops destroyed, 100 million, and the other added that the Soviets themselves destroyed 200 million maps, so they would not go to the enemy.

If the Soviet army planned to defend Moscow, Kursk, and Stalingrad, it needed maps of those regions. There was no reason to transport these maps to the state border. At the border, the army needed maps of border regions. And, if there was a plan to advance, the army needed maps of the territories that lay ahead. If the Soviet Union planned to take over large territories, it needed the corresponding number of maps to supply a multimillion-strong army. the Red Army did not save its maps in the border regions, because they were useless for defending the country. In 1941, the plans for the "liberation" of Europe crumbled, and the value of the maps that were kept in railcars on the border became zero. Millions of Russian- German and Russian-Romanian phrase books were burned along with the maps. The Soviet population was expecting a war, but it didn't anticipate a German invasion. Therefore, once the Germans attacked, everyone was shocked. Major General of the KGB O. D. Gotsiridze remembered: "Before July 3, when Stalin made a public appearance, it was completely unclear as to what we were to do. Everyone had thought that the war would be quick and on foreign soil."

"The complete demoralization among our troops occurred because . . . the people had planned to fight on the enemy's territory, and our military commanders were dreaming of a blitzkrieg no less than the Germans were. But everything turned out not quite so happily. . . . the sudden need for defense turned into a total retreat on all fronts for the troops and the people."

Stalin's Panic

After Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev recounted that in 1941, having found out about the German invasion, Stalin panicked, retreated to his dacha-fortress outside Moscow, completely kept out of all affairs, did not receive anybody, did not ask about developments on the front, and did not answer telephone calls. Stalin was totally apathetic. He isolated himself from all state and party obligations. Stalin was extremely depressed for over a week, and only on July 1 did the members of the Politburo manage to force him to return to the reins of power. is story was accepted and repeated in thousands of books and essays. It served as the main proof of Stalin's lack of readiness for war.

After 1991, the Soviet archives became more accessible, and researchers saw logbooks documenting visitors to Stalin's office from 1927 to 1953. It turned out that Stalin worked extremely hard in the first days of the war. the entry from June 21, 1941, read: "The last [visitors] left at 11 PM." is did not at all mean that Stalin's workday ended. After the last visitors left, he could have worked on the documents himself, talked on the telephone, worked outside of the office, in his Kremlin apartment or at his dacha. Stalin began receiving visitors on June 22, 1941, at 5:45 AM. He worked for eleven hours without breaks. His visitors included Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Mekhlis, Zhukov, Malenkov,

Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Vyshinskyi, Kuznetsov, Dimitrov, Manuilsky, Shaposhnikov, Vatutin, Kulik, and others. The following week was one continuous workday for Stalin, with only brief breaks. Reception of visitors began at 3:20 AM (June 23), or at 1 AM (June 25), and ended the following morning. The meetings lasted five, six, twelve hours. Sometimes Stalin's workday lasted twenty-four hours, with short breaks. After this initial week of the war, the logbooks have nothing recorded for two consecutive days, June 29 and 30.

Khrushchev claimed that when the Germans attacked, Stalin got scared and isolated himself. Today, we know that right after the German invasion Stalin worked seven days in a row, as much as humanly possible. During the first moments, Stalin simply did not believe that Hitler had invaded. Stalin had calculated all possible moves, and none of them included an attack by Hitler. During the first week of the war, Stalin herded his troops into an attack. He should have been giving orders for defense, but he resisted. Finally, on June 28, he found out that the Western Front was surrounded, the 4th Army was destroyed, and the 3rd, 10th, and 13th armies were encircled. Only then did Stalin finally understand that his plans for the "liberation" of Europe were over. When he arrived at the People's Commissariat of Defense on June 29, Stalin learned the true dimensions of the utter failure of the Western Front. There, Stalin exploded in anger at Timoshenko and Zhukov, bringing the latter to tears. Anastas Mikoyan recollected: "Stalin was despondent. After leaving the Commissariat, he said: 'Lenin left us a grand legacy, and we, his followers, flushed that legacy down the toilet.' We were shocked by that statement. Was everything lost for good? In the end, we ascribed those words to Stalin's emotionally affected state."

Stalin realized that he could not fix anything. The socialist country was capable of crushing others, but it couldn't compete with other countries in peacetime. From June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union was destined for demise. Sooner or later, it was bound to collapse. It could survive only by consuming everything around it. Otherwise, it was doomed. The Soviet Union could exist only if the Soviet people would have no opportunities to compare their lives with the lives of people in surrounding countries. Therefore, Stalin's main idea was to destroy the capitalism surrounding the Soviet Union. All of Stalin's plans were simple, logical, and understandable: complete victory was only possible on a global scale. Hitler understood this as well: "The Bolshevized world will be able to hold only if it encompasses everything."² On June 22, 1941, Hitler delivered a suicidal but lethal attack on Communism. No matter how events unfolded afterward, Stalin could no longer conquer the whole world, which was the equivalent of his demise. On June 30, 1941, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, and others entered Stalin's room in his dacha. Anastas Mikoyan, a member of Stalin's Politburo, left a wonderful description of this episode:

"We came to Stalin's dacha. Found him in the small dining room, sitting in his armchair. Upon seeing us, he seemed to shrink into the armchair, then look at us questioningly. He asked: 'What did you come for?' He had a wary, strange look on his face—and the question he asked was no less strange. As a matter of fact, he should have summoned us

all himself. I had no doubts: he had decided that we had arrived to arrest him. Molotov, speaking for us all, said that power had to be concentrated if the country were to get back on its feet, and that a State Committee of Defense had to be created. 'Who's in charge?' asked Stalin. When Molotov answered that he, Stalin, was in power, the latter looked at Molotov with surprise, but said nothing. 'Fine,' he eventually pronounced."

The members of the Politburo hadn't come to arrest Stalin. they needed Stalin as a symbol, a flag around which the remnants of a crushed division would rally in battle. ey talked of saving the country, but Stalin did not listen to them. Without taking Europe, without expanding the Soviet Union's borders, the USSR would sooner or later crumble. Stalin had lost the country founded by Lenin. In 1941, only Stalin could appreciate the full weight of the German invasion. In 1941, the members of the Politburo could not fully understand that Hitler's invasion meant death for the Soviet Union. the Politburo forced Stalin to resume power, and Stalin, with a careless wave of the hand, returned, fully aware that the cause he had worked for his whole life was dead.

If It Weren't for Winter!

During the war with the Soviet Union, Goebbels's "Reich Ministry for People's Enlightenment and Propaganda" quickly filled newspaper and magazine pages with thousands of photographs: German automobiles stuck in Russian mud, a horse being flogged because it couldn't pull a cart out of the terrible slush, blizzards covering tanks with a thick layer of snow, and gusts of wind ripping the summer hat off a poor German soldier's head. The core principle of propaganda is visual appeal. Goebbels showed the shocked Germans back home tons of chronicles: mud, mud, mud, impassable mud, endless fields, plains, snow, and hurricane-strength wind knocking the soldiers off their feet. (The photos were taken on an airfield, where a three-engine J-52's propellers helped the storm, adding wind—and drama—to the situation.) If it were not for winter . . . from German staffs and memoirs of generals were added to Goebbels's propaganda, and featured descriptions of the horrors of the Russian winter, the impassable mud, and the unimaginable lack of roads. It would seem that Marxist historians should have refuted these claims, so that nobody repeated the conclusions of Hitler's defenders. However, Marxist historians not only did not refute those claims, but they joined the chorus of Nazi voices. Marxist propagandists declared that the Russians were completely unprepared for war, and it wasn't them that defeated Hitler: all the credit should go to the endless Russian plains, the mud, and the fierce winter.

Why did the Communists need to repeat the Nazi lies? the answer was simple: they needed to prove that the Soviet Union could not have invaded Europe. they had to demonstrate weakness. Here is an example: "Artillery, motorcycles, trucks, and even tanks got stuck in the impenetrable mud; airplane wheels got stuck in the ground on air bases. the supply of ammunition, fuel, and produce to the front was drastically reduced. [An] early winter suddenly replaced an unusually rainy autumn. When the ground froze

in November, many cannon and vehicles were left right there on the spot, where they had gotten stuck in the mud several weeks earlier.”¹ The combined power of Nazi and Communist propaganda turned out to be so strong that the Hitler legend about the frost and winter, the lack of roads, and the vast open spaces was repeated by people who were wise and far removed from Goebbels’s propaganda. It is no surprise that to the question about the reasons for Hitler’s defeat, today’s German schoolchildren answer in unison: winter, frost, and open spaces.

When we are told of tanks getting stuck in the mud, we should remember their specific power and their specific pressure on the ground. the best German tank of 1941, the T-III A, had a specific pressure of 0.94 kilograms per square centimeter of support surface. Of course it sank in the mud! Its specific power was only 13.9 horsepower per ton of weight. the rest of the German models were even weaker. ese tanks were designed by people who simply did not understand the nature of war. ese tanks could not compete with the Soviet tanks, and yet we are told that the mud was to blame.

In February 1940, the Red Army broke through the impenetrable Mannerheim Line. At the same time, the German army was simply refusing to fight in France. German generals, by blaming the weather in France, sabotaged orders to invade issued by the High Command. “Here, luckily, nature intervened and forced the postponement of the set date, which between the fall of 1939 and the end of January 1940 changed fifteen times.”² the order to start the invasion was postponed many times even after January 1940. German generals were unprepared to fight in France even in April. In 1941, Hitler fought near Moscow. Here there was no Arctic frost like in Finland, no deep snow, no swamps. the topography around Moscow was an invader’s dream: there were no rocky rivers and no steep shores. Soviet defenses near Moscow did not compare to the Mannerheim Line. But Hitler got stuck. We are told: the Red Army could not fight, and that is why breaking through the Mannerheim Line took so much time. Nobody remembers the frost, snow, and impassable terrain in Finland. But the German army got stuck at Moscow’s gate only because the winter had prevented it.

Marshal K. K. Rokossovskii remembered: “Upon a realistic evaluation of the situation and a consideration of the coming winter, the enemy was only left with one choice—immediate retreat covering great distance.”⁷ Why didn’t the Germans retreat? On September 13, 1941, Halder wrote: “At the current moment, we cannot forecast the number of troops that can be freed from the Eastern Front upon arrival of winter, and the number of troops that will be needed for conducting operations in the following year.”⁸ is entry shows that the blitzkrieg was already over before the snow, before the mud. the war had already turned into a war of attrition—a prolonged war lethal for Germany. On May 29, 1942, Hitler watched the famous Soviet film German Defeat near Moscow. In Henry Piker’s Hitler’s Table Conversations, Hitler’s comments are recorded in the entry for that day: “is winter we experienced especially harsh trials, because our soldiers’ clothing [and] the level of their motorization and supply did not in any way correspond to the conditions of that winter, when the temperature dropped below 50 [degrees] Celsius.”⁹ “en the first

German prisoners come, who form hordes without coats, gloves, without winter clothing. They dance from the cold, their hands thrust deep into their pockets, which they take out from time to time to rub their ears and noses! . . . Finally, the frozen German tanks, trucks, and cannon stretch in an endless file; all are abandoned, because the General Staff of land forces did not prepare in time sufficient amounts of frost-resistant fuel and winter clothing.”

A Model War

A Soviet historian’s account of Japanese-German relations in World War II went as follows: “The German leaders had especially strong expectations from their Japanese allies. They really wanted Japan to be the first to start military action against the USSR. . . . But the Japanese leaders evaded talks with Germany. Only in March 1941 did the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Yosuke Matsuoka, arrive in Berlin. . . . Matsuoka refused to determine the deadline for Japanese action against the USSR, which led to a strong clash between him and Hitler.”¹ The shortest route between Berlin and Tokyo lay straight through Moscow, and on his return trip from Berlin, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Matsuoka, stopped briefly in Moscow. Here, on April 13, 1941, he signed a pact of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Japan. Both countries pledged to “maintain peaceful and friendly relations and mutually respect each other’s territorial integrity and independence. . . . In the event that one of the sides becomes the victim of military actions from one or several other nations, the other side of the pact will observe neutrality for the duration of the entire conflict.”

The neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan was a remarkable achievement for Stalin’s diplomats and a crushing blow to Hitler’s plans. Japan was Germany’s ally, but it refused to fight against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Japan signed a pact with the Soviet Union instead. “When Matsuoka informed Ribbentrop about the high probability of a Soviet-Japanese pact, the head of German diplomacy stated that one would be wise not to involve oneself too intimately with the Soviet Union, but watch the events in the region.”³ The Japanese government, however, had its own opinion on the matter. On April 14, the day after the signing of the Soviet-Japanese pact, Goebbels wrote in his diary that the agreement caused a great sensation. For Germany, this was quite an unpleasant sensation.⁴ “The signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality agreement was a great surprise for Germany. Ribbentrop ordered the German ambassador in Tokyo to demand an explanation from the Japanese government.”⁵ An explanation was provided. Matsuoka told the German ambassador in Tokyo that “if Germany and the Soviet Union were to start fighting, not a single Japanese premier or minister of foreign affairs could keep the nation neutral. Japan will ally with Germany in attacking Russia, whatever the situation. Pacts of neutrality do not matter in this affair.”⁶ But this intent never materialized. Japan didn’t attack the Soviet Union.

On April 13, 1941, right after the signing of the agreement between Japan and the USSR,

Matsuoka headed for the train station in Moscow, on his way to Tokyo. According to protocol, many officials accompanied him. Suddenly, the rules of protocol were broken. At the last minute before the train left, Stalin appeared on the platform. He usually never met anyone or saw anyone off. On that day, Stalin was in a remarkably good mood. Obviously, the train departure was delayed. Stalin laughed and joked. He walked with the Japanese minister right to the steps of the railcar, and here he did something entirely uncharacteristic for him—he embraced the Japanese minister and proclaimed that the Soviet Union and Japan would remain friends forever. Among those seeing off the Japanese minister was the German military attaché—Stalin noticed and also embraced him, declaring that Germany and the Soviet Union would also remain friends. Stalin's behavior was very uncommon. He was usually very discreet. He never embraced anyone in the presence of outsiders. Many historians explained this unusual behavior as Stalin's commitment to peace, as proof that he attempted to avoid war with Japan and Germany at any cost.

Exactly ten weeks later, on June 22, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Soon, Stalin found himself on the brink of defeat. At this critical moment, the Japanese government kept its word to the Soviets and remained neutral. In that same year, 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor, triggering the war between the United States and Japan. It was advantageous for Stalin, and despite the signed pact, he started secret preparations to attack Japan. "They did not know Stalin well in Tokyo," wrote one observer. "If the Japanese had at least superficially acquainted themselves with the lifestyle and career path of the great follower of Lenin's legacy, they would have noticed that his methods always remained the same: make an alliance with somebody against somebody else, and follow it with a stab in the back to the ally once he becomes useless."

Stalin kept his intentions secret until the right time, but in the beginning of 1943 he told the American president about his decision to attack Japan. Stalin had planned his sudden attack on Japan not for 1943, when America was engaged in a difficult war and needed help, but at the very last moments of the war, when Japan would be already on the verge of defeat. Stalin could have helped the United States much earlier. He had the capacity to drastically quicken Japan's defeat. The United States had a very powerful strategic air force, but they had to fly to Japan across the largest ocean in the world, and then fly back without refueling. Raids on Japan could also be carried out from islands in the Pacific Ocean, but these islands had to be taken first, and therefore it was first necessary to achieve naval domination. And even after taking the islands, the Americans still had to fly several thousand kilometers to their targets and back. Each plane had to carry a large amount of fuel and an insignificant number of bombs. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was right next to Japan.

"Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, tried to obtain from Moscow permission for the American air force to use Soviet military airbases in the Far East." Stalin firmly refused. President Roosevelt sent messages to Stalin on December 30, 1942, and January 8, 1943, urging the Russian leader to allow American air force units to be stationed on

bases in the Soviet Far East. Stalin answered the messages with an uncompromising "no." If Stalin had given the Americans the opportunity to use Soviet air bases, instead of making long flights to Japan from the faraway islands, every plane could have completed several short flights with a large load of bombs. In that case, the American raids on Japanese targets would have been considerably more effective. But it was in Stalin's interest that the war between Japan and the United States be stretched as long as possible. By the way, Stalin allowed America to use several Soviet air bases in the Poltava region for bombing Germany. American B-17 strategic bombers took off from the airfields at Poltava and flew to bomb Germany. Their takeoffs were covered by Soviet fighters, which accompanied them to the length of their radius of action. At the same time, other waves of American bombers flew out of Britain. Having dropped bombs on German cities and factories, these bombers landed on the airfields at Poltava. They were met by Soviet fighters, which covered them during landing. But Stalin did not give permission to use the air bases in Nakhodka and Petropavlovsk for bombing Japan. Stalin waited for a complete depletion of Japanese forces in a prolonged war, and prepared his own attack. As Japan weakened, Stalin strengthened the preparation for a war against it. Stalin called Japan an aggressor for the first time on November 6, 1944. On April 5, 1945, the USSR leadership cancelled the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

In the summer of 1944, Stalin told Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky that he would be the chief commander of Soviet troops in a war against Japan. The initial figures of the concentration of our troops in the Amur, Pacific Coast, and Trans-Baikal regions were sketched out in the fall of 1944. At the same time, rough calculations of the resources needed for a war in the Far East were made. Vasilevsky was one of the most talented commanders in the history of the Soviet Union. His talent became apparent during the war. In 1940, he was given the rank of major general. "[As] deputy chief of the Operations branch of the General Staff, he worked on the operational section of planning the strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces on the Northern, Northwestern, and Western Fronts."

A month after the beginning of the German invasion, Stalin appointed Vasilevsky as chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate. Vasilevsky was responsible now not just for a separate (although the most important) sector of the front, but for all the plans of the war on all fronts. Two months later, Stalin promoted Vasilevsky to lieutenant general. Half a year later, Vasilevsky became colonel general. One month later, Vasilevsky received yet another promotion: Stalin named him chief of the General Staff, the central brain of the Red Army, and entrusted to him the preparations for offensive operations in the Stalingrad region. In October 1942, Colonel General Vasilevsky became Stalin's deputy. According to Vasilevsky's plans, all command and communications posts in the Stalingrad region were moved to the very front lines. He also moved there all air bases, hospitals, huge supplies of shells, cartridges, fuel, and lubricants. Until the very last moment, Soviet troops did not know anything about what they were going to do. By keeping his offensive preparations secret from his own troops, Vasilevsky managed to keep them secret from the enemy as well. And then, a sudden, crushing attack followed. All the so-called

“mistakes of 1941,” Vasilevsky repeated at Stalingrad, because they were not mistakes at all, but a preparation for sudden attack. Vasilevsky received the rank of General of the Army for the defeat of the surrounded German formations near Stalingrad. He only carried this title for twenty-nine days; after the Stalingrad operation, Stalin made him a Marshal of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1944, during the peak of the war with Germany, Stalin not only gave Marshal Vasilevsky the task of planning a sudden attack on Japan, but appointed him to head all Soviet troops in a war against Japan. But Stalin had no intention of landing his troops on the Japanese islands. He had more attractive targets. Korea, Manchuria, the greater part of China, and French Indochina (Vietnam) were all occupied by Japan. Stalin planned to “liberate” them and take them under his control.

Starting in the summer of 1944, Soviet military might in the Far East began to grow, but it could not be observed from outside. There was rearmament and strengthening of divisions, corps, and armies, as well as a storing of the supplies necessary for a sudden and crushing attack. Roads, air bases, bridges, and command and communications posts were being built near the borders with great intensity. Soviet commanders, on orders from Moscow, moved ammunition and fuel storages and hospitals to the borders. A movement of regiments, brigades, and divisions from the German front to the Far East began in the early spring of 1945. “The most important aspect of the preparations for the operation was the fact that they all had to be done before an official declaration of war on Japan.”

In May 1945, the troop transfer took on truly gigantic dimensions. “The mass regrouping of troops began with a transport by railroad from Eastern Prussia of the 5th Army, which had gained rich experience in breaking through fortified regions and operating in forested territories.” The strategic regrouping of Soviet troops was carried out at a distance of nine thousand to twelve thousand kilometers. A regrouping of troops on such a scale was being performed for only the second time in human history. The first time was in May and June 1941, from the east toward the German borders. In 1945, it was done in the opposite direction. After the strategic regrouping of the troops was complete, the three Soviet fronts contained eleven field armies, three air defense armies, three air force armies, one tank army, and four separate air force corps.²⁴ In addition, the Pacific fleet, the Amur flotilla, NKVD troops, and the armed forces of Mongolia were all under the command of the Soviet commander-in-chief in the Far East. The formation of Soviet troops included 1,747,465 men, 29,835 guns and mortars, 5,250 tanks, and 5,171 airplanes.²⁵ The Pacific fleet had 417 warships, including 78 submarines, and 1,618 airplanes, including 1,312 combat aircraft. The Amur navy flotilla had 126 warships and 68 combat aircraft.

A stream of cargo flowed in from the United States at the same time Soviet forces were being transferred out of Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin was the most cunning diplomat of the twentieth century. He demanded that the president of the United States supply food and fuel for all Soviet troop formations. “An agreement was reached with the

United States about the concentration of three months' supplies and fuels for our troops in this theater of military operations." The United States also supplied airplanes, armored cars, automobiles, radios, telephone cables, medicines, optical devices, and much more.

The Trans-Baikal Front was deployed in a territory stretching 2,300 kilometers, and it was supposed to carry out a surprise attack eight hundred kilometers deep into enemy territory. There were 648,000 troops, 2,359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,324 warplanes, 9,668 guns and mortars, and 369 salvo-fire field installations ("Katyusha"). Four men, without secretaries, draftsmen, or other personnel, did all the planning of military operations for this mass of troops. The 1st Far Eastern Front had 589,000 troops, 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 salvo-fire field installations, 1,974 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,137 combat planes. All the planning on this front was also done by just four men. The Trans-Baikal and the 1st Far Eastern Fronts were to attack in converging directions. Between these two attack formations there was the relatively weaker 2nd Far Eastern Front, which had 333,000 troops, 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 salvo-fire field installations, 917 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat planes. A classic encirclement operation was being prepared, with a relatively weak middle and two extremely powerful flank formations. The newness lay in the size of the operation. All three fronts were meant to advance simultaneously along the front line of 5,130 kilometers. Such an operation was unprecedented. (Let's hope that it will never again be repeated.)

The core principle of strategy is the concentration of force against weakness. The most powerful Soviet formation, the Trans-Baikal Front, was deployed against the weakest area of the Japanese defenses. But even here the forces were not spread out evenly along the entire border. Instead, extremely powerful assault groups gathered. Between these groups remained significant gaps, which were not covered by any troops. For example, on the Trans-Baikal Front, there was a gap of two hundred kilometers between the 17th Army and the 6th Tank Guards Army. Long before World War II, there was a chain of fortified regions erected along the border in the Far East. These regions housed a significant number of troops that were specially trained for conducting long defense operations. But in the summer of 1945, Japan found itself on the verge of defeat. Therefore, the Soviet troops stationed in the fortified regions were issued orders to leave their armored concrete fortifications and reinforce the assault formations.

On August 6, 1945, the American air force dropped an atomic bomb over Hiroshima, and on August 9, over Nagasaki. Japan was on its deathbed. And at this moment, on August 9, 1945, the Red Army carried out its sudden and crushing attack against Japanese troops in Manchuria and China. The operations of all the armies were planned according to the principle of surprise attack and overpowering the enemy with the immediate use of gigantic force. Even in secondary locations, the actions immediately took on an active and maneuvering character. On August 8, the Soviet government declared: "This kind of action is the only measure capable of speeding up the coming of peace, to save people from further suffering and misery, and give the Japanese people the opportunity to rid themselves of danger and destruction."

In the evening of August 8, 1945, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow was notified of a Soviet statement, which read: "Starting the next day, August 9, the Soviet Union will consider itself in a state of war with Japan."⁴¹ On August 9, the Soviet armies carried out their surprise attack. One could ask: How was it possible to declare the war on August 8 and to deliver a sudden strike on August 9? The answer is that in Vladivostok the day begins seven hours earlier than in Moscow. Military actions began on August 9 at 12:10 AM Vladivostok time.⁴² At that moment in Moscow, it was still 5:10 PM on August 8. No one had yet warned the Japanese ambassador. Then, when night fell in Moscow, the Japanese ambassador was summoned to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and at 11:50 PM Moscow time, it was announced that a war would begin on the following day. In Moscow, there were still 10 minutes left until the next day, but in the Far East the new day had long since begun. At the time of the announcement, it was already 6:50 AM. War had been going on for over six hours. The most important events had already happened: a sudden Soviet air raid destroyed the Japanese air bases, the border defenses were liquidated, and powerful tank formations entered Manchuria and China, continuing an unstoppable thrust forward.

The Japanese ambassador in Moscow was told about the beginning of the war, but he still had to reach the embassy and communicate with his government. All the telephone and telegraph lines were not working. Even in normal circumstances, radio connection with Japan, which was almost halfway around the world, was difficult. But here the circumstances were not normal: someone had tampered with the radio stations. In other words, the Japanese government found out that war was declared after a huge delay and through entirely different channels. In military language, this could be called "preparation and carrying out of a sudden initial attack with the opening of a new strategic front."⁴³ In the language of politics, this was called a "just and humane action by the USSR."

After the first crushing attack, Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky told his troops on August 10, 1945: "The Soviet people cannot live and work in peace while the Japanese imperialists brandish arms at our far-eastern borders and await a convenient moment to attack our motherland."⁴⁵ Malinovsky spoke four days after an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and one day after an atomic bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki. Those two Japanese cities lay in ruins unseen in human history, and Malinovsky was fully aware of the fact. Did the "Japanese imperialists," after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, really have nothing else to do but "await a convenient moment"?

In March 1939, Stalin had accused Great Britain and France of wanting to draw Europe into war while they remained on the sidelines: "In the politics of non-intervention, there is a desire not to hinder the aggressors while they do their dirty deeds, not to interfere, for example, with Japan involving itself in a war against China . . . the goal is to let all the participants of the conflict become engulfed by the quicksand of war, and let them weaken and exhaust each other. Then, when they are sufficiently weakened, one can enter the scene with fresh forces, act, of course, 'in the interests of peace,' and dictate to the weakened war participants all the terms of peace."⁴⁶ Stalin always ascribed his own

intentions to his enemies. Stalin did everything that he accused Great Britain and France of doing. Now, Japan was exhausted by the war, and it was time to intervene “in the interests of peace”: “The Soviet government, striving for the quickest possible restoration of peace, issued a declaration of war.”

The offensive operation by Soviet armies in August 1945 was truly a lightning war. “The forward battalions, accompanied by border guards, silently crossed the border without opening fire, and before the Japanese defenders had time to occupy them, took control of long-term enemy defense structures in a series of locations.”⁴⁸ In just the first day, the 6th Tank Guards Army completed a thrust of 150 kilometers. The advance took place in extremely difficult conditions. Manchurian summers were extremely rainy, especially in August.

Officially, the Soviet military campaign in the Far East lasted twenty-four days, but battles only took place for twelve days. Not even two weeks had passed before a massive surrender of the Japanese troops began. Japanese losses numbered 84,000 killed and 594,000 taken prisoner. Among the prisoners were 148 Japanese generals. Unbelievable trophies were captured. The results of the operation were enviable. The United States had fought against Japan for almost four years, and what did it receive? The Soviet Union fought against Japan for twelve days, and all of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam fell under the Soviet Union’s control. Vasilevsky happily reported:

By delivering a crushing blow to the Japanese troops in Korea, the Soviet Army created favorable conditions for the activities of revolutionaries. . . . In the northern section of the country, workers led by Communists began to build the first truly independent, democratic nation in Korean history. . . . As a result of Japan’s defeat, favorable conditions were created in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam for the victory of people’s revolutions. . . . The Chinese People’s Army of Liberation received huge reserves of trophy arms, military equipment, and supplies. . . . The defeat of Japanese militarism opened the way for national liberation movements throughout Asia. On September 2, when the Japanese foreign affairs minister Sigemitsu and Chief of Staff Umedzu signed the pact of total capitulation, President Ho Chi Minh declared the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On October 12, the Laos patriots pronounced the birth of Phatet-Lao.

For many years, Soviet officers have been taught the lightning war of 1945 as an example. It was how one must fight: in two weeks, hundreds of millions of people were under Soviet control. One should be amazed by the assault of the 6th Tank Guards Army, the thrust of the Amur flotilla up the Sungari River, the bold actions of the paratroops. The most amazing was the coordination among the troops. Tankers, pilots, artillerists, sailors, communications men, paratroops, railroad workers, sappers, and the High Command staff in the Far East, the administrations and staffs of the three fronts and one fleet, eighteen armies and one flotilla, tens of corps, divisions, and brigades, hundreds of regiments and thousands of battalions, performed like one symphony orchestra under the direction of the great maestro Vasilevsky.

I reread many times Marshal Vasilevsky's biography, his book, and his articles, before I stumbled across a sentence that made me pause for breath: "Since May 1940, the deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff worked on the operational part of a plan of strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces in the northern, northwestern, and western directions." In other words, between May 1940 and June 1941—that is, for more than a year—Major General Vasilevsky worked on preparing a plan for war against Germany. He personally prepared war plans for the Northern, Northwestern, and Western Fronts—in other words, for the Soviet troops in the Karelian, Baltic, and Byelorussian regions. These regions were precisely where the Soviet troops were hit the hardest in the summer of 1941. The troops of the Northern Front let the Finnish troops from the north through to Leningrad, and the worst blockade in human history ensued. The formations of the Northwestern Front fell apart, letting German troops through to Leningrad from the south. The troops of the Western Front in Byelorussia were almost instantly surrounded and crushed, leaving the way to Moscow wide open.

I have been taught to search for rules in the actions of enemy troop leaders, to note all moments that repeat themselves. If a general has a propensity to use the same maneuver several times, his conduct in the future can be predicted and his plans can be resisted. I used this method to analyze the battle habits of Soviet generals. I discovered that they had constantly repeated the same preparations: before carrying out the surprise attack against the Japanese 6th Army at Khalkhin-Gol in 1939; before invading Finland in 1939; before the operation to take Bessarabia in 1940; before sending Soviet troops into Iran in August 1941. They did it in all the aggressive operations of World War II, and, finally, before the sudden defeat of Japanese troops in August 1945. In the summer of 1941, they followed the same program.

Understandably, Japanese intelligence was unable to determine the true scope of the Soviet troop transfer, the date of the beginning of the invasion, or the locations chosen for the primary attacks. But still, it saw something, and in the Japanese staffs it was understood that such a troop transfer meant that sooner or later the Red Army would attack. The Japanese had only one way out: to carry out a preemptive strike against the Soviet troops. If the Japanese army had carried out an attack, the disaster of June 1941 would have been repeated in the Far East at the end of July or the beginning of August 1945. Thousands of Soviet tanks without crews, as well as thousands of airplanes without pilots in the fields, were left right on the borders. The border forests were full of piles of shells, the railroad stations with trains of fuel and ammunition. If the Japanese had attacked, they would have seized all these resources, while the Red Army would have been left without ammunition or fuel. Thousands of soldiers from the railroad troops were ready to change the Japanese tracks to the Soviet standards, but they were not prepared to blow up their own bridges and tunnels. If they had attacked, the Japanese armies could have used Soviet bridges and tunnels. Soviet artillery had advanced right up to the border, but was not protected by infantry. For the purpose of surprise, the tanks and infantry would advance to the border only at the very last moment. If they had attacked,

the Japanese could have taken thousands of Soviet cannon and howitzers, millions of shells which were already piled on the ground, and the Red Army would have been left without artillery, just like in 1941. The Red Army's command posts and communication lines were also located right at the borders. In the event of a surprise Japanese attack, the Red Army would have been left without command or communication—in other words, without a head or a nervous system.

Arriving Soviet troops were formed into tight assault formations, which made great targets for the Japanese air force. The bare areas between the attack formations were two hundred kilometers or more. The Japanese would not even have to breach Soviet defenses in these locations, because there were none there. Most importantly, the Soviet troops had no plans for defense in the Far East in the summer of 1945. Invasion plans were relayed to the troops at the very last moment. If the Japanese troops had carried out a surprise attack before August 9, 1945, Soviet troops would have suffered almost the same losses as Soviet troops in the summer of 1941 on the German border. And we would now be laughing at the stupidity of Soviet marshals, who ordered soldiers to harvest the hay in the fortified regions and sent officers to rest homes and sanatoriums. But the Japanese did not attack, since they never planned to attack the USSR, at least not in 1945.

The Aggressor

The Soviet Union entered World War II as an aggressor. Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania—all the western neighbors of the Soviet Union—fell victim to the Red Army. During talks in Berlin, Stalin's envoy Molotov demanded strongholds in Yugoslavia, in the Adriatic Sea, in Greece, in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in the Persian Gulf; he demanded that countries south of the Baku-Batumi line, in the direction of the Persian Gulf, be given over to Soviet control, including eastern Turkey, northern Iran, and Iraq. He also declared the Soviet Union's interest in southern Bukovina. Molotov constantly asked Hitler and Ribbentrop whether Germany had reconsidered its position on the fate of Finland, seeing that the Soviet Union was not going to let that country be independent. Finally, Stalin's major demand at the Berlin talks in November 1940 was for Germany to acquiesce to a Soviet military presence in Bulgaria. Molotov added, in a conversation with Hitler, that "the USSR was ready to support Bulgaria in its desire for an outlet to the Aegean Sea, and considered said desire to be just." Stalin never specified which countries his puppet Bulgaria would have to invade to reach this outlet—Greece, Turkey, or both. In reality, the Germans took Greece and gave the go-ahead for Bulgaria to annex a part of the Greek territory—western race and eastern Macedonia, thus reaching the Aegean Sea. But it was Stalin who wanted to give this go-ahead.

The Soviet Union finished World War II as an aggressor as well. It was the only country that expanded its borders as a result of World War II. Stalin annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, northern Bukovina, western Ukraine, and western Byelorussia, as well as parts of eastern Prussia with Koenigsberg, Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, the Kuril Islands, South

Sakhalin, and Bessarabia.³ Under the banner of the “great patriotic war,” Stalin punished entire peoples and nations. On Stalin’s orders, all the Chechens, Ingushes, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and other peoples were transported to empty frozen fields or waterless, lifeless steppes, and abandoned there to die. It is interesting to note that the Kalmyks, who already lived on the steppes, were not relocated further into their depths but into the Siberian taiga. Stalin controlled the fates of entire peoples, not only on the territory of the Soviet Union but also in nearby countries. Stalin relocated millions of Germans from Prussia, Silesia, and Sudet.

When the Nazi leaders went on trial in Nuremberg, Hitler’s concentration camps in Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Mulberg, Furstenwalde, Liebe-Roze, Bautzen, and others were not shut down. These concentration camps were simply taken out of the SS system and incorporated into the system of the GULAG. For example, the Nazi concentration camp at Buchenwald was transformed into “Special camp #2,” which remained operational until 1950.

The Red Army came to Central Europe with the supposedly noble goal of liberating it from the Nazis, but it left only after establishing puppet governments in most of those countries. Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, part of Austria, and Albania were forced under Stalin’s control, as well as China, North Korea, and Vietnam in Asia. On July 22, 1945, the Soviet delegation suggested that the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain separately or jointly oversee the former Italian colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. On July 23, Stalin demanded the right to create Soviet military naval bases in the Black Sea region, in the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles.⁵ He also wanted parts of Turkey—the Kars and Ardagan regions—to belong to the Soviet Union.⁶ Stalin tried to take control of West Berlin by strangling it through a blockade. Soviet agents appeared in France, Italy, and Greece. The NATO military alliance was formed with the clear goal of preventing Stalin’s troops from occupying Greece and Turkey. Stalin declared northern Iran to be a part of Azerbaijan, and right until the end of his life never gave up trying to take control of this province. Stalin set up the People’s Democratic Republic of Southern Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish People’s Democratic Republic, respectively in northern and western Iran.

In 1945, tens of millions of square kilometers of territory, occupied by millions of people, lay at Stalin’s feet. But Stalin at that time did not have the resources to control all his conquests. On June 22, 1941, Hitler dealt a lethal blow to the Soviet Union. The best part of the male population of the Soviet Union perished in the war against Germany. After the war, the USSR was supposed to have conducted a population census and calculated its war losses. But Stalin did not conduct a census. It was only conducted fourteen years after the war, when Stalin was dead. “The decision not to count all the citizens until 1959 was founded on a desire not to draw attention to the huge unjustified human losses during the war period.”

During the last year of the war, the Red Army had to recruit underage boys, without saying how many years they would have to serve. They were kept in the army for seven

to eight years. Otherwise, there would have been nobody left to serve in the gigantic army, which controlled almost half the globe. These seven to eight years lasted until Stalin's death. If he had lived longer, these soldiers would have been kept in the army for fifteen years, or even more. World War II opened unlimited opportunities for Stalin to spread Communism throughout the world, but there was nobody left in the Soviet Union to reap the crops in the fields. Famine broke out in the country in 1946 and 1947. One soldier was quoted as saying: "In this awful regiment, we were awfully hungry. Our rations were very small, plus they somehow managed to rob us." The army, which the government was supposed to feed, starved. The people, whom the government was under no obligation to feed, starved as well. The famine of 1946 and 1947 claimed the lives of about a million people. Stalin had sentenced Europe to death, but he could not carry out the execution. Hitler, according to Stalin's plans, was supposed to crush Europe, and then Stalin, with a surprise attack, would "liberate" it from Hitler. In the name of that goal, German tankers and pilots were trained in the Soviet Union, and Stalin brought Hitler to power. But Hitler ruined Stalin's plan.

Some people did not even notice that the Soviet Union lost World War II. Where was Stalin's great victorious country? The Soviet Union was created for war and conquest. It was not adapted for peacetime. It could either spread over the entire planet and kill off all normal life, or die. Stalin did not succeed in taking over the world, and this meant another war or the end of the Soviet Union in the near future. The Soviet Union was preparing itself for a new war, World War III. It concentrated all its strength and resources in preparing for a new war, and it was crushed in 1991 by the burden of its military expenditures.

12.10 Roosevelt Seeks a Pretext for War

Hitler Launches a Blitzkrieg along the Western Front

Before the Nazi armed forces had scored an important success in the Norway campaign, President Roosevelt began a series of endeavors to keep Italy out of the war. On April 29 he sent a telegram to Mussolini in which he expressed his deepest satisfaction with reference to "the policy of the Italian Government in exerting every effort to prevent war from spreading to southern and southeastern Europe." A further extension of the area of hostilities would bring into the war "still other nations which have been seeking to maintain their neutrality." He could see "no reason to anticipate that any one nation or any one combination of nations" could successfully "dominate either the continent of Europe . . . or a greater part of the world." He earnestly hoped that the powerful influence of Italy would continue to be exercised "in behalf of the negotiation of a just and stable peace." When Ambassador Phillips conveyed this message to Mussolini he was informed that "Italy, Germany and Russia did not desire an extension of the war." The Duce then expressed the opinion that "Germany could not be beaten" and that an

Allied naval blockade would be “completely ineffective.” The President should realize that the political system created by the Treaty of Versailles had been liquidated. In the new system Germany “would willingly permit a new independent Polish State” to be erected but it would not have the “old boundaries which were completely without justification.” Germany was “also willing that a new Czechoslovakian state be reestablished.” Last, but not least, certain important concessions should be given to Italy. Throughout this conversation Mussolini appeared to go “out of his way to be friendly.” He requested Ambassador Phillips to “thank President Roosevelt cordially” for his message and he seemed to be “extremely appreciative of it.”

In his diary, Count Ciano had a somewhat different story to tell. He noted that the Duce received the Roosevelt message with “ill grace” and that he said “little or nothing to the American Ambassador.” Mussolini then sent a brief note to the President in which he argued that responsibility for World War II did “not fall upon Germany but upon the initiatives of the Allies.” As far as he knew, Germany was “opposed to a further extension of the conflict, and Italy likewise.” With reference to the President’s belief that “an extension of the war fronts” might have a serious effect upon the Western Hemisphere, he called attention “to the fact that Italy has never concerned itself with the relations of the American republics with each other and with the United States (thereby respecting the Monroe Doctrine), and might therefore ask for ‘reciprocity’ with regard to European affairs.” Ciano regarded this note as “cutting and hostile.” It was certainly not conciliatory. The Duce was “literally exalted” by the news of Hitler’s victories in Norway. In a letter describing his successes the Führer complained that the “excessive rapidity” of the advance of his troops had not “permitted his involving the English forces more effectively” so as to “destroy them completely.” He intimated that he would have to “obtain a victory in the West as soon as possible” because of “hidden threats of American intervention.”

On this same day (May 4) the German General Staff issued a statement that awakened instant apprehensions in Belgium and the Netherlands. The charge was made that those countries had not maintained an impartial neutrality. It was also alleged that on January 12, 1940, some extended discussions had taken place in Breda “between Dutch, Belgian, French and British staff officers.” These discussions were supposed to have been for the purpose of aiding British and French forces to launch an “attack on the Ruhr.” Alleging the necessity of anticipating this Anglo-French invasion, the German Government began a blitzkrieg upon the Western Front. News of this attack came to President Roosevelt early on the morning of May 10 when Ambassador Cudahy telephoned the White House to report that a large German air force was already over Luxemburg en route to Belgium and the Netherlands. Later during the morning “President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull called from time to time asking for latest developments.” Cudahy replied that the news was “entirely reassuring.” But King Leopold, of Belgium, was not so confident about the situation. Fearful of the outcome of the German invasion he sent a hurried telegram to President Roosevelt expressing the ardent hope that he would support with all his “moral

authority the efforts which we are now firmly decided to make in order to preserve our independence." The President could only reply that he and the American people cherished the strong desire that "policies which seek to dominate peaceful and independent peoples through force and military aggression may be arrested, and that the government and people of Belgium may preserve their integrity and freedom."

In Rome, Ambassador Phillips told Ciano that the German blitzkrieg was "bound to stir America profoundly." It had already stirred the Pope who had sent telegrams to the "rulers of the three invaded states." This act had incensed Mussolini who blurted out to Ciano that the Papacy was "a cancer which gnaws at our national life." If necessary he would "liquidate this problem once and for all." Later the Pope evidenced a "clear-cut intransigency" and remarked that he was "even ready to be deported to a concentration camp." Into this tense and ominous atmosphere in Rome the President once more intervened by sending another note to Mussolini. Rumors that the Duce was "contemplating early entry into the war" had given him "great concern." Most Americans believed that the whole world faced a "threat which opposes every teaching of Christ, every philosophy of all the great teachers of mankind over thousands of years." Therefore, as the President of the United States he made "the simple plea that you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack."

Ciano noted that the new communication from the President was not in a "covertly threatening style." It was rather a "discouraged and conciliatory message." Allusions to the "Gospel of Christ" would have "little effect upon the mind of Mussolini," who was convinced that Germany would win the war. As an ally of Hitler, Italy could secure rich spoils of war.

Roosevelt Regards Neutrality as an Outmoded Concept

While the President was pleading with Mussolini to remain neutral in the great conflict that was wrecking Europe, he himself was pushing America down the road to war. On April 16 it was reported that the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission could obtain planes of almost any type then being produced for the armed forces of the United States. This news encouraged the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, to send to Washington (May 14) the startling request that the American Government arrange for the "sale or lease of old destroyers." On the following day Winston Churchill, who displaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister on May 10, sent a more ambitious request that was quite breath-taking:

"All I ask now is that you [President Roosevelt] should proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. Immediate needs are: First of all, the loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers; . . . Secondly, we want several hundred of the latest types of aircraft; . . . Thirdly, anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition. . . . Fourthly, the fact that our ore supply is being compromised from Sweden, from North Africa and perhaps from Northern Spain, makes it necessary to purchase steel in the United States. . . . I should like to

feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same. Fifthly, . . . the visit of a United States Squadron to Irish ports . . . would be invaluable."

The President replied that he could not make a deal concerning the destroyers "without authorization from Congress." Moreover, America "needed the destroyers" for its "own defences." Churchill greatly regretted this negative answer but he still hoped to get "at the earliest possible date" the "largest possible number of Curtiss P-40 fighters." In conclusion he sounded a loud note of alarm that he knew would profoundly affect the President. If Britain were "left by the United States to its fate," there was a definite danger that the British fleet might be turned over to the Germans as a bargaining point. We have already noted that in 1939, while Chamberlain was still Prime Minister, Churchill began his momentous personal correspondence with President Roosevelt. It has been stated that one of the first cablegrams sent by Churchill to Roosevelt was phrased in a most grandiloquent manner. The gist of it has been given as follows: "I am half American and the natural person to work with you. It is evident we see eye to eye. Were I to become Prime Minister of Britain we could control the world." Churchill states that he sent "nine hundred and fifty" of these cablegrams to the President and received "about eight hundred in reply." His relations with the American Chief Executive "gradually became so close that the chief business between our two countries was virtually conducted by these personal interchanges between him and me. . . . As head of the State as well as Head of the Government, Roosevelt spoke and acted with authority in every sphere." It is obvious that Churchill regarded Roosevelt as an American dictator who had little concern for the opinions of Congress and the American people. With reference to the matter of war the Churchill cablegrams reveal that he believed that Roosevelt could plunge America into the conflict in Europe at any time he desired. The French Cabinet apparently had the same viewpoint.

The urgency of Churchill was translated into hysteria by Premier Reynaud. On May 18, Bullitt was informed by Alexis Leger, Secretary- General of the French Foreign Office, that Reynaud was about to request President Roosevelt to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. Bullitt frankly informed Leger that such a request would be worse than useless: Congress would almost unanimously vote against such a declaration. The President then talked to Bullitt over the telephone and instructed him to say that "anything of this nature was out of the question." But Reynaud continued to press for the impossible. On May 22 he told Bullitt that the German tide was growing more menacing every minute. There was grave danger that the French public would insist upon a separate peace with Germany. In that event a German victory over Britain "would follow in a few weeks." After this dire event the Panama Canal would be destroyed by air bombardment and the "American Army would be able to offer little resistance." Prompt action by the American Government was "the only real guarantee that Hitler v/ould not some day be in the White House."

A week later the Reynaud appeals grew more frantic. On May 28 he warned Bullitt that

he had convincing evidence that "if France and England were conquered, Hitler would move almost immediately against the United States." The American fleet should be sent at once to the Mediterranean so as to exert pressure upon Mussolini to stay out of the war. The President did not send the fleet to the Mediterranean but he decided to permit American pilots to fly planes, ordered by the Allies, to Halifax and other ports in the Canadian maritime provinces. Before this decision the Dominion had been designated as a combat area and American nationals had not been allowed to enter it in aircraft belonging to belligerent nations. The President then urged Churchill to send additional planes to France but he was told that Britain needed all available aircraft for defense against expected German attack. Ambassador Bullitt became furious over this negative reply from Britain and he confided to Secretary Hull his belief that the British Cabinet "might be conserving their air force and fleet so as to use them as bargaining points in negotiations with Hitler."

Both the President and Secretary Hull discounted these observations of Bullitt. They were certain that while France "was finished," Britain, with the aid of American supplies, could withstand a German assault. It was imperative, therefore, that these supplies be rushed at once to British ports. Joseph C. Green, chief of the Division of Controls, brought to Secretary Hull's attention an old statute of May 12, 1917. The language of this statute could be interpreted so as to authorize the exchange of army and navy aircraft for new models of a more advanced type. Arrangements were made with a Buffalo concern to deliver to them fifty planes belonging to the Naval Reserve squadrons in exchange for planes of a "superior type." These planes were then rushed to Britain. But Churchill wanted more than planes. In order to meet his importunate requests, the President turned to the Acting Attorney General, Francis Biddle, who conveniently ruled that the Secretary of War had the right to sell surplus war supplies to "any corporation or individual upon such terms as may be deemed best." General George C. Marshall, as Chief of Staff, now came to the front and directed his chief of Ordnance and his Assistant Chief of Staff to survey the entire list of American reserve ordnance and munitions stocks. On June 3 he approved these lists. The first list was a lengthy one:

"It comprised half a million .30 calibre rifles out of two million manufactured in 1917 and 1918. . . . For these there were about 250 cartridges apiece. There were 900 soixante-quinze field guns with a million rounds, 80,000 machine guns and various other items. . . . On June 3 all the American Army depots and arsenals started packing the material for shipment.... By June 11 a dozen British merchant ships moved into the bay [Raritan] and anchored, and loading from lighters began."

But this flood of war materiel reached the Allies too late to stop the rapid German advance. On May 15, General Winkelman, the Dutch Commander in Chief, signed articles of capitulation. German pressure upon Belgium rapidly mounted. When General Giraud's Army in Holland was completely crushed and the French Ninth Army collapsed on the Mezieres-Dinant front, it was evident that a crisis had arisen. After the news of the British retreat to Dunkerque was brought to King Leopold he realized that the

situation had become critical. On May 27 the demoralization of the French military forces was so rapid and complete that he decided the time had arrived to ask the German High Command to state its terms for a suspension of hostilities. The blunt answer called for unconditional surrender. The King felt compelled to comply with this grim demand, and at 4:00 A.M. on the following day the Belgian Army obeyed a cease fire order from headquarters.

The President Makes a Third Plea to Mussolini to Stay Out of the War

Before the bad news from Belgium was received in the United States, the President decided to make another plea to Mussolini to stay out of the war. In this third communication to the Duce, Roosevelt offered to act as a mediator between Hitler and the Allies. Ambassador Phillips was instructed to deliver this message to Mussolini personally, but Count Ciano bluntly informed him that this was not possible. When Ciano finished reading the President's plea he was asked by Phillips as to the nature of the reply: "He said with conviction—'it would be a no' and he went on to explain that Mussolini's position was not merely a question of securing Italy's legitimate aspirations but that the Duce was determined to carry out his obligations under his alliance with Germany." Later in the day Ciano sent for Ambassador Phillips and confirmed the statements he had made during the morning meeting. Mussolini desired to preserve his "freedom of action" and was not disposed to "enter into any negotiations which . . . would not be in the spirit of Fascism."

Although to Sumner Welles the "horizon looked extremely dark," Roosevelt thought that the clouds might take on a silver lining if he could persuade Mussolini to stay out of the war. On May 30 he made his fourth appeal to the Duce. Ambassador Phillips was instructed to call upon Count Ciano and once more emphasize the fact that the entrance of Italy into the war would "immediately and prejudicially affect" the interests of the United States. While the American Government had never "asserted any political interests in Europe," it had "asserted its clearly defined interests of an economic and property character. Through the extension of the war to the Mediterranean region and the inevitable destruction of life and property . . . the legitimate interests of the American people will be gravely curtailed." Inasmuch as the relations between the Italian and American peoples had always been particularly close, it was hoped that nothing would be done adversely to affect them.

On June 1, Ciano informed Ambassador Phillips that the Duce did not agree "with the point taken by the President with regard to the interests of the United States in the Mediterranean" and he maintained that the United States had the same interest in that area as Italy had, for example, "in the Caribbean Sea." The decision had "already been taken to enter the war."

Reynaud Makes a Last Appeal to Roosevelt for Immediate Military Assistance

It had long been realized in Paris that Italy would probably enter the war as soon as Hitler's armies had gained important successes. The early collapse of the Netherlands and Belgium had made a deep impression upon the mind of Mussolini who was intent upon securing some of the spoils of war. Ambassador Bullitt knew this fact only too well and for this reason he begged the President to consent to the delivery of some old destroyers that would strengthen French naval forces in the Mediterranean. The President's reply remained negative: "Any exchange for American destroyers probably unacceptable because of enormous sea area which must be patrolled by us and would require Congressional action which might be very difficult to get. Our old destroyers cannot be sold as obsolete as is proved by fact. All of them are now in commission and in use or are in process of being commissioned for actual use."

Churchill was critical of the President's continued refusal to send old destroyers to the Allies. On June 5 he remarked to Mackenzie King that although the American Chief Executive was an excellent friend he had sent "no practical help" to Britain. He had not expected any military aid from the Americans "but they have not even sent any worthy contribution in destroyers or planes." It would be expedient "not to let Americans view too complacently prospect of a British collapse, out of which they would get the British Fleet and the guardianship of the British Empire."

On the day that Churchill sent this letter to Mackenzie King, the Germans began the final phase of the Battle of France. In five days they blazed a path to Paris. With a crushing defeat staring him in the face, Reynaud sent another plea to President Roosevelt. Its tone was quite epic but there was a strong feeling that the French Premier was like some frightened boy whistling loudly as he walked down a very dark alley: "For six days and six nights our divisions have been fighting without one hour of rest against an army which has a crushing superiority in numbers and material. Today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris. We shall fight in front of Paris; we shall fight behind Paris; we shall close ourselves in one of our provinces to fight and if we should be driven out of it we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight and if necessary in our American possessions." To make matters even worse, at this tragic hour Italy had "stabbed France in the back." The Allies were in desperate straits and required at once all the material support of the United States "short of an expeditionary force."

Reynaud's allusion of Italy's entrance into the war was turned by Roosevelt into a sharp thrust at Mussolini. That evening, in an address at Charlottesville, Virginia, the President alluded to the sweep of the tides of war across the Continent of Europe and the consequent menace to America of such a martial flood. Then, adopting a graphic phrase from Reynaud's plea earlier in the day, he suddenly remarked with dramatic intensity: "On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor." This unexpected interpolation directed at the Duce indicated the President's bitterness towards a dictator to whom he had made four futile pleas for nonintervention.

But Reynaud needed more than bitter allusions. Churchill rushed to France and tried to recall to Marshal Petain the glorious stand of the Allied armies in the spring of 1918. The Marshal replied very quietly "that in those days he had a mass of manoeuvre of upwards of sixty divisions; now there was none." In 1918 there had been "sixty British divisions in the line." In 1940 the story was tragically different and Petain was "haunted" by the grief he felt "that Britain, with her fortyeight million population had not been able to make a greater contribution to the land war against Germany." The remarks of Marshal Petain irritated Churchill considerably. On June 12 he sent to President Roosevelt the latest news from the French front and in this communication he permitted his resentment to color his message: "The aged Marshal Petain, who was none too good in April and July, 1918, is, I fear, ready to lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace for France." This was the moment for the President to "tip the balance in favour of the best and longest possible French resistance." In the White House it was believed that Reynaud's arm might be strengthened by brave words and bright promises. The Premier was assured that the American Government was "doing everything in its power" to make available to the Allied powers the war materiel they so urgently needed. The "magnificent resistance of the French and British armies" had profoundly impressed the American people.

When Ambassador Kennedy brought to Churchill a copy of this Presidential salute to Allied courage, the Prime Minister pressed for its immediate publication. It could play a "decisive part in turning the course of world history." At the very least it would "decide the French to deny Hitler a patched-up peace with France."³⁸ In a hurried note to Reynaud, Churchill indicated the compromising character of the Roosevelt message. If France, on the basis of this assurance from the American Chief Executive, would continue in the war, it should be obvious that the United States was "committed beyond recall to take the only remaining step, namely, becoming a belligerent in form as she has already constituted herself in fact."

The President realized the truth of this Churchill statement. He had already committed beyond recall the United States to take part in the war then raging in Europe but he could not afford in the summer of 1940 to let this fact become known. His campaign for re-election as President would soon take shape and he knew he could not hope for success if the voters knew that he was secretly putting America into World War II. He quickly sent word to Churchill explaining that he could not agree to the publication of his message to Reynaud. The Department of State saw in such publication the "gravest dangers." Churchill would not take this "disappointing telegram" as a final answer from the White House. On June 15 he frankly told the President that events in Europe were moving "downward at a pace where they will pass beyond the control of American public opinion." Eventually America would enter the struggle; why not now? It would be expedient to remember that if the Churchill Government fell a new cabinet might give the British fleet to Hitler. What would the United States do in that event? There was desperate need for the delivery of thirty-five destroyers at once. This matter should not be delayed.

Reynaud realized that he could not wait for several months until American assistance reached France. It was now or never. On June 14 he sent a message to Roosevelt that plumbed the depths of despair. German troops had just burst into Paris. Would it pay France to "continue to sacrifice her youth in a hopeless struggle? Unless America could rush to France's aid with armed force she would "go under like a drowning man and disappear after having cast a last look towards the land of liberty from which she awaited salvation." When Roosevelt replied with a warm encomium upon the "resplendent courage" of the French armies but with no promise of immediate military aid, Reynaud requested Churchill to release his Government from its obligations not to negotiate a separate peace. The Prime Minister hastened to France in a vain effort to save the situation, but Reynaud had resigned by the time he reached Bordeaux. Marshal Petain now assumed the burden of leadership and forwarded to Berlin a request for an armistice.

On June 18, Ambassador Biddle was assured that the French fleet would "never be surrendered to the enemy." After receiving this comforting news Secretary Hull instructed the American representatives in Berlin and Rome that the government of the United States "would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power." Germany would not be permitted to occupy any French islands in the Caribbean.

The Destroyer Deal

The fall of France imparted a sense of urgency to the Administration's program for aiding Britain by the sale or lease of war materiel. The President's qualms about constitutional limitations slowly disappeared under the drumfire of repeated requests from Churchill. Moreover, he brought into his Cabinet certain new members who were not averse to a prowar inclination. This was particularly true of the new Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who was a notorious war hawk. It is apparent that after June 1940 the Administration embarked upon a phony bipartisan policy that pointed directly to American intervention in the European conflict. This policy was given a green light on June 10 when Senator Sheppard offered an amendment to a pending defense bill authorizing the War Department to exchange unserviceable or surplus materials for others of which there was a scarcity. Senator Clark, of Missouri, declared that the purpose of the amendment was "an evasion of international law and of the Neutrality Act." But the amendment was adopted by a large majority and the measure finally became law on July 2, 1940.

In the meantime Senator David I. Walsh had sponsored legislation that would provide against any "limitation or reduction in the size of our Navy." The Act of June 28, 1940, embodied the ideas of Senator Walsh. It was not long, however, before the fertile mind of Benjamin Cohen, special assistant to the Attorney General, found several loopholes in this act. The President still had wide powers he could use without previous consultations with Congress. This opinion of Mr. Cohen was shrewdly argued but the Chief Executive

“frankly doubted” if it would “stand up.” He also feared that Congress was “in no mood at the present time to allow any form of sale.”

These doubts were dissolved under the impact of pressure from Churchill. On June 24 he wrote to Mackenzie King and once more emphasized the danger that if England fell there was the possibility that Hitler would get the British fleet. Four days later, in a letter to Lord Lothian in Washington, he repeated this disturbing thought which should be repeated to Roosevelt. He also complained that Britain had “really not had any help worth speaking of from the United States so far.” After more than a month of silence he wrote again to the President (July 31) to inform him that the need for destroyers had “become most urgent.” The whole fate of the war might rest upon the speed with which these destroyers were delivered. He was confident that the President would not “let this crux of the battle go wrong” for want of the much-needed warships. When Lord Lothian spoke of an exchange of naval bases for destroyers, Churchill indicated his preference was for an indefinite lease and not an outright sale.

Churchill’s cablegram to the President (July 31) had led to a Cabinet meeting in the White House on August 2. There was immediate agreement that “the survival of the British Isles under German attack might very possibly depend on their getting these destroyers,” but there was also recognition that legislation would be “necessary” to authorize any deal concerning the destroyers. If the British Government would give positive assurances that the British fleet “would not under any conceivable circumstances fall into the hands of the Germans,” the opposition in Congress would be “greatly lessened.” Perhaps William Allen White would work upon Wendell Willkie, Joseph Martin, and Charles McNary and thus divide the Republican ranks! When the President talked with White over the telephone he elicited a promise from the famous editor to get in touch with Willkie at once.

There was no doubt in Churchill’s mind that any transfer of American destroyers to Britain would be a “decidedly unneutral act by the United States.” It would justify a declaration of war by Hitler. Such action would be eminently agreeable to Churchill who would ardently welcome American help in the struggle against the dictatorships. But the situation had to be handled carefully. When Lord Lothian (August 6) cabled that the President was exceedingly anxious for a pledge that the British fleet would not be turned over to the Germans in the event that Britain fell, Churchill refused to give one. The British nation would “not tolerate any discussion of what we should do if our island were overrun.” It would be best to couple the transfer of destroyers with the lease of naval and air bases in Newfoundland and on some British islands in the Caribbean.

On August 13 the essential paragraphs in this agreement were worked out during a conference between the President, Secretaries Knox, Morgenthau, and Stimson, and Sumner Welles. In the meantime William Allen White had received assurances from Wendell Willkie that he would “not make a campaign issue of the transfer.” The services of General Pershing were next enlisted. The old warrior warned the American public in a broadcast that Britain needed immediate aid. This could best be given by placing at the disposal of the British and Canadian governments “at least fifty over-age destroyers

which are left from the days of the World War." Admirals Yarnell, Standley, and Stirling supported this viewpoint.

On August 16, President Roosevelt issued a statement that he was negotiating with the British Government for the acquisition of naval and air bases. Nothing was said about a deal for destroyers. Senator David I. Walsh was still showing strong opposition to such a transaction. With the hope of changing the Senator's opinion in this regard the President wrote him a letter with the familiar salutation, "Dear Dave." He assured the Senator that the British islands were "of the utmost importance to our national defence as naval and operating bases." After reminding him that Jefferson in 1803 had purchased Louisiana "without even consulting Congress," the President then expressed the hope that there would be no further opposition to a deal that would be the "finest thing for the nation that has been done in your lifetime and mine."

"Dear Dave" did not fall for this bait so he was later smeared as a loose character. But even so staunch a New Dealer as Secretary Hull had doubts about a destroyer deal and he regretfully informed Lord Lothian that in order "to meet the wishes of your Government an amendment to these provisions of law [the United States Code and the Act of June 28, 1940] may be necessary." But this would take time and Britain's need was immediate. In the meantime Churchill on August 20 had announced in Parliament that negotiations were in progress for leasing air and naval bases in Newfoundland and on British islands in the Caribbean to the United States. Two days later he explained to President Roosevelt the difficulties that would attend any exchange of letters that would admit "in any way that the munitions which you send us are a payment for the facilities." The dispatch of war materiel to Britain should seem to be "a separate spontaneous act on the part of the United States, arising out of their view of the world struggle." But Sumner Welles informed Lord Lothian that under existing legislation it was "utterly impossible" for the President to send destroyers to Britain as a spontaneous gift; they could be sent only as a quid pro quo.

On August 23 the President confessed to Secretary Hull that the negotiations with Britain "on the bases and destroyers have bogged down. Please see what you can do." In an extended conference among the President, Secretary Hull, and Lord Lothian the matter was further explored. Secretary Hull made it clear to the British Ambassador that the President "had no authority whatever to make a gift of public property to any Government or individual." But Attorney General Jackson had no trouble finding convenient loopholes in existing legislation. His assistant, Ben Cohen, had also discovered them some months previously. The Act of June 15, 1917, made it unlawful to send any ship out of the United States that was "built, armed or equipped as a vessel of war, with any intent or under any agreement or contract . . . that such vessel shall be delivered to a belligerent nation." This restriction did not apply "to vessels like the over-age destroyers which were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into, vessels of war with the intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent."

Mr. Jackson blandly pushed aside the pertinent provisions of the Treaty of Washington

(May 8, 1871) and Article 8 of the Hague Convention XIII of 1907 which required that a neutral government take measures to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to engage in belligerent operations, if the vessel was specially adapted within the neutral's jurisdiction to warlike use. The one precedent that Mr. Jackson adduced to support his contention concerning the transfer of destroyers was a most dubious one. Indeed, the opinion of the Attorney General was distinctly "phony" and was based upon the familiar dictum: "What's the Constitution between friends." The way was now prepared for the destroyer deal. On September 2 notes were exchanged between Secretary Hull and Lord Lothian which first recited that the British Government, freely and without consideration, granted to the United States a lease for the "immediate establishment and use of naval and air bases and facilities" on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda. The second item dealt with the establishment by the United States of air and naval bases on certain British territory in the Caribbean (Bahamas, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British Guiana) in exchange "for naval and military equipment and material which the United States Government will transfer to His Majesty's Government." The leases would run for a period of 99 years. At the same time Churchill also gave an assurance that the British fleet would not be scuttled or surrendered. This assurance was not to be published.

From the viewpoint of international law the destroyer deal was definitely illegal. As Professor Herbert Briggs correctly remarks: "The supplying of these vessels by the United States Government to a belligerent is a violation of our neutral status, a violation of our national law, and a violation of international law." Professor Edwin Borchard expressed a similar opinion: "To the writer there is no possibility of reconciling the destroyer deal with neutrality, with the United States statutes, or with international law." The whole matter was correctly described by the 57. *Louis Post-Dispatch* in a pertinent headline: "Dictator Roosevelt Commits an Act of War."

Propaganda Pushes America towards Intervention

During the years 1914 and 1917, British propaganda played a significant part in preparing the American mind for intervention in the World War. In the period prior to American intervention in World War II the British Government did not have to bear a heavy burden of propaganda: there were thousands of Americans who eagerly assumed this responsibility. The colorful story of these merchants of death has been told in such detail that it will be given merely a brief mention in these pages. Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick gave Roosevelt an excellent cue when he remarked that "of all the ways for Christians to make a war seem holy, the simplest way is to get Jesus into it." The President followed this tip on January 4, 1939, when he addressed Congress on the state of the nation. Storms from abroad were challenging three institutions "indispensable to Americans, now as always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy and international good

faith. . . . We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world which observe the sanctity of treaties and good faith in their dealings with other nations cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations."

The belligerent implications of these words were not lost upon members of Congress who fully realized the dangers and futility of embarking upon a holy war. Their fears were heightened when the President enlarged upon the same theme in an international broadcast under the auspices of the Christian Foreign Service convocation: "Today we seek a moral basis for peace. . . . It cannot be a moral peace if freedom from invasion is sold for tribute. . . . The active search for peace which the early Christians preached meant meeting and overcoming those forces in the world which had set themselves against the brotherhood of man and which denied the equality of souls before the throne of God." Catholic leaders did not respond to this summons to enlist the churches in a movement towards intervention. Catholic cardinals like O'Connell and Dougherty were strongly opposed to America's entry into World War II, and the Catholic press was outspoken in its criticism of the implications in the President's policy. The Catholic World thought Americans "were in no position to save anyone. We shall be lucky to save ourselves. . . . What kind of madness has got hold of those who advocate our settling the quarrels of the world, changing the habits of nations that have been fighting for the last thousand years? Who do we think we are?" The Ave Maria was equally opposed to intervention: "The people of this country do not want war at this moment; they can see no transgression against our safety or honor to justify a war. . . . They have no commission, human or divine, to challenge aggression not directed against them."

The Ave Maria was particularly sharp in its criticism of William Allen White, famous Kansas editor, who was "doing everything humanly possible to get us into the European conflict." It was certainly true that White had been very busy in the fight against fascism. He was a member of the Union for Concerted Peace Efforts, the American Committee for Non-participation in Japanese Aggression, the National Refugee Service, the Council Against Intolerance, and the Non-partisan Committee for Peace through the Revision of the Neutrality Law. This last organization was an active pressure group in favor of sabotaging existing neutrality legislation. After this work had been carried to a successful conclusion, White helped to launch the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. The implications of this movement should have been evident to him. In December 1939, Robert Sherwood wrote to White to express the view that "it was necessary for the United States to intervene in a military way to check aggression by dictators." In his reply White remarked that he had always stood with Sherwood "in spirit" but had been constrained "by an old man's fear and doubt when it comes to lifting my voice for war."

In the spring of 1940 after this new organization had begun its activities, White became feverish in his anxiety to speed the gift of munitions of war to the hard-pressed Allies. In July he and the members of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies bent every effort to secure "the release of fifty or sixty over-age but recently reconditioned

American destroyers to England." When the President failed to show any great enthusiasm to push through a destroyer deal, White felt that "he had, as it were, lost his cud." Contact was made with large numbers of influential persons throughout the United States and they were urged to exert pressure upon the Chief Executive. The committee with its six hundred local chapters and thousands of volunteer workers was able to inundate the Capitol in Washington with a flood of letters and telegrams favoring the destroyer deal. The President owed a big debt to White who was so naive as to believe that America could walk halfway down the road to war and then stop.

This naivete was clearly indicated on December 20, 1940, in a letter he wrote to Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain. He assured Howard that "the only reason in God's world" he was a member of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was to keep America "out of war." Some of the war hawks on the committee deeply resented White's letter to Howard. When Frederick McKee flew to Emporia to persuade White to issue a statement that he was "not for peace at any price," he was met with a flat refusal. But White then showed his mental confusion by signing a round-robin letter to the President urging him to do "everything that may be necessary to insure defeat of the Axis powers." This letter, as the committee recognized, had "more warlike implications than the repeal of the neutrality law or the convoy issue." But there were still some lingering doubts in the mind of Clark Eichelberger who wired White on December 26 about the "unfortunate repercussions" of the letter that had appeared in the Scripps-Howard newspapers. It was at last apparent to White that he had failed to understand the real intentions of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Its real drive was towards war, not peace. In his letter of resignation he confessed that he was "amazed" that he was "so far behind the procession," but he would go "no faster nor no further." He had been used as a convenient facade by an organization that had talked of peace while rushing down the road to war. He was the symbol of millions of Americans.

Lend-Lease

It was entirely fitting that lend-lease legislation should have a prelude of promises by the President that American boys would not be sent abroad to die along far-flung frontiers. It had been evident to the President in the summer of 1940 that American involvement in World War II might be just around the corner of the next year. Senator Wheeler had read between the lines of the President's pronouncements and when he saw the word war written in bold letters he tried to block such a contingency by a strongly-worded plank in the Democratic platform. But the pledge to keep out of "foreign wars" was nullified by the pregnant phrase—"except in case of attack." It would not be difficult for an Administration seeking war to push one of the Axis powers to the point where an attack was inevitable.

But the American people, like William Allen White, had to be fooled by pacific phrases. When the election currents in the fall of 1940 appeared to be making a turn towards

Wendell Willkie, the President made some new pledges at Philadelphia on October 23: "To every man, woman and child in the nation I say this: Your President and your Secretary of State are following the road to peace. . . . We are arming ourselves not for any purpose of conquest or intervention in foreign disputes." A week later, in Boston, his pledge became more specific: "While I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

Robert Sherwood who helped to prepare this Boston speech had some qualms of conscience in later years: "For my own part, I think it was a mistake for him [the President] to go so far in yielding to the hysterical demands for sweeping reassurance, but, unfortunately for my own conscience, I happened at the time to be one of those who urged him to go the limit on this. . . . I burn inwardly whenever I think of those words 'again—and again—and again.' " In the spring of 1941 these fires of conscience were burning very low in the President's entourage. Under the impact of appeals from Churchill in England the entire structure of American neutrality was finally demolished by the legislative bomb of lend-lease. This bomb was many months in the making. On November 6, 1940, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt to express his profound relief at the election results: "I feel you will not mind my saying that I prayed for your success and that I am truly thankful for it. . . . I must avow my sure faith that the lights by which we steer will bring us all safely to anchor." Those lights would lead America into the war.

On December 8, 1940, Churchill sent another long letter in which he outlined in great detail the pressing needs of Britain. In Churchill's eyes these needs were also America's needs because Britain was fighting our war as well as hers. The safety of the United States was "bound up with the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Therefore, America should rush to Britain war materiel of specified kinds together with the gift or loan "of a large number of American vessels of war." It was useless to expect Britain to pay for these loans. The moment was approaching when the British Government would "no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies." The few dollars Britain had left were badly needed for domestic requirements. It would be wrong "in principle" for Britain to be "divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone." America should bear a large part of the financial burden for a new crusade in Europe. Roosevelt received this communication while he was cruising in the Caribbean. When he returned on December 16 he signified his ardent approval of aid to Britain at America's expense. On the following day, at a press conference, he recited an interesting parable:

"four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out the fire. Now what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, "Neighbor, my garden hose cost me fifteen dollars; you have to pay me fifteen dollars for it." No! What is the transaction that goes on? I don't want fifteen dollars—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over.... What I am trying to

do is to eliminate the dollar sign.”

What he really meant to say was that he was trying to eliminate the dollar sign so far as Britain was concerned. The American taxpayers would have it before their anxious eyes for the next generation. But before they had time to make any estimates, a lend-lease bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. It bore the significant number H.R. 1776. In that year we declared our independence from Britain; in 1941 we put it into grave peril by giving Britain a blank check which Churchill filled in with great gusto and then sent back to Washington for Roosevelt's indorsement. Harry Hopkins was the contact man in this regard and while still in Britain he heard Churchill's famous broadcast in which the following dangerous nonsense was beamed to rapt American listeners:

“It seems now to be certain that the Government and the people of the United States intend to supply us with all that is necessary for victory. In the last war the United States sent two million men across the Atlantic. But this is not a war of vast armies, firing immense masses of shells at one another. We do not need the gallant armies which are forming throughout the American Union. We do not need them this year, nor next year, nor any year that I can foresee.”

These assurances of Churchill were of the same stripe as the Roosevelt assurances during the last days of his campaign for re-election. He probably remembered Lord Northcliffe's sharp indictment of the American masses during the World War: “What sheep! They could be sheared once more for British benefit by constant repetition of the old propaganda line about Britain fighting America's fight. Roosevelt repeated this line on December 29 in a “fireside chat” to the American people. Aid to Britain was now a question of “national security.” If Britain were conquered, “all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun.”

On the following day the President summoned to the White House, Secretary Morgenthau and Arthur Purvis, head of the Anglo-French Purchasing Commission, to discuss the details of lend-lease legislation. On January 2, 1941, Edward Foley, Morgenthau's general counsel, and his assistant, Oscar Cox, began the arduous task of drafting the bill. When opposition to the bill developed in certain circles in the State Department, Secretary Knox remarked to Morgenthau in his best seriocomic manner: “Let's organize a hanging bee over there someday and hang the ones that you and I pick out.” Some of the clique around the President probably would have regarded the matter of a hanging bee very seriously when Senator Wheeler began a series of blasts against lend-lease legislation. On January 4, 1941, he asked some very pertinent questions: “If it is our war, how can we justify lending them stuff and asking them to pay us back? If it is our war, we ought to have the courage to go over and fight it, but it is not our war.” A week later, in a radio broadcast, he feathered a shaft that evoked an immediate cry of pain from the sensitive President. He regarded the lend-lease program as “the New Deal's 'triple A' foreign policy—to plow under every fourth American boy.” The President deeply resented these prophetic words and denounced the Wheeler comment upon lend-lease as the “rottenest thing that has been said in public life in my generation.”

Although Admiral Stark expressed on January 13 the opinion that “we are heading straight for this war,” the lend-lease program was sold to the American people as a form of peace insurance. On March 11, 1941, the lend-lease bill was signed by the President, and it was not long before a forecast of Senator Taft was proved correct: “I do not see how we can long conduct such a war [undeclared war] without actually being in the shooting end of the war.”

Hitler Is Anxious to Avoid Conflict with the United States

This “shooting end of the war” was greatly feared by Hitler who strove in every way to avoid any incident that might lead to war with the United States. In order to conciliate public opinion in neutral countries, submarine commanders, from the very beginning of the war, had been directed “to conform to the Hague Convention.” Passenger lines were not to be torpedoed even when under escort. In September and October 1939, Hitler had high hopes that America might be induced to accept the role of mediator and thus bring to an early close a war that he had entered with many misgivings. In a previous chapter we have dealt with the mission of William Rhodes Davis to Berlin for the purpose of arranging mediation. It is apparent that Berlin took this mission quite seriously. In Hitler’s speech of October 6 there were evident indications of his readiness to accept Roosevelt as mediator, and on the following day Mr. Kirk, American charge d’affaires in Berlin, cabled to Secretary Hull that “someone close to Hitler had conveyed the thought that the President might use Hitler’s speech as the occasion to send a confidential message to him endorsing his ‘efforts toward peace.’” On October 9, Kirk cabled that a German press spokesman informed him that Germany “would certainly accept from the President a suggestion for a truce and negotiations toward peace and intimated that Germany might take part in a conference somewhere far removed from the war theater—which some interpreted to mean Washington.”

The terms of peace that Germany would present to such a peace conference were made known to the President and Secretary Hull through the long letter that William Rhodes Davis had sent to the Chief Executive. General Goring had spoken to Mr. Davis (October 3) in the following terms:

“You may assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish State and a new Czechoslovakian independent government would come into being. . . . As for myself and my Government, I would be glad to attend and in the event of such a conference I would represent Germany. I agree that the conference should be in Washington.”

At this time Germany was already profoundly disturbed by the way the Russians were acting in Poland. During the meetings of a peace conference in Washington there would be an opportunity to focus the eyes of the world upon the ills of Europe and attempt to remedy them. If the President had possessed real courage and vision he would have welcomed these German overtures and staged a peace conference that would have saved

both Poland and Czechoslovakia. But he and Secretary Hull were fearful that a move towards peace might benefit Hitler and discourage the Allies so they rejected the German peace feelers⁹⁸ and thus prepared the way for eventual Red domination over both those countries. In the long chapter of historical might-have-beens, Roosevelt plays a prominent and dismal part.

Roosevelt's rejection of the idea of a peace conference in Washington did not put an end to Nazi efforts to conciliate the United States. Hitler was exceedingly anxious not to have war with America. This fact is clear in the testimony given during the Niirnberg trials. Ribbentrop insisted upon the pacific disposition of the Fihrer concerning the United States," and Weizsacker confirmed this fact: "No German desired to be at war with the United States or looked for trouble in that direction. . . . We were not to let ourselves be provoked to be the ones who bring the conflict to the open daylight. Wherever there would be unfriendly acts, . . . we would not be the ones who start." The German press, under strict instructions, stopped its sharp criticism of the United States and of prominent American officials. Nazi officials became increasingly careful about any statements that might offend American sensibilities, and the German charge d'affaires in Washington (Dr. Hans Thomsen), in a press release, went so far as to call President Roosevelt "high-minded" and to praise his admonitions of neutrality. In April 1940, General Walther von Brauchitsch assured representatives of the press that he had always admired the youthful strength of the United States and its people to which he attributed the "gigantic success of the new continent."

The new American neutrality law (November 4, 1939) gave certain satisfaction to Hitler who assured leading Nazis that it would render the United States harmless. Under this law the waters around the British Isles and the entire European coast from Bergen to the Spanish border were closed to American ships.¹⁰⁴ These restrictions pleased the Fihrer who decreed on December 30, 1939, that American crews were to be treated "with the greatest consideration." In this same spirit Admiral Raeder issued instructions that American ships were not to be pursued or sunk in order that "all difficulties which might result from trade war between the United States and Germany might-be avoided at the very beginning." But this German policy of conciliation was sorely tried by incidents arising out of the establishment of a neutrality zone announced by the Panama Conference, October 3, 1939. This safety belt around the Americas south of Canada varied in width from 300 to 1000 miles. Belligerents were warned to refrain from naval action within that area, but no armed forces were stationed along the safety belt to enforce this regulation.

In order to conciliate America the German Admiralty issued orders designed to prevent naval engagements within this safety belt. When the Admiralty wished to recede from this position, Hitler refused to permit any change of orders. Moreover, the Fihrer adhered to this conciliatory policy even when American vessels adopted a course that must have enraged him. In December 1939 the German liner Columbus left Veracruz and was closely trailed by the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa which constantly broadcasted her position. This action compelled the Nazi captain to scuttle his ship some 450 miles east of Cape May. The

same tactics were pursued by the U.S.S. Broome in trailing the Rhein, which also was scuttled by her captain. The freighter Idarwild was followed by the Broome until it was destroyed by H.M.S. Diomedé (November 1940), with the Broome standing by to watch the result of her pursuit. The German Government refrained from filing any protest at these actions.

At a naval conference on March 18, Admiral Raeder was finally able to secure an important concession from the Führer. This took the form of a new blockade order (March 25, 1941) which not only included Iceland but went as far as the waters of Greenland. The first naval incident in the North Atlantic would soon take place.

The background for such an incident had been carefully filled in by President Roosevelt. In August 1940 he had sent Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Major General D. C. Emmons, and Major General George V. Strong to London for exploratory conversations concerning eventual "armed co-operation with the British Commonwealth." After some months of conversations with important officers in the British armed services, Admiral Ghormley, in October 1940, sent to Admiral Stark a full report on his mission. Stark, in turn, presented to Secretary Knox on November 12 a memorandum on national objectives. One of the most important items in this memorandum was "the prevention of the disruption of the British Empire." In order to achieve this objective, in January 1941 a series of secret staff conversations began in Washington. Two months later (March 27, 1941), the ABC-i Staff Agreement was consummated which envisaged a "full-fledged war co-operation when and if Axis aggression forced the United States into the war." One of the sections of this agreement was aimed at creating an incident that would "force the United States into the war." It contained the following explosive phraseology: "Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers." In order to carry out this task the Royal Navy hastened to give the United States Navy the "benefit of its experience, and of the new devices and methods for fighting submarines that had already been evolved." The responsibility "now assumed by the United States Navy meant the organization of a force for escort-of-convoy." On February 1, 1941, this patrol force was given "the new and appropriate designation of Atlantic Fleet," and its commander, Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, was promoted to the rank of Admiral and designated Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet. The first naval incident was almost at hand.

On April 10, 1941, the destroyer N/black (Lieutenant Commander E. R. Durgin), in the waters off Iceland, picked up three boatloads of survivors from a torpedoed Netherlands freighter. As the last men were being pulled aboard, the sound operator made contact on a submarine. The division commander, D. L. Ryan, immediately assumed that the submarine was approaching for an attack so he ordered Mr. Durgin to drop some depth charges which caused the submarine to retire. This was the first action between United States and German armed forces. As the system of convoy escorts developed in accordance with Anglo-American plans, other incidents were bound to occur. On April 17, John

O'Donnell, well-known newspaper commentator, published a statement that "battlecraft" of the American Navy and Coast Guard were "giving armed escort to munition-laden British merchantmen leaving American ports." The President, through his secretary, Mr. Early, replied that American naval forces were merely on "neutrality patrol" in the Atlantic. He then charged that Mr. O'Donnell was guilty of a "deliberate lie." On April 25, during a press conference, the President expressly denied that naval escorts were being provided for fleets carrying lend-lease goods, and he developed at great length the difference between patrolling and convoying. A month later (May 27), in a national broadcast, he insisted that the delivery of war materiel to Britain was "imperative" and then stated that he had extended "our patrol in north and south Atlantic waters."

It was evident to Senator Taft that the President's broadcast disclosed "an intention on his part to push further and further toward war without consulting the people. . . . His speech contains vague threats of aggressive, warlike action to be undertaken in his sole discretion." Two weeks later the *Washington Post* printed a story by two columnists, Alsop and Kintner, to the effect that more than a month earlier there had been an encounter between American and German vessels of war and this had been followed by offensive operations on the part of an American destroyer. The columnists were making a specific reference to the Niblack incident which had been kept very quiet by navy authorities. Secretary Knox promptly denounced this story but failed to confirm or explicitly deny it. In further statements he was purposely vague.

While these exercises in double talk were being carried on, the President was taking active measures to see that Greenland did not fall into German hands. On January 9, 1941, the Department of State issued a release indicating that an American consulate had been established at Godthaab, and that provision had been made for the purchase in the United States of small arms for the Greenland police. These steps were followed by the signature (April 9, 1941) of an agreement authorizing the United States to occupy Greenland for defensive purposes. Inasmuch as the Danish Minister in Washington (Henrik Kauffmann) had no authority to conclude such an agreement, he was recalled by the Nazi-controlled Danish Foreign Office. He preferred to remain in Washington and was recognized by Secretary Hull as the regularly accredited minister. Needless to say, from the viewpoint of international law, this whole transaction was legally indefensible. In the meantime the Fiihrer was showing a strong determination to adhere to his policy of keeping out of war with the United States. In May 1941 the German attitude was summed up at a meeting between Hitler and his naval advisers:

Whereas up to now the situation confronting submarines and naval forces on operations was perfectly clear, naval warfare in the North Atlantic is becoming increasingly complicated as the result of the measures taken by the U.S.A. In order to help Britain, the American neutrality patrol, which was hitherto confined to the area within the American neutrality zone, has been reinforced and considerably extended toward the east to about 38 degree W., i.e. as far as the middle of the Atlantic. The true character of the American neutrality patrol is shown by the fact that vessels on patrol have also been instructed

to report by radio any battleships encountered. . . . We have laid down the following rules for naval warfare in order to comply with German political aims with regard to the U.S.A.: No attack should be made on U.S. naval forces and merchant vessels. Prize regulations are not to be applied to U.S. merchant ships. Weapons are not to be used, even if American vessels conduct themselves in a definitely unneutral manner. Weapons are to be used only if U.S. ships fire the first shot. As a result of these instructions and of the constant endeavors on the part of Germany not to react to provocation, incidents with the U.S.A. have been avoided up to the present time. It is unmistakable that the U.S. Government is disappointed about this cautious attitude on the part of Germany, since one of the most important factors in preparing the American people for entry into the war is thus eliminated. The U.S. is therefore continuing its attempt to obliterate more and more the boundary line between neutrality and belligerency, and to stretch the "short of war" policy further by constantly introducing fresh measures contrary to international law.

The next naval incident involving German-American relations was the sinking of the American merchant ship (May 21, 1941) Robin Moor, New York to Cape Town, by a German submarine. There was no visit or search but the crew and passengers were allowed to take to open lifeboats. As the sinking occurred outside the blockade zone it is evident that the submarine commander disregarded orders concerning American ships. Admiral Raeder immediately issued orders to prevent further incidents of this nature, and Hitler, after confirming these instructions, remarked that he wished to "avoid any incident with the U.S.A." On June 20 the President sent a message to Congress in which he bitterly criticized Germany as an international outlaw. He followed this message with another move in the direction of war. On July 7 he ordered American occupation of Iceland. Two days later Secretary Knox gave a statement to the press which implied that the American patrol force in the North Atlantic had the right to use its guns when the occasion arose.

This occasion arose on September 4, 1941, when the destroyer Greer, bound for Iceland, was informed by a British plane that a submerged U-boat lay athwart her course some ten miles ahead. The Greer at once laid a course for the reported submarine, and after having made sound contact with it, kept it on her bow for more than three hours. During this period a British plane dropped four depth charges in the vicinity of the submarine without effect. Finally, the submarine commander grew tired of this game of hide-and-seek and launched a torpedo which the Greer was able to dodge. When the Greer counterattacked with depth charges, the submarine launched another torpedo which was avoided. When sound contact with the submarine could not be reestablished, the Greer resumed course for Iceland. On September 11 the President gave a broadcast which presented a distorted version of the Greer incident. He conveniently forgot to tell that the initiative had been taken by the Greer: "She [the Greer] was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable. She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. . . . We have sought no shooting war

with Hitler. . . . The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense." American vessels would now shoot at sight.

In the face of this serious incident that clearly showed the aggressive character of American naval patrolling, Hitler maintained his policy of avoiding difficulties with the United States. On September 17 orders concerning American merchant vessels exempted them from attack, even when in convoy, in all zones except that immediately surrounding the British Isles. In the Pan-American safety belt "no warlike acts" were to be carried out on German initiative. The American answer to these pacific gestures was to authorize escort duty for American destroyers. It was arranged that an American escort group, based on Argentia, should take over from a Royal Canadian Navy escort at a designated place off Newfoundland and hand over the convoy to a Royal Navy escort at an agreed mid-ocean meeting place. Convoying was now an established practice, and it should be kept in mind that Secretary Knox, during the lend-lease hearings, had frankly admitted that he regarded convoying as an "act of war."

This de facto war in the Atlantic soon produced another incident. On October 16 five American destroyers rushed from Reykjavik, Iceland, to the help of a convoy that was being attacked by submarines. On the following day, while in the midst of the fighting, the destroyer Kearny was struck by a torpedo and slowly made its way back to Iceland. It had deliberately moved into the center of a pitched battle between German submarines and British and Canadian warships and had taken the consequences. It was not long before President Roosevelt gave to the American people a twisted account of the incident. On October 27 he recounted the happenings on October 16 and 17 and asserted that he had "wished to avoid shooting." America had "been attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this Nation. . . . Hitler's torpedo was directed at every American." In order to give additional overtones of villainy to his description of Nazi wickedness he then stated that he had a secret map made in Germany which disclosed Hitler's plan to put all the continent of South America under his domination. But that was not all. He had in his possession another document made in Germany that revealed Hitler's intention, if he was victorious, to "abolish all existing religions."

It should be evident that the "forward march of Hitlerism" should be stopped. . . . We are pledged to pull our own oar in the destruction of Hitlerism." The American Navy had been given orders to "shoot on sight." The Nazi "rattlesnakes of the sea" would have to be destroyed.

This declaration of war was confirmed by the Reuben James incident. On October 31, while the Reuben James was escorting a convoy to Iceland, some German submarines were encountered about 600 miles west of that island. The American destroyer was struck by a torpedo and rapidly sank. Only 45, out of a crew of about 160, were saved. When the news of the sinking of the Reuben James reached Germany, Hitler remarked: "President Roosevelt has ordered his ships to shoot the moment they sight German ships. I have ordered German ships not to shoot when they sight American vessels but to defend

themselves when attacked." On November 13, 1941, the directives for conduct of German warships when encountering American naval vessels remained pacific: "Engagements with American naval or air forces are not to be sought deliberately; they are to be avoided as far as possible. . . . If it is observed before a convoy is attacked that it is being escorted by American forces, the attack is not to be carried out."

Germany was trying desperately to stay out of war with the United States. America's attitude was clearly stated by Sumner Welles at Arlington on November 11: "Beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror has reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom. It is his boast that his system shall prevail even unto the ends of the earth. . . . The American people after full debate . . . have determined upon their policy. They are pledged . . . to spare no effort and no sacrifice in bringing to pass the final defeat of Hitlerism and all that which that evil term implies. . . . We cannot know, we cannot yet foresee, how long and how hard the road may be which leads to that new day when another armistice will be signed."

To the mind of Welles and to others in the White House group it was obvious that America was really in the war. But the American people did not realize that momentous fact, nor did they know that they were pledged "to spare no effort and no sacrifice in bringing to pass the final defeat of Hitlerism." It was easy for Mr. Welles to speak glibly of sacrifice. He had long enjoyed wealth and high social position. The word "sacrifice" had always been excluded from his dictionary. As the spokesman for the President he was suddenly breaking to the American people the dread news that they had become involved in a war they had ardently wished to avoid. The war hawks of 1941 were never tired of sneering at the majority of Americans as benighted isolationists who had tried to build a Chinese wall around the United States and thus cut it off from all foreign contacts. They knew their sneers were patent lies. America had never been isolated from the social, economic, religious, and cultural forces that shaped the modern world. Thanks to its geographical position it had escaped the recurring tides of conflict that had crumbled the walls of ancient civilizations and washed away the heritage men had earned through dauntless courage and high endeavor. Americans had been isolationists only against war and its evident evils, and their country had grown prosperous beyond the dreams of the founding fathers.

But in 1915, President Wilson began to nurse the thought of sharing America's ideals and wealth with the rest of the world, and two years later he led us into a foreign war that he hoped would make the world safe for democracy. But this theme song turned sour in American ears when it led to the great parade of 1917 which ended for many men in the vast cemeteries in France. It gained new popularity after 1933, and with Roosevelt as maestro, the old macabre accents began to haunt every home. In 1941 his orchestra of death was anxiously waiting for the signal to begin the new symphony. He had hoped for a German motif but Hitler had refused to assist with a few opening martial notes. Perhaps some Japanese statesman would prove more accommodating! At any rate, after the Reuben James incident had fallen flat he turned his eyes towards the

Orient and sought new inspiration from the inscrutable East. He found it at Pearl Harbor when Japanese planes sounded the first awesome notes in a chorus of war that is still vibrating throughout the world. The story of how the first notes in the script of that chorus were written in by President Roosevelt is told in the next chapter.

12.11 Pearl Harbor: A forced Incident

When the President perceived that Hitler would not furnish the pretext for a war with Germany, he turned to the Far East and increased his pressure upon Japan. The path to Pearl Harbor had already been pointed out by Mr. Hornbeck in February 1939. After discussing how the American Government had tried to restrain the Japanese advance in North China by "moral and economic opposition," he stated his belief that in the long run the situation would so "develop that military opposition by this country will have to be offered." But Herbert Feis, the adviser on International Economic Affairs, still favored economic pressure, so on July 26, 1939, Secretary Hull sent a note to Ambassador Horinouchi informing him that the Treaty of February 21, 1911, would terminate on January 26, 1940. The way was thus prepared for an all out economic offensive against Japan. But before this could be launched, several incidents arose which further disturbed the course of Japanese-American relations.

Japanese Bombings of Chungking

On July 10 the American charge d'affaires in Tokyo called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and made "the strongest possible representation with regard to the recent bombings at Chungking." Mr. Arita said that he was "distressed" to learn that Ambassador Johnson and his staff "had been put in jeopardy," but it was "impossible for him to promise that the bombing of Chungking would cease." Attack from the air was an important phase of the military operations in that area. On this same day the President informed Secretary Hull that he desired to receive "without delay a statement from the Japanese Government in regard to the matter." On July 20 the Japanese Ambassador had a conference with Secretary Hull. When the Ambassador explained that military necessities dictated the bombings, Hull sharply rebuffed him by remarking that if the bombings continued "something very serious was liable to happen." When the Ambassador murmured that he hoped the American Government would urge its nationals to "keep away from places of danger," Hull acidly replied that the United States did not "concede the right of any other outside country to a monopoly of highways or streets or other localities in China."

The Tientsin Affair

It was soon apparent that the Department of State was adopting a far more aggressive attitude towards Japan than was the British Foreign Office. This fact was given a

convincing demonstration in the Tientsin affair. During the World War the Chinese liquidated the Austrian and German concessions in this city, and in 1920 the Russian concession was taken over. British investment in its concession in Tientsin was estimated at \$46,000,000; French investment in the French concession was considerably less. In the British concession banks held silver to the value of \$50,000,000 in the name of the Chinese Nationalist Government. When they refused to turn this over to Japanese authorities, reprisals were ordered against the British and French concessions. Barricades and wire entanglements were erected around them and they were subjected to a rigorous blockade. As a result of this pressure Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, consented to sign a far-reaching agreement (the Craigie-Arita Agreement) on July 21. Under the terms of this formula the British Government fully recognized that as long as large-scale military operations were in progress in China, the Japanese forces there would insist upon "special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in the regions under their control, and that they have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy."

The Department of State had no intention of following the British policy of appeasement. Although the Japanese had been unusually conciliatory towards the Americans and had given assurances that their goods would be permitted to move through the embargoes around the British and French concessions, the Department of State was disposed to challenge the Japanese program in Tientsin. Its attitude was reflected in a memorandum prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs:

"If Great Britain should give way at Tientsin and substantially meet Japanese demands there, that surrender would signal to Japan Great Britain's vulnerability to further demands and would be the beginning of abandonment by the Powers of the National Government of China. If Great Britain and France were driven, through pressure . . . to close the French Indochina and Burman routes, the United States would be unable, in defense of its own interests, to afford China any further material assistance in the latter's resistance to Japanese aggression. If the United States does not make an effort at this point, the assistance of Great Britain and France may well be lost to any later efforts that developments may require the United States to make."

The outbreak of World War II eliminated any possibility that either Britain or France could give any real assistance to the United States in the Far East. It also occasioned a careful survey by the Japanese of the impact of the war upon its program. The Nazi-Soviet Pact had deeply disturbed Japanese statesmen who had welcomed ties with Germany as one means of blunting any Soviet thrust in the Far East. The international situation had to be restudied and a policy of caution was an imperative. From the American Embassy in Tokyo came a report that "the immediate effects of a European war should bring about a sharp increase in the demand for American goods, particularly cotton, wood pulp, machinery and other industrial equipment, nonferrous metals, iron and steel and chemicals." Without these imports from America, "Japan's industrial expansion program

would completely break down." America would have to be conciliated.

Chiang Kai-shek Asks that Roosevelt Mediate in Sino-Japanese War

While European statesmen were having a case of war jitters, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly asked for Roosevelt mediation in the Sino-Japanese War. On September 1 the Chinese Ambassador in Paris called on Bullitt and gave him the substance of some long telegrams he had received from Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo hoped that President Roosevelt could "take action immediately to put an end to the war between China and Japan." He did not want the public to know "that this initiative had come from him." It should appear as "a purely American initiative." With regard to the Soviet Union the Generalissimo wanted the President to realize that he (the Generalissimo) retained "absolute freedom of action." He had "no pacts with the Soviet Union binding him in any way." There was need to take action before Japan established "a so-called Chinese Government under Wang Ching-wei." It would be best to have Britain and France associated in this move towards mediation.

The President was aware of the difficulties of proposing mediation at that time, and any inclination he might have had was checked by the news from China. After the outbreak of war in Europe, Britain was anxious to remove her troops from the Far East. To accelerate this movement, Japan addressed a note to Britain and France pointing to the importance of this action. This step was resented by Secretary Hull who frankly informed the Japanese Ambassador he regarded the move as an indication that Japan was anxious to push the Western powers out of China.⁹ The British Foreign Office welcomed these stern words to Japan but doubt was expressed that any real support would be given to British interests in the Tientsin concession where it was greatly needed. It would probably be expedient to remove British troops and thus avoid a clash with Japanese forces. In France the Foreign Office had been fearful that "the Soviet Union might send bombing planes to assist the German army in attacking France." They desired, therefore, "to placate Japan" even though this might injure China. This appeasement policy on the part of France would soon be put into effect.

The President's Attitude towards Japan Becomes Increasingly Belligerent

While Britain and France were making plans to appease Japan, President Roosevelt was giving extended consideration to a program of pressure upon that country. He knew from the dispatches from Tokyo that Japan would be increasingly dependent upon imports of certain basic commodities from the United States. The time had arrived when he could use to advantage this economic club. In his talks with the President in September (1939), Ambassador Grew had stressed the fact that sanctions against Japan might lead to war. If an embargo were placed upon American oil exports to Japan the result could well be a Japanese thrust in the direction of the Netherlands East Indies in order to control the

rich petroleum resources of Borneo. The President's answer to these fears indicated that he was thinking in terms of war with Japan: "We could easily intercept her fleet."

But Grew wished to prevent rather than provoke war with Japan. While the President was uttering this belligerent bombast, Grew was confiding to his diary that Secretary Hull should "offer the Japanese a *modus vivendi*" and then commence negotiations for a new commercial treaty. In Japan the Shidehara policy of conciliation "has existed. It can exist again."¹³ To Grew the Japanese program with its insistence upon "strategic protection against a future attack by Soviet Russia" did not appear too unreasonable. If America wished to change this program it should not try to do so through the employment of sanctions: "There must be no tone of threat in our attitude." It is evident that Grew did not appreciate the fact that the President's dislike of Japan had gone very deep and spread very far. He was inclined to discount all Japanese gestures for an understanding. In Japan, Grew had some friendly talks with the Foreign Minister who gave repeated assurances that "the Japanese forces in China have not the slightest intention to drive out American interests and that they have the strictest orders to the contrary." Measures were being taken "to facilitate American commerce." Indeed, certain "positive measures were being taken in line with the valuable suggestions" which Grew had recently made.

These Japanese gestures of conciliation were answered by a White House press release which called for a moral embargo upon the shipment to Japan of "airplanes, aeronautical equipment and materials essential to airplane manufacture." Japan was being penalized for her bombing operations in China. To make these penalties more effective a press release was issued by the Department of State on December 20 containing the significant statement that "national interest suggests that for the time being there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline." These measures were merely the prelude to a subsequent program of economic pressure upon Japan. Senator Pittman had introduced a resolution which authorized the President to forbid the export of specified war materiel whenever he found that any signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty was endangering the lives of American citizens or depriving them of their lawful rights. But the Department of State was not ready to push this legislation. A new ministry was about to take office in Japan and it would be given an opportunity to show its hand. On January 17 the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (Arita) issued a statement which spoke of the efforts he would make to "normalize" relations with the United States. He was referring particularly to the fact that treaty relations with the United States would expire on January 26. After that date there would be no legal barrier to legislation or to Presidential proclamations imposing severe restrictions upon exports to Japan.

Japan Establishes a New Central Government in China

Japan's program for expansion in China made it impossible to "normalize" relations with the United States. On March 15, 1940, the Japanese Prime Minister issued a statement which called for the creation of "a new international relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China." This would necessitate the establishment of "a new Central Government of China" to be headed by Wang Ching-wei. On March 30, at Nanking, this puppet government was formally proclaimed. It was immediately noted, however, that the three important northern provinces of Hopeh, Shansi, and Shantung, including such key cities as Peiping, Tientsin, and Tsingtao, were not placed under the control of the Wang regime. Secretary Hull's answer to this Japanese action was immediate and forceful: "The Government of the United States has ample reason for believing that the Government [of Chiang Kai-shek] with capital now at Chungking, has had and still has the allegiance and support of the great majority of the Chinese people. The Government of the United States of course continues to recognize that Government as the Government of China."

The language of the Department of State was significantly different from that employed by Sir Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo. On March 28, Craigie delivered an address to the Japanese-British Society in which the note of conciliation was strongly accented. He believed that Britain and Japan were "striving for the same objective, namely, a lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous, subversive influences." This friendly gesture towards Japan was favorably regarded by the London Times which spoke of the proposed establishment of the Wang regime as "an offer of peace to the Chinese people."

Japan Compels Both Britain and France to Adopt a Policy of Appeasement

The British Foreign Office quickly changed its tune when the Japanese Foreign Minister (Arita) announced on April 15 that the economic ties that bound Japan to the Netherlands East Indies were particularly important. For that reason the government of Japan could not but be "deeply concerned over any development accompanying the aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands Indies." The Netherlands Minister in Washington (Dr. Loudon) immediately issued a statement that his government would resist any "preventive protection" of its colonial possessions. Secretary Hull was equally quick to announce the attitude of the Department of State: "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." He then alluded to the provisions of the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 and the Four-Power Treaty of 1921 with reference to "the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean." President Roosevelt was about to leave

for a vacation at Warm Springs, Georgia, when the Hull statement was given to the press. He remarked that the Secretary of State had spoken "right to the point," and then significantly added: "I'll be right back if another country is invaded."

Japan did not take this threat very seriously and immediately inaugurated a policy of pressure upon France. On June 17 the Japanese Government presented to the Petain regime a series of demands which were aimed at stopping all shipments of supplies to Chungking through Indochina. Three days later these demands were complied with and the government of Chiang Kai-shek received a severe setback. On June 19 another Japanese victory was recorded. For a year pressure had been applied to British and French banks in Tientsin to compel them to turn over to Japanese authorities a large amount of silver that belonged to the Nationalist Government of China. These banks finally yielded to Japanese demands and also agreed to permit Japanese-sponsored paper currency to circulate in the British and French concessions. The British Foreign Office resented this Japanese pressure and on June 10 made inquiries through Lord Lothian as to the possibility of Anglo-American fleet movements in the Atlantic and Pacific. When Hull gave a negative answer, Lothian, accompanied by the Australian Minister, pointedly asked Hull on June 27 "whether Japan should be opposed or appeased." A stringent economic embargo could be imposed upon Japan and warships could be sent to Singapore as a demonstration of naval unity. These measures might compel the Japanese Government to adopt a less aggressive policy. If appeasement appealed to the Department of State, Britain was ready to make further concessions. On June 28, Hull vetoed the idea of an embargo and refused to consider the dispatch of any American warships to Singapore. He was equally opposed to a policy of appeasement. It would be best to let things drift along and let Japan take the initiative.

Japan was not backward in this regard. After securing from France an agreement to stop the shipments of war materiel to Chiang Kai-shek through Indochina, the Japanese Government persuaded Britain (July 17) to close the Burma Road for a period of three months. Munitions of war, gasoline, motor trucks, and railway materials could no longer reach China by this route. Secretary Hull, although he had refused to make any promise of support to Britain, announced that the United States had a "legitimate interest in keeping open the arteries of commerce in every part of the world." The closing of the routes to China through Burma and Indochina had been "unwarranted interpositions of obstacles to world trade."

The President Orders a Cautious Economic Offensive against Japan

While Secretary Hull was following a policy of watchful waiting, the President favored more forceful measures. Under the recently enacted National Defense Act authority was granted for a rigid control over exports from the United States. Secretary Morgenthau was eager to have the Treasury Department take over this job of export control, while Secretary Hull was exceedingly anxious that the task be given to another department.

He was fearful that Morgenthau's crusading fervor against the dictatorships might lead to a clash in the Pacific. The President finally decided to appoint a single administrator of export control who would be directly under White House supervision. Actually, the control of policy and the issuance of licenses remained in State Department hands.

The basic differences of opinion between the State and Treasury departments were highlighted by what occurred the last week in July 1940. On the evening of July 18, Secretaries Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau dined with Lord Lothian and the Australian Minister. After the conversation had centered upon the impact of an oil embargo upon Japan, Lothian suddenly suggested that it might be possible for Britain to arrange for the destruction of the oil wells in the Dutch East Indies. If these two sources of supply were cut off from Japan her war machine would come to an abrupt stop.

When this matter was discussed at the White House, the President seemed deeply interested in this program of pressure but Sumner Welles promptly asserted that an embargo against Japan would lead to a Japanese attack upon British or Dutch colonial possessions. This viewpoint was sharply challenged by Knox, Morgenthau, and Stimson who advised bold measures to curb Japan. Morgenthau, realizing that he "spoke to the President's nature and inclination," drew up a proclamation that placed the export of all kinds of oil and all scrap metals under control. This was signed by the President who sent it to Welles for countersignature. Under the excited insistence of Welles the President discarded the proclamation he had signed and substituted one that dealt only with aviation motor fuel and lubricants, and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap.

The Japanese Embassy, seeing the newspaper accounts that spoke of total embargo upon oil and scrap metals, hurriedly made inquiries at the Department of State. Welles gave comforting reassurances as to the real scope of the President's proclamation and asserted that the action was not aimed at any particular country. The Japanese Government assailed this position in three long diplomatic notes but Welles, with his tongue in his cheek, held his ground. Lord Lothian, fearing that Roosevelt had tipped his hand, counseled greater prudence in the future, and this advice was strongly seconded by the Dutch representative. This policy of prudence, however, received a sharp and unexpected attack from Ambassador Grew. He had long been opposed to sanctions against Japan because he believed they would be the prelude to war. But in a long dispatch of September 12, 1940, he reversed his opinions:

"If we conceive it to be in our interest to support the British Empire in this hour of her travail, and I most emphatically do so conceive it, we must strive by every means to preserve the status quo in the Pacific at least until the European war has been won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done . . . by merely registering disapproval and keeping a careful record thereof. . . . Until such time as there is a complete regeneration of thought in this country [Japan], a show of force, together with a determination to employ it if need be, can alone contribute effectively to the achievement of such an outcome and to our own future security."

This dispatch from Grew confirmed the President's desire to exert more economic pressure upon Japan. The Japanese thrust southward gave him increasing concern. On September 23, Japanese soldiers moved into Indochina and soon took over Tonkin Province. When this news reached the White House, together with reports that Japan was about to conclude an alliance with Germany, it was decided to place an embargo upon the shipment of all grades of iron and steel scrap to Japan. This was a step Japanese statesmen had anticipated by building up a large stockpile for immediate needs. The President's action was a challenge instead of a bombshell.

Japan Concludes an Alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis

The alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis was long in the making. The most important Japanese promoter of this agreement was General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese military attache and subsequently the Ambassador in Berlin. He and Ribbentrop were particularly intimate. In the summer of 1938, during the Sudeten crisis, Ribbentrop inquired if Japan would be willing to sign a treaty aimed at all the potential enemies of the proposed Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle. Tokyo rejected this proposal and in February 1939, Prince Ito was sent to Berlin to acquaint Ribbentrop with the decision that Japan wished to limit the proposed treaty to action against Russia alone. In April 1939, Ribbentrop redoubled his efforts to reach an intimate accord with Japan. He insisted that such an arrangement would be a warning to Washington to remain neutral in the event of an outbreak of war in Europe. But Japan remained cold to these suggestions, and after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Treaty in August 1939 this fridity definitely increased.

But Ribbentrop never lost hope that he could induce Japan to enter into closer political relations with Germany, and through the agency of the I. G. Farben Chemical Trust large sums of money were spent in Japan for propaganda purposes. On June 12, 1940, Ambassador Ott reported that he was "still endeavoring to stir up Japanese ill-feeling against America by influencing the press and leading political personalities." On July 8, Naotake Sato arrived in Berlin for a conference with Ribbentrop. He remarked that Japan had drawn the attention of the United States "to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war, and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean." When the Nazi Foreign Minister inquired as to the fundamental differences between Japan and the United States, Sato pointed to the Nine-Power Pact. It seemed evident to Ribbentrop that Japan could soon be brought into intimate association with the Rome-Berlin Axis.

On July 12 a conference was held in Tokyo between representatives of the ministries of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs with reference to the signature of a tripartite pact. In order to hasten their decision, Heinrich Stahmer hurried to Tokyo. The conversations between Stahmer and Matsuoka began on September 9 with Stahmer always emphasizing the fact that Germany's prime purpose in seeking the alliance with Japan was to keep America out of the war. By September 16 the opposition in Japan had been largely silenced, and on September 27 the pact was signed with great pomp in Berlin. Article

3 was phrased in language that pointed straight at the United States: "Japan, Germany and Italy . . . undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict."

There is evidence to show that Japan extracted from Stahmer a secret oral understanding that she retain for herself the right to decide whether the *casus foederis* existed in any situation that might arise. There is further evidence to indicate that Japan signed the tripartite pact primarily to deter the United States from entering the war. In the instructions from the Japanese Foreign Minister to Admiral Nomura on October 8, 1941, it was repeatedly stated that one of the reasons why Japan entered into the alliance with Germany and Italy was to maintain "amicable relations with America." Matsuoka made a similar statement to Masuo Kato in 1941. In September 1940 it was difficult for the Department of State to appreciate this viewpoint.

America Draws Closer to Britain

To the Roosevelt Administration it seemed obvious that the new Rome- Berlin-Tokyo Axis was a design for war. In order to sound a note of defiance to this menacing political alignment, the President, on October 12, boldly declared that the "Americas will not be scared or threatened into the ways the dictators want us to follow.... No combination of dictator countries of Europe and Asia will stop the help we are giving to almost the last free people fighting to hold them at bay" In order to implement these bold words, the President had already instructed the Department of Agriculture to cease paying subsidies for wheat exports to the Far East since much of this grain was being purchased by Japan. At the same time Prime Minister Churchill announced in the House of Commons that the Burma Road would be opened on October 8. Throughout November and December 1940, Lord Lothian continued to push for joint talks and joint action in the Far East. The conference between Secretary Hull and the British Ambassador on November 25 was typical:

"The British Ambassador came in at his request, having just returned from London. He referred to the Far Eastern situation with apprehension, saying that he believed the Japanese were likely soon to attack Singapore. . . . The main point the Ambassador raised was that there should be conferences between the naval experts of our two Governments with respect to what each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the part of Japan. I [Hull] said that, of course there could be no agreement entered into in this respect, but there should undoubtedly be collaboration with the view of making known to each other any and all information practicable in regard to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, in case of a military movement by Japan in the South or in some other direction."

"The Ambassador said that the information he had gathered in London was that, while our Naval Attache, Admiral Ghormley, was a good man, he consistently declined to discuss

possible future plans on the ground that he had absolutely no authority. . . . He said he hoped there would be discussion between his and our high naval officials with respect to all phases of the Pacific situation."

We have already seen how these conversations between Hull and Lord Lothian resulted in the Joint Staff conferences that began in Washington in the last week of January 1941. These conferences paralleled a drive to put into effect an embargo upon exports to Japan. On December 10 the White House issued a statement announcing that after December 30 new licensing restrictions would apply to exports of iron ore, pig iron, ferroalloys, and "certain iron and steel manufactures and semi-manufactures." On December 20 restrictions were placed upon the export of bromine, ethylene, abrasives, hydraulic pumps, and equipment for the production of aviation lubricating oil. Three weeks later (January 10, 1941) this economic offensive shifted to restrictions upon the export of copper, brass, zinc, nickel, and potash. These proclamations were followed by a series of others that seemed to touch everything from radium to kip skins—that is everything but oil.

Matsuoka and Prince Konoye Are Willing to Sacrifice Japan's Position in China for the Cause of Peace

While the President was preparing this new economic offensive against Japan, Matsuoka was prepared to sacrifice Japan's position in China for the cause of peace. In November 1940, Matsuoka asked Bishop James E. Walsh, Superior General of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of Maryknoll, New York, and Father J. M. Drought, of the same order, to undertake a special mission to Washington in order to impress upon the President the fact that the Japanese Government "wished to negotiate a peace agreement: (1) An agreement to nullify their participation in the Axis Pact . . . (2) a guarantee to recall all military forces from China and to restore to China its geographical and political integrity." Other conditions bearing upon the relations of Japan and the United States were to be explored and agreed upon "in the conversations that it was hoped would ensue."

Bishop Walsh and Father Drought then had a conference with General Muto, the director of the Central Bureau of Military Affairs, who assured them that "he and his associates in the Japanese Army were in accord with the efforts to reach a peace agreement." Bishop Walsh and Father Drought hurried to Washington where (on January 23, 1941) they placed the whole matter before President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull during a long conference of more than two hours. They were told that the matter would be "taken under advisement," and thus ended an anxious effort on the part of the Japanese Government to find a path to peace even though this path led to a renunciation of Japan's objectives in China and a tremendous loss of face. It seems quite possible that the Far Eastern Military Tribunal brought to trial the wrong persons. It might have been better if the tribunal had held its sessions in Washington.

An Informal Negotiation Looking towards an Improvement in Japanese-American Relations

Just before Bishop Walsh and Father Drought placed their peace proposal before the President, an informal Japanese peace delegation began some fruitless conversations with officials in the Department of State. This delegation was headed by S. Hashimoto, once a member of the Amur Society and more recently connected with Shi-Un-So, the Purple Clouds Society. Mr. Hashimoto was devoted to the cause of peaceful relations between the United States and Japan and he had connections with important members of the Japanese Government. In lengthy conversations with Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Ballantine he explored every phase of the difficulties between Japan and the United States. To Mr. Hashimoto it appeared obvious that the best way to improve Japanese-American relations was for the Department of State to convince Prince Konoye of the "desirability of pursuing a new course." If America would help to secure for Japan "an open door to trade in the colonial possessions of various countries throughout the world," Prince Konoye might have the courage of his real convictions. This friendly gesture would be of enormous value. Mr. Hornbeck had no use for friendly gestures towards Japan. Japan should be chided, not conciliated. His answer to Hashimoto's plea for new efforts towards a friendly understanding was a gruff negative:

"It is Japan, not the United States, that has been the aggressor: Japan, not the United States, has disregarded law, violated treaties, killed and injured persons, created fear, destroyed property, discriminated, necessitated evacuations, piled up armaments, seized territory and threatened to seize more, et cetera. . . . It is Japan, not the United States, that has made threats and talked of war."

Blueprint for Anglo-American Co-operation

While informal negotiations looking towards an improvement in Japanese- American relations were reaching an impasse, the formal Joint Staff conferences between the American delegation and representatives of Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand finally resulted in the ABC-1 Staff Agreement. During the sessions the British had ardently argued that the defense of Singapore was so essential that the United States should be willing to divide the Pacific fleet for that purpose. This proposal was rejected by the American delegation. In the ABC-1 Staff Agreement, in the event of American intervention in the war, the main task assigned to the American fleet was a defensive one (the protection of our island possessions). But it was also to undertake diversions in the direction of the Marshall and Caroline Islands and to attack Japanese communications and shipping. The plan, therefore, provided for connected but not joint naval operations.

After an extended consideration of all the factors involved, the plan was endorsed by the Secretaries of the Navy and War; the President gave it no explicit approval. It was soon apparent, however, that American military plans were profoundly affected by it. The

changes made in them were far more than mere technical details: they indicated a close community of thought between important representatives of America and Britain. They were additional bonds drawing the two countries closer together and all their dangerous implications were not lost upon the President. A blueprint had been drawn for Anglo-American co-operation. It would be implemented as soon as the Chief Executive could find a pretext for doing so.

Japan Seeks Peace, Not War, with the United States

As Hitler moved towards war with Russia he began to think more and more of Japanese assistance in this projected struggle with the Soviets. During a conference with his military leaders on January 8-9, 1941, Stalin was denounced as a "cold-blooded blackmailer" who would, if he found it expedient to do so, repudiate "any written treaty at any time." In any contest with Russia, Germany could receive vital help from Japan. Japanese assistance against Britain was equally important. When General Oshima returned to Germany in 1941 he hurried to Fuschl to see his old friend, Ribbentrop. The Nazi Foreign Minister had a great deal to say. Japan, in its own interest, should enter the war "as soon as possible." This intervention would destroy England's key position in the Far East. It was also "bound to keep America out of the war."

On March 3, Ribbentrop renewed his pressure upon Oshima in favor of an early entry into the war by Japan. He again advised that no action be taken against the United States. Two days later (March 5), Hitler issued a secret order to the German armed forces which summarized the Ribbentrop viewpoint:

"It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interest of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.... The common aim of the conduct of the war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of war."

On March 26, Matsuoka, now serving as the Japanese Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. On the following day Ribbentrop plied him with the usual arguments. It would be "very advantageous if Japan would decide as soon as possible to take an active part in the war upon England." Japanese intervention would be "most likely to keep America out of the war." When Matsuoka was taken into the presence of Hitler he heard a repetition of Ribbentrop's remarks, but he refused to commit himself. On March 28, Ribbentrop continued the conversations with Matsuoka and the war in the Pacific was discussed from all angles. Finally the Japanese Foreign Minister bluntly inquired about the attitude of Germany towards America after Britain was defeated. Ribbentrop quickly answered that "Germany did not have the slightest interest in a war against the United States." Matsuoka closed the conference with the expression of a wish that America might be converted to "our way of thinking."

Matsuoka moved from Berlin to Moscow where on April 13 he signed with Molotov a neutrality pact. It is possible that Hitler welcomed this pact as a part of his scheme to lull Russian suspicions with reference to the approaching Nazi offensive, but it is certain that it aroused apprehensions in many minds in Berlin.

Admiral Nomura Strives to Improve Japanese-American Relations

The appointment of Admiral Nomura as ambassador to the United States was another friendly gesture on the part of the Japanese Government. The new ambassador had been the naval attache in Washington during the World War where he formed a friendly acquaintance with Franklin D. Roosevelt then serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He had also been a member of the Japanese delegation to the Washington Disarmament Conference, 1921-1922. His reception at the White House (February 14) was cordial but the President frankly referred to the fact that relations, between Japan and the United States were steadily "deteriorating." At the State Department he discovered a studied "policy of coolness toward the Japanese."

On March 8, Hull and Nomura had their first conversation on Japanese- American relations. Subsequently they met more than forty times in vain endeavors to find some firm ground on which to build a new structure of friendship. Hitler viewed these negotiations with frank alarm. As Ribbentrop later remarked:

"The Fuehrer . . . saw the attitude of the United States "short of war" and he was worried . . . about groups in Japan who wanted to come to an arrangement with America. He was afraid that if an arrangement would be made between the United States and Japan, this would mean, so to speak, the back free for America and the expected attack or entry into the war by the United States would come quicker."

Ribbentrop, in the spring of 1941, exerted strong pressure upon the German Ambassador in Tokyo with reference to the Hull-Nomura talks. Japan should insist upon the abandonment of unneutral policies on the part of the United States. The ambassador, in turn, emphasized to the Japanese Foreign Office the importance of being firm with the United States. That was the only way to keep America neutral.

Matsuoka Advises a Policy of Delay

In the spring of 1941 before he left for Berlin, Matsuoka wrote to Thomas Lamont a "passionate plea" for the promotion of better understanding between Japan and the United States. When he reached Rome, en route to Berlin, he received a message from the Japanese Embassy in Washington that "a specially chartered airplane was waiting for him at Lisbon to take him to America for a confidential meeting with the President. This had been arranged by Roy Howard, Matsuoka's intimate friend." But Matsuoka would first have to go to Berlin and Moscow to complete the important items in his program.

In Moscow he talked freely with Ambassador Steinhardt in an effort to prepare the way for conversations in Washington. When he arrived in Dairen on April 21 he received a call from Konoye who asked him to fly at once to Tokyo. He returned to the capital to find an American proposal that Nomura had just cabled from Washington.

At this point, according to the story as related by Toshikazu Kase, Matsuoka found that negotiations in Washington were being conducted on the basis of a series of "informal" conversations between two American Catholic priests "and an ex-official of the Japanese Treasury Department whose integrity was rather dubious." For this reason, Matsuoka asked for a halt in the negotiations. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kase is badly confused in this matter of the negotiations. As the deposition of Bishop Walsh clearly shows, Matsuoka himself asked Bishop Walsh and Father Drought to go on a special mission to Washington, and their program was worked out in a series of conferences among Foreign Office officials, General Muto, and Prince Konoye. It is certainly incorrect to state that this mission had "been inaugurated without the knowledge of the foreign minister."

Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura Search in Vain for a Formula of Peace

During the spring and summer of 1941, through more than forty conversations between Hull and Nomura, the search for a formula of peace was carried on in vain. The story of these negotiations is told in great detail in the memoirs of Prince Konoye and in the documents published by the Department of State.

The Japanese Government was willing to give two important pledges: (1) to use only peaceful measures in the southwest Pacific; (2) to go to the support of Germany only in the event she was the object of aggression. In return for these pledges Japan wished America (1) to restore normal trade relations between the two countries; (2) to assist Japan to secure access to basic raw materials in the southwest Pacific area; (3) to exert pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek so that he would consent to certain peace terms; (4) if Chiang refused to yield to this pressure the American Government would withdraw support from his regime; (5) and finally, to lend friendly diplomatic assistance aimed at the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways "to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East." Secretary Hull countered with a memorandum emphasizing the following points: (1) respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; (4) nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

The discussion of these bases for a friendly accord was not helped by occasional verbal pyrotechnics on the part of Matsuoka. On May 14 he had a conversation with Ambassador Grew during the course of which he sharply criticized the attitude of the United States towards Germany. American attacks upon German submarines might bring into action Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. This conversation was the subject

of comment by Sumner Welles during a conference with the British Ambassador. Lord Halifax inquired as to the progress of the Hull-Nomura talks. Was there any chance that they would have a successful outcome? Welles thought that the "chances might not be better than one in ten." He then handed to Halifax a copy of a letter Matsuoka wrote to Grew immediately after their conversation on May 14. It was written in such a rambling style that Halifax thought it "bore evidence of lunacy." Welles shared this impression but finally came to the conclusion that it "might be due to the fact that Mr. Matsuoka was understood to be drinking extremely heavily at this time and the mental state apparent in the writing of this letter might be momentary rather than permanent." It is obvious that Matsuoka's belligerent state of mind was a result of the pressure from Berlin. Hitler would soon launch his attack upon Russia and he was particularly anxious that America remain neutral.

But this Japanese threat failed to restrain Roosevelt. On June 20 an announcement was made in Washington that no more oil would be exported from American eastern ports (including the Gulf of Mexico) except to the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere. Two days later, Hitler's armies crossed the Russian frontier and the German offensive began to roll. When the news reached Tokyo, Matsuoka rushed to the Emperor and vehemently argued that Japan should support Germany by immediately attacking Russia. He readily admitted that his program implied possible war with the United States.

Although Konoye wished to apply a brake to the forward tactics of Matsuoka, the Japanese army leaders were restive, and liaison conferences on June 25 and July 2 mapped a new and dangerous program: (1) Japan should not rush into a conflict with the Soviets; (2) the tripartite pact should not be abandoned; (3) Japan should move south into Indochina.⁸¹ Knowledge of this decision reached Washington during the first week in July. The Japanese code had been broken and from July to December 1941 the President and the Secretary of State could read the instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. The projected Japanese drive to the South was soon familiar in all its details.

Matsuoka Is Dropped but Roosevelt Grows More Belligerent

Prince Konoye reluctantly accepted the decisions of the liaison conferences but he was determined not to endure the constant arguments of Matsuoka for a bolder policy towards the United States. During the new liaison conferences of July 10 and 12, Matsuoka led a bitter attack upon the United States and even asked for a termination of the Hull-Nomura conversations. But the Army and Navy representatives in the conference were strongly in favor of the continuation of the talks, so Matsuoka's proposal was quickly defeated. It was evident that the Foreign Minister was quite unpopular with his colleagues who decided to get rid of him by indirection. On July 16 the whole Cabinet resigned. Konoye was then asked to form a new cabinet, and when it was organized, Admiral Toyoda was given the post of Foreign Minister. This significant cabinet change made

little impression upon the President and several of his advisers who had been pushing for sanctions against Japan. One of the most active of these was Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. As early as December 16, 1940, he confided to his diary that eventually America would be drawn into the war. During the spring and summer of 1941 he was constantly pressing the President to take stronger measures against the Germans.

Some of the instructions sent by Tokyo to Nomura strengthened the Stimson counsel. These intercepted messages were placed before the President and influenced his decisions. On July 14 a particularly important message was decoded. It clearly outlined Japanese objectives: "The immediate object of our occupation of French Indochina will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. . . . In the main, through the activities of our air arm . . . we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us." A week later the Foreign Office sent an ominous instruction to Ambassador Nomura:

"Should the U.S. . . . take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as . . . the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation."

The very step that the Japanese Foreign Office greatly feared was then being seriously discussed by American cabinet officials. The Navy Department counseled caution, the Treasury Department was anxious for prompt action against Japan, while the Department of State vacillated from day to day. On July 24 the President had a conference with Ambassador Nomura and talked with brutal frankness. He said that he had not shut off oil supplies from Japan because such action would have furnished a pretext for "moving down upon the Netherlands East Indies." But in view of the oil shortage in the eastern part of the United States there were many persons who were asking why further oil shipments to Japan were permitted while she was following a policy of aggression. In the event that Japan did move upon the Netherlands East Indies she could be certain that Britain would rush to the assistance of the Dutch, and this, in turn, might involve the United States in hostilities. The President then stated that he had a proposal to make to the Ambassador:

"If the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina with its military and naval forces, or, had such steps actually been commenced, if the Japanese Government would withdraw such forces, the President could assure the Japanese Government that he would do everything within his power to obtain from the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States itself a binding and solemn declaration . . . to regard Indochina as a neutralized country."

On the following day (July 25) Colonel Iwakuro had a long talk with Mr. Ballantine and expressed the hope that an understanding with the United States could be effected. As far as Japan was concerned this could be achieved in a satisfactory manner if the

American Government "did not take measures in the nature of embargoes or freezing of assets against Japan." The President was not impressed with this gesture of good will. On the following day (July 26) an order was issued freezing Japanese funds in the United States. When Ambassador Nomura called at the Department of State to inquire as to the administration of this order, he was received in a definitely cold manner by Sumner Welles. He expressed the hope that the measure would not mean any "further deterioration in the relations of our two countries," but Welles parried the indirect query by remarking upon the "extraordinary patience which the United States had demonstrated in its relations with Japan during recent years." Nomura quietly stated that he believed the best thing to do under the circumstances was to adopt some "compromise solution which would prove acceptable to both sides." Welles crisply replied that he did not see "that there was the slightest ground for any compromise solution." It was evident that Welles was thinking of war.

This feeling of a deadlock was deepened during a conversation between Welles and Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister to the United States. Wakasugi was about to return to Tokyo to report to his Government on the actual state of Japanese-American relations. He wanted a frank statement from Mr. Welles in this regard. The Acting Secretary of State was glad to respond in his usual cold, detached manner. Japan should always keep in mind the basic principles of American foreign policy:

"The maintenance of peace in the Pacific; the renunciation by all of the powers interested in the Pacific of force and of conquest as their national policy; the recognition of the rights of independent and autonomous peoples of the Pacific to independence and integrity; and equal opportunity and fair treatment for all. . . . If Japan continued on an aggressive policy of force and undertook moves of expansion . . . I thought it necessary at this stage to say that in my judgment such a situation as that would inevitably be regarded as intolerable by the United States and . . . would inevitably result in armed hostilities in the Pacific."

This threat of war was very discouraging to Wakasugi who clearly realized that Japanese-American relations had reached an impasse that had very dangerous implications. On the following day (August 5) he received an instruction from Tokyo that gave ample evidence of the deep concern the Foreign Office felt with regard to the situation: "We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-U.S. relations." In order to improve these strained relations the Japanese Government was willing to pledge that it would "not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas except French Indo-China and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indo-China will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident." Japan would gladly guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands if the United States, in turn, would suspend its military measures in the southwestern Pacific areas, would help Japan to secure access to the important natural resources of these areas, and would also restore normal trade relations between Japan and the United States. In answer to an oral statement by the Japanese Ambassador, Hull replied that

he felt "very discouraged indeed" about future relations between the two countries.

Similar discouragement in Tokyo led the Konoye Ministry to send instructions to Nomura to sound out Secretary Hull about a joint meeting between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. When the Japanese Ambassador handed to Hull this proposal for a conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, the reply came in the form of a written memorandum which rejected the Japanese proposals of August 6 as "lacking in responsiveness." It was evident that Hull thought no purpose would be served by a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting. This fact was clear to Nomura who cabled the Foreign Office that he greatly feared "that even the offer of the Prime Minister to personally come here would not move the United States to any perceptible degree." He could only report that he saw "dark clouds over the world."

The Atlantic Conference Pushes America Closer to a Break with Japan

For Japan there were very dark clouds along the Newfoundland horizon. On the evening of August 9, in the Newfoundland harbor of Argentia, Roosevelt and Churchill had their first conference. The British were particularly concerned about the danger of a Japanese thrust into the southwest Pacific area, and Sir Alexander Cadogan had drafted parallel Anglo-American declarations designed to halt this possible advance. America was to state very frankly that "any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific" would compel the United States to take measures that might lead to war. In order to implement this declaration the President was to "seek authority from Congress" to employ American armed forces as he thought best. The President at once rejected any thought of consulting with Congress. On his own initiative and responsibility he would let the Japanese Government know that if her armed forces moved southward, "various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan." But Sumner Welles thought that the United States should play the role of policeman in a much wider area than the southwest Pacific. America should be ready to repel any Japanese thrust whether it was directed "against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area." Churchill and Roosevelt were in hearty agreement with this wider formula, but the President was too cautious to broadcast it to the American public. It had better remain a secret understanding.

Churchill had failed to secure a parallel declaration that pointed straight to war, but the Roosevelt pledges of support relieved most of his fears. This fact was revealed in his speech to Parliament on January 27, 1942: "The probability, since the Atlantic Conference . . . that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. . . . As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone."

Roosevelt Refuses to Meet Prince Konoye

In a statement he handed to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, Roosevelt carried out his pledge to Churchill. It was phrased in language that was not unduly provocative, but its meaning was very clear:

“If the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.”

With reference to a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, the Japanese Ambassador was informed that if his Government was ready “to suspend its expansionist activities” and embark upon a “peaceful program for the Pacific,” the government of the United States “would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.” Before this Roosevelt statement could reach Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda had a conference with Ambassador Grew and once more strongly pushed the idea of a meeting at Honolulu between Konoye and Roosevelt. He ardently hoped that at such a meeting it would be possible “to reach a just and equitable agreement.” Grew was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Toyoda’s plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to Secretary Hull and urged, “with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration. . . . The opportunity is here presented . . . for an act of the highest statesmanship . . . with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific.” On August 28, Ambassador Nomura delivered to President Roosevelt a personal message from Konoye pleading for a meeting which could “explore the possibility of saving the situation.” In his remarks to Nomura with reference to a possible meeting with Konoye, the President appeared to think that it would be difficult for him to go as far as Hawaii. Possibly Juneau, Alaska, would be more suitable.

As the President vacillated as to what course to pursue about this proposed meeting with Konoye, an Imperial conference was held on September 6. It was finally decided that Japanese preparations for war would have to be continued so “that they be completed approximately toward the end of October.” At the same time, the Foreign Office should “endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America and England.” If these negotiations did not lead to favorable results by the early part of October, then the government should “get ready for war against America.” The position of Japan was very clear. It was insisting upon American recognition of Japan’s dominance in the Far East. In the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908, we had given Japan a green light to move ahead in Manchuria. Japan had taken advantage of President

Theodore Roosevelt's friendly suggestions and had strongly entrenched herself in large areas in North China. In the face of rapidly expanding Russian power in the Far East, this action had been regarded as a national imperative. In the Far East the future belonged either to Japan or Russia, not to a China that had been exhausted by an endless cycle of war, revolution, and war. The policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in giving strong support to a gravely weakened China was highly unrealistic, and the later collapse of the American position in China stems straight back to the decisions taken in September and October 1941.

During the eventful weeks of September, President Roosevelt seemed unable to make up his mind concerning a meeting with Konoye. In order to dispel this sense of uncertainty, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Mr. Ballantine) prepared a long memorandum which was highly critical of Japan. In conclusion, Mr. Ballantine remarked: "The holding of the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on the basis of the present status of the discussions between this country and Japan would result in more of disadvantage than of advantage as regards this country's interests and policies." From Tokyo, Ambassador Grew spoke from an entirely different angle. He would not stand inflexibly upon certain principles and demand that Japan agree to accept every one of them. Political differences can be expressed in subtle shades that need not affront nations involved in serious controversy; one does not have to insist upon the conventional pattern of black and white. If America would show some slight spirit of compromise, this concession might evoke concessions on the part of Japan and some path to understanding might be found. There was no real point in insisting that Konoye agree in advance to a long agenda which would awaken instant opposition in Japan. During the sessions of a conference between Konoye and Roosevelt it was highly possible that a spirit of reciprocity might arise which would turn thoughts from war to peace. The situation required statesmanship of the highest order. There seemed no reason to doubt that it could be found in Washington.

Unfortunately, at this time of national crisis, President Roosevelt did not measure up to the demands of the hour. Without the courage to make a decision in the matter of meeting Konoye, he pushed the responsibility upon the shoulders of Secretary Hull. Hull did not hesitate. He was always "Wound-up" for such occasions. On October 2 he handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement that contained all the Hull cliches about high moral principles being the directing force in international relations. Dubious American practices in the Caribbean were not mentioned. After a long rehearsal of the reasons why the Hull-Nomura conversations had been a flat failure, he sonorously remarked that before there could be a meeting between the President and Prince Konoye, there would first have to be an agreement upon basic principles of policy. He knew that such an agreement was not possible. He had cleared the decks of the American ship of state for war at any time. It would not be long in coming.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark Oppose an Ultimatum to Japan

The Hull note of October 2 did not kill all Japanese hopes for an adjustment of difficulties with the United States. Konoye retained a faint belief that through indirect channels he still might find a means of convincing President Roosevelt of his sincerity. Through August and September 1941 he had worked through Bishop Walsh, of the Maryknoll mission, who sent many messages to Father Drought in New York. These messages, which revealed a strong desire for accommodation, were "concealed under missionary phraseology." Father Drought conveyed the messages to Washington, but to no avail. Finally, on October 14, Walsh was commissioned by Konoye to hurry to Washington and tell the President that "the pressure of events on the Japanese Government was such that it would not be able to negotiate much longer." The Konoye Ministry fell long before Walsh reached Washington. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Toyoda had turned to the British Ambassador in Tokyo and requested his help with regard to the Konoye- Roosevelt meeting. Craigie at once cabled to London his view of the situation. It was decidedly critical of the Hull policy:

"By pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. It seems apparent that the United States does not comprehend the fact that by the nature of the Japanese and also on account of the domestic conditions in Japan, no delays can be countenanced. It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problems since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner. . . . Both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude."

On October 7, in a final bid for an understanding with the United States, Toyoda told Grew that it seemed apparent that the United States "wished the Japanese Government to revert at once and unqualifiedly to the status quo which had prevailed four years ago. . . . The Japanese Government was willing and prepared to return to the situation prevailing four years ago but it was essential that the Government of the United States should understand that to undo virtually at a moment's notice the work of the past four years is an undertaking of tremendous scope." It would take time on the part of the Japanese Government and understanding on the part of the American.

But these gestures of conciliation failed to evoke the hoped-for response from Washington, so on October 16 the Konoye Cabinet resigned. In the new Cabinet, General Hideki Tojo assumed the post of Prime Minister, with Shigenori Togo as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. The story of the attempts of the Tojo Cabinet to find some formula of accommodation with the United States is a twice-told tale that does not have to be repeated here. The hopelessness of the situation was apparent to Ambassador Grew who warned Secretary Hull that "action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."

The Army feared this sudden Japanese attack upon an American outpost, and they were deeply disturbed during a meeting of the Army- Navy Joint Board when Mr. Hornbeck, representing the Department of State, advocated a firm stand against Japan. The armed forces were not ready for war with Japan, and they resented the pressure of Chiang Kai-shek for assistance that might lead to American intervention. On November 2 the Generalissimo wrote to Roosevelt that a new Japanese offensive against Yunnan might shake the morale of the Chinese Army and the Chinese people "to its foundation." For the "first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible" if the Japanese drive succeeded in taking Kunming. General Marshall and Admiral Stark were extremely anxious that these appeals from Chiang should not push the President to some rash act. On November 5, after a review of the situation in the Far East, they strongly recommended that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

This blunt recommendation temporarily slowed the President's progress down the road to war. On the following day (November 6) he had a talk with Secretary Stimson with reference to the pressing need for time to complete American military preparations. It might be well for the Department of State to arrange for a truce "in which there would be no movement or armament for six months." Stimson opposed such a truce. It was still "very important to keep the Chinese in the war, and I believed that they would feel that such a truce was a desertion of them, and that this would have a very serious effect on Chinese morale." On November 7 the President polled the Cabinet on the question of whether he would receive popular support "if it became necessary to strike at Japan in case she should attack England in Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would support such a move." This unanimity was not as genuine as Secretary Stimson's diary would indicate. Hull thought that there was definite need for numerous speeches throughout the country which would prepare the people for the possibility of war. The tragedy of the situation was that America was really at war without any clear perception of that fact by the popular mind. As Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on November 7: "The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country doesn't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of opposition is evident in a considerable section of the press. . . . Whether the country knows it or not, we are at war."

Japan Is Maneuvered into Firing the First Shot at Pearl Harbor

In the second week in November 1941 tension began to mount in Tokyo. On November 10 the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed to Grew the opinion that the "preliminary and exploratory conversations" in Washington had proceeded long enough. It was time for both countries to "enter into formal and official negotiations." The Japanese Government had "repeatedly made proposals calculated to approach the American point of view, but the American Government. . . had taken no step toward meeting the Japanese position." On this same day (November 10), Ambassador Nomura presented to President

Roosevelt a further explanation of his Government's proposals. In the meantime the Japanese Foreign Office instructed Nomura that November 25 was the deadline. All negotiations would have to be concluded by that date. This deadline was repeated from Tokyo on November 11. Under pressure from the Foreign Office, Nomura was extremely anxious to secure an early answer to the Japanese proposals of November 7 and 10. While he was awaiting this answer, he noted the military preparations that were being rushed by the Roosevelt Administration: "They are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare." Tokyo replied to this cablegram by insisting that the deadline of November 25 was "an absolutely immovable one."

Secretary Hull knew of this deadline through intercepted Japanese instructions to Nomura, so on November 15 he handed to Nomura a long oral statement setting forth the bases of an agreement. He knew they would not be acceptable to Japan. Complete control over "its economic, financial and monetary affairs" should be restored to China, and Japan should abandon any thought of preserving in China, or anywhere else in the Pacific area, a "preferential position." The abrupt tone of this note was a challenge that could easily lead to a break in diplomatic relations. Japan had long feared that such a break was inevitable, but in a final attempt to stave off such an emergency it had been decided to send to Washington another diplomat who would assist Nomura in the delicate negotiations that were hanging by a very slender thread. The new appointee, Saburo Kurusu, had served as consul in Chicago and New York and had recently been in Berlin as ambassador. His happy marriage to an American girl gave him a personal interest in maintaining friendly relations between Japan and the United States.

On November 17, Nomura and Kurusu had a talk with President Roosevelt, and then long, inconclusive conversations with Hull were carried on. To Kurusu it seemed that the President was "very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and the United States." With Hull, little progress was made. This was particularly true with reference to a solution of the difficulties between China and Japan. Roosevelt seemed to have taken a liking to his old naval acquaintance, Nomura, and was not ready to push things. One day Lowell Mellett and Max Lowenthal paid a visit to the office of Senator Burton K. Wheeler to convey the information that "the President does not want to push America into the war." The Senator took this statement with a large grain of salt, but he remembered that at times Secretary Hull had been more belligerent than the President. This fact had been particularly evident during the sessions of the Democratic National Convention in 1940. When Wheeler was putting up a strong fight to write an antiwar plank in such specific terms that the President could not disregard it, "Jimmy" Byrnes confided to him that Hull was strongly against such a plank. It would prevent him from exerting maximum pressure upon Japan.

In November 1941 the Hull policy of pressure upon Japan was being implemented at full strength. On November 20, Kurusu discussed with Hull the matter of bringing to a close the hostilities between China and Japan. The Japanese Foreign Office believed this could be arranged if the United States would stop sending supplies to China. After stressing

this point, Nomura then remarked: "If the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." Kurusu pushed the idea of a *modus vivendi*,^{12*} and President Roosevelt responded by outlining one that might be accepted. The fourth item in this Presidential proposal read as follows: "U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. to take no part in their conversations. Later on Pacific agreements."

Japan met this show of conciliation with a concession of her own. The deadline in the negotiations was now extended from November 25 to November 29. But this was the final concession: "This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen." On the same day that this deadline was extended (November 22), Nomura and Kurusu once more met Hull in conference. It was soon apparent from his tone that there was small chance that Japanese conditions for a truce would be accepted: (1) a revocation of the American order of July 26 freezing Japanese credits in the United States and thereby stopping all shipments of oil from American ports; (2) American consent to a program aimed at increasing the export of oil and other commodities from the Netherlands East Indies to Japan; (3) American mediation between China and Japan so as to initiate negotiations between the two powers and the cessation of American assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. American consent to these conditions was out of the question even if Japan made far-reaching concessions in return.

During the conference on November 22, Hull acidly complained of the "threatening tone" of the Japanese press and then asked why some Japanese statesman did not start "preaching peace." When Nomura remarked that he "did not have the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace," Hull scoffed at this statement and lamented that it was a pity that Japan "could not do just a few small things to help tide over the situation." He was particularly critical of the Japanese attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek. Two days later (November 24), Hull had a conference with the diplomatic representatives of Australia, Britain, China, and the Netherlands. He quickly discovered that the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, was not enthusiastic about a three months' truce with Japan. But Hull went ahead and drafted a *modus vivendi* which President Roosevelt regarded as a "fair proposition" but he was "not very hopeful" and thought there might be "real trouble very soon."

On the following morning (November 25), Hull showed to Secretaries Knox and Stimson this draft that provided for a three months' truce with Japan. But its terms were so drastic that Stimson believed that Japan would not accept it. That afternoon Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson, along with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, went to the White House for a long conference with the President. From intercepted Japanese cablegrams to Nomura, the President knew that the Japanese deadline for an end to the current negotiations was on November 29. He expressed a fear that Japanese armed forces might make an attack "as soon as next Monday." The main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

When Hull returned to the Department of State he had a long talk with the Chinese Ambassador who handed him a telegram from Chungking: "After reading your [Hu Shih's] telegram the Generalissimo showed rather strong reaction. He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside the Chinese question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking a solution and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China." This impudent telegram placed Hull on the defensive. He frankly admitted that the conversations he had been carrying on with the Japanese envoys was merely a delaying action: "The official heads of our Army and Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into war with Japan until they have an opportunity to increase further their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area."

On the afternoon of November 25 there were more cablegrams from China. Mr. T. V. Soong handed Secretary Stimson another cablegram from Chiang Kai-shek in which the Generalissimo urged the United States to be "uncompromising" in its attitude towards Japan.¹³⁸ This pressure was increased by a communication from Owen Lattimore, the American adviser of Chiang Kai-shek, to Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to President Roosevelt: Any "modus vivendi" arrived at with Japan "would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America." For a week Currie was "terribly anxious" because he feared that "Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river." In Chungking, Madame Chiang Kai-shek became "unrestrainedly critical" of the American Government for its failure to "plunge into the war" and thus aid China.

On the morning of November 26, Hull saw a telegram from Churchill to the President: "There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?" It was not long before Hull was nearly hysterical. During a telephone conversation with Secretary Stimson he remarked that he had just about made up his mind about the modus vivendi—he "would kick the whole thing over." A few moments later Stimson phoned to the President and informed him that a Japanese expeditionary force was moving south from Shanghai. The President promptly "blew up" and exclaimed that this fact "changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese." But the leading officers of the American armed forces still counseled caution. On this same morning (November 26) there was a meeting of the Army-Navy Joint Board and Admiral Ingersoll presented a series of arguments "why we should not precipitate a war."

But Hull was tired of carrying on negotiations with Japan. He was not a master of diplomatic double talk and he squirmed under the direct questions of the Japanese envoys. As far back as January 23, 1941, he had listened without any real interest to the proposals that Bishop Walsh and Father Drought had brought from Matsuoka: "(1) an agreement to nullify their [Japanese] participation in the Axis Pact; (2) a guarantee to recall all military forces from China and to restore to China its geographical and political integrity." If he had rejected these unusually conciliatory proposals why should he be deeply concerned about recent ones that did not go nearly so far! On the afternoon of November 26 he abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put into final shape a ten-point

proposal. Both he and the President knew this program would be rejected by Japan. There was no thought of compromise or conciliation: "The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina." When Kurusu read the ten-point proposal of Secretary Hull he immediately inquired if this was the American answer to the Japanese request for a *modus vivendi* or truce. Was not the American Government interested in a truce? Hull merely replied that "we have explored that" but had arrived at no real decision. Kurusu could only reply that the Secretary's attitude "could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end." It was obvious that the next step was war.

On the morning of December 4, the Navy radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, intercepted a Japanese overseas news broadcast from Station JAP in Tokyo, in which there was inserted a false weather report, "east wind rain." On November 19 the Japanese Government had instructed its ambassador in Washington that such a weather forecast would indicate imminence of war with the United States. After intercepting this Japanese instruction the radio receiving stations of the American armed forces were on the alert for the "east wind rain" message. As soon as it was translated, Lieutenant Commander Kramer handed it to Commander Safford with the exclamation: "This is it." Safford got in touch immediately with Rear Admiral Noyes who telephoned the substance of the intercepted message "to the naval aide to the President." According to the testimony of Captain Safford [in 1941 a Commander], the

"winds" message and the change of the [Japanese] naval operations code came in the middle of the week: two days to Saturday and three days to Sunday. It was unthinkable that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-end of December 13—14. This was not crystal-gazing or "intuition"—it was just the plain, common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposition. Col. Sadtler saw it, and so did Capt. Joseph R. Redman, U.S.N., according to Col. Sadtler's testimony in 1944. . . . The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941."

For the next three days Commander Safford and Lieutenant Commander Kramer tried in vain to get some action out of their superior officers with regard to the implications of the "east wind rain" message. When they induced Captain McCollum to exert some pressure upon Admiral Stark he was given a sharp rebuke which so infuriated him that he later poured the whole story into the receptive ears of Admiral Kimmel. This disclosure led Kimmel to press for the Pearl Harbor investigations. The unaccountable failure of high naval officers to convey a warning to Honolulu about the imminence of war was given additional highlights on the evening of December 6 when the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was sent secretly to Ambassador Nomura. It was intercepted by Navy receiving stations and decoded. When the President read this message to Nomura he at once exclaimed: "This means war!" He tried to get in touch with Admiral Stark but was informed that the chief of naval operations was at the National Theatre enjoying the delightful strains of *The Student Prince*.1** The next day the

Admiral's ears would be assailed by the crashing echoes of the attack upon Pearl Harbor. It would ordinarily be assumed that the President, after reading this intercepted Japanese message, would hurriedly call a conference of the more important Army and Navy officers to concert plans to meet the anticipated attack. The testimony of General Marshall and Admiral Stark would indicate that the Chief Executive took the ominous news so calmly that he made no effort to consult with them. Did he deliberately seek the Pearl Harbor attack in order to get America into the war? What is the real answer to this riddle of Presidential composure in the face of a threatened attack upon some American outpost in the faraway Pacific? This problem grows more complicated as we watch the approach of zero hour. At 9:00 A.M. on December 7, Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered to Admiral Stark the final installment of the Japanese instruction to Nomura. Its meaning was now so obvious that Stark cried out in great alarm: "My God! This means war. I must get word to Kimmel at once."

But he made no effort to contact Honolulu. Instead he tried to get in touch with General Marshall, who, for some strange reason, suddenly decided to go on a long horseback ride. It was a history-making ride. In the early hours of the American Revolution, Paul Revere went on a famous ride to warn his countrymen of the enemy's approach and thus save American lives. In the early hours of World II, General Marshall took a ride that helped prevent an alert from reaching Pearl Harbor in time to save an American fleet from serious disaster and an American garrison from a bombing that cost more than two thousand lives. Was there an important purpose behind this ride? This question looms constantly larger as we look further into the Pearl Harbor hearings. When Colonel Bratton, on the morning of December 7, saw the last part of the Japanese instruction to Nomura he realized at once that "Japan planned to attack the United States at some point at or near 1 o'clock that day." To Lieutenant Commander Kramer the message meant "a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor today." This information was in the hands of Secretary Knox by 10:00 A.M., and he must have passed it on to the President immediately.

It was 11:25 A.M. when General Marshall returned to his office. If he carefully read the reports on the threatened Japanese attack (on Pearl Harbor) he still had plenty of time to contact Honolulu by means of the scrambler telephone on his desk, or by the Navy radio or the FBI radio. For some reason best known to himself he chose to send the alert to Honolulu by RCA and did not even take the precaution to have it stamped, "priority." As the Army Pearl Harbor Board significantly remarked: "We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or the FBI radio or the scrambler telephone or all three." Was the General under Presidential orders to break military regulations with regard to the transmission of important military information? Did he think that the President's political objectives outweighed considerations of national safety? Was the preservation of the British Empire worth the blood, sweat, and tears not only of the men who would die in the agony of Pearl Harbor but also of the long roll of heroes who perished in the epic encounters in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean area, and in the famous offensive that rolled at high tide

across the war-torn fields of France? New cemeteries all over the world would confirm to stricken American parents the melancholy fact that the paths of military glory lead but to the grave.

But the President and Harry Hopkins viewed these dread contingencies with amazing equanimity. In the quiet atmosphere of the oval study in the White House, with all incoming telephone calls shut off, the Chief Executive calmly studied his well-filled stamp albums while Hopkins fondled Fala, the White House scottie. At one o'clock, Death stood in the doorway. The Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. America had suddenly been thrust into a war she is still fighting.

12.12 Operation Barbarossa

Book review by Daniel W. Michaels, 2001 of ("Operation Barbarossa and the Russian Historians' Dispute"), by Wolfgang Strauss. Munich: Herbig, 1998.

No two peoples suffered more during the Second World War than the Russians and the Germans. In the carnage of that great global conflict, nothing matched the massive destruction of life and property wrought on the Eastern front by Russian and German forces fanatically driven by irreconcilable ideologies. Now, more than 50 years after the end of the "clash of the titans," free Russian and German historians are collaborating to ascertain the historical decisions and actions that led to that bloodiest of all conflicts. Wolfgang Strauss, a respected German Slavist and political analyst, explains this clarifying historical process in "Operation Barbarossa and the Russian Historians' Dispute," his most recent work. He examines here the research of revisionist scholars in Russia and Germany on Stalin's role in igniting the German-Russian conflict and his efforts to expand the Soviet empire across Europe. Perhaps most importantly, he also shows how a shared understanding of the war is contributing to reconciliation between these two great European peoples.

Strauss affirms the view of German historian Ernst Nolte that Hitler's militant anti-Communism was an understandable reaction to the looming Soviet threat to Europe and humanity. Put another way, the militancy of the "fascist" movements that arose in Germany, Spain, Italy and other European countries in the 1920s and 1930s was, in essence, a response to the undisguised Bolshevik goal of dominating Europe. This view, Strauss contends, has now largely been embraced by Russian revisionists and the French historian François Furet. It is basically irrelevant whether one regards the war that broke out in June 1941 between Germany and Soviet Russia as a war of aggression, a preventive war or a counterattack. For each side, Nolte and others contend, this was a life or death struggle to decide which world view and way of life would prevail in Europe – atheistic, internationalist Communism or the bourgeois Christian civilization of the West.

The Black Book

In no way does Strauss dismiss or whitewash Hitler's brutal excesses. He also holds that Hitler's racist concept of the inferiority of the Slavic peoples and his attempt to colonize their lands was not only wrong but doomed his military campaign, and ultimately the Third Reich, to failure. At the same time, Strauss stresses the monumental brutality of Soviet and international Communism. In this regard he cites *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror and Repression*, a recent 860-page work by French scholar Stéphane Courtois and others.

As Courtois stresses, many American and European scholars have upheld a morally peculiar view of history that fervently condemns National Socialist Germany while maintaining a meretriciously non-judgmental "objectivity" toward Soviet Russia. But there is no hierarchy of death and suffering. As Courtois writes: "The death of a Ukrainian peasant child, deliberately exposed to starvation by the Stalinist regime, is just as important as the starvation of a child in the Warsaw Ghetto." As Strauss relates, Courtois finds that 1) some 100 million human beings lost their lives as a result of Communist policies in the Soviet Union, Red China and other Communist states 2) The Communists made mass criminality an integral part of their governmental system; 3) Terror was part of the Soviet regime from the outset, beginning with Lenin; 4) Class and ethnic genocide, begun by Lenin and systematized by Stalin, preceded Hitler's dictatorship by years; 5) Stalin was unquestionably a greater criminal than Hitler; and 6) Stalin's joint, if not primary, responsibility for the outbreak of Russo-German War is undeniable.

It is often forgotten that the Russian people were the first victims of Communism. Citing evidence from British, Russian and other sources, Strauss shows that those who imposed Communist despotism on the Russians were primarily non-Russian and non-Christian aliens – above all, Jews. Their goal was nothing short of eradicating Christianity and European civilization, at whatever the human cost. Many Russians place the primary responsibility for the crimes of Communism, particularly in the first ten years of Soviet rule, on the Bolshevik party's non-Russian elements. For example, Strauss notes, the Russian press has referred to the execution of Tsar Nicholas II and his entire family as a "Jewish ritualistic murder." In a similar context, Strauss cites from Solzhenitsyn the names of the ruthless Soviet secret police (NKVD) chiefs – all of them Jews – who put tens of thousands of slave laborers to death under appallingly inhumane conditions in building the White Sea Canal. One should not, however, get the impression that Slavs were the exclusive victims of Stalin's terror, or that the murderers were all non-Russians. During the Great Purge of 1937-39, Strauss points out, Stalin executed many Jews who had played a prominent role in the early Soviet regime. In 1940 Stalin succeeded in killing his greatest rival, Lev Trotsky (Bronstein), who had once been the second most powerful figure in the Soviet state. And when Stalin installed the Russian Nikolai Yezhov as head of the NKVD, replacing the Jewish Genrikh Yagoda, thousands of Yagoda's followers and their families, mostly Jews, were murdered or committed suicide.

Pioneering Russian Revisionists

One of the earliest Russian revisionists of World War II history was Pyotr Grigorenko, a Soviet Army Major General and highly decorated war veteran who taught at the Frunze Military Academy. Already in the early 1960s, during the Khrushchev era, he was a “dissident,” publicly supporting civil rights for oppressed ethnic minorities. (Authorities committed him to a mental asylum.) In 1967, Strauss relates, he was the first leading Soviet figure to advance the revisionist arguments, which became well known during the 1980s and 1990s, on Stalin’s preparations for aggressive war against Germany. In an article submitted to a major Soviet journal (but rejected, and later published abroad), Grigorenko pointed out that Soviet military forces vastly outnumbered German forces in 1941. Just prior to the German attack on June 22, 1941, more than half of the Soviet forces were in the area near and west of Bialystok, that is, in an area deep in Polish occupied territory. “This deployment could only be justified” wrote Grigorenko, “if these troops were deploying for a surprise offensive. In the event of an enemy attack these troops would soon be encircled.”

The best known Russian historian to advance revisionist arguments on Stalin’s preparations for a first-strike against Germany has been Viktor Suvorov (pen name of Vladimir Rezun). Strauss recapitulates his main arguments (which have been treated in detail in the pages of this Journal).[11] Strauss examines three significant speeches by Stalin (which have also been dealt with by Suvorov, as well as in the pages of this Journal):[12]

1. In his address of August 19, 1939, shortly before the outbreak of war, Stalin explained why a temporary alliance with Germany was more beneficial to Soviet interests than an alliance with Britain and France.
2. In his speech of May 5, 1941, Stalin explained to graduate officers of military academies that the impending war would be fought offensively by Soviet forces, and that it would nonetheless be a just war because it would advance world socialism.
3. In the speech of November 6, 1941, some four months after the outbreak of the “Barbarossa” campaign, Stalin stressed the importance of killing Germans. (This speech helped to “inspire” the Soviet Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg to make his notorious contribution to the war effort in the form of murderously anti-German propaganda.)

Recent Russian Revisionist Historiography

A radical revision of World War II history, Strauss contends, became possible only after the collapse of the multinational Soviet Union (1991), when some 14 million previously classified documents dealing with all aspects of Soviet rule were finally open to free examination. This book’s greatest contribution may well be to highlight for non-Russians the research of Russian revisionists. Strauss is very familiar with this important work, which has been all but entirely ignored in the United States. The most important publications cited by Strauss in this regard are two Russian anthologies, both issued in 1995:

“Did Stalin Make Preparations for an Offensive War Against Hitler?,” and “September 1, 1939-May 9, 1945: 50th Anniversary of the Defeat of Fascist Germany.” The first of these contains articles by revisionist scholars as well as by critics of revisionism. (The “Russian historians’ dispute” referred to in the subtitle of Strauss’ book echoes the “German historians’ dispute” of the 1980s, in which Ernst Nolte played a major role.) As Strauss notes, the most prominent critic of the revisionist view of Suvorov and others has been Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, who teaches at Tel Aviv University. (Strauss suggests that he is an long-time apologist for Stalin.) Gorodetsky is the author of a 1995 Russian-language anti-Suvorov work, “The ‘Icebreaker’ Myth,” and a detailed 1999 study, *Grand Illusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia*.

In his discussion of “Did Stalin Make Preparations for an Offensive War Against Hitler,” Strauss writes (pages 42-44):

“Even though revisionists as well as the critics of revisionism have their say in this book, the end result is the same. The anti-Fascist attempts to justify and legitimize Stalin’s war policy from 1939 do not hold up. The view that the Second World War was “a crime attributable solely to National Socialist Germany” can no longer be sustained. The historical truth as seen by Russian revisionists is documented in this collection of articles published by Bordyugov and Nevezhin as well as by the renowned war historian Mikhail Melitiukhov, academic associate of the All-Russian Research Institute for Documentation and Archives.”

This most recent compendium of Russian revisionist writings deepens our understanding of Stalin’s preparations for a military first-strike against Germany in the summer of 1941. The strategic deployment plan, approved by Stalin at a conference on May 15, 1941, with General Staff chief Georgi Zhukov and Defense Commissar Semen Timoshenko, called for a Blitzkrieg:

“Tank divisions and mechanized corps were to launch their attack from the Brest and Lviv [Lemberg] tier accompanied by destructive air strikes. The objective was to conquer East Prussia, Poland, Silesia and the [Czech] Protectorate, and thereby cut Germany off from the Balkans and the Romanian oil fields. Lublin, Warsaw, Kattowice, Cracow, Breslau [Wroclaw] and Prague were targets to be attacked.”

A second attack thrust was to be directed at Romania, with the capture of Bucharest. The successful accomplishment of the immediate aims, namely, to destroy the mass of the German Army east of the Vistula, Narev and Oder rivers, was the necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of the main objective, which was to defeat Germany in a quick campaign. The main contingents of the German armed forces were to be encircled and destroyed by tank armies in bold rapid advances. Three recurrent terms in the mobilization plan of May 15 confirm the aggressive character of Stalin’s plan. “A sudden strike” (*vnyyzapni udar*), “forward deployment” (*razvertyvaniye*), and “offensive war” (*nastupatel’naya voyna*). Of the 303 [Soviet] divisions assembled on the western front, 172 were assigned to the first wave of attack. One month was allotted for the total deployment – the period from

June 15 to July 15. Mikhail Melitiukhov: "On this basis it appears that the war against Germany would have to have begun in July."

This anthology also devotes much attention to analyzing Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941, delivered to graduates of Soviet military academies. In this speech Stalin justified his change of foreign policy in connection with the now decided-upon attack against Germany. From the Communist point of view even a Soviet war of aggression is a "just war" because it serves to expand the "territory of the socialist world" and "to destroy the capitalist world." Most important in this May 5 speech was Stalin's efforts to dispel the "myth of the invincible Wehrmacht." The Red Army was strong enough to smash any enemy, even the "seemingly invincible Wehrmacht."

Strauss lists (pages 102-105) the major findings and conclusions of Russian revisionists, derived mostly from the two major works cited above:

"Stalin wanted a general European war of exhaustion in which the USSR would intervene at the politically and militarily most expedient moment. Stalin's main intention is seen in his speech to the Politburo of August 19, 1939. - To ignite this, Stalin used the [August 1939] Soviet-German Non- Aggression Pact, which:

- a) provoked Hitler's attack against Poland, and
- b) evoked the declarations of war [against Germany] by Britain and France.
- In the event Germany was defeated quickly [by Britain and France], Stalin planned to "Sovietize" Germany and establish a "Communist government" there, but with the danger that the victorious capitalist powers would never permit a Communist Germany.
- In the event France was defeated quickly [by Germany], Stalin planned the "Sovietization" of France. "A Communist revolution would seem inevitable, and we could take advantage of this for our own purposes by rushing to aid France and making her our ally. As a result of this, all the nations under the 'protection' of a victorious Germany would become our allies."
- From the outset Stalin reckoned on a war with Germany, and the [Soviet] conquest of Germany. To this end, Stalin concentrated on the western border of the USSR operational offensive forces, which were five- to six-times stronger than the Wehrmacht with respect to tanks, aircraft and artillery.
- With respect to a war of aggression, on May 15, 1941, the Red Army's Main Political Directorate instructed troop commanders that every war the USSR engaged in, whether defensive or offensive, would have the character of a "just war."
- Troop contingents were to be brought up to full strength in all the western military districts; airfields and supply bases to support a forward-strategy were to be built directly behind the border; an attack force of 60 divisions was to be set up in the Ukraine and mountain divisions and a parachute corps were to be established for attack operations.
- The 16th, 19th, 21st, 22nd and 25th Soviet Armies were transferred from the interior to the western border, and deployed at take-off points for the planned offensive.
- In his speech of May 5, 1941, to graduate officers of the academies, Stalin said that war with Germany was inevitable, and characterized it as a war not only of a defensive

nature but rather of an offensive nature.

- Stalin intended to attack in July 1941, although Russian historians disagree about the precise date. Suvorov cites July 6, [Valeri] Danilov [a retired Soviet Colonel] gives July 2, while Melitiukhov writes: "The Red Army could not have carried out an attack before July 15."

Hitler's Proclamation

In an appendix of documents, Strauss includes portions of Hitler's "Operation Barbarossa" directive of December 18, 1940. Also here, in facsimile, is a German press announcement of June 22, 1941, that gives Hitler's reasons for Germany's attack against the Soviet Union:

"This morning the Führer, through Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, issued a proclamation to the German people in which he explains that after months-long silence he can finally speak openly to the German people about the dangerous machinations of the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers in Soviet Russia. After the German-Russian Friendship Treaty in the Autumn of 1939, he hoped for an easing of tensions with Russia. This hope, however, was crushed by Soviet Russia's extortionist demands against both Finland and the Baltic states as well as against Romania."

After the victory in Poland the Western powers rejected the Führer's proposal for an understanding because they were hoping that Soviet Russia would attack Germany. Since the Spring of 1940 Soviet troops have been deploying in ever increasing numbers along the German border, so that since August 1940 strong German forces have been tied down in the East, making any major German effort in the West impossible. During his [November 1940] visit to Berlin, [Soviet foreign minister] Molotov posed questions regarding Romania, Finland, Bulgaria and the Dardanelles that clearly revealed that Soviet Russia intended to create trouble in eastern Europe. To be sure, the Bolshevik coup attempt against the [Romanian] government of Antonescu failed, but, with the help of the Anglo-Saxon powers [Britain and the United States], their putsch in Yugoslavia succeeded. Serbian air force officers flew to Russia and were immediately incorporated in the Army there.

With these machinations Moscow has not just broken the so-called German-Russian Friendship Treaty, it has betrayed it. In his proclamation the Führer stressed that further silence on his part would be a crime not only against Germany, but against Europe as well. On the border now stand 160 Russian divisions, which have repeatedly violated that frontier. On June 17-18 Soviet patrols were forced back across the border only after a lengthy exchange of fire. Meanwhile, to protect Europe and defend against further Russian provocations, the greatest build-up of forces ever has been assembled against Soviet Russia. German troops stand from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, allied in the north with Finnish troops and along the Bessarabian border with Romanian forces. The Fuehrer concluded his proclamation with the following sentences: "I have

therefore decided to once again lay the fate and the future of the German Reich and of our people in the hands of our soldiers. May the Lord God help us especially in this struggle!”

Coming to Terms With the Past

Even though more and more independent Russian, German and other European historians support the revisionist arguments of Suvorov (and others), it still seems impossible, especially in Germany, to reappportion historical responsibility from Hitler to Stalin. In this regard, Strauss recalls (pages 45-46) a discussion in May 1993 at the Military History Research Office in Freiburg involving German historian Dr. Joachim Hoffmann, decades-long associate of the Research Office, and Russian historian Viktor Suvorov. Hoffman told of conversations on the “preventive war” issue he has had with prominent Germans, including President Richard von Weizsäcker, the influential journalist Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, and political figures Egon Bahr and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel. In every case he was told that even if Suvorov is correct, and Hitler’s attack indeed preceded Stalin’s by weeks, this must not be acknowledged publicly because it would exonerate Hitler. This is typical, says Hoffmann, of the immoral attitude that prevails in Germany. In their egotism, he adds, these Germans do not realize that they are, in effect, demanding that Russians accept the propaganda lies of the Stalin era.

Strauss contrasts the very different attitudes of Germans and Russians toward 20th century history, and the role of historical revisionism. Whereas Germans are imbued with a national masochistic guilt complex about their collectively “evil” past, which was instilled during the postwar occupation as part of Allied “reeducation” campaign, and reinforced ever since in their media and by “their” political leaders, Russians are much more free and open about their Communist past, largely because they have not been occupied by foreign conquerors, and their media and educational system has not come under the control of outsiders. Although die-hard Communists try to uphold the historiography of the Soviet era, most Russians want to know the truth about their past. After all, Strauss points out, one out of every two Russian families suffered under the Stalinist tyranny. For the time being, anyway, nothing is taboo in Russia, including the role of Jews in the Communist movement. (By contrast, Germans are forbidden by law to say anything derogatory about the political activities of Jews in the first half of the 20th century.)

The term “genocide” is used to refer particularly to the World War II treatment of Europe’s Jews. Without in any way minimizing the sufferings of innocent Jews caught up in that maelstrom, one should not forget that Stalin’s Soviet regime inflicted a much more ruthless and widespread genocide against the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. It is estimated that in the Soviet Union about 20 million people, the vast majority of them Slavs, lost their lives as a result of Soviet policies, either executed or otherwise perished in the Gulag prison network or as victims of imposed famine, and so forth. Millions of Germans were also victims of genocide. It is estimated that some four million Germans

were killed or otherwise perished during the 1944-1948 period, victims of Allied-imposed "ethnic cleansing," starvation, slave labor in the USSR, and in inhumane POW camps administered by the victorious Allies.

In promoting greater understanding of the calamitous German-Russian clash of 1941-1945, German and Russian revisionist scholars foster reconciliation between these two peoples. Strauss cites recent developments that attest to this process. In Volgograd, victors and vanquished have joined to erect a monument dedicated to all the victims of the Battle of Stalingrad. Its inscription, written in Russian and German, reads: "This monument commemorates the suffering of the soldiers and civilians who fell here. We ask that those who died here and in captivity will rest in eternal peace in Russian soil." On the outskirts of St. Petersburg a German soldiers' cemetery and memorial was recently dedicated. Across Russia today, it is not unusual for Russian women to tend the graves of German soldiers. (Because the Soviet government did very little to help identify and provide decent burials for their war dead, few Russian women have had any idea where their own sons, brothers, and husbands fell.)

In the book's epilogue, Strauss describes the fervent indignation and rage of Russians over the criminal capitalism that has taken hold in their country. The inequities between the nouveau riches and the mass of Russian working class people are now greater than under Soviet rule. Many Russian revisionists see an intrinsic resemblance and affinity between capitalism and Communism. Given that many former Soviet officials still hold office or otherwise wield power in the "new Russia," everyone readily sees how easy it has been for members of the old Soviet elite – the Nomenklatura – to reemerge in Russia's predatory capitalism as racketeers, gangsters, money speculators, bank frauders, extortionists and mafiosi. On the ruins of the Soviet system, writes Strauss, has emerged a new dictatorship of pitilessness, corruption, criminality, social division, poverty and despair. Resentment against the "reformist" policies advocated by the United States is widespread. In this regard Strauss cites the views of Spanish writer Juan Goytisolo, who asserts that if this social pathology endures in Russia, then Karl Marx's analysis will be proven correct, at least in part. While Marx was wrong about the promised virtues of Communism, writes Goytisolo, events seem to confirm his critique of capitalism, especially of unrestrained monetarism that knows only one value, namely, maximum profits regardless of human cost.

'Strong and Free'

Whether they call themselves "Reformers" (Westernizers), Communists or nationalists ("Eurasians"), Russians today, writes Strauss, overwhelmingly reject all forms of internationalism, whether Communist or capitalist. They want a Russia that is strong and free.

Toward this goal, many look to geopolitics, an outlook built on the Eurasian "heartland" theory expounded by 20th-century British geographer Halford Mackinder and promoted in

Third Reich Germany by Karl Haushofer. (According to this theory, Russia has the potential for great power and prosperity because it is the core of the vast, resource-rich Eurasian heartland.) The leading exponent in Russia today of this view is Alexander Dugin, whose book, "The Basics of Geopolitics: Russia's Geopolitical Future," has been influential with both old Communists and new nationalists in a grouping sometimes referred to as the "national Bolshevik alliance," and whose adherents are known as "Eurasianists." Dugin is a close associate of Gennady Zyuganov, head of the country's largest political party, the Russian Communist Party (which, in spite of its name, is much more nationalist than Marxist). Zyuganov himself is the author of a recent book, "The Geography of Victory: The Bases of Russian Geopolitics." Russia's parliament, the Duma, has established a Committee of Geopolitical Affairs, chaired by Alexey Mitrofanov, a member of Vladimir Zhirinovksy's Liberal Democratic Party. (Zhirinovksy proposes the formation of a Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis, and has been quoted as saying: "Today, the United States of America is the major enemy of our country. All our actions and dealings with America from now on should be undertaken with this in mind.")

Russian and German Historians Debate Barbarossa and Its Aftermath

- Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia, by Gabriel Gorodetsky. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 408 pages.
- Samoubiystvo (Suicide), by Viktor Suvorov. Moscow: AST, 2000. 380 pages. Illustrations.
- Upushchenny shans Stalina (Stalin's Lost Opportunity), by Mikhail Meltiukhov. Moscow: Veche, 2000. 605 pages. Illustrations, maps.
- Stalin's War of Extermination, 1941-45: Planning, Realization, and Documentation, by Joachim Hoffmann. Capshaw, Ala.: Theses and Dissertations Press, 2001. 415 pages. Illustrations.

Revising the history of the Second World War's crucial Russo-German campaign is very much a work in progress, nowhere more so than in Russia and Germany. Ever since Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun) broke the ice a decade ago with his sensational *Ledokol* (published in English as *Icebreaker* [reviewed in the *Journal of Historical Review*, (Nov.-Dec. 1997)]), Russian historians have been reexamining the many myths, legends, and fantasies associated with the outbreak of the death duel between Communism and National Socialism. The role of Joseph Stalin, in particular, has aroused the most heated controversy.

In Russia, the debate has involved two major groups. The first asserts that the Soviet Union had no aggressive designs against Germany or Europe and was unprepared for war, while the second maintains that Stalin and the Red Army indeed had plans for a surprise attack against Germany and Europe, but were beaten to the punch by Hitler.

Contending Factions

To the first group have belonged such notables as the late Marshal Georgi Zhukov, journalist Lev Bezymenski (also professor at the Academy of Military Sciences), General M. A. Gareyev, V. A. Anfilov, and Yu. A. Gorkov. This group, in general, also contends that Stalin had decapitated the Red Army by purging many high-ranking officers just before the war; that he was too trusting of Hitler, wrongly believing that the Führer would never deliberately initiate a two-front war; and that Stalin was the cause of Communism's failure. These views are shared by many, regardless of political leanings. An Israeli, Gabriel Gorodetsky, much ballyhooed in the English-speaking world, also fits in this company. Gorodetsky is a colleague of Lev Bezymenski, as he was of the late General Dmitri Volkogonov. Gorodetsky, Suvorov contends, has been granted unparalleled access to selected archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, the NKVD, the GRU, and other records usually closed to researchers, above all revisionists, who might probe too deeply. For this reason Suvorov suspects Gorodetsky of being a conduit for information that the Russian government chooses to have disseminated.

To the second group belong military historians such as Viktor Suvorov, Mikhail Meltiukhov, V. A. Nevezhin, V. D. Danilov, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, as well as several Germans (Joachim Hoffmann, Wolfgang Strauss, Fritz Becker) and Austrians (Heinz Magenheimer, Ernst Topitsch). (See review of Topitsch's *Stalin's War* in JHR, [Summer 1988]). They argue that Stalin trusted no one, least of all Hitler; that Stalin had, together with Marshal Zhukov, devised his own plan for a surprise offensive against Germany, with the ultimate goal of establishing Communism in Europe; and that it was the USSR, not Germany, which was better prepared for war. Suvorov has also argued that Stalin's purges actually improved the Red Army, by ridding it of the heavy-handed political commissars, most of whom were Trotskyite thugs despised by the people. As is well known, many of Trotsky's followers were his fellow Jews, often foreign born rather than native to Russia. The American historians Richard Raack and R. H. S. Stolfi (see review in JHR [Nov.-Dec. 1995]) have joined the debate, lending it a worldwide dimension. Professor Raack in particular has reinforced the arguments of the Suvorov group, writing that "in fact the discussion is now international ... the genie of truth is out of the bottle."

The first group has been taxed with harboring Stalinist apologists for the old Soviet Establishment, the second of seeking to justify Hitler's German invasion. Polemics aside, the historiographical roots of the division are manifest in the reliance of the first group on the Soviet political literature to substantiate its arguments, as opposed to the second group's reliance on historical analysis based on military science, studying and comparing troop deployments, weapons systems, and so on. In the past few years, several major books have appeared from representatives of both sides of the dispute. Gorodetsky, supported in his research by many former Soviet Jews now residing in Israel, has recently published *Grand Delusion*. Widely circulated in the West, it has won the acclaim of most of its Anglo-American reviewers. The irrepressible Suvorov, who resides in Eng-

land, has published his fourth major book on the war, entitled *Samoubiystvo* ("Suicide"), dealing with events immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, while Meltiukhov, currently associated with the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Documentation and Archival Science, has just published *Upushchenny shans Stalina* ("Stalin's Lost Opportunity"). Regrettably, with the exception of *Icebreaker*, none of Suvorov's and Meltiukhov's works are currently available in English, and they have only rarely been reviewed or evaluated in the English-speaking world. Finally, an excellent translation of *Stalin's War of Extermination*, by Joachim Hoffmann, historian at Germany's Military History Research Office (MGFA), has now been made available to English speakers. This book has gone through several editions in Germany, and is widely read there.

Suvorov's works enjoy the greatest sales and circulation of serious Russian literature on the war. At first his opponents (almost all professional historians) tried to ignore him. Later, when compelled to recognize his work, they attempted to dismiss his theses as the product of a fantast who had had no access to official documents whatsoever. Yet, working solely from Soviet open source literature on the war, Suvorov deduced the Soviet plan to invade Germany, predicting that in time official documents would be found to substantiate his conclusions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, such documents have surfaced with increasing frequency, and in recent years Suvorov has found a perfect partner in Meltiukhov, who, with his experience in documentation and archival science and his easier access to Soviet-era records, has provided documentation for Suvorov's theses.

Plan of Attack

The Zhukov Plan of May 15, 1941, discussed briefly in these pages last year (see JHR [Nov.-Dec. 2000]), continues to be the focus of analysis and discussion. Recently, on the fifty-ninth anniversary of the German attack, Vladimir Sergeyev described and published excerpts from the Zhukov document, which was discovered in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation some years ago. For ultimate security, the original twelve-page text had been handwritten by then Major General, later Marshal, A. M. Vasilevski, and addressed to the chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars, Joseph Stalin. The document, marked "Top Secret! Of Great Importance! Stalin's Eyes Only! One Copy Only!," was authorized and approved by People's Defense Minister S. K. Timoshenko and Zhukov, then chief of the Red Army general staff.

A key passage in the war plan not previously cited in these pages reads: In order to prevent a surprise German attack and to destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstances should the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command[. I consider it essential] to preempt enemy deployment, to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front and the interaction between his service arms.[The word for "preempt" was underlined twice in the original document. – D. M.]

Thus did Zhukov propose to Stalin precisely what the German Army would do to his forces a month later.

The Suvorov school and certain German military analysts speculate that Stalin's failure to attack before the German onslaught of June 22, 1941, was probably because his own forces had not yet fully deployed for the offensive. Sergeev, on the other hand, suggests that the attack plan prepared by Zhukov was faulty.

Upon his return from the successful blitzkrieg operation he had orchestrated in the battle of Khalkin-Gol in Mongolia (August 1939), Marshal Zhukov was put in charge of the Kiev Special Military District, where he commanded the Soviet Southwestern and Western fronts. His plan of May 15, 1941, assigned these fronts the task of destroying the Wehrmacht units before them, then advancing southwest across Poland to the German border. This operation was intended to cut German forces off from the Balkan theater of operations and from their Romanian and Hungarian allies, including their vital oil fields. Zhukov was unaware that the main deployment of German forces was not on the Soviet left flank, but in Army Group Center, further to the north. Thus, had Soviet forces attacked toward Cracow-Lublin, as Zhukov's plan called for, Army Group Center could easily have cut through the exposed right (northern) flank of the Soviet thrust, upset the Soviet offensive, and then advanced along the Minsk-Smolensk line toward Moscow. In that event, the Red Army would have found itself in an even worse situation than after the outbreak of the actual German offensive on June 22. Zhukov admitted as much later to military historian V. A. Anfilov: "In retrospect it is good that he [Stalin] did not agree with us. Otherwise, our forces might have suffered a catastrophe." Stalin's Aims

Soviet mobilization and deployment in the period January-June 1941 took place in three stages:

- first stage, January-March, the call-up of about a million reservists, industry ordered to step up production of T-34 and KV tanks, first echelon troops brought up to strength;
- second stage, April-June, second echelon forces moved up to the western border, Far Eastern troops moved west;
- third stage, June 1-June 22, Stalin agrees to open mobilization and to advancing second echelon armies to the front. All these operations were to be carried out in secrecy, without the enemy taking note. Once mobilized and in position, the Soviet forces were to launch a sudden, decisive offensive against Germany and her allies.

According to Meltiukhov, the correlation of forces along the front from Ostroleka (Poland) to the Carpathians at the time of the planned Zhukov offensive was as shown in the table below:

Red Army Wehrmacht Ratio

Divisions 128 55 2.3:1

Troop strength 3,400,000 1,400,000 2.1:1

Field guns 38,500 16,300 2.4:1

Tanks 7,500 900 8.7:1

Aircraft 6,200 1,400 4.4:1

The attack was to begin in typical blitzkrieg fashion – without warning, with air raids on enemy airfields, and with heavy artillery bombardment of frontline enemy forces. The USSR would thus have had the clear advantage of superior forces and the benefits of the first strike. Why Stalin did not give the order to attack is unknown.

In “Stalin’s Lost Opportunity,” Meltiukhov establishes, with meticulous documentation, that in the years 1938-40 the Soviet Union had carried out a massive build-up of military muscle that made it the superpower of the day, far exceeding the might of any enemy. Meltiukhov presents the comparative strength of the major belligerents for August 1939, on the eve of Germany’s invasion of Poland, as shown in the table above.

Accounting for Stalin’s Delay

Meltiukhov minces no words on Stalin’s intent: “The content of the Soviet operational plans, the ideological guidelines and the military propaganda, combined with information on the immediate military preparations of the Red Army for an offensive, attest unambiguously to the intention of the Soviet government to attack Germany in the summer of 1941.” He concludes that at first the opening strike against Germany (Operation Groza [Thunderstorm]) was scheduled for June 12, 1941, but that the Kremlin later fatefully shifted the date to July 15. According to Meltiukhov: “Unfortunately, what we now know today was a secret in 1941. The Soviet leadership made a fateful miscalculation by not striking first.”

Meltiukhov speculates that Stalin delayed the date for the attack when he learned, on May 12, of Rudolf Hess’ flight to Scotland. Stalin feared that if the Hess peace mission succeeded, and the British withdrew from the war, the Red Army would be left to stand alone against the Germans. When it became clear that the Hess mission had failed, Stalin set July 15 as the date for Operation Thunderstorm – 23 days after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. Had the Red Army attacked on the originally scheduled date, Meltiukhov believes, it would have succeeded.

Although Soviet intelligence had been informed of the precise date of the German attack by its agent Richard Sorge in Japan, and by its “Korsikanets” and “Starshina” sources in Berlin, Stalin refused to be convinced. Moreover, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had also warned Stalin, to no avail: Stalin knew that Britain desperately needed the USSR in the war against Germany for its own sake. By failing to strike first, as planned, the USSR lost 800,000 men (Germany, 80,000), 4,000 aircraft (Germany, 850), 21,500 field guns and 11,800 tanks (Germany, 400) during the first two and a half weeks of the war. By the end of 1941 the Soviet Union had lost three million Red Army troops.

Meltiukhov rejects the term “preventive war.” For a true preventive war, it is necessary for the attacker to know definitely that his adversary is about to invade. Meltiukhov maintains that, while the each side was aware of the other’s build-up and deployment of forces, neither the Germans nor the Russians knew with certainty that the other was about to attack. Stalin believed, with some logic, that Hitler would never open a second front while the Britain was still in the war, but the German leader chose not to wait until the Red Army launched its attack: he unleashed his own blitzkrieg.

The situation best resembles two cats sitting on a fence waiting to see which will jump off first. On the day before the attack, Hitler signaled his frame of mind in a letter to Mussolini: “Even if I were forced to lose 60-70 divisions in Russia by the end of the year, this would still only be a small fraction of the forces I would have to maintain constantly on the eastern border under the present conditions.” In the end Germany failed, Meltiukhov states, simply because it had neither the resources nor the reserves necessary to bring a long war to a successful conclusion.

A Suicidal Invasion?

The ever controversial, iconoclastic Suvorov dedicates his new book to his adversaries. He writes, “You can’t dedicate a book with this title [Ledokol, or “Suicide”] to friends, so I dedicate it to my enemies.” An enemy of the Soviet regime who defected to England, Suvorov was tried in absentia and sentenced to death. Although his opponents are legion, including many in the post-Soviet as well as the Anglo-American establishments, in today’s Russia he is the most popular writer on the history of the Second World War.

Suvorov joins Meltiukhov in the belief that if any side was unprepared for the war that ensued, it was the Germans. On June 22, 1941 when Germany launched its desperate attack, Stalin had some 13,000 aircraft to Hitler’s 2,500. Moreover, the Red Army had an even greater advantage in numbers and quality of tanks (24,000:3,700).

In “Suicide” Suvorov analyzes secondary sources in German, just as he did in his books on Russian war plans, and concludes that Hitler had lost the war even before the first shot was fired. It is Suvorov’s contention that Hitler and the Nazi leadership were irresponsible in launching a war against the much larger, better prepared, and better armed Soviet Union in the absurd belief that the USSR could be defeated in 90 days – July-August-September. Hitler and the German high command unpardonably underestimated the strength of the Soviet armed forces, which Stalin had been building up since the mid- 1920s. Germany, of course, did not begin rearming until the mid-1930s, and would delay mobilizing for total war until around 1943. Stalin and his advisors knew that the Wehrmacht lacked all the essentials for a protracted war under conditions of extreme cold. Through their intelligence services and agents, the Soviets had learned that: German tanks were inferior to their own in both quantity and quality; Germany was critically short of oil; Germany did not manufacture cold-resistant lubricants; the German forces had not been issued winter clothing; Germany was dependent for its war effort on the import of many raw materials;

and much more. Exasperated by the short-sighted, superficial German plan for victory in three months, Suvorov asks a few rhetorical questions: Did Hitler think that May followed October in Russia? Had he learned nothing from Napoleon's campaign? Did he not know that, even if he reached Moscow, Russia would have continued the war from the Urals in the interior, far beyond the reach of German long-range bombers? By the end of the fourth month of Barbarossa, the German economy was already groaning. Fritz Todt, chief of arms production, advised Hitler to arrange for an armistice. Large-scale German tank operations had to be curtailed for lack of fuel. The German panzer units, with their limited number of tanks, were often forced to cover long distances to quell unforeseen exigencies, thereby further exhausting fuel supplies. (Large-scale blitzkrieg operations, ensuring the greatest possible encirclement and bag of prisoners, require that the tanks moving out from one pincer proceed with minimum diversion in order to meet those jumping off from the other pincer, thereby closing the encirclement.)

Overrating Stalin

Occasionally Suvorov contradicts himself. For example, he argues that when Hitler turned his troops southward to Kiev before Moscow was taken, he all but lost the war. But elsewhere Suvorov recognizes that in war the best strategy is to defeat the enemy's armed forces, not to take prestige cities. In fact the German forces turned south not so much to take Kiev as to destroy another Soviet army. The German generals, who after all had some experience in the conduct of war, were of course perfectly aware of the pointlessness of capturing large cities merely for trophy value. When the enemy's armed forces are destroyed, his cities will fall on their own.

Only in the case of Stalingrad did the German invaders commit all their forces and energies to take a city – with disastrous results. The previous winter, after the failure to take Moscow, reason had prevailed and the Germans retreated to a more defensible line, where they were able to regroup and reinforce their armies. Without the help of the Finns, German forces were inadequate to take Leningrad, so they bypassed the city. But Hitler forbade any retreat from Stalingrad. Its capture had been aimed, among other things, at blocking oil shipments up the Volga north to the Soviets. The Wehrmacht was no less concerned to fuel its own war machine: it had secured the Crimea in order to protect its chief sources of petroleum, in Romania and Hungary, from Soviet air attack from that peninsula.

Suvorov's excessive regard for Stalin's leadership and his equally overdone criticism of Hitler's ignores the fact that Germany nearly did defeat the Red Army. Had the United States, Great Britain, France, and other allies not supported Stalin with arms, trucks, provisions, and other necessities of war, the outcome might have been quite different. It must also be recalled that, throughout much of the long Russian-German conflict, Germany was compelled to divert 20-30 percent of its war effort to the Western front.

It must be recalled that Germany's ill-fated attack on the Soviet Union followed sev-

eral successive attempts at its encirclement by its enemies. In the 1930s British and French diplomacy had succeeded in surrounding her with hostile nations. Then came the attempted Scandinavian and Balkan encirclement, and finally that of the U.S., UK, and USSR. With both Soviet and Western forces increasing in strength, Germany took a desperate gamble to break the ring, rather than wait until the Red Army seized the most opportune time to pounce. True, the gamble failed. Today's Germany, however, is a prosperous country, much smaller than it might have wished, but the remnant of Stalin's USSR, stripped of the Tsar's empire, is not much more than an overgrown economic basket case.

Suvorov exaggerates Stalin's "genius." While it is true that he created a police state and built up the Red Army to superpower status, his armed forces failed miserably at the time they were most needed, June 1941. It is also true that Stalin dominated Churchill and Roosevelt, above all in the several conferences that determined postwar arrangements among the "Big Three," but the Western leaders had cast themselves in the role of supplicants who needed the Red Army to contain and destroy Germany.

For all that, Suvorov has made a great contribution to correcting the history of the Second World War by dispelling, once and for all, the myth of a peaceloving Soviet Union invented by Communist propagandists and circulated in the West by their dupes and sympathizers.

Trusting Stalin

According to Gorodetsky's version of the Soviet Union, the USSR planned only counter-attacks in defense of the homeland, and its leader, Stalin, was too trusting of Adolf Hitler. Gorodetsky completely ignores the Soviet Union's military build-up from the 1930s until the outbreak of hostilities in 1941. The tens of thousands of advanced tanks and aircraft; the training of hundreds of thousands of paratroopers; the forward deployment of airfields, depots, and attack units on the eve of the attack in June 1941 are all hard evidence of Stalin's real intentions.

The Israeli researcher has limited himself almost entirely to examining statements from official Soviet sources. For the most part, he ignores military analysts (whether Russian, German, or American), who are better equipped than he to evaluate military capabilities and designs. These researchers tend increasingly to agree with Suvorov. Gorodetsky retains the stale support of the old Soviet establishment, while Suvorov has gained many post-Soviet adherents in recent years. While Gorodetsky is read mostly in England and the United States, erstwhile allies of Stalinist Russia, Suvorov is read widely in Russia and Germany, whose peoples experienced Stalin's and Hitler's war first hand.

In Stalin's War of Extermination Joachim Hoffmann examines both the underlying causes and the ruthless execution of the war by Russians and Germans alike, in a thoroughly engrossing, systematic approach that is unsurpassed with respect to comprehensiveness,

objectivity, and documentation. Hoffmann has made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. These interviews, combined with the traditional exploitation of open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials, irrefutably dispel the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union led by a trusting, pacific Joseph Stalin. Hoffmann's research confirms conclusively that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own preemptive attack when the Wehrmacht struck.

Besides the POW interrogations, Hoffmann cites such military authorities as Dmitri Volkogonov, to the effect that Stalin needed only a few more weeks to bring his forces into complete battle readiness; Soviet military analyst Colonel Danilov, who agrees that the "vozhd" (commander) only needed a bit more time; and Colonel Karpov, who has written:

"In the early grayness of a May or June morning, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our guns would have dealt the blow against the densely concentrated German force, whose positions were known down to battalion level – a surprise even more inconceivable than the German attack on us."

Hoffmann contends that war between these two mutually hostile, ideologically driven nations was inevitable: it was merely a question of which side would initiate hostilities. He reminds us that the First World War had brought Communism to power over the one sixth of the Earth's surface that had been the Russian empire. A second world war, Lenin preached, would advance Communism throughout Europe. Stalin, Lenin's faithful disciple in propagating Communism, acted from the outset of his rule to increase the USSR's military might to that end. By 1941, the Red Army's aircraft, tanks, and field artillery exceeded Germany's by a factor of at least six to one in each category. In that year, the USSR's paratroops and submarines, exclusively offensive forces, exceeded those of the rest of the world combined.

The main principles of Soviet military doctrine in the spring of 1941 were: 1) the Red Army is an offensive army; 2) war must always be fought on enemy territory, with minimum friendly losses and the total destruction of the enemy; 3) the working class in the enemy's country is a potential ally and should be encouraged to rebel against its masters; and 4) war preparations must serve to ensure offensive capabilities.

So confident was Stalin of Soviet military superiority, Hoffmann asserts, that he doubted Germany would ever be foolish enough to attack, especially as long as Britain remained in the war. Dumbfounded at the German successes at the outset of Barbarossa, the Soviet dictator realized that he had underestimated Germany's chances of defeating the Red Army. Suvorov has described Stalin's probable state of mind as comparable to that of the designer of the Titanic after learning it had sunk. Nevertheless, vowing vengeance, still confident of ultimate victory, Stalin demanded the total extermination of the German invaders. On November 6, 1941, he declared:

"Well now, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they will get it. From now on it will be our task, the task of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the task of our fighters,

commanders, and the political officials of our Army and Navy, to exterminate to the last man all Germans who have invaded the Homeland as occupiers. No mercy to the German occupiers! Death to the German occupiers!

Hitler, for his part, by underestimating the military strength of the Soviet Union, led his country to a catastrophic defeat. Goebbels, in his diary, suggested that had Hitler known the actual strength of the Red Army, he might have at least paused before taking his fateful gamble. Yet, however disastrous the Axis attack finally proved for the German nation in the end, Hoffmann believes that all Europe would have suffered as grim a fate had the Red Army succeeded in striking first.

This clash to the death between two ideologically driven states, Hoffmann observes, left no room for chivalry, or for the strict observance of international conventions on land warfare. Stalin insisted that Soviet soldiers not surrender, and used maximal terror to prevent them from doing so. Soviet POWs were deemed deserters, and any Soviet soldier who surrendered was to be killed on falling into Soviet hands. (Near the end of the war German soldiers who refused to fight were shot and hanged from lamp posts for all to see.) Throughout the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviets dubbed it, "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" were heavily dependent on terrorism. As Hoffmann writes, the head of Red Army Political Propaganda, Commissar Lev Sakharovich Mekhlis, was empowered by Stalin to use every device of terror to keep the Red Army fighting. This Mekhlis did with relish. In consequence of the activity of this and other commissars, Stalin's terror against his own people (soldiers and civilians) during the war accounted for a substantial percentage of the estimated twenty-five million Soviet war dead. (See also Walter Sanning's essay on Soviet losses, "Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare," in JHR [spring 1985]). Even so, more than five million Soviet soldiers managed to surrender to the invaders by the end of the war. Of those who survived the war, many had cause to wish they hadn't following their repatriation to the USSR.

Unpunished Crimes, Aggressive Plans

From the onset of the war, German soldiers unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner were often mutilated and murdered. When the Soviet forces entered Germany, men and boys were murdered or drafted for forced labor; the women were often raped, sometimes murdered, and, if strong enough, dragooned for forced labor.

Although by about 1950 Stalin decided to lessen the influence of Jews in the Communist Party, Jews were very much involved in murderous assignments during the war. In addition to Mekhlis, there was Lazar Kaganovich, responsible for the deaths of millions; General Abakumov, who headed the NKVD/MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs, or secret police), and Generals Reichman and Chernyakhovski, who were especially ruthless. Hoffmann hastens to add that the criminal actions of individual Jews should no more reflect on the Jewish people as a whole than the criminal actions of individual Nazis on the German people. Yet Nazis charged with war crimes have been, and continue to be, tried and

punished, while, curiously, no courts appear to be interested in bringing Communist criminals to justice.

The thoroughness and reliability of Hoffmann's work (which helpfully includes an appendix containing key original documents in Polish, Russian, English, and German) is nicely exemplified in his treatment of Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941. While Sergeyev and Bezymenski seem to suggest that the plan was only recently discovered, Hoffmann makes manifestly clear that the plan has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents that indicate Soviet preparations for attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal (*Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech (see above) heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army. Hoffmann reproduces an original document, referred to as "Short Notation of Comrade Stalin's Speech to the Red Army Academy on May 5, 1941," which concludes with the words:

"But now that we have reconstructed our army and abundantly saturated it with the technology to wage modern warfare, now that we have become strong – now we are obliged to go from defense to attack. In defending our country we are obliged to act in an offensive manner. To switch over from defense to a military policy of offensive action. We must reconstruct our training, our propaganda, our agitation, and our press in the spirit of attack. The Red Army is now a modern army, and a modern army is an army of attack."

The Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, indicates clearly that the Red Army planned a preemptive strike against the German forces across the border. Hoffmann further notes that a few days later, on May 20, 1941, Mikhail Kalinin, then chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and nominally head of state, gave a speech in which he said:

"War is a very dangerous business, laden with sorrows, but when a time comes when it is possible to expand the realm of Communism, war should not be discounted ... and the zone of Communism must be expanded. The capitalist world can only be destroyed by the red hot glowing steel of a holy revolutionary war."

Kalinin thus strongly implied that the war the USSR was about to wage was not a preventive war forced upon it by Germany, but a war of conquest to expand the Communist empire.

The Perfect Storm

The preponderance of documents uncovered in the past decade, including further analyses of the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, by members of the Suvorov school, should convince the impartial reader that: Germany was woefully unprepared for a long war; that the Soviet Union was not only armed to the teeth, but poised to spring in July 1941; that

Stalin was Lenin's disciple in striving to advance Communism to the rest of Europe, especially to Germany; and that the governments of Britain and France were totally oblivious of the greater danger Communism posed to them when they declared war on Germany over its border dispute with Poland. The failure of the British, French, and American leaderships to perceive that the Soviet Union was by far the deadlier threat, even in 1939, was a mistake that has taken half a century to rectify, at the cost of countless millions of lives.

Hoffmann concludes that the war between the two irreconcilable ideologies was inevitable and unavoidable. Stalin's fanatical adherence to Communism (class hatred) and Hitler's equally fanatical adherence to racial theories (Hoffmann cites Disraeli: "The race question is the key to world history") led their peoples to a catastrophe unmatched since the Thirty Years' War. Hoffmann blames the horrible excesses the Red Army inflicted on German civilians on hate-obsessed war propagandists such as Ilya Ehrenburg in Russia who deliberately exaggerated German crimes. Thus, Hoffman notes, Ehrenburg announced a death toll of four million for Auschwitz on January 4, 1945, weeks before the capture of the camp. Likewise, months before the war's end, Ehrenburg reported that six million Jews had been murdered by the Germans. Moreover, in many instances, including the infamous Katyn forest massacre of Polish prisoners, Red propagandists shamelessly tried to blame the German army for crimes committed by the Soviets.

Like his colleague Wolfgang Strauss, Hoffmann advocates reconciliation between the peoples of Germany and Russia. The policies of both Stalin's Communist regime and Hitler's National Socialist state were aberrations far removed from the traditional friendship between the two peoples as prevailed under Bismarck and before him. In that spirit Hoffmann makes special mention of Drs. Heinz Magenheimer, Werner Maser, Ernst Topitsch, Günther Gillessen, Alfred M. de Zayas, Viktor Suvorov, and also Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich and Lev Kopelev, two former Soviet wartime commissars of Jewish extraction, for their courageous contributions to revisionist history. (Nor has Hoffmann been less than courageous: he testified in a German court to the scholarly quality of Germar Rudolf's Holocaust revisionist anthology, *Grundlagen zur Zeitgeschichte*, later published in English as *Dissecting the Holocaust*.)

The extreme economic and political conditions that afflicted much of the first half of the twentieth century devastated Germany and Russia. The slaughter of the First World War, the triumph of Communism in Russia, the treaty of Versailles, and the Great Depression combined to culminate in the political storm of the century, the Second World War, much as unique and unforeseen meteorological conditions in October 1991 – three merging hurricanes – combined to create what writer Sebastian Junger called "the perfect storm," a devastating "nor'easter" in the North Atlantic. In historians such as Suvorov and Hoffmann, the historical tempest of the twentieth century is, increasingly, finding able and objective chroniclers.

12.13 The Jewish Hand in the World Wars

by Thomas Dalton

As far back as the Book of Genesis, we find stories such as that of Joseph, son of Jacob, sold into slavery in Egypt. Joseph earns the favor of the Pharaoh and is elevated to a position of power. When a famine strikes, Joseph develops and implements a brutal policy of exploitation, leading Egyptian farmers to sell their land, animals, and ultimately themselves in exchange for food. Joseph himself survives unscathed, living out his days in “the land of Goshen,” with a life of luxury and ease — evidently as repayment for a job well done. Over time, Jews continued to build a reputation as rabble-rousers and exploiters. In 41 AD, Roman Emperor Claudius issued his Third Edict, condemning the Jews of Alexandria for abuse of privilege and sowing discord; he charged them with “fomenting a general plague which infests the whole world.” Eight years later he expelled them from Rome. As a result, the Jews revolted in Jerusalem in the years 66-70, and again in 115 and 132. Of that final uprising, Cassius Dio made the following observation — the first clear indication of Jews causing a major war:

Jews everywhere were showing signs of hostility to the Romans, partly by secret and partly overt acts. . . [M]any other nations, too, were joining them through eagerness for gain, and the whole earth, one might almost say, was being stirred up over the matter.

Jewish Advance in America and Elsewhere

The long history of Jewish involvement in social conflict has a direct bearing on both world wars. Consider their progressive influence in American government. Beginning in the mid-1800s, we find a number of important milestones. In 1845, the first Jews were elected to both houses of Congress: Lewis Levin (Pa.) to the House and David Yulee (Fla.) to the Senate. By 1887 they had their first elected governor, Washington Bartlett in California. And in 1889, Solomon Hirsch became the first Jewish minister, nominated by President Harrison as ambassador to the Ottoman Empire — which at that time controlled Palestine. Overseas, trouble was brewing for the Jews in Russia. A gang of anarchists, one or two of whom were Jewish, succeeded in killing Czar Alexander II in 1881. This unleashed a multi-decade series of periodic pogroms, most minor but some killing multiple hundreds of Jews. Further difficulties for them came with the so-called May Laws of 1882, which placed restrictions on Jewish business practice and areas of residency within the “Pale of Settlement” in the western portion of the Russian empire. Many Jews fled the Pale; of those heading west, Germany was their first stop.

Even prior to the 1880s, Jewish influence in Germany was considerable. In the 1840s, both Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx wrote influential essays on *Die Judenfrage* (The Jewish Question). In 1850, composer Richard Wagner complained that Germans found themselves “in the position of fighting for emancipation from the Jews. The Jew is, in fact. . . more than

emancipated. He rules..." By 1878, Wagner declared that Jewish control of German newspapers was nearly total. A year later Wilhelm Marr decried "the victory of Jewry over Germandom"; he believed it self-evident that "without striking a blow... Jewry today has become the socio-political dictator of Germany."

The facts support these views. And with the influx of Russian and Polish Jews in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the situation got demonstrably worse. Sarah Gordon (1984: 10-14) cites the following impressive statistics:

Before the First World War, for example, Jews occupied 13 percent of the directorships of joint-stock corporations and 24 percent of the supervisory positions within these corporations. ... During 1904 they comprised 27 percent of all lawyers, 10 percent of all apprenticed lawyers, 5 percent of court clerks, 4 percent of magistrates, and up to 30 percent of all higher ranks of the judiciary. ... Jews were [also] overrepresented among university professors and students between 1870 and 1933. For example, in 1909-1910... almost 12 percent of instructors at German universities were Jewish... In 1905-1906 Jewish students comprised 25 percent of the law and medical students... The percentage of Jewish doctors was also quite high, especially in large cities, where they sometimes were a majority. ... [I]n Berlin around 1890, 25 percent of all children attending grammar school were Jewish...

For all this, Jews never exceeded 2% of the German population. The public accepted the foreigners with a remarkable degree of tolerance, and more or less allowed them to dominate certain sectors of German society. There were no legal constraints, and violent attacks were rare. But the Germans would come to regret such liberal policies.

The other important factor at that time was the emergence of Zionism. Formally established by Theodor Herzl in 1897, its basic principles were laid out in his book *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State). He argued that the Jews would never be free from persecution as long as they were foreigners everywhere, and thus they needed their own state. A number of locations were discussed, but by the time of the first meeting of the World Zionist Organization in 1897, the movement had settled on Palestine. This, however, was problematic because the region at that time was under control of the Ottoman Empire, and was populated primarily by Muslim and Christian Arabs. Somehow, the Zionist Jews would have to wrest control of Palestine away from the Ottoman Turks and then drive out the Arabs. It was a seemingly impossible task.

They immediately understood that this could only be done by force. It would take a condition of global distress — something approaching a world war — in order for the Zionists to manipulate things to their advantage. Their guiding principle of 'profit through distress' could work here, but it would require both internal and external pressure. In states where the Jews had significant population but little official power, they would foment unrest from within. In states where they had influence, they would use the power of their accumulated wealth to dictate national policy. And in states where they had neither population nor influence, they would apply external pressure to secure support for

their purposes.

That the Zionists seriously contemplated this two-pronged, internal/external strategy is no mere speculation; we have the word of Herzl himself. He wrote: When we sink, we become a revolutionary proletariat, the subordinate officers of the revolutionary party; when we rise, there rises also our terrible power of the purse. (1896/1967: 26) In fact, Herzl apparently predicted the outbreak of global war. One of the original Zionists, Litman Rosenthal, wrote in his diary of 15 December 1914 his recollection of a conversation with Herzl from 1897. Herzl allegedly said,

It may be that Turkey will refuse or be unable to understand us. This will not discourage us. We will seek other means to accomplish our end. The Orient question is now the question of the day. Sooner or later it will bring about a conflict among the nations. A European war is imminent. . . . The great European war must come. With my watch in hand do I await this terrible moment. After the great European war is ended the Peace Conference will assemble. We must be ready for that time. We will assuredly be called to this great conference of the nations and we must prove to them the urgent importance of a Zionist solution to the Jewish Question. This was Herzl's so-called "great war prophecy." Now, he does not say that the Zionists will cause this war, only that they will "be ready" when it comes, and "will seek other means" than diplomacy to accomplish their end. A striking prediction, if true.

In any case, there was clearly a larger plan at work here. The Jews would pursue a policy of revolution in states like Russia in order to bring down hated governments. To the degree possible, they would seek to undermine the Ottoman Turks as well. And in Germany, the UK, and America, they would use "the terrible power of the purse" to dictate an aggressive war-policy in order to realign the global power structure to their favor. This would have a triple benefit: curtailing rampant anti-Semitism; enhancing Jewish wealth; and ultimately establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, one that could serve as the global center of world Jewry. Revolution and war thus became a top priority. Turkey was in fact an early success for the movement. The Sultan's system of autocratic rule generated some dissatisfaction, and a group of Turkish Jews exploited this to their advantage — resulting in the Turkish Revolution of 1908. As Stein explains,

the revolution had been organized from Salonica [present-day Thessaloniki], where the Jews, together with the crypto-Jews known as Dönme, formed a majority of the population. Salonica Jews and the Dönme had taken an important part in the events associated with the revolution and had provided the Committee of Union and Progress with several of its ablest members. (1961: 35)

This group of revolutionaries, today known as the Young Turks, was able to overthrow the Sultan and exert substantial influence on the succeeding ruler. But in the end they were unable to steer the declining empire in a pro-Zionist direction. Back in the USA, Jewish population was rising even faster than in Germany. In 1880 it had roughly 250,000 Jews (0.5%), but by 1900 — just 20 years later — the figure was around 1.5 million (1.9%).

A census of 1918 showed this number increasing to an astonishing figure of 3 million (2.9%). Their political influence grew commensurately. For present purposes, significant American influence began with the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901. He was shot by a Polish radical named Leon Czolgosz, who had been heavily influenced by two Jewish anarchists, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman. The presidency immediately fell to the vice president, Theodore Roosevelt — who, at age 42, was (and remains) the youngest president in history. His role as an army colonel in the 1898 victory in Cuba over the Spaniards had led to widespread publicity, and with the backing of the Jewish community, he won the New York governorship later that same year. Thus he was well situated to earn the vice presidential nomination in 1900.

A question of interest: Was Roosevelt Jewish? I will examine this issue in detail later with respect to FDR (as to whom there is more to say), but in brief, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that all of the Roosevelts were, at least in part, Jewish. In Theodore's case, the only explicit indication is a claim by former Michigan governor Chase Osborn. In a letter dated 21 March 1935, Osborn said, "President [Franklin] Roosevelt knows well enough that his ancestors were Jewish. I heard Theodore Roosevelt state twice that his ancestors were Jewish." But Osborn offers no specifics, and I am not aware of any further claims regarding Theodore himself.

However, there are two other relevant items regarding his Jewish connections. Having acceded to the office in 1901, he subsequently won the 1904 election. In late 1906 he appointed the first Jew to the presidential cabinet: Oscar Straus, a wealthy New York lawyer and former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. As Secretary of Labor and Commerce, Straus was in charge of the Bureau of Immigration — at the critical time of accelerating Jewish immigration. We can be sure that his office was particularly amenable to incoming Jews.

The second event occurred in 1912. Roosevelt had declined to run again in 1908, preferring to nominate his Secretary of War, William Taft — who proceeded to win handily. Taft, however, disappointed many Republicans, and there was a call to bring Roosevelt back. But the party would not oust a sitting president, and so Roosevelt decided to run on a third-party ticket. Hence the peculiar status of the 1912 election: it featured Taft running for reelection, Roosevelt running as a third-party candidate, and Woodrow Wilson running as a first-term Democrat. As the history books like to say, we had a former president and a sitting president running against a future president. Wilson, as we know, would win this race, and go on to serve two consecutive terms — covering the lead-up, duration, and aftermath of World War I.

But less well known is this fact: For perhaps the first time in US history, all three major candidates had substantial Jewish financial backing. Henry Ford's Dearborn Independent reported on a 1914 Congressional testimony by Paul Warburg, best known as the Jewish "father of the Federal Reserve." Warburg was the prototypical Jewish banker, long-time partner at Kuhn, Loeb, and Co., and later head of Wells Fargo in New York. At some point during Taft's presidency, Warburg decided to get financially involved in politics. By

the time of the 1912 election, he and his partners at Kuhn, Loeb were funding all three candidates. Warburg's testimony, before Senator Joseph Bristow (R-Kan.), is revealing:

JB: "It has been variously reported in the newspapers that you and your partners directly and indirectly contributed very largely to Mr. Wilson's campaign funds." PW: "Well, my partners — there is a very peculiar condition — no; I do not think any one of them contributed largely at all; there may have been moderate contributions. My brother, for instance, contributed to Mr. Taft's campaign." . . .

JB: "I understood you to say that you contributed to Mr. Wilson's campaign." PW: "No; my letter says that I offered to contribute; but it was too late. I came back to this country only a few days before the campaign closed." JB: "So that you did not make any contribution?" PW: "I did not make any contribution; no." JB: "Did any members of your firm make contributions to Mr. Wilson's campaign?" PW: "I think that is a matter of record. Mr. [Jacob] Schiff contributed. I would not otherwise discuss the contributions of my partners, if it was not a matter of record. I think Mr. Schiff was the only one who contributed in our firm." JB: "And you stated that your brother had contributed to Mr. Taft's campaign, as I understand it?" PW: "I did. But again, I do not want to go into a discussion of my partners' affairs, and I shall stick to that pretty strictly, or we will never get through." JB: "I understood you also to say that no members of your firm contributed to Mr. Roosevelt's campaign." PW: "I did not say that." JB: "Oh! Did any members of the firm do that?" PW: "My answer would please you probably; but I shall not answer that, but will repeat that I will not discuss my partners' affairs." JB: "Yes. I understood you to say Saturday that you were a Republican, but when Mr. Roosevelt became a candidate, you then became a sympathizer with Mr. Wilson and supported him?" PW: "Yes." JB: "While your brother was supporting Mr. Taft?" PW: "Yes." JB: "And I was interested to know whether any member of your firm supported Mr. Roosevelt." PW: "It is a matter of record that there are." JB: "That there are some of them who did?" PW: "Oh, yes."

In sum: some unknown members of Kuhn, Loeb (which also financed the bolshevik revolution) donated to Roosevelt; Paul's brother (Felix) gave to Taft; and Schiff donated to Wilson. Cleverly, Paul Warburg himself admitted to no funding, but we can hardly take him at his word here. In any case, there was a Jewish hand in all three contestants, and the Jews were guaranteed influence with the winner, no matter the outcome. We don't know the extent of this influence, nor how long it had gone on. To date I have not uncovered evidence of Jewish involvement with Roosevelt's 1904 election, although his appointment of Straus to the cabinet is typical of the kind of political patronage that follows financial support. And the same with Taft: We don't know the degree of Jewish support for his initial run in 1908, but support in 1912 suggests that they were reasonably satisfied with his performance.

But Taft turned out to be a mixed bag for the Jews. On the one hand, Jewish immigration continued apace. And he did appoint Oscar Straus to the ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire. However, he was less inclined to act on the international stage than the Jews

had wished. Of particular concern was the growing problem in Russia, and steady reports of Jewish pogroms. For example, there was the “Kishinev massacre” of April 1903; the New York Times reported that “Jews were slaughtered like sheep. The dead number 120. . . . The scenes of horror attending this massacre are beyond description. Babies were literally torn to pieces by the frenzied and blood-thirsty mob” (April 28; p. 6). A slight exaggeration — the actual death toll was 47. A second attack in Kishinev in 1905 left 19 dead; regrettable, but hardly a catastrophe. In early 1910 the NYT ran an article, “Russian Jews in Sad Plight.” Their source said, “The condition of Russian [Jews] is worse today than at any time since the barbarous massacres and pogroms of 1905 and 1906.” Then on 18 September 1911, the Russian Prime Minister, Pyotr Stolypin, was shot and killed — by a Jewish assassin, Mordekhai Gershtovich, aka Dmitri Bogrov. (The reader will recall Herzl’s demand for revolutionary action.) This of course brought even harsher recriminations.

But the last straw, for the American Zionists, was the restriction on American Jews from entering into Russia. There had been obstacles in place since the turn of the century, but they became much more stringent during Taft’s presidency. The Zionists wanted the US government to take action, but this was forestalled by a long-standing treaty of 1832, one that guaranteed “reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation” and allowed mutual freedom of entry of citizens on both sides. The Zionists thus took it upon themselves to initiate the abrogation of this treaty as a means of putting external pressure on the Czarist regime. And, despite the wishes of President Taft and the best interests of America at large, they succeeded. This whole incident, thoroughly documented by Cohen (1963), is an astounding and watershed event in Jewish influence. As she says,

Credit for this act belongs to a small group which had campaigned publicly during 1911 for the abrogation of the treaty. How a mere handful of men succeeded in arousing American public opinion on a relatively obscure issue to a near “wave of hysteria,” how they forced the hand of an antagonistic administration, and what principal aim lay behind their fight for abrogation constitute an absorbing story of pressure politics.

The “mere handful of men” consisted primarily of Jewish lawyer Louis Marshall, the banker Jacob Schiff, and their colleagues at the American Jewish Committee — the ‘AIPAC’ of its day, and still a potent force a century later. They had raised the topic of abrogation as early as 1908, but it did not become a top priority until early 1910. They then approached Taft, knowing that he was preparing to run for reelection the following year. As Cohen (p. 9) says, “The quid pro quo was obvious; the Jewish leaders would try to deliver the Jewish vote to Taft.” But he was unsympathetic. Taft knew that, for several reasons, it was not in America’s favor: Our commercial interests, our Far East foreign policy, Russian good will, and our international integrity would all be harmed by abrogation. But the Jews were pressing; in February 1910 they met with Taft, to “give him one last chance” to support their cause. When he again declined, they decided to go around the president, to Congress and to the American people. They knew how to work Congress. As Cohen (p. 13) explains, “the pattern of Jewish petitions to the government. . . was

generally that of secret diplomacy. Wealthy or politically prominent individuals asked favors... but always in the form of discreet pressure and behind-the-scenes bargaining." But mounting a public campaign was something new.

In January 1911, Marshall "officially opened the public campaign for abrogation." He immediately appealed not to Jewish interest — though that was the sole motive — but rather to allegedly American interests. "It is not the Jew who is insulted; it is the American people," he said. As Shogan (2010: 22) puts it, "a key to the [Jewish] strategy was to frame its demand as a plea to protect American interests in general, not just the rights of Jews." The AJC then embarked on a massive propaganda effort. They enlisted Jewish support in the media; Samuel Strauss and Adolph Ochs (of the New York Times) helped coordinate a series of articles and op-eds in several major cities. They made the case "in popular emotional terms," organized petitions and letterwriting programs, and held dedicated, pro-abrogation rallies — one of which included such luminaries as William Hearst and future president Woodrow Wilson. Everything was designed to put maximum pressure on Congress to act.

At the same time, Taft remained firm in his opposition. In a private letter he wrote, "I am the President of the whole United States, and the vote of the Jews, important as it is, cannot frighten me in this matter" (Cohen, p. 21)

Secretary of State Philander Knox, and Ambassador to Russia William Rockhill, both strongly supported him. Rockhill was particularly galled; expressing his thoughts, Cohen asks, "were national interests to be subservient to a small group of individuals?" After all, the actual harm was near microscopic: "Only 28 American Jews resided in Russia, and the State Dept knew of only four cases in five years where American Jews were denied admission" (p. 16). And yet this "small group of men" was turning the tide in their favor.

By November of 1911, just 11 months after launching their public campaign, the AJC was confident of victory. Schiff was able to predict easy passage for the resolution. That same month an "unofficial delegation" of Jews met with Taft regarding his pending annual message, and they convinced him that Congressional action was inevitable, and veto-proof. Taft relented, agreeing to sign the resolution when it reached his desk. Wanting no further delay, the AJC pressed for a vote before the end of year. On December 13 the House approved the measure — by the astounding tally of 301 to 1. A slightly modified version came up for Senate vote on December 19, which was passed unanimously. A reconciled bill was approved the next day, and Taft signed it. So it came to be that, on 20 December 1911, the US government sold its soul to the Jewish Lobby.

The importance of this event can scarcely be overestimated. The interests of "a mere handful of men," acting on behalf of a small American minority, were able to dictate governmental foreign policy, against the express wishes of the president and his staff, and contrary to the larger interests of the nation. The Russians, incidentally, were stunned at this decision. They knew of the Jewish hand behind it, but could hardly believe that it had the power to carry through on its threat. The NYT again gives a useful report:

In parliamentary circles here [in Russia] the prevailing comment is characterized by astonishment that the American government has responded so readily to the Jewish outcry. The opinion is expressed by members of the Duma that in all probability the Jews will now attempt to force matters further. (20 Dec 1911; p. 2)

Indeed — the Jewish-led Bolshevik revolution was just six years away. Such was the state of things in America and globally at that time. International Jewry had sufficient wealth and influence to steer events at the highest levels, and American Jews (Zionist and otherwise) had come to permeate the government — and American culture generally. The situation so impressed German economist Werner Sombart that in 1911 he made this observation: “For what we call Americanism is nothing else than the Jewish spirit distilled.” From the perspective of a century later, this would seem truer than ever.

Wilson and the “Great War”

All this, then, serves as the context and backdrop for the emergence of Woodrow Wilson, beginning with the election of 1912. If Franklin Roosevelt was “the first great hero of American Jews,” then Wilson was the first great understudy. As Henry Ford saw it, “Mr. Wilson, while President, was very close to the Jews. His administration, as everyone knows, was predominantly Jewish.” Wilson seems to have been the first president to have the full backing of the Jewish Lobby, including multiple major financial donors. And he was the first to fully reward their support. It’s worthwhile summarizing the main figures in the Jewish power structure, as of 1912. Herzl died young in 1904, so he was out of the picture. But a “mere handful” of others came to dominate the movement, and the American scene:

- Oscar Straus (age 62), German-born, first Jewish cabinet member under T. Roosevelt, and later ambassador to the Ottoman Empire under Taft.
- Jacob Schiff (65), head of the Kuhn, Loeb banking firm.
- Louis Marshall (56), borderline Zionist, founder of the AJC.
- The Warburg brothers: Paul (44) and Felix (41), German-born bankers. A third brother, Max, stayed in Germany (until 1938).
- Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (56), German-born lawyer, father of the even more influential Henry, Jr.
- Louis Brandeis (56), lawyer, strongly Zionist.
- Samuel Untermyer (54), lawyer.
- Bernard Baruch (42), Wall Street financier.
- Stephen Wise (40), Austrian-born rabbi and fervent Zionist.

- Richard Gottheil (50), British-born rabbi and Zionist.

These, to emphasize, were all Americans. On the European side there was a different structure, one centered on such figures as Chaim Weizmann and Herbert Samuel in Britain, and Max Nordau in France.

Let me begin with financial backing — which of course has long been the trump card of Jewry. Many of the above individuals were prime supporters of Wilson. Cooper (2009: 172) remarks that his “big contributors” included the likes of “Henry Morgenthau, Jacob Schiff, and Samuel Untermyer, as well as a newcomer to their ranks, Bernard Baruch.” Such assistance continued throughout Wilson’s tenure; for his 1916 reelection bid, “financiers such as Henry Morgenthau and Bernard Baruch gave generously” (ibid: 350). As we saw, Schiff’s support was admitted by Warburg in his congressional testimony. Warburg himself was very evasive, allowing only that his “sympathies went with Mr. Wilson.” Yet we can hardly believe that no money followed. Warburg’s most profound impact was his leading role in the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the year Wilson took office. Seligman (1914: 387) remarks that “it may be stated without fear of contradiction that in its fundamental features the Federal Reserve is the work of Mr. Warburg more than of any other man in the country.” Its basic principles, he said, “were the creation of Mr. Warburg and of Mr. Warburg alone.” In due recognition, Wilson appointed him to the Fed’s first Board of Governors in August 1914.

Morgenthau’s influence began in 1911, when Wilson was still governor of New Jersey. Balakian (2003: 220) notes that it was at this time that the two “bonded,” and that “Morgenthau offered Wilson his ‘unreserved moral and financial support’.” In the run-up to the 1912 Democratic convention, “Morgenthau was giving \$5,000 a month to the campaign, and continued to give generously throughout the fall” (ibid.: 221). In fact, says Balakian, only a few of his wealthy Princeton classmates gave more. Ward (1989: 252) confirms this, noting that Morgenthau “had been an important backer of Woodrow Wilson in 1912.” Morgenthau duly received his reward: ambassadorship to Ottoman Turkey, again overseeing Palestine. Of special importance was Wilson’s association with Louis Brandeis. The two first met back in 1910; Shogan (2010: 64) describes Brandeis’s “friendship with Woodrow Wilson,” noting that he had “worked mightily” for him in the 1912 campaign. In a telling statement, Wilson wrote to his friend after the election, “You were yourself a great part of the victory.” Brandeis would be rewarded by a successful nomination to the Supreme Court in June 1916 — the first Jew on the court. He would serve a full 23 years, well beyond Wilson’s lifetime, and, despite his formal ‘neutrality’ as a justice, would play a vital role in both world wars.

But perhaps the most significant of all was Bernard Baruch. A millionaire before he was 30, Baruch catapulted out of nowhere, under obscure conditions, to become a leading influence in the Wilson administration. Already in 1915, in the early years of the European war, he was convinced that America would be involved. In Congressional testimony of February 1920, Baruch stated that, in 1915, he “had been very much disturbed by the

unprepared condition of this country.” “I had been thinking about it very seriously, and I thought we would be drawn into the war. . . . I thought a war was coming long before it did.” Through some still-mysterious process, Baruch was named to the Council of National Defense in early 1916. He then came to control a particular subcommittee, the War Industries Board (WIB), which had extraordinary wartime powers. Baruch single-handedly ran it throughout the war years. His testimony before Sen. Albert Jefferis (R-Neb.) summarizes his role:

AJ: “In what lines did this board of 10 have the powers that you mention? BB: “We had the power of priority, which was the greatest power in the war.” AJ: “In other words, you determined what everybody could have?” BB: “Exactly; there is no question about that. I assumed that responsibility, sir, and that final determination rested within me.” AJ: “What?” BB: “That final determination, as the President said, rested within me; the determination of whether the Army or Navy should have it rested with me; the determination of whether the Railroad Administration could have it, or the Allies, or whether General Allenby should have locomotives, or whether they should be used in Russia, or used in France.” AJ: “You had considerable power?” BB: “Indeed I did, sir.” . . .

AJ: “And all those different lines, really, ultimately, centered in you, so far as power was concerned?” BB: “Yes, sir, it did. I probably had more power than perhaps any other man did in the war; doubtless that is true.”

An astonishing fact: a young, unelected Jew with no political experience becomes, in time of crisis, the most powerful man in the US government, after the president himself. And yet all this was just a rehearsal. Baruch would play a similar role in the Second World War under FDR, in his Office of War Mobilization. He was also a friend and confidant of Winston Churchill. No doubt “Barney” Baruch had lots of advice for all parties involved. World War I began in earnest in August of 1914, when the German army crossed into officially neutral Belgium on its way to France. A series of alliances and treaties triggered a chain reaction in which 10 nations entered the war by the end of that year. Ultimately another 18 would be engaged — though in the case of the US, it would be nearly two and half years later. It’s difficult today, with our present eagerness to engage in warfare around the world, to understand the degree to which Americans then were so strongly anti-interventionist. Neither the public nor the government had any real inclination to get involved in a European war. Publicly, at least, Wilson himself was a pacifist and an isolationist. In a speech of 19 August 1914, just after the outbreak of war, he proclaimed that “every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned.” We have a duty to be “the one great nation at peace,” and thus “we must be impartial in thought as well as in action.”

And yet, American governmental policy did not fully adhere to these lofty words. Under international law, the United States, as a neutral party, had the right to conduct commerce with all sides. But of course both Britain and Germany sought to restrict trade

with the other. A British naval blockade interrupted or seized a substantial portion of our intended shipments to Germany, reducing trade by more than 90%. And yet Wilson hardly objected. On the other hand, when German submarines attacked or threatened our shipments to England, he reacted in the strongest manner. The end result was a near quadrupling of trade with the Allies between 1914 and 1916. In practical terms, we were supporting the Allied war effort, even as we remained officially neutral. Wilson's government — if not he himself — was decidedly biased against the Germans. Not coincidentally, Wilson's Jewish advisors were, to a man, anti-German. By the time of the 1916 election, war was churning throughout Europe. Still, Wilson promised to remain unengaged; he ran and won on the slogan, "He kept us out of war." The American people too had little appetite for armed conflict; as Cooper (2009: 381) writes, "Clearly, the president was not feeling a push for war from Congress or the public." But like so many campaign promises, this one would be discarded soon afterward — in fact, barely one month after his second inauguration.

So: Why did he do it? Why did Wilson change his mind and, on 2 April 1917, issue his famous call to Congress to declare war on Germany? His official answer: German submarines were relentlessly targeting US military, passenger, and cargo ships, and thus we simply had no choice. But this explanation does not withstand scrutiny. Early in the war the Germans were sinking a number of ships that were trafficking with the Allies, but in September 1915, after urgent demands from Wilson, they suspended submarine attacks. This suspension held for an exceptionally long time — through February 1917. And all throughout that time, we, and other "neutral" nations, were trading with Germany's enemies, supplying them with material goods, and assisting in a naval blockade. Thus it is unsurprising that the Germans eventually resumed their attacks, on all ships in the war zone.

In his famous speech to Congress, Wilson said of the lifting of the suspension, "the Imperial German Government . . . put aside all restraints of law or of humanity, and uses its submarines to sink every vessel [in the war zone]." Sparing no hyperbole, he added, "The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations."

But what are the facts? Specifically, how big a threat did Germany pose to the US? In reality, it was not much of a threat at all. From the time of the outbreak of war (August 1914) until Wilson's declaration in April 1917, a total of three small military ships were lost — one submarine in 1915, one armored cruiser in 1916, and one protected cruiser in early 1917. Additionally, a total of 12 American merchant steamers (freight ships) were sunk in the same period, but with the loss of only 38 individual lives. So the US had lost a grand total of 15 ships to that point. Putting this in perspective: Over the course of the entire war, German U-boats sank roughly 6,600 ships in total. Hence the threat to the US was all but inconsequential. Clearly Wilson was thinking in internationalist terms, and someone or something convinced him that realigning the global order was more important than American public opinion; thus his famous and much-derided phrase:

“The world must be made safe for democracy.” Yes — but whose democracy?

A few powerful voices opposed Wilson, including Senators Robert La Follette (R-Wisc.) and George Norris (R-Neb.). Both spoke on April 4, just two days after Wilson’s plea for war. La Follette was outraged at the unilateral action taken by the Wilson administration. In a scathing speech, he said:

I am speaking of a profession of democracy that is linked in action with the most brutal and domineering use of autocratic power. Are the people of this country being so well-represented in this war movement that we need to go abroad to give other people control of their governments? Will the President and the supporters of this war bill submit it to a vote of the people before the declaration of war goes into effect? . . . Who has registered the knowledge or approval of the American people of the course this Congress is called upon to take in declaring war upon Germany? Submit the question to the people, you who support it. You who support it dare not do it, for you know that by a vote of more than ten to one the American people as a body would register their declaration against it.

Norris had some ideas about the driving forces behind the call to war. He believed that many Americans had been “misled as to the real history and the true facts, by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war.” Wall Street bankers loaned millions to the Allies, and naturally wanted it repaid. And then there were the profits to be made from military hardware and ammunition. These same forces also held sway in the media: [A] large number of the great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known, to manufacture sentiment in favor of war. . . . [And now] Congress, urged by the President and backed by the artificial sentiment, is about to declare war and engulf our country in the greatest holocaust that the world has ever known. . .

Indeed — every war is a ‘holocaust.’ Norris then encapsulated his view with a most striking line: “We are going into war upon the command of gold.” And everyone knew who held the gold. Norris and La Follette both realized they had no chance to change the outcome. Any force that could compel abrogation of the Russian treaty and monopolize a presidential election could manufacture Congressional consent for war. Later that same day, the Senate confirmed it, by a vote of 82 to 6. Two days thereafter, the House concurred, 373 to 50. And so we were at war. American troops would be on the ground in Europe within three months.

Balfour

Political power is a strange thing; it is one of those rare cases where appearance is reality. If you say you have power, and others say you have power, and if all parties act as if you have power — then you have power. Such is the case with the Jewish

Lobby. Simply because, at that time, they had no army, had internal disagreements, and in no country exceeded one or two percent of the population, we cannot conclude that they were mere helpless pawns, manipulated at will by the great powers. And yet today, modern commentators continue to refer to the 'illusory' or 'misperceived' power of the Jews at that time. This can now be exposed as a weak attempt to whitewash the Jewish power play. When a small minority can dictate foreign policy, promote global war, and steer the outcome in their favor, then they have substantial power — no matter what anyone says. It was true in 1911; it was true in the 1912 election; and it would be clearly demonstrated once again in the case of the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

To recap: During Wilson's first term, Jewish Americans achieved major political gains. Paul Warburg's Federal Reserve Act was passed, and he was named to the Board. Henry Morgenthau, Sr. was nominated ambassador to Turkey, watching over Palestine. Brandeis was named to the Supreme Court. And Baruch became the second most powerful man in the land. Jews also made important strides elsewhere in America during those four years. Two more Jewish governors were elected — Alexander in Idaho, and Bamburger in Utah. The motion-picture business witnessed the beginning of Jewish domination, with Universal Pictures (Carl Laemmle), Paramount (Zukor, Lasky, Frohmans, and Goldwyn), Fox Films (William Fox), and the early formation of "Warner" Bros. Pictures — in reality, the four Wonskolaser brothers: Hirsz, Aaron, Szmul, and Itzhak. This development would prove useful for wartime propaganda. And the Jewish population grew by some 500,000 people. 1917 was the first year of Wilson's second term. The European war was into its third year, and looking increasingly like a stalemate. With the German resumption of U-boat attacks on shipping to the UK and the American declaration, a true world war was in hand. And it was also a time of revolution in Russia. In fact, two revolutions: the worker's uprising in February that overthrew Czar Nicholas II, and the Bolshevik revolution in October that put the Jewish revolutionaries in power.

The role of Jews in the Russian revolution(s) is a complicated and interesting story. There isn't space here to elaborate, but in brief, the communist movement had a heavy Jewish hand from its inception. Marx, of course, was a German Jew, and his writings inspired an 18-year-old Vladimir Lenin in 1888. Lenin was himself one-quarter Jewish (maternal grandfather: Alexandr Blank). In 1898, Lenin formed a revolutionary group, the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party (RSDWP), which was the early precursor to the Soviet Communist Party. Four years later, Lenin was joined by a full-blooded Jew, Leon Trotsky — born Lev Bronstein. Internal dissension led to a schism in 1903, at which time the RSDWP split into Bolshevik ('majority') and Menshevik ('minority') factions. Both factions were disproportionately Jewish. In addition to Lenin and Trotsky, leading Bolshevik Jews included Grigory Zinoviev, Yakov Sverdlov, Lev Kamenev (aka Rozenfeld), Karl Radek, Leonid Krassin, Alexander Litvinov, and Lazar Kaganovich. Ben-Sasson (1976: 943) observes that these men, and "others of Jewish origin... were prominent among the leaders of the Russian Bolshevik revolution." This was public knowledge, even at the time. As the London Times reported in 1919,

One of the most curious features of the Bolshevik movement is the high percentage of non-Russian elements amongst its leaders. Of the 20 or 30 leaders who provide the central machinery of the Bolshevik movement, not less than 75 percent are Jews. . . . [T]he Jews provide the executive officers.

The article proceeds to list Trotsky and some 17 other individuals by name. Levin (1988: 13) notes that, at the 1907 RSDWP Congress, there were nearly 100 Jewish delegates, comprising about one third of the total. About 20 the Mensheviks were Jews, but by 1917 they comprised eight of 17 (47 Central Committee members.

Thus it was that, in the years leading up to the 1917 revolutions, Jews were working internally and externally to overthrow the Czar. Stein (1961: 98) quotes a Zionist memo of 1914, promoting "relations with the Jews in Eastern Europe and in America, so as to contribute to the overthrow of Czarist Russia and to secure the national autonomy of the Jews." Temperley (1924: 173) noted that, "by 1917, [Russian Jews] had done much in preparation for that general disintegration of Russian national life, later recognized as the revolution." Ziff (1938: 56) stated the common view of the time that "Jewish influence in Russia was supposed to be considerable. Jews were playing a prominent part in the revolution. . . ." Surprisingly, even Winston Churchill acknowledged this fact. In 1920 he wrote an infamous essay explaining the difference between the "good" (Zionist) Jews and the "bad" Bolsheviks. This dichotomy, which was nothing less than a "struggle for the soul of the Jewish people," made it appear almost "as if the gospel of Christ and the gospel of Antichrist were destined to originate among the same people" (1920/2002: 24). The Zionists were "national" Jews who sought only a homeland for their beleaguered people. The evil "international Jews," the Bolsheviks, sought revolution, chaos, and even world domination. It was, said Churchill, a "sinister conspiracy." He continued:

This movement among the Jews is not new. From the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxemburg (Germany), and Emma Goldman (United States), this world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the reconstitution of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malevolence, and impossible equality, has been steadily growing. . . . It has been the mainspring of every subversive movement during the Nineteenth Century; and now at last this band of extraordinary personalities from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America have gripped the Russian people by the hair of their heads and have become practically the undisputed masters of that enormous empire.

"There is no need to exaggerate" the Jewish role in the Russian revolution; "It is certainly a very great one. . . . [T]he majority of the leading figures are Jews." In the Soviet institutions, "the predominance of Jews is even more astonishing." But perhaps the worst aspect was the dominant role of Judeoterrorism. Churchill was clear and explicit:

[T]he prominent, if not indeed the principal, part in the system of terrorism applied by the Extraordinary Commissions for Combating Counter-Revolution has been taken by

Jews, and in some notable cases by Jewesses. The same evil prominence was obtained by Jews in the brief period of terror during which Bela Kun ruled in Hungary. The same phenomenon has been presented in Germany (especially in Bavaria), so far as this madness has been allowed to prey upon the temporary prostration of the German people. . . . [T]he part played by the [Jews] in proportion to their numbers in the population is astonishing.

By this time, Churchill had been working on behalf of Zionist Jews for some 15 years. He had long counted on Jewish political support, and was rumored to be in the pay of wealthy Zionists.

The Russian revolutions were significant, but the premier event of 1917 was surely the Balfour Declaration of November 2. This short letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild was remarkable: it promised to a "mere handful" of British subjects (and indirectly their coreligionists worldwide) a land that the United Kingdom did not possess, and that was part of some other empire. It is enlightening to examine the orthodox account of this event. According to the standard view, it was at this time that Britain was not only mired in the war on the Continent, but also that "British forces were fighting to win Palestine from the Ottoman Empire." The Brits wanted it "because of its location near the Suez Canal." (In fact, of course, Palestine is more than 200 km from the Canal, separated by the whole of the Sinai Peninsula.) "The British believed the Balfour Declaration would help gain support of this goal from Jewish leaders in the UK, the United States, and other countries."

So, here are a few relevant questions: Was control of the Canal really the primary objective? Or did the British think that the Jews would help them in their broader war aims? The Jews? — a beleaguered minority everywhere, with no nation, no army, no "real power"? Could they really help the British Empire? And did they in fact help them? And if so, how? Nothing in the documentation of the time suggests that the canal was anything more than an incidental concern. But there was clearly a larger goal — to enlist the aid of Jews everywhere, in order to help Britain win the war. Schneer (2010: 152) notes that, beginning in early 1916, the British sought to "explore seriously some kind of arrangement with 'world Jewry' or 'Great Jewry'." A diplomatic communiqué of March 13 is explicit:

[T]he most influential part of Jewry in all the countries would very much appreciate an offer of agreement concerning Palestine. . . . [I]t is clear that by utilizing the Zionist idea, important political results can be achieved. Among them will be the conversion, in favour of the Allies, of Jewish elements in the Orient, in the United States, and in other places. . . . The only purpose of [His Majesty's] Government is to find some arrangement. . . which might facilitate the conclusion of an agreement ensuring the Jewish support. (in Ziff 1938: 56)

Later that year, an advisor to the British government, James Malcolm, pressed this very point: that, by promising Palestine to the Zionists, they would use their influence around

the world — and especially in America — to help bring about overall victory. On the face of it, this was a preposterous suggestion: that the downtrodden Jewish minority, and in particular the even smaller minority of Zionist Jews, could do anything to alter events in a world war. And yet that quickly became the official view of the British government — particularly so when David Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916. Lloyd George was, from the Zionist perspective, a nearly ideal leader. He had been working with them since 1903. He strongly believed in their near-mythic influence. And he was a devout Christian Zionist, making him an ideological compatriot. Immediately upon assuming office, Lloyd George directed his staff — in particular, Mark Sykes and Lord Arthur Balfour — to negotiate Jewish support. MacMillan explains:

From [early] 1917, with Lloyd George's encouragement, Sykes met privately with Weizmann and other Zionists. The final, and perhaps most important, factor in swinging British support behind the Zionists was to make propaganda among Jews, particularly in the United States, which had not yet come into the war, and in Russia... (2003: 416; my italics)

And as if the stalled war wasn't motivation enough, rumors were soon flying that the Zionists were also soliciting German support; the Jews, it seems, were willing to sell their services to the highest bidder. When these rumors reached London, "the British government moved with speed" (*ibid*). And with speed they did. With Brandeis's input, a first draft of the brief statement was completed in July. A second draft appeared in mid-October, and by the end of that month Balfour was ready to make public his Government's stance: "from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made. . . . If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America." Three days later, they did.

But most striking was the implication that the "mere handful" of Zionist Jews in England could actually be a decisive factor in bringing a reluctant US into the global war. If successful, this would dramatically swing the military balance of power. And via Wilson's Jewish advisors — most notably Baruch and Brandeis — they had the ear of the president. But could they do it? Unquestionably, the Brits thought they could — and that they did. This is such an astonishing manifestation of Jewish power that it is worth reviewing the opinions of several commentators. Speaking after the war, on 4 July 1922, Churchill argued for full implementation of the famous Declaration:

Pledges and promises were made during the War... They were made because it was considered they would be of value to us in our struggle to win the War. It was considered that the support which the Jews could give us all over the world, and particularly in the United States, and also in Russia, would be a definite palpable advantage. In his monumental six-volume study of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, British historian Howard Temperley (1924) made this observation:

It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations in

Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente [Allies]. It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry in the same way, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. It was believed, further, that it would greatly influence American opinion in favour of the Allies. Such were the chief considerations which, during the later part of 1916 and the next ten months of 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.

We must bear in mind that the Declaration was issued seven months after US entry into the war. But Temperley is unequivocal: the deal was concluded “during the later part of 1916,” well before Wilson’s decision to go to war. Apparently the deal was this: bring the US into the war, and we will promise you your Jewish homeland. Such was the “contract with Jewry.”

Sensing the importance, Temperley reiterates the point, to drive it home: “That it is in purpose a definite contract with Jewry is beyond question. . . . In spirit it is a pledge that, in return for services to be rendered by Jewry, the British Government would ‘use their best endeavours’ to secure. . . . Palestine.” And in fact, it was a good deal all around. “The Declaration certainly rallied world Jewry, as a whole, to the side of the Entente. . . . [T]he services of Jewry were not expected in vain, and were. . . well worth the price which had to be paid” (p. 174). Britain’s price was low: a spit of land far from the home country. True, there would be Arab resistance, but the Brits were used to that. A much higher price would be paid by Germany and the Central Powers, and by America — who would expend hundreds of millions of dollars, and suffer 116,000 war dead.

A Zionist insider, Samuel Landman, wrote a detailed and explicit account of these events in 1936. After noting some preliminary attempts in 1916, he remarks on the significance of Malcolm’s involvement. Malcolm knew that Wilson “always attached the greatest possible importance to the advice of a very prominent Zionist, Mr. Justice Brandeis. . . .” (p. 4). Malcolm was able to convince Sykes and French ambassador Georges Picot that: “the best and perhaps the only way. . . to induce the American President to come into the war was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of the Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo basis.”

Granted, Landman was not an unbiased observer, and had good reason to exaggerate Zionist influence. But that was not the case with the British Royal Palestine Commission, which issued a report in 1937. At the critical stage of the war, “it was believed that Jewish sympathy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one way or the other to the Allied cause. In particular, Jewish sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry. . . .” (p. 23). The report then quotes Lloyd George:

The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to. . . a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word.

Two years after this report, in 1939, the British contemplated starting a war with Germany. Churchill wrote a memo for his War Cabinet, reminding them that:

“it was not for light or sentimental reasons that Lord Balfour and the Government of 1917 made the promises to the Zionists which have been the cause of so much subsequent discussion. The influence of American Jewry was rated then as a factor of the highest importance, and we did not feel ourselves in such a strong position as to be able to treat it with indifference. (in Gilbert 2007: 165)“

The implication, of course, was that the British might once again need Jewish help to defeat the Germans. Having been goaded into war in 1939 by Roosevelt and his Jewish advisors, the British were becoming desperate once again to draw in the Americans. As David Irving reports, it was in late 1941 that Weizmann and his fellow British Zionists began “promising to use their influence in Washington to bring the United States into the war” (2001: 73). Irving quotes from an amazingly blunt letter from Weizmann to Churchill, promising to do again in this war what they did in the last:

“There is only one big ethnic group [in America] which is willing to stand, to a man, for Great Britain, and a policy of ‘all-out aid’ for her: the five million Jews. From [Treasury] Secretary Morgenthau [Henry, Jr.], Governor [Herbert] Lehman, Justice Frankfurter, down to the simplest Jewish workman or trader. . . . It has been repeatedly acknowledged by British Statesmen that it was the Jews who, in the last war, effectively helped to tip the scales in America in favour of Great Britain. They are keen to do it — and may do it — again.“

So here we have Weizmann explicitly naming the influential Jews with the power to bring Roosevelt and the United States into a war in which it, once again, had no compelling interest. The letter was dated September 10, 1941. Churchill did not have to wait long. Within 90 days, America would be at war.

Wars, of course, are not only events of great death and destruction; they provide tremendous opportunity for financial profit, and for dramatic shifts in global power structures. For those in the right position, warfare can yield extreme gains in wealth and influence. Specifically, the events surrounding the First World War brought substantial gains to Jews worldwide — in several ways. First, with highly-placed individuals in the Taft and Wilson administrations, the US was very amenable to Jewish immigration; in fact their numbers increased dramatically, from 1.5 million to over 3 million between 1905 and 1920 — on the way to 4 million by the mid-1920s. Second was the Balfour Declaration, which promised them Palestine. Granted, nothing was immediately delivered as to Palestine, but even so, it was a major concession by a world power. Third, the world order was changed in their favor: the hated and “anti-Semitic” Czarist rule in Russia was replaced by the Jewish-led Bolshevik movement, the hated and “anti-Semitic” Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was replaced by the Jewish-friendly Weimar regime, and the Jewish-influenced governments of the US and Great Britain reestablished their global dominance.

Finally, and as always, there was money to be made. Running the War Industries Board

for Wilson, Jewish Financier Bernard Baruch had extraordinary power to direct military spending; we can be sure that his preferred clients benefitted.¹ But perhaps Nebraska Senator George Norris said it best. Speaking in opposition to Wilson's call for a war declaration, Norris exclaimed that Americans were being deceived "by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war." Furthermore, "a large number of great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known, to manufacture sentiment in favor of war." Summarizing his case, Norris said this: "We are going into war upon the command of gold." Finance, media, 'gold' — Jewish interests prospered on many fronts. But Wilson was evidently unaffected by such matters, or by his pledge to his fellow Americans to "keep us out of war." His team of Jewish backers and advisors — Baruch, but also Henry Morgenthau Sr., Jacob Schiff, Samuel Untermyer, Paul Warburg, Stephen Wise, and Louis Brandeis — wanted war, and war they got. The fact that it would cost America \$250 billion (current equivalent), and some 116,000 war dead, did not seem to figure into their calculations. The main topic of the present essay is World War Two, but its roots lie in the outcome of the First World War. I therefore continue the story from that time.

Some Context

Before proceeding, we must bear something in mind. The striving of Jews for greater influence and political power is to be found on both of the sides of World War I. Russian imperial leaders had long been suspicious of the Jews, and largely banished them to the so-called Pale of Settlement that was established in western Russia in the 1790s. Beginning in the 1880s, western media issued exaggerated reports of slaughters, pogroms, and assorted massacres among the Russian Jews there, whose numbers were nearly always recorded — astonishingly — as "6 million."

This naturally generated deep hostility toward the House of Romanov, and the Jews sought its demise. Special animosity was reserved for Czar Nicholas II, who assumed power in 1894. In Part 1, I explained the stunningly successful effort of the American Jewish lobby to abrogate the long-standing US-Russia treaty in 1911; this was a small punishment aimed at the Czar. The ultimate goal, though, was his overthrow, and thus we can imagine the joy of the global Jewish community at his fall in March 1917. As we recall, the Czar and his family were then murdered by Jewish Bolsheviks in July of the following year.

It was a somewhat similar story with the German ruler Wilhelm II, who rose to power in 1888. There, however, Jews were prosperous and enjoyed a relatively high degree of freedom — despite the Kaiser's evident personal dislike of them. Previously I cited some impressive statistics by Sarah Gordon regarding their numbers in law, media, business, and academia, all prior to World War I. In the banking sector, they utterly flourished; prominent German-Jewish banking families included the well-known Rothschilds and War-

burgs, but also the Mendelssohns, Bleichroeders, Speyers, Oppenheims, Bambergers, Gutmanns, Goldschmidts, and Wassermanns. But despite their wealth and success, Jews had no access to political power, owing to the hereditary monarchy. This, for them, was unacceptable. Thus they had to introduce “democracy” — with all due high-minded values, of course. Only through a democratic system could they exert direct influence on political leadership.

Consequently, as soon as the Czar fell in Russia, calls came out to repeat the success in Germany. On 19 March 1917, four days after the Czar’s ouster, the *New York Times* reported on Louis Marshall lauding the event, and adding that “the revolt against autocracy might be expected to spread to Germany.” Two days later, Jewish speakers at Madison Square Garden “predict[ed] an uprising in Germany.” As the article explains, “[some] predicted that the revolution of the working classes of Russia was the forerunner of similar revolutions the world over. That the next revolution would be in Germany was predicted by a number of the speakers” (March 21). On March 24, Jacob Schiff took credit for helping to finance the Russian revolution. At the same time, Rabbi Stephen Wise put the blame for the pending American entry into WWI on “German militarism,” adding “I would to God it were possible for us to fight side by side with the German people for the overthrow of Hohenzollernism [i.e., Kaiser Wilhelm].”

Strangely enough, Wise got his wish. Within two weeks, America was in the war. And about 18 months later, Wilhelm would suffer defeat and be compelled to abdicate.

The Paris Peace Conference

Having won the war, Wilson’s Jewish team was anxious to dictate the peace. “As it turned out,” remarks Robert Shogan (2010: 25), “the war would bring benefits to the Zionist cause, in part because of Brandeis’ role as a trusted advisor [to Wilson].” The victorious nations convened in Paris in January 1919, and the American Jewish Congress was there as its own delegation. Shogan adds that “[Stephen] Wise was in Paris, on assignment from President Wilson to head the Zionist delegation to the peace talks.” (One might reasonably ask: Why do Zionists get their own delegation at all?) Louis Marshall was also prominent there among the American Jews.

The Jewish aim was neither a just implementation of peace, nor fair treatment of Germany, but rather to maximize benefit to the various Jewish communities of Europe and the US. “At the beginning of 1919,” says Ben-Sasson (1976: 940), “diplomatic activity in Paris became the main focus of the various attempts to fulfill Jewish aspirations.” Fink (1998: 259) concurs: “In March 1919, pro-Zionist and nationalist Jewish delegations arrived in Paris.” Nearly every victorious nation, it seems, had its own Jewish representatives. Some sought formal and explicit Jewish rights in their own nations, and others worked for recognition of a Jewish national state. Polish Jews were notable beneficiaries; they succeeded in achieving explicit mention in the Polish Treaty for Minority Rights.

Writing shortly after the event, Irish philosopher and journalist Emile Dillon saw it this way:

Of all the collectivities whose interests were furthered at the Conference, the Jews had perhaps the most resourceful and certainly the most influential exponents. There were Jews from Palestine, from Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, Rumania, Greece, Britain, Holland, and Belgium; but the largest and most brilliant contingent was sent by the United States. (1920: 12) Describing the American side, Fink explains that “the fervent Zionist Julius Mack and the more moderate Louis Marshall quickly overshadowed the leading American anti-nationalists, Henry Morgenthau, Oscar Straus, and Cyrus Adler.”

Though he was predisposed to be sympathetic to the Jewish plight, Dillon nonetheless noted that a “religious” or “racial” bias “lay at the root of Mr. Wilson’s policy” (496). It is a fact, he said, “that a considerable number of delegates believed that the real influences behind the Anglo-Saxon peoples were Semitic.” Summarizing prospects for the future, he remarked on the general conclusion by many at Paris: “Henceforth the world will be governed by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who, in turn, are swayed by their Jewish elements.”

Among non-Jewish Americans there was a young Herbert Hoover, then- Secretary of the US Food Administration, and of course, future president. He was accompanied by a Jewish assistant, the financier Lewis Strauss, who remarked on his boss’s notable inclination to “champion Jewish rights,” especially in Poland. Strauss would later become instrumental in funding early development of the atomic bomb.

Treatment of the Germans at the conference, as is well known, was brutally harsh. They expected, and were promised, that the conference would be a fair settlement of the legitimate war claims of all belligerents — particularly given the complex and convoluted nature of the outbreak of hostilities. (We recall: the Archduke was assassinated by a Serb in June 1914; the Russian army mobilized and massed on the German border in July; a threatened Germany declared war on Russia in August; a Franco-Russian Pact required a simultaneous declaration against France; and Britain declared war on Germany as soon as its army crossed into Belgium.) By the time of the Peace Conference, Wilson and his team had decided that Germany alone was responsible for the war, and thus had to bear the full burden of reparations.⁶ The impossible conditions forced upon them set the stage for the rise of National Socialism and the next great war.

All in all, what emerges from the first war and the subsequent peace conference is a picture of British and American supplication to Jewish interests. Indeed, the prime beneficiaries of the war were Jews, both in America and in Europe generally. For Germany, it was obviously a disastrous event; it suffered some 2 million military deaths along with thousands of indirect civilian losses, crushing financial debts, and witnessed the end of the 900-year reign of the House of Hohenzollern. This was a tragedy for a nation that, according to Fay (1928: 552), “did not plot a European war, did not want one, and made genuine. . . efforts to avert one.”

America, which had no legitimate interest in the battles in Europe, was drawn in by Wilson's compliance with Jewish demands. For his part, Wilson comes across as something of an amoral political schemer. MacMillan (2010: 7) describes his close, "possibly romantic," relationships with several other women during his first marriage. Theodore Roosevelt viewed him "as insincere and cold-blooded an opportunist as we have ever had in the presidency" (ibid: 6). To Lloyd-George, he was "tactless, obstinate, and vain." Granted, we all have our faults; but for most of us, they do not lead to national catastrophe.

The Jewish Revolutions

With the fall of Czar Nicholas in March 1917, and upon the Bolshevik revolution of October that same year, Jewish revolutionaries became particularly active in East and Central Europe. Flush with success in Russia, they hoped to duplicate events in other countries. Ben-Sasson provides a typically understated account:

The new forces that emerged in many countries... opened up new horizons of activity for Jewish statesmen of liberal-democratic propensities, particularly those with radical-revolutionary views. ... Jews were also extremely active in the socialist parties that came to power or attained political importance in many European countries. They were even more prominent in the communist parties that split from the socialists... In short, never before in European history had so many Jews played such an active part in political life and filled such influential roles... (1976: 943)

In other words, Jewish anarchists and militant communists ("new forces") conducted violent insurrection ("new horizons of activity") aimed at overthrowing the ruling governments, and installing Jewish-led regimes. Bermant (1977: 160) confirms this point: "most of the leading revolutionaries who convulsed Europe in the final decades of the last [19th] century and the first decades of [the 20th], stemmed from prosperous Jewish families." This again is in keeping with the longstanding trend of Jewish rebellion. Not that any of this was news; major politicians of the time knew it well. Lord Balfour, for example, once remarked to Wilson's aide Edward House that "nearly all Bolshevism and disturbances of a like nature, are directly traceable to the Jews of the world. They seem determined either to have what they want or to upset present civilization" — a concise and accurate summary.

Consider Hungary, for example. There, a Hungarian Jew named Bela Kun (Kohn) founded and led the local wing of the Russian Communist Party in early 1918 — which later became an independent entity. Along with Jewish colleagues Matyas Rakosi (Roth/Rosenfeld) and Otto Korvin (Klein), Kun's party organized numerous strikes, and conducted violent and subversive attacks against President Karolyi and the ruling Social Democrats. In March 1919 Karolyi resigned, and the SD Party made an alliance of necessity with Kun's communists, in the hope of leveraging his connections to the Russian Bolsheviks. Kun agreed, on the condition that the government reestablish itself as the

“Hungarian Soviet Republic” — which it did.

Kun dominated the new government, filling many top seats with Jews; as Muller (2010: 153) explains, “Of the government’s 49 commissars, 31 were of Jewish origin.”⁸ He fended off a coup attempt in June, and then conducted what came to be known as the “Red Terror”; this was a paramilitary group, led by Jewish ideologues Georg Lukacs and Tibor Szamuely, that hunted down and killed members of the local opposition. Unfortunately for Kun, ongoing conflicts with neighboring Romania led to an invasion of Hungary, and the promised Russian aid never materialized. Kun and his fellow Jews were driven out in August, just 133 days after taking power. It was not only Russia and Hungary that had problems. “Jews had a prominent role in Communist parties elsewhere,” explains Bermant (172). In Poland, for example, “about a quarter of party members and about a third of delegates to party congresses were Jews.” The Polish Communists were unable, however, to generate sufficient force to oust the newly-established government of Jozef Pilsudski.

It was in Germany, though, that the most significant actions occurred, ones that would have a lasting effect. We need to recall events at the end of World War I. Long a stalemate, the war had essentially become a battle of attrition. American forces on the ground in mid to late 1917 threatened to change things, but for the Germans, the western front generally held up — even to the very end. At no point in time did it ever retreat into German territory. But even though the Germans were able to hold out, their allies could not. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire surrendered by the end of October 1918. Austria- Hungary yielded in early November. For the Germans, though, the last straw was their problems at home — with the Jews.

Trouble began with a minor naval mutiny in late October and early November 1918, at the ports of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. A number of sailors, workers, and Jews from the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) joined forces to conduct a nonviolent rebellion against the Kaiser. The German rebels simply wanted the war to end, whereas the Jewish rebels sought power; in this sense it was a natural alliance. The “rebellion” — primarily in the form of a general strike — quickly spread, reaching Munich within a matter of days. In an attempt to cut short this action, the majority Social Democrats (SPD) called on the Kaiser to abdicate, at which time they would form a republican government. On November 9, they prevailed; Wilhelm stepped down and a new “German Republic” was proclaimed. It was this new leadership that signed the armistice agreement on November 11, ending the war.

The USPD rebels, however, had their own plans. On the very same day that the German Republic was created, they declared the formation of a “Free Socialist Republic.” This group had an almost entirely Jewish leadership: Rosa Luxemburg, Hugo Haase, Karl Liebknecht (half-Jewish), Leo Jogiches, Karl Radek (Sobelsohn), and Alexander Parvus (Gelfand/Helphand) were the dominant figures. And these were just the activists centered in Berlin. In Munich, other Jewish rebels were conducting a separate, simultaneous revolution, aimed at creating a Bavarian communist state. The leading USPD revolu-

tionary there was a Jewish journalist, Kurt Eisner. On November 7, he demanded the abdication of the local monarch, King Ludwig III. The king fled on the following day, and Eisner declared himself “Minister-President” of a free Bavarian state.

Soon enough, though, Eisner’s luck ran out. On 21 February 1919, he was assassinated by a fellow Jew, Anton Arco-Valley. Within a few weeks, other USPD Jews regained power and established a Bavarian Soviet Republic — the third in Europe, behind Russia and Hungary. Its leader was the Jewish playwright Ernst Toller. Among his group were the noted Jewish anarchists Gustav Landauer and Erich Muehsam. Through sheer incompetency, Toller’s government managed to get usurped by yet another Jewish faction, one led by Eugen Levine and the half-Jew Otto Neurath. Levine attempted to institute a true communist system, including its own “Red Army” modeled on the Russians’. But once again, his success was short-lived. Remnants of the old German army quickly intervened, deposing the communists in early May.

Things did not end well for the Jewish rebels. Levine was captured and executed, as was Landauer. Toller, Muehsam, Radek, Parvus, and Neurath managed to escape. Luxemburg and Liebknecht were shot by German soldiers in January, and Jogiches died under mysterious circumstances in March. Haase was killed by a deranged worker in November of that same year. But that was far from the end of their influence in Germany. The USPD was reconstituted as the German Communist Party (KPD), under the leadership of Paul Levi. The ruling SPD had meanwhile joined forces with the moderate German Democratic Party (DDP), convening in January 1919 in the city of Weimar to create a constitutional form of government. Jews were front and center in both of these parties: Otto Landesberg, Eduard Bernstein, and Rudolf Hilferding in the SPD, and Walter Rathenau in the DDP; Rathenau was eventually named as German Foreign Minister. His Jewish colleague, Hugo Preuss, wrote the Weimar constitution. This Jewish influence was well described by a philo-Semitic and Pulitzer Prize winning American journalist, Edgar Mowrer. Writing in 1933, he noted that:

“large number of Jews entered the Social Democratic Party [SPD] which inherited power as a result of the [November] Revolution. Other Jews flocked to the Democratic Party [DDP], a group which certainly overlooked no chance to favor the interests of trade, banking and the stock exchange. . . .”

It is interesting that then, as now, they seem to have covered all the bases: liberal, left-wing Jews dominated the SPD, and capitalist, right-wing Jews dominated the DDP. Thus, no matter which party emerged with control, Jews retained influence. Confirming my earlier statements, Mowrer added that “a number of outspoken revolutionary leaders, Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin, Erich Muehsam and Ernst Toller in Munich, were Jews.” He continued:

“In post-war politics any number of Jews rose to leadership. Both in the Reich and in the Federal States, Jews, particularly Social Democrats, became Cabinet Ministers. In the bureaucracy, the Jews rose rapidly to leading positions, and until about 1930 their

number seemed on the increase.“

Summing up the situation, he observed that, “in short, after the Revolution, the Jews came in Germany to play in politics and administration that same considerable part that they had previously won by open competition in business, trade, banking, the Press, the arts, the sciences, and the intellectual and cultural life of the country”

The new Weimar Republic was duly signed into law in August 1919. Unsurprisingly, it was notably friendly to German Jews, removing all remnants of legal obstructions, and granting them full access to business, academia, and government — the very process that Mowrer described. As Lavsky (1996: 41) says, “All remaining discrimination was abolished and there were no restrictions on participation in German public life.” The vital role played by Weimar Jews is concisely explained by Walter Laqueur:

“Without the Jews there would have been no ‘Weimar culture’ — to this extent the claims of the antisemites, who detested that culture, were justified. They were in the forefront of every new daring, revolutionary movement. They were prominent among Expressionist poets, among the novelists of the 1920s, among the theatrical producers and, for a while, among the leading figures of the cinema. They owned the leading liberal newspapers such as the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the *Vossische Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and many editors were Jews too. Many leading liberal and avant-garde publishing houses were in Jewish hands (S. Fischer, Kurt Wolff, the Cassirers, Georg Bondi, Erich Reiss, the Malik Verlag). Many leading theatre critics were Jews, and they dominated light entertainment.“

Laqueur, however, does not explain that the celebrated “Weimar culture” was perhaps best known for its licentiousness, promiscuity, and general moral depravity. “They established themselves in the universities, civil service, law, business, banking, and the free professions,” adds Lavsky. “Certain spheres were virtually monopolized by the Jews, and their contribution to journalism, literature, theater, music, the plastic arts, and entertainment was considerable.”

It was this very centrality of Jews to social upheaval, the November Revolution, and the new Weimar Republic that led three German activists and intellectuals — Anton Drexler, Gottfried Feder, and Dietrich Eckart — to found the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (DAP) in January 1919. This would be the forerunner to the *National Socialist DAP* (NSDAP), or Nazi Party. One of their first recruits was a distraught 30-year-old former soldier, Adolf Hitler. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler describes in painful, personal detail how the young German men went to fight and die on the front lines, even as the Jewish activists and rebels undermined the imperial government back home. Calling them “hoary criminals,” he adds that, all the while, “these perjured criminals were making preparations for a revolution” (1.5). Upon a medical leave from the front in October 1916, he describes the situation in Munich:

Anger, discontent, complaints met one’s ears wherever one went. . . . The administrative offices were staffed by Jews. Almost every clerk was a Jew and every Jew was a clerk. . . .

In the business world the situation was even worse. Here the Jews had actually become 'indispensable.' Like leeches, they were slowly sucking the blood from the pores of the national body. . . . Hence as early as 1916-1917 practically all production was under the control of Jewish finance. Hitler returned to the front in March 1917, and was struck by a mustard gas attack in October of the following year. The gas severely burned his eyes, sending him to a military hospital for recovery. It was there that he first heard about the revolution. The Jewish-Marxist "gang of despicable and depraved criminals" had led the overthrow of the Emperor and were attempting to take direct power themselves. Their revolts would be transitory, but the Jewishinfluenced Weimar regime would soon take control of the nation, and this was scarcely any better. It was these events that led Hitler to become politically active.

The Interwar Period and Emergence of FDR

1920 was a year of some importance. The Hitler-led NSDAP was formally established in February. That same month, a 46-year-old Winston Churchill penned his infamous article "Zionism versus Bolshevism," in which he decried the pernicious role of Jewish Marxists such as Trotsky, Kun, Luxemburg, and the American Emma Goldman. And in the US, Henry Ford had just begun his two-year series on the "International Jew." The following year, in late 1921, Ford recalled his past efforts to bring a peaceful end to WWI.

They explained to me] the means by which the Jew controlled the war, how they had the money, how they had cornered all the basic materials needed to fight the war. . . . They said. . . that the Jews had started the war; that they would continue it as long as they wished, and that until the Jew stopped the war, it could not be stopped. (New York Times, 5 December 1921, p. 33) During that earlier time, he says, "it was the Jews themselves that convinced me of the direct relation between the international Jew and war."

Meanwhile across the ocean, Lenin (a quarter-Jew) and his Jewish Bolshevik colleagues established the Soviet Union in December of 1922. The next year, Hitler and others within the NSDAP launched a failed coup attempt in Bavaria, leading to his 12-month imprisonment and consequent writing of *Mein Kampf*. In early 1924, both Lenin and Woodrow Wilson died within a month of each other.

Little of note occurred during the mid- to late-1920s. Jewish immigration into the US continued to expand, with their numbers surpassing 4.3 million by 1927. Jews made further inroads into Hollywood; Marcus Loew acquired MGM studios, the Cohn brothers took over at Columbia Broadcasting System, and David Sarnoff founded RKO Pictures. In the political sphere, the Republican and Christian Zionist Herbert Hoover won the presidential election of 1928, and a relatively unknown Democrat, Franklin D. Roosevelt, won the governorship of New York.

From the start, FDR had close and persistent ties to American Jews — ties that would

prove decisive to his actions in the Second World War. His running mate in New York was Herbert Lehman, the son of German Jews. (His Republican opponent, Jewish Attorney General Albert Ottinger, failed to draw the Jewish vote that FDR did; this says something about the strength of FDR's connection to that group.) Upon assuming the governorship, Roosevelt "filled a number of key positions from the state's large Jewish population," according to Shogan (2010: 5). One of his first major appointments was his longtime friend Henry Morgenthau Jr. to the New York State Agriculture Committee. He also named a former speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, as "counsel to the governor." Both would play important roles in his presidency.

Other Jews, though, also had an interest in FDR — notably, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and his protégé, Harvard lawyer Felix Frankfurter. Even prior to his gubernatorial win in New York, "Brandeis alerted Frankfurter to his eagerness to connect with the man he believed would someday be the nation's president" (ibid: 72). And indeed, "for the next four years Brandeis was content to rely on Frankfurter to be his conduit to the governor's chambers in Albany."

The same election that put Roosevelt in the governor's seat placed Hoover in the presidency. As I noted earlier, he had long championed Jewish interests. As president, Hoover did his part for the Hebrews, naming Eugene Meyer Fed Chairman in 1930, and appointing the second Jewish justice, Benjamin Cardozo, to the Supreme Court in March 1932. But by then the Great Depression was well underway, dooming any chance for reelection.

FDR's Jewish Ancestry?

Before turning to FDR's long and historic stint as president, I want to recall a question I raised in Part 1 of the present series: Was Roosevelt Jewish? Previously I noted that his fifth cousin Theodore claimed to be Jewish, according to former Michigan governor Chase Osborn. I have yet to find any independent confirmation of this assertion, though there seems to be no reason why Osborn would lie about such a thing. Both were good Republicans, after all. But more to the point, Osborn would have much to say about FDR, as I will explain momentarily.

Regarding Franklin, he left many clues to a possible Jewish heritage, beginning as far back as 1914. In a letter to a friend upon the birth of his son Franklin Jr., he wrote that he had considered naming him Isaac — a classic Jewish name, and one shared by both his grandfather and great-greatgrandfather. But the family resisted: "this name is not met with enthusiasm, especially as the baby's nose is slightly Hebraic and the family have visions of Ikey Rosenvelt, though I insist it is very good New Amsterdam Dutch." For Shogan this is a sign of latent anti-Semitism, but I find that an unlikely excuse. What true anti-Semite would admit that his newborn son looked Jewish? Or would contemplate a Jewish name? More likely it was an inside joke, of the kind that people might say to family or close friends about a particular ethnic heritage within one's own background. Twenty years later, another clue. In 1934, now-president FDR gave a photo of himself

and Henry Morgenthau to Henry's wife. It bore this inscription: "For Elinor from one of two of a kind." Yes, but two of what kind? Democrats? Americans? Jews? An oddly suggestive remark.

That same year saw the publication of an enlightening interview with Osborn, one that would initiate a prolonged discussion on FDR's heritage. The 8 February 1934 edition of the St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times carried an interview in which Osborn claimed that the Roosevelts were descended from the Rossacampos, a Jewish family expelled from Spain in 1620. That family spread out into Europe and altered their spelling according to the various places where they took root: Rosenberg, Rosenblum, Rosenthal, and in Holland, Rosenvelt. "The Rosenvelts in north Holland finally became Roosevelt," claimed Osborn — which in fact seems to be true: the family patriarch, Claes van Rosenvelt, immigrated to the US in 1649. His son Nicholas apparently dropped the 'van' and changed the spelling to the standard form. A small Michigan publication, Civic Echo, picked up and repeated the story soon thereafter. A year later, Jewish journalist and publisher Philip Slomovitz came across the Echo story, and decided to write directly to FDR to get his opinion. On 7 March 1935 the president responded:

I am grateful to you for your interesting letter of March fourth. I have no idea as to the source of the story which you say came from my old friend, Chase Osborn. . . . In the dim distant past they [the Roosevelts] may have been Jews or Catholics or Protestants — what I am more interested in is whether they were good citizens and believers in God — I hope they were both. (cited in Slomovitz 1981: 5)

Once again this is a suspiciously circumspect reply by FDR. For him to say that his relatives "may have been Jews" sounds very much as if he knows this truth, does not want to openly acknowledge it, but cannot quite bring himself to lie about it. Slomovitz planned to publish the reply in his Detroit Jewish Chronicle. Before he could do so, the New York Times got wind of it and carried the text in their issue of March 15 — on page 1. Slomovitz passed this reply on to Osborn, who repeated his original assertion in a return letter of March 21: "President Roosevelt knows well enough that his ancestors were Jewish. I heard Theodore Roosevelt state twice that his ancestors were Jewish. Once was to me when I asked him about it after he had made a pleasing euphemistic statement in a speech to a Jewish gathering" (ibid: 6-7). Osborn is adamant. And it is important to note that he does not take this Jewish heritage as a slur; in fact, quite the opposite. He is evidently a Christian Zionist (and Republican), and thus views it as a redeeming quality. As such, he would likely not cast the Democrat Franklin in this positive light unless he actually believed it to be true. It seems that he was talking from a factual, if unconfirmed, basis.

If Slomovitz was inclined to doubt Osborn's claim, another letter would soon fortify his belief. On March 27 he received a note from none other than Rabbi Stephen Wise of New York City. Wise had evidently seen the New York Times story, and wrote to confirm it. In his letter he recounts an "almost literal transcript" given to him by his wife, who had previously attended a luncheon with Roosevelt's wife Eleanor — who said the following:

“Often cousin Alice and I say that all the brains in the Roosevelt family comes [sic] from our Jewish great-grandmother” (ibid: 9). She then allegedly added a name, ‘Esther Levy.’ The Alice in question was the oldest child of Theodore; Eleanor’s father Elliot was his brother. Their common great-grandmother would have been either Margaret Barnhill or Martha Stewart — neither of whom appears to be Jewish, unfortunately. And we have no record of any Esther Levy in the Roosevelt lineage. A bit of a mystery. The letter then takes a little twist. Eleanor continued: “Whenever mention is made of our Jewish great-grandmother by cousin Alice or myself, Franklin’s mother [Sara Delano] gets very angry and says, ‘You know that is not so. Why do you say it?’” Another puzzling remark, and one that Wise leaves unexplained.

Wise closes the letter with his own assessment: that Roosevelt “knows what I [Wise] have just written to be true, but deems it wiser and more expedient not to make any public mention of it at this time.” The letter, after all, was marked “Strictly private and confidential.” Wise adds that “you [Slomovitz] must not, however, make use of this. I think it is just as well to let the matter die down now.” A strange series of comments, to be sure. Many years later, a final small clue appeared. From the mid-1920s to mid-1930s, Franklin’s daughter Anna was married to a stockbroker named Curtis Dall. After having two children, they divorced in 1934. Three decades later Dall published a book, *FDR: My Exploited Father-in-Law* (1968). In it we read this sentence: “As I gathered it, the background of the Franklin Roosevelt family was a composite of English, Dutch, Jewish, and French stock” (98). There is no further elaboration.

In the end, many questions remain, but it seems very likely that the Roosevelts were at least in part Jewish. Perhaps the larger question is this: Does it matter? I believe it does, on two counts. First is the basic matter of historical accuracy; if we did in fact have a partially Jewish president, or rather two such presidents, the history books ought to reflect this reality. Likely other relevant evidence exists in the vast presidential archives, and an open admission might bring this to light. Second and more important is the possible effect this may have had on FDR’s actions prior to and during World War II. With even a partial Jewish heritage, he would likely have been more sympathetic to the Jewish cause, more amenable to Jews within his administration, and more likely to sacrifice on behalf of Jewish interests. The evidence shows that all these things actually happened — which is precisely why “Franklin Roosevelt was the first great hero of American Jews” (Shogan 2010: xi). The ‘family connection’ would certainly help to explain such things.

Alternatively, and as is often the case today, it could have been strictly a matter of money — of rewarding those who paved one’s way to the top. But perhaps the strongest case is this: that it was a combination of both. If FDR was predisposed by his heritage to be sympathetic to the Jews, and they also stepped forward to fund his campaigns and support him in the media, these would then be powerful incentives to reward them within his administration, and to be swayed by their concerns when it came time to deploy American military power. I examine that case now.

All the President's Jews

The case for a possible Jewish hand in World War II could be made, if we could show the following:

1. an extensive and influential Jewish presence in FDR's administration,
2. that the US public did not want war,
3. that influential American Jews did want war,
4. that FDR acted surreptitiously on behalf of war,
5. that Jewish-run US media supported war, and
6. that the US entered the war under false pretenses.

I will provide specific data on the first two points, and then address the remaining ones collectively.

Earlier I showed Roosevelt's dependence on Jewish supporters during his gubernatorial term. When it came time to mount a presidential campaign, his old buddies were there to help. As Scholnick (1990: 193) explains, "A number of wealthy Jewish friends contributed to Roosevelt's prenomination campaign fund: Henry Morgenthau Jr., Lt. Gov. Lehman, Jessie Straus, [and] Laurence Steinhardt." Once the primaries were out of the way, "Roosevelt's campaign was heavily underwritten by Bernard Baruch." The first rule in politics is to reward those who finance your path to success. Thus it is unsurprising that "[FDR's] administration contained a higher proportion of Jews than any other" (Michael 2005: 178). In the words of Herzstein (1989: 40), "Jews were indeed more prominent than ever before in American history." So who were these leading figures that were so dominant during the Roosevelt years? At the top of the list were the Big 5, the "President's Jews" as Shogan says, who had the largest hand in swaying events within the presidency: Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Sam Rosenman, and Ben Cohen.

Brandeis was of course a sitting Supreme Court justice long before Roosevelt ran for office, having been placed there by his friend Woodrow Wilson in 1916. Even prior to his initial election in 1932, FDR arranged a meeting with Brandeis to discuss policy. According to Shogan (2010), the Justice soon sent Roosevelt "a broad blueprint for the New Deal". Some years later, in 1938, "Brandeis made his first call on FDR on behalf of the Jews". Such involvement in government administration by a Supreme Court justice is unusual, to say the least. Others would call it flagrantly unethical. Justices are supposed to rule on constitutional matters, not make policy. He obviously knew this, and thus generally worked through Jewish intermediaries, like Frankfurter and Cohen, to get his message to the president.

On a day-to-day basis, Frankfurter was particularly important. Even by 1933 he had become "probably FDR's most influential advisor". Incensed at the extent of his power,

American general Hugh Johnson called him “the most influential single individual in the United States”. Frankfurter, he said, “had insinuated his boys into obscure but key positions in every vital department” related to the New Deal. Later, when Europe was on the brink of war, Frankfurter was apparently instrumental in initiating a series of secret correspondences between FDR and Churchill at a very sensitive time — neutral presidents are not supposed to be conducting secret negotiations with leaders of belligerent nations. Frankfurter, as we know, would be well rewarded by Roosevelt for his efforts, with the nomination to the Supreme Court in January 1939.

Moving down the list: Roosevelt “was as close to Henry Morgenthau. . . as to any man” . So close, in fact, that Franklin would make him the second Jew ever to join a presidential cabinet; he was named Secretary of the Treasury in early 1934, serving right through the end of the war. Henry would later author the notorious “Morgenthau Plan” — a policy for the virtual destruction of postwar Germany. This again was an outrageously out-of-line effort by a treasury secretary, who formally has no business conducting foreign policy. But this evidently did not stop him from trying. The two youngest members of the Big 5 were Rosenman and Cohen. Though serving as a New York state judge, Rosenman also functioned as “FDR’s chief speechwriter and a leading general advisor”. Ward notes that he was “a close aide from 1928 onwards” — that is, even before FDR’s governorship. The lawyer Benjamin Cohen became one of the key drafters of Roosevelt’s vital New Deal legislation, which was his lasting economic legacy. He clearly had the president’s ear; Nasaw calls him the “unofficial emissary of Justice Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter.”

But more importantly, Cohen was the lead architect and executor of the infamous ‘bases for destroyers’ plan of mid- to late-1940. At that time Britain was well into the war and badly needed military assistance from the US. But as a neutral nation, and by law, it was unable to help. Cohen then concocted a plan by which America would “loan” 50 warships to the UK in exchange for the use of certain global bases that they held. “Employing hairsplitting technicalities and unprovable assertions about national defense, [Cohen’s] memorandum stretched the law, creating a loophole wide enough for fifty warships to steam through on their way to join the Royal Navy,” says Shogan . Seeking legal approval for this blatantly illegal action, Roosevelt turned to. . . Justice Frankfurter. And to no one’s surprise, the Justice conferred his blessing. The Brits, of course, were elated. For the Germans, this was a veritable act of war by the nominally neutral Americans. Most fatefully, it seems to have been decisive in causing Hitler to sign a mutual-defense pact with Japan in October 1940; it was this agreement that would trigger Germany’s declaration of war on the United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Beyond the Big 5, several other Jews played influential roles. Bernard Baruch, another Wilsonian holdover, was a part-time financial advisor and “prominent confidant” of both FDR and Churchill. Jerome Frank was a close aide, as was David Niles. James Warburg, son of Paul, was an early financial advisor. In May of 1934, Eugene Black was named Fed Chairman, and Jesse Straus was appointed ambassador to France — even as his nephew, Nathan Straus Jr., came to head the US Housing Authority. William Bullitt, a

quarter-Jew, was given two critical ambassadorships: first to the Soviet Union, and then, during the war, to France. Laurence Steinhardt, who had helped so much with campaign funding, was awarded a string of ambassadorships throughout FDR's tenure. Franklin's old friend Herbert Lehman was appointed head of the new Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation in 1943. Herbert Feis was an influential economics advisor for the State Department. Abe Fortas served as Undersecretary of the Interior. Charles Wyzanski was solicitor general in the Labor Department. Mordecai Ezekiel was economics advisor to the Agriculture Secretary. David Lilienthal became chairman of the TVA. Other Jews, like Sidney Hillman and Rose Schneiderman, emerged as important advisors on labor matters.

Even some of FDR's non-Jewish team members had Semitic connections. Long-time Secretary of State Cordell Hull's wife, Frances Witz, was Jewish. So too was the spouse of New Deal architect and close confidant Harry Hopkins (Ethel Gross). We can be sure that they were sympathetic to the Jewish cause. All in all, one can well understand the motivation of Roosevelt's critics, who called his administration the "Jew Deal."

On the second point, it is uncontroversial that Americans overwhelmingly wanted to avoid the war. In a radio address of 23 April 1941, the leading antiwar advocate, Charles Lindbergh, condemned the course of action "to which more than 80 percent of our citizens are opposed." In an address the month before, Congressman Hamilton Fish stated that "somewhere between 83 and 90 percent of the people, according to the various Gallop polls, are opposed to our entrance into war unless attacked." The data supported such claims. According to surveys conducted in June and July 1940, between 81 and 86 respondents preferred to "stay out" of a war, if it were to come up for a vote. Another poll in July 1941 registered a 79% figure. The highest recorded number came somewhat earlier, in a report published in mid-1938; when asked "If another war like the World War [I] develops in Europe, should America take part again?," fully 95% of the respondents replied "No". Such figures generally held up right until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Path to War

As is well known, Jews worldwide confronted Hitler as soon as he assumed power in 1933 — witness the infamous "Judea Declares War on Germany" headline in the UK's Daily Express of 24 March 1933. In a sense, this was understandable. Putting an end to a post-World War I Weimar Republic dominated by Jews, Hitler quickly banished them from positions of power, and placed immediate restrictions on their movement and business practices. In fact, one may speculate that this was not unrelated to Germany's amazing economic renaissance. But the Western media did not see it this way. As early as April 1933, the New York Times was reporting on the "economic extermination of Jews in Germany" (April 6). Two months later we read, simply, that "Hitler's program is one of extermination" (June 29). In August, we are shocked to learn that "600,000

Jews are facing certain extinction" (August 16). Here we can graphically see how the 'extermination' myth rapidly evolved, from a simple plan of economic exclusion.

For the Germans, Western — particularly American — media meant Jewish media. As early as 1934, they viewed it as a potential threat. A communiqué by the German ambassador to the US, Hans Luther, observed that America possessed "the strongest Jewish propaganda machine in the world." This comment was made in light of Jewish dominance in Hollywood, and the fact that Jews owned two of the major American newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post. Luther's impression was held by German leadership throughout the war. Goebbels, for example, wrote the following in his diary entry of 24 April 1942: "Some statistics are given to me on the proportion of Jews in American radio, film, and press. The percentage is truly frightening. Jewry controls 100% of the film business, and between 90 and 95% of press and radio."

By the mid-1930s, Germany was in the midst of their astounding economic recovery, one that was particularly striking given their ruination after World War I, and that it occurred during the Great Depression. Within just his first four years, Hitler had reduced unemployment from 6 million to 1 million; the jobless rate fell from 43.8% when he took office, to effectively zero by the end of 1938. In just four years, he increased GNP by 37% increase in auto production. In effect, he single-handedly ended the Depression in Germany. Two more years, and the nation would be a world power of the first rank. Germany thus emerged as a viable competitor to the traditional global powers. Churchill felt particularly threatened. In a congressional testimony, US General Robert Wood recalled a statement by the British politician from 1936: "Germany is getting too strong. We must smash her." This suggests a belligerence on Churchill's part long before any aggressions by Hitler. As we know: it was the UK that declared war on Germany, not vice versa.

In October 1937, Roosevelt gave his famous 'quarantine' speech. Here we find one of the first indications, albeit indirect, that he anticipates a time when the US would come into direct conflict with Germany, and he subtly propagandizes the public in favor of war. The danger of Hitler is exaggerated; neutrality and isolation are disparaged; baseless assertions and cautiously conditional statements are thrown out — and all in the language of peace. Should Hitler prevail, "let no one imagine that America will escape, ... that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked." "There is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality," he said; "international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace." "We are determined to keep out of war," said FDR, "yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement." Sparing no hyperbole, he added that, if Germany initiates a war, "the storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos." This is difficult to read except as an indication that the path of violent confrontation had already been decided upon, and that the long process had begun to persuade a reluctant public that they must support it.

By this time, Jewish lobbies around the world, but especially in the UK and US, began

to press hard for military action, to intervene on behalf of their beleaguered coreligionists in Nazi Germany, and to once again overthrow a hated regime — never mind that the Germans may have had some right to selfdetermination. One of the first clear pieces of evidence of this came in early 1938, from the Polish ambassador to the US, Jerzy Potocki. He reported back to Warsaw on his observations of the American political scene:

“The pressure of the Jews on President Roosevelt and on the State Department is becoming ever more powerful... The Jews are right now the leaders in creating a war psychosis which would plunge the entire world into war and bring about general catastrophe. This mood is becoming more and more apparent. In their definition of democratic states, the Jews have also created real chaos; they have mixed together the idea of democracy and communism, and have above all raised the banner of burning hatred against Nazism. This hatred has become a frenzy. It is propagated everywhere and by every means: in theaters, in the cinema, and in the press. The Germans are portrayed as a nation living under the arrogance of Hitler which wants to conquer the whole world and drown all of humanity in an ocean of blood. In conversations with Jewish press representatives, I have repeatedly come up against the inexorable and convinced view that war is inevitable. This international Jewry exploits every means of propaganda to oppose any tendency towards any kind of consolidation and understanding between nations. In this way, the conviction is growing steadily but surely in public opinion here that the Germans and their satellites, in the form of fascism, are enemies who must be subdued by the ‘democratic world.’ (February 9)“

Such a view is confirmed in a letter by Senator Hiram Johnson (R-Cal.), written to his son that same year. The pro- and anti-war camps were clear: “all the Jews [are] on one side, wildly enthusiastic for the President, and willing to fight to the last American.” Though sympathetic, Johnson had no interest in fighting a war on their behalf. He and other like-minded politicians wanted to speak out, “but everybody is afraid — I confess I shrink from it — of offending the Jews.” The situation has hardly changed in 75 years.

For his part, Bernie Baruch was certainly itching for a fight. Speaking to General George Marshall, he said “We are going to lick that fellow Hitler. He isn’t going to get away with it.”³⁴ One wonders how he would know this, in 1938. Actually, it’s not much of a mystery: Churchill apparently told him so. As Sherwood (1948: 111) recounts, Churchill — then still First Lord of the Admiralty — said this to Baruch: “War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you (the United States) will be in it. You (Baruch) will be running the show over there, but I will be on the sidelines over here.” This is an astonishing claim; how would Churchill know such a thing, in 1938? The Anschluss with Austria had been completed in March that year, and Germany annexed the Sudetenland in October, but the Munich Accord was signed in September, nominally preserving a kind of tenuous peace. So what could have convinced Churchill that war was inevitable, and that the Americans would be running the show? Kristallnacht, perhaps? Was that the last straw, for the global Jewish lobby?

Apparently Lord Beaverbrook (Lord Beaverbrook is the top newspaper mogul in Great

Britain. His Daily Express is the most widely read newspaper in the world. During World War I, he served as UK's Minister of Information.) thought so. In a private letter written in 1938, Lord Beaverbrook voices concern over Jewish influence leading the UK towards war with Germany. He writes:

“There are 20,000 German Jews in England – in the professions, pursuing research. They all work against an accommodation with Germany.”

Writing to Frank Gannett in December 1938, he made this striking statement:

The Jews are after [Prime Minister] Chamberlain. He is being terribly harassed by them. . . . All the Jews are against him. . . . They have got a big position in the press here [in the UK]. . . . I am shaken. The Jews may drive us into war [and] their political influence is moving us in that direction. (cited in Nasaw 2012: 357-358) Beaverbrook was a prominent and influential media executive and politician, rather like the Rupert Murdoch of his day. He was well positioned to make such a claim.

The year 1939 opened with FDR's State of the Union speech — and more veiled threats. “We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world. . . cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations.” He consequently called for an unprecedented peacetime allocation of \$2 billion for national defense. A message to Hitler — and to all those Americans who might oppose intervention in European affairs. Hitler, incidentally, was giving his own speeches, most infamously to the Reichstag on January 30. It included this memorable warning:

If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation [Vernichtung] of the Jewish race in Europe!

Two quick comments: The German word ‘Vernichtung’ has multiple meanings, and in no way requires the killing of the persons in question. The literal meaning is “to bring to nothing.” More broadly it means to completely remove or eliminate the presence, role, or influence of something. And there are many ways to do this short of murder. But more to the point, Hitler's alleged program of physical extermination was supposedly a great secret. He cannot possibly have told the world, in the most public of venues, of his ‘secret’ plan to kill all the Jews — in early 1939. Clearly he was referring to their displacement from Europe, and to an elimination of their previously dominant role there. But this was no secret at all — he had been doing that in Germany for some six years already.

Back in Washington, Ambassador Potocki sent two more revealing reports to Warsaw. A short statement on January 9 included this: “The American public is subject to an ever more alarming propaganda, which is under Jewish influence and continuously conjures up the specter of the danger of war. Because of this, the Americans have strongly altered

their views on foreign policy problems, in comparison with last year.” Three days later came the longest and perhaps most insightful report:

“The feeling now prevailing in the United States is marked by a growing hatred of Fascism and, above all, of Chancellor Hitler and everything connected with Nazism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews, who control almost 100 percent radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as black as possible — above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited — this propaganda is nevertheless extremely effective, since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe. . . .

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German Nazism is further kindled by the brutal policy against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action, various Jewish intellectuals participated: for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; and others who are personal friends of President Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-makers. These groups of people, who occupy the highest positions in the American government and want to pose as representatives of ‘true Americanism’ and ‘defenders of democracy,’ are, in the last analysis, connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry. For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to portray the President of the United States as the ‘idealist’ champion on human rights was a very clever move. In this manner they have created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere, and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a masterly manner. Roosevelt has been given the foundation for activating American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous military stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving very consciously.”

If Potocki were correct, it would mean that war had effectively been decided upon by the Allied powers. And in fact, that’s exactly what Bullitt said to American journalist Karl von Wiegand: “War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland had an assurance of the support of Britain and France, and would yield to no demands from Germany. America would be in the war after Britain and France entered it.” Bullitt obviously had inside access to a welldeveloped plan, one that was proceeding apace. In July, Potocki was back in Warsaw, speaking with a foreign ministry undersecretary named Jan Szembek. In his diary, Szembek recorded Potocki as stating the following: “In the West, there are all kinds of elements openly pushing for war: Jews, big capitalists, arms dealers. Now they are all ready for some excellent business. . . . They want to do business at our expense. They are indifferent to the destruction of our country.” This is notable, if only as confirmation of the legitimacy of the earlier reports.

Around that same time, the American ambassador to Great Britain began to cause a stir. He was a member of the Boston-area Irish Catholic set, a successful businessman. . . and

father of a future president. Joseph Kennedy contributed to Roosevelt's 1932 presidential campaign, and was rewarded with the chairmanship of the SEC. He left that office in 1935, and was appointed ambassador to the UK in January 1938. By mid-1939, Kennedy evidently began to have concerns about the Jewish role in the push toward war — and he began to speak openly to his colleagues in London. Somehow word of this got out to a local periodical, *The Week*, which found its way over the ocean to Washington D.C. and into the hands of the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. Convening with the president in early July, Ickes raised his concern: “This [story] was to the effect that Kennedy was privately telling his English friends in the Cliveden set that the Jews were running the United States and that the President would fall in 1940. It also charged that ‘[Kennedy believes] that the democratic policy of the United States is a Jewish production’.”

Amazingly, the president was unfazed. “It is true,” he said. Ickes provides no further information on the incident, and thus it is hard to know how to take this blunt response. Was FDR joking? A half-joke? An outright, straight-faced admission? We simply do not know. What was undoubtedly true, though, was that Kennedy had deep concerns about Jewish influence. He was not the only diplomat with such worries. A month later, reports Taylor (1961: 267), British ambassador to Germany Neville Henderson told Hitler that “the hostile attitude in Great Britain was the work of Jews and enemies of the Nazis.” Here again we see a parallel action on both sides of the Atlantic, and possibly coordinated. This would be consistent with Baruch’s role as a “prominent confidant” of both Roosevelt and Churchill.

A few weeks later, on September 1, the German army crossed into Poland. What began as part of a long-standing border conflict between two neighboring countries became, two days later, a European war, when England and France declared war on Germany.

England Stands Alone

On September 3, Roosevelt broadcast another of his many fireside chats to the American public. It contained the usual combination of exaggeration, propaganda, and misrepresentation. “When peace has been broken anywhere,” he said, “the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.” Even one who strives for neutrality “cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience.” His ending was again cloaked in the hypocritical language of peace:

“I hate war. I say that again and again. I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your government will be directed toward that end. As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no black-out of peace in the United States.”

Here Roosevelt clearly reveals himself as a dissembler and a liar. Qualifications, conditionals, half-truths — all evidently designed to manipulate public opinion in favor of war. Jews inside and outside his administration had been pressing for intervention for

years; now with actual combat underway, the pressure would rapidly escalate. Roosevelt knew this, but said nothing. After all, he was facing another election the following year, and had to publicly maintain an anti-war stance, or risk losing to the Republicans. But he also had to keep his Jewish financiers happy. The fact that the vast majority of the American people were still strongly against the war apparently had no effect upon him — so much for democracy.

Kennedy could see what was happening. He strongly opposed American entry into the war, both on principle and because he had three sons who would likely be drawn in — and indeed, his eldest son, Joe Jr., would be killed during a bombing run in 1944. Speaking to his colleague Jay Moffat, Kennedy said, “Churchill. . . wants us there as soon as he can get us there. He is ruthless and scheming” — unsurprising, given that the Brits found themselves in a war that they were ill-prepared to fight. But Churchill knew whom to go to: “He is also in touch with groups in America which have the same idea, notably, certain strong Jewish leaders.”

Not that this was a secret. In a December 1939 memo to the British cabinet, Churchill recalled the vital role played by the Jews back in World War One — to draw in the Americans, against their wishes, against their desires, and against their national interests. “It was not for light or sentimental reasons,” wrote Churchill, that Balfour issued his famous promise of Palestine to the Zionists. “The influence of American Jewry was rated then as a factor of the highest importance. . . .” “Now,” he added, “I should have thought it was more necessary, even than in November 1917, to conciliate American Jewry and enlist their aid in combating isolationist and indeed anti-British tendencies in the United States.”

Here we have an amazingly bald-faced admission. Churchill has utter contempt for the “tendencies” (read: democratic principles) of the Americans. His sole concern is to leverage Jewish power to draw a neutral nation into yet another major war, to save his skin and to aid his Zionist friends. Kennedy was naturally appalled — both that Churchill would do such a thing, and that it seemed to be working. “I don’t trust him,” he wrote in his diary; “He always impressed me that he was willing to blow up the American Embassy and say it was the Germans if it would get the United States in.” No doubt that was true — just as FDR would be willing to sacrifice some 2,400 American lives at Pearl Harbor, for precisely that end. Into 1940, Hitler ran off an impressive string of victories, culminating in the capture of Paris in June. Chamberlain resigned as prime minister, to be replaced by Churchill, who immediately initiated the ‘bases for destroyers’ plan with the US.

As the year wore on, Roosevelt continued to lie to the American public. His campaign address in Boston on October 30 contained the same deceptive falsehoods of his earlier speeches. “Your government has acquired new naval and air bases in British territory in the Atlantic Ocean” — but no mention of the extralegal 50 destroyers that he gave them in return. He boasted of doubling the size of the army within the past year, and of letting out \$8 billion in defense contracts. But not worry, fellow Americans — “I give

you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." An utter lie, and he knew it.

One is perhaps tempted to make excuses for FDR: that he was morally torn, that he could see a larger danger that the public could not see, that he had to lie to us 'for our own good.' None of these withstands scrutiny. The ethics of warfare are fairly well established, at least for nominal democracies. They would include, at a minimum: proportionality, mutuality, direct threat, and public support. That is, (a) any aggressions should be responded to only with equivalent force, (b) rules for one party hold for all, (c) force is justified only in the face of a direct and imminent threat, and (d) the public must be given an honest appraisal of the situation, and its wishes respected. Suffice it to say that none of these conditions would hold. One wonders: If the public had known of the ultimate cost — some 420,000 American deaths, and roughly \$4.2 trillion (present-day equivalent) — would they have embraced war, even after Pearl Harbor? Or would they perhaps have put FDR and his Jewish supporters on trial, for fraud, treason, and war crimes?

By October, Joe Kennedy had enough; he resigned his post. But he continued to comment on the role of the Jews, both to friends and in his private writings. On December 15, for example, he made this diary entry:

[Justice Frankfurter] is supposed directly and indirectly to influence Roosevelt on foreign policy over [Secretary of State] Hull's and [Undersecretary of State] Welles's heads, [and] whose cohort of young lawyers are in practically every government department, all aiding the cause of Jewish refugees getting into America. . . . It looks to me as if the English sympathizers were tying their cause in with the Jews because they figure they've got all the influence in US. (cited in Nasaw 2012: 507)

Jewish population in the US, incidentally, was soon to reach 5 million. Frankfurter's boys were doing a good job.

As before, Kennedy was not alone in his concern. Another Supreme Court Justice, Frank Murphy, confided to him that "it was Frankfurter and Ben Cohen who wrote the Attorney General's opinion on destroyers and bases." Kennedy added: "Murphy regards the Jewish influence as most dangerous. He said that after all, [Harry] Hopkins's wife was a Jew; Hull's wife is a Jew; and Frankfurter and Cohen and that group are all Jews." For his part, Welles privately referred to Frankfurter as "dangerous" and "a Jew chiseler." One of the most revealing remarks by Kennedy comes from the diary of James Forrestal, who at the time was Secretary of the Navy. In the entry from 27 December 1945, we read this:

Played golf today with Joe Kennedy. . . . He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight, and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England, if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British

would have made Poland a cause of war, if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. . . . Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. (Forrestal 1951: 121-122)

So, we must ask: Why was the partly Jewish Bullitt — a mere diplomat — “urging” the president of the United States to face down Hitler? And why were Bullitt and Roosevelt “constantly needling” England and France to fight a war that they themselves did not see as necessary or winnable? And why did these nations succumb to American pressure? And why did Chamberlain ultimately link together America and “the world Jews” as the driving force for war? We need not look very hard to see a Jewish hand at work.

Media Blitz

Jewish-run media was becoming very active by this time. The newspapers, for example, had found much disagreement with Washington on domestic issues, but “Roosevelt’s standing with the press on foreign policy matters was much stronger,” according to Cole (1983: 478). Apart from the Chicago Tribune and the Hearst papers, most dailies backed intervention. Unsurprisingly, “the more prestigious and influential news publications strongly supported the president.” These included the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Chicago Daily News, and Time Magazine.

The motion picture industry certainly did its part to get America into war. Given that it took at least a year to get a motion picture from conception to theater, and that efforts to produce pro-war films did not start in earnest until 1937, it was well into 1939 before they began to appear. Early efforts like *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* and *Beasts of Berlin* came out that year, and set the stage for a flood of films over the next three years. In 1940, Hollywood released graphic and high-impact films like *Escape and Mortal Storm*; Hitchcock’s *Foreign Correspondent* came out that year, as did Chaplin’s *The Great Dictator*. In May, two major studio heads, Jack and Harry Warner — more accurately known as Itzhak and Hirsz Wonskolaser — wrote to Roosevelt, assuring him that they would “do all in our power within the motion picture industry. . . to show the American people the worthiness of the cause for which the free peoples of Europe are making such tremendous sacrifices.” It’s nice to see such unselfish, high-minded public service amongst corporate executives.

By early 1941, Jewish filmmakers and producers were working subtle, pro-war themes into many of their films. The anti-war group America First argued that belligerent propaganda was becoming widespread; “films that have nothing to do with the European war are now loaded with lies and ideas which bring about an interventionist reaction” (in Cole: 474). In August of that year, Senator Gerald Nye (R-N. Dak.) delivered a stinging radio address, arguing that the Hollywood studios “had become the most gigantic engines of propaganda in existence, to rouse the war fever in America and plunge this nation to her destruction” (in *ibid*: 475). By that time, nearly three dozen major pro-war films had been released.

In the end, more than 60 explicitly 'patriotic,' pro-war films were produced, along with dozens of ordinary films that incorporated subtle pro-war messages. There were a few classics — *Casablanca*, *Sergeant York*, *To Be or Not to Be* — and many duds. *Hitler's Children* and *Nazi Agent*, for example, won't be making any Top 10 lists.

In March of 1941, under pressure from the Jewish lobby, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act; this allowed shipment of armaments and military supplies to Britain and the other Allied nations. The vote was 260-165 in the House, and 59-30 in the Senate. Public opinion was narrowly in favor of the Act, but only as a defensive measure; a strong majority still wished to stay out of the war. FDR could arm the Allies but not join the fighting. Roosevelt made a major radio address in May, declaring an "unlimited national emergency." It was filled with more war hyperbole, most notably regarding the Germans' alleged striving toward "world domination." Over and over came the words: "Nazi book of world conquest"; "Hitler's plan of world domination"; "a Hitler-dominated world." Suffice to say that no evidence of such a plan has ever come forth. Deploying the most facile, us-or-them language, FDR struggled to persuade reluctant Americans that they should fight and die: "Today the whole world is divided between human slavery and human freedom — between pagan brutality and Christian ideal." He even hinted at the essentials of his strategy, namely, to provoke an 'incident' that would allow him to declare war: "We are placing our armed forces in strategic military position. We will not hesitate to use our armed forces to repel attack."

In June, convinced of the Bolshevik threat posed by Stalin, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. In August, the US placed military forces in Iceland, effectively occupying that country. And on 11 September 1941 — 60 years to the day before that other 9/11 — Charles Lindbergh gave his most famous speech, at Des Moines, Iowa. There he called out, for the first time, the three main groups that were driving the US toward war: the British, the Roosevelt administration, and the Jews. Of this latter group, Lindbergh acknowledged their plight under the Nazis, and their hatred of Hitler. But instead of inciting America to war, they should be working to halt it; "for they will be among the first to feel its consequences" — presumably meaning both in Germany and in the US, where anti-Semitism would surely be inflamed. In one of the more notable lines of the speech, he said that "[The Jews'] greatest danger in this country lies in their large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, our radio, and our government." Lindbergh thus ran afoul of the first rule of wartime: Thou shalt never speak the truth.

Indeed: If Jewish influence in "our government" was part of the danger, then naming the "Roosevelt administration" was redundant. The true danger was Jews in media, Jews in Hollywood, and Jews in the government — along with those non-Jews who worked on their behalf. And even to name the British — Churchill and his Zionist backers — was, in effect, to name yet more Jews. On all fronts, it was powerful and influential Jews driving peaceful people toward war, simply to destroy the hated Nazi regime.

There is no doubt that Lindbergh was right — that British Jews were pushing the US

toward war, and that they were succeeding. In a strange coincidence, just one day before Lindbergh's Des Moines speech, leading British Zionist Chaim Weizmann delivered this notorious letter to Churchill:

There is only one big ethnic group [in America] which is willing to stand, to a man, for Great Britain, and a policy of "all-out aid" for her: the five million Jews. From Secretary Morgenthau, Governor Lehman, Justice Frankfurter, down to the simplest Jewish workman or trader, they are conscious of all that this struggle against Hitler implies. It has been repeatedly acknowledged by British Statesmen that it was the Jews who, in the last war, effectively helped to tip the scales in America in favour of Great Britain. They are keen to do it — and may do it — again. (cited in Irving 2001: 77)

A most explicit admission: American Jews, working in conjunction with British Jews, hold the key to war. They are "keen to do it." Virtually upon command, they can "tip the scales" — again — and drive the Americans into another war that they desperately want to avoid.

The Pearl Harbor Incident

With American opposition to war still hovering near 80team were evidently becoming desperate. Dramatic action was increasingly necessary. At that point, only a direct attack on American soil could alter public opinion. For a good two years, Roosevelt had been harassing the Germans. But they refused to bite. What to do?

History is full of 'false flag' operations in which governments or other actors conduct a fake attack, blame the enemy, and then use the event as a pretext for military action. By some accounts, the earliest was in 47 BC, when Julius Caesar arranged and paid for insurgent 'rebel' actions in Rome prior to his taking of the city. A more recent instance occurred in 1846, when President James Polk sent an army detachment into a disputed area along the Texas- Mexico border. When the Mexicans responded, he declared it an attack on "American soil," and promptly began the US-Mexico War. For centuries, military commanders have understood the benefits of false flags; Roosevelt's team was no different.

Though I cannot elaborate here, there is ample evidence that the Pearl Harbor attack was effectively a false flag event. While obviously not directly conducting the attack, Roosevelt did everything possible to encourage and allow the Japanese to strike — and then to feign shock when it actually happened. Below are the key elements of that story.

The earliest explicit indication that some such plan was in the works comes from October 1940, in the so-called McCollum Memorandum. Lt. Commander Arthur McCollum was director of the Office of Naval Intelligence's Far East Asia section, when he issued a five-page letter to two of his superiors. The memo describes a situation in which a neutral US is surrounded by hostile nations across two oceans, and notes that "Germany and Italy have lately concluded a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States."

This was a mutual-defense pact, such that an attack against Japan would be considered by Germany to be an act of war. This gave FDR two paths to war: attack by Germany, or attack by Japan. Germany was scrupulously eschewing conflict, but perhaps Japan could be engaged.

This was evidently well understood within the military establishment. As McCollum explained, "It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion, the US government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude" — clever language that essentially means: Japan does not really want war either, but perhaps we could provoke them enough ("more ado") that they would launch a first strike ("modify their attitude"). McCollum then suggested an eight-point action plan, anticipating conflict with Japan. Item Six includes this: "Keep the main strength of the US fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands." The memo concludes with this striking sentence: "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." The plan could hardly be clearer.

On 19 August 1941, Churchill told his war cabinet that FDR was doing all he could to provoke an attack by the Axis powers — information which came to light only in 1972. Churchill said:

"[Roosevelt] was obviously determined that they [the US] should come in. . . . The president said to me that he would wage war but not declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces. . . . Everything was being done to force an 'incident.' The president has made it clear that he would look for an 'incident' which could justify him in opening hostilities."

Lindbergh essentially understood what was going on. In his September 1941 speech, he laid out FDR's three-part plan: (1) prepare for war in the guise of defense, (2) incrementally involve the US in conflict situations, and (3) "create a series of incidents which would force us into actual conflict." Near the end of his speech he added that "The war groups have succeeded in the first two of their three major steps into war. . . . Only the creation of sufficient 'incidents' yet remains." An amazing prognosis, given that the Pearl Harbor attack was just three months away.

On 25 November 1941, 12 days before the attack, Roosevelt held a War Cabinet meeting at the White House. Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote the following in his diary of that day:

"[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday [December 1] (Pearl Harbor was attacked December 7), for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition."

The following day, November 26, Secretary of State Hull presented a letter to the Japanese ambassador, demanding that they withdraw from China and French Indochina (section II, point #3). Though couched in the language of peace, it was effectively an ultimatum, and it was thusly perceived by the Japanese prime minister.

On December 4, the anti-war paper Chicago Daily Tribune ran a huge headline: "FDR's War Plans!" It detailed a plan for a 10-million-man military force, half of whom would be dedicated to fighting Germany. It even mentioned a specific date — 1 July 1943 — as the day for the "final supreme effort by American land forces to defeat the mighty German army in Europe." This was incredibly accurate; the Allied invasion of Sicily, the first direct assault on European territory, occurred on 9 July 1943. Clearly FDR's secrets were quickly unraveling.

At 4:00 pm on Saturday, December 6, a decoded Japanese communiqué was delivered to Roosevelt. It indicated that Japan was not going to accept any portion of America's ultimatum, and that they were compelled to respond to its on-going belligerence. "This means war," said the president. If war was inevitable, said Harry Hopkins, it was too bad that we couldn't strike first. "No, we can't do that," said Roosevelt, hypocritically; "We are a democracy of a peaceful people. We have a good record. We must stand on it." Pearl Harbor was not explicitly mentioned, but the president took no action to forewarn any of his commanders in the Pacific theater, thus rendering them defenseless before the oncoming assault.

Eight years after the attack, the president's administrative assistant, Jonathan Daniels, recalled events of that time. "There was a mass of warning before Pearl Harbor," he wrote (1949: 490). "As a matter of fact, warning had been clear for many months before Pearl Harbor. The increasing menace had been understood and accepted. Of course, even Senators can now read to precise clarity — to the place and the hour — the warnings we possessed." At the time, though, Roosevelt was surprised: "Of course, he was surprised. But he had deliberately taken the chance of surprise, as he had won the strategy of successful militant delay. The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be." Indeed — 2,400 Americans killed in one day.

Or perhaps it was no "surprise" at all. In 1989, a 90-year-old British naval intelligence officer named Eric Nave came forth with a stunning assertion: that the Brits had detailed foreknowledge of the attack, days before the event. As reported in the Times of London (June 1), Nave's decoding of Japanese battle commands made "clear their intention to attack several days before the raid took place." "His revelations challenge the view that the Americans were taken by surprise, and support evidence that Churchill, and probably Roosevelt, allowed the attack to go ahead unchallenged as means to bring America into the Second World War." Nave added this: "We never had any doubt about Pearl Harbor itself. It should never have happened. We knew days, even a week before." His account is detailed in his book *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor* (1991). Nave died in 1993.

12.14 War Profit

The Empire of I.G. Farben

On the eve of World War II the German chemical complex of I.G. Farben was the largest chemical manufacturing enterprise in the world, with extraordinary political and economic power and influence within the Hitlerian Nazi state. I. G. has been aptly described as “a state within a state.” The Farben cartel dated from 1925, when organizing genius Hermann Schmitz (with Wall Street financial assistance) created the super-giant chemical enterprise out of six already giant German chemical companies — Badische Anilin, Bayer, Agfa, Hoechst, Weiler-ter- Meer, and Griesheim-Elektron. These companies were merged to become Inter-nationale Gesellschaft Farbenindustrie A.G. — or I.G. Farben for short. Twenty years later the same Hermann Schmitz was put on trial at Nuremberg for war crimes committed by the I. G. cartel. Other I. G. Farben directors were placed on trial but the American affiliates of I. G. Farben and the American directors of I. G. itself were quietly forgotten; the truth was buried in the archives.

It is these U.S. connections in Wall Street that concern us. Without the capital supplied by Wall Street, there would have been no I. G. Farben in the first place and almost certainly no Adolf Hitler and World War II. German bankers on the Farben Aufsichtsrat (the supervisory Board of Directors)¹ in the late 1920s included the Hamburg banker Max Warburg, whose brother Paul Warburg was a founder of the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Not coincidentally, Paul Warburg was also on the board of American I. G., Farben’s wholly owned U.S. subsidiary. In addition to Max Warburg and Hermann Schmitz, the guiding hand in the creation of the Farben empire, the early Farben Vorstand included Carl Bosch, Fritz ter Meer, Kurt Oppenheim and George von Schnitzler. All except Max Warburg were charged as “war criminals” after World War II.

I. G. Farben is of peculiar interest in the formation of the Nazi state because Farben directors materially helped Hitler and the Nazis to power in 1933. I.G. Farben contributed 400,000 RM to Hitler’s political “slush fund.” It was this secret fund which financed the Nazi seizure of control in March 1933. Many years earlier Farben had obtained Wall Street funds for the 1925 cartelization and expansion in Germany and \$30 million for American I. G. in 1929, and had Wall Street directors on the Farben board. It has to be noted that these funds were raised and directors appointed years before Hitler was promoted as the German dictator. Qualified observers have argued that Germany could not have gone to war in 1939 without I. G. Farben. Between 1927 and the beginning of World War II, I.G. Farben doubled in size, an expansion made possible in great part by American technical assistance and by American bond issues, such as the one for \$30 million offered by National City Bank. By 1939 I. G. acquired a participation and managerial influence in some 380 other German firms and over 500 foreign firms. The Farben empire owned its own coal mines, its own electric power plants, iron and steel units, banks, research units, and numerous commercial enterprises. There were over 2,000 cartel agreements

between I. G. and foreign firms — including Standard Oil of New Jersey, DuPont, Alcoa, Dow Chemical, and others in the United States, The full story of I,G, Farben and its world-wide activities before World War II can never be known, as key German records were destroyed in 1945 in anticipation of Allied victory.

Directors of Farben firms (i.e., the “I. G. Farben officials“ referred to in the investigation) included not only Germans but also prominent American financiers. This 1945 U.S. War Department report concluded that I.G.’s assignment from Hitler in the prewar period was to make Germany self-sufficient in rubber, gasoline, lubricating oils, magnesium, fibers, tanning agents, fats, and explosives. To fulfill this critical assignment, vast sums were spent by I.G. on processes to extract these war materials from indigenous German raw materials - in particular the plentiful German coal resources. Where these processes could not be developed in Germany ,they were acquired from abroad under cartel arrangements. For example, the process for iso-octane, essential for aviation fuels, was obtained from the United States.

The process for manufacturing tetra-ethyl lead? essential for aviation gasoline, was obtained by I. G. Farben from the United States, and in 1939 I.G. was sold \$20 million of high-grade aviation gasoline by Standard Oil of New Jersey. Even before Germany manufactured tetraethyl lead by the American process it was able to “borrow“ 500 tons from the Ethyl Corporation. This loan of vital tetra-ethyl lead was not repaid and I.G. forfeited the \$1 million security. Further, I.G. purchased large stocks of magnesium from Dow Chemical for incendiary bombs and stockpiled explosives, stabilizers, phosphorus, and cyanides from the outside world. In 1939, out of 43 major products manufactured by I.G., 28 were of “primary concern“ to the German armed forces. Farben’s ultimate control of the German war economy, acquired during the 1920s and 1930s with Wall Street assistance, can best be assessed by examining the percentage of German war material output produced by Farben plants in 1945. Farben at that time produced 100 percent of German synthetic rubber, 95 percent of German poison gas (including all the Zyklon B gas used in the concentration camps), 90 percent of German plastics, 88 percent of German magnesium, 84 percent of German explosives, 70 percent of German gunpowder, 46 percent of German high octane (aviation) gasoline, and 33 percent of German synthetic gasoline.

Unfortunately, when we probe the technical origins of the more important of these military materials — quite apart from financial Support for Hitler — we find links to American industry and to American businessmen. There were numerous Farben arrangements with American firms, including cartel marketing arrangements, patent agreements, and technical exchanges as exemplified in the Standard Oil-Ethyl technology transfers mentioned above. The Berlin N.W. 7 office of I.G. Farben was the key Nazi overseas espionage center. The unit operated under Farben director Max Ilgner, nephew of I.G. Farben president Hermann Schmitz. Max Ilgner and Hermann Schmitz were on the board of American I.G., with fellow directors Henry Ford of Ford Motor Company, Paul Warburg of Bank of Manhattan, and Charles E. Mitchell of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

The American I.G. Farben

American I.G. Farben directors included some of the more prominent members of Wall Street. German interests re-entered the United States after World War I, and successfully overcame barriers designed to keep I.G. out of the American market. Neither seizure of German patents. The Directors of the American I.G. were Carl Bosch (Ford Motor), Edsel B. Ford (Ford Motor), Max Ilgner, F. Ter Meer, H.A. Metz (Bank of Manhattan), C.E. Mitchell (Director Federal Reserve New York and National City Bank), Herman Schmitz (Deutsche Bank, Bank for International Settlements), Walter Teagle (Director Federal Reserve Bank New York and Standard Oil New Jersey), W.H. von Rath (Director of German General U.S. Electric A.E.G), Paul M. Warburg (U.S. First member of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bank of Manhattan) and W.E. Weiss (Sterling Produits).

Directors of American I.G. were not only prominent in Wall Street and American industry but more significantly were drawn from a few highly influential institutions. Directors of American I.G. were not only prominent in Wall Street and American industry but more significantly were drawn from a few highly influential institutions. Between 1929 and 1939 there were changes in the make-up of the board of American I.G. The number of directors varied from time to time, although a majority always had I.G. backgrounds or connections, and the board never had less than four American directors. In 1939 — presumably looking ahead to World War II — an effort was made to give the board a more American complexion, but despite the resignation of Hermann Schmitz, Carl Bosch, and Walter Duisberg, and the appointment of seven new directors, seven members still belonged to the I.G. group. This I.G. predominance increased during 1940 and 1941 as American directors, including Edsel Ford, realized the political unhealthiness of I.G. and resigned.

Several basic observations can be made from this evidence. First, the board of American I.G. had three directors from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the most influential of the various Federal Reserve Banks. American I.G. also had interlocks with Standard Oil of New Jersey, Ford Motor Company, Bank of Manhattan (later to become the Chase Manhattan), and A.E.G. (German General Electric). Second, three members of the board of this American I.G. were found guilty at Nuremburg War Crimes Trials. These were the German, not the American, members. Among these Germans was Max Ilgner, director of the I.G. Farben N.W. 7 office in Berlin, i.e., the Nazi pre-war intelligence office. If the directors of a corporation are collectively responsible for the activities of the corporation, then the American directors should also have been placed on trial at Nuremburg, along with the German directors — that is, if the purpose of the trials was to determine war guilt. Of course, if the purpose of the trials had been to divert attention away from the U.S. involvement in Hitler's rise to power, they succeeded very well in such an objective.

General Electric

The multi-national giant General Electric has an unparalleled role in twentieth-century history. The General Electric Company electrified the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, and fulfilled for the Soviets Lenin's dictum that "Socialism = electrification." The Swope Plan, created by General Electric's one-time president Gerard Swope, became Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, by a process deplored by one-time President Herbert Hoover and described in *Wall Street and FDR*. There was a long-lasting, intimate relationship between Swope and Young of General Electric Company and the Roosevelt family, as there was between General Electric and the Soviet Union. In 1936 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, an early Roosevelt supporter, became aware of Roosevelt's betrayal of liberal ideas and attacked the Roosevelt New Deal program as a "tyrannical" measure "leading to despotism, [and] sought by its sponsors under the communistic cry of 'Social Justice.'" Senator Reed further charged on the floor of the Senate that Franklin D. Roosevelt was a "hired man for the economic royalists" in Wall Street and that the Roosevelt family "is one of the largest stockholders in the General Electric Company."

As we probe into behind-the-scenes German interwar history and the story of Hitler and Naziism, we find both Owen D. Young and Gerard Swope of General Electric tied to the rise of Hitlerism and the suppression of German democracy. That General Electric directors are to be found in each of these three distinct historical categories — i.e., the development of the Soviet Union, the creation of Roosevelt's New Deal, and the rise of Hitlerism — suggests how elements of Big Business are keenly interested in the socialization of the world, for their own purposes and objectives, rather than the maintenance of the impartial market place in a free society. General Electric profited handsomely from Bolshevism, from Roosevelt's New Deal socialism, and, as we shall see below, from national socialism in Hitler's Germany.

General Electric in Weimar Germany

Walter Rathenau was, until his assassination in 1922, managing director of Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A.E.G.), or German General Electric, and like Owen Young and Gerard Swope, his counterparts in the U.S., he was a prominent advocate of corporate socialism. Walter Rathenau spoke out publicly against competition and free enterprise, Why? Because both Rathenau and Swope wanted the protection and cooperation of the state for their own corporate objectives and profit. (But not of course for anybody else's objectives and profits.) Rathenau expressed their plea in *The New Political Economy*:

"The new economy will, as we have seen, be no state or governmental economy but a private economy committed to a civic power of resolution which certainly will require state cooperation for organic consolidation to overcome inner friction and increase production and endurance."

When we disentangle the turgid Rathenau prose, this means that the power of the State

was to be made available to private firms for their own corporate purposes. Owen D. Young of General Electric was one of the three U.S. delegates to the 1923 Dawes Plan meeting which established the German reparations program. And in the Dawes and Young Plans we can see how some private firms were able to benefit from the power of the State. The largest single loans from Wall Street to Germany during the 1920s were reparations loans; it was ultimately the U.S. investor who paid for German reparations. The cartelization of the German electrical industry under A.E.G. (as well as the steel and chemical industries discussed in Chapters One and Two) was made possible with these Wall Street loans.

In 1928, at the Young Plan reparations meetings, we find General Electric president Owen D. Young in the chair as the chief U.S. delegate, appointed by the U.S. government to use U.S. government power and prestige to decide international financial matters enhancing Wall Street and General Electric profits. In 1930 Owen D. Young, after whom the Young Plan for German reparations was named, became chairman of the Board of General Electric Company in New York City. Young was also chairman of the Executive Committee of Radio Corporation of America and a director of both German General Electric (A.E.G.) and Osram in Germany. Young also served on the boards of other major U.S. corporations, including General Motors, NBC, and RKO; he was a councilor of the National Industrial Conference Board, a director of the International Chamber of Commerce, and deputy chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Gerard Swope was president and director of General Electric Company as well as French and German associated companies, including A.E.G. and Osram in Germany. Swope was also a director of RCA, NBC, and the National City Bank of New York. Other directors of International General Electric at this time reflect Morgan control of the company, and both Young and Swope were generally known as the Morgan representatives on the G.E. board, which included Thomas Cochran, another partner in the J.P. Morgan firm. General Electric director Clark Haynes Minor was president of International General Electric in the 1920s. Another director was Victor M. Cutter of the First National Bank of Boston and a figure in the "Banana Revolutions" in Central America. In the late 1920s Young, Swope, and Minor of International General Electric moved into the German electrical industry and gained, if not control as some have reported, then at least a substantial say in the internal affairs of both A.E.G. and Osram. In July 1929 an agreement was reached between General Electric and three German firms — A.E.G., Siemens & Halske, and Koppel and Company — which between them owned all the shares in Osram.

In July 1929 great interest was shown in rumors circulating in German financial circles that General Electric was also buying into A.E.G. and that talks to this end were in progress between A.E.G. and G.E.⁸ In August it was confirmed that 14 million marks of common A.E.G. stock were to be issued to General Electric. These shares, added to shares bought on the open market, gave General Electric a 25-percent interest in A.E.G. A closer working agreement was signed between the two companies, providing the German company U.S. technology and patents. By 1930, unknown to the German

financial press, General Electric had similarly gained an effective technical monopoly of the Soviet electrical industry and was soon to penetrate even the remaining bastions in Germany, particularly the Siemens group. In January 1930 three G.E. men were elected to the board of A.E.G. — Clark H. Minor, Gerard Swope, and E. H. Baldwin — and International General Electric (I.G.E.) continued its moves to merge the world electrical industry into a giant cartel under Wall Street control.

In February General Electric focused on the remaining German electrical giant, Siemens & Halske, and while able to obtain a large block of debentures issued on behalf of the German firm by Dillon, Read of New York, G.E. was not able to gain participation or directors on the Siemens board. Consequently, in the early 1930s, as Hitler prepared to grab dictatorial power in Germany — backed by some, but by no means all, German and American industrialists — the German General Electric (A.E.G.) was owned by International General Electric (about 30 percent), the Gesellschaft für Electriche Unternehmen (25 percent), and Ludwig Lowe (25 percent). International General Electric also had an interest of about 16 2/3rds percent in Osram.

General Electric and the Financing of Hitler

The tap root of modern corporate socialism runs deep into the management of two affiliated multi-national corporations: General Electric Company in the United States and its foreign associates, including German General Electric (A.E.G.), and Osram in Germany. We have noted that Gerard Swope, second president and chairman of General Electric, and Walter Rathanau of A.E.G. promoted radical ideas for control of the State by private business interests.

From 1915 onwards International General Electric (I.G.E.), located at 120 Broadway in New York City, acted as the foreign investment, manufacturing, and selling organization for the General Electric Company. I.G.E. held interests in overseas manufacturing companies including a 25 to 30-percent holding in German General Electric (A.E.G.), plus holdings in Osram G.m.b.H. Kommanditgesellschaft, also in Berlin. These holdings gave International General Electric four directors on the board of A.E.G., and another director at Osram, and significant influence in the internal domestic policies of these German companies. The

significance of this General Electric ownership is that A.E.G. and Osram were prominent suppliers of funds for Hitler in his rise to power in Germany in 1933. A bank transfer slip dated March 2, 1933 from A.E.G. to Delbruck Schickler & Co. in Berlin requests that 60,000 Reichsmark be deposited in the “Nationale Treuhand” (National Trusteeship) account for Hitler’s use. I.G. Farben was the most important of the domestic financial backers of Hitler, and (as noted elsewhere) I.G. Farben controlled American I.G. Moreover, several directors of A.E.G. were also on the board of I.G. Farben — i.e., Hermann Bucher, chairman of A.E.G. was on the I.G. Farben board; so were A.E.G. directors Julius Flechtheim and Walter von Rath. I.G. Farben contributed 30 percent of the 1933 Hitler

National Trusteeship. Walter Fahrenhorst of A.E.G. was also on the board of Phoenix A-G, Thyssen A-G and Demag A-G — and all were contributors to Hitler's fund. Demag A-G contributed 50,000 RM to Hitler's fund and had a director with A.E.G.

Osram contributed 40,000 RM directly to the Hitler fund. The Otto Wolff concern, Vereinigte Stahlwerke A-G, recipient of substantial New York loans in the 1920s, had three directors on the A.E.G. board: Otto Wolff, Henry Nathan and Jakob Goldschmidt. Alfred Krupp von Bohlen, sole owner of the Krupp organization and an early supporter of Hitler, was a member of the Aufsichtsrat of A.E.G. Robert Pferdmenges, a member of Himmler's Circle of Friends, was also a director of A, E.G. Walter Rathenau became a director of A.E.G. in 1899 and by the early twentieth century was a director of more than 100 corporations. Rathenau was also author of the "Rathenau Plan," which bears a remarkable resemblance to the "Swope Plan" — i.e., FDR's New Deal but written by Swope of G.E. In other words, we have the extraordinary coincidence that the authors of New Deal-like plans in the U.S. and Germany were also prime backers of their implementers: Hitler in Germany and Roosevelt in the U.S. In brief, we have hard evidence of unquestioned authenticity (see p, 56) to show that German General Electric contributed substantial sums to Hitler's political fund. There were four American directors of A.E.G. (Baldwin, Swope, Minor, and Clark), which was 80 percent owned by International General Electric. Further, I.G.E. and the four American directors were the largest single interest and consequently had the greatest single influence in A.E.G. actions and policies.

Standard Oil Fuels World War II

The Standard Oil group of companies, in which the Rockefeller family owned a one-quarter (and controlling) interest,¹ was of critical assistance in helping Nazi Germany prepare for World War II. This assistance in military preparation came about because Germany's relatively insignificant supplies of crude petroleum were quite insufficient for modern mechanized warfare; in 1934 for instance about 85 percent of German finished petroleum products were imported. The solution adopted by Nazi Germany was to manufacture synthetic gasoline from its plentiful domestic coal supplies. It was the hydrogenation process of producing synthetic gasoline and iso-octane properties in gasoline that enabled Germany to go to war in 1940 — and this hydrogenation process was developed and financed by the Standard Oil laboratories in the United States in partnership with I.G. Farben.

During World War II Standard Oil of New Jersey was accused of treason for this pre-war alliance with Farben, even while its continuing wartime activities within Himmler's Circle of Friends were unknown. The accusations of treason were vehemently denied by Standard Oil. Whatever may have been Standard Oil's wartime recollections and hasty defense, the 1929 negotiations and contracts between Standard and I.G. Farben were recorded in the contemporary press and describe the agreements between Standard Oil of New Jersey and I.G. Farben and their intent. In April 1929 Walter C. Teagle, president

of Standard Oil of New Jersey, became a director of the newly organized American I.G. Farben. Not because Teagle was interested in the chemical industry but because,

It has for some years past enjoyed a very close relationship with certain branches of the research work of the I.G. Farben-industrie which bear closely upon the oil industry.

It was announced by Teagle that joint research work on production of oil from coal had been carried on for some time and that a research laboratory for this work was to be established in the United States. In November 1929 this jointly owned Standard — Farben research company was established under the management of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and all research and patents relating to production of oil from coal held by both I.G. and Standard were pooled. Previously, during the period 1926-1929, the two companies had cooperated in development of the hydrogenation process, and experimental plants had been placed in operation in both the U.S. and Germany. The Farben memorandum answered the key question: What did I.G. Farben acquire from Standard Oil that was "vital for the conduct of war?" The memo examines those products cited by Haslam — i.e., iso-octane, tuluol, Oppanol-Paratone, and buna — and demonstrates that contrary to Standard Oil's public claim, their technology came to a great extent from the U.S., not from Germany.

Another prominent example of Standard Oil assistance to Nazi Germany — in cooperation with General Motors — was in supplying ethyl lead. Ethyl fluid is an anti-knock compound used in both aviation and automobile fuels to eliminate knocking, and so improve engine efficiency; without such anti-knocking compounds modern mobile warfare would be impractical. In 1924 the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation was formed in New York City, jointly owned by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and General Motors Corporation, to control and utilize U.S. patents for the manufacture and distribution of tetraethyl lead and ethyl fluid in the U.S. and abroad. Up to 1935 manufacture of these products was undertaken only in the United States. In 1935 Ethyl Gasoline Corporation transferred its know-how to Germany for use in the Nazi rearmament program. This transfer was undertaken over the protests of the U.S. Government.

All this goes on also for rubber and petroleum.

I.T.T. Works Both Sides of the War

The multi-national giant International Telephone and Telegraph (I.T.T.)¹ was founded in 1920 by Virgin Islands-born entrepreneur Sosthenes Behn. During his lifetime Behn was the epitome of the politicized businessman, earning his profits and building the I.T.T. empire through political maneuverings rather than in the competitive market place. In 1923, through political adroitness, Behn acquired the Spanish telephone monopoly, Compañia Telefonica de Espana. In 1924 I.T.T., now backed by the J.P. Morgan firm, bought what later became the International Standard Electric group of manufacturing plants around the world. The parent board of I.T.T. reflected the J.P. Morgan interests,

with Morgan partners Arthur M. Anderson and Russell Leffingwell.

The National City Bank (NCB) in the Morgan group was represented by two directors, Sosthenes Behn and Allen G. Hoyt. In brief, I.T.T. was a Morgan-controlled company; and we have previously noted the interest of Morgan-controlled companies in war and revolution abroad and political maneuvering in the United States. In 1930 Behn acquired the German holding company of Standard Elektrizitäts A.G., controlled by I.T.T. (62.0 percent of the voting stock), A.E.G. (81.1 percent of the voting stock) and Felton & Guillaume (six percent of the voting stock). In this deal Standard acquired two German manufacturing plants and a majority stock interest in Telefonfabrik Berliner A.G. I.T.T. also obtained the Standard subsidiaries in Germany, Ferdinand Schuchardt Berliner Fernsprech-und Telegraphenwerk A.G., as well as Mix & Genest in Berlin, and Suddeutsche Apparate Fabrik G.m.b.H. in Nuremberg.

It is interesting to note in passing that while Sosthenes Behn's I.T.T. controlled telephone companies and manufacturing plants in Germany, the cable traffic between the U.S. and Germany was under the control of Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphengesellschaft (the German Atlantic Cable Company). This firm, together with the Commercial Cable Company and Western Union Telegraph Company, had a monopoly in transatlantic U.S.- German cable communications. W.A. Harriman & Company took over a block of 625,000 shares in Deutsch-Atlantische in 1925, and the firm's board of directors included an unusual array of characters, many of whom we have met elsewhere. It included, for example, H. F. Albert, the German espionage agent in the United States in World War I; Franklin D. Roosevelt's former business associate von Berenberg-Gossler; and Dr. Cuno, a former German chancellor of the 1923 inflationary era. I.T.T. in the United States was represented on the board by von Guillaume and Max Warburg of the Warburg banking family.

There is no record that I.T.T. made direct payments to Hitler before the Nazi grab for power in 1933. On the other hand, numerous payments were made to Heinrich Himmler in the late 1930s and in World War II itself through I.T.T. German subsidiaries. The first meeting between Hitler and I.T.T. officials — so far as we know — was reported in August 1933, when Sosthenes Behn and I.T.T. German representative Henry Manne met with Hitler in Berchtesgaden. Subsequently, Behn made contact with the Keppler circle (see Chapter Nine) and, through Keppler's influence, Nazi Baron Kurt von Schröder became the guardian of I.T.T. interests in Germany. Schröder acted as the conduit for I.T.T. money funneled to Heinrich Himmler's S.S. organization in 1944, while World War II was in progress, and the United States was at war with Germany.

Through Kurt Schröder, Behn and his I.T.T. gained access to the profitable German armaments industry and bought substantial interest in German armaments firms, including Focke-Wolfe aircraft. These armaments operations made handsome profits, which could have been repatriated to the United States parent company. But they were reinvested in German rearmament. This reinvestment of profits in German armament firms suggests that Wall Street claims it was innocent of wrongdoing in German rearmament — and

indeed did not even know of Hitler's intentions — are fraudulent. Specifically, I.T.T. purchase of a substantial interest in Focke-Wolfe meant, as Anthony Sampson has pointed out, that I.T.T. was producing German planes used to kill Americans and their allies — and it made excellent profits out of the enterprise.

In Kurt von Schröder, I.T.T. had access to the very heart of the Nazi power elite. Who was Schröder? Baron Kurt von Schröder was born in Hamburg in 1889 into an old, established German banking family. An earlier member of the Schröder family moved to London, changed his name to Schroder (without the diëresis) and organized the banking firm of J. Henry Schroder in London and J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation in New York. Kurt von Schröder also became a partner in the private Cologne Bankhaus, J. H. Stein & Company, founded in the late eighteenth century. Both Schröder and Stein had been promoters, in company with French financiers, of the 1919 German separatist movement which attempted to split the rich Rhineland away from Germany and its troubles. In exchange for financial and industrial support arranged by von Schroder, he later gained political prestige. Immediately after the Nazis gained power in 1933 Schrader became the German representative at the Bank for International Settlements, which Quigley calls the apex of the international control system, as well as head of the private bankers group advising the German Reichsbank. Heinrich Himmler appointed Schroder an S.S. Senior Group Leader, and in turn Himmler became a prominent member of Keppler's Circle.

In 1938 the Schroder Bank in London became the German financial agent in Great Britain, represented at financial meetings by its Managing Director (and a director of the Bank of England), F.C. Tiarks. By World War II Baron Schrader had in this manner acquired an impressive list of political and banking connections reflecting a widespread influence; it was even reported to the U.S. Kilgore Committee that Schroder was influential enough in 1940 to bring Pierre Laval to power in France. In the mid-1930s another link was forged between Wall Street and Schröder, this time through the Rockefellers. In 1936 the underwriting and general securities business handled by J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation in New York was merged into a new investment banking firm — Schroder, Rockefeller & Company, Inc. at 48 Wall Street. Carlton P. Fuller of Schroder Banking Corporation became president and Avery Rockefeller, son of Percy Rockefeller (brother of John D. Rockefeller) became vice president and director of the new firm. Previously, Avery Rockefeller had been associated behind the scenes with J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation; the new firm brought him out into the open.

Westrick, Texaco, and I.T.T.

I.T.T. had yet another conduit to Nazi Germany, through German attorney Dr. Gerhard Westrick. Westrick was one of a select group of Germans who had conducted espionage in the United States during World War I. The group included not only Kurt von Schröder and Westrick but also Franz von Papen — whom we shall meet in company with James Paul Warburg of the Bank of Manhattan in Chapter Ten — and Dr. Heinrich Albert.

Albert, supposedly German commercial attache in the U.S. in World War I, was actually in charge of financing von Papen's espionage program. After World War I Westrick and Albert formed the law firm of Albert & Westrick which specialized in, and profited heavily from, the Wall Street reparations loans. The Albert & Westrick firm handled the German end of the J Henry Schroder Banking loans, while the John Foster Dulles firm of Sullivan and Cromwell in New York handled the U.S. end of the Schroder loans.

Just prior to World War II the Albert-Papen-Westrick espionage operation in the United States began to repeat itself, only this time around the American authorities were more alert. Westrick came to the U.S. in 1940, supposedly as a commercial attache but in fact as Ribbentrop's personal representative. A stream of visitors to the influential Westrick included prominent directors of U.S. petroleum and industrial firms, and this brought Westrick to the attention of the FBI. Westrick at this time became a director of all I.T.T. operations in Germany, in order to protect I.T.T. interests during the expected U.S. involvement in the European war. Among his other enterprises Westrick attempted to persuade Henry Ford to cut off supplies to Britain, and the favored treatment given by the Nazis to Ford interests in France suggests that Westrick was partially successful in neutralizing U.S. aid to Britain.

Although Westrick's most important wartime business connection in the United States was with International Telephone and Telegraph, he also represented other U.S. firms, including Underwood Elliott Fisher, owner of the German company Mercedes Buromaschinen A.G.; Eastman Kodak, which had a Kodak subsidiary in Germany; and the International Milk Corporation, with a Hamburg subsidiary. Among Westrick's deals (and the one which received the most publicity) was a contract for Texaco to supply oil to the German Navy, which he arranged with Torkild Rieber, chairman of the board of Texaco Company. In 1940 Rieber discussed an oil deal with Hermann Goering, and Westrick in the United States worked for Texas Oil Company. His automobile was bought with Texaco funds, and Westrick's driver's license application gave Texaco as his business address. These activities were publicized on August 12, 1940. Rieber subsequently resigned from Texaco and Westrick returned to Germany. Two years later Rieber was chairman of South Carolina Shipbuilding and Dry Docks, supervising construction of more than \$10 million of U.S. Navy ships, and a director of the Guggenheim family's Barber Asphalt Corporation and Seaboard Oil Company of Ohio.

During World War II International Telephone and Telegraph was making cash payments to S.S. leader Heinrich Himmler.¹⁰ These payments enabled I.T.T. to protect its investment in Focke-Wolfe, an aircraft manufacturing firm producing fighter aircraft used against the United States.

Henry Ford

Henry Ford is often seen to be something of an enigma among the Wall Street elite. For many years in the 20s and 30s Ford was popularly known as an enemy of the financial

establishment. Ford accused Morgan and others of using war and revolution as a road to profit and their influence in social systems as a means of personal advancement. By 1938 Henry Ford, in his public statements, had divided financiers into two classes: those who profited from war and used their influence to bring about war for profit, and the “constructive” financiers. Among the latter group he now included the House of Morgan. During a 1938 New York Times interview Ford averred that:

“Somebody once said that sixty families have directed the destinies of the nation. It might well be said that if somebody would focus the spotlight on twenty-five persons who handle the nation’s finances, the world’s real warmakers would be brought into bold relief.”

The Times reporter asked Ford how he equated this assessment with his long-standing criticism of the House of Morgan, to which Ford replied:

“There is a constructive and a destructive Wall Street. The House of Morgan represents the constructive. I have known Mr. Morgan for many years. He backed and supported Thomas Edison, who was also my good friend”

After expounding on the evils of limited agricultural production — allegedly brought about by Wall Street — Ford continued,

“... if these financiers had their way we’d be in a war now. They want war because they make money out of such conflict — out of the human misery that wars bring.”

On the other hand, when we probe behind these public statements we find that Henry Ford and son Edsel Ford have been in the forefront of American businessmen who try to walk both sides of every ideological fence in search of profit. Using Ford’s own criteria, the Fords are among the “destructive” elements. It was Henry Ford who in the 1930s built the Soviet Union’s first modern automobile plant (located at Gorki) and which in the 50s and 60s produced the trucks used by the North Vietnamese to carry weapons and munitions for use against Americans. At about the same time, Henry Ford was also the most famous of Hitler’s foreign backers, and he was rewarded in the 1930s for this long-lasting support with the highest Nazi decoration for foreigners.

This Nazi favor aroused a storm of controversy in the United States and ultimately degenerated into an exchange of diplomatic notes between the German Government and the State Department. While Ford publicly protested that he did not like totalitarian governments, we find in practice that Ford knowingly profited from both sides of World War II — from French and German plants producing vehicles at a profit for the Wehrmacht, and from U.S. plants building vehicles at a profit for the U.S. Army.

Ford Motor Company Assists the German War Effort

A post-war Congressional subcommittee investigating American support for the Nazi military effort described the manner in which the Nazis succeeded in obtaining U.S. technical

and financial assistance as “quite fantastic.¹¹ Among other evidence the Committee was shown a memorandum prepared in the offices of Ford-Werke A.G. on November 25, 1941, written by Dr. H. F. Albert to R. H. Schmidt, then president of the board of Ford-Werke A.G. The memo cited the advantages of having a majority of the German firm held by Ford Motor Company in Detroit. German Ford had been able to exchange Ford parts for rubber and critical war materials needed in 1938 and 1939 “and they would not have been able to do that if Ford had not been owned by the United States.” Further, with a majority American interest German Ford would “more easily be able to step in and dominate the Ford holdings throughout Europe.” It was even reported to the Committee that two top German Ford officials had been in a bitter personal feud about who was to control Ford of England, such “that one of them finally got up and left the room in disgust.”

According to evidence presented to the Committee, Ford-Werke A.G. was technically transformed in the late 1930s into a German company. All vehicles and their parts were produced in Germany, by German workers using German materials under German direction and exported to European and overseas territories of the United States and Great Britain. Any needed foreign raw materials, rubber and nonferrous metals, were obtained through the American Ford Company. At the outbreak of the war Ford-Werke placed itself at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for armament production. It was assumed by the Nazis that as long as Ford-Werke A.G. had an American majority, it would be possible to bring the remaining European Ford companies under German influence — i.e., that of Ford-Werke A.G.

And, of course, this kind of strict “neutrality”, taking an international rather than a national viewpoint, had earlier paid off for Ford Motor Company in the Soviet Union, where Ford was held in high regard as the ultimate of technical and economic efficiency to be achieved by the Stak-hanovites. In July 1942 word filtered back to Washington from Ford of France about Ford’s activities on behalf of the German war effort in Europe. The incriminating information was promptly buried and even today only part of the known documentation can be traced in Washington.

Although there is evidence that European plants owned by Wall Street interests were not bombed by the U.S. Air Force in World War II, this restriction apparently did not reach the British Bombing Command. In March 1942 the Royal Air Force bombed the Ford plant at Poissy, France. A subsequent letter from Edsel Ford to Ford General Manager Sorenson about this RAF raid commented, “Photographs of the plant on fire were published in American newspapers but fortunately no reference was made to the Ford Motor Company.¹⁵ In any event, the Vichy government paid Ford Motor Company 38 million francs as compensation for damage done to the Poissy plant. This was not reported in the U.S. press and would hardly be appreciated by those Americans at war with Naziism. Dubois asserts that these private messages from Ford in Europe were passed to Edsel Ford by Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long. This was the same Secretary Long who one year later suppressed private messages through the State

Department concerning the extermination of Jews in Europe. 16 Disclosure of those messages conceivably could have been used to assist those desperate people.

A U.S. Air Force bombing intelligence report written in 1943 noted that,

Principal wartime activities [of the Ford plant] are probably manufacture of light trucks and of spare parts for all the Ford trucks and cars in service in Axis Europe (including captured Russian Molotovs).

The Russian Molotovs were of course manufactured by the Ford-built works at Gorki, Russia. In France during the war, passenger automobile production was entirely replaced by military vehicles and for this purpose three large additional buildings were added to the Poissy factory. The main building contained about 500 machine tools, "all imported from the United States and including a fair sprinkling of the more complex types, such as Gleason gear cutters, Bullard automatics and Ingersoll borers. Ford also extended its wartime activities into North Africa. In December 1941 a new Ford Company, Ford-Afrique, was registered in France and granted all the rights of the former Ford Motor Company, Ltd. of England in Algeria, Tunisia, French Morocco, French Equatorial, and French West Africa. North Africa was not accessible to British Ford so this new Ford Company — registered in German-occupied France.

In brief, there is documentary evidence that Ford Motor Company worked on both sides of World War II. If the Nazi industrialists brought to trial at Nuremberg were guilty of crimes against mankind, then so must be their fellow collaborators in the Ford family, Henry and Edsel Ford. However, the Ford story was concealed by Washington — apparently like almost everything else that could touch upon the name and sustenance of the Wall Street financial elite.

Wall Street-Nazi Collaboration in World War II

Behind the battle fronts in World War II, through intermediaries in Switzerland and North Africa, the New York financial elite collaborated with the Nazi regime. Captured files after the war yielded a mass of evidence demonstrating that for some elements of Big Business, the period 1941-5 was "business as usual." For instance, correspondence between U.S. firms and their French subsidiaries reveals the aid given to the Axis military machine — while the United States was at war with Germany and Italy. Similarly, the Rockefeller Chase Bank was accused of collaborating with the Nazis in World War II France, while Nelson Rockefeller had a soft job in Washington D.C.

Treasury officials urged that an investigation be started with the French subsidiaries of several American banks — that is, Chase, Morgan, National City, Guaranty, Bankers Trust, and American Express. Although Chase and Morgan were the only two banks to maintain French offices throughout the Nazi occupation, in September 1944 all the major New York banks were pressing the U.S. Government for permission to re-open pre-war branches. Subsequent Treasury investigation produced documentary evidence of

collaboration between both Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan with the Nazis in World War II.

American I.G. in World War II

Collaboration between American businessmen and Nazis in Axis Europe was paralleled by protection of Nazi interests in the United States. In 1939 American I.G. was renamed General Aniline & Film, with General Dyestuffs acting as its exclusive sales agent in the U.S. These names effectively disguised the fact that American I.G. (or General Aniline & Film) was an important producer of major war materials, including atabrine, magnesium, and synthetic rubber. Restrictive agreements with its German parent I.G. Farben reduced American supplies of these military products during World War II.

An American citizen, Halbach, became president of General Dyestuffs in 1930 and acquired majority control in 1939 from Dietrich A. Schmitz, a director of American I.G. and brother of Hermann Schmitz, director of I.G. Farben in Germany and chairman of the board of American I.G. until the outbreak of war in 1939. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Treasury blocked Halbach's bank accounts. In June 1942 the Alien Property Custodian seized Halbach's stock in General Dyestuffs and took over the firm as an enemy corporation under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Subsequently, the Alien Property Custodian appointed a new board of directors to act as trustee for the duration of the war. These actions were reasonable and usual practice, but when we probe under the surface another and quite abnormal story emerges.

Between 1942 and 1945 Halbach was nominally a consultant to General Dyestuffs. In fact Halbach ran the company, at \$82,000 per year, Louis Johnson, former Assistant Secretary of War, was appointed president of General Dyestuffs by the 'U.S. Government, for which he received \$75,000 a year. Louis Johnson attempted to bring pressure to bear on the U.S. Treasury to unblock Halbach's blocked funds and allow Halbach to develop policies contrary to the interests of the U.S., then at war with Germany. The argument used to get Halbach's bank accounts unblocked was that Halbach was running the company and that the Government-appointed board of directors "would have been lost without Mr. Halbach's knowledge."

During the war Halbach filed suit against the Alien Property Custodian, through the Establishment law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, to oust the U.S. Government from its control of I.G. Farben companies. These suits were unsuccessful, but Halbach was successful in keeping the Farben cartel agreements intact throughout World War II; the Alien Property Custodian never did go into court during World War II on the pending antitrust suits. Why not? Leo T. Crowley, head of the Alien Property Custodian's office, had John Foster Dulles as his advisor, and John Foster Dulles was a partner in the abovementioned Sullivan and Cromwell firm, which was acting on behalf of Halbach in its suit against the Alien Property Custodian.

There were other conflict of interest situations we should note. Leo T. Crowley, the Alien Property Custodian, appointed Victor Emanuel to the boards of both General Aniline & Film and General Dyestuffs. Before the war Victor Emanuel was director of the J. Schroder Banking Corporation. Schroder, as we have already seen, was a prominent financier of Hitler and the Nazi party. The wartime influence of General Dyestuffs and this cozy government-business coterie on behalf of I.G. Farben is exemplified in the ease of American Cyanamid. Before the war I.G. Farben controlled the drug, chemical, and dyestuffs industries in Mexico. During World War II it was proposed to Washington that American Cyanamid take over this Mexican industry and develop an "independent" chemical industry with the old I.G. Farben firms seized by the Mexican Alien Property Custodian.

At the end of World War II, Wall Street moved into Germany through the Control Council to protect their old cartel friends and limit the extent to which the denazification fervor would damage old business relationships. General Lucius Clay, the deputy military governor for Germany, appointed businessmen who opposed denazification to positions of control over the denazification proceeds. William H. Draper of Dill. on, Read, the firm which financed the German cartels back in the 1920s, became General Clay's deputy.

The Pervasive Influence of International Bankers

Looking at the broad array of facts presented in the three volumes of the Wall Street series, we find persistent recurrence of the same names: Owen Young, Gerard Swope, Hjalmar Schacht, Bernard Baruch, etc.; the same international banks: J.P. Morgan, Guaranty Trust, Chase Bank; and the same location in New York: usually 120 Broadway. This group of international bankers backed the Bolshevik Revolution and subsequently profited from the establishment of a Soviet Russia. This group backed Roosevelt and profited from New Deal socialism. This group also backed Hitler and certainly profited from German armament in the 1930s. When Big Business should have been running its business operations at Ford Motor, Standard of New Jersey, and so on, we find it actively and deeply involved in political upheavals, war, and revolutions in three major countries.

The version of history presented here is that the financial elite knowingly and with pre-meditation assisted the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in concert with German bankers. After profiting handsomely from the German hyper-inflationary distress of 1923, and planning to place the German reparations burden onto the backs of American investors, Wall Street found it had brought about the 1929 financial crisis.

On May 1st, 1918, when the Bolsheviks controlled only a small fraction of Russia (and were to come near to losing even that fraction in the summer of 1918), the American League to Aid and Cooperate with Russia was organized in Washington, D.C. to support the Bolsheviks. This was not a "Hands off Russia" type of committee formed by the Communist Party U.S.A. or its allies. It was a committee created by Wall Street with George P. Whalen of Vacuum Oil Company as Treasurer and Coffin and Oudin of General

Electric, along with Thompson of the Federal Reserve System, Willard of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and assorted socialists.

When we look at the rise of Hitler and Naziism we find Vacuum Oil and General Electric well represented. Ambassador Dodd in Germany was struck by the monetary and technical contribution by the Rockefeller-controlled Vacuum Oil Company in building up military gasoline facilities for the Nazis. The Ambassador tried to warn Roosevelt. Dodd believed, in his apparent naiveté of world affairs, that Roosevelt would intervene, but Roosevelt himself was backed by these same oil interests and Walter Teagle of Standard Oil of New Jersey and the NRA was on the board of Roosevelt's Warm Springs Foundation. So, in but one of many examples, we find the Rockefeller-controlled Vacuum Oil Company prominently assisting in the creation of Bolshevik Russia, the military build-up of Nazi Germany, and backing Roosevelt's New Deal.

Is the United States Ruled by a Dictatorial Elite?

Within the last decade or so, certainly since the 1960s, a steady flow of literature has presented a thesis that the United States is ruled by a self-perpetuating and unelected power elite. Even further, most of these books aver that this elite controls, or at the least heavily influences, all foreign and domestic policy decisions, and that no idea becomes respectable or is published in the United States without the tacit approval, or perhaps lack of disapproval, of this elitist circle. Obviously the very flow of anti-establishment literature by itself testifies that the United States cannot be wholly under the thumb of any single group or elite. On the other hand, anti-establishment literature is not fully recognized or reasonably discussed in academic or media circles. More often than not it consists of a limited edition, privately produced, almost hand-to-hand circulated. There are some exceptions, true; but not enough to dispute the observation that anti-establishment critics do not easily enter normal information/distribution channels.

Whereas in the early and mid-1960s, any concept of rule by a conspiratorial elite, or indeed any kind of elite, was reason enough to dismiss the proponent out of hand as a "nut case," the atmosphere for such concepts has changed radically. The Watergate affair probably added the final touches to a long-developing environment of skepticism and doubt. We are almost at the point where anyone who accepts, for example, the Warren Commission report, or believes that that the decline and fall of Mr. Nixon did not have some conspiratorial aspects, is suspect. In brief, no one any longer really believes the Establishment information process. And there is a wide variety of alternative presentations of events now available for the curious.

Several hundred books, from the full range of the political and philosophical spectrum, add bits and pieces of evidence, more hypotheses, and more accusations. What was not too long ago a kooky idea, talked about at midnight behind closed doors, in hushed and almost conspiratorial whispers, is now openly debated — not, to be sure, in Establishment newspapers but certainly on non-network radio talk shows, the underground press, and

even from time to time in books from respectable Establishment publishing houses. So let us ask the question again: Is there an unelected power elite behind the U.S. Government?

A substantive and often-cited source of information is Carroll Quigley, Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University, who in 1966 had published a monumental modern history entitled *Tragedy and Hope*.¹ Quigley's book is apart from others in this revisionist vein, by virtue of the fact that it was based on a two-year study of the internal documents of one of the power centers. Quigley traces the history of the power elite:

... the powers of financial capitalism had another far reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. Quigley also demonstrates that the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Planning Association, and other groups are "semi-secret" policy-making bodies under the control of this power elite. Possibly, the papers used by Quigley had been vetted, and did not include documentation on elitist manipulation of such events as the Bolshevik Revolution, Hitler's accession to power, and the election of Roosevelt in 1933. More likely, these political manipulations may not be recorded at all in the files of the power groups. They may have been unrecorded actions by a small ad hoc segment of the elite. It is noteworthy that the documents used by this author came from government sources, recording the day-to-day actions of Trotsky, Lenin, Roosevelt, Hitler, J.P. Morgan and the various firms and banks involved.

On the other hand, such authors as Jules Archer, Gary Allen, Helen P. Lasell, and William Domhoff, writing from widely different political standpoints² are consistent with the "Wall Street" evidence. These writers present a hypothesis of a power elite manipulating the U.S. Government. The "Wall Street" series demonstrates how this hypothesized "power elite" has manipulated specific historical events. Obviously any such exercise of unconstrained and supra-legal power is unconstitutional, even though wrapped in the fabric of law-abiding actions. We can therefore legitimately raise the question of the existence of a subversive force operating to remove constitutionally guaranteed rights.

The New York Elite as a Subversive Force

Twentieth-century history, as recorded in Establishment textbooks and journals, is inaccurate. It is a history which is based solely upon those official documents which various Administrations have seen fit to release for public consumption. But an accurate history cannot be based on a selective release of documentary archives. Accuracy requires access to all documents. In practice, as previously classified documents in the U.S. State Department files, the British Foreign Office, and the German Foreign Ministry archives and other depositories are acquired, a new version of history has emerged; the prevailing Establishment version is seen to be, not only inaccurate, but designed to hide a pervasive fabric of deceit and immoral conduct.

The center of political power, as authorized by the U.S. Constitution, is with an elected Congress and an elected President, working within the framework and under the constraints of a Constitution, as interpreted by an unbiased Supreme Court. We have in the past assumed that political power is consequently carefully exercised by the Executive and legislative branch, after due deliberation and assessment of the wishes of the electorate. In fact, nothing could be further from this assumption. The electorate has long suspected, but now knows, that political promises are worth nothing. Lies are the order of the day for policy implementors. Wars are started (and stopped) with no shred of coherent explanation. Political words have never matched political deeds. Why not? Apparently because the center of political power has been elsewhere than with elected and presumably responsive representatives in Washington, and this power elite has its own objectives, which are inconsistent with those of the public at large.

In this three-volume series we have identified for three historical events the seat of political power in the United States — the power behind the scenes, the hidden influence on Washington — as that of the financial establishment in New York: the private international bankers, more specifically the financial houses of J.P. Morgan, the Rockefeller-controlled Chase Manhattan Bank, and in earlier days (before amalgamation of their Manhattan Bank with the former Chase Bank), the Warburgs.

The United States has, in spite of the Constitution and its supposed constraints, become a quasi-totalitarian state. While we do not (yet) have the overt trappings of dictatorship, the concentration camps and the knock on the door at midnight, we most certainly do have threats and actions aimed at the survival of non-Establishment critics, use of the Internal Revenue Service to bring dissidents in line, and manipulation of the Constitution by a court system that is politically subservient to the Establishment.

It is in the pecuniary interests of the international bankers to centralize political power — and this centralization can best be achieved within a collectivist society, such as socialist Russia, national socialist Germany, or a Fabian socialist United States. There can be no full understanding and appreciation of twentieth-century American politics and foreign policy without the realization that this financial elite effectively monopolizes Washington policy. In case after case, newly released documentation implicates this elite and confirms this hypothesis. The revisionist versions of the entry of the United States into World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam reveal the influence and objectives of this elite. For most of the twentieth century the Federal Reserve System, particularly the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (which is outside the control of Congress, unaudited and uncontrolled, with the power to print money and create credit at will), has exercised a virtual monopoly over the direction of the American economy. In foreign affairs the Council on Foreign Relations, superficially an innocent forum for academics, businessmen, and politicians, contains within its shell, perhaps unknown to many of its members, a power center that unilaterally determines U.S. foreign policy. The major objective of this submerged — and obviously subversive — foreign policy is the acquisition of markets and economic power (profits, if you will), for a small group of giant multi-nationals under the virtual control

of a few banking investment houses and controlling families.

Through foundations controlled by this elite, research by compliant and spineless academics, “conservatives” as well as “liberals,” has been directed into channels useful for the objectives of the elite essentially to maintain this subversive and unconstitutional power apparatus. Through publishing houses controlled by this same financial elite unwelcome books have been squashed and useful books promoted; fortunately publishing has few barriers to entry and is almost atomistically competitive. Through control of a dozen or so major newspapers, run by editors who think alike, public information can be almost orchestrated at will. Yesterday, the space program; today, an energy crisis or a campaign for ecology; tomorrow, a war in the Middle East or some other manufactured “crisis.”

The total result of this manipulation of society by the Establishment elite has been four major wars in sixty years, a crippling national debt, abandonment of the Constitution, suppression of freedom and opportunity, and creation of a vast credibility gulf between the man in the street and Washington, D.C. While the transparent device of two major parties trumpeting artificial differences, circus-like conventions, and the cliché of “bipartisan foreign policy” no longer carries credibility, and the financial elite itself recognizes that its policies lack public acceptance, it is obviously prepared to go it alone without even nominal public support. In brief, we now have to consider and debate whether this New York-based elitist Establishment is a subversive force operating with deliberation and knowledge to suppress the Constitution and a free society. That will be the task ahead in the next decade.

The Slowly Emerging Revisionist Truth

The arena for this debate and the basis for our charges of subversion is the evidence provided by the revisionist historian. Slowly, over decades, book by book, almost line by line, the truth of recent history has emerged as documents are released, probed, analyzed, and set within a more valid historical framework. Let us consider a few examples. American entry into World War II was supposedly precipitated, according to the Establishment version, by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Revisionists have established that Franklin D. Roosevelt and General Marshall knew of the impending Japanese attack and did nothing to warn the Pearl Harbor military authorities. The Establishment wanted war with Japan. Subsequently, the Establishment made certain that Congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor would fit the Roosevelt whitewash. In the words of Percy Greaves, chief research expert for the Republican minority on the Joint Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor:

“The complete facts will never be known. Most of the so-called investigations have been attempts to suppress, mislead, or confuse those who seek the truth. From the beginning to the end, facts and files have been withheld so as to reveal only those items of information which benefit the administration under investigation. Those seeking the truth are told that other facts or documents cannot be revealed because they are

intermingled in personal diaries, pertain to our relations with foreign countries, or are sworn to contain no information of value.”

But this was not the first attempt to bring the United States into war, or the last. The Morgan interests, in concert with Winston Churchill, tried to bring the U.S. into World War I as early as 1915 and succeeded in doing so in 1917. Colin Thompson’s *Lusitania* implicates President Woodrow Wilson in the sinking of the *Lusitania* — a horror device to generate a public backlash to draw the United States into war with Germany. Thompson demonstrates that Woodrow Wilson knew four days beforehand that the *Lusitania* was carrying six-million rounds of ammunition plus explosives, and therefore, “passengers who proposed to sail on that vessel were sailing in violation of statute of this country.”

The British Board of Inquiry under Lord Mersey was instructed by the British Government “that it is considered politically expedient that Captain Turner, the master of the *Lusitania*, be most prominently blamed for the disaster.” In retrospect, given Colin Thompson’s evidence, the blame is more fairly to be attributed to President Wilson, “Colonel” House, J.P. Morgan, and Winston Churchill; this conspiratorial elite should have been brought to trial for willful negligence, if not treason. It is to Lord Mersey’s eternal credit that after performing his “duty” under instructions from His Majesty’s government, and placing the blame on Captain Turner, he resigned, rejected his fee, and from that date on refused to handle British government commissions. To his friends Lord Mersey would only say about the *Lusitania* case that it was a “dirty business.”

Then in 1933-4 came the attempt by the Morgan firm to install a fascist dictatorship in the United States. In the words of Jules Archer, it was planned to be a Fascist putsch to take over the government and “run it under a dictator on behalf of America’s bankers and industrialists.”⁵ Again, a single courageous individual emerged — General Smedley Darlington Butler, who blew the whistle on the Wall Street conspiracy. And once again Congress stands out, particularly Congressmen Dickstein and MacCormack, by its gutless refusal to do no more than conduct a token whitewash investigation. Since World War II we have seen the Korean War and the Vietnamese War — meaningless, meandering no-win wars costly in dollars and lives, with no other major purpose but to generate multibillion-dollar armaments contracts. Certainly these wars were not fought to restrain communism, because for fifty years the Establishment has been nurturing and subsidizing the Soviet Union which supplied armaments to the other sides in both wars — Korea and Vietnam. So our revisionist history will show that the United States directly or indirectly armed both sides in at least Korea and Vietnam.

In the assassination of President Kennedy, to take a domestic example, it is difficult to find anyone who today accepts the findings of the Warren Commission — except perhaps the members of that Commission. Yet key evidence is still hidden from public eyes for 50 to 75 years. The Watergate affair demonstrated even to the man in the street that the White House can be a vicious nest of intrigue and deception. Of all recent history the story of Operation Keelhaul is perhaps the most disgusting. Operation Keelhaul was the forced repatriation of millions of Russians at the orders of President (then General)

Dwight D. Eisenhower, in direct violation of the Geneva Convention of 1929 and the long-standing American tradition of political refuge. Operation Keelhaul, which contravenes all our ideas of elementary decency and individual freedom, was undertaken at the direct orders of General Eisenhower and, we may now presume, was a part of a long-range program of nurturing collectivism, whether it be Soviet communism' Hitler's Naziism, or FDR's New Deal. Yet until recent publication of documentary evidence by Julius Epstein, anyone who dared to suggest Eisenhower would betray millions of innocent individuals for political purposes was viciously and mercilessly attacked.

What this revisionist history really teaches us is that our willingness as individual citizens to surrender political power to an elite has cost the world approximately two-hundred-million persons killed from 1820 to 1975. Add to that untold misery the concentration camps, the political prisoners, the suppression and oppression of those who try to bring the truth to light. When will it all stop? It will not stop until we act upon one simple axiom: that the power system continues only so long as individuals want it to continue, and it will continue only so long as individuals try to get something for nothing. The day when a majority of individuals declares or acts as if it wants nothing from government, declares it will look after its own welfare and interests, then on that day power elites are doomed. The attraction to "go along" with power elites is the attraction of something for nothing. That is the bait. The Establishment always offers something for nothing; but the something is taken from someone else, as taxes or plunder, and awarded elsewhere in exchange for political support.

Periodic crises and wars are used to whip up support for other plunder-reward cycles which in effect tighten the noose around our individual liberties. And of course we have hordes of academic sponges, amoral businessmen, and just plain hangers-on, to act as non-productive recipients for the plunder. Stop the circle of plunder and immoral reward and elitist structures collapse. But not until a majority finds the moral courage and the internal fortitude to reject the something-for-nothing con game and replace it by voluntary associations, voluntary communes, or local rule and decentralized societies, will the killing and the plunder cease.

12.15 Winning with combined forces: Lend-Lease

One chapter of this book already mentioned lend-lease. From Wikipedia, we learn:

The Lend-Lease policy, formally titled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States", was a program under which the United States supplied Free France, the United Kingdom, the Republic of China, and later the USSR and other Allied nations with food, oil, and materiel between 1941 and August 1945. This included warships and warplanes, along with other weaponry. It was signed into law on March 11, 1941 and ended in September 1945. A total of \$50.1 billion (equivalent to \$659 billion today, roughly the current, yearly US military expenses) worth of supplies was shipped, or 17% of the total

war expenditures of the U.S. In all, \$31.4 billion went to Britain, \$11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, \$3.2 billion to France, \$1.6 billion to China, and the remaining \$2.6 billion to the other Allies.

Lend-Lease would help the British and Allied forces win the battles of future years; the help it gave in the battles of 1941 was trivial. In 1943–1944, about a quarter of all British munitions came through Lend-Lease. Aircraft (in particular transport aircraft) comprised about a quarter of the shipments to Britain, followed by food, land vehicles and ships. Even after the United States forces in Europe and the Pacific began to reach full strength in 1943–1944, Lend-Lease continued. Most remaining allies were largely self-sufficient in front line equipment (such as tanks and fighter aircraft) by this stage, but Lend-Lease provided a useful supplement in this category even so, and Lend-Lease logistical supplies (including motor vehicles and railroad equipment) were of enormous assistance. Furthermore, the logistical support of the Soviet military was provided by hundreds of thousands of U.S.-made trucks. Indeed, by 1945, nearly a third of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built.

According to the Russian historian Boris Vadimovich Sokolov, Lend-Lease played a crucial role in winning the war:

“On the whole the following conclusion can be drawn: that without these Western shipments under Lend-Lease the Soviet Union not only would not have been able to win the Great Patriotic War, it would not have been able even to oppose the German invaders, since it could not itself produce sufficient quantities of arms and military equipment or adequate supplies of fuel and ammunition. The Soviet authorities were well aware of this dependency on Lend-Lease. Thus, Stalin told Harry Hopkins [FDR’s emissary to Moscow in July 1941] that the U.S.S.R. could not match Germany’s might as an occupier of Europe and its resources.”

Nikita Khrushchev, having served as a military commissar and intermediary between Stalin and his generals during the war, addressed directly the significance of Lend-lease aid in his memoirs:

I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin’s views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were “discussing freely” among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany’s pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don’t think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject

of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so.

US deliveries to the USSR

Delivery was via the Arctic Convoys, the Persian Corridor, and the Pacific Route. The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely. This constituted some 23% of the total aid to the USSR during the war.

The Persian Corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid-1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total. The Pacific Route opened in August 1941, but was affected by the start of hostilities between Japan and the US; after December 1941, only Soviet ships could be used, and, as Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be transported. Nevertheless, some 8,244,000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. In total, the U.S. deliveries through Lend-Lease amounted to \$11 billion in materials: over 400,000 jeeps and trucks; 12,000 armored vehicles (including 7,000 tanks, about 1,386 of which were M3 Lees and 4,102 M4 Shermans); 11,400 aircraft (4,719 of which were Bell P-39 Airacobras) and 1.75 million tons of food. Roughly 17.5 million tons of military equipment, vehicles, industrial supplies, and food were shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR, 94% coming from the US. For comparison, a total of 22 million tons landed in Europe to supply American forces from January 1942 to May 1945. It has been estimated that American deliveries to the USSR through the Persian Corridor alone were sufficient, by US Army standards, to maintain sixty combat divisions in the line.

The United States gave to the Soviet Union from October 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945 the following: 427,284 trucks, 13,303 combat vehicles, 35,170 motorcycles, 2,328 ordnance service vehicles, 2,670,371 tons of petroleum products (gasoline and oil) or 57.8 percent of the High-octane aviation fuel, 4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs (canned meats, sugar, flour, salt, etc.), 1,911 steam locomotives, 66 Diesel locomotives, 9,920 flat cars, 1,000 dump cars, 120 tank cars, and 35 heavy machinery cars. Provided ordnance goods (ammunition, artillery shells, mines, assorted explosives) amounted to 53 percent of total domestic production. One item typical of many was a tire plant that was lifted bodily from the Ford Company's River Rouge Plant and transferred to the USSR. The 1947 money value of the supplies and services amounted to about eleven billion dollars.

British deliveries to the USSR

In June 1941, within weeks of the German invasion of the USSR, the first British aid convoy set off along the dangerous Arctic sea routes to Murmansk, arriving in September.

It was carrying 40 Hawker Hurricanes along with 550 mechanics and pilots of No. 151 Wing to provide immediate air defence of the port and train Soviet pilots. After escorting Soviet bombers and scoring 14 kills for one loss, and completing the training of pilots and mechanics, No 151 Wing left in November, their mission complete. The convoy was the first of many convoys to Murmansk and Archangelsk in what became known as the Arctic convoys, the returning ships carried the gold that the USSR was using to pay the US. By the end of 1941, early shipments of Matilda, Valentine, and Tetrarch tanks represented only 6.5% of total Soviet tank strength, but over 25% of medium and heavy tanks in service with the Red Army. First seeing action with the 138 Independent Tank Battalion in the Volga Reservoir on 20 November 1941, Lend-Lease tanks constituted between 30 and 40% of heavy and medium tank strength before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941.

Significant numbers of British Churchill, Matilda and Valentine tanks were shipped to the USSR along with the US M3 Lee after it became obsolete on the African Front, ceasing production in December 1942 and withdrawn from British service in May 1943. The Churchills, supplied by the arctic convoys, saw action in the Siege of Leningrad and the Battle of Kursk, while tanks shipped by the Persian route supplied the Caucasian Front. Between June 1941 and May 1945, Britain delivered to the USSR: 3,000+ Hurricanes, 4,000+ other aircraft, 27 naval vessels, 5,218 tanks, 5,000+ anti-tank guns, 4,020 ambulances and trucks, 323 machinery trucks, 2,560 Universal Carriers, 1,721 motorcycles, £1.15bn worth of aircraft engines, 600 radar and sonar sets, Hundreds of naval guns, 15 million pairs of boots.

In total 4 million tonnes of war materials including food and medical supplies were delivered. The munitions totaled £308m (not including naval munitions supplied), the food and raw materials totaled £120m in 1946 index. In accordance with the Anglo-Soviet Military Supplies Agreement of 27 June 1942, military aid sent from Britain to the Soviet Union during the war was entirely free of charge.]

Especially all support vehicles (trucks, trains, etc.) the USSR received were of great importance since the USSR lost most of these, like most of their military, in the first few month's of Operation Barbarossa. Looking through Soviet diaries, one finds that the soldiers were extremely greatfull for the US support, especially food. This shows that the Allies won the Second World War only through a team effort.

From the Russian Historian Oleg Budnitskiy we also learn:

The importance of economic cooperation with the U.S., UK and Canada cannot be overestimated. According to the dollar rate of 2003, the inflation-adjusted value of these supplies amounted to \$130 billion. These supplies were critical in some key areas. For example, in the beginning of 1942, Western tanks fully replenished Soviet losses, and exceeded them by three times. About 15 percent of the aircraft used by Soviet air forces were supplied by Allies, including the Airacobra fighter and Boston bomber. The Allies supplied 15,000 state-of-the-art machines at that time; for example, famous Soviet ace

Alexander Pokryshkin flew Airacobra, as did the rest of his squadron. He shot down 59 enemy aircraft, and 48 of them were thanks to American military equipment.

One of the main areas of cooperation was aviation fuel. The USSR could not produce gasoline with high octane. However, it was this fuel that was used by the equipment supplied by the Allies. In addition, the Achilles heel of the Soviet Army was communication and transport. The Soviet industry simply could not meet the demand either in number or in quality. For example, the army lost 58 percent of its vehicles in 1941 alone. To recover these losses, the Allies supplied more than 400,000 vehicles, mainly trucks, to the USSR. During the occupation, the German concern Daimler Benz set up a vehicle assembly line at a factory in Minsk (now the capital of Belarus). After the liberation of the city, the assembly of American vehicles under Lend-Lease was organized there. It was not only supplies of finished products, but also raw materials that were extremely important – metals, chemicals and products, which were either not produced in the USSR or lost to the enemy. For example, more than half of Soviet aircraft were produced using aluminum supplied by the Allies.

It is impossible to imagine how the Soviet economy would have functioned without these supplies. For example, the telephone cable provided by the Allies could wrap the Earth at the equator. The Allies' aid was also critical in the reconstruction of production in the liberated regions of the country, including the role of seeds for the resumption of agriculture. Specific products were also supplied; the Allies delivered 610,000 tons of sugar to the USSR, whereas the USSR itself produced little more than 1.46 million tons.

Peace with Britain, War with the USSR?

How important was the Western Front for the war effort? Some considerations:

Well over half the Luftwaffe was engaged in the west from 1942-5, and 75% of German aircraft casualties were against the western Allies. Each U-boat cost 5,000,000 Marks to build. The Germans built over 1,000. A Panther tank cost 117,000 Marks, That means about 40,000 tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the War of the Atlantic. Think 40,000 panthers might have made a difference against an unallied Russia in the East?

Each V2 rocket cost, in labor and material, the same as 3.5 fighter planes. The Germans launched over 3,000 V2's, the equivalent of 10500 fighter planes which could have been used in the east. The British and Americans deployed over 20,000 heavy bombers against the Germans, causing great destruction. What would have happened if Rommel's Africa Corps and the 30+ German divisions in France would have been in the don bend in fall 1942 protecting Stalingrad instead of waiting for British and American divisions to land? What would have happened if the 400,000 troops stationed in Norway could have helped Army Group North capture Leningrad? What would have happened if, in 1944, the German armies trying to hold the divisions fighting in Italy and the Balkans could

have been freed to fight against the Russians in the south? I think it becomes apparent just how important keeping the Western Front alive was for the Allies.

Britains categorical refusal of any peace offers kept the Western Front open (of course, accepting the peace offers would have ended the war), the Soviets poured in from the East with millions of lives sacrificed and all of this was kept running by the US industrial strength. Just one of these 3 things missing and the war would have taken a different turn.

If the reader is interested to learn more about the Lend-Lease Programm and just how important it was for the survival of the Soviet Union, lots of information can be found in the book "Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II" by Albert L. Weeks.

'The United States is a country of machines. Without the use of these machines through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war.' - Josef Stalin (1943), quoted in W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, Random House, N.Y., 1975, p. 277.

12.16 The Number One Enemy

Mercantile rivalry among nations is often the genesis of armed conflicts, though those profiting from the adventures publicly describe them as defensive wars or waged for altruistic reasons. The former U.S. President William Taft confessed that modern diplomacy is "fundamentally commercial," but cloaked in "idealistic feelings of humanitarianism and moral obligations." Regarding American hostility toward Germany, which plagued Hitler throughout his tenure in office, economic considerations played a major role. His country drained of gold reserves, Hitler created a novel money system to get the national economy back on its feet. Accordingly capital came to represent human productivity; work itself became money. Currency was no longer a commodity to be speculated upon, loaned at high interest, or wielded to manipulate economic life, but solely a means to facilitate transactions. Germany introduced new principles to international commerce as well. Hitler, in the words of the Canadian historian Helmut Gordon, "was firmly convinced that as long as the international monetary system remains based on the value of gold, nations able to hoard the most gold can force those nations lacking gold to their will...compelling others to accept loans at high interest to dissipate their assets." Hitler believed that a country's power of production should determine the strength of her economy, and not the amount of gold in the treasury.

Germany concluded trade agreements with 25 financially distressed countries in southeastern Europe, the Near East, and South America. The treaties based transactions on an exchange of wares without monetary payments. In return for foodstuffs and raw materials, Germany supplied poorer nations with agricultural machinery, locomotives, and manufactured goods. This was a barter system, which spared trade partners having to

borrow from foreign banks to finance purchases—a relief for countries already in debt during the world-wide depression. The mutually beneficial arrangement gradually deprived the United States, France, and Britain of markets they had previously dominated. Financial institutions in London and New York, accustomed to providing credit to smaller nations, lost a lucrative portion of their international commerce. British General Fuller wrote that Hitler's "economic policy of direct barter and subsidized exports struck a deadly blow to British and American trade." Lord Forbes, belonging to an English trade commission visiting South America, warned, "We don't want the Germans continuing to conduct their system of an exchange of goods and other disrespectful trade methods right under our nose."

In 1941, President Roosevelt asked rhetorically, "Will anyone suggest that Germany's attempt to dominate trade in central Europe was not a major contributing factor to war?" Churchill remarked in 1938, "What we desire is the complete destruction of the German economy." He told Lord Robert Boothby, "Germany's most unforgivable crime before the Second World War was her attempt to extricate her economic power from the world's trading system and to create her own exchange mechanism which would deny world finance its opportunity to profit." Addressing newly commissioned officers of the armed forces in May 1942, Hitler explained the challenge Germany's foreign trade treaties posed for the USA. He described how America enjoyed an abundance of grain and natural resources, plus maintained her own manufacturing industry. Countries wishing to trade with the United States therefore, had little to offer in exchange: "So America began taking gold for her labors, piling up this gold into the billions. Naturally this mineral threatens to become utterly worthless once it's realized that a new world is forming, one that no longer recognizes the concept of gold, but substitutes the concept of work and human productivity, and from then on begins to trade what is produced through labor without using gold."

As far as the Germans were concerned, the U.S. Government and corporate America pursued the same goals. In the words of Giselher Wirsing, there was "no longer any force in the United States that could resist the unbridled domination of big business. There appeared to be no more difference between the interests of high finance and those of the state." In Roosevelt, America elected a president inordinately concerned with foreign affairs. "Roosevelt was a determined internationalist and interventionist," observed Congressman Hamilton Fish. The New York Times correspondent Arthur Krock described FDR as "considering himself absolutely indispensable to mankind." A proponent of liberal democratic globalization, the new president strongly believed in the Versailles structure. Hitler's step-by-step eradication of the post-war order, German competition in European and South American markets, and the Reich's stand for the sovereignty of nations over the one-world concept made Roosevelt an irreconcilable enemy of Germany.

During the peacetime years, Washington opposed Hitler's efforts to revise the Versailles construction. In April 1933, Roosevelt told the French ambassador, "The situation is alarming. Hitler is a madman and his advisors, some of whom I know personally, are

crazier than he is.” (So far, Ambassador Hans Luther was the only German official the president had met.) FDR told his French guest, “France must not disarm and no one will demand it to.” A month later, Roosevelt wrote the heads of 54 countries urging disarmament. The president discussed foreign affairs before an audience in Chicago in October 1937. He told listeners, “The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago,” referring to Germany and Italy. Aggressor nations were supposedly “piling up armament on armament. . . . Their national income is being spent directly for armaments. It runs from 30 to as high as 50 percent in most of those cases.” He suggested that such diseased countries should be quarantined, in other words economically boycotted. After publication of the speech, the Reich’s War Ministry notified German military commanders, “Roosevelt’s words may be regarded as America’s formal decision to join the front of the democracies against the fascist states, abandoning the policy of isolation.” The Reich’s press described FDR’s speech as the “prelude to a huge armaments appropriation planned for the near future” by the Roosevelt administration.

Upon orders from the White House, U. S. Navy Captain Royal Ingersoll went to London in December to discuss fleet cooperation with the British. The prospect of American naval support against Japan, Italy and Germany strengthened England’s hand in negotiations with Hitler. The German annexation of Austria on March 12, 1938, initially produced a mild reaction from the American press and from Secretary of State Cordell Hull. This altered abruptly within 24 hours. The German ambassador reported to Berlin that the Anschluss suddenly became “regarded as a breach of treaty, as militarism, as the rape of defenseless little Austria by a neighbor armed to the teeth, and as a product of the policy of might makes right.” As to the probable genesis of the about-face in American attitude, “the president personally became involved and gave both the State Department and the press corresponding guidelines.” The ambassador warned the Reich’s Foreign Office that were Germany ever to become involved in a conflict against England, “there isn’t much left here that could prevent the entrance of the United States into a war against us.”

Roosevelt reached beyond America’s borders – and his authority – during the Sudeten crisis that September. To prevent this crucial revision of the Versailles system, he proposed to British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay that the U.S. and Royal Navies blockade the entire European Atlantic coast and the Mediterranean to cut Germany off from overseas imports. Sea blockades are by international law an act of belligerency. FDR was prepared to abandon neutrality and wage war to preserve Czechoslovakia’s claim to the Sudetenland. Chamberlain, wary of Roosevelt’s endeavors to extend U.S. influence into Europe, rejected the idea. “Then Washington began a savage campaign to malign the ‘appeasers’ who had again backed down before the dictators,” wrote the editor of Germany’s *Völkischer Beobachter* (National Observer). “Chamberlain and Daladier were branded in the U.S. press as downright traitors to the democratic world cause.”

Washington’s intrigues impeded diplomatic resolution of Germany’s bid for Danzig in 1939. On December 2, 1938, America’s ambassador in Poland, Biddle, met with the Free City’s Commissioner Burckhardt. Biddle, Burckhardt recalled, “declared with gen-

uine glee that the Poles are ready to wage war over Danzig. . . . Never since the torpedoing of the Lusitania has such religious hatred against Germany existed in America like today. Chamberlain and Daladier will be blown away by public opinion. It will be a holy war." Roosevelt disrupted negotiations between Germany and England regarding a trade agreement in February 1939, during which Berlin offered far-reaching concessions to improve diplomatic relations, by making London a substantially better offer. In this way he obstructed another attempt at Anglo-German reconciliation. The following month, Hans Thomsen, Ribbentrop's chargé de affaires in Washington, advised Berlin, "Roosevelt is personally convinced that Germany is the enemy that must be destroyed, because she is seriously disrupting the balance of powers and the status quo."

On March 23, the president promised the British to transfer more U.S. Navy warships to Hawaii, thereby freeing the English Pacific fleet for deployment in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. He instructed the American ambassador in London, Kennedy, to shore up Chamberlain's resolve to guarantee Poland. On FDR's instructions, the U.S. military attaché in Paris pledged American naval support to protect the French colony of Indochina from the Japanese. In this way, the president gradually increased Anglo-French dependency on the United States, indirectly augmenting his influence over the democracies in their negotiations with Hitler. The April 14, 1939 edition of the Washington Times Herald reported that Roosevelt was warning the English, in the form of an ultimatum, to make no concessions to Germany.

The American ambassador in Paris, William Bullitt, informed the French government during the summer that if England and France did not come to Poland's aid in the event of a German attack, then they could expect no assistance from Washington in a general European war. They could on the other hand, reckon with the "full support" of the USA if they declared war on Germany on Poland's behalf. The former French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet later wrote that Bullitt "urged France to take a strong stand against Hitler. I am convinced also that he persuaded Daladier that Roosevelt would intervene (in the war) if he saw that France and England were in danger. . . . Bullitt in 1939 did everything he could to make France enter the war." Congressman Fish concluded, "If Roosevelt had refrained from meddling in the European situation by encouraging England and France to believe that we would fight their battles, they would have reached an agreement by peaceful means to settle the Danzig issue . . . (and) avoided the disastrous war." On August 17, Hans Herwarth von Bittenfeld, a traitor on the Reich's embassy staff in Moscow, disclosed information about German-Soviet negotiations to the American diplomat Charles Bohlen. The German government had reassured the Kremlin that there "are no conflicts of interest (between us) regarding the countries from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea" and it was prepared to discuss "every territorial question in eastern Europe" with Stalin. The State Department's Sumner Welles relayed this intelligence to British Ambassador Lindsay. He in turn forwarded news of the German-Soviet understanding, which implied dire consequences for Poland, to the Foreign Office in London. A Soviet spy there, Herbert King, notified Stalin of

the intrigue. The Soviet dictator most likely assumed that the British would forewarn Beck of the danger facing his country, leading him to seek rapprochement with Germany. "But Stalin overestimated British and American fairness," as a German historian put it. Neither democratic government passed this vital information on to Warsaw.

Herwarth also leaked the complete text, including the secret protocol about dividing Poland, of the August 23 agreement Ribbentrop had concluded in Moscow. Bohlen likewise communicated it to Washington. Bullitt, fully aware of the text and import of the German-Soviet secret protocol, told a Polish diplomat in Paris, Count Lukasiewicz, that the document addressed only the status of the Baltic States and not Poland. As a result, Beck remained doubtful about serious cooperation between Moscow and Berlin. The result of Germany's rapid victory over Poland in September, France's passive strategy of defense, and England's token commitment to the continental war was a stalemate. On October 6, 1939, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, asking for a peace conference. Chamberlain himself admitted in his diary that the Führer presented some "very attractive proposals." Roosevelt however, pressured the British not to allow a "second Munich." Göring, Hitler's number-two man, met with the American consul general in Berlin on October 9 and urged that FDR mediate peace talks. Offering to travel to Washington personally to represent Germany in the negotiations, Göring expressed Berlin's willingness to re-establish Polish and Czech independence as a demonstration of good faith. Roosevelt formally refused to arbitrate a cease fire. During a press conference that month, he described the German offer as the product of anonymous subordinates in the Reich's propaganda ministry and without substance.

Two American tycoons visited Germany in October, hoping to open the road to negotiations. On the 19th, Göring told James Mooney, a senior executive of General Motors, "If we could conclude a treaty with the English today, we'll throw Russia and Japan overboard tomorrow." Göring again offered to reinstate Poland and the Czech state to William Davis, a Texas oil magnate on a semi-official visit to Berlin. Even American newspapers acknowledged that considering Roosevelt's outspoken hostility toward Germany, for the Germans to nominate him and accept his judgment as arbitrator in a peace conference was a generous concession. Upon returning home, Davis was unable to obtain an audience with the president. Hull yanked his passport, to prevent Mr. Davis from returning to Europe and interfering with the progress of the war.

In Warsaw, Ribbentrop's staff compiled the pre-war diplomatic correspondence between Warsaw and its missions in Washington, London, and Paris. The *Völkischer Beobachter* published the content on October 27. Its editor summarized, "The Polish documents prove that Roosevelt's diplomacy bears a major, if not the greatest measure of responsibility for the outbreak of the English war." One letter for example, was from the Polish general staff to Beck. It quoted the American military attaché, Commander Gade, as promising Poland 1,000 airplanes "as soon as the war begins." The Polish staff officer described Gade as "a man who enjoys the confidence of Roosevelt and is a personal friend of his. . . . He is very unfriendly towards Germany. Personally he is very wealthy."

Another document the Germans brought to light was a report by Count Jerzy Potocki, the former Polish ambassador in Washington, about a conversation he had had with Bullitt in November 1938: "About Germany and Chancellor Hitler, he (Bullitt) spoke vehemently and with great hatred.... The United States, France, and England must rearm tremendously in order to be in a position to cope with German power. Only then, when the moment is ripe, declared Bullitt further, will one be ready for the final decision.... In reply to my question whether the United States would take part in such a war, he said, 'Undoubtedly yes, but only after Great Britain and France had made the first move!'" Ribbentrop presented the original Polish foreign policy letters to the international press for inspection. The editor of the American edition of the German White Book, which published 16 of the letters in English, concluded, "It is likely that they are authentic documents. This is the opinion of many Washington correspondents, including Sir Willmott Lewis of the London Times, who might be expected to be skeptical of them." Roosevelt and Hull publicly claimed that the Polish documents were forgeries.

During this time, the White House focused on persuading Congress to amend the 1937 neutrality law. The law imposed an embargo on the sale of war materiel to belligerents in Europe. Already in September, the president had managed to have the restrictions partially relaxed. As a result, U.S. arms manufacturers sold \$4,429,323 worth of ordnance to France that month, and \$1,422,800 to England.²⁴² Germany's share in armaments purchases from America, according to the State Department Bulletin of October 28, 1939, was \$49.²⁴³ By the close of 1940, Britain had purchased \$2.7 billion in arms from the United States. Roosevelt told a cabinet member, "We have been milking the British financial cow, which had plenty of milk at one time but which has now about become dry." The president speculated on how to keep the British at war "until their supply of dollars runs out."

Giselher Wirsing, editor of Germany's popular Signal magazine, made this observation about the arsenal of democracy: "The armaments business has grown to one of the worst rackets in American history and has amassed billions in profits through this 'trading in death.' During 1940, there was an enormous increase in dividends. According to an exhibit of the National City Bank in New York, the clear profit of around 2,600 shareholding companies in 1940 amounted to \$4,253 million, compared to \$3,565 million in 1939."²⁴⁶ Congressman Fish recalled, "Roosevelt's war cabinet had a great deal of cooperation from the powerful Eastern press, largely for war.... Pro-war propaganda was heavily financed by the international bankers, armament makers, and big business, numerically few in numbers but exceedingly powerful in financial resources and control over vast publicity and propaganda." Reverend John McNicholas, the Archbishop of Cincinnati, remarked in January 1941, "Ten percent of our people are cunningly forcing the United States into a world conflict, while the majority of 90 percent, which is for peace, stands aside silently and helplessly."

As Congress eased restrictions on selling weapons to belligerents, America provided logistical support for England to continue the war. Under Washington's leadership, the Western

Hemisphere countries proclaimed a nautical security zone southward from Canada. This zone, 300 to 1,000 miles wide in places, was off-limits to combat operations of warring powers. Hitler ordered his navy to refrain from attacking British merchant vessels inside this belt. It substantially reduced the sea lanes the English Royal Navy had to patrol to guard cargo ships en route to Britain. U.S. warships eventually assisted in protecting convoys, monitoring the movement of German U-boats, and reporting their findings to the Royal Navy. During September 1941, Roosevelt decided to become "more provocative," adding that if the Germans "did not like it they could attack American forces." He ordered U.S. warships "to attack any U-boat which showed itself, even if it were 200 or 300 miles away from the convoy." In three separate incidents in September and October, U.S. destroyers on anti-submarine patrol crossed lances with German U-boats. In one occurrence, the USS Greer assisted a British bomber in a depth charge attack against the U-652. Bombarded for four hours, the U-boat finally launched two torpedoes against its assailant. The Greer eventually broke off the engagement. Roosevelt told the American public in a September 11 radio address, "I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon the American destroyer without warning and with deliberate design to sink her. . . . We have sought no shooting war with Hitler." The Navy Department refused to furnish the Greer's log to the Senate.

Hitler instructed his U-boats to avoid confrontations with the U.S. Navy and to fire only in self-defense. According to a Gallup survey, 87 percent of Americans opposed involvement in a European war, and in that day and age Congress still had many representatives who understood their duty to respect the wishes of the majority. Roosevelt could not arbitrarily start a war against Germany. Unless the enemy fired the first shot, and Hitler was eschewing incidents, the United States would remain sidelined: a silent partner in the Allied war effort. The president therefore sought what an American historian described as the "back door to war"; to provoke a conflict with Germany's ally, Japan. Like Germany, Japan is a country that relies heavily on imports. The European war seriously curtailed her commerce. As a result, the Japanese depended on increased trade with the United States. Supporting China in her war against Japan, Roosevelt imposed various embargoes on the island empire. On October 10, 1940, the secretary of the navy told Admiral James Richardson, commander-in-chief of the fleet, that the president wants U.S. warships deployed "across the western Pacific in such a way as to make it impossible for Japan to reach any of her sources of supply." Richardson objected that distributing our navy in such a vulnerable manner against a formidable maritime adversary, and in so doing provoking it to belligerency, would be militarily senseless. Roosevelt dropped the idea.

Considering the USSR the greater menace, Tokyo sought an understanding with the United States. In November 1940, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka asked Bishops James Walsh and Pater Drought of the Catholic Missionary Society of Maryknoll, New York, to deliver his peace proposal to Washington. Meeting with the president and secretary of state on January 23, 1941, the emissaries relayed Japan's willingness to negotiate

cancelling her pact with Germany, evacuating her army from China, and respecting Chinese sovereignty. At the close of the two-hour meeting, Roosevelt and Hull agreed to consider the proposals. Walsh and Drought heard nothing further from the White House. In February, Tokyo appointed Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, acquainted with Roosevelt from World War I, ambassador to the United States. Meeting with the president on the 14th, and in over 40 sessions with Hull during the next several months, Nomura was unable to reach a compromise with the administration. Washington was in fact more interested in the action proposal submitted on October 7, 1940, by naval Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum. This memorandum stated, "Prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England. ... It is in the interest of the United States to eliminate Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity."

McCollum suggested among other things, that America "completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire," and pressure the Dutch to "refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil." McCollum cautioned, "It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado." The author introduced an eight-point program to provoke the Japanese: "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war." In November 1941, Secretary of War Henry Stimson speculated in his diary on how to maneuver Japan into "firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." Without Congress' knowledge, Hull delivered an antagonistic ultimatum to Japanese negotiators on November 26. He himself confessed, "We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal." The terms, had Tokyo agreed to them, would have so substantially weakened Japan's position in the Far East, especially with respect to China and Russia, that they were unacceptable. The Japanese responded by opening hostilities against U.S. and British bases in the Pacific. The infamous air raid on the U.S. naval base at Hawaii, conducted by 350 carrier-based Japanese bombers and fighters, galvanized American public opinion and Congress to enter the war.

The Three Power Pact that Germany had concluded with Italy and Japan in September 1940 was a defensive alliance. It did not obligate the Reich to declare war on the United States, since Japan had struck the first blow. The Japanese for example, had done nothing to assist the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union which had been raging for six months. But U.S. warships were taking part in the battle of the Atlantic. Federal attorneys in fact had determined that Roosevelt's swap in September 1940 of 50 destroyers in exchange for British bases in the Caribbean and Newfoundland not only violated American laws, but by international law put the USA in a technical state of war with Germany. The primary influence in Hitler's deliberations was the situation in the East. During the summer of 1941, the German armed forces had advanced far into Russia, winning impressive victories over the Red Army. Dogged Soviet resistance,

overextended German supply lines and a severe winter then forced the invaders onto the defensive. Another factor contributed to the shift of the initiative to the Russians: logistical support from the United States. Less than five weeks after Germany had invaded the USSR, Roosevelt's emissary, Harry Hopkins, was in Moscow offering aid to Stalin: "The president regards Hitler as the enemy of all humanity and therefore wishes to help the Soviet Union in its war against Germany." Without demanding any payment whatsoever, and despite protests from the U.S. Army, Roosevelt prioritized supplying the Russians with immense quantities of war materiel by sea. Stalin confessed in 1943 that without American aid, "we would lose the war."

Hitler believed that it would only be possible to regain the initiative against this military behemoth were the flow of supplies from the United States curtailed. Unrestricted submarine warfare could sever the nautical lifelines keeping the Soviet fighting forces combat-effective. His U-boat commanders were still under orders not to torpedo American ships and to avoid the expansive security zone of the Western Atlantic. These orders not only prevented the German navy from disrupting the delivery of ordnance to England and Russia, but were demoralizing the U-boat crews. Declaring war on the USA would free the German navy to fight the battle of the Atlantic with the gloves off, and buy the army time for another major thrust against Russia during the 1942 campaign season. Against the advice of Ribbentrop, Hitler declared war on December 11, 1941. This gained Germany a temporary tactical advantage. The Reichstag convened on the 11th to hear the Führer's announcement. He recapped the history of his country's poor relations with Washington, beginning with Roosevelt's 1937 quarantine speech, through the president's promises to Poland in 1939, and finally the U.S. Navy's operations on behalf of Britain. Hitler also offered a personal comparison of his own experience as a combat soldier during World War I with that of FDR, who had then been undersecretary of the navy: "Roosevelt comes from a super-rich family, belonging from the start to that class of people whose birth and background pave the way to advancement in a democracy. I myself was just the child of a small and poor family, and had to struggle through life through toilsome work and by personal industry.

"When the World War came, Roosevelt found a spot in the shade under Wilson and experienced the war from the sphere of those who reaped dividends from it. He therefore knew only the pleasant consequences of the clash of nations and states; those that provide opportunity for one to do business while another bleeds. . . . As an ordinary soldier I tried to do my duty in the face of the enemy during these four years, and naturally returned home from the war as impoverished as I had entered it in the fall of 1914. I shared the fate of millions. Mr. Franklin Roosevelt shared his with the so-called upper ten thousand. While Mr. Roosevelt after the war was already trying his hand at financial speculation . . . I was still lying in a hospital."

The German U-boat fleet launched its first coordinated operation, Paukenschlag (Pounding), against American shipping on January 13, 1942. During the balance of the month, the Germans sank 49 merchant vessels in the Atlantic and in the North Sea. They tallied

84 steamers during a second nautical offensive in March. By the end of 1942, the U-boats had conducted five major operations, sinking 1,160 ships totaling 6,266,215 tons. They targeted both convoys bound for English harbors and those delivering supplies to the Soviet port of Murmansk. This brought some relief to the German armies fighting in the East. In the long run however, American wharves built more ships than the U-boats could torpedo. As the 1942 summer offensive against Russia lost impetus, Germany gradually became snared in the “east-west pincers” as Hitler had feared.

12.17 The Mission of the Reich

The Waffen SS

Nations often maintain elite troops to supplement regular military forces. They serve as personal bodyguards for the ruler, perform ceremonial functions, and in wartime deploy where the fighting is the hardest. From the Persian Immortals and Roman Praetorians of the Ancient World throughout the ages, elite formations uphold traditions of prowess in combat and loyalty. During World War II, France’s Chasseurs Alpains, British Royal Marines, Soviet Guard divisions and the U.S. Marine Corps were among units retaining this select status.

In addition to the prestigious army divisions Brandenburg, Feldherrnhalle and Grossdeutschland, as well as the airborne, Germany fielded an entire service branch of elite ground forces: the Waffen (armed) SS. It evolved from four pre-war internal security regiments into a dauntless and respected front-line troop. It challenged official German policy and dogma and helped introduce significant amendments. Considering the obedience to state authority customarily drilled into military establishments, this was an unusual well-spring for political and social reform. The maturation of the Waffen SS demonstrates how National Socialism’s emphasis on personal initiative created the opportunity for flexibility and development on an unprecedented scale.

The SS traces its origin to the early years of the NSDAP. Fewer than 100 men formed the “Adolf Hitler Shock Troop” in Munich in 1923. This was a personal bodyguard recruited from SA men displaying personal loyalty to the Führer. Its members generally possessed better comprehension of the movement’s political objectives than the rank-and-file SA. The troop received its final name, Schutzstaffel (Security Echelon), in April 1925. It maintained strict discipline and a small, selective affiliation. Heinrich Himmler became chief of the SS in January 1929, and proved a talented organizer and a match for political rivals in the party. Once Hitler gained power in 1933, Himmler sought to enroll affluent persons, such as successful businessmen and aristocrats, to enhance the organization’s prestige. Private contributions through a public sponsorship program helped finance the administration. The SS grew from 280 members in 1929 to 52,000 by 1933.

National security issues led to the formation of an SS military branch. When Hitler

became chancellor, Communists were still numerous in Germany. They hijacked 150 tons of explosives, of which just 15 tons had been recovered by the police by mid-March 1933. The exiled Communist Wilhelm Piech issued a proclamation in September, calling for a general strike and "armed insurrection by the majority of the German proletariat" to topple the "Hitler dictatorship." The police were neither equipped nor trained to suppress a possible uprising. The German army was not psychologically suited to wage urban warfare against elements of the indigenous population.

After discussions with War Minister Werner von Blomberg, Hitler decided that the task of combating potential civil unrest should fall to a party formation. Blomberg's decree of September 24, 1934, defined its purpose as "for special, internal political missions assigned by the Führer to the SS." This was the birth of the Waffen SS, officially titled the Verfügungstruppe from 1935-1940. Abbreviated to VT, the expression translates literally as "Availability Troop," meaning ready for immediate deployment. Hitler himself stated, "The SS Verfügungstruppe is neither a part of the armed forces nor of the police. It is a standing armed troop available exclusively for my use."

The VT consisted of the Leibstandarte, Hitler's Berlin-based bodyguard, which performed primarily ceremonial functions, the Deutschland regiment garrisoned in Munich, Germania in Hamburg, plus an engineer battalion in Dresden and a signals battalion in Berlin. A fourth motorized infantry regiment, Der Führer, mustered in Vienna in 1938. With army approval, the SS established a military academy to train VT officers at Bad Tölz in October 1934. General Paul Hausser, who had retired from the army in 1932, received a commission to found a second school in Brunswick. Each institution offered a ten-month curriculum to commission officers. The VT soldier's pay was the same as that of the regular army.

Adding an artillery regiment, as well as anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and reconnaissance battalions, the VT numbered 18,000 men by May 1939. Though the army assisted in instruction, the VT's training departed from military convention. Its senior commanders had been junior officers during World War I. They witnessed how battles of materiel had decimated the army's long-standing cadre of well-schooled professional officers, non-commissioned officers (NCO's) and reservists. The quality of personnel declined as hastily-trained replacements filled the void. The general staff failed to break the deadlock of trench warfare. Frontline regiments began forming small, independent units called shock troops. They re-trained behind the lines to fight in close coordination using flame throwers, smoke canisters, machine guns, pistols, and grenades. Officers displayed boldness and initiative, directly leading their men into combat.

The commander of the Deutschland regiment, Felix Steiner, wrote that during World War I, the officers "assembled the best, most experienced soldiers the front could spare. . . . They realized the shock troop concept of spontaneity, rapid assault, and the mechanics of the little troop's trade within the framework of entire formations. They were of different spirit than the mobilized masses. . . . In a world of standardization of soldiering, they proved that better trained, hand-picked soldiers, mastering the military technology of the

times, were a match for any vastly superior, collective soldierly mass." After World War I, the German general staff reverted to the pre-war concept of a disciplined professional army without particular emphasis on improvisation. Though the army still trained officers at lower command levels to take initiative and be decisive in battle, the program did not include forming shock troops. Steiner exploited the comparative independence of the VT to develop a contemporary fighting force less constrained by customary military regimen. "Not the form of Prussian drill still in part practiced in the army, but training and educating men to become modern, individual fighters was the goal," wrote the former SS Captain Fritz Schutter. Though Steiner acknowledged that mass armies are an indispensable element of total war, he considered rapidly mobile elite formations distributed among the army decisive, in order to "disperse the enemy through lightning-fast blows and destroy his scattered units." In the words of one historian, the training program Steiner introduced to the Deutschland regiment "broke the preeminence of mechanical barracks drill."

Physical education also played a significant role in the VT. It promoted the "soldier-athlete" concept. Competitive sports supplanted calisthenics and forced marches as the focus of the training. Enlisted personnel competed against their officers and NCO's in sports contests. The purpose was not just to weld leader and followers into a cohesive fighting unit. It also taught officers to rely on their ability to command and strength of character to gain the confidence and respect of the men, rather than on the customary aloofness and strict discipline of military protocol. In the same spirit, the VT dropped the practice of soldiers addressing officers as "sir" or speaking in the third person. Through such steps, "the relationship between the leadership and men became much more personal and ultimately more binding." Officers and men dined together in the same mess hall. Pastor Karl Ossenkop, a former army captain transferred to the Waffen SS, recalled, "contrary to the army, disparity in rank was no barrier dividing person from person. There was no pedantic structure held together by fear of punishment. This did not lead to a lack of discipline, but to a voluntary discipline such as I have seldom experienced. . . . In this corps one felt completely free." A former director of the Tölz academy summarized, "The authority of the officers, who were scarcely older than the men, rested far more on esteem for their character, performance, and care for the men's welfare." A soldier in the Germania regiment in 1937 and future officer, Heinrich Springer, wrote this of his first platoon commander: "He was not just a military instructor, but guided us in cultivating a decent personal bearing, inwardly and outwardly perceptible. Throughout the entire time as a recruit, I never once heard him shout at or curse the men."

The former general staff officer Hausser patterned the instruction at the Brunswick academy to be similar to army institutions. The two SS Junkerschulen, or Schools for Young Gentlemen, assigned top priority to preparing candidates for field operations and tactical combat command. Instructors also placed emphasis on personality development. As Lieutenant Colonel Richard Schulze wrote, "The Junker Schools' goal was to produce men of refined, fearless character, chivalrous with an unblemished sense of honor and obedience, displaying helpfulness, camaraderie, and willingness to accept re-

sponsibility. Impeccable deportment in public and cultivation of family values were also prerequisites." The staff encouraged cadets to exhibit a respectful, but never subservient demeanor toward superiors. The VT educated field officers to exercise audacity as well as initiative.

The Junker Schools did not select candidates from among the general SS, but from enlisted members of the VT. Only men who had already served in the ranks could receive an appointment to Bad Tölz or to Brunswick. In the German army, a university degree was sufficient for an applicant to be accepted into a war college. Education had no influence on VT standards for enrollment. Many Junker School cadets did not possess a high school diploma. The institutions nonetheless graduated capable officers. The English historian Gerald Reitlinger concluded, "Under the influence of Hausser's cadet schools, the Waffen SS developed the most efficient of all military training systems of the Second World War." Georg Jestadt, who belonged to the 12th SS Panzer Division in 1944, wrote this of the men he served under: "We had fantastic superior officers, from platoon leaders to the battalion commanders and upward, who were genuine ideals for the men. Looking back, I can objectively state that during the Normandy operation, amid all the inferno and terror, I never saw a superior officer suffer a breakdown or lose his nerve. Again and again, when things looked so hopeless and critical, they mastered the situation calmly and with presence of mind."

When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the VT fell under armed forces command. The OKW distributed most VT formations among army divisions participating in the campaign. The SS soldiers acquitted themselves well in battle, and expansion and reorganization of the VT followed. Hausser formed Deutschland, Germanid, Der Führer, and their combat support units into a single division in October 1939. That same month, the SS transferred 15,000 law enforcement personnel to create the SS Police Division. Yet another new division, Totenkopf (Death's Head), filled its roster largely from concentration camp guards and incorporated the Home Guard Danzig. Together with Hitler's bodyguard, the Leibstandarte, the military branch of the SS now numbered 100,000 men. The entire force deployed in the 1940 campaign against Holland, Belgium, and France, fighting side by side with the regular army.

The SS had accomplished the expansion of the VT, renamed the Waffen SS in 1940, by shifting men from other contingents under Himmler's command. This was necessary because the OKW, which had jurisdiction over the draft, limited the number of indigenous recruits whom the Waffen SS could induct. In order to increase its quantity of divisions, the chief of SS recruitment, Gottlob Berger, developed a fresh source of manpower. He introduced a campaign to encourage enlistment from among the expansive ethnic German colonies in Southeastern Europe. In May 1939, 1,080 members of Rumania's German community left the country to join the Waffen SS. They preferred to avoid service in the Rumanian army, whose officers treated ethnic German recruits badly. During the war, the roster of ethnic Germans from beyond the Reich's frontier who served in the Waffen SS would greatly increase; over 60,000 of them came from Rumania alone. In time, Berger's

solution for increasing manpower would significantly redefine the character of the Waffen SS.

Germanic Volunteers

A primary element determining the survival of a species is its ability to adapt to shifting environs. This natural law applies to nations as well. War forces abrupt changes that demand endurance and flexibility of disposition in order to rapidly accept new conditions. In Hitler's time, nationalism was a compelling influence. It roused people to give for their country, but simultaneously maintained barriers between nations. On the threshold of World War II, Europe stood in the shadow of peripheral superpowers prepared to contest her leadership in world affairs. To assert her economic and political independence and preserve her cultural identity, her populations needed to evolve toward mutual cooperation and fellowship. Italy's former treasurer Alberto De Stefani observed, "We're all persuaded that continuation of this intransigent nationalism, which has no understanding for the requirements of a continental policy, is finally turning Europe against herself."

Europe settled into an uneasy peace in the summer of 1940, following a series of rapid campaigns Germany had conducted against neighboring states. German army garrisons held Western Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium, and Northern France. Allied with Italy and favored by Spain, the Reich also enjoyed economic influence over the Balkans. Cooperation with Germany was necessary for a strong, unified continent. The continuing war against Britain required the German armed forces to occupy the North Atlantic coast to guard against potential British landings. The German military presence was not popular with the populations affected. The English also supported Communist "resistance" movements in the occupied countries, encouraging sabotage. They trained and smuggled in agents, plus weapons and explosives, while the BBC broadcast anti-German wireless propaganda designed for Western Europe.

At the same time, many Europeans regarded the Reich's victories as a demonstration of the authoritarian state form's superiority. Democracy had not only failed to alleviate unemployment and depression for the past 20 years, but bungled national defense. Germany's spirited, martial society aroused awe and to some extent, admiration among her neighbors. The parliamentary debates, scandals, lack of progress and uninspired leadership associated with democracy seemed vapid by comparison. Marxism had an equally unimpressive track record. Leon Degrelle, a Belgian who eventually served in the Waffen SS, wrote that Marxism "nowhere reached its promised goal of welfare for all. . . . The broad masses considered it a complete failure during the 1930s. They sought the remedy in other mass movements, those that tried to realize the desired social objectives within the framework of order, authority, firm leadership, and devotion to fatherland."

One blight on the track record of Western European governments, as far as the people in their charge were concerned, was the dismal military performance against Germany in 1940. In Norway for example, the state had periodically slashed defense spending between

the World Wars. The army could no longer afford to conduct field exercises, officers and men received inadequate training, and there were no anti-tank weapons for the infantry. The Germans invaded Norway on April 9. The German navy had urged Hitler to take this step in order to thwart a planned British amphibious operation to come ashore to sever the Reich's transit route importing strategic minerals from Sweden and Finland via Norway. The German armed forces landed 100,000 men from ships and planes. The indecisive reaction of the Norwegian government and conflicting military orders plunged Norway's mobilization into chaos.

Retreating Norwegian army units failed to uniformly destroy tunnels, bridges, or lines of communication to delay the enemy's advance. German motorized units refueled their vehicles at pumping stations the defenders had abandoned intact. Some Norwegian troops surrendered at first sight of the invaders. The capital fell without a shot fired. The German 324th Infantry Regiment landed at a nearby airfield and entered Oslo in marching order led by its brass band. The German armed forces simultaneously occupied Denmark. This was to secure lines of communication and supply to the strategic Norwegian theater of operations. The previous January, Thorvald Stauning, head of the country's social-liberal government, had more or less admitted publicly that Denmark would be unable to defend her neutrality. He did nothing to improve defense capabilities.

In the early morning of April 9, the German icebreaker Stettin and the troop transport Hansstadt Danzig, ferrying 1,000 riflemen of 198th Infantry Division, steamed into Copenhagen harbor. Danish searchlights illuminated the ships' German war flag and the soldiers on deck. The coastal batteries however, never fired. As one Danish lieutenant told a parliamentary commission after the war, "The men on watch fumbled with the cannon but had no idea of what actually to do. The mechanism was out of order, so that the breach didn't work." A crewman of another shore battery testified, "We didn't have a single man who would have been able to operate the cannon." The German troops landed unmolested and occupied the capital. The day before, the government had received a report that German forces were massing at Flensburg, a city near the Danish frontier. When the invasion began, the Stauning administration stated in a proclamation, "It is the people's duty to offer no resistance against these troops." It ordered the Danish army to stand down. This evoked bitterness among soldier and civilian alike. The public suspected that the government had sabotaged national defense in collusion with the Germans. One Dane recalled, "Many young people had already been disappointed over political developments in Denmark for a long time.... The political system the government represented finally lost our confidence." Holland, another constitutional monarchy, Germany invaded the following month. The Dutch parliament underfunded the military; shortages of uniforms and small arms compelled recruits to wear a motley combination of army tunics and civilian caps and often to substitute wooden staffs for rifles when standing post. One Dutchman wrote, "Because of the general disinterest in the army, also manifest among politicians, not a single cadet enrolled in the Imperial Military Academy during 1935 and 1936." Dutch pacifists lobbied to have the army disbanded. The German armed forces

required just five days to break its resistance.

France, a pioneer of democracy, displayed weaknesses that one might attribute to the influence of liberalism's emphasis on the individual. Lieutenant Pierre Mendès-France observed this upon returning home from Syria only days before the Germans invaded his country on May 10, 1940: "Everyone, civilians as well as those in the military, had but one thing on their minds; to arrange their personal affairs as well as possible, to get through this seemingly endless period with little or no risk, loss or discomfort." On May 18, with the French army already reeling before the German offensive, General Gamelin wrote this to France's prime minister: "The German success is most of all the result of physical training and of the lofty moral attitude of the people. The French soldier, the private citizen of yesterday, never believed there would be war. Often his interests did not reach beyond his work bench, his office or his farm. Inclined to habitually criticize anyone in authority, and demanding on the pretext of civilization the right to live a comfortable existence from day to day, those capable of bearing arms never received the moral or patriotic upbringing between the two wars that would have prepared them for the drama that would decide the fate of their country."

Inadequate defense preparations, craven leadership and moral deficiency were not the only factors causing Western Europeans to lose confidence in the parliamentary system or in democracy. English conduct during the fighting left a bad impression. Retreating across Belgium and Northern France toward Dunkirk, demolition parties of the British Expeditionary Force destroyed bridges, warehouses, refineries, fuel dumps, harbor installations, and anything else presumed potentially useful to the advancing German army. A Belgian sergeant described, for example, how on May 27 his men saw British troops destroying food stores: "Worst of all was that refugees were there also, who had not eaten for days. They watched English soldiers throw eggs against the walls of houses, stomp on biscuits, and split tinned preserves with axes."

Germany and France concluded an armistice on June 22, 1940. The agreement stated that the "German government . . . does not intend to use the French battle fleet in wartime for its own purposes," acknowledging that the French need the warships "to safeguard their interests in their colonial sphere." On July 3, a British Royal Navy squadron steamed from Gibraltar to the French Algerian anchorage at Mers-el-Kebir. The English demanded that the French battle fleet moored there join them, to continue fighting Germany, or scuttle the ships. When French Admiral Marcel Gensoul refused the ultimatum, the British bombarded his fleet.

The battleship *Bretagne* sank, the *Provence* and the *Dunkerque* suffered serious damage, and the barrage cost 1,147 French sailors their lives. Royal Navy torpedo planes raided the harbor again on July 6, killing another 150 seamen. Two days later, British naval forces attacked Dakar, damaging the French battleship *Richelieu*. All this evoked strong anti-English sentiment throughout France. Britain extended her nautical blockade of foodstuffs to include European countries occupied by the German army, creating hardships for the populations. London established sham "governments in exile" for these states.

They consisted of democratic politicians, officers, and aristocrats who had deserted their country and fled to Britain, in most cases when the fighting was still going on. Entirely dependent on England for their existence, these administrations supposedly represented the true interests of Europe.

The United States also sought to indirectly influence European affairs. On February 9, 1940, the U.S. State Department announced an economic plan for post-war Europe. According to Secretary of State Hull, America would support the principle European currencies through loans backed by gold. This would supposedly regenerate commerce once peace returned. It was apparent that Washington was intent on eradicating Germany's burgeoning international barter system and restoring trade based on gold as the medium of exchange. The State Department relied on the counsel of American bankers when preparing the plan, not consulting representatives of the continent it was intended for. Other resolutions and proposals for post-war reconstruction followed, such as the Atlantic Charter, the Keynes Plan, the Morgenthau Plan, and economic conferences in Hot Springs in 1943 and in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. The Bretton Woods session established the International Monetary Fund in order to influence and if possible regulate foreign economies after the war, bringing the world one step closer to Roosevelt's vision of a global government. In a speech in Königsberg on July 7, Walter Funk, the Reich's minister of economics, told European economists, "Today the Americans are propagating a return to the gold standard. What this means, especially considering this country's dominant hoard of gold, is nothing but an elevation of the dollar to the basis for currencies worldwide and a claim to absolute control of the world's economy." A German diplomat pointed out, "The prerequisite for practical implementation of such plans is the conquest of Europe by the other side."

German propaganda capitalized on the subjective character of these programs. *Germanisches Leitheft*, a periodical targeting a broad-based European readership, asked in its January 1941 issue, "Will foreign powers and racially alien forces determine Europe's fate for all time to come, or will Europe form her own future, through her own vitality and on her own responsibility?" Another German publication stated, "One of the main deficiencies in the mentality of the American is that he has no clear comprehension of other peoples. For this reason, he shrugs off their rights and natural requirements for life with a wave of the hand. He claims the prerogative to dictate his boundless wishes to the rest of the world, thanks to an unrivaled sense of superiority."

German leaders realized that to win European support, they would have to offer a viable alternative to the Anglo-American agenda. The most immediate requirement was to regulate the continental economy to become as self-sufficient and cooperative as possible. The British endeavored to starve or make destitute the populations of states under German occupation, in order to lend impetus to resistance cells. Werner Daitz, economic advisor in the NSDAP Foreign Policy Branch, submitted a memorandum in May 1940 urging establishment of a trade commission to explore Germany's options: "The present blockade has unavoidably made necessary the formation of a continental European econ-

omy under German leadership, as an economic self-help measure. . . . If we expect to direct Europe's commerce, which is absolutely essential to economically strengthen the continent that is the mainstay of the white race, then we must naturally not publicly declare this to be a German economic sphere. We must always speak only of Europe."

As the ranking industrial power, only Germany could organize a prosperous and independent continental economy. The September 1940 edition of *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* (National Socialist Monthly) stated, "Without the Reich, a European community of nations can never be established. . . . The Reich is the great political mission of the German people. It represents the concept of a European order. It eliminates foreign influences and guards against powers hostile to Europe. It strives for European cooperation on the principle of ethnic kinship, and of productive labor as the substance and foundation of all life."

One of Germany's more astute propagandists was Major Walther Gehl, who served in the infantry in both world wars. He recognized that securing his country's influence depended not on military conquest, but on gaining the popular support of neighboring peoples. In *Die Sendung des Reiches* (The Mission of the Reich), he wrote that in order for Germany to succeed, she would have to devote herself to the welfare of the continent and not vice versa: "With a sacred sense of responsibility for the future of Europe, Germany will incorporate the natural rights of the other peoples into her own political ambitions, and hold a protective, not ruling hand over them. And her military protection is a better guarantee for perpetuating their sovereign culture than are anti-German alliances with nations beyond our continent."

Germanisches Leitheft maintained that the "Reich does not mean domination, but responsibility and a sense of mission; not hegemony, but a unifying inspiration of our clans, particular nations and ethnically-related families." Thus far-sighted Germans advocated the need for the transition from the German Reich into a European Reich. Franz Six, director of ideological research in the SS, wrote that "Common racial ancestry, despite political and ideological differences, is the binding element of the European nations."

One Dane recalled, "Young people receptive to this biologically-based perception correspondingly adjusted their attitude toward foreign peoples. This led to a genuine broadening of the national sense of belonging. It was the starting point for renewing the 1,100 year-old idea of a unified Europe." Many such Western Europeans sought an opportunity to "help build a better, stronger, and wealthier Europe."

With Hitler's approval, the SS established recruiting offices in Oslo, The Hague and Copenhagen in April and May 1940. Several hundred Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch volunteers signed on for a pre-military training course. Lasting months, the course included weapons firing, sports, German language instruction, and ideological lectures. Conducted in Kärnten, Germany, it also acquainted participants with the indigenous population. Upon conclusion of the course, officers invited the young Europeans to enlist in the SS as Germanic volunteers.

Beyond the allure of a unified continent and disenchantment with previous democratic administrations, economic factors contributed to a gradual rapprochement with Germany. Many unemployed Scandinavians and Western Europeans sought work in the Reich. The Germans registered 100,000 Hollanders who migrated and found jobs in Germany. Denmark recorded 147,000 men out of work in the summer of 1940. The unemployment rate was 18 percent.

Germany helped revive industry in Belgium and in the Netherlands by awarding armaments contracts to manufacturing companies there. The cooperative attitude of the workers, many of whose plant managers had fled to Britain, led the Germans to implement measures to improve labor's social conditions. Unemployment in France, the largest foreign producer for the German war industry, dropped to practically nil by 1943. Having grappled with Communist trade unions before the war, French industrialists favored collaboration with the Germans. They also recognized that France and her colonies were too small a market for the country's modern, expansive industry, and sought to cultivate European clientele.

The NSDAP's foreign policy chief, Alfred Rosenberg, argued in a speech that Europeans should acquiesce to German leadership in continental affairs: "A smaller nation does not relinquish its honor by subordinating itself to a more numerous people and a larger realm. We must acknowledge the laws of life to survive. The facts of life show that there are numerically, geographically and politically powerful nations and there are smaller ones. To accept the influence of a realm like that of the Germans, demonstrating its former strength after years of hard trials, is not a sign of weak character or of questionable honor, but a recognition of the laws of life." The German army instructed its soldiers garrisoning conquered countries to assume a firm but cordial posture. Guidelines for soldiers stationed in Denmark stated, "Every German in Denmark must always be conscious that he represents the German Reich, and that Germany will be judged by his conduct. When meeting Danes, avoid anything that could insult the Danish national honor. The Danish woman is to be treated respectfully. Avoid political arguments." These circumstances reaped benefits for the Germans. According to a 1947 Gallup poll, 40 percent of Danes canvassed had been outspokenly sympathetic toward Germany. Just 32 percent had felt hostile.

Late in 1940, the Waffen SS established its first division incorporating Germanic volunteers. Flemish and Dutch enrolled in the Westland regiment, while Nordland recruited Norwegians and Danes. Joined by the seasoned VT regiment Germania, these formations merged into the 5th Waffen SS division Wiking (Viking). The roster included 400 Finns, plus smaller contingents from Switzerland and Sweden. Hausser later observed, "They thought beyond the boundaries of their national states toward something greater, a common purpose." A post-war poll of surviving Dutch SS men summarized that "the better educated were fascinated by the Reich concept, with its prospect of the consolidation of all Germanic peoples." The Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell saw their commitment as proof that "there could be a civilization based not on birth or on the privilege of wealth,

but on community spirit.... They sought new values which could guarantee the state's cohesion, and this disavowal of materialism excited, fulfilled and influenced the spirit of many Europeans -and not just the least prominent among them."

The German cause, groping for acceptance among European populations, gained favor when war broke out with the Soviet Union in June 1941. Hitler authorized a Waffen SS proposal to establish national legions of volunteers from neighboring states to fight in the East. Opening on June 27, recruiting offices counted 40,000 applicants the first day. The German security police, the SD, circulated a confidential analysis to leading representatives of the Reich's government and the NSDAP on the reaction in the occupied countries. It reported "a direct reversal in attitudes in Germany's favor" in Denmark: "Prominent people in Danish business life and in the clergy, who had up till now been reserved or even hostile toward Germany, are changing their position on Germany now that she has begun the battle for European civilization against Soviet Russia. . . . Applications to join the Waffen SS have markedly increased."

One recruit, among the 6,000 Danes to serve in the Waffen SS, recalled how many of his countrymen feared that were Germany defeated, "Denmark could suffer the same fate as the small Baltic states; degraded to a Russian military district, politically neutralized, forcible implementation of the Communist bureaucratic economic system, gradual Russianization, and deportation of the political and cultural elite, with ruinous consequences for the biological substance of the Danish people." The Danish government founded the Freikorps Danmark (Denmark Volunteer Corps) on July 3, 1941, which granted authorized absence, without forfeiture of seniority or pension, to members of the Danish army who transferred to the new formation. Its first commanding officer, Christian Kryssing, stated in a national radio speech in July, "Regardless of our political affiliations, we all feel that Bolshevism and its threat to the northern states must be destroyed....I call upon all Danish men capable of bearing arms to take part in this crusade... to secure a rightful place for our fatherland in the reformation of Europe."

In Amsterdam, 50,000 people attended an anti-Communist rally in support of the German war effort. Regarding Scandinavia, the SD reported, "The German-Russian conflict has turned attitudes in Norway more favorably toward Germany. . . . There are countless volunteers for the SS Nordland regiment." In Belgium, "Flemish nationalist circles are unconditionally on Germany's side in the struggle against Bolshevism." Eventually over 20,000 Flemish served in the Waffen SS, many joining to combat "the arch-enemy of Christian Europe" in the East. The Swiss journalist Armin Mohler wrote, "They came because they hoped for the German Reich to forge a unified Europe of free nations. They wanted neither a commissar state nor a society of everyone competing against one another. There was much idealism then, such as is really only possible among the young."

In Paris, French politicians met on July 7 to discuss formation of the Legion des Volontaires Francais (Legion of French Volunteers), or LVF. The resulting fighting force left to deploy against the Soviets in August 1941. Within months a sponsorship program, "Friends of the Legion," gained 1.5 million supporters.⁶² The rector of the Catholic Uni-

versity of Paris, Alfred Cardinal Baudrillart, called the volunteers "among the best sons of France." They defended not only the honor of their country, he stated, but "fight also for the Christian civilization of the continent. . . . This legion is in fact in its own way a new knighthood. These legionnaires are the crusaders of the 20th Century."

Jacques Benoist-Mechin, a cabinet minister in the government of unoccupied France, regarded a pan-European war effort against the USSR as "the platform upon which provincial patriotisms can bond together, free from antagonism and traditional rivalries. It is the vehicle to break nationalism's inner conflicts, to develop into a European super-nationalism." The threat of Soviet expansion was a genuine concern to Europeans, who were more familiar with the consequences of earlier Communist revolutions in Russia, Germany, Hungary, and Spain than were the people of Britain and the United States. German correspondents covering the advance of the fighting forces into Russian territory filled the news media with reports about destitute living conditions among populations under the hammer and sickle as well as the merciless treatment of political dissidents there.

An article published in the *Volkischer Beobachter* in August 1941 expressed more or less popular views about the Soviet menace: "Today all Europe knows that the war against Bolshevism is Europe's own decisive struggle, the consolidated war of European civilized nations against the powers of destruction and formless chaos. A new, revitalized Europe has learned to grasp what an enormous danger the specter of Bolshevism represents. It is of symbolic significance that the unity of Europe has begun to take place and prove itself in this struggle. "We know only too well what this war is about. But only when one sees the reality of the Bolshevik regime face to face, the influence of this system on the individual person and on his life, only then can one comprehend the cruelty, the overall horror of this system. It is a system that combines every element of devastation and absolute ruin of human values and ruin of humanity itself. Bolshevism is not even a political system one can intellectually debate with, but the organized murder of all life, the degradation of the earth and its people, destruction for the sake of destroying." Regardless of their personal attitude toward Germany, the war against the Soviet Union was in part a unifying factor out of necessity for Europeans.

French, Walloon, and Spanish volunteers served in the Germany army, in ethnic regiments commanded by officers of their own nationality. French and Walloon troops eventually transferred to the *Waffen SS*. Berger arranged for German drill instructors conducting recruit training to attend special courses to acquaint themselves with the national and religious customs of the inductees in their charge. *SS Colonel Richard Schulze* recalled, "The instructors needed to summon sympathy and understanding, and a well-balanced acceptance of the mentality of the various nations." In a September 1941 article, an *SS combat correspondent* described the Odyssey of foreign volunteers serving in the *Wiking* division: "They came to us, misunderstood by their countrymen, not in proud columns but individually, resolute and clear-minded, often against father, mother, and family. They are not strangers here, but through their blood and their deeds have found in their

regiments honor, a rightful place, and a home.”

Negative Nationalism

Germanic volunteers often experienced isolation from their countrymen, thanks to lingering ambivalence among the populations of the occupied lands toward Germany. Traditional international rivalries, a saturation of anti-German publicity in the pre-war democratic press, suspicion of Hitler's motives and the German invasion of 1940 all retarded appeals for European unity. Another obstacle to cooperation and good will, ironically, sprung from the Reich itself. Powerful and numerous, it was unavoidable that the Germans would exercise great influence over European affairs. Prominent nationalists in the country believed that this entitled them to subordinate the interests of neighboring states to those of Germany.

In June 1940, the German government introduced proposals to restructure European commerce. Addressing members of the planning committee, Funk offered this guideline: “Germany now possesses the power in Europe to implement a reorganization of the economy according to her requirements. The political will to use this power is on hand. It therefore follows that the countries must fall in line behind us. The economy of other European lands must suit our needs.” Foreign observers heard Funk state in a speech in July, “Future peacetime commerce must guarantee the Greater German Reich a maximum of economic security, and the German people a maximum of consumer goods to elevate the national economy. European trade is to be aligned with this goal.”

Based on a 1939 study by the Prussian jurist Carl Schmitt, National Socialist officials proposed granting sovereignty only to countries populated by “ethnically worthwhile peoples.” The German commissioner for occupied Holland, Seyss-Inquart, championed similar views. Party zealots considered him a better choice for foreign minister than the pragmatic, more constructive Ribbentrop. In his essay, “The European Order,” Seyss-Inquart wrote of “a natural ranking, in which every nation has a place in the community according to its economic capabilities, its biological vitality, its martial strength, and cultural value.” He called upon Europeans to “acknowledge the Reich as the principle power, through which their own strength can best be realized.” He added that Germany, “through superior achievement is accorded higher responsibility for all” who comprise European civilization, “which was formed by the industriousness of the Nordic race.” Such one-sided proposals regarding post-war Europe dismayed Ribbentrop. He warned in a memo that Germany's allies fear that after the war, Berlin will place a German governor in every country. Neutrals, he wrote, are concerned that Germany plans to annex them. The notion of ranking European peoples according to their value, racial or ethnic heritage among the criteria, threatened to create the divisions Hitler had previously sought to avoid in Germany proper when combating the party's race theorists.

In the occupied countries, attitudes of German superiority were often apparent at lower administrative levels. Lvov for example, was a Polish- Ukrainian city the German army

wrested from the Soviets in June 1941. It subsequently came under the Reich's civil jurisdiction. An ethnic German resident there recalled, "The passenger compartments of the street cars were divided in the middle by wide leather tubing. A sign in the front section read, 'Only for Germans and their allies – Italians, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Rumanians.' It was shameful to see how people were crowded together in the rear section, while up front sat perhaps two people, and one or two policemen stood on the platform or beside the engineer." Though Hitler had decided to gradually release all Polish prisoners of war, German authorities discouraged fraternization. In a 1939 assessment, the SD faulted members of the armed forces for their "great broad mindedness and sympathy" toward the Poles, especially former Austrian officers for their "respectful attitude." The German military command then ordered that Poles clear the sidewalk for German soldiers and remove their hats when passing officers; however, few occupational troops enforced this tactless regulation. In the west, Hitler detained 65,000 Walloon prisoners of war, while sending all Flemish captives home. Germany continued to hold one-and-a-half-million French soldiers prisoner.

The war demanded that the Germans abandon such counterproductive policies. The Reich's disorganized armaments industry experienced a decline in weapons manufacture during 1941. Production of howitzers, artillery rounds and small arms ammunition substantially dropped between February and December. The factories could not keep pace with the quantity of ordnance being lost in the Russian campaign. As the Red Army retreated in the east, the Soviets dismantled and evacuated 1,360 industrial plants. Their demolition squads destroyed remaining facilities, including 95 percent of the Ukraine's power works, plus granaries, warehouses, refineries, bridges and machinery. The Germans were able to partially restore the economy at considerable cost, investing far more in reconstruction than they were able to reap in raw materials and surplus grain. These circumstances placed an enormous burden on German resources.

There were seven-and-a-half million foreign workers in the Reich by September 1944. These included prisoners of war, the voluntarily recruited, and eventually those impressed into the work force. Northern and Western Europeans received the same pay, vacation time and health care benefits as German labor. Eastern Europeans suffered poor treatment. Fritz Sauckel, in charge of mobilizing labor, stated in December 1942 that "whipped, undernourished and cowed eastern workers will more burden the German economy than be of use to it." A decree enacted by Himmler that month made abuse of foreign laborers by Germans a punishable offence. Only as the military situation worsened, did conditions for Russian and Ukrainian workers improve.

Poles fared better, largely due to the value of Polish industry for the war economy. Decent treatment of foreign labor, plus the re-organization of the entire armaments industry by civilian officials, led to a dramatic improvement in output. Between December 1941 and June 1944, armaments manufacture increased 230 percent, though the work force was augmented by just 28 percent. In 1944 alone, German industry produced enough ordnance to fully equip 225 infantry and 45 panzer divisions. German factories accounted

for 88 percent of arms production, foreign contracts for the balance. A unified Europe, based on good will and equal status for all countries, was now a necessity.

Hitler harbored reservations about restructuring Europe with all nations on equal footing. He mistrusted his allies. German intelligence reported that after German defeats in 1943, Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria discreetly contacted London and Washington about concluding a separate peace. The Allies informed them that the USSR must be involved in the negotiations, leading Germany's satellites to drop the initiative. The Führer was no less wary of Philippe Petain, president of unoccupied "Vichy" France, who proved unsympathetic to the German cause. Hitler limited the roster of the Legion of French Volunteers to 15,000 men, even though there was available manpower to quadruple the number. The contemporary historian Franz Seidler pointed out, "Hitler feared losing his freedom to make decisions about regulating post-war Europe if he accepted foreign help." When the Walloon Legion officer Degrelle addressed Belgian workers in the Berlin Sportspalast in January 1943, he received acclaim from his audience . . . and a total press blackout in the German media. Recognizing German policy as an obstruction to the rapprochement supported by many of his countrymen, the French politician Laval told Hitler, "You want to win the war to create Europe. You must create Europe to win the war."

At the time of Degrelle's Berlin speech, the German armed forces and their allies were already losing ground in a war of attrition against Russia, Britain, and the United States. More Germans saw the need for foreign assistance. This required rethinking the Reich's continental attitude. In February 1943, the foreign policy advisor Dr. Kolb introduced proposals for multilateral cooperation. He recommended that treaties be concluded upon the basis of absolute equality of the signatories. A nation should enjoy parity in the European community regardless of its form of government. Kolb's plan required Germany to relinquish hegemony over the continent.

In September 1943, Arnold Köster, head of the planning commission of the armaments ministry, bluntly stated in a memorandum that the Reich conducts an improvised exploitation of the occupied territories. The result was "resentment among society's elements of good will, mounting hatred among hostile strata of the populations, passive resistance, and sabotage." The German diplomat Cecil von Renthe-Fink reported to Ribbentrop on September 9, "It is obvious that the mood in Europe has been worse for some time and that resistance movements are growing rapidly. This development can have dire consequences for the willingness of the European nations to commit their resources for our victory, and must be countered."

Renthe-Fink considered one of the worst shortcomings to be the fact that "apart from what is occasionally stated about the economic field, we have so far avoided saying anything more concrete about our intentions. This gives the impression that we want to keep our hands free to implement our own political plans after the war." Attending a wartime lecture on the danger of Communism, Degrelle voiced pan-European concerns when he told the speaker that the volunteers understand what they are fighting against,

but not what they are fighting for. German occupational policy in former Soviet territory was counterproductive. Aware of the threat that eastern populations such as the Mongols had historically posed, Hitler preferred to keep them politically impotent. He stated during a military conference in June 1943, "I cannot set any future objective that would establish independent states here, autonomous states." He privately remarked in April 1942, "To master the peoples east of the Reich whom we have conquered, the guiding principle must be to accommodate the wishes for individual freedom as far as possible, avoid any organized state form, and in this way hold the members of these nationalities to as limited a standard of civilization as possible."

The *Völkischer Beobachter* mirrored this contempt for the Russians, as in the following description of a group of Soviet prisoners, published in a July 1942 edition: "We all know him from the newsreels; this earthcolored, leathery face with the apathetic, furtive animal gaze and the wearied, mechanical motions; this grey, monotonous, nameless mass, this herd in the truest sense of the word." Thousands of Russians deserted to the invaders, often giving the reason that Stalin had executed someone in their family. In July 1941, out of 12,000 members of the Soviet 229th Rifle Division, 8,000 jumped ship. In September, 11,000 men belonging to the 255th, 270th, and 275th Rifle Divisions went over the hill as well. Desertions continued to plague the Red Army. In May 1942 alone, 10,962 Soviet soldiers crossed over to the Germans. Another 9,136 followed in June, then 5,453 in July. The Germans counted 15,011 Red Army deserters in August. In May 1943, 90 Russian battalions, 140 independent rifle companies, 90 battalions consisting of non-Russian troops such as Georgians and Tartars, plus over 400,000 unarmed auxiliaries served in the German armed forces. A Cossack division and several regiments supplemented this military force. At least 500,000 former Soviets fought on the German side that year, and Cossacks were especially effective in combating Communist partisans. Hitler was initially shocked by the number of Russian units in German army service, and in February 1942, forbade more to be established. He soon gave up his resistance to the practice, thanks to the achievements of these formations.

Since the beginning of the Soviet-German war, captured Russian officers repeatedly advised the invaders that the establishment and formal recognition of a Russian national state with its own army of liberation was essential to overthrow the Stalin regime. Officers testifying included former commanders of the 3rd Guards Army, the 5th, 12th, 19th and 22nd Armies and more than a dozen other generals. The German diplomat Hilger interviewed three prominent Russian prisoners in August 1942: General Andrei Vlassov, Colonel Vladimir Soyersky, and Regimental Commissar Joseph Kerness. Vlassov himself told Hilger, "Soviet government propaganda has managed to persuade every Russian that Germany wants to destroy Russia's existence as an independent state. . . . The Russian people's resistance can only be broken if they are shown that Germany pursues no such objective, but is moreover willing to guarantee Russia and the Ukraine... an independent existence."

Hilger recorded Colonel Soyersky as stating that "Stalin, because of continuous defeats

he is considered responsible for, has lost all his popularity in the army. The Soviet regime has always been hated by the broad mass of the population." Soyersky also opined that publicly defining German war aims favorable to Russia would lead to the "immediate collapse" of Red Army and national resistance. At this stage, Hitler, his influential chancery director Martin Bormann, and Reich's Commissioner for the Ukraine Erich Koch opposed post-war Russian autonomy. Italian Marshal Giovanni Messe observed, "Germany has not understood how to awaken the sympathy and willingness to cooperate among the populations of the occupied territories."90 Hitler's mistrust of Germany's treaty partners and of the eastern peoples obstructed a rational European policy.

Throughout most of the war, German propaganda vilified the governments of enemy countries while describing their civilian populations and military personnel as decent but duped by unscrupulous leaders. The Reich's media revised this prudential practice with respect to the war in the East. When the Germans invaded, the Soviet secret police, the GPU, liquidated political prisoners in eastern Poland and in the Baltic States. The Germans discovered over 4,000 victims in Lvov, in Luck 1,500, in Dubno 500. Summarizing the German official inquiry, Dr. Philipp Schneider wrote, "Without any doubt, those murdered were tortured before their death in a sadistic way. Torture chambers built especially for the purpose were used."

Along retreat routes, the GPU and the Red Army strew mutilated bodies of German prisoners shot or tortured to death. The purpose was to provoke reprisals against surrendering Russians by the invaders, thereby deterring desertion. In the Tarnopol jail, German troops found one of their missing bomber crews with eyes gouged out, tongues, ears and noses cut off, and the skin on the hands and feet peeled away. This was a favorite GPU torment accomplished by first immersing the appendages in boiling water. During January 1942, the Soviet Black Sea fleet landed Russian marines along the German-occupied section of the Crimean coast near Odessa. An engineer with a German infantry division there recalled this: "Many houses along the beach had served as hospitals or as collection areas for the wounded. The Russians entered, killed the orderlies and the physicians, and raped the nurses and female assistants. Then they threw the women into the ice-cold waters of the harbor basin. They shot the wounded and sick soldiers, or dragged them into the street and poured cold water over them, so that they would freeze to death in the outdoors."

The German press described GPU agents and Soviet soldiers committing atrocities as *Untermenschen*. The expression literally translates as "lowly persons," but historians sometimes interpret it as meaning subhuman or racially inferior. It in fact refers to the depravity of the individual mind and spirit, the triumph of corruption over the refined qualities of civilized man. Beyond the Soviet troops, Stalin's enforcers, and rank-and-file Russian Communists, the word more or less became associated with the eastern peoples in general.

Melitta Wiedemann, editor of the diplomatic journal *Die Aktion*, expressed the frustration over German propaganda and foreign policy felt among many prominent citizens. In

1943, she wrote to several SS leaders, advocating the pan-European idea and a revision of German practices in the East. She directed a letter to Himmler via his advisor on October 5, in which she maintained, "Our silence over the future form of the new Europe is considered in the occupied territories and among those who are officially our friends to be absolute proof of our wicked intentions." Wiedemann added, "First the Jews were declared Untermenschen and deprived of their rights. Then the Poles joined them, then the Russians, and very nearly the Norwegians as well. Who's protecting any nationality from being relegated to the realm of Untermenschen by Germany and then destroyed?"

She continued, "Our Untermensch slogan has helped Stalin proclaim a national war. . . . The entire Russian farming community, most of the intelligentsia, and the senior leadership of the Red Army are enemies of Bolshevism and especially of Stalin. Our policy confronts these people with a tragic dilemma; either fight for Stalin, or abandon their people, surely among the most talented of the white race . . . to the fate of a destitute, looted colonial territory."

The German army suffered a catastrophic defeat at the six-month battle of Stalingrad, which ended in February 1943. This forced many Germans to the conclusion that without active foreign help, the war would be lost, which required a fundamentally new approach to the Reich's administration in Europe. To implement such a revision, resisted by the highest state leadership, advocates needed a vehicle, an organized bloc. They found it in the Waffen SS.

The European Mission

Early in the war against Russia, Hitler spoke of the need for Europeans to overcome nationalist proclivities: "The threat from the east alone, with the danger of reducing everyone to the Bolshevik-Asiatic plane, which would mean the destruction of all basis of European civilization, compels us to unify." A prominent journalist and former Waffen SS lieutenant, Hans Schwarz van Berk, wrote later, "The old points of departure of German policy were too provincial to realize the European revival in a voluntary spirit of freedom, so passionately striven for by activist, optimistic younger elements. . . . Only the foreign units with their clearcut European will, anchored in the perception of the SS as the European fighting elite, changed this. . . . This war's fury demanded more than hired mercenaries. It demanded constructive, common goals and binding, idealistic motives of the fighters."

Germanic volunteers in the Reich's service did not consider themselves to be in a subordinate role. "We fought neither for Germany nor for Hitler, but for a much greater idea; the creation of a united states of Europe," wrote Degrelle. "We were all unified by the same will: Honorably represent our nation among the 30 that came to fight. Do our duty, since we fought for Europe. Gain an honorable place for our fatherland in the continental community that would evolve from the war, and finally, create combat units whose value guaranteed achieving social justice, when we ultimately returned home after

the end of hostilities.”

The Swiss SS man Heinrich Büeler recalled, “Regarding the restructuring of Europe after the war, there was no program. This question was nevertheless often discussed in the Waffen SS. . . . We were certain that the struggle against Asiatic Bolshevism, and the camaraderie joining Germanics and Europeans, will lead to reforming Europe in the same spirit.” The Swiss journalist Francois Lobsiger considered the men “political soldiers in the loftiest sense,” fighting to achieve a “strong, unified, and brotherly Europe.” The historian Lothar Greil summarized, “With the beginning of the Russian campaign, a decisive mental awareness developed within the Waffen SS: The fight for freedom for the realm of all Germans became a struggle for the freedom of the European family of nations. The common cause of volunteers from throughout Europe reinforced this ideal.” The French historian Henri Landemer concluded that within the Waffen SS, “The Reich is no longer Germany but Europe.”

Himmler, primarily involved in law enforcement, intelligence gathering and counter-espionage, initially envisioned a post-war Europe with Germany dominant. He harbored a colonial attitude toward the East. Influenced not only by the deteriorating military situation but by many letters he received from soldiers of the Waffen SS, he gradually abandoned this imperialistic viewpoint. In a 1943 speech to NSDAP officials in Posen, he described the brotherhood in arms of the Wiking division, in which Germans and non-Germans served together, as the basis for the greater Germanic Reich to come. When a local party functionary refused to approve the application for marriage of a Germanic volunteer to a German woman, Himmler reacted sharply. On October 4, 1943, he sent a letter to Bormann arguing, “If on one hand the Reichsführer SS (Himmler’s title) is supposed to recruit Flemish, Dutch, and other Germanics to fight and die . . . and in return declare that they have equal rights, then marriage to the sisters and daughters of these Germanics, or of a German maiden to a member of these Germanic peoples, cannot be forbidden.” Demanding that the NSDAP’s Racial Policy Office be deprived of the authority to license marriages, Himmler added, “It makes no sense for me to try for years, under difficult circumstances, to animate a Germanic idea and win people for it, while other offices in Germany thoughtlessly and categorically make it all for nothing.”

Despite the authority of his office, Himmler was navigating precarious waters. He advocated a European commonwealth, challenging official “Germany first” programs and NSDAP dogma. “He became the most demonstrative critic of this policy and tacitly the most significant enemy of all supporters and defenders of this policy,” stated Schwarz van Berk. Himmler began gaining the upper hand early in 1943. In February, the Reich’s Chancery granted him supervision over all “mutual ethnic- Germanic affairs” in the occupied countries. German officials could no longer act on related issues unless “in agreement with the Reichsführer SS.” The historian Seidler observed, “To shape the new order in Europe after the war, the SS had an optimal starting position in competition with organs of the NSDAP.” The SS planned to establish a European union with close economic co-operation and a universal currency system, without German domination. “The loyalty of

the foreign SS men gave Himmler more weight . . . in opposing official German policy. These men were not in the slightest degree of a subservient nature," wrote Schwarz van Berk. Eventually non-Germans became the majority in half of the SS combat divisions in active service.

The Waffen SS took control of all foreign legions serving in the German army in 1944 except for Cossacks. This was an important step in supplanting the concept of national armies with that of a multi-national fighting force defending common interests, a force whose veterans could maintain a camaraderie transcending customary European rivalries after the war. The Waffen SS actively promoted establishment of a Russian army of liberation. After meeting with Vlassov, Himmler approved not only the

formation of this army but the founding of an "exile" Russian government. Vlassov stated that he found greater understanding for his proposals during negotiations with the SS than with the German army. He ultimately received the green light to establish the Russian army of liberation, which deployed toward the end of the war. Estonians and Latvians became the vanguard of eastern peoples donning the uniform of the Waffen SS. Not without reservations, Himmler eventually acquiesced to Berger's appeal to enroll Ukrainians. Formation of the 14th SS Grenadier Division, together with Yugoslavian contingents, ultimately broke down the "Slav skepticism" that had infected the Reichsführer SS no less than NSDAP doctrinaires. The diplomat Renthe- Fink wrote, "The Estonian SS has proven itself in action against the Bolsheviks, and these developments appear to be taking place with the Führer's approval." The former director of the Bad Tölz officer's academy noted, "The N.S. racial concept became less plausible after the forming of Slavic divisions. It gave way to the unifying element of anti- Communism, especially welding together the eastern and western SS."

The example of the Waffen SS encouraged others in Germany opposed to national policies detrimental to a community of nations. In February 1944, the German commissioner in the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, sent Berlin a 37-page memorandum describing National Socialist eastern policy as a "masterpiece of poor management." That June, the economist Walter Labs submitted proposals for administrative reform in occupied Russia. He asked, "Are the eastern territories and the populations residing in them to be accepted as members of the European realm, or are they simply colonies and colonial peoples to be exploited?" Labs demanded they be accorded the right to private property, advanced education and opportunities to realize prosperity. He bluntly pointed out that "nations which achieve as much in wartime as what the Red Army has demonstrated, are too advanced to accept being reduced to the standard of a colonial people."

For its part, the German army issued lengthy guidelines to its troops in Russia in 1943, ordering them to "be fair.... The Russian hates nothing more than injustice. The Russian is an especially good worker; if he is treated decently he works hard. He is intelligent and learns easily." Nearly two years earlier, the Waffen SS had already instructed its members to "sincerely try to gain a fundamental understanding of the contemporary Russian psyche," every SS man being "not just a soldier but a bit of a politician." The

purpose, stated in a directive for soldiers of the Leibstandarte, was “one of the most important tasks for the German people, namely to win these populations for the European family of nations.”

The Leibstandarte defended the Mius River position on the eastern front until April 1942, when it received transfer orders. A grenadier recalled, “During our withdrawal from Taganrog, thousands of residents stood along the road and waved to the units as they drove away; an example of how good the relationship between an SS division and the Russian civilian population could become.” Though better known for its reputation as an elite fighting troop, the Waffen SS was no less resolute in advancing social and political reforms necessary for Europe to recover supremacy and renown in world affairs. In combating both the lingering 19th Century nationalism dividing the continent and the unproductive dogma of the Racial Policy Office within Germany, the Waffen SS trod a solitary path; few among the Reich’s hierarchy risked contradicting the NSDAP’s legislated programs. Albert Frey, a regimental commander in the Leibstandarte, recalled that “during the war, in no other realm of the NS state were the flawed political and military decisions of the senior leadership so openly discussed and criticized as within the Waffen SS.” Induction into the Waffen SS of non-German volunteers forced the Reich’s Government to recognize the contribution of foreign peoples to the war effort. Germanic recruits demanded a post-war European federation in place of German hegemony. They found political expression through the SS, steadily leading the German government toward a balanced perspective. This augmented the influence of the under-represented strata that did the fighting, much in the sense that the wars of liberation in 1813 began shifting power from the imperial dynasty to the Prussian peasant militia.

Thousands of Ukrainians volunteered to serve in the Waffen SS. The Ukrainian 14th SS Grenadier Division, which the Germans decided to establish in April 1943, went into action the following year. When Hitler learned of its existence he questioned its dependability, suggesting it would be better to give its weapons to a new German division. Hearing of General Vlassov’s wish to lead an army of liberation, Hitler retorted, “I’ll never form a Russian army. That’s a specter of the first order.” When SS Colonel Günther d’Alquen criticized the official attitude degrading the Russians, Himmler expressly warned him against the SS taking any course of action contrary to the Führer’s wishes. Yet the Waffen SS prevailed. Again citing Schwarz van Berk, “In Himmler, those demanding that the narrowly defined racial policy be abolished in favor of a broader, more rational interpretation found their strongest voice. And now this same Himmler, who in his own domain once established the most stringent racial criteria, became the advocate of a liberal understanding of the rights of nationalities and races.”

Hitler disapproved of the revisions doggedly promoted by the Waffen SS, yet ironically, he had created the system that enabled them to progress. In a 1937 speech at Vogelsang he had once stated, “From our ranks the most capable can reach the loftiest positions without respect to origin and birth. . . .What they’ve been, what their parents do, who their mother was, mean nothing. If they’re capable, the way stands clear. They just have

to accept responsibility; that is, have it in them to lead." Hitler's policy resembled the spirit of 18th Century liberalism in France, in which talented individuals realized their potential and rose to positions of leadership. Since its establishment in 1934, the VT, the future Waffen SS, attracted men from the untapped wellspring of superior human resources once identified by Gneisenau. Frey, among the first to join the armed SS, wrote that regarding fellow recruits in training at the Ellwangen barracks, "Most were farm lads and came from villages." In the German army, 49 percent of the officer corps hailed from military families. In the VT, the figure was five percent. Just two percent of army officers had rural backgrounds, but a substantial percentage of VT officers grew up on farms. Despite their comparatively limited education, SS officers enrolled in army general staff courses consistently scored in the upper ten percent of graduates. In some German provinces, nearly a third of the farm lads applied to enlist in the VT.

Like the German army, this novel fighting force encouraged battlefield initiative at junior command levels. However, it also relaxed social barriers between officers and subordinates, based authority on winning the men's respect rather than on rank and instilled a liberal attitude that enabled Germans and other Europeans to stand together as brethren. In a few short years, the Waffen SS contributed to political and military evolutions that might otherwise have taken decades, and without the patronage of the men's respective governments or populations.

In its final form, the Waffen SS bore little resemblance to the party's showpiece guard troop, personifying the flower of German manhood, that Hitler originally intended for domestic missions at his discretion. Himmler ultimately acknowledged that "the Waffen SS is beginning to lead a life of its own." Not constrained by established military convention, the men of the Waffen SS approached their craft with a spirit of independence and innovation. Through their voluntary commitment and wartime sacrifices they lobbied for political reform—customarily forbidden waters for the armed forces. And yet its members hailed largely from a stratum historically lacking public influence. Despite the dynamics, boldness and aplomb of the Waffen SS, it never would have gained leverage without a state system in place that fostered discovery of latent ability. The Führer approved expansion of the Waffen SS despite its defiance. Hitler was a man who sought not to control his people but to guide them, to help them explore, discover, and harness their potential, even when the changes they introduced contradicted his personal beliefs.

12.18 Traitors to the Reich

Fatal Diplomacy

What the Waffen SS could have finally achieved toward a European confederation, what caliber of leadership the Adolf Hitler Schools would have produced, or how education and advancement of Germany's nonaffluent classes might have reshaped the nation will never be known. Military defeat in 1945 ended the era of German self-determination, quelling

a revolution of historical consequence that may never be emulated. Germany's overthrow we broadly attribute to the larger populations and superior industrial capacity of the Allies, but a seldompublicized, insidious factor also contributed to the outcome of the war. This was the systematic sabotage, conducted by disaffected, malevolent elements within Germany, of the Reich's peacetime diplomacy and wartime military operations.

Unlike the Bolsheviks, Hitler did not oppress the aristocracy to promote labor. He personally considered the role of the nobility "played out". It would have to prove itself to regain its former prestige, but only by competing against other classes within the parameters of the Reich's social programs. A tract published for officers declared, "The new nobility of the German nation, which is open to every German, is nobility based on accomplishment." Many from the country's titled families accepted the challenge. They enrolled in the NSDAP or the SS or served with valor in the armed forces during the war. A small percentage, concentrated in the army general staff and in the diplomatic corps, resented the social devaluation of their high-born status. Rather than contribute to the new Germany, they conspired against her. Together with a self-absorbed minority of misguided intellectuals, clerics, financiers and Marxists, they intrigued to bring down both the National Socialist government and their country as well.

An especially harmful characteristic of this subversive resistance movement was that its leaders tenanted sensitive positions in public office and in the military. Major players included Leipzig's Mayor Carl Goerdeler, Ribbentrop's subordinates Baron von Weizsäcker, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin and Erich Kordt, and chief of military intelligence Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. They and their fellow conspirators knew that Hitler was too popular for them to incite a national insurrection against him. They sought assistance beyond Germany's borders, from England. The subversives established contact with British politicians in June 1937. With Canaris providing a smoke screen, Goerdeler covertly travelled to London using foreign currency provided by the banker Schacht. He met with Halifax, Churchill, Eden, Vansittart and Montague Norman of the Bank of England. Goerdeler told his hosts of an approaching "unavoidable confrontation between Hitler and the conspirators," giving the impression that plans for a coup were well under way.

That December, Ribbentrop submitted to Hitler a confidential analysis of attitudes in Britain. He warned that the English were by no means weak and decadent and would go to war were German ambitions considered a threat to their empire. In secret discussions with Vansittart, Churchill and British diplomats, Weizsäcker falsely claimed the opposite, that Ribbentrop was advising the Führer that London was too spineless to seriously oppose the Reich.

During the Sudetenland crisis in the summer of 1938, the resistance attempted to persuade the British to reject Hitler's proposed territorial revisions. Its envoy, Kleist-Schmenzin, was a patrician landowner and monarchist. He enjoyed a certain reverence among peers for his fight to reduce the wages of Pomerania's farmers during the 1920s. He once maintained, "The nobility must adhere to the sovereign manner developed over centuries, the feeling of being master, the uncompromising feeling of superiority."

On August 19, Kleist-Schmenzin told Churchill that in the event of war, German generals were prepared to assist in a revolt to establish a new government in Berlin "within 48 hours." The envoy also supplied the British Secret Service with classified information regarding the Reich's defense capabilities. Just as Goerdeler had previously described German rearmament as a "colossal bluff" in London the year before, Kleist-Schmenzin told the English that the German army was unprepared for war. The British agent Jan Colvin wrote later that every single sentence Kleist uttered would suffice on its own to earn him a death sentence for treason.

The back gate of Number 10 Downing Street swung open on the evening of September 7, 1938, to admit Erich Kordt with a private letter from Weizsäcker for Halifax. The German baron wrote of how "the leaders of the army are ready to resort to armed force against Hitler's policy. A diplomatic defeat would represent a very serious setback for Hitler in Germany, and in fact precipitate the end of the National Socialist regime." Thanks to his lofty position in the Reich's Foreign Office, Weizsäcker knew that the Führer's determination to recover the Sudetenland was no bluff. By encouraging London toward a showdown, he hoped to provoke an armed confrontation.

Chamberlain prudently concluded the Munich accord with Hitler on September 30, peacefully transferring the Sudetenland to Germany. The resistance movement considered this a "crushing defeat" for its machinations. Disappointed, Kordt declared that "the best solution would have been war." Undaunted, its members exploited covert diplomatic channels to flood London with more bogus news about Germany. Goerdeler told the English on October 18 how supposedly Ribbentrop was boasting that Chamberlain "signed the death sentence of the British Empire" in Munich: "Hitler will now pursue a relentless path to destroy the empire."

As the Polish crisis charged the diplomatic atmosphere in the summer of 1939, the resistance again poured oil on the fire. After meeting with Danzig's Commissioner Burckhardt in June, the British diplomat Roger Makins stated in a Foreign Office memo, "Great Britain should continue to show an absolutely firm front. This is the course advocated by Baron von Weizsäcker and by most well-disposed Germans." Assistant Undersecretary Sargent summarized, "Weizsäcker is constant in his advice that the only thing which makes Hitler see reason is the maintenance of a firm front and no premature offer to negotiate under pressure." Weizsäcker, the number-two man in German foreign affairs, contributed to the inflexibility of the other side.

The resistance continued to supply Chamberlain with descriptions alleging the desperate economic situation in Germany, Hitler's unpopularity and the army's readiness to mutiny. The better-informed British emissaries in Berlin maintained a sober perspective. Henderson's subordinate, Ogilvie-Forbes, wrote Halifax about the conspirators on July 4, 1939: "I have a deep-rooted mistrust of their advice and their information. They are quite powerless to get rid of the Nazi leaders by their own efforts and they place all their hopes for this purpose in war with England and the defeat of Germany. One can have little respect for or confidence in Germans for whom the destruction of a regime is a higher

aim than the success in war of their own country.”

Despite such warnings, Henderson saw with dismay how his government based some policy decisions on intelligence provided by the resistance movement. To be sure, Chamberlain was aware of the risk posed by war. An all-out conflict with Germany would compel England to seek American aid, increasing U.S. influence abroad. Waging war against the Reich was therefore contingent on an immediate collapse of enemy resistance. Told by conspirators in August 1939 that German generals anxiously await London’s declaration of war so that they can topple the government, and that Hitler is on the verge of a nervous breakdown, Britain’s prime minister reacted. The director of the Central European Section of the British Secret Service, Sigismund Best, recalled, “At the outbreak of the war our Intelligence Service had reliable information that Hitler faced the opposition of many men who occupied the highest functions in his armed forces and his public offices. According to our information, this opposition movement had assumed such proportions as to be able to lead to a revolt and overthrow the Nazis.”

French Foreign Minister Bonnet wrote in his memoirs, “We expected an easy and rapid victory. The declaration of war by England and France on Germany of September 3 was supposed to clear the way for the military coup so sincerely promised to us.” General Gamelin told Benoist-Mechin, “I don’t anticipate having to deal with the German army. Hitler will be ousted the day we declare war.” Right after the war’s start, Chamberlain noted in his diary, “What I hope for is not a military victory – I doubt very much that this is possible – but a collapse of the German home front.”

The Early Campaigns

Germany’s campaigns in World War II are a popular subject for study by historians and military analysts; however, when researching Hitler’s strategies, successes and failures, few take into account the pernicious influence of the resistance movement. Just as turncoats in the diplomatic service helped block an understanding with England in 1939, high-ranking members of the army consistently disrupted the war effort once hostilities opened. Though less than five percent of German army officers identified with those betraying their country,¹⁹ the unfaithful few often occupied positions in planning and logistics, enabling them to cause havoc disproportionate to their number. The Gestapo eventually maintained a watch list but generally did not investigate the army. This allowed subversion of combat operations to continue virtually undetected. The Prussian aristocrat Fabian von Schlabrendorff, a staff officer and remorseless saboteur, expressed the spirit of the plotters: “Preventing Hitler’s success under any circumstances and through whatever means necessary, even at the cost of a crushing defeat of the German realm, was our most urgent task.”

Appointments to key posts in the general staff gained the conspirators insight into military strategy as it was formulated, information they communicated to the enemy. The former army chief of staff, Haider, testified in 1955, “Almost all German attacks, immediately

after being planned by the OKW, became known to the enemy before they even landed on my desk." The German armed forces lacked the element of surprise from the first day of the fighting. On August 30, 1939, two days before Germany invaded Poland, Kleist-Schmenzin delivered the detailed operational orders to the British embassy in Berlin with instructions to "pass this on to Warsaw." Chamberlain duly forwarded the document to Colonel Beck. A few months after the Polish campaign, a member of the Reich's Foreign Office in Berlin who was smuggling microfilm was arrested by the SD. The film contained precise information about the strength and locations of the German occupational forces in Poland. The former SD chief wrote later, "In the OKW they were more than a little surprised at such an accurate and comprehensive report, especially as the statistics were correct to the smallest detail." He speculated that "only senior German officers" could have provided the material.

Among the loosely-affiliated subversive groups, military intelligence, the Abwehr, was especially destructive. Its chief, Canaris, was a master of disinformation. In his memoirs, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz stated that the Abwehr "delivered not a single useful report about the enemy throughout the entire war." Canaris recruited the equestrian monarchist Hans Oster to run the Central Department of the agency. A general staff officer during World War I, Oster had left the army in 1932 for violating its code of honor. Canaris reinstated him as an ersatz lieutenant colonel in 1935. When war broke out anew, Oster began drawing acquaintances hostile to the state into the Abwehr as "specialists." From October 1939 on, Oster furnished copies of every agency report, plus whatever could be obtained from the OKW, to the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Colonel Gijsbertus Sas. He urged Sas to use the information to reinforce Holland's defenses against Germany and to relay the reports to the Western powers. On April 3, 1940, Oster provided him the details of the imminent German invasion of Norway in order for him to forewarn Oslo.

One month later, Oster gave Sas the target date of the German surprise offensive in the West. The Dutch disbelieved the information. Similarly instructed, Belgian Ambassador Adrien Nieuwenhuys opined skeptically, "No German would do something like that!" Believing to have tipped the Allies off in time, Oster calculated that the abortive offensive would cost the German army 40,000 dead. In his own words, he still considered himself "a better German than all those who run after Hitler."

Canaris not only protected Oster, but betrayed military secrets on his own. The fact that he had served as a U-boat captain during World War I did not prevent Canaris from providing the British Secret Service with details of German submarine development during the 1930's. Senior Abwehr officers profited from the war, accepting bribes in exchange for draft deferments, and the police arrested Hans von Dohnanyi, a "specialist" recruited by Oster, for public graft. Abwehr directors in Munich sold paintings, tapestries and currencies on the black market. Canaris himself arranged for his agency courier plane to regularly fly in fresh strawberries for himself from Spain.³⁰ Abwehr corruption and incompetence became so rife that Hitler eventually relieved the crafty admiral of his post and placed the agency under Himmler.

The house-cleaning, however, was far off in 1940, when Canaris struck another serious blow to the German cause. After London rejected Hitler's generous peace offer that July, the Führer contemplated how to continue the war against England. Considering an amphibious invasion of the British Isles too risky, he decided to attack the enemy's overseas possessions. Capture of the British base at Gibraltar, controlling the nautical lifeline to Egypt and the Suez Canal, was an option. Not only would the conquest virtually cripple England's position in the Mediterranean, but the operation was within Germany's resources. Prerequisite was Spain entering the war on the German side, and Madrid already favored Germany and Italy. In July 1940 the Spanish head of state, Francisco Franco, publicly stated, "Control of Gibraltar and expansion into Africa is both the duty and the calling of Spain." On the 19th, he announced his willingness to declare war on Britain, adding, "In this case, some support by Germany would be necessary for the attack on Gibraltar." Hitler could transfer troops to southern Spain to stage the expedition against the strategic English base. Berlin sent Canaris to negotiate the alliance because of his good relations with prominent Spaniards. In collusion with Weizsäcker, however, he accomplished the opposite by privately informing Franco that Germany's position was desperate, with almost no hope of winning the war. He advised his host to keep Spain neutral, reassuring him that Hitler would not send troops into Spain to force Madrid's cooperation. Had Canaris persuaded Franco to support the Reich, "It's more than possible that such a decision by Spain at this moment would have meant the end of the war," wrote Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suner. With Germany's position thus strengthened, Hitler would have possessed a more formidable hand when dealing with Molotov that November. He may have been able to resolve his differences with the USSR without resorting to arms.

Betrayal in the East

Germany possessed a superb intelligence-gathering network for the war in the East. Her specialists had already cracked the complex Soviet radio encryption and monitored its traffic. Since 1934, code breakers at the Hillersleben installation had been tapped into secure telephone lines connecting Moscow to its European embassies. In 1937, the Germans began deciphering Soviet photo-telegraphic communications. In addition to reading diplomatic correspondence, they gained knowledge of Russian armaments production, the location and capacity of the factories and shortfalls in industry. Theodor Rowehl's Long Range Reconnaissance Squadron, subordinate to the Luftwaffe Supreme Command, flew high-altitude missions over the USSR beginning in 1935. Air crews photographed Soviet naval installations, armaments and industrial complexes, military fortifications and troop concentrations. Thousands of pictures of the Russian interior provided ample images to produce accurate maps. In 1947, the USA used Rowehl's photographs to prepare its own maps of the Soviet Union. During the first weeks of the Russian campaign, advancing German troops captured many official documents which Soviet administrators had failed to destroy or evacuate. The cache offered a comprehensive picture of the USSR's

infrastructure, analyses of civilian attitudes and so forth. Luftwaffe communications specialists deciphered Soviet military radio traffic, promptly and consistently delivering details about Russian troop strength, status of available ammunition and fuel, planned aerial and ground attacks and the marching routes of enemy divisions. The post-war American Seabourne Report concluded that German code breakers maintained 80 percent accuracy in their knowledge of all planned Soviet military operations and armaments production.

Monitoring stations forwarded this vast quantity of intelligence to the Abwehr for assessment. Canaris, Oster and fellow conspirators relayed almost none of the findings to Hitler. They instead stored the cache of documents in Angerburg, East Prussia, never evaluated. Military cartographers prepared maps of the East without referencing Rowehl's pictures. Some they based on Russian maps that had been printed in 1865. The German army received inaccurate ones depicting dirt roads, which became impassable quagmires after rainfall, as modern, paved highways. This misinformation often confounded the tactical advance of German mechanized forces. They occasionally approached towns that were not even shown on the maps.

Shortly before the Russian campaign began, members of the German military mission in Rumania had already learned from locals and from Red Army deserters of formidable new Soviet armor sighted during Stalin's occupation of Bessarabia. Witnesses provided details about the Russian KV-I and KV-II heavy tanks plus sketches of a third model that was faster, wellarmored and boasting equally good firepower. Georg Pemler, a reconnaissance flight officer, pored over aerial photographs taken by Rowehl's squadron above the Pruth and Dneestr River areas. He discovered images depicting the mystery tank on railroad flatcars, en route to Red Army units stationed near the Reich's frontier. Called by Pemler to examine the pictures, Rumanian Colonel Krescu told him, "Until now, we thought that this tank is still in development and being tested. That manufacture has progressed so far that the troops are already receiving deliveries, is a discovery of great importance.... The supreme command must be informed of this at once!" Gathering the photographs and relevant data, Pemler personally flew to Berlin to disclose his findings. Intelligence officers accepted his report but did not forward it to the OKW. When the new Soviet tank, the T-34, appeared in battle in June 1941, it shocked German frontline troops. Its innovative sloping armor was too thick for German tank guns to penetrate, and it rendered German anti-tank ordnance obsolete.

While German intelligence concealed Soviet armaments capability from OKW planners, Canaris assured Hitler that only one single-track railroad joined the Russian source of raw materials in the Urals to industrial centers in Moscow. An Abwehr liaison in Rumania, Dr. Barth, told his associate Pemler, "The leadership of the armed forces is grossly underestimating the strength of the Red Army. I personally can't avoid the impression that this is even promoted by certain men. We have confirmed confidential information, for example, that in one particular tank factory around 25 heavy tanks are produced daily. Since then we've identified three such plants.... The chief of the general staff scribbles a question mark here, sending the report back for re-evaluation without informing the

Führer.“

Barth was referring to Haider, who had become chief of staff in September 1938. A post-war “de-Nazification” panel judged Haider’s earlier conduct a “complete betrayal of his country.”⁴¹ After the conquest of Poland in 1939, he formed a secret planning staff to overthrow the government and placed General Heinrich von Stuipnagel in charge, who one German historian described with admiration as an “old-school European nobleman.” Haider urged Hitler to invade Russia, downplaying the hazards of the campaign. On February 3, 1941, Hitler directed Foreign Armies East, a branch of military intelligence, to assess the Red Army’s ability to deploy large formations in the expansive Pripyat marshland. This consisted of swampy terrain in the south-central sector of the future front. Receiving the finished report on the 12th, Haider made an alteration before forwarding it to the Führer. He deleted the assessment’s conclusion that it would be possible for the Russians to shift troops within the marsh, thus posing a threat to the flank and rear of advancing German divisions. Based on this evaluation, the OKH did not allot formations to guard the southern periphery of the wetlands to screen the planned thrust of the German 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army toward Kiev.

Soon after hostilities broke out, the Soviet 5th Army, transferred south via Pripyat’s railroad network, assaulted the open left flank of the German 6th Army. This compelled Hitler to halt the advance on July 10. “The capture of Kiev by the beginning of July 1941, barely three weeks into the campaign, would have been entirely possible but was prevented by strong Soviet forces operating from out of the Pripyat marshlands,” concluded the military historian Ewald Klapdor. Unable to continue the advance without infantry support from the 6th Army, the 1st Panzer Army became deadlocked in costly battles of attrition against frontally attacking Russian divisions for another seven weeks. Two months into the campaign, Hitler remarked that the entire operation would have been planned differently, had he known the enemy’s actual disposition and strength. Once the invasion began, the Soviets received timely reports on German military operations from the Supreme Command of the Army, the OKH, right from Hitler’s headquarters. The communications chief there, General Erich Fellgiebel, secretly installed a direct telephone line to Switzerland to transmit classified information. Stationed in Bern was Hans Gisevius, another of Canaris’ s Abwehr “specialists.” He relayed the reports to Moscow. Other agents in Switzerland such as Rudolf Rössler participated, identified but tolerated by Swiss intelligence. The sophisticated espionage network was nicknamed the Red Orchestra by the SD. Schellenberg wrote later that the information it leaked “could only have come from the highest German sources.” When the SD finally shut down the spy ring in 1942, it arrested 146 suspected operatives in Berlin alone. The courts condemned 86 of them to death for treason. They had transmitted over 500 detailed reports to the Kremlin. In October 1942, the Gestapo arrested 70 more Communist operatives in the Reich’s Air Ministry and in the Bureau for Aerial Armaments.

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army possessed 25,508 tanks, 18,700 combat aircraft, and 5,774,000 soldiers. There were 79,100 cannons distributed among the 303 divisions

deployed in the first and second waves. Hitler took on this force with crucial information withheld, his intelligence agencies consciously understating enemy resources, and officers forewarning the enemy of German attacks. On August 1, five weeks into the campaign, the Red Army deployed 269 divisions, 46 of them armored, and 18 brigades against the invaders. An intelligence report the Führer received two weeks earlier had fixed Russian strength at just 50 rifle divisions and eight tank divisions. On August 10, German soldiers overran the command post of the Soviet 16th Army east of Smolensk. The field police discovered copies of two OKH plans for the German attack. They found another German operational plan upon capturing Bryansk soon after, which the OKH had presented to Hitler on August 18. Gisevius later boasted, "We had our spies all over the war ministry, in the police, in the ministry of the interior, and especially in the foreign office. All threads connected to Oster."

Advance knowledge of German plans helped the Red Army embroil the invaders in heavy fighting around Smolensk in July and August. The Germans regained the initiative when Hitler decided on August 21 to shift his panzer divisions southward toward Kiev. "The senseless operation now decided upon," fumed Haider in his diary, will "scatter our forces and stall the advance on Moscow." The Germans in fact destroyed four Soviet armies and mauled a fifth around Kiev, an immense battle of encirclement, capturing much of the Ukraine. Hitler told his architect Giesler, "I saw in these flanking thrusts and envelopments the only chance of beating the Russian mass-formations.... I had to literally wrest operations away from my generals.... Not even this success persuaded my generals of the only possible strategy in Russia."

Weary of wrangling, the Führer ultimately endorsed Haider's brainchild; a frontal attack against Moscow. Operation Typhoon began on October 1, but deception and sabotage determined the outcome. Quartermaster General Wagner reported the stockpile of provisions for the attack to be "satisfactory." Against the minimum requirement of 24 supply trains per day for Army Group Center, however, between eight and 15 reached the front daily during August, twelve in September. Even during fair weather, hundreds of fully-laden freight trains sat idle in switch yards between Berlin and Krakow. Largely responsible for the delay in supplies were the director of Main Rail Transport South, Erwin Landenberger in Kiev, and the director of Main Rail Transport Center, Karl Hahn in Minsk. Hitler ordered both men arrested for sabotage. Released from Sachsenhausen concentration camp months later, Hahn described himself to another officer as a "mortal enemy of the Nazis." Hitler personally selected their replacements. Erhard Milch and Albert Speer assumed responsibility for getting the trains rolling again. The situation improved within weeks. Speer prioritized locomotive manufacture, while Milch reorganized rail and canal transportation to the front. Milch warned subordinates, "I have permission to hang any railroad official from any tree, including senior managers, and I'll do it!"

Typhoon made progress nonetheless. Northwest of Moscow, the 1st Panzer Division took Kalinin. Instead of wheeling southeast to invest the capital, the troops advanced northward. Eyewitness Carl Wagener recalled, "The capture of Kalinin opened a great

tactical opportunity for us. We now held the cornerstone of Moscow's defense system and could push toward the poorly-secured northern flank of the city. The place was ours for the taking, with good roads and less than a day's travel time. Instead, our panzers and the 9th Infantry Army supporting us received the order to attack the completely insignificant town of Torzhok, more than 100 miles north of Kalinin. We felt that the new directive from the OKH didn't make any sense."

The worst handicap confronting German combatants was the dearth of cold-weather gear. The Reich's industry had manufactured enough quilted winter uniforms to equip at least 56 divisions. Also, prefabricated shelters and barracks heaters had been loaded into 255 freight trains awaiting rail transport east. On November 1, Hitler inspected winter apparel earmarked for the Russian front, and Quartermaster Wagner assured him that the gear was already en route to the field armies in sufficient quantity. Nine days later, Wagner confided to Haider that most quilted uniforms would not go forward until the end of January. They remained loaded on trains in Warsaw for months. Hitler did not learn of the shortages until December 20, when General Heinz Guderian flew in from the central front and told him. Luftwaffe personnel all received cold-weather apparel, only thanks to Milch's personal supervision.

The OKH was no less remiss about advising Hitler of intelligence reports predicting a planned Soviet counteroffensive. During November, the Russians transferred most of their Siberian rifle divisions from the Far East to the Moscow sector. German aerial reconnaissance monitored the augmenting concentration of enemy reserves. Long-range observation planes reported an alarming increase in the number of Soviet transport trains conveying fresh formations to the Kalinin-Moscow sector. The OKH disregarded the information. Sweden supplied the Germans with accurate statistics of the planning and scope of the approaching Red Army offensive, but the Abwehr group receiving this intelligence did not forward it to Berlin.

In mid-November, Foreign Armies East assessed that Soviet divisions are 50 percent understrength, with more than half the officers and men untrained. In fact however, many of the 88 rifle divisions, 15 cavalry divisions and 24 armored brigades about to attack the German lines were well-equipped and at full roster. On the evening of December 4, 1941, only hours before the onslaught began, Foreign Armies East concluded that the combat effectiveness of the Red Army is insufficient for "the Russian to be capable of a major offensive at this time, unless he introduces significant reinforcements."

At the end of its strength, caught by surprise, the ill-clad German army gave ground that winter. Hitler was exasperated over the failure to realize his strategic concept in the face of opposition from the general staff. He cited "the total underestimation of the enemy, the false reports of enemy reserves and of the strength of his armaments... and incomprehensible treason" as contributing to the German army's first major defeat of the war.

In late October, the Führer directed that the crack 6th Panzer Division and two more

infantry divisions be shifted from France to buttress the Rumanians and the Italians. The OKH delayed the full transfer of these formations until December. It was equally tardy about stationing new Luftwaffe field divisions behind the armies of Germany's allies, as Hitler had called for. The 22nd Panzer Division, which he thought was at full strength, sorely needed replenishment. Of its 104 panzers, just 32 were operational. The OKH concealed this fact from its commander-in-chief.

On September 9 and 16, the war diary of the OKW staff recorded Hitler's orders to reinforce the Italian 8th Army. The diary noted on October 6, "The Führer repeats his anxiety over a major Russian attack, perhaps even a winter offensive in the sector of our allies' armies, driving across the Don toward Rostov. The reasons for apprehension include strong enemy troop movements and bridge-building over the Don in many places." Once more the OKW diary, from November 5: "The feared Russian attack over the Don is again discussed. The number of bridges under construction there is constantly growing. The Luftwaffe wants to show pictures. The Führer orders strong air attacks against the bridge sites and suspects enemy assembly areas in the woods along the banks."

Reconnaissance confirmed Hitler's concerns. From the comparatively high ground they defended southwest of Sirotinskaya, men of the 44th Hoch und Deutschmeister Infantry Division observed concentrations of Soviet troops and materiel along the Don, opposite positions of the Rumanian 3rd Army. In a nearby sector, Russian deserters told Italian interrogators that they had been ordered to remain in concealment during the day. The Abwehr liaison to whom the Italians relayed this intelligence, replied that German aerial observation was more credible and had reported nothing, when in fact, the opposite was true. Max Ladoga, a radioman with the long-range reconnaissance squadron, wrote, "The Russians there are constantly bringing up strong reinforcements. Our daily flights have captured it all, filmed and reported it." The observer Pemler recalled that flight crews sent timely warnings up the chain of command, which no one took seriously.

Other sources delivered details of Red Army preparations. The Abwehr had launched Operation Zeppelin in July 1942, during which hundreds of anti-Communist Russians parachuted behind Soviet lines and provided information to the Germans. Over the next several months, they counted 3,269 railroad trains ferrying Soviet troops toward the Stalingrad combat zone, plus another 1,056 trains carrying war materiel. German aerial reconnaissance discovered on November 10 that the Russians had transferred the 5th Tank Army there as well. On November 11, the commander of Nachrichtenaufklärung 1 (Communications Evaluation Section 1) submitted to the OKH a comprehensive analysis of intercepted Soviet military radio traffic. It identified enemy reserves transferred to the Stalingrad area of operations. The report accurately predicted that that Russians were about to launch a pincer attack to surround the German 6th Army: "The deployment may already be substantially progressing." Foreign Armies East was responsible for assessing these reports. In the spring of 1942, Halder had arranged for his former adjutant, Reinhard Gehlen, to become its chief. Believing like Hindenburg that "Germany should not be governed by a Bohemian corporal," Gehlen later acknowledged actively supporting the

resistance. In August 1942, he reported with a straight face that since the previous February, due to a shortage of officers, the Red Army had not formed a single new combat division.

Gehlen disclosed to Hitler neither the progress of Zeppelin nor the proximity of the 5th Tank Army, which he claimed was stationed far to the north. Even though the Red Army had massed 66 percent of its armor opposite Army Group B, Gehlen warned that the Russians were planning instead to attack near Smolensk farther north. He reassured the Führer's headquarters on November 11, "There is no indication of a possible attack soon.... Available (Soviet) forces are too weak for major operations."

The Russian offensive began on November 19, 1942. Tanks steamrolled the Rumanian positions as Hitler had feared. In a major pincer operation, they drove southward to surround Stalingrad. The Soviet 57th Army plunged headlong into General Hans-Georg Leyser's full-strength, motorized 29th Infantry Division, which counterattacked without authorization from the general staff. Its 55 tanks of Panzer Battalion 129 struck furiously along a railroad line detraining masses of surprised Russian infantrymen and supplies. Sealing off this enemy penetration, the 29th turned southwest to assault the flank of the Soviet 4th Corps. Before the operation began, the division received the suspicious order to break contact and withdraw into the Stalingrad perimeter. This enabled the Russians to continue their encirclement of the 6th Army.

Believing that the Luftwaffe could airlift sufficient supplies into Stalingrad, but also based on Gehlen's report that the Soviets had no reserves left, Hitler decided to supply the trapped garrison by air until a relief operation could be prepared. Junkers transport planes and Heinkel bombers delivered provisions to the 6th Army's airfields and evacuated wounded on return flights out. Organizing the missions was quartermaster Colonel Eberhard Finckh. An active conspirator, he arranged for a substantial number of flights to carry useless cargo. In addition to food, medical supplies and ammunition, the beleaguered troops at Stalingrad received thousands of old newspapers, candy, false collars, barbed wire, roofing paper, four tons of margarine and pepper, 200,000 pocketbooks, shoe laces, spices and so on.

The German army launched a relief expedition on December 13, spearheaded by General Erhard Raus's 6th Panzer Division. Ten percent above full strength, the formation possessed 160 tanks, including Panzer IVs fitted with the new high velocity cannon, 4,200 trucks, 20 heavy armored cars and 42 self-propelled assault guns. The 17th and 23rd Panzer Divisions (which had been weakened by constant fighting that autumn) took part in the operation. The attack progressed to within 30 miles of Stalingrad. Some 50 miles west, Soviet tanks counterattacked and captured the airfield at Morosovskaya, threatening the German flank on the lower Chir River. Instead of dispatching weaker covering units to plug the gap, the high command transferred the 6th Panzer Division to the Chir position. This, in the opinion of the historian and former Waffen SS Lieutenant Heinz Schmolke, was pure overkill: "Two weeks later, I myself was commander of a strongpoint on the Donez River, which was completely frozen over, with two bridges. I held the

position there for ten days and nights against a vastly superior Russian force. No one can tell me that the Chir front could not have held out one more day, until contact with the surrounded 6th Army was established." When on December 23 the 6th Panzer Division received the incomprehensible order to withdraw from the relief operation, its officers at first assumed it to be a mistake. Deprived of this armored spearhead, the remaining units proved too weak to press the attack toward Stalingrad. Shortly before his death in the 1950's, Raus expressed the torment his conscience still suffered for not disobeying the order and continuing the advance. There were 220,000 German soldiers and foreign auxiliaries on the 6th Army's roster in mid-January 1943, two weeks before the garrison surrendered. Six thousand survived Soviet captivity.

The battle of Stalingrad not only proved a crushing military defeat for Germany but, for her civilian population, became the psychological turning point of the war. In 1948, former Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller summarized the dissonance in the Führer's headquarters: "Many older officers of high rank sabotaged Hitler's plans.... Although I'm no military expert, I know that Hitler was right about military matters more often than these people. Hitler would issue an order, and because some general would find Hitler personally offensive, this officer would indirectly disobey the order. Then when a disaster occurred, the same man and his friends dumped the blame on Hitler. And they often lied right to his face."

Herbert Brunnegger, serving in the SS Totenkopf division, recalled that the day before the offensive, "Two deserters, waving a white flag, come over to us from the Pirol woods. . . . The deserters tell us what we still don't know; the scope and exact timetable of our offensive!" During the battle, Brunnegger continued, "I learn from one of our artillery officers that this operation was already postponed twice because the attack schedule had been betrayed." Hitler called off the slow-moving, costly advance in less than two weeks.

The fighting at Orel-Belgorod coincided with Anglo-American landings in Italy. This compelled the OKW to transfer troops to the Mediterranean theater, so the Red Army went over to the offensive. It never relinquished the strategic initiative for the balance of the war. Traitors on the general staff continued to work for their country's defeat. General Rudolf Schmundt said this of the plotters: "They stick together through thick and thin, sabotage the Führer's orders whenever they can, naturally in such a way that the evidence never points to them. They're always scattering sand in the machinery of our armed forces. Each one watches the other's back. Officers who don't belong to their clique they try to banish to some insignificant post."

In the summer of 1944, law enforcement authorities cracked the resistance movement and began trying the ringleaders for treason. One of the defendants, the former social democrat Wilhelm Leuschner, testified about a conversation he had once had with Ludwig Beck. A general staff officer during World War I, Beck had become chief of staff in 1935. He had retired from active service before the second war, but the former general still intrigued against Hitler. His fellow plotters considered him the military head of the anti-government movement. Leuschner's recollection of Beck's words, quoted here, offer

disturbing insight into the designs of these so-called Germans: "Beck explained that there are now enough people we can depend on in positions of command on the eastern front, that the war can be controlled until the regime collapses. They arrange, for example, retreats of their units without ever informing neighboring formations, so that the Soviets can penetrate the gap and roll up the front on both sides. These neighboring units are therefore also forced to retreat or are captured."

The following illustrates what it meant to be captured by the Red Army, as Leuschner so indifferently described. In June 1944, the Soviets began a major offensive against Army Group Center. The Germans had shifted reinforcements too far south, to the sector where Gehlen had falsely warned that an enemy operation would take place. Foreign Armies East apparently took no notice of the 138 Soviet divisions and 5,200 tanks (in all 2.5 million Russian soldiers), massed opposite Army Group Center. The army group's first general staff officer, a tenanted aristocrat named Henning von Tresckow, had gradually filled the entire staff with anti-Hitler officers.

The Russian attack, Army Group Center's report for the first day stated, was "a complete surprise, since according to the current evaluation of the enemy, no one presumed such massing of enemy forces." In the path of the Soviet juggernaut was the fully operational German 4th Army. Much according to Beck's recipe for defeat, it received no orders; nor was it informed of the plight of neighboring formations. In the words of historian Rolf Hinze, it suffered from an "inexplicable lack of direction" from the headquarters of Army Group Center. Tresckow made no effort to reestablish communications or to airlift supplies. His staff dispatched not one observation plane to reconnoiter the progress of advancing enemy mechanized forces, which would have been necessary for determining a retreat route for the 4th Army. The Germans lost a total of 350,000 men during the Soviet offensive, of which 150,000 became prisoners of war. Roughly half of these men soon died from shootings along the march to collection areas, starvation or neglect during the torturous rail journey, jammed into freight cars, toward the Russian interior. The Soviets paraded 57,600 survivors through Moscow. The mob lining the street cursed, threatened and spat at the helpless prisoners. This was the fate that Tresckow, Gehlen, Beck and company visited upon their countrymen who wore the same uniform.

D-Day Normandy

Throughout the struggle against the USSR, the German soldier fought in the Mediterranean theater as well. First engaged in Libya and in the Balkans, he eventually defended Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy against slowly advancing Allied forces. He also guarded Europe's Atlantic coast in preparation for the Anglo-Americans' long-heralded invasion. Until the Allied troops that were massing in England crossed to Normandy on June 6, 1944, the German garrison in France experienced comparative tranquility. Pre-invasion France was a suitable environment for subversive staff officers to reinforce their position without distraction. They transferred abettors to the corps and divisional headquarters where the

armed forces were most vulnerable, and contrived to coordinate their sabotage with the Western Allies. The resistance liaison agent was Count Helmuth von Moltke, a wealthy landowner hoping “to exterminate the National Socialist ideology.” He maintained contact with Goerdeler, Halder and Beck, and told an English acquaintance in 1942 that he and his friends consider a “military defeat and occupation of Germany absolutely necessary for moral and political reasons.”⁹¹ Canaris sent Moltke to Istanbul the following year to establish contact with the Americans. There he met with two professors affiliated with the U.S. intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

After the interview, the pair submitted a report to OSS chief Bill Donovan, describing “the readiness of a powerful German group to prearrange and support military operations of the Allies against Nazi Germany.” The OSS drafted the “Hermann Plan,” based on negotiations with Moltke, which it forwarded to the Allies’ combined chiefs of staff. It stated that the German group is prepared “to develop as far-reaching a military plan of cooperation as possible with the Allies . . . so that rapid, decisive success on a wide front is secured.” Moltke’s accomplices offered to fly a general staff officer to England “to arrange with the western Allies the opening of the German west front” in case of a planned invasion.

U.S. records on the progress of the negotiations remain classified to this day. Washington withholds the names of German contact persons and agents who never came to light through arrest by the Gestapo, post-war admission in personal memoirs and interviews or by accident. In October 1945, representatives of the U.S. military government in Germany and the War Department convened to discuss “views on documents which should be destroyed, or to which the Germans were to be denied all future access.” The conference chairman, Lieutenant Colonel S.F. Gronich, recommended, “Serious consideration must be given to plans for the organized destruction of papers which possess no value for the Allies, and . . . which must not be permitted to fall into German hands after the departure of the occupational forces.”

Among the inaccessible records are those pertaining to U.S. collusion with German subversives before and during the Normandy invasion. The reader must decide whether incidents cited below, in which German command centers issued orders which were militarily incomprehensible given the tactical situation, are the product of pre-arranged sabotage or examples of gross misjudgment by well-trained and thoroughly experienced professional staff officers. Prior to the beginning of Operation Overlord, the Allies’ code name for the invasion, the Germans possessed a communications, espionage and reconnaissance network capable of discerning the enemy’s plans well in advance; technicians in the German Postal Investigation Office had even tapped into the Atlantic cable. In early 1944, they monitored a conversation between Churchill and Roosevelt about the approaching landings. At the same time, a specially-trained SD agent parachuted into England from a captured B-17 bomber. He had been reared in the United States, so the German-born operative could convincingly pose as a British officer of engineers. Arriving in Portsmouth, he visited unit after unit inquiring about how he could improve the troops’ equipment.

He supplied Berlin with detailed messages regarding invasion preparations using a radio transmitting a virtually untraceable signal.

April 1944, the U.S. 4th Division conducted a mock landing, Operation Tiger, at Slapton Sands, to simulate the planned attack on Utah beach along the Normandy coast. The German operative sent his superiors advanced warning of the exercise, where a large number of ships and troops would be concentrated in broad daylight. He even transmitted the precise location of the building where U.S. Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley intended to observe the maneuver. Though the 9th Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe had enough bombers available to launch a surprise raid on the Allied ships as the SD agent recommended, it neglected the opportunity. On the second day of the exercise, German speed boats attacked on their own initiative, torpedoing four large landing ships, causing the death of hundreds of Allied troops. The question of whether the Allies would land at Calais, where the English Channel is most narrow, or further south at Normandy, supposedly tormented German intelligence. In February 1944, an Arado 240 twinengine observation plane joined the 3rd Test Formation, an air force reconnaissance unit. Thanks to its exceptionally high speed, the Arado began safely flying two to three missions daily over English ports. Curiously, the Luftwaffe staff abruptly transferred it to Reconnaissance Squadron F100 on the eastern front in March, depriving the Atlantic defenses of this valuable spotter.

Though incapable of the Arado's performance, Messerschmidt 410 and Bf 109 combat aircraft were able to patrol the English coast during variable weather, descending from a high altitude to gain speed. The pilots identified hundreds of landing vessels assembled at Southampton and Portsmouth on April 25. They discovered no similar concentration in the English harbors of Dover and Folkestone, which were opposite Calais. German signals personnel monitoring enemy radio traffic between Plymouth and Portsmouth established beyond any doubt that these ports were the staging zones for an invasion army. Nevertheless, the general staff took no corresponding measures, such as transferring more troops to Normandy or laying nautical mines. The Germans also employed a captured American Thunderbolt fighter to photograph the enemy ship build-up that spring. Shortly before D-Day, the Allied landings on June 6, however, the OKW suspended all reconnaissance flights over England without explanation. At Tourcoing, headquarters of the German 15th Army, Lieutenant Colonel Helmut Meyer operated a sophisticated radio monitoring station. Its 30 specialists were each fluent in three languages. They intercepted English radio traffic on June 1, 2, 3, and 5 announcing the invasion. This discovery Meyer sent up the chain of command, but no one alarmed the front-line units."

In May 1942, Hitler had ordered the systematic construction of fortifications along the Western European coastline. In addition to large artillery emplacements reinforced by thick concrete walls, his plan called for a myriad of smaller steel and concrete structures. These included shallow, one-man wells to conceal machine gunners, bunkers for anti-tank or anti-aircraft guns, protected storage for munitions and shelters for personnel. The building of this Atlantic Wall, defending the beaches of Calais, Normandy and Brittany,

consumed immense quantities of cement and iron, and employed thousands of artisans and laborers. In May 1943 alone, 260,000 men were at work on the project. Defending the coast was Army Group B, consisting of the German 7th and 15th Armies. The commander of the army group, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, believed that the invasion should be repulsed right on the beaches. Were the invaders to penetrate inland, the German army would succumb to their quantitative superiority and control of the skies.

The basic plan was that once the enemy landed, the coastal artillery and front-line infantry divisions would keep him pinned down until German armored formations could counter-attack. The Allies intended to land 20,000 men in the first wave, and have 107,000 ashore by the second night of the invasion. The German 7th Army, which would bear the brunt at Normandy, was 128,358 men strong. Many were veterans of earlier campaigns, occupying numerous fortified, well-concealed positions constructed of solid building materials. The 91st Airborne Division, comprising another 10,555 men, supplemented this force. The OKW subordinated the 4,500-man Parachute Rifle Regiment 6 to the 91st. This was a superbly trained and resolutely led formation especially suitable for combating Allied paratroopers.¹⁰¹ Supporting the 7th Army were three armored divisions comprising 56,150 men, and the Germans had three more Panzer divisions in western France. By all estimates, the defenders, even considering Allied air power, had sufficient forces on hand to repel the invasion. In fact, the American chief of staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, estimated that there was a 50 percent chance the Allies would be unable to hold the Normandy beachhead.

During the final weeks before D-Day, German staff officers neglected opportunities to strengthen the Atlantic Wall and arranged troop and supply movements that substantially weakened its defensive capabilities. One German surveillance unit infiltrated French resistance cells with 35 of its operatives. They furnished Colonel Oskar Reile, the unit's commander, with a list of lines of communications, power stations, rail and traffic junctions, and fuel depots the French planned to sabotage once the invasion was under way. They also revealed the locations of where partisans intended to ambush German troops en route to the combat zone. Reile delivered a comprehensive, written report to General Heinrich Stuipnagel, the military commander in France. The report included the prearranged sentences the BBC would broadcast to alert the French resistance that the invasion fleet is at sea. Stuipnagel, however, was secretly attempting to win the cooperation of this Communist-oriented terrorist organization for the coup against Hitler. He took no action on Reile's information.

Rommel implored the OKW to release several million French-made teller mines in storage since the 1940 campaign. He wished to incorporate them into the network of wire obstacles along the beaches. After months of stalling, the OKW delivered them a couple of days before the invasion, too late to emplace. The Germans' own coastal mines, equipped with both magnetic and pressure detonators and difficult to disarm, had been in production since 1943. Some 2,000 of these powerful explosive devices had been stowed in an underground airplane hangar at Le Mans, but instead of using them to mine

coastal waters, supply personnel received orders to transfer the mines to Magdeburg, Germany, as a "precaution against sabotage."

On May 15, 1944, the German high command transferred the second group of Fighter Squadron 26 from Normandy to Mont-de-Marsan in southern France. Only days before the invasion, it also relocated elements of Fighter Squadron 2 to airfields around Paris. The Luftwaffe still possessed 183 FW190 daylight fighters in camouflaged bases near the coast, but on June 4, 26th squadron commander Joseph Priller received orders to fly another 124 fighters to Mont de Marsan in southern France, far from Normandy. Ground personnel and ordnance would travel there by truck, hence temporarily neutralizing the squadron's combat effectiveness.

Priller telephoned General Werner Junck, chief of the 2nd Fighter Corps and protested, "This is just pure insanity! If we're expecting an invasion, the squadrons have to be here, not gone away somewhere. And what happens if the attack takes place right during the move? . . . Are you all nuts?" Junck brusquely replied that his irate subordinate cannot judge "important developments of state" from the perspective of a squadron commander. On the morning of June 6, Colonel Priller and his wing man, Sergeant Heinz Wodarczyk, strafed the first wave of the Allied landing forces. Two FW190s were all that the Luftwaffe could scramble after years to prepare a defense.

The Germans concentrated a substantial amount of artillery on the Atlantic Wall, whose crews conducted frequent firing exercises. Many batteries rested in massive concrete bunkers that could withstand repeated hits from naval or aerial bombardment. Observation posts and range finders were in reinforced emplacements to direct the fire. However, ten days before D-Day, orders came to move over half the artillery ammunition into storage in St. Lo, and the crews of the observation bunkers received instructions to dismount all range finders for immediate shipment to Paris for inspection.¹⁰⁹ On June 6, German coastal gunners had to fire on Allied warships by sighting down the barrel. Once the invasion began, the gun crews received deliveries of ammunition from the St. Lo arsenal. Projectiles were often of the wrong caliber. One 88mm battery was issued a load of special rounds for spiking the barrels.

One of the worst disadvantages for the defenders was the absence of senior officers the morning of June 6. The day before, the commander of the 7th Army, General Friedrich Dollmann, had ordered all divisional, regimental, and artillery chiefs to Rennes to take part in war games. He also personally postponed an alarm exercise for his army scheduled for the night of June 5/6. Had the drill run its course, the troops would have been on full alert when the invaders came. Other commanders were on inspection tours, hunting, or visiting Paris nightclubs. Even Rommel was away. His chief of staff, General Hans Speidel, was an active conspirator, and had encouraged Rommel to return to Germany for a family birthday party. Among the few generals to remain at his post was Dietrich Kraiss, who kept his 352nd Infantry Division on alert on his own initiative. Defending "bloody Omaha" beach, his men inflicted serious losses on the first waves of U.S. troops.

The trump card of the German defense scenario was armor. During 1943, the Waffen SS established two new tank divisions, the 9th Hohenstaufen and 10th Frundsberg. Formed into the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser, their mission was to help repulse an invasion in the west, and their training emphasized countermeasures against airborne and nautical landings with enemy air superiority. In March 1944, despite Hitler's misgivings, the OKW transferred the corps to the southern Ukraine to rescue General Valentin Hube's surrounded 1st Panzer Army. Hausser's divisions accomplished the task, but the supreme command kept them in the Ukraine as an army reserve. The OKW shifted the corps from sector to sector, performing no useful purpose and disrupting training.

Corporal Franz Widmann recalled, "Then comes the report from the western front on June 6 that the Allies have landed in Normandy. We, the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg, who had drilled and prepared for this landing for months, sat around in Russia doing nothing and waited for the Russians to attack." Finally on June 12, Hausser received orders to return with his corps to France. The fatiguing rail journey across Europe ended over 150 miles from the invasion front. Since the June nights were short, much of the road march west took place in daylight. This not only exposed the vehicles to attacks by enemy fighter-bombers but the inordinate driving distance reduced engine life of the tracked vehicles by half.

The army's most formidable formation was the Panzer-Lehrdivision. Its 229 fully operational tanks included upgraded Panzer IV's and highperformance Panthers. The division had 658 armored half-tracks serving as personnel carriers or mounting anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, flame throwers, and cannons. The OKW stationed this mechanized monolith nearly 100 miles from the Normandy coast. On June 4, the high command ordered the division to load its Panther tanks onto a freight train for transfer to Russia. They were en route east when the invasion began. "Taking away the Panther battalion robbed the division of its strongest attack force," wrote its last commanding officer after the war.¹¹⁴ The U.S. Army later calculated that it averaged a loss of five Sherman tanks to neutralize a single Panther in combat.

Shortly before 10:00 pm on the evening of June 5, 1944, naval personnel manning the German radar station at Paimbeouf near St. Nazaire discovered a large concentration of ships making south from England. Radio operator Gerhard Junger recalled, "It was clear to every one of us that the long awaited invasion had begun." The radar stations at Le Havre and Cherbourg also monitored the Allied armada, reporting its movement to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief West, Gerd von Rundstedt, in Paris. They further intercepted American meteorological predictions transmitted to U.S. bomber squadrons, which normally did not fly nocturnal missions. At 3:09 am on June 6, the navy reported "hundreds of ships course south" to the Supreme Command West. The Luftwaffe signals company on the isle of Guernsey off the Normandy coast identified 180 Lancaster bombers towing gliders toward the mainland at 10:40pm. The commander of a German army regiment on the island was duly notified, and relayed the information to an adjutant at his corps headquarters in St. Lo. Having hosted guests that evening at Army Group

B headquarters in La Roche-Guyon, Speidel received word from General Erich Marcks' army corps of Allied airborne landings in five different areas, another report from the Navy Group West of paratroopers dropping in sectors defended by the German 716th and 711th Infantry Divisions, confirmation from Major Förster about the situation developing near the 711th and a Luftwaffe report that 50-60 transport machines were ferrying in enemy paratroops. Speidel did not alarm his divisions. When Rundstedt's staff telephoned Speidel for clarification, he replied that "the reports are considered exaggerations." Army Group B headquarters wrote them off as "possibly confused with flight crews bailing out." The commander of the 716th Infantry Division, General Wilhelm Richter, wrote that there was no alert until Allied paratroopers were already in action. The chief of staff of OB West, Günther Blumentritt, justified not sounding the alarm to avoid "unnecessarily disturbing the troops, who...need time to sleep."

Once the landings were under way, Rundstedt formally requested immediate release of the three armored divisions in Normandy from the OKW reserve for deployment at the front. From Hitler's headquarters General Alfred Jodl refused, explaining, "according to the reports I've received, this attack can only be a feint. ... I don't think now is the time to release the OKW reserves." In Rommel's absence, Speidel had persuaded the Führer's headquarters by telephone that until the situation becomes "clarified," the OKW has to "keep its nerve and wait." Rundstedt's chief of operations, Colonel Bodo Zimmermann, telephoned the OKW to protest the senseless delay. The OKW's Baron Horst von Buttlar-Brandenfels, another general conspiring against the government, shouted in reply, "You have no right without our prior permission to alarm the armored troops. You are to halt the panzers at once!"

The OKW posted the weakest of the three reserve armored divisions, the 21st, closest to the coast. Despite the urgings of its commanding officer to authorize an attack against British paratroopers who had landed nearby, Speidel denied permission at 4:30am to commit the division's panzer regiment. The formation remained concealed in a wooded area for hours. Finally released by the 7th Army to attack the drop zone, Panzer Regiment 22 began rolling at 8:00am. Speidel soon directed it to aboutface and advance toward the coast, keeping the troops on the road and out of action for much of the day. The 21st suffered repeated aerial attacks and lost 50 tanks on the march. It ultimately attacked on direct orders from Rommel, who had just returned to Normandy. Speidel had briefed his commander-in-chief on the situation in a telephone conversation at 10:15 am. The marshal's arrival late that evening put an end to his chief of staff's dilatory tactics. Speidel had however, effectively sabotaged the timely deployment of three armored divisions. During midday on June 6, he also refused requests by General Max Pemsel to reinforce the hard-pressed 716th Infantry Division, defending the east bank of the Orne River, with elements of a neighboring formation. The division was practically wiped out by nightfall.

The 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend was alerted by its commanding officer at 2:30am and by the OB West at 4:00. On his own initiative, Speidel sent the division in the wrong direction. In position near Lisieux, it received his instructions to transfer 30

miles further from the coast. "The order had a shocking effect" on the troops, wrote its first general staff officer, Hubert Meyer, after the war. A new directive arrived for the division to about-face and advance toward Caen late in the afternoon. "That meant a change of direction, more time lost and for our strung-out armored unit, one more day's march under rotten conditions," recalled the Panther crewman Georg Jestadt. "We had the impression that the whole movement of our army's components was like an anthill someone had struck with a stick." Jestadt reflected on the corresponding influence on morale: "Disappointment, even anger spread among the men. Almost every soldier saw that something here just isn't right." Heinz Schmolke, a company commander in the division's Panzer Grenadier Regiment 26, wrote later, "The troops and frontline officers of all ranks knew back then that the enemy had to be driven back into the sea in his moment of weakness; that is during the first hours after the landings.... My regiment only went into action on the third day of the invasion, although we could have engaged the enemy within the first three hours."

The *modus operandi* of various army staffers was to keep the troops on the roads as long as possible, often exposing the men to strikes by Allied aircraft. As columns of the Panzer-Lehrdivision approached Caen, according to a surviving officer, "they were discovered by enemy aerial reconnaissance and a short time later attacked with machine guns, rockets, and bombs. . . . Soon black pillars of smoke from the burning vehicles revealed the route for fresh waves of fighter-bombers. Even today, many years later, recalling this march causes nightmares for everyone who participated." The division lost ten percent of its strength before reaching the combat zone. Despite the protests of its commanding officer, Fritz Bayerlein, Dollmann had ordered the Panzer-Lehrdivision to advance on Caen at 5:00pm, in broad daylight, after having withheld its marching orders for nine hours.

On D-Day, Rommel ordered the transfer to Normandy of the fullymotorized 3 Flak Corps, quartered south of Amiens, but the corps commander, General Wolfgang Pickert, only learned of the invasion well into the afternoon. He first had to drive to Paris to get confirmation. His batteries, which were also effective against armor, did not reach the front until June 8 and 9.¹³¹ Even arriving late, the corps shot down 462 aircraft and destroyed over 100 Allied tanks.

One staff officer who played a primary role in thwarting German countermeasures at Normandy was Colonel Alexis Freiherr von Roenne. As chief of Foreign Armies West and a protégé of Gehlen, he sought to deceive Hitler, Rommel, and Rundstedt through bogus reports that the Normandy operation was a feint intended to divert German formations from Calais, further to the north where the real invasion was supposedly about to take place. General Eisenhower had hoped to mislead the defenders through operation Fortitude, consisting of false reports about a fictitious "First U.S. Army Group" waiting in reserve in England to launch an invasion at Calais. Roenne came by this information as the Allies had intended. He forwarded it to the OKW, but not before drastically inflating the number of American divisions beyond that which U.S. intelligence had fabricated on

June 2. Receiving Roenne's analysis, Speidel's staff actually increased the tally further. The assessments regarding the Allies' disposition and plans that Roenne supplied to Army Group B were too consistently inaccurate to have been unintentional. Evidence of surveillance refuting Roenne's mendacious predictions never reached the Führer. At dawn on June 6, Lieutenant Adalbert Bärwolf flew a Messerschmidt Bf 109 model G8 observation plane over the Allied invasion fleet. The photographs he took of the enormous armada off the Normandy coast should have dispelled any doubt that this was the only landing force. The general staff of Army Group B took no action, nor did it forward the images up the chain of command

Staff officers transplanted from the eastern front caused terrible consequences for the German defense at Normandy. In May 1944, General Wagner, remiss in shipping cold weather gear to the troops in 1941, attempted to transfer the entire stockpile of artillery rounds for the 352nd and 716th Infantry Divisions to an army ammunition depot far behind the lines. This was supposedly to increase the amount of munitions in reserve. Only the intervention of General Marcks prevented Wagner from carrying out this suspicious directive, which would have practically crippled the two divisions on D-Day. Wagner appointed Colonel Finckh, who had previously mismanaged supply deliveries to Stalingrad, to quartermaster for Rommel's army in June 1944. Almost immediately, deliveries to the front of fuel and munitions slowed down drastically. The German method of employing French waterways at night to convey materiel remained successful and undetected by the Allies until Finckh interfered. Under his direction, just one tenth of the artillery's allotted ammunition was coming forward, despite sufficient stores in the depots. The troops were receiving only one fifth of the required quantity of other supplies. On July 2, General Alfred Gause reported from Caen that only three to five rounds per gun were available to German batteries per day. Rommel assigned General Friedrich Dihm to investigate the bottleneck. Dihm advised Rommel of Finckh's dereliction of duty. The field marshal wanted Finckh courtmartialled.

Among the supplies that never reached the front, subsequently falling into U.S. hands, were 500,000 gallons of aviation fuel and 175,000 day's rations for the troops, including 2.5 million cigarettes. What German soldiers did receive was often useless. At Carentan for example, transport planes airdropped provisions to Parachute Rifle Regiment 6. The German paratroopers, low on small arms ammunition, found some containers filled with condoms.

Hitler believed that treason played a decisive role in the success of the Allied landings. Regarding the German defense of Cherbourg, Rochus Misch of the Führer's staff recalled, "Pictures reached us from Sweden showing a German colonel in command of a bunker installation defending Naturally without having fired a single shot.... Nothing, absolutely nothing worked right on the German side during the invasion. There was but one explanation; betrayal and sabotage."

In his memoirs, Corporal Otto Henning of the Panzer-Lehrdivision attributes the fall of Cherbourg to "unknown individuals in the Führer's headquarters," who stalled the trans-

fer of fully equipped reserves to Normandy while the 7th Army bled. The eyewitness Henning's verdict: "One can't avoid the impression that here, the most varied orders were intentionally twisted, while other, equally important orders were simply never forwarded." Gestapo chief Müller, perhaps the best informed man in Germany with respect to sabotage, said after the war, "A great measure of the German military's wretched performance in France after the invasion was the result of attempts by the conspirators and their friends to surrender to the Western powers or to let the Americans and the English pass right through our front lines, so that they would reach Germany before the Russians did."

German headquarters staffers failed to alarm front-line units, air crews, and naval forces in a timely manner. They delayed counterattacks, issued frequently conflicting orders, and commanded anti-aircraft batteries to hold their fire during the Allied aerial bombardment of the Le Havre naval base. They transferred combat-ready formations away from the enemy, and plotted against their own government. Speidel, who in Rommel's initial absence directed Army Group B during the critical first stage of the invasion, spent much of the morning of June 6 playing table tennis with fellow staff officers.

It is inconceivable that the German army in France, major component of an experienced combat force accustomed to fighting at unfavorable odds, could function in such chaotic fashion after months of preparation and rehearsal for a crucial battle. In January 1944 by comparison, withdrawing German troops in Italy occupied the Gustav Line south of Rome. Their engineers had begun fortifying it the previous October. Despite being outnumbered in some sectors by Allied forces ten to one, with virtually no armor or air support, the German defenders held their position for four months. At Cassino, the key position on the Gustav Line, a New Zealand division spent four days trying to neutralize a single German panzer concealed in the ruins, suffering nearly 300 men killed. The Germans at Normandy possessed hundreds of panzers and stronger, more systematically prepared defenses, yet forfeited the initiative on the first day of combat.

Stauffenberg

So surreptitious was the German resistance movement, its ruinous influence may never have come to light but for a single incident. A bungled attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, prompted an ongoing state investigation. This exposed the conspiracy to sabotage the German war effort. It led to the death by firing squad, suicide, or execution after trial of 160 plotters. The would-be assassin was Count Claus von Stauffenberg, chief of staff of the Reserve Army since July 1, 1944. There were approximately half a million soldiers, trained and fully equipped, awaiting transfer to the front. In charge of the Reserve Army was General Friedrich Fromm. To weaken the field formations, he contrived ways to delay the deployment of the ersatz troops under his administration. During the first month of fighting in Normandy for example, the Germans suffered 96,000 men killed, wounded or captured. Under Fromm's direction, the western army received

just 6,000 replacements and 17 new tanks. In July, battalions stationed in Holland for the purpose of replacing losses to infantry divisions fighting in Normandy were transferred to southern France instead.

Stauffenberg represented Fromm at the Führer's headquarters in Rastenburg during situation conferences. His job was to report on the progress of replenishing the combat divisions with reserve personnel. Stauffenberg understood his mission as the fabrication of plausible excuses for why only a fraction of the troops languishing in homeland garrisons were moving forward. An officer on Goebbels's staff summarized the deceptive explanations Stauffenberg offered Hitler: "The air raids are responsible, he says. Then only the gas masks are lacking, next the NCOs still have some mandatory course, or a particular type of ammunition isn't available, or rather can't be delivered because of the destroyed transportation network, an arsenal suffered a direct hit where the rifle bolts for a whole regiment were stored. . . . Always at the last minute something gets in the way." Stauffenberg once told fellow plotters that their "allies" were Germany's "military crises and defeats." Stauffenberg concealed in his brief case a time bomb, weapon of choice for terrorists worldwide, and smuggled it into the July 20 conference at Rastenburg. He prudently left the session before the explosion and boarded a courier plane for Berlin. The blast superficially injured Hitler but mortally wounded a stenographer and three officers. Several others among the 24 participants suffered injuries. Among those to die was Rudolf Schmundt; he had recently used his personal influence with the Führer to promote Stauffenberg's lackluster career. Another victim was the staff officer Colonel Heinz Brandt, an opponent of National Socialism whom no one had forewarned of the day's agenda.

At the OKW offices on Bendler Street in Berlin, accomplices awaited news of Hitler's demise to launch *Wälkure*, the coup to overthrow the National Socialist government. There among others were the pensioned General Ludwig Beck, ex-general Erich Hoepner, who had been dishonorably discharged from the army in 1942 for insubordination and cowardice, the retired Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, and General Friedrich Olbricht, who was Fromm's subordinate (Based on the examination of captured German records, the U.S. State Department later established that Olbricht had leaked military secrets to the Red Orchestra via Gisevius). When Stauffenberg arrived, he told his colleagues that the commander-in-chief did not survive the bombing. The plotters therefore set the revolt in motion. Back at Rastenburg, General Fellgiebel, who was privy to the planned assassination, did not contact the Berlin conspirators to warn them of its failure. Instead, he was among the first to congratulate Hitler on his narrow escape from death. Fellgiebel was able to briefly block communications between Rastenburg and the outside world, but could not indefinitely disrupt telephone service. Hitler reached Goebbels in the capital. He also spoke on the line with Major Ernst Remer, commander of the Berlin Watch Regiment. He ordered Remer to arrest the conspirators.

One reason for the coup's rapid collapse was the lack of cooperation the usurpers received from the army. Signals personnel on the Bendler block monitored the Führer's telephone

conversation. Aware of the circumstances, they did not transmit teletype orders formulated by the plotters to military units. Colonel Fritz Jäger, a member of Stauffenberg's circle, visited several barracks to muster a company of riflemen to seize the radio station, the propaganda ministry, and to arrest Goebbels. He could not find a single soldier willing to carry out his orders. Stulpnagel and a handful of like-minded aristocrats supported the coup from their Paris headquarters. They managed to mobilize a battalion of German Security Regiment No. 1 to arrest members of the SD and the Gestapo, including the SS police chief in Paris, Carl Oberg, in their office. Stulpnagel's associates persuaded the battalion's troops that the SD had rebelled against Hitler; only through this fiction did they gain the men's cooperation. In Berlin, one of the teletype orders Witzleben drafted for the army falsely blamed "an unscrupulous clique of party leaders who are nowhere near the front" for the mutiny he himself helped instigate. According to an analysis by a contemporary German historian, "The plotters did not risk openly confessing that the coup was directed against Hitler, but argued instead to be acting supposedly in the name of the dead Führer against an 'unscrupulous clique.' They were themselves not certain in their own cause. They feared that most of the armed forces and the German people stood behind Hitler in their hearts and would therefore not obey them."

Military members of the resistance movement had no connection with the rank-and-file of the armed forces. "They have nothing within them in common with the German soldier," charged the *Völkischer Beobachter* on July 22. Stauffenberg, for example, had never held a combat command. His army driver, Karl Schweizer, testified later that the count had maintained a generous supply of wine, champagne, schnapps, liqueurs and tobacco at both his Berlin residence and his duty office in the war ministry. Lieutenant Colonel Fritz von der Lancken had regularly procured these luxury items, unavailable to the front-line soldier or to the German public in the fifth year of war, for his fellow conspirator. Schweizer stated that he could scarcely remember a day when Stauffenberg did not consume alcohol. The count had also arranged for frequent deliveries to his address of smoked eel, oil sardines and other delicacies through administrative contacts with North Sea fisheries.

The chief of the SD, Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, prepared a series of confidential reports for the Reich's Chancery analyzing the motives of the plotters. After the war, the former resistance member Friedrich Georgi judged the reports to be "absolutely sober and factual, if not of course one-sided." Regarding Stauffenberg, Kaltenbrunner concluded in his September 23, 1944 report that the count and his circle of aristocrats "pursued not only political objectives but social ones, namely to reinstate and maintain the privileged position of a select, socially-connected group of persons."

Major Remer wrote of July 20, "The presumed death of Adolf Hitler left all the officers and also the troops in a state of shock. Never in my life, even after the collapse (in 1945), have I witnessed such profound sorrow." In his post-war autobiography, Günther Adam, a veteran of the SS Hohenstaufen division which was deployed in France that July, included his own recollection: "That evening, after a day of combat, some young

army officers come to us in our command post and tell us that there was an attempt on the life of the Führer that had failed. They said that senior army commanders had been involved. They ask in complete sincerity if they can join us, since they are too ashamed now to be officers of the army." In the opinion of Rolf Hinze, a veteran of the 19th Panzer Division, the assassination attempt came "at the most unfavorable time imaginable, at a time when unified, firm leadership was essential. The troops felt this way regardless of their diverse ideological viewpoints, even among those who inwardly rejected Hitler. Everywhere we heard the expression, 'stab in the back', and were relieved that the Führer's central authority remained intact." The Führer's adjutant, Colonel Nicolaus von Below, stated, "In as much as the senior generals had lost that unswerving confidence in Hitler, in the same measure the ordinary soldier trusted in his leadership. I have no doubt that only this fact held the front together."

Right after the assassination attempt, signals personnel at Rastenburg discovered Fellgiebel's secret telephone line to Switzerland that had served to communicate military intelligence to Soviet agents. The Gestapo questioned staff officers, some of whom were already on the watch list, making arrests when suspicion of subversive activity surfaced. Colonel Below told the Führer of word received from his cousin: Since the roundup began, his army corps on the eastern front was finally receiving supplies at consistent and timely intervals. Discovery of the sabotage "totally depressed" Hitler, Goebbels told an associate. The Führer's personal security officer, Hans Rattenhuber, said this to Giesler: "The betrayal of the fighting front hit him harder than the attempt on his life. He just repeated to us that he has long reckoned with being shot at by someone in this reactionary clique. But something this underhanded he never would have expected from an officer, certainly not this shabby betrayal of the soldier who risks his life every day for Germany."

In the past, Hitler had not acted on warnings from NSDAP subordinates about the general staff's disloyalty. A military liaison officer in the propaganda ministry, Colonel Hans Martin, recalled that Goebbels claimed to "possess a great amount of irrefutable evidence that a defeatist attitude among many officers of the OKW, especially in the OKH, is assuming serious proportions." The Führer nonetheless shielded them from attacks by Goebbels and Himmler. The officers had sworn an oath of fealty to him, and "he firmly believed in their code of loyalty and honor," wrote another Goebbels aid, Wilfred von Oven. Addressing the Rastenburg staff on July 24, Jodl told how whenever suspicions had surfaced about particular officers, Hitler had "laughed it off goodnaturedly... as with the case of General Fellgiebel, who had already brought attention to himself through some of his remarks."

The Führer expressed bitterness over the affair to his staff: "I took over the old officer corps just as it was, preserved its traditions, and respected them," he said. "I advanced the officers' careers and their economic status whenever I could. I recognized their achievements and rewarded them. I promoted and decorated them. Each of them who reported to me I shook hands with as a comrade. And now every officer up to general

who comes to me I have to have searched in a vestibule first, in case he's bringing in some killing device like this Count Stauffenberg, who had nothing better to do than sneak a bomb under my conference table to rid the world of me and his own comrades."

The German public reacted to news of the assassination attempt "with horror and loathing," the former Gauleiter Rudolf Jordan recorded in his autobiography. "In the evening I addressed the population outdoors in the cathedral square in Magdeburg. The whole town took part in this demonstration of loyalty, with deep emotion. It seemed to me that in view of the fateful, life-or-death situation of the war, the people stood behind Adolf Hitler as one." The Lutheran bishop of Hannover, who was personally unsympathetic to National Socialism, publicly condemned Stauffenberg's "criminal scheme."

At Carlshof hospital, Hitler visited officers who had been seriously injured in the July 20 bombing. He offered General Karl Bodenschatz an analysis of the murder plot: "I know that Stauffenberg, Goerdeler, and Witzleben thought through my death to rescue the German nation. . . . But these people really had no fixed plan of what to do next. They had no idea which army would support their coup, which military district would help them. First of all, they had not established contact with the enemy. I've even found out that the enemy refused their offer to negotiate."

Hitler's information was accurate. In April 1941, the Reich's Foreign Office assigned Hans Buwert to manage France's Hachette Publishing House. In late 1942 the Berlin police chief, Count Heinrich Helldorf, and a general staff officer, Count Heinrich Dohna-Tolksdorf, brought him into Stulpnagel's circle. Buwert met with Allied representatives during a trip to Spain and Portugal. "Contact with the Allies turned out badly," he wrote later. In the summer of 1940, the Churchill cabinet had adopted the policy of "absolute silence" toward the German resistance. Even before the war, the British Foreign Office had cautioned against such an alliance. In November 1938, Undersecretary Sargent had warned in a memo, "An open and capable military dictatorship could be even more dangerous than the NS regime."

The subversives encountered another obstacle with respect to the United States. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, Roosevelt publicly announced that the Allies will accept nothing less than the Reich's unconditional surrender. What this portended for Germany, FDR's private notes from December 1944 reveal: **"Whatever measures may be taken against Japan and Germany, they must in any case include the reduction of their industrial output, to prevent them from competing on the world markets against the English, French, Dutch, Belgians, and other exporters, and against us as well."** U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer wrote, "The western Allies made not the slightest attempt to divide the Germans by promising the enemies of the Hitler regime acceptable peace terms."

The Allies' attitude was no secret to members of the resistance movement. Count Ulrich Schwerin von Schwanefeld, a staff officer and determined advocate of Hitler's murder, continued his intrigues even though acknowledging that FDR will not mollify

surrender conditions.¹⁷⁷ Just two days before Stauffenberg bombed Hitler's situation conference, the conspirator Otto John returned from fruitless negotiations with Allied representatives in Madrid. He informed his fellow plotters that even were the Führer dead, unconditional surrender is still in force.¹⁷⁸ He ultimately acknowledged that "the internal German resistance against Hitler was no longer a factor of significance for the political and military strategy of the western powers... in contrast to the resistance in France, which was nurtured by the western powers morally and with all kinds of materiel."¹⁷⁹

The staff officer Tresckow, who described Hitler as "a mad dog that has to be put down," also realized that the demise of his commander-in-chief would have no influence on the Allies' war effort. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, a former conspirator and president of the West German parliament after the war, stated in a 1975 interview, "What we in the German resistance during the war didn't really want to see, we learned in full measure afterward; that this war was ultimately not waged against Hitler, but against Germany." Right after Stauffenberg's botched assassination attempt, British radio stations for Europe broadcast the names of Germans known to the English to be conspiring against Hitler. This enabled the Gestapo to round up the subversives more quickly. A BBC editorial dismissed the coup as a product of Prussia's military caste, the very stratum which the Anglo-Saxons are waging war to eradicate. The German people, the BBC continued, would be deceiving themselves to entrust their leadership to such people. Fritz Hesse, a specialist on English affairs in the German

Foreign Office, monitored the Allied reaction and ventured, "Not much further and the English and American radios would have congratulated Hitler on his survival." The Führer, shocked at the hostility manifest in some Allied news coverage, remarked to Ribbentrop, "These people hate Germany even more than they do me." On July 25, John Wheeler-Bennett, a British historian assisting the Foreign Office in London, submitted a memorandum on the consequences of the recent events at Rastenburg: "It may now be said with some definiteness that we are better off with things as they are than if the plot of July 20 had succeeded and Hitler had been assassinated. . . . The Gestapo and the SS have done us an appreciable service in removing a selection of those who would undoubtedly have posed as 'good' Germans after the war. . . . It is to our advantage therefore that the purge should continue, since the killing of Germans by Germans will save us from future embarrassment of many kinds." Churchill, Eden, and the Foreign Office staff accepted Wheeler-Bennett's viewpoint. An in-house analysis prepared by the OSS also regarded Hitler's escape as a blessing, explaining that it robbed the conspiring German generals of the opportunity to dump the blame for losing the war on him alone.

One German general who clearly understood the Allies' outlook was Walter von Brauchitsch, commander of the army until December 1941. In April 1940, Halder had presented him with a written proposal to overthrow Hitler and reach a settlement with the West. Brauchitsch rebuked him with the words, "What's going on here is pure treason. . . . In wartime this is unthinkable for a soldier. This battle isn't about governments

anyway, but a battle of diametrical ways of life. So getting rid of Hitler will serve no purpose."

A Contrast of Motives

In July 1944, the armed forces journal *Offiziere des Führers* (Officers of the Führer) published an essay by Walter Gross of the Racial Policy Office. It presented the usual argument that bloodlines contribute more to a person's intrinsic characteristics and qualities of leadership than academics and material circumstances. With respect to the military, Gross added this: "On the Führer's orders, the officer's career became open to every German man without consideration of social origin and education. Some expressed misgivings. They saw this as the intrusion of a radical socialist principle, and a danger to the accomplishments and bearing of the officer corps. Dozens of times I've encountered objections to this National Socialist innovation; objections from those who point to the lofty, inherent value of a leadership class cultivated over generations of selecting the best from soldiers' and officers' families." Gross parried this protest with the observation that any traditional, exclusive system stifles the development of unexplored human resources within the nation: "Beyond such socially elevated families, there also rests within a people thousands upon thousands of individuals of comparable aptitude, submerged in the broad masses. They possess the same value to the community and are capable of accomplishing just as much in a particular field as the best of the old, cultivated families. . . . Wherever people with similar and equally precious qualities lie undiscovered, then it is possible and indeed necessary to find them, and place them in communal life. With the right training, they can achieve the utmost they're capable of. . . . The standard for determining whether the inherent prerequisites are present or are lacking, is one and the same for both groups; it lies exclusively in accomplishing the task at hand."

When Hitler reinstated national defense before the war, the men occupying positions of command had entered service during the time of the old army. Many senior officers displayed little imagination or adaptability to warfare's innovations such as armor, aviation, and elastic defense. Their shortcomings became especially apparent in the campaign against Soviet Russia. Some generals lacked the boldness, initiative, and raw nerve to outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight such an imposing military goliath and were dismissed. Replacing them were often men from ordinary backgrounds. Hitler himself stated in January 1944, "More than 60 percent of the new officer corps rose through the ranks, creating a bridge to the hundreds of thousands of workers, farmers and members of the lesser middle class."

Though deprived of imperial privilege, the scions of Germany's distinguished families retained their ancestral honors, and found the same path of opportunity open to them as to all of their countrymen. Most men of their younger generation dutifully entered frontline service during World War II, doing credit to their traditional standing. The inveterate conservatives and reactionaries among the aristocracy gravitated to the diplomatic corps

and to the general staff, where they could inflict maximum damage to the German cause at minimal risk. Solitary and aloof, the resistance movement allied itself with the only group capable of destroying the social revolution that had transformed Germany: the enemy. To topple a form of government, the subversives accepted the enemy's war aims, with all the consequences for their own country.

During a session with the Western Allies in Madrid on April 17, 1944, the conspirator Otto John asked that the demand for unconditional surrender be rescinded. The Anglo-American representatives replied that they intend to allow the Russians to be the first to invade Germany and enter Berlin. The Germans deserve to be punished, they maintained, and the job was better left to the Soviets. The Russians discharged the task as follows: In October 1944, the German 4th Army repulsed an offensive toward Königsberg in East Prussia by the Soviet 11th Guards Army. Recapturing Nemmersdorf, German soldiers discovered 72 murdered civilians, including the ravaged bodies of young women whom the Russians had nailed to barn doors. In Schillmeyszen in the Memel territory, the German artillery gunner Erich Czerkus was among the counterattacking troops re-entering the village, which was his home town. This is what he discovered after the withdrawal of the Soviet 93rd Rifle Corps: "I found my father in a barn, lying face-down with a bullet hole in his neck. In a stall lay dead a man and a woman with their hands tied behind their back, both bound together by a rope. In another farm we saw five children with their tongues nailed to a large table. Despite a desperate search I found no trace of my mother. While looking, we saw five girls bound together with rope. Their clothing was completely stripped away and their backs badly lacerated. It appeared that the girls had been dragged a long distance." The Germans documented countless other atrocities.

The Soviets renewed the invasion of East Prussia in January 1945. They surrounded Königsberg. The German army conducted a relief operation beginning on February 19. Several German divisions, including the 5th Panzer, simultaneously attacked outward from the invested city. In the town of Metgethen, advancing troops recovered the bodies of 32 women whom the Russians had raped, murdered, and thrown into a shell crater. Master Sergeant Kurt Göring, a German tank commander participating in the attack, offered this testimony: "Then we reached Metgethen. We were appalled to see what had happened here. At the rail station was a refugee train standing on the tracks, with women and young girls. They had all been raped and murdered. We wrote on the side of the rail car, 'Avenge Metgethen.' The fighting went on without quarter."

Another eyewitness participating in local German counterattacks was Sergeant Günther Adam, who recalled this: "We attacked and recaptured a town displaying the same crimes of these beasts. On a snow-covered, trampled-down village street was what remained of a young woman. It looked as though she was wearing a fur coat. She was lying on her back, her arms and legs outstretched. (The Soviets) had run her over with a tank and crushed her. This bloody, ground-up mass was frozen solid and the most horrible thing I ever saw during the war.... In a house, we found some men who had been beaten to death. In blood-soaked beds were ravaged women, who were still alive. Then worst of

all, we found the head of a baby spiked to a bed-post.”

Red Army units overrunning German POW camps ruthlessly impressed the Russian inmates into first wave infantry battalions, or treated them as deserters. At the Alt-Drewitz camp, they fired on 30 American prisoners whom the German guards had failed to evacuate, killing some. This was the Soviet army, which Stauffenberg, Olbricht and their associates enabled to enter Germany. The Western powers also waged war against German civilians, but from the air. In July 1943, the British Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army's 8th Air Force conducted several nearly consecutive bombing missions against Hamburg. In the bombardment 30,482 residents perished by being blown apart, incinerated, asphyxiated, or buried by rubble. Among them were 5,586 children. Fires destroyed 24 hospitals, 277 schools, and 58 churches. An officer assisting in the evacuation of refugees described how some passenger cars carried grey-haired children, aged practically overnight from the terrors of the raid. Among the eyewitnesses was Gerd Bucerius of the resistance movement. In a Hamburg suburb, he watched the approach of the English bombers from his rooftop: “Finally, I shouted! Too long I have waited for the Allies to destroy the world-enemy Hitler. . . . What horror, what sorrow, I naturally thought back then. But also, you dead want it this way. And whom did I worry about during the attack? The pilots! They were valiant and did what I had hoped of them.” After the war, the U.S. Army conducted a survey of German morale. Responding to the query about what caused the population the greatest suffering under Hitler, 91 percent of Germans who were polled cited Allied air raids. Just two percent completing the questionnaire marked “loss of freedom” or “Nazi crimes.”

“July 20 demonstrated that thoughts about high treason had no roots in the majority of the people,” Schwarz van Berk summarized. “What deprived the would-be usurpers of the last grain of sympathy was the clearly apparent intention of those involved not to risk their lives for what they claimed was an urgent necessity in the interests of their country, but to personally survive and satisfy their ambition for future positions of authority.” This SS officer also emphasized that the Gestapo was not the force that maintained cohesion and kept the Germans in line. This, he argued, was an illusion nurtured among those opposing the government. “The people and the troops fought bitterly and doggedly in the awareness that this struggle was literally a question of national and personal existence. Especially on the eastern front, there were as good as no deserters in the front lines. There were practically no saboteurs on the workbenches in the armaments factories at home. . . . The nation stood as never before in common cause, summoning all its moral strength to survive.”

Of the 70 military officers implicated in the plot to overthrow or assassinate Hitler, 55 were aristocrats. This class-conscious clique resorted to sabotage, treason, and murder to achieve its ends. Also dissatisfied with elements of the Reich's foreign and domestic policies were members of the Waffen SS. Youthful and idealistic, they fought both to preserve their continent from foreign invasion and for revolutionary change, not to restore anachronistic distinctions in title and rank of the former imperial age. The SS men

promoted their social and political agenda through loyalty, service, and sacrifice. They gained influence through courage and commitment, working within the legal framework to reform rather than destroy the existing order. They were prepared to give up more than they expected to gain as individuals, for the benefit and growth of the European community. A comparison of two persons, one an icon of the resistance and the other an ordinary German infantryman, illuminates the essence of the contrast: The son of a prominent psychiatrist, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer covertly assisted the Abwehr in its intrigues against the German cause. His relatives traded profitably on the black market. Visiting Geneva in 1941, he told fellow clerics, "The Christian faith must be rescued, even if an entire nation must perish" (He apparently saw no contradiction in aiding the Soviets)... "I pray for the defeat of my fatherland." Nowhere near the fighting front, Bonhoeffer occasionally travelled and enjoyed a comfortable existence until April 1943, when the authorities jailed him for undermining the war effort.

In August 1940, the 17-year old Fritz Hahl volunteered for the Waffen SS. Assigned to the Wiking division, he saw his first action against the Red Army on July 1, 1941. During the balance of the war, Hahl was on the front line 861 days. He suffered seven wounds in combat. He wrote after the war, "Today I can no longer comprehend how as a young man from 17 to 22 years of age, I found the strength to keep my self-control again and again, to conquer my fears and then continue fighting, and despite the setbacks still believe in a good outcome. One argument alone determined my actions and those of my generation: Together with my troops, like all German soldiers, we wanted to protect our homeland with its women and children from the Soviets - and without regard for ourselves."

12.19 Bits and Pieces about the War

"I lived in Germany during the 1980's when many people who lived during the war were still alive. I sought out anyone who lived near Poland in 1939 and was lucky enough to meet several people. One was a customs official who said it was so bad on the border they were armed and also had grenades in their office ready for attacks. Another told me his farm animals were often stolen by Polish (Jewish?) terrorists. Another told of his niece being raped by a Pole who crossed the border. He told me in 1940 they caught the man and showed me a copy of the death order signed by Heydrich, in which he ordered the man be put to death. This is just one of many stories told to me by German civilians who witnessed these border incursions just like had happened in 1919-1928. One thing many people fail to see is that Poland openly attacked Germany right after World War I, which led to many border battles. Once Germany started pressing Poland to work out a solution to the corridor, the attacks started again. .And one thing that is clear to me is that Germany did not make up these attacks." - George H. Ohio, USA

SEPTEMBER 17, 1939 Soviet Union Invades Poland

With the Polish army being routed by the advancing Germans in the west, Stalin cleverly decides to break the Soviet-Polish Non Aggression Pact of 1932. Poland is stabbed in the back as Soviet forces pour in from the east. The advancing Reds carry out massacres, the most infamous being the Katyn Forest Massacre in which 10,000 Polish Army officers are shot in the head. Other than the pre-Versailles German areas which Germany reclaims, the Soviets will eventually take all of Poland. In a shocking double-standard, the anti-German, FDR, France & the UK remain oddly silent about this brutal Soviet aggression. Poland appeals to Britain for help, citing the Poland-British Defense Pact just signed a few weeks ago. The Polish ambassador in London contacts the British Foreign Office pointing out that clause 1(b) of the agreement, which concerned an "aggression by a European power" on Poland, should apply to the Soviet invasion. The UK Foreign Secretary responds with hostility, stating that it was Britain's decision whether to declare war on the Soviet Union. The truth is, the Allies don't give a rat's ass about Poland. They only used its foolish ultra-nationalist leader, who by now has shamelessly abandoned his troops and fled to Romania, to instigate Hitler so that they could have their war. The horror that Poland will suffer under Soviet occupation is now Poland's problem, not Britain's.

OCTOBER, 1939 – MAY, 1940 Hitler pleads for Peace

The German-Polish War has ended quickly. The Allies never had any intention of helping Poland. The French actually invade Germany on September 7th, advancing 8 km before stopping. The quiet period between the end of the Polish war until May 1940, is dubbed by a U.S. Senator as "The Phony War." During this time, Hitler pleads for the Allies to withdraw their war declarations. Towards France he declares: "I have always expressed to France my desire to bury forever our ancient enmity and bring together these two nations, both of which have such glorious pasts." To the British, Hitler says: "I have devoted no less effort to the achievement of Anglo-German friendship. At no time and in no place have I ever acted contrary to British interests. . . . Why should this war in the West be fought?" Hitler's pleas for peace are ignored as the allies begin to mobilize more than 2,000,000 troops in Northern France. Plans are openly discussed to advance eastward upon Germany, via "neutral" Belgium and Holland, as well as establishing operations in "neutral" Norway and Denmark, with or without their consent.

APRIL 9, 1940 Norway and Denmark

The Allied plan of attack is to disrupt Germany's iron ore imports from Sweden by illegally mining Norwegian waters, and then occupying the important Norwegian port of Narvik. Plans are also made for imposing a base of operations in Denmark, Germany's neutral neighbor to its north. A Norwegian politician named Vidkun Quisling confirms

the existence of these Allied plots. (Operation Wilfred and Plan R 4). Sympathetic to Germany, and not wanting his country to become a battlefield, Quisling informs Hitler of the Anglo-French plot to wage war from the two Scandinavian countries. Germany moves quickly to secure the Norwegian port of Narvik just before the British can place their mines, and also to occupy Denmark. German diplomats assure the leaders of both Scandinavian nations that Germany seeks neither conquest nor interference in internal affairs. Life under limited German occupation goes on quietly for the Scandinavians during the war. Quisling's name is now a dictionary word in the English language, synonymous with "traitor" – a totally unfair characterization.

MAY 10, 1940 Great Britain invades Iceland

The British invasion of tiny, neutral Iceland is code named "Operation Fork." It begins on May 10, 1940 (the same day that Churchill comes to power) with British troops disembarking in the Capital City of Reykjavik. The British quickly move inland, disabling communications networks and securing landing locations. The government of Iceland protests the violation of their neutrality, but to no avail. This force is then subsequently augmented, to a final strength of 25,000. The recently thwarted British occupations of neutral Denmark and Norway, and the successful occupation of neutral Iceland, show that Rothschild Britain is the true aggressor of the coming war in Western Europe. Although FDR, up until December 1941, promises that America will remain non-belligerent, 30,000 US troops will relieve the British and occupy Iceland in spring of 1941.

MAY 10, 1940 The "Low Countries

Hitler's pleas for peace have been repeatedly ignored as 400,000 British and at least 2,000,000 French troops have massed in northern France. The massive invasion of Germany's industrial Ruhr region is to come through the ostensibly "neutral" League of Nations member states of Belgium and The Netherlands (Holland), whose governments are under intense Allied pressure to allow safe passage for the planned Allied attack on the bordering Ruhr region of Germany. Again, Hitler's hand is forced. On the same day that Churchill comes to power, and that the UK invades Iceland, as an act of national self-defense, Germany takes the fight to the Allies before they can bring it to German soil and reinstitute a 2nd Versailles Treaty. In a stunning advance westward, the German Blitzkrieg quickly overtakes the smaller nations (known as the Low Countries because of their geography) and pushes the Allied armies into a full retreat towards the beaches of northern France. The globalist press, as well as today's history books, portrays the Blitz as "the Nazi conquest of Holland, Belgium, and France." But the menacing presence of the massive Allied force on Germany's industrial frontier is conveniently ignored, as is the undeniable and extensive collaboration between the "neutral" Low Countries and the Allies.

MAY, 1940 Peace through Swedish Channel

After having just defeated the French the British invaders, Hitler, via a Swedish third party, proposes generous peace terms to Britain. The Germans contact the British ambassador in Sweden, Victor Mallet, through Sweden's Supreme Court Judge Ekeberg, who is known to Hitler's legal advisor, Ludwig Weissauer. Hitler's peace proposal demands nothing of Great Britain and implies that the states currently occupied by Germany would de-occupied; as Germany's occupation was only due to the present war situation. But Winston Churchill is not interested in peace. The offer goes nowhere.

JULY 20, 1940 Peace Leaflets over London

With Germany in total control of the continent and the war situation, Hitler responds to Churchill's bombs by dropping mass quantities of leaflets over London. The 4-page broadsheet contains an English language summary of Hitler's recent speech before the Reichstag. The speech is entitled, "A Last Appeal to Reason", in which he closes with a final appeal for peace:

"In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices it will claim. Possibly Mr. Churchill again will brush aside this statement of mine by saying that it is merely born of fear and of doubt in our final victory. In that case I shall have relieved my conscience in regard to the things to come."

The British respond to Hitler's sincere plea with mockery, threats, and more bombs.

SEPTEMBER 16, 1940 First ever Peace-Time Draft in the US

While publicly insisting that American boys "will not be going to foreign wars", FDR continues to secretly prepare for entry into the Globalists' World War. FDR institutes a peacetime "Selective Service" Act which requires all males aged 26-35 to register for an upcoming draft "just in case". The actual draft begins in October 1940. The unlucky draftees are told that they will serve a 12 month term, based in either the Western Hemisphere, or a US territory. By the summer of 1941, the deceitful FDR (who is planning to trick America into the war by way of a Japanese provocation) decrees that the terms be lengthened. Outraged draftees protest FDR's broken promise and threaten to desert when their 12 months are up. But most will obey the order and continue to serve past the promised October 1941 release date, and right up until the "surprise attack" upon Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. This is the first, and only, peacetime draft in U.S. history.

OCTOBER 28, 1940 Italy Invades Greece

Italy had occupied tiny Albania in the spring of 1939. Mussolini now turns his ambitions towards Greece. Greece has good relations with Germany, but Mussolini wants to claim the Ionian Islands. Italy's invasion of Greece is completely unrelated to Germany's war and creates unexpected problems for Hitler. The Greeks repel the invasion. The British then offer to send troops to assist Greece. Churchill now has an opening on the European mainland from which he can move north towards Germany and eastward towards Romania and the crucial oil fields which supply Germany.

NOVEMBER, 1940 The Vatican Helps

As far back May of 1939, as revealed by the front page of the New York Times, the Vatican had been trying to mediate between Britain and Germany. Hitler was ready and willing to talk peace at all the times. It was the British who said "no". The peace-seeking Vatican and peace-seeking Germany remained in contact as the war raged. The following excerpt from Martin Allen's 'Himmler's Secret War' describes a meeting held in Spain between the Papal Nuncio and British officials Hoare and Hilgarth; and the latest peace offer from Hitler:

"The nature of the concessions that the German Fuhrer was prepared to make in order to obtain peace with Britain must have astounded the men at the head of SO1. This was not even a deal worked out through a process of hard negotiation. It was Hitler's opening gambit....an offer so generous and pragmatic that it would be very tempting to anyone who genuinely wanted peace. His (Hitler's) offer of such remarkable concessions was an extremely threatening development. Should the terms become public, it had the potential to render British resolve to stand firm against German aggression to a shattering halt."

MARCH, 1941 Germany Must Perish!

"Germany Must Perish!" is a 104 page booklet published by an American Zionist businessman named Theodore Kaufman. Kaufman calls for the complete extermination of the German people through forced sterilization and total dismemberment and reappportionment of German territory. The murderous hate-fest starts out in the very opening lines of Germany Must Perish as follows:

"This dynamic volume outlines a comprehensive plan for the extinction of the German nation and the total eradication from the earth, of all her people. Also contained herein is a map illustrating the possible territorial dissection of Germany and the apportionment of her lands."

Incredibly, at a time when America is supposedly "neutral", the hateful book is actually reviewed by The New York Times, Time Magazine and the Washington Post. Though

not widely distributed in America, *Germany Must Perish* is read throughout Germany. Propaganda Minister Dr. Josef Goebbels states: "Thanks to the Jew Kaufmann, we Germans know only too well what to expect in case of defeat."

'Germany Must Perish!' will inspire the frightened German people to fight harder. Kaufman's work, along with the deadly Jewish Partisan guerilla warfare against German troops, will contribute to Hitler's decision to intern the Jews of occupied Europe into wartime work camps later in 1941.

APRIL 6, 1941 Greece & Yugoslavia

Though unrelated to Germany's war, Mussolini's foolish adventure in Greece has already created a big problem for Hitler. As Italian forces meet stiff Greek resistance, Churchill uses the conflict as an opportunity to again establish armies on Europe's mainland, in Europe's "soft underbelly". British troops begin arriving in Greece to help the Greeks in their fight against the Italians. Hitler offers to mediate peace between Italy and Greece, but the Greeks (egged on by the British) won't come to the table as more British troops keep arriving. In March, 1941, Yugoslavia joins Hitler's defensive Tripartite Pact. In response, British intelligence immediately triggers an orchestrated coup. The new Yugoslavian regime is now a British puppet state, which immediately signs a "Treaty of Friendship" with the USSR. Stalin's Yugoslavian Communists take to the streets in support of the new government. Again, Hitler's hand is forced. If he does not act now, the "soft underbelly" of Europe will be flooded with British troops destined for southern Germany, as well as the Romanian oil fields upon which Germany depends. On April 6, 1941, the Germans invade both Greece and Yugoslavia. The still small numbers of British troops are forced to evacuate, spoiling Churchill's scheme to inflame southern Europe and invite the Soviets in to help. Naturally, the Globalist media simplistically portrays these events as: "Germans Invade Yugoslavia & Greece".

Hitler on Operation Barbarossa

"Already in 1940 it became increasingly clear from month to month that the plans of the men in the Kremlin were aimed at the domination, and thus the destruction, of all of Europe. I have already told the nation of the build-up of Soviet military power in the East during a period when Germany had only a few divisions in the provinces bordering Soviet Russia. Only a blind person could fail to see that a military build-up of world-historical dimensions was being carried out. And this was not in order to protect something that was being threatened, but rather to attack that which seemed incapable of defense..... I may say this today: .If the wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, all of Europe would have been lost."
(30) - Adolf Hitler, 12-11-1941

JUNE, 1941 Lend Lease Begins

With Stalin's Empire facing swift extinction at the hands of German forces, FDR moves quickly to rescue Stalin's murderous regime. He unfreezes Soviet assets that had been frozen after Stalin's attack on Finland in 1939, enabling the Soviets to immediately purchase 59 Fighter aircrafts. The "Arsenal of Democracy" is now, "The Arsenal of Communism." By 1945, the staggering amount of Lend-Lease deliveries to Stalin include 11,000 aircraft, 4,000 bombers, 400,000 trucks, 12,000 tanks and combat vehicles, 32,000 motorcycles, 13,000 locomotives and railway cars, 8,000 anti-aircraft cannons, 135,000 submachine guns, 300,000 tons of explosives, 40,000 field radios, 400 radar systems, 400,000 metal cutting machine tools, several million tons of food, steel, other metals, oil and gasoline, chemicals etc.

JULY, 1942 – FEBRUARY, 1943 Stalingrad

The Battle of Stalingrad between the Germans and the Soviets was fought for control of the strategically vital Russian city that Stalin named after himself (today known as Volgograd). It will go down in history as the bloodiest battle ever, with combined deaths of nearly 2 million. Stalin's refusal to pull the Red Army out of the city leads to a long siege and great suffering for the hungry residents. After the German offensive manages to capture most of the city, the U.S. Lend Lease-equipped Red Army wears the Germans down with bloody house-to-house fighting. Brainwashed and inflamed by the NKVD's false atrocity propaganda, much of the city's civilian population fiercely resists the Germans as well. As intended, this "false flag" terror enflames the civilian population against the Germans. The losses suffered by the Germans will make victory in Russia impossible.

1943 Famine in India

While famines were not uncommon in India, largely because of droughts or monsoons, the 1943 tragedy in Bengal has the unmistakable fingerprints of the mad dog Churchill on it. In the prior year, when Japan occupied Burma, an important rice exporter, the British bought up massive amounts of rice and hoarded it. Churchill then orders the diversion of food away from India and toward British troops around the world. Now a rare commodity, the price of rice shoots up four-fold. Wheat from Australia (which could have been delivered to starving Indians) is instead transported to British troops as well. Even worse, British colonial authorities (again under Churchill's leadership) actually turn down offers of food from the U.S. Churchill hates Indians almost as much as he hates Germans; mainly because India wants its independence from Britain. Later, at a War Cabinet meeting, Churchill blames the Indians themselves for the famine, saying that they "breed like rabbits."

1943-45 Protection of European Art

Under Kaiser Wilhelm II during World War I, the highly cultured Germans had gone to great lengths to protect and preserve artworks located in near zones of combat. The German word to describe this principal of saving Europe's cultural and artistic treasures during wartime is "Kunstschutz" (art protection). A talented painter himself, Adolf Hitler has a great appreciation for art and culture. He sees Churchill and FDR as uncultured barbarians with merciless disregard for innocent life, architecture, and works of art. As the Germans had done during World War I, Hitler too orders the protection of artworks throughout the combat theatres of Europe. The task of protecting the art is handed over to Air Force Marshal Hermann Goering. As Allied terror bombing ravages Europe, thousands of paintings and sculptures from Italy, France, Belgium, Russia, Romania, and Poland are gathered and meticulously inventoried by the Germans. After the war, the American Art Looting Investigation Unit (ALIU) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) issues 13 reports on the German "looting" of artworks. By the way, this is the same OSS (forerunner of the CIA) that also accused the Germans of using dead Jews to make "shrunken heads", "lamp shades" and "bars of soap" - allegations which are today universally acknowledged as false.

1943 US postpones Advance, Aids Stalin

With "the soft underbelly of Europe" now vulnerable, Churchill and British General Montgomery argue for an immediate Allied advance upon Germany from the south of Europe. This was Hitler's greatest concern. The oil fields of Romania fuel the German military. An Allied advance on the Balkans through Yugoslavia and Greece would be disastrous for Germany. From Italy and the Balkans, the Allies can then launch a final push upon Germany itself from the south and southeast. Inexplicably, Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower ('Ike') and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall (who had promoted Eisenhower over scores of senior officers) insist upon making preparations for an invasion of heavily fortified Northern France the following year. This bizarre "blunder" prolongs the war, buys the Soviets much needed time to march westward, and eventually enables Stalin to steal Eastern Europe. There is a reason for this geo-political "blunder". FDR and his Globalist gang envision a post-war world in which the Soviets and the United States join forces to lay the foundation for a 'New World Order' (World Government). However, after the war, Stalin will break with the Globalists and move towards a form of Nationalistic Communism instead; an extension of the ideological conflict that had bitterly divided Stalin and Trotsky during the 1920's. Stalin still supports world-wide Communist revolution, of course. But his vision of a New World Order is one in which Moscow calls the shots, not London or New York.

1943-1945 Russians fighting Soviets

Stalin's tyranny was hated by so many Russians that as many as 300,000 Russian POW's volunteered to fight for Germany! The anti-Communist soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army wore German uniforms with a Russian patch. They were led by General Andrey Vlasov, but under German high command. The RLA fought valiantly, mainly in key rear guard support roles against Communist partisans. After the war, the RLA will attempt to surrender to the western allies. Not wanting to deny 'Uncle Joe' of his revenge, Eisenhower will turn down their offers and forcibly repatriate those who were already in U.S. custody. Despite pleading with the Americans for political asylum, General Vlasov and his freedom fighters will then be handed over to the brutal Soviets. Vlasov and 11 of his senior officers are hanged in Moscow in August, 1946.

JUNE 6, 1944 Normandy Invasion

At the 6th hour, of the 6th day, of the 6th month of 1944, Allied armies based in England launch 'D-Day' (Devil's Day?), and successfully cross the English Channel. The cost of Operation Overlord (the Devil?) is high as nearly 10,000 men are killed storming the fortified beaches of Normandy. But Overlord establishes an initial beachhead of 100,000 troops. From this base in northern France, the Allies will be reinforced for the push towards Germany. At the same time, the Soviet Red Army, armed to the teeth with state-of-the-art American weaponry, advances upon Germany from the east. With Italy also under Allied occupation, Germany has three fronts to defend (West, South, and East) as its cities, railways, dams, factories and civilian population endure relentless bombardment and Partisan sabotage. In order to give Stalin time to conquer Eastern Europe, Generals Eisenhower and Marshall repeatedly delay the advance of General Patton's unstoppable 3rd army, going so far as to cut off shipments of gasoline to Patton's army! Patton (August, 1944): "At the present time our chief difficulty is not the Germans, but gasoline. If they would give me enough gas, I could go all the way to Berlin!"

SUMMER, 1944 France gets "liberated"

Under what was intended to be only temporary, wartime German occupation (1940-1944), life in Northern France goes by peacefully for French civilians. The conduct of the German occupiers is impeccable. Many French women fall in love with German soldiers. But with the Normandy invasion (June 6, 1944), the peace and security of France is shattered into a million pieces. To support the cross-channel invasion, and to then push the Germans eastward, the Allies unleash a ferocious aerial bombardment campaign. Entire towns are mercilessly carpet bombed. Cultural icons and works of art are destroyed, 65,000 French civilians are killed, 150,000 are injured, and at least 500,000 left homeless. Even Paris is heavily bombed. Incredibly, twice as many French civilians are bombed to death during only a few months, as the total amount of British civilians killed during the entire war!

(10) Of course, these numbers pale in comparison to the 1,000,000 + German civilians who were killed by Allied bombings. The horror doesn't end with the bombardment either. The Allied occupation and subsequent economic collapse bring new nightmares for the women of France. Under Allied occupation, American troops rape 1000's of French women, and turn many 1000's more hungry women into sex-for-food prostitutes. To appease the French population, the U.S. Army will eventually hang 130 of its rapist soldiers, a majority of them Black. It will take years for these areas of France to recover from the tragedy. Such is the glorious "liberation" that Churchill, FDR, and the French traitor de Gaulle have imposed upon France.

AUGUST, 1944 French Revenge

After the collapse of the Vichy French regime, General Charles de Gaulle returns from his English exile. The Globalist and Communist French then impose a new Reign of Terror. Cruel punishment is meted out against those labeled as "Nazi collaborators", whose only crime was in making peace with Germany, or to have fought against the Soviets on the eastern front as members of the German SS units. The de Gaullist 'liberals' will murder as many as 40,000, and imprison 100,000 of their countrymen. French women who dated German soldiers during the occupation are humiliated by having their heads shaved bald or stripped naked. Marshal Petain escapes to Germany. After the war, he will be sentenced to death for "treason", but due to his age, 88, and hero status from WW I, de Gaulle has no choice but to reduce Petain's sentence to life in prison.

FEBRUARY, 1945 The Yalta Conference

The most historic of the "Big Three" conferences is held in the Black Sea resort of Yalta (Russian Crimea). At the Yalta Conference, FDR & Churchill (especially FDR).make easy concessions to the mass-murdering Communist, "Uncle Joe". With Red spies Alger Hiss and Harry Hopkins influencing the dying Roosevelt (who dies in April), it is decided that after Germany's defeat:

The Soviets will occupy Eastern Europe until free elections can be held.

The Soviets will eventually join the war against Japan and be supplied with U.S. arms for the effort.

After Japan is defeated, the Soviets will occupy northern Korea (without Korea's approval!), and Manchuria in China (without China's approval!)

Millions of Russian POWs captured by the Germans, as well as Russian refugees fleeing Stalin, will be forcefully returned to Stalin.

Germany will be split in half as will the Capital of Berlin.

APRIL 15, 1945 Eisenhower Orders Patton to halt

British General Bernard Montgomery argues that there is now nothing to stop the Allies from sweeping into Berlin, thus taking the German Capital before the advancing Soviet army can get there. Eisenhower, however, has other ideas. As FDR's loyal lapdog had done time and time again, "Ike" would find a way to delay the Allied advance so as to buy time for Stalin to advance from the east. On March 28, '45, Ike sends a message to Stalin, assuring him that the Allied advance will focus on western Germany. On April 15, Ike issues a halt order forbidding Allied commanders from crossing the Elbe River. (22) Generals Montgomery and Patton are very upset over the sudden order to halt the advance, thus condemning Berlin, and all of Eastern Europe, to Soviet barbarism.

APRIL 30, 1945 Hitler's Final Testament

With the situation in Berlin hopeless, Hitler marries his longtime mistress, Eva Braun. The two then commit suicide; Eva by poison, Hitler by gunshot. Hitler's dog Blondie is also poisoned. The staff is under orders to burn the bodies and to escape Berlin before the Soviets can capture them. One day before committing suicide, Hitler had dictated his final Political Testament, a suicide note, in essence, in which he denied any responsibility for starting the war. Some critical excerpts that you'll not find in your High School history book:

"More than thirty years have now passed since I in 1914 made my modest contribution as a volunteer in the First World War that was forced upon the Reich. In these three decades I have been actuated solely by love and loyalty to my people in all my thoughts, acts, and life. They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions which have ever confronted mortal man. I have spent my time, my working strength, and my health in these three decades. "It is untrue that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was wanted and provoked solely by international statesmen either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests.

I have made too many offers for the control and limitation of armaments, which posterity will not for all time be able to disregard for the responsibility for the outbreak of this war to be laid on me. Nor have I ever wished that after the appalling First World War a second against England, or even against America, should break out. Centuries will pass away, but out of the ruins of our towns and monuments the hatred of those whom we have to thank for all this will always grow anew: international Jewry and its henchmen.

Three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish war I again proposed to the British ambassador in Berlin a solution to the German-Polish problem—similar to that in the case of the Saar district, under international control This offer also cannot be denied. It was only rejected because the leading circles in English politics wanted the war, partly on account of the business hoped for and partly under influence of propaganda organized

by International Jewry.

After six years of war, which in spite of all setbacks will go down one day in history as the most glorious and valiant demonstration of a nation's life purpose, I cannot forsake the city which is the capital of this Reich. As the forces are too small to make any further stand against the enemy attack at this place, and our resistance is gradually being weakened by men who are as deluded as they are lacking in initiative, I should like, by remaining in this town, to share my fate with those, the millions of others, who have also taken upon themselves to do so.

Moreover, I do not wish to fall into the hands of an enemy who requires a new spectacle organized by the Jews for the amusement of their hysterical masses. I have decided therefore to remain in Berlin and there of my own free will to choose death at the moment when I believe the position of the Fuehrer and Chancellor itself can no longer be held. I die with a happy heart, aware of the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front, our women at home, the achievements of our farmers and workers and the work, unique in history, of our youth who bear my name".

JUNE 26, 1945 The United Nations

At the founding San Francisco Conference that established the United Nations, the U.S. official serving as Secretary General is the Communist agent Alger Hiss. Hiss will later be exposed as a Soviet spy in 1948. The U.N. replaces the League of Nations as the foundation of The New World Order. All 51 nations signing the original charter agree to be bound by its articles. The all-out propaganda campaign surrounding the UN's establishment is pervasive and intense. It is argued that "isolationist" America's refusal to join the League of Nations after World War I was the tragic mistake that led to World War II. That mistake "must not be repeated". Within 30 days, the US Senate will approve the UN Treaty by a vote of 89-2! Even the conservative legend, Senator Robert Taft (son of President William.Howard.Taft) votes in favor of U.S. entry. The embryonic World Government will be headquartered in New York, on 18 acres of prime real estate donated by the Rockefeller Family. Globalism has won World War II!

1945-1947 Operation Keelhaul

Stalin brands Russian POW's captured by Germany, and Russian refugees who fled west with the retreating Germans, as traitors. At Yalta, FDR and Churchill had agreed that Russian "traitors" and SS men should be sent to Stalin in exchange for American & British POW's "liberated" by the Soviets. General Eisenhower eagerly carries out this atrocity; which was mockingly code named: "Operation Keelhaul" (after an old naval punishment that involved tying a rope around a sailor and then dragging him under the hull of a ship)! Up to 3 million terrified Russian POWs are forced at gunpoint onto trains and trucks that bring them to their Soviet executioners. (11) Many commit suicide.

U.S. troops, upon returning from the drop-off points, later report seeing rows of bodies already hanging from the trees. In separate operations, anti-Communist refugee families, who actually followed their German protectors as they retreated from Russia, are also shipped back to "Uncle Joe", and subjected to special tortures, including rape of the women. As a final insult from our "ally", Stalin holds on to 25,000 American POW's and 30,000 British, sending them to his Siberian Gulags, and even summarily executing some..(12) Ike, Churchill, and Truman are aware of the missing POW's but say nothing!

1945 - Present: The Occupation of Germany

From the days of the post war "de-Nazification" of Germany, throughout the 45 year Communist rule over East Germany, as well as the 70 U.S. domination of a united Germany that continues to this day, perhaps the greatest crime of all is the psychological rape of three subsequent generations of Germans. From an early age, German school children are taught to hate the great accomplishments of previous generations and wallow in self-loathing. Most pathetic Germans today fervently believe all the lies told about "Nazi" Germany as they continue to hunt down and imprison "holocaust deniers" and innocent 90-year old SS men for "war crimes". Those Germans who are not full of self-loathing are too afraid to speak up, lest the occupation governments of Germany or Austria throw them in jail. Many Germans today actually enjoy self-flagellation! It's like a woman who has been raped and battered to near death, blaming herself and apologetically groveling before the perpetrator.

1960 History is written by the Winners

After having received what he calls a "generous grant" from the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), American newspaper hack and former CBS mouthpiece William Shirer publishes his "definitive" and "comprehensive" history of World War II, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. In the book's opening acknowledgement, Shirer thanks "the Council" - whose Globalist members were the very ones that engineered the war in the first place! Shirer's *Rise and Fall* is heavy on the empty verbiage and page-count (1,245!), but extremely light on essential facts. Weaving truths with half truths and outright lies, while sprinkling in a few seemingly objective, even pro-German nuggets of truth; Shirer skillfully paints a deceptive facade; one which any reader of *The Bad War* should now be able to easily crack open. The Jewish publishing giant Simon & Schuster publishes the book, and the Jewish press hypes it to the stars. Shirer becomes wealthy beyond his wildest dreams. His putrid package of propaganda remains, to this day, the "go to" book for those who think they know anything about World War II. What a joke!

Closing Statement

World War II, or 'The Good War' as modern day court-historian refer to it - is the gift that keeps on giving - giving us problems that is! This tragedy, and its aftermath, haunt humanity to this day, and will continue to well into the foreseeable future. Out of the aftermath of World War II comes the Cold War, the Korean War, the Viet Nam War, the wars and ongoing problems in the Middle East, the financial schemes and distress caused by the IMF and the World Bank, the framework of the tyrannical and corrupt European Union, and so many other problems of the modern day. The Bad War was a complete disaster for the forces of civilization, stability, virtue, culture, and independent nationalism of blood-related kinfolk...But it was a total triumph for the overlapping dark forces of Globalism, debt-based "Crony Capitalism", World Communism, misguided liberalism and Zionism.

Behold what the victorious "good guys" have wrought in the days since that tragic war. Europe, and by extension America, Canada and Australia, no longer exist as peoples with common history, heritage or values. The Globalists have reduced the beloved "Europa" of Hitler into a rootless, cultureless, godless, genderless, alienated, infertile, pornographic, multi-cultural, homosexual mish-mash of mentally medicated tax and debt slaves. The true European essence that was once rooted in places like ancient Athens, Rome, Florence, Paris, London, Madrid, Dresden; and grand historical personages such as Plato, Aristotle, Pericles, Jesus, Marcus Aurelius, Charlemagne, Mozart, Kant, Dante, Shakespeare, Jefferson; and vital institutions such as family, farm, folk, community, church and civic groups, is, if not totally "gone with the wind", certainly in the process of coming off its moorings.

Collectively, the people of the West are no longer really even 'peoples' defined by common cultures, traditions, bloodlines and sets of eternal values. We are economies defined solely by the Gross Domestic Product. As individuals, we are no longer persons defined by our virtues and intellects. We are soulless machines – disposable, pill-popping, TV-addicted "human resources" and "tax payers" defined solely by our "net worth" and ability to "consume" - a euphemism for going into debt to buy crap that we don't need. In a broader philosophical sense, that's what World War II was all about. It was a titanic struggle between the forces of classical Europa (as well as historic Japan) and those of the culturally degenerate and predatory Capitalist-Communist hybrid New World Order in which we live in, no, exist in today.

12.20 Never Retreat, Never Surrender!

After reading about the history of World War 2, many people often ask "Why did they not surrender?" when certain doom was inevitable for the National Socialists? The answer to that might be Allied/Jewish Propaganda, the knowledge of the use of Soviet Gulags for slave labor during peace time and also the killing of millions of Christian Russians during

peace time. Here is what their plans for Central Europe looked like:

The Kalergi-Plan

Kalergi was the son of an Austrian diplomat named Heinrich von Coudenhove-Kalergi and a Japanese woman named Mitsu Aoyama. His movement was financially backed by Zionist billionaire bosses such as Rothschild, Baruch and Warburg. With such high-powered backers and close contacts with European aristocrats and politicians, Kalergi managed to attract important heads of state to his project for European integration – what Winston Churchill openly referred to, in 1945, as the “United States of Europe.” Very few people know that Kalergi, one of the main “founding fathers” of the process of European integration, also designed the genocide for the peoples of Europe. As far back as 1922, Kalergi founded the “Pan-European” movement in Austria, which aimed to create a federation of nations led by the United States. European integration would be the first step in creating a future world government. With the rise of Benito Mussolini in Italy, Adolf Hitler in Germany and General Francisco Franco in Spain, Kalergi’s Jewish-inspired ‘One Europe’ project was put on hold. But very soon after the final crushing defeat of Germany in 1945, Kalergi’s New World Order, thanks to the support of Winston Churchill, the Jewish B’nai B’rith and major newspapers like the New York Times, began to take its first visible steps toward fruition.

Coudenhove-Kalergi is recognized as the founder of the first popular movement for a united Europe. In December 1921, he joined the Masonic lodge “Humanitas” in Vienna. In 1922, he co-founded the Pan-European Union (PEU) with Archduke Otto von Habsburg. In 1923, he published a manifesto entitled Pan-Europa, each copy containing a membership form which invited the reader to become a member of the Pan-Europa movement. According to his autobiography, at the beginning of 1924 his friend Baron Louis de Rothschild introduced him to Max Warburg who offered to finance his movement for the next 3 years by giving him 60,000 gold marks. Warburg remained sincerely interested in the movement for the remainder of his life and served as an intermediate for Coudenhove-Kalergi with influential Americans such as banker Paul Warburg and financier Bernard Baruch. In April 1924, Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the journal *Pan-europa* (1924–1938) of which he was editor and principal author. The next year he started publishing his main work, the *Kampf um Paneuropa* (The fight for Paneuropa, 1925–1928, three volumes). In 1926, the first Congress of the Pan-European Union (basically the forerunner of the EU) was held in Vienna and the 2,000 delegates elected Coudenhove-Kalergi as president of the Central Council, a position he held until his death in 1972. Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to enlist prominent European politicians in his pan-European cause and European freemason lodges supported his movement, including the lodge Humanitas.

Coudenhove-Kalergi had less success with Tomáš Masaryk, who referred him to his uncooperative Prime Minister Edvard Beneš. However, the idea of pan-Europe elicited support

from politicians as diverse as Carlo Sforza and Hjalmar Schacht. Although Coudenhove-Kalergi found himself unable to sway Benito Mussolini, his ideas influenced Aristide Briand through his inspired speech in favour of a European Union in the League of Nations on 8 September 1929, as well as his famous 1930 "Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union." Hitler's view of Coudenhove-Kalergi was that the "rootless, cosmopolitan, and elitist half-breed" was going to repeat the historical mistakes of Coudenhove ancestors who had served the House of Habsburg, i.e. creating a multi-ethnic state which will eat itself up through internal friction and ultimately collapse.

In his book 'Praktischer Idealismus', Kalergi boldly declares that the citizens of the future "United States of Europe" will not be White people anymore. In his own words: "The man of the future will be of mixed race. The races and classes of today will gradually disappear due to the elimination of space, time, and prejudice. The Eurasian-negroid race of the future, similar in appearance to the Ancient Egyptians, will replace the diversity of peoples with the diversity of individuals. Of course, Kalergi's chosenite paymasters will not be replaced or blended out by this "Eurasian-negroid race of the future". Writes the hired hack of his paymasters:

"... Inbreeding builds character, weakens the mind - crossing weakens the character, strengthens the Spirit. Where inbreeding and crossbreeding meet under happy auspices, they testify to the highest type of human being the strongest character with the sharpest mind connects. Where under unfortunate auspices inbreeding and mix meet, they create degeneration types with a weak character, dull mind... Instead of destroying European Judaism, Europe, against her will, refined and educated this people, driving them to their future status as a leading nation through this artificial evolutionary process. It's not surprising that the people that escaped from the Ghetto-Prison, became the spiritual nobility of Europe. Thus, the compassionate care given by Europe created a new breed of aristocrats. This happened when the European feudal aristocracy crashed because of the emancipation of the Jews... Russian Bolshevism constitutes a decisive step towards this purpose where a small group of Communist spiritual aristocrats govern the country... The general staff of both... are recruited from Europe's spiritual leader race, the Jews"

In Kalergi's World, by his own admission, Whites are to be blended out of their own nations while the Jew becomes "the spiritual nobility." He states that the peoples of Europe should interbreed with Asians and colored races, thus creating a multinational flock with no quality and easily controlled by the ruling elite. Kalergi proclaims the abolition of the right of self-determination and then the elimination of nations with the use of ethnic separatist movements and mass migration. In order for Europe to be controlled by an elite, he wants to turn people into one homogeneous mixed breed of Blacks, Whites and Asians. Although no textbook mentions Kalergi, his ideas are the guiding principles of the European Union. The belief that the peoples of Europe should be mixed with Africans and Asians, to destroy our identity and create a single mestizo race, is the basis of all community policies that aim to protect minorities.

Every year the Coudenhove-Kalergi Prize is awarded to the two Europeans who have done

most to promote this genocidal plan in that year. In 2010, the prize was awarded to none other than Angela Merkel. In 2012, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, was awarded the Coudenhove-Kalergi Prize. They both made speeches praising the writings and ideas of Kalergi as they accepted the prize. Kalergi was also had a hand in designing the flag of the European Union and it is rumored that the 12 stars of the flag represent the 12 Tribes of Israel.

Germany Must Perish!

Theodore Newman Kaufman was an American Jewish businessman and writer known for his eliminationist views on Germans. In 1939, he published pamphlets as “chairman of the American Federation of Peace” that argued that Americans should be sterilized so that their children will no longer have to fight in foreign wars. In 1941, he wrote and published *Germany Must Perish!* which called for the sterilization/genocide of the German people and the distribution of the German lands. The text was used extensively in Nazi propaganda, often as a justification for the persecution of Jews and was specifically cited as a reason to round up the Jews of Hanover, Germany. Some excerpts:

“Since Germans are the perennial disturbers of the world’s peace ... they must be dealt with like any homicidal criminals. But it is unnecessary to put the whole German nation to the sword. It is more humane to sterilize them. The army groups, as organized units, would be the easiest and quickest to deal with. ... The population of Germany, excluding conquered and annexed territories, is about 70,000,000, almost equally divided between male and female. To achieve the purpose of German extinction it would be necessary to only sterilize some 48,000,000 – a figure which excludes, because of their limited power to procreate, males over 60 years of age, and females over 45. ... Taking 20,000 surgeons as an arbitrary number and on the assumption that each will perform a minimum of 25 operations daily, it would take no more than one month, at the maximum, to complete their sterilization. ... The balance of the male civilian population of Germany could be treated within three months. Inasmuch as sterilization of women needs somewhat more time, it may be computed that the entire female population of Germany could be sterilized within a period of three years or less. Complete sterilization of both sexes, and not only one, is to be considered necessary in view of the present German doctrine that so much as one drop of true German blood constitutes a German. Of course, after complete sterilization, there will cease to be a birth rate in Germany. At the normal death rate of 2 per cent per annum, German life will diminish at the rate of 1,500,000 yearly. Accordingly in the span of two generations that which cost millions of lives and centuries of useless effort, namely, the elimination of Germanism and its carriers, will have been an accomplished fact. By virtue of its loss of self-perpetuation German Will will have atrophied and German power reduced to negligible importance.”

When the Nazis required German Jews to wear a yellow badge on their clothing on September 1, 1941, they published a flyer explaining to the German people that those

individuals wearing the star were conspiring to implement Kaufman's plan for the destruction of Germany. The Nazi propaganda ministry continued to publish pamphlets, posters and flyers on Kaufman's ideas through the end of the war, and also urged newspapers and public speakers to remind Germans of Kaufman's book. Kaufman's last major appearance in Nazi propaganda occurred in late 1944, when a five-page section on him was included in the widely published booklet *Never!*, which described a number of plots to destroy Germany.

The book received considerable attention in the United States. An advertisement in *The New York Times* stated that the book was released to the public on March 1, 1941. *Time* magazine published a review in its 24 March and described it as the "enshrinement of a single sensational idea." Kaufman's advocacy of mass sterilization of Germans was echoed in a later book by another American Jew, Louis Nizer, who cited Kaufman.[8] In his 1944 book *What To Do With Germany*, Nizer accepted collective punishment of Germans and considered, but ultimately rejected, their mass "eugenic sterilization".

The Morgenthau Plan

From "Nuremberg: The Last Battle" by David Irving

Firstly, there was President Roosevelt. While he talked eloquently in public of pursuing the Nazi criminals to the ends of the earth, privately he too intended that they should be punished without trial. At a stag dinner held at the White House on June 7, 1944, he had regaled Polish prime minister Stanislas Mikolajczyk with stories of Stalin's plans to 'liquidate 50,000 German officers,' and he had laughed out loud as he recalled how his joint chiefs had listened with round eyes to these words. Talking, later that evening, about which of the victorious powers should acquire the great north German ports, Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. secretary of war, urged Roosevelt to caution. 'I felt,' Stimson recorded in his diary, in an oblique hint at the ethnic cleansing that would occur after those regions were turned over to the Poles, 'that repercussions would be sure to arise which would mar the page of our history if we, whether rightly or wrongly, seemed to be responsible for it.'? Still worried about the bloodbath in store for the defeated Germans, Stimson wrote two days later that occupying the southern sector of Germany would be more congenial as it 'keeps us away from Russia during occupational period. Let her do the dirty work but don't father it.'

Such was the climate of hatred that even Cordell Hull, Roosevelt's secretary of state and a distinguished statesman, argued for nothing less than the summary liquidation of the Axis leaders as and when they fell into Allied hands. 'Hull surprised me,' admitted the British ambassador Lord Halifax in his secret diary after dining with him on March 16, 1943, 'by saying that he would like to shoot and physically kill all the Nazi leaders down to quite low levels!' In this belief Hull was on a par with the ambassador's barber in Washington, who perpetually told him: 'Kill every one. Leave one - they will breed again and you have to do the job again. It is like leaving one rabbit in a young plantation.'?

In the autumn of 1944 Cordell Hull again graphically proposed: 'If I had my way, I would take Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their arch accomplices and bring them before a drumhead court-martial, and at sunrise on the following day there would occur an historic incident.'

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who has a well-manicured image in the history books as a military commander blessed with both chivalry and decency, was little better. He told Lord Halifax on July 22, 1944 that in his view the enemy leaders should be 'shot while trying to escape' - the common euphemism for murder used in Hollywood's cheaper films about the Nazis. Eisenhower's naval aide Harry Butcher heard his chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith, an officer who nursed a phenomenal hatred for the Germans, urge that imprisonment was not enough for the enemy's General Staff, a body of some 1,000 officers. 'There was agreement,' noted the aide in his unpublished diary, 'that extermination could be left to nature if the Russians had a free hand.' Why just the Russians? inquired Eisenhower: the victorious powers, he suggested, could temporarily assign zones in Germany to the smaller nations with scores to settle.

He repeated these views to Henry Morgenthau when the latter visited the Portsmouth command post of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.) on August 7 - indeed, Morgenthau would, with some justification, point to Eisenhower as the father of his famous Plan. According to Morgenthau's version, General Eisenhower opposed any soft line: 'The whole German population is a synthetic paranoid,' he told the treasury secretary. 'And there is no reason for treating a paranoid gently. The best cure is to let the Germans stew in their own juice.' 'General Eisenhower had stated,' Morgenthau told his officials five days later, '... that in his view we must take a tough line with Germany as we must see to it that Germany was never again in a position to unleash war upon the world.'?? According to another witness, Eisenhower also said: 'The ringleaders and the S.S. troops should be given the death penalty without question, but punishment should not end there.' Eisenhower himself later summarised as follows: 'The German people must not be allowed to escape a personal sense of guilt for the terrible tragedy that had engulfed the world. Germany's war-making power should be eliminated. Certain groups should be specifically punished by Allied tribunals: leading Nazis, Gestapo members, S.S. members.' He added, 'The German General Staff should be utterly eliminated. All records destroyed and individuals scattered and rendered powerless to operate as body. In proper cases more specifically punished.'

Morgenthau tackled the British prime minister Winston S. Churchill about this three days later, over lunch on August 10, 1944. The prime minister indicated his 'general concurrence' with Eisenhower's viewpoint. Morgenthau then sketched the outlines of what later became his Plan - 'In his opinion serious consideration should be given to the desirability and feasibility of reducing Germany to an agrarian economy wherein Germany would be a land of small farms, without large-scale industrial enterprises.' Morgenthau reported all this to his Washington staff a few days later, one of whom recorded: 'He said that in his conversation with Churchill the question of the program to be followed

upon occupation of Germany had come up and that he had gathered from the Prime Minister's comments that he was in agreement with the view expressed by Morgenthau.

Morgenthau advised the president on August ??, on his return from Europe to Washington, that some people in Europe were planning a soft future for Germany. Roosevelt confidently assured him, 'Give me thirty minutes with Churchill and I can correct this.' He added, 'We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis. You either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.' (The presidential interest in castration is worth bearing in mind.) Stimson, the U.S. secretary of war tried to collect his own thoughts about the future of Germany, drafting a document entitled 'Brief for Conference with the President on August 25,' in which he listed 'a number of urgent matters of American policy' including in particular their policy vis-a-vis the 'liquidation of Hitler and his gang.' Stimson's wording was very explicit. 'Present instructions seem inadequate beyond imprisonment. Our officers must have the protection of definite instructions if shooting [is] required. If shooting required it must be immediate; not post-war.' He also asked the question, 'How far do U.S. officers go towards preventing lynching in advance of Law and Order?'

Morgenthau got at Roosevelt first, lunching with him at the White House on August 25. Here he filled in more details of his Plan for punishing and emasculating post-war Germany - regardless of the effect which this 'running sore' would have on the rest of the European economy. The treasury secretary visited Roosevelt early on August ?? to hand him his own memorandum on the German problem. Later that day he and Stimson both lunched with the president. Stimson again focused attention on the allocation of British and American zones of occupation in Germany. He now urged Roosevelt to dump on the British the occupation of northern Germany. 'By taking south-western Germany,' he recorded in his diary, 'we were ... further away from the dirty work that the Russians might be doing with the Prussians in Eastern Germany' - another unsubtle reference to the mopping up or purification operations which the Russians would conduct in their own occupation zone. Stimson wrote in his diary:

"I found around me, particularly Morgenthau, a very bitter atmosphere of personal resentment against the entire German people without regard to individual guilt and I am very much afraid that it will result in our taking mass vengeance on the part of our people in the shape of clumsy economic action."

The economic part of the Morgenthau Plan, what was properly called the Treasury Plan, was drafted by Morgenthau's principal assistant Harry Dexter White (an actual Soviet agent, who is also remembered as the architect of the Bretton Woods Conference that created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and he had his hands also full with disrupting Japanese desires for peace... which ultimately led to the incident at Pearl Harbor (more to be found via google)); Roosevelt's current thinking on Germany was still rather simplistic: no aircraft, uniforms, or marching. Morgenthau said: 'That's very interesting, Mr President, but I don't think it goes nearly far enough.' He wanted to

put eighteen or twenty million Germans out of work, and he wanted able-bodied Germans transported to Central Africa as slave labour on 'some big TVA project.' (The Tennessee Valley Authority hydroelectric project of Roosevelt's New Deal had generated employment for half the continent.) How different was the staid, elderly Republican Stimson from the vengeful Democrat Morgenthau. That Monday, September 1, the former flew back to Washington and conferred with General George C. Marshall, Roosevelt's chief of staff, about the treatment of Germany and ways of investigating and punishing the Gestapo. 'It was very interesting,' Stimson dictated afterwards in a note, 'to find that army officers have a better respect for the law in those matters than civilians who ... are anxious to go ahead and chop everybody's head off without trial or hearing.'

'My plan,' said Morgenthau in a meeting, unabashed, 'will stop the Germans from ever trying to extend their domination by force again. Don't worry. The rest of Europe can survive without them.' Stimson was unconvinced. 'This plan will breed war,' he said, 'not prevent it!' To General Marshall he wrote, 'It's very singular. I'm the man in charge of the Department which does the killing in this war, and yet I am the only one who seems to have any mercy for the other side.' Stimson returned to his office and dictated this note for his diary:

"As soon as I got into the meeting it became very evident that Morgenthau had been rooting around behind the scenes and had greased the way for his own views by conference with the president and others. I, to my tremendous surprise, found that Hull was as bitter as Morgenthau against the Germans and was ready to dump all the principles that he had been laboring for in regard to trade for the past twelve years. He and Morgenthau wished to wreck completely the immense Ruhr-Saar area of Germany into a second rate agricultural land. I found myself a minority of one and I labored vigorously but entirely ineffectively against my colleagues. In all the four years that I have been here I have not had such a difficult and unpleasant meeting."

It was decided that each of the three men (Hull, Morgenthau and Stimson) would submit to the president a memorandum on the treatment of Germany. Stimson utterly rejected Hull's proposals, which closely tallied with Morgenthau's. 'I cannot treat as realistic the suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can be turned into a non-productive "ghost territory" when it has become the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples of energy, vigor, and progressiveness.' Lord Halifax sent a further telegram to London, briefing the foreign office at McCloy's request on what Morgenthau was up to. Two awesome questions were now being raised, on which the ambassador asked for formal instructions: 'Whom do we imprison or intern? On what scale? Is it by tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands?' And, more crucially, 'Whom do we shoot or hang? The feeling is that we should not have great state trials, but proceed quickly and with despatch. The English idea, once preferred but then withdrawn, was to give the army lists to liquidate on mere identification. What has happened to this idea? Besides individuals, what categories should be shot?'

General Marshall was a wise, unhurried soldier-politician. On September 7, Stimson secured him as an ally. After reading the memorandum which Stimson had received from Morgenthau 'demanding,' as Stimson summarised it, 'that the leaders of the Nazi party be shot without trial and on the basis of the general world appreciation of their guilt,' Marshall gave it the reception that his political master had expected - 'absolute rejection of the notion that we should not give these men a fair trial.' Morgenthau nonetheless stuck to his guns and went to the very top, demanding of the president a re-hearing. Learning of this, Stimson cast about for other allies. He dined with Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of the twelve members of the Supreme Court and one of Roosevelt's less extreme advisers. 'Although a Jew, like Morgenthau,' dictated Stimson afterwards, 'he approached this subject with perfect detachment and great helpfulness.' He went over the whole matter with the judge from the beginning, reading out Morgenthau's proposals on the future of the Ruhr and on the summary liquidation without trial of the Nazis, at both of which Frankfurter 'snorted with astonishment and disdain.' He fully backed Stimson's views and those of his army generals. The accused Germans, said Frankfurter, were to be given a fair hearing: 'They cannot be railroaded to their death without trial.'

The fight nonetheless continued. By September 9 Morgenthau had his full Plan ready, 'a new diatribe' on the subject of how to deal with the Nazis. At a meeting that day with Roosevelt, Stimson waded into it. But the meeting was very unsatisfactory. Hull sat silent.?? Morgenthau's record shows that Roosevelt said he wanted Germany partitioned into three parts. He flipped through the pages of Morgenthau's Plan, and kept prodding Morgenthau: 'Where is the ban on uniforms and marching?' Morgenthau reassured him it was all there. The president was planning to meet in a few days' time with the British war leadership at Quebec, in Canada, to decide on these and other matters. He now, as Stimson put it, 'pranced up to the meeting at Quebec,' leaving Hull and Stimson behind.?? Morgenthau seized the opportunity to share the train journey north with the president as far as Hyde Park. Roosevelt's country home in upstate New York. He wanted to have the last word.

What views did Churchill bring with him to Quebec? His cabinet had displayed some differences of attitude on the punishment of enemy war criminals. A number of German prisoners-of-war had been shot in Britain during the war, but the file on these episodes is closed to public scrutiny. The treatment of the principal enemy leaders was clearly a different matter altogether. The archives show that as early as 1942 Churchill had decided that they should be executed without trial, and he repeatedly canvassed this proposal until long after the war was over, although there is no trace of it in his memoirs. For example, when the British ambassador in Moscow conveyed a Foreign Office statement on the case of Rudolf Hess to Marshal Stalin on November 5, 1942, the Soviet leader put his concerns to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr outright: 'After the war it is customary to repatriate prisoners-of-war: do you intend to send Hess home?' and he added, 'If Goebbels landed in the U.K. tomorrow, would you send him back as a P.o.W. (Prisoner

of War) too?' He was perturbed about the plan to set up a United Nations commission to try these criminals. 'I would not like to see Hitler, Mussolini, and the rest of them escaping like the Kaiser to some neutral country.' (The German Kaiser had been given sanctuary by the Netherlands after World War One.)

It was then that His Majesty's ambassador reassured the dictator that Churchill proposed a 'political decision,' whereby the enemy leaders would be liquidated upon capture. Both on this occasion and subsequently when Churchill tried to force this solution on him Stalin voiced wise objections. 'Whatever happens,' he lectured the ambassador in November 1942, 'there must be some kind of court decision. Otherwise people will say that Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin were wreaking vengeance on their political enemies!' 'I am sure,' persisted the ambassador laconically, 'that the political decision that Mr Churchill has in mind will be accompanied by all the necessary formalities.' This was not an isolated document, in which an ambassador had perhaps expressed an opinion without sufficient warrant from his superiors. From both the British and American archives it becomes clear that the British - from their autocratic prime minister Winston Churchill downwards - were set on executing against the Nazi leadership what can only be described as lynch justice without the palliative noun, or alternatively as judicial murder without the exculpatory adjective. It was a matter on which Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, equivocated. Cabinet papers show that in July 1943 he proposed that the United Nations warn all neutral countries that the harbouring of war criminals at any future time would be regarded as an unfriendly act.

Responding to this, another cabinet minister, Duff Cooper, pointed out that the United Nations had yet to decide on the fate of Hitler and Mussolini if they should be taken prisoner. As for the alternative, 'punishment without trial,' Duff Cooper warned that this would shock the consciences of many people at the time and 'many more in retrospect.' Since Hitler and Mussolini would no doubt meet their deaths with dignity, the result would be that their 'memories would be enshrined for ever in the hearts of their people.' He argued that it would be infinitely preferable for the Axis leaders to creep into a despised and dishonoured exile than to have trials leading to a St Helena or, worse, to executions. Duff Cooper quoted historical parallels - showing that the exiles of James II, the Kaiser, and Charles X were fatal to their dynasty; while the harsher punishments meted out to Napoleon, Louis XVI, and Charles I built up legends on which restorations were later founded. Churchill's drafted a paper in which the three powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, declared that at the time of any armistice with Germany, those Germans who had been responsible for the atrocities 'will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done.' 'The above declaration,' he was careful to end, 'is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation.'

Eden carried Churchill's draft to Moscow and, with minor amendments, it was adopted as the declaration issued there at the end of the foreign ministers' meeting on October 30. This Moscow Declaration became the basis of the post-war disposition of many of the

German war criminals - though not of the Italian and Japanese. Churchill expressed relief at this, telling the cabinet, 'I am certain that the British at any rate would be incapable of carrying out mass executions for any length of time, especially as we have not suffered like the subjugated countries.' This left unresolved the awkward problem of how to deal with the major war criminals, particularly those 'whose offences however have no particular geographical localisation' - the major criminals like Hitler. For these the prime minister reverted, in November 1943, to his own final solution. 'A list,' he suggested, 'shall be compiled by the United Nations of all major criminals other than those provided for by local jurisdiction.' This growing list, of fifty or at the most one hundred names, would include 'the Hitler and Mussolini gangs and the Japanese War Lords.' From time to time at a conference of jurists the lists would be pruned, added to, and approved. 'Thereafter, the persons named on the approved list will, by solemn decree of the 32 United Nations, be declared world outlaws.' The beauty of this proposal was that the 'outlaws' could be liquidated at will: 'No penalty will be inflicted on anyone who puts them to death in any circumstances.' 'As and when any of these persons falls into the hands of any of the troops or armed forces of the United Nations,' suggested Churchill, 'the nearest officer of the rank or equivalent rank of Major-General will forthwith convene a Court of Inquiry, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but merely to establish the fact of identification. Once identified, the said officer will have the outlaw or outlaws shot to death within six hours and without reference to higher authority.'

It was perhaps infelicitous for the leader of a great democracy, the head of a nation fighting a war to re-establish the rule of law, to have put his name to such a document. It was drafted in November ????, even as Churchill was issuing orders for the severest fire raids in history to be executed against the capital of Germany, with the specific aim of killing as many of its civilian inhabitants as possible. There is no historian writing on the Third Reich who has not shuddered with uncomprehending disgust upon finding broadly identical orders signed by Adolf Hitler for the summary execution or liquidation of commandos, commissars, and Allied 'terror fliers' - and precisely those were the documents which were to be used as prosecution exhibits in the Tribunal that forms the centrepiece of this narrative.

These were some of the consideration on how Germany shall be treated after the War.

When General Eisenhower asked the British government in April 1944 for a statement to issue to the Germans about how they would be treated in defeat, Churchill wrote to the Foreign Office as follows:

" I have pointed out to the cabinet that the actual terms contemplated for Germany are not of a character to reassure them at all, if stated in detail. Both President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin at Teheran wished to cut Germany into smaller pieces than I had in mind. Stalin spoke of very large executions of over 50,000 of the staffs and military experts. Whether he was joking or not could not be ascertained. The atmosphere was jovial, but also grim. He certainly said he would require 4,000,000 German males to work for an indefinite period to rebuild Russia. We have promised the Poles that they shall

have compensation both in East Prussia and, if they like, up to the line of the Oder. There are a lot of other terms implying the German ruin and indefinite prevention of their rising again as an armed Power."

Unlike Churchill, Stalin seemed inclined to take the judicial path, albeit using the trial procedures for which the Russians were already well known. On December 16, 1943 they opened a war crimes tribunal against three German officers taken prisoner in Stalingrad, accused of murdering Russian civilians by means of gassing-trucks. The trial ended after only three days with death sentences. The three officers were executed in a public square in Kharkov before forty thousand spectators. The Russians spliced together a gruesome documentary film about the Kharkov trials, and its message - the Soviet trial procedures - was not lost on Justice Robert H. Jackson when it was shown to him and his entire newly assembled staff on the evening of May 17, 1945. Limiting his own verdict on it, the judge diplomatically called it 'a very interesting exposition of the Russian method of proving a case by the defendants themselves' - that is, the tortured 'self-confessions' for which Soviet-style trials had long become renowned.?? As the British attorney-general Sir David Maxwell Fyfe wrote, these trials were efficiently stage-managed examples of summary action, in which the defendants abjectly confessed to their crimes and were convicted and executed without further ado.

The show trial in Kharkov was not without consequences in Berlin during that winter of 1943-4. Goebbels' senior colleagues Dr Hans Fritzsche, who would also be indicted at Nuremberg, would testify in June 1946 to having particularly clear recollections of the moment when he learned that the Russians had staged a trial after recapturing the city of Kharkov. It was then that he heard for the first time the allegations about people being killed with gas. Dr Goebbels had told him explicitly, he said, that 'The gas trucks that they mentioned in the Russian trial were a product of somebody's fevered imagination, without any basis whatever in fact.'

Going further towards the International Military Trial (IMT) at Nuremberg:

Left in Washington, Stimson was disgusted on hearing of his president's action. 'I cannot believe that he will follow Morgenthau's views,' he wrote on the thirteenth. 'If he does, it will certainly be a disaster.' Churchill later wrote: 'We had much to ask from Mr Morgenthau.' When he discussed policy toward Germany with Roosevelt later that day he declared himself in favour of the Plan, as explained to him by Lord Cherwell (basically, that by smashing Germany's industries the British Empire could grab the defeated enemy's export markets.) Lord Cherwell produced a one-page draft memorandum on the treatment of Germany. Out of earshot of Churchill, Morgenthau invited the Prof. and Harry Dexter White up to his room at eleven A.M. on September 15, read the Prof.'s draft - and expressed a profound dislike for it. It represented 'two steps backward,' he suggested. Since the last discussion, he said, Churchill had seemed to accept the Plan, and had himself spoken promisingly of turning Germany into an agricultural state as she had been in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Churchill added:

'This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.'

It went in fact far beyond the Morgenthau Plan in its punitive economic provisions. The Morgenthau Plan included controversial provisions for the establishment of slave-labour battalions comprised of all the members of the 'S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups,' and it proposed to punish with death any person trying to leave Germany. As for the punishment of 'arch-criminals' the Morgenthau Plan seemed to convey more than just the spirit of Churchill's original 'outlaw' proposals. Roosevelt was still under Morgenthau's influence. Both Stimson and Hull continued to lobby him against the Morgenthau Plan. Remarkably, almost overnight, he began to reconsider. It was of course an election year, and what finally helped change his mind was when the newspapers got wind of the Plan; details of it appeared on September ?? in the Wall Street Journal. There was a torrent of criticism directed at both the president and Morgenthau. The five biggest American engineering unions issued a declaration dismissing the Plan as economically unsound and warning that it 'contained the seeds of a new war.'

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov asked outright for Churchill's view on the Morgenthau Plan. Churchill admitted that Roosevelt and Morgenthau had been taken aback by its public reception. The prime minister repeated, according to the British record, that, as he had declared at Teheran, Britain would not agree to the mass execution of Germans, since he feared that 'one day' British public opinion would cry out. 'But it was necessary,' the British minutes record Churchill as saying, 'to kill as many as possible in the field.' Stalin made no comment on that. A few moments later Churchill suggested that the population of Silesia and East Prussia should be 'moved' to other provinces in western Germany, explaining with disarming cynicism: 'If seven million had been killed in the war there would be plenty of room for them.'

After a week dominated by Polish affairs - of which Churchill declared both British and Russia to be 'heartily sick' - the two leaders renewed their discussion on the future in a macabre humour. British foreign secretary Anthony Eden had already secretly promised the Russians on October 16 that Britain would repatriate to the Soviet Union eleven thousand Russian prisoners-of-war 'without exception,' even if they did not wish to return. (The eleven thousand would be shot as soon as they arrived on Russian soil.) The next day Churchill regaled Stalin with an account of his bombing onslaught - boasting that three days earlier R.A.F. Bomber Command had put down ten thousand tons of bombs in twelve hours on one minor Ruhr town, Duisburg. 'The war,' boasted Churchill, 'is the most cruel since the Stone Age.' When Stalin allowed himself a witticism about cannibalism, Churchill chimed in, 'Talking of eating - Britain has managed to arrange for the despatch of 45,000 tons of corned beef to the Soviet Union.' With a guffaw he added, 'We are also sending eleven thousand Soviet ex-prisoners-of-war to eat the beef.' The reader can almost hear the unkind laughter crackling from the pages in the archives - but they merit quoting here as an indication of the kind of reprehensible remarks which are

exchanged at high-level conferences between men of war, and which hardly bear reading out by public prosecutors in the cold light of a war-crimes tribunal years later.

When Stalin asked point-blank what they were to do with Germany, Eden dutifully talked of dismemberment; and Churchill reverted to his old bugaboo, Prussia and her military caste as 'the root of the evil.' They should strip everything out of the Ruhr and the Saar, he said. 'This was the policy which Mr Morgenthau had laid before the President,' Churchill explained, adding, 'Mr Morgenthau's hatred of the Germans was indescribable.' 'A second Vansittart,' remarked Stalin approvingly, referring to the pathologically anti-German Lord Vansittart, a former adviser to the British foreign office. Roosevelt, continued the prime minister, had liked what Morgenthau had said; so did he, and he quoted page after page from the Plan as they both pored over maps of Europe, Germany, and the Dardanelles Straits, pencils in hand. It was a pity, Churchill murmured, that when God created the world he had not consulted the two of them. 'God's first mistake,' agreed Stalin.

This should give the reader a good view on what the Allied leader thought needed to be done to the losing side of the war which was forced into it by the Allies in the first place.

The Hooton Plan

A plan similar to Kaufman's (Germany Must Perish) was issued during the war years by a prominent American anthropologist. In an article headlined "Breed War Strain Out of Germans" in the New York daily newspaper P.M., January 4, 1943, Ernest Hooton laid out an "outbreeding" plan that would "destroy German nationalism and aggressive ideology while retaining and perpetuating desirable German biological and sociological capacities. The Harvard University professor's proposal called for genetically transforming the German nation by encouraging mating of German women with non-German men, who would be brought into the country in large numbers, and of German men, forcibly held outside of Germany, with non-German women. Ten to twelve million German men would be assigned to forced labor under Allied supervision in countries outside of Germany to rebuild their economies. "The objects of this measure," wrote Dr. Hooton, "include reduction of the birthrate of 'pure' Germans, neutralization of German aggressiveness by outbreeding and denationalization of indoctrinated individuals."

This plan, Hooton estimated, would require at least 20 years to be implemented. "During this period," he went on, "encourage also the immigration and settlement in the German states of non-German nationals, especially males."

12.21 Adolf Hitler: An Overlooked Candidate for the Nobel Prize

By Alex S. Perry Jr.

If anyone deserved the Nobel Peace Prize, it was Adolf Hitler. Hitler did not want war. World War II was forced on Germany. Poland was encouraged to attack Germany by the promises of British Ambassador Sir Howard William Kennard and French Ambassador Leon Noel. They promised unconditionally that England and France would come to Poland's immediate aid should she need it in case of war with Germany; therefore, no matter what Poland did to provoke Germany's attack, Poland had an assurance from England and France. With this guarantee, Poland began acting ruthlessly. In addition, Kennard and Noel flattered Poland into thinking she was a great power. As the Chinese proverb says, "You can flatter a man to jump off the roof." They sabotaged the efforts of those Polish leaders who wanted a policy of friendship with Germany.¹

Poland delivered the first blow, and Hitler announced, "Since dawn today, we are shooting back," when he spoke to the Reichstag on September 1, 1939. "Shooting back" is not the statement of an aggressor.² When Hitler attacked, Donald Day said, Poland got exactly what she deserved. None of Poland's immediate neighbors felt sorry for her. Poland had conducted a policy of terror. Ethnic Germans living on German soil that had been given to Poland at the end of World War I by the Versailles Peace Treaty had been so mistreated that 2 million left the area for Germany and elsewhere.³ They were driven from what had been their homeland long before World War I. Leon Degrelle, a young Belgian political leader in the 1930s, and who later joined Hitler's hardest fighting unit, the Waffen SS, with over 400,000 other non-German European volunteers, says, "Of all the crimes of World War II, one never hears about the wholesale massacres that occurred in Poland just before the war. Thousands of German men, women and children were massacred in the most horrendous fashion by press-enraged mobs. Hitler decided to halt the slaughter and he rushed to the rescue."⁴ Young German boys, when captured by the Poles, were castrated.⁵

William Joyce, nicknamed Lord Haw Haw by British propaganda, became a German citizen and took up for the German cause. He described the conditions of the Germans who were living in Poland because of the Versailles Treaty: German men and women were hunted like wild beasts through the streets of Bromberg. When they were caught, they were mutilated and torn to pieces by the Polish mob. . . . Every day the butchery increased. . . . [T]housands of Germans fled from their homes in Poland with nothing more than the clothes that they wore. Moreover, there was no doubt that the Polish army was making plans for the massacre of Danzig. . . . On the nights of August 25 to August 31 inclusive, there occurred, besides innumerable attacks on civilians of German blood, 44 perfectly authenticated acts of armed violence against German official persons and property. These incidents took place either on the border or inside German territory. On the night of [August 31], a band of Polish desperadoes actually occupied the German

Broad casting Station at Gleiwitz. Now it was clear that unless German troops marched at once, not a man, woman or child of German blood within the Polish territory could reasonably expect to avoid persecution and slaughter.⁶

Due to Poland's atrocious acts against the German people, Hitler declared to British Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson on August 25, 1939: "Poland's provocations have become intolerable."⁷ So Poland delivered the first blow, not Germany. The first blow was important to the United States in its war with Japan. It gave the United States the right and justification to do whatever was necessary to defeat the Japanese. But Germany did not have this right with Poland even after Poland had delivered the first blow. What fair-minded man, if he knew the true facts involved in the Polish situation, could blame Hitler for his retaliatory attack on Poland? Poland, if any nation ever did, deserved exactly what Germany gave her in return. But Hitler did not even want to do what he had to do. No sooner than Hitler began protecting the German people inside Poland, he was ready to stop all hostilities and begin peace negotiations. Prince Sturdza narrates: Only hours after the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Poland, Mussolini, renewing his efforts for peace, proposed to all the interested powers an immediate suspension of hostilities and the immediate convocation of a conference between the great powers, in which Poland would also participate. Mussolini's proposals were, without any delay, accepted by all governments concerned except Great Britain.⁸

Before war broke out Britain's ambassador to Berlin, Sir Nevil Henderson, on August 30, 1939, said, in his final report of Germany's proposed basis for negotiations, "Those proposals are in general not too unreasonable." Even Pierre and Renee Gosset, in their rabid anti-German book *Hitler*, declare: "It was a proposal of extreme moderation. It was in fact an offer that no Allied statesman could have rejected in good faith."⁹ As early as January 1941, Hitler was making extraordinary efforts to come to peace terms with England. He offered England generous terms. He offered, if Britain would assume an attitude of neutrality, to withdraw from all of France, to leave Holland and Belgium . . . to evacuate Norway and Denmark, and to support British and French industries by buying their products. His proposal had many other favorable points for England and Western Europe. But England's officials did not want peace. They wanted war. Had they not celebrated their declaration of war by laughing, joking and drinking beer?¹⁰

Hitler allowed the British to escape at Dunkirk (Note: This is not entirely true. Letting the British troops escape was no deliberate decision, rather a later rationalization to justify having lost a great opportunity.) He did not want to fight England. German Gen. Blumentritt states why Hitler allowed the British to escape: He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of the Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but "where there is planning there are shavings flying." He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church—saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge

Germany's position on the continent. The return of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.¹¹

Blumentritt's statement is not the only notice about Hitler's hope of peace and friendship with England. The renowned Swedish Explorer Sven Hedin observed Hitler's confusion about Britain's refusal to accept his peace offers: Hitler "felt he had repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and each time they had blacked his eye in reply." Hitler said, "The survival of the British Empire is in Germany's interests too because if Britain loses India, we gain nothing thereby."¹² Harry Elmer Barnes says that Hitler lost the war because he was too good. While the theory of Hitler's diabolism is generally accepted, there are very well informed persons who than too tough and ruthless. They point to the following considerations: he made a genuine and liberal peace offer to Britain on August 25, 1939; he permitted the British to escape at Dunkirk to encourage Britain to make peace, which later on cost him the war in North Africa; he failed to occupy all of France, take North Africa at once, and split the British Empire, he lost the Battle of Britain by failing to approve the savagery of military barbarism which played so large a role in the Allied victory; he delayed his attack on Russia and offered Molotov lavish concessions in November 1940 to keep peace between Germany and Russia; he lost the war with Russia by delaying the invasion in order to bail Mussolini out of his idiotic attack on Greece; and he declared war on the United States to keep his pledged word with Japan which had long before made it clear that it deserved no such consideration and loyalty from Hitler.¹³

David Irving's descriptive account of Hitler's love for Great Britain confirms what others had to say of Hitler's desire to do no harm to England: For 20 years Hitler had dreamed of an alliance with Britain. Until far into the war he clung to the dream with all the vain, slightly ridiculous tenacity of a lover unwilling to admit that his feelings are unrequited. As Hitler told Maj. Quisling on August 18, 1940: "After making one proposal after another to the British on the reorganization of Europe, I now find myself forced against my will to fight this war against Britain. . . ." This was the dilemma confronting Hitler that summer. He hesitated to crush the British. Accordingly, he could not put his heart into the invasion planning. More fatefully, Hitler stayed the hand of the Luftwaffe and forbade any attack on London under pain of court-martial; the all-out saturation bombing of London, which his strategic advisers Raeder, Jodl, and Jeschonnek all urged upon him, was vetoed for one implausible reason after another. Though his staffs were instructed to examine every peripheral British position—Gibraltar, Egypt, the Suez Canal—for its vulnerability to attack, the heart of the British Empire was allowed to beat on, unmolested until it was too late. In these months an adjutant overheard Hitler heatedly shouting into a Chancellery telephone, "We have no business to be destroying Britain. We are quite incapable of taking up her legacy," meaning the empire; and he spoke of the "devastating consequences" of the collapse of that empire.¹⁴

Hitler told Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, March 2, 1940, (1) that he had

long been in favor of disarmament, but had received no encouragement from England and France; (2) he was in favor of international free trade; (3) Germany had no aim other than the return of the “German people to the territorial position that historically was rightly theirs”; (4) he had no desire to control non-German people and he had no intention to interfere with their independence; and (5) he wanted the return of the colonies that were stolen from Germany at Versailles.¹⁵ Churchill wanted war. Churchill was a war criminal. Churchill did not want peace. He wanted the war to continue as long as possible. In a January 1, 1944, letter to Stalin, Churchill said: “We never thought of peace, not even in that year when we were completely isolated and could have made peace without serious detriment to the British Empire, and extensively at your cost. Why should we think of it now, when victory approaches for the three of us?”¹⁶ This is a confession even by Churchill that Hitler never did want war with England. Churchill in his July 1943 Guildhall speech stated quite plainly, “We entered the war of our free will, without ourselves being directly assaulted.”¹⁷

When Churchill was leaving London to meet Roosevelt for a conference in Quebec late in the summer of 1943, a reporter asked if they were planning to offer peace terms to Germany. Churchill replied: “Heavens, no. They would accept immediately.”¹⁸ So the war went on from August 1943 until May 1945—for 22 more months just because peace terms were not offered. Churchill wanted England to be in war with Germany as early as 1936.¹⁹ Roosevelt was a war criminal. He wanted war and he wanted World War II to last as long as possible. Hitler and the German people did not want war, but Roosevelt wanted war. He worked for getting World War II started. He wanted war for political reasons. Jesse Jones, a member of Roosevelt’s cabinet for five years, states, “Regardless of his oft-repeated statement, ‘I hate war,’ he was eager to get into the fighting since that would ensure a third term.”²⁰ While the president repeated he did not want war and had no intent to send an expeditionary force to Europe, the militant secretaries of the Navy and of the War Department, Knox and Stimson, denounced the neutrality legislation in speeches and public declarations and advocated an American intervention in the Atlantic Battle. As members of the cabinet they could not do it without the president’s consent.²¹ When the press quoted Frank Knox as saying: “The only hope for peace for the United States would be the battering of Germany,” FDR did not rebuke him.²²

Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Gen. Eisenhower’s brother, said, “President Roosevelt found it necessary to get the country into World War II to save his social policies.”²³ Clare Booth-Luce shocked many people by saying at the Republican Party Convention in 1944 that Roosevelt “has lied us [the U.S.A.] into the war.” However, after this statement proved to be correct, the Roosevelt followers ceased to deny it, but praised it by claiming he was “forced to lie” to save his country and then England and “the world.”²⁴ Rep. Hamilton Fish made the first speech in Congress on December 8, 1941, asking for a declaration of war against Japan. In his book, *FDR: The Other Side of the Coin*, Fish says he is ashamed of that speech today and if he had known what Roosevelt had been doing to provoke Japan to attack, he would never have asked for a declaration of war.²⁵ Fish

said Roosevelt was the main firebrand to light the fuse of war both in Europe and the Pacific.²⁶ Roosevelt's real policy was revealed when the Germans were able to search through Polish documents and found in the archives in Warsaw "the dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and Paris which laid bare Roosevelt's efforts to goad France and Britain into war. In November 1938, William C. Bullitt, his personal friend and ambassador in Paris, had indicated to the Poles that the president's desire was for "Germany and Russia [to] come to blows, whereupon the democratic nations would attack Germany and force her into submission"; in the spring of 1939, Bullitt quoted Roosevelt as being determined "not to participate in the war from the start, but to be in at the finish."²⁷ Oliver Lyttelton, wartime British production manager, was undeniably correct when he declared, "America was never truly neutral. There is no doubt where her sympathies were, and it is a travesty on history ever to say that the United States was forced into the war. America provoked the Japanese to such an extent that they were forced to attack."²⁸

The Japanese were begging for peace before the atom bombs were dropped, and MacArthur recommended negotiation on the basis of the Japanese overtures. But Roosevelt brushed off this suggestion with the remark: "MacArthur is our greatest general and our poorest politician."²⁹ These statements tell the whole history of World War II from the beginning to the end, The war was started to keep Roosevelt in office and it was allowed to go on much longer than necessary—it could have been over any day from 1943 on. At the same time American boys were battling to end World War II, leading American politicians were doing all they could for political reasons to continue the conflict. Hitler had only one goal with regard to his relations with other nations. That goal was peace. On May 17, 1933, Hitler addressed the Reichstag about his intentions: Germany will be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighboring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness. Germany is entirely ready to renounce aggressive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their part, will destroy their aggressive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention. Germany is at all times prepared to renounce offensive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of non-aggression because she does not think of attacking anybody but only of acquiring security.³⁰ None of the "peace loving democracies" paid any attention to Hitler's offer. The only reason why King Edward was not allowed to remain on the British throne was because he let it be known that as long as he was the king, England would not go to war with Germany. Hitler expressed himself about the results Germany would gain from war: "A European war could be the end of all our efforts even if we should win, because the disappearance of the British Empire would be a misfortune which could not be made up again" (Michael McLaughlin, *For Those Who Cannot Speak*, page 10). Based on the above, Hitler should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize posthumously to set things straight. He was not the cause of World War II and he did not want any war. He was a man of peace and he worked for peace in every way he could.

ENDNOTES:

- 1 Day, Donald, *Onward Christian Soldiers*, 68-9. Donald Day was The Chicago Tribune's only correspondent in northeastern Europe before and during World War II.
- 2 McLaughlin, Michael, *For Those Who Cannot Speak*, 9.
- 3 *Onward Christian Soldiers*, 55.
- 4 *The Journal of Historical Review*, winter 1982, 454-5.
- 5 Fish, Hamilton, *FDR: The Other Side of the Coin*, 86.
- 6 *Twilight Over England*, 125-6.
- 7 *The Suicide of Europe* (memoirs of Prince Michel Sturdza, former foreign minister of Romania), 1.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 145.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 10 McLaughlin, *op. cit.*, 10.
- 11 Barnes, Harry Elmer, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, 162. The last sentence in the paragraph just quoted should put an end to any claim that Hitler wanted to capture the world.
- 12 Irving, David, *Hitler's War*, paperback edition, Avon History, 236.
- 13 *The Barnes Trilogy*, section "Revisionism and Brainwashing," 33.
- 14 Irving, *op. cit.*, 236.
- 15 Tansill, Charles Callan, *Back Door to War*, 577.
- 16 Walendy, Udo, *The Methods of Reeducation*, 3.
- 17 Martin, James J., *The Saga of Hog Island*, 42.
- 18 Martin, James J., *Revisionist Viewpoints*, 75.
- 19 Neilson, Francis, *The Churchill Legend*, 350.
- 20 Jones, Jesse H., with Edward Angly, *Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years with the RFC: 1932-1945*, New York: the Macmillan Company, 1951, 260.
- 21 Fehrenbach, T.F., *F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941*, pages 135, 189.
- 22 Walendy, Udo, *The Methods of Reeducation*, 3.
- 23 Grieb, Conrad, *American Manifest Destiny and the Holocaust*, 124-5.
- 24 Walendy, *op. cit.*, 3
- 25 *Ibid.*, 144.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 149.
- 27 Irving, *op. cit.*, 235.
- 28 *The Saga of Hog Island*, *op. cit.*, 63.
- 29 Chamberlin, William Henry, *America's Second Crusade*, 219.
- 30 Neilson, Francis, *The Churchill Legend*, 278.

12.22 More Untruths, really?

This chapter depicts more possible untruths told about history but I was not able to find them in history books, just from the Internet. Hence, this information should definitely be taken with a grain of salt.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

From "Washington's Blog and Global Research 12 October 2012"

It is perceived wisdom throughout the Western world – particularly America – that the dropping of two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was "necessary" to end the war with Japan. Printed throughout textbooks in the post-war world, the understanding is that, had these targets not been struck, the war would have waged on indefinitely, with potentially untold American soldier and Japanese civilian deaths. We are told repeatedly that, without the use of weapons which current Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui refers to as the "ultimate inhumane weapon and an absolute evil", Japan would never have surrendered. We are told that President Truman was troubled by the mounting Allied casualties, and that the Joint Chiefs had told him to expect 1,000,000 dead Americans in the pending attack on the Japanese home islands. Yet this figure is a complete fabrication, invented by Secretary of War Stimson. No such claim was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Truman himself, in different statements, asserted "thousands of lives would be saved," and "a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities," and also "I thought 200,000 of our young men would be saved by making that decision." None of these statements were based on any evidence.

Truman knew weeks before the Potsdam Conference, which began in July, 1945, that the Japanese were making overtures to surrender, the only condition being the retention of the Emperor. But Truman was determined to test the new bombs. In the words of General Douglas MacArthur: "The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." In the event, the US agreed to the terms of the Japanese surrender anyway – but not until they had tested their new weapons and caused the deaths of 100,000s of innocent civilians. In reality, most of the military top brass were disgusted at the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki and understood completely that it served no military purpose whatsoever.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey group, assigned by President Truman to study the air attacks on Japan, produced a report in July of 1946 that concluded:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not

entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

General (and later president) Dwight Eisenhower – then Supreme Commander of all Allied Forces, and the officer who created most of America's WWII military plans for Europe and Japan – said:

“The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”

Newsweek, 11/11/63, Ike on Ike

Eisenhower also noted (pg. 380):

“In [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. . . . the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude...”

Admiral William Leahy – the highest ranking member of the U.S. military from 1942 until retiring in 1949, who was the first de facto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and who was at the center of all major American military decisions in World War II – wrote (pg. 441):

“It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons. The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

General Douglas MacArthur agreed (pg. 65, 70-71):

“MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the

retention of the institution of the emperor.”

Moreover (pg. 512):

“The Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face ‘prompt and utter destruction.’ MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General’s advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary.”

Similarly, Assistant Secretary of War John McLoy noted (pg. 500):

“I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs.”

Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bird said:

“I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted... In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn’t have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb.”

He also noted (pg. 144-145, 324):

“It definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn’t get any imports and they couldn’t export anything. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in.”

General Curtis LeMay, the tough cigar-smoking Army Air Force “hawk,” stated publicly shortly before the nuclear bombs were dropped on Japan:

“The war would have been over in two weeks.... The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.”

The Vice Chairman of the U.S. Bombing Survey Paul Nitze wrote (pg. 36-37, 44-45):

“[I] concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945. Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1, 1945] would have been necessary.”

Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias wrote:

“Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia. Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb. I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds.”

Ellis Zacharias, *How We Bungled the Japanese Surrender*, Look, 6/6/50, pg. 19-21.

Brigadier General Carter Clarke – the military intelligence officer in charge of preparing summaries of intercepted Japanese cables for President Truman and his advisors – said (pg. 359):

“When we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs.”

Many other high-level military officers concurred. For example:

The commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated that the naval blockade and prior bombing of Japan in March of 1945, had rendered the Japanese helpless and that the use of the atomic bomb was both unnecessary and immoral. Also, the opinion of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was reported to have said in a press conference on September 22, 1945, that “The Admiral took the opportunity of adding his voice to those insisting that Japan had been defeated before the atomic bombing and Russia’s entry into the war.” In a subsequent speech at the Washington Monument on October 5, 1945, Admiral Nimitz stated “The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war.” It was learned also that on or about July 20, 1945, General Eisenhower had urged Truman, in a personal visit, not to use the atomic bomb. Eisenhower’s assessment was “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing . . . to use the atomic bomb, to kill and terrorize civilians, without even attempting [negotiations], was a double crime.” Eisenhower also stated that it wasn’t necessary for Truman to “succumb” to [the tiny handful of people putting pressure on the president to drop atom bombs on Japan.]

British officers were of the same mind. For example, General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence, said to Prime Minister Churchill that “when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”

On hearing that the atomic test was successful, Ismay’s private reaction was one of “revulsion.”

Why Were Bombs Dropped on Populated Cities Without Military Value?

Even military officers who favored use of nuclear weapons mainly favored using them on unpopulated areas or Japanese military targets ... not cities. For example, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy Lewis Strauss proposed to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that a non-lethal demonstration of atomic weapons would be enough to convince the Japanese to surrender ... and the Navy Secretary agreed (pg. 145, 325):

“I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated before it was used. Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate. . . My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to Japanese observers and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomeria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood. . . I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest. . . would lay the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities at will. . . Secretary Forrestal agreed wholeheartedly with the recommendation. . . It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world. . .”

General George Marshall agreed:

“Contemporary documents show that Marshall felt “these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave—telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers. . . .” As the document concerning Marshall’s views suggests, the question of whether the use of the atomic bomb was justified turns . . . on whether the bombs had to be used against a largely civilian target rather than a strictly military target—which, in fact, was the explicit choice since although there were Japanese troops in the cities, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki was deemed militarily vital by U.S. planners. (This is one of the reasons neither had been heavily bombed up to this point in the war.) Moreover, targeting [at Hiroshima and Nagasaki] was aimed explicitly on non-military facilities surrounded by workers’ homes.”

As historian Doug Long notes:

“U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission historian J. Samuel Walker has studied the history of research on the decision to use nuclear weapons on Japan. In his conclusion he writes, “The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisors knew it.” (J. Samuel Walker, *The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update*, *Diplomatic History*, Winter 1990, pg. 110).“

Many high-level politicians agreed. For example, Herbert Hoover said (pg. 142):

“The Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945... up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ... if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs.“

Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew noted (pg. 29-32):

“In the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision. If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer.“

Why Then Were Atom Bombs Dropped on Japan?

If dropping nuclear bombs was unnecessary to end the war or to save lives, why was the decision to drop them made? Especially over the objections of so many top military and political figures? One theory is that scientists like to play with their toys:

“On September 9, 1945, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet, was publicly quoted extensively as stating that the atomic bomb was used because the scientists had a “toy and they wanted to try it out” He further stated, “The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment It was a mistake to ever drop it.”“

However, most of the Manhattan Project scientists who developed the atom bomb were opposed to using it on Japan. Albert Einstein – an important catalyst for the development of the atom bomb (but not directly connected with the Manhattan Project) – said differently:

“A great majority of scientists were opposed to the sudden employment of the atom bomb.” In Einstein’s judgment, the dropping of the bomb was a political – diplomatic decision rather than a military or scientific decision.

Indeed, some of the Manhattan Project scientists wrote directly to the secretary of defense in 1945 to try to dissuade him from dropping the bomb:

“We believe that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable. If the United States would be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.”

Political and Social Problems, Manhattan Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 76, National Archives (also contained in: Martin Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 1987 edition, pg. 323-333).

The scientists questioned the ability of destroying Japanese cities with atomic bombs to bring surrender when destroying Japanese cities with conventional bombs had not done so, and – like some of the military officers quoted above – recommended a demonstration of the atomic bomb for Japan in an unpopulated area.

The Real Explanation?

History.com notes:

“In the years since the two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, a number of historians have suggested that the weapons had a two-pronged objective It has been suggested that the second objective was to demonstrate the new weapon of mass destruction to the Soviet Union. By August 1945, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had deteriorated badly. The Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Russian leader Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill (before being replaced by Clement Attlee) ended just four days before the bombing of Hiroshima. The meeting was marked by recriminations and suspicion between the Americans and Soviets. Russian armies were occupying most of Eastern Europe. Truman and many of his advisers hoped that the U.S. atomic monopoly might offer diplomatic leverage with the Soviets. In this fashion, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan can be seen as the first shot of the Cold War.”

New Scientist reported in 2005:

The US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 was meant to kick-start the Cold War rather than end the Second World War, according to two nuclear historians who say they have new evidence backing the controversial theory... Causing a fission reaction in several kilograms of uranium and plutonium and killing over 200,000 people 60 years ago was done more to impress the Soviet Union than to cow Japan, they say. And the US President who took the decision, Harry Truman, was culpable, they add... “He knew he was beginning the process of annihilation of the species,” says Peter Kuznick, director of the Nuclear Studies Institute at American University in Washington DC, US. “It was not just a war crime; it was a crime against humanity.”... [The conventional explanation of using the bombs to end the war and save lives] is disputed by Kuznick and Mark Selden, a historian from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, US. ... New studies of the US, Japanese and Soviet diplomatic archives

suggest that Truman's main motive was to limit Soviet expansion in Asia, Kuznick claims. Japan surrendered because the Soviet Union began an invasion a few days after the Hiroshima bombing, not because of the atomic bombs themselves, he says... According to an account by Walter Brown, assistant to then-US secretary of state James Byrnes, Truman agreed at a meeting three days before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima that Japan was "looking for peace". Truman was told by his army generals, Douglas MacArthur and Dwight Eisenhower, and his naval chief of staff, William Leahy, that there was no military need to use the bomb... "Impressing Russia was more important than ending the war in Japan," says Selden.

John Pilger points out:

"The US secretary of war, Henry Stimson, told President Truman he was "fearful" that the US air force would have Japan so "bombed out" that the new weapon would not be able "to show its strength". He later admitted that "no effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb". His foreign policy colleagues were eager "to browbeat the Russians with the bomb held rather ostentatiously on our hip". General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project that made the bomb, testified: "There was never any illusion on my part that Russia was our enemy, and that the project was conducted on that basis." The day after Hiroshima was obliterated, President Truman voiced his satisfaction with the "overwhelming success" of "the experiment"."

We'll give the last word to University of Maryland professor of political economy – and former Legislative Director in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and Special Assistant in the Department of State – Gar Alperovitz:

"Though most Americans are unaware of the fact, increasing numbers of historians now recognize the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb to end the war against Japan in 1945. Moreover, this essential judgment was expressed by the vast majority of top American military leaders in all three services in the years after the war ended: Army, Navy and Army Air Force. Nor was this the judgment of "liberals," as is sometimes thought today. In fact, leading conservatives were far more outspoken in challenging the decision as unjustified and immoral than American liberals in the years following World War II."

"Instead [of allowing other options to end the war, such as letting the Soviets attack Japan with ground forces], the United States rushed to use two atomic bombs at almost exactly the time that an August 8 Soviet attack had originally been scheduled: Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The timing itself has obviously raised questions among many historians. The available evidence, though not conclusive, strongly suggests that the atomic bombs may well have been used in part because American leaders "preferred"—as Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Martin Sherwin has put it—to end the war with the bombs rather than the Soviet attack. Impressing the Soviets during the early

diplomatic sparring that ultimately became the Cold War also appears likely to have been a significant factor.”

“The most illuminating perspective, however, comes from top World War II American military leaders. The conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that . . . most Americans haven’t paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue: Not only did most top U.S. military leaders think the bombings were unnecessary and unjustified, many were morally offended by what they regarded as the unnecessary destruction of Japanese cities and what were essentially noncombat populations. Moreover, they spoke about it quite openly and publicly.”

“Shortly before his death General George C. Marshall quietly defended the decision, but for the most part he is on record as repeatedly saying that it was not a military decision, but rather a political one.”

The Gleiwitz Incident

Robert H. Jackson, a U.S. Supreme Court Justice from 1941 to 1954, was sent to Europe when the war was ending to make sure that Germany alone would be blamed for the Second World War. Jackson, as leader of the U.S. legal team, helped draft the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which created the legal basis for the Nuremberg Trials. (You have read about Jackson in the chapter about the Morgenthau Plan and he will also be part of the later story of the Nuremberg Trials). After studying some of the documents, Jackson knew well and emphasized that the German declaration of war on the United States was perfectly legal. Therefore, he pointed out, it had to be shown before the court that the war in Europe was, from the beginning, a German aggression contrary to international law (making it a Crime Against Peace). Thus, the invasion of Poland had to be shown to be an aggressive move with no justification, and no blame on Poland. Further study of the files brought Jackson to doubt that a fair trial would support, in any way, the finding of Germany’s exclusive responsibility. On the contrary, he said:

“The Germans will certainly accuse our three European allies to have pursued a policy that has enforced the war. I say this because the seized documents from the German Foreign Office, which I have seen, all come to the same conclusion: “We have no escape, we must fight, we are surrounded, we are strangled.” How would a judge react if this is found in the trial? I think he would say: “Before I condemn anyone as the aggressor, he ought to describe his motives.”

And that would be catastrophic, Jackson continued, because

“... if this trial leads to a discussion of the political and economic causes of the war, this may cause infinite damage, both in Europe I do not know well, and in America that I know fairly well.”

As a servant of the U.S. Government and U.S. war policy, Jackson came up with the only solution: to ban any discussion on the causes of the war before the Nuremberg tribunal. In other words, not to have a fair trial. In the transcripts of the proceedings, nothing is found on the war policies of the West, Poland, or the USSR since almost all documents and testimonies that would have been relevant in this respect were rejected by the court as irrelevant.

But affidavits like the one signed by Alfred Naujocks, in which he claimed, without any corroboration, that he participated in a German undercover operation to attack the Gleiwitz radio station on the very night that Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland, and blame it on the Poles in order to “justify” Germany’s “crime against peace”—this was admitted by the court with no questions or discussion. Naujocks did not appear in person, only his affidavit was put in evidence; there was no opportunity for cross-examination of the witness by the defense. In such a way did the “evidence” accumulate to find Germany’s National Socialist government guilty of “Crimes Against Peace.”

What the German reports said at the time

A communication was sent from the chief of police in Gleiwitz on the night of August 31 that the radio station was assaulted by irregular Polish troops who, for a short time, succeeded in occupying the station before being chased out by the German Frontier Police. During their defense [of the station] one Polish irregular was mortally wounded and left behind. Another communication came from a representative of the town of Troppau about the customs house of Hohenlinde. In the night of August 31, it was attacked by Polish irregulars who succeeded in occupying it; but thanks to a counterattack by Waffen-SS auxiliary troops, the irregulars were routed. If true, this means that the first two war crimes of WWII were committed by the Poles! First, by making incursions into German territory when a declared state of war did not exist. Second, by using irregular, non-uniformed troops (as doing so invites attacks on any suspicious civilians).

In the official German documents about the border raids, there are mentioned fully 44 acts of Polish aggression over the six days and nights before the German invasion (which began around 4 a.m. on September 1st). On the night of August 31st, there were reportedly 14 incidents of provocation by Polish irregulars of which Gleiwitz and Troppau were but two. In this text, it is clearly stated that the attackers did not wear Polish uniforms, but that they were irregular troops, based in Hohenlinde and in Gleiwitz. And finally, according to the German documents detailing Polish prewar attacks, the post of Hohenlinde was not burned (as stated by H. S. Hegner) but merely occupied. In his speech to the nation on Sept. 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler did not mention, except indirectly, this so-important Gliewitz “false flag” that was supposedly ordered by him to justify his invasion order, but instead spoke at length about the ongoing provocations over the past

four months by the Poles. He pointed out that since 1919-1920, 100,000 ethnic Germans who were Polish citizens had been forced to flee their homes in Poland. He had only this to say about what occurred during the previous night:

“These proposals for mediation have failed because in the meanwhile there, first of all, came as an answer the sudden Polish general mobilization (Aug. 30), followed by more Polish atrocities. These were again repeated last night (Aug. 31). Recently in one night there were as many as twenty-one frontier incidents: last night there were fourteen, of which three were quite serious. I have, therefore, resolved to speak to Poland in the same language that Poland for months past has used toward us. This attitude on the part of the Reich will not change.”

Further on in his speech, Hitler said

“This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory. Since 5:45 A.M. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met by bombs.”

Fire coming across the border from Polish regular soldiers does not mean a raid on a radio station by irregulars. The raid on the Gleiwitz station and the customs house in Hohenlinde must be included in the “three which were quite serious.” But is that how a leader makes use of a “false flag” event that he ordered, intending to use as a pretext? No. The words “Gleiwitz” or “radio station” never came up in the speech, nor afterward from Hitler. So much for it being a German “false flag” from the German perspective!

The “confession” of Alfred Naujocks is the sole basis for the story

The only “evidence” for the Gleiwitz radio station attack as a Nazis operation consists of the uncorroborated “confession” (signed statement) in 1945 of a German SS officer, Alfred Naujocks, who was then in the hands of the Allies. Here is the affidavit taken from the transcript of the tribunal.

COL. STOREY:

I now offer in evidence Document 2751-PS, which is Exhibit USA-482. It is an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, dated November 20, 1945. This affidavit particularly refers to the actual occurrences in connection with the Polish border incident. I believe it was referred to by the Witness Lahousen when he was on the stand:

“I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

“1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 and a member of the SD [Sicherheitsdienst: SS Security Service] from its creation in 1934 to January 1941. I served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February 1941 until the middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics Department of the Military Administration of Belgium from September 1942 to September 1944. I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944.

“2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish

border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: 'Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.' I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take place.

My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.

"3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of August I went to see Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Müller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Müller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the assault members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

"4. Müller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was 'Canned Goods.'

"5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o'clock that evening. Heydrich said, 'In order to carry out this attack, report to Müller for "Canned Goods."' I did this and gave Müller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.

"6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots, and left."

And then "sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin".

Note that the simulated attack on the radio station is ordered already on August 10, whereas the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was not signed until the 26th of August. It seems the prosecutors are wanting to show that it was pre-planned in order to emphasize the criminal nature of it. Heydrich tells Naujocks that the purpose is to create something for German propaganda and for the foreign press ... but was it used for that? No. Who were the five or six SD men who accompanied him? Why aren't they named? Pointing out that a Polish-speaking German was going to be put at his disposal to broadcast the message over the radio transmitter seems an unnecessary appendage. After two weeks of waiting, Naujocks goes to see Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller and hears a discussion with a man named Mehlhorn about another planned incident in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops. Twelve or thirteen condemned criminals were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground. But rather than just shooting them, they were to be given "fatal injections" by a doctor employed by Heydrich, and then given gunshot wounds. Afterwards, members of the press were to be taken to the spot and shown the dead bodies. Do we have any reports of this? No.

Müller told Naujocks he had been ordered by Heydrich to make one of those condemned criminals available to him for Gleiwitz. On the 31st of August, Naujocks reported to Mueller again and requested his one "dead man" be delivered near to the radio station. The man who was delivered was still alive, but unconscious. Naujocks saw no gunshot wounds on the man and he, Naujocks, did not shoot him. But also, this man was not wearing a Polish uniform as previously determined, but was dressed in civilian clothes! He then said "they" (wearing Polish uniforms?) broadcast a message of 3 to 4 minutes over the emergency transmitter ... fired some shots, and left.

This story doesn't hold together and doesn't sound like the kind of plan intelligent Germans would come up with. As pointed out above, it was totally unnecessary. It was only of value to the Nuremberg prosecutors who needed some believable German aggression against Poland for their "Crimes against Peace" charge. But the Nuremberg prosecutors were accusing the SD of carrying out a crime against peace by staging so-called border incidents before the outbreak of the [German-Polish] war to give Hitler an excuse for starting the war. However, as the defense for the SD showed, nothing of the sort was carried out by the pertinent departments (Amt. III and VI). Naujocks explained this away by saying it was a personal request made to him by Reinhard Heydrich. No one in the appropriate SD departments had any knowledge of such an operation.

Background Information on Alfred Naujocks

Born in Kiel in 1911, where he studied engineering. As is said in the affidavit, he became a member of the SS in 1931, and the SD in 1934. In 1941, with the rank of SS Sturm-bannführer, he was dismissed from the SD after disputing one of Reinhard Heydrich's orders. He was demoted and had to serve in the Waffen-SS on the Eastern Front. In 1943, due to his health, he was sent to the West, where he served as an economic administrator for the troops in Belgium. These experiences may have soured him and made him want to look after himself first when the opportunity arose. Because...in October

of 1944, Naujocks surrendered or “deserted”—turned himself over to U.S. forces—who placed him in detention as a possible war criminal.

He is said to have “escaped custody” after the war, but he signed the Nuremberg affidavit on November 20, 1945 – the day before testimony at the war crimes trial started. Was he in custody at that time, and was he released following the carrying out of that service for the United States prosecutors? Naujocks turned up later as a businessman in Hamburg operating under his own name, and later sold his story to a newspaper, under the title “The Man Who Started The War.” All this occurred very much in the open. He died of a heart attack in 1966 in Hamburg without ever being interviewed by a historian. Strange.

The writer H.S. Hegner, aka Harry Wilde, included an account of the Gleiwitz incident from the Polish/Jewish propaganda point of view in his book *Die Reichskanzlei 1933-1945*. Since no one else has done so, (realize that there exists no official version with respect to this subject—not in the French Yellow Book [of diplomatic documents] about the war, nor in Churchill’s *Memoirs*) Hegner’s has become the most widely quoted reference for Gleiwitz, in spite of the fact that it differs in important ways from the Naujocks affidavit. A summary of Hegner’s version was included in Spanish revisionist Joachin Bochaca’s *Los Crimenes de los “Buenos”* (The Crimes of the “Good Guys”), 1982, quoted below:

Heinrich Mueller, a high functionary in the Gestapo, had been tasked (by someone, perhaps Hitler) with concocting an official motive for Germany’s declaring war on Poland. **A hundred prisoners** from German concentration camps were taken to the city of Oppeln, next to the Polish frontier. These men were **put into German SS uniforms** and posted near the frontier. There they were surprise-attacked by **German soldiers dressed in turn in Polish uniforms**, who pounced on the poor prisoners – the faux SS – **and murdered them**. That was part one.

Once this was done, the Germans in their Polish uniforms next headed toward the Polish frontier and, in passing, occupied and burned their own German customs post in Hohenlinde. Next, an **alleged agent of the Gestapo named Naujocks, in command of German soldiers** disguised as members of a Polish patriotic paramilitary organization – a detail that Hegner omits to mention – **attacked the German radio station in Gleiwitz**.

In the Gleiwitz operation there was only one fatality, which Mueller conveniently took care of. It was of a **prisoner wearing a Polish military uniform**, who had been **rendered unconscious by an injection and was afterwards executed** in the course of the action.

Differences between Hegner and Naujocks:

- One hundred prisoners instead of twelve or thirteen.
- Heinrich Müller concocts the fake incident, rather than Reinhard Heydrich
- Says the Customs House in Hohenlinde was burned, while Naujocks doesn’t even

mention Hohenlinde.

- Naujocks is said to be a member of the Gestapo rather than the SS and SD.

- Naujocks commands "German soldiers" rather than "a few SD men."

- The single prisoner at Gleiwitz was dressed in a Polish military uniform rather than civilian clothes.

- The prisoner was not given a fatal injection, but only to render him unconscious, and was executed by the Germans, while Naujocks says he did not shoot him.

This is all reminiscent of rumors and stories that are passed around—the details change in ways that make it something quite different.

Background on H.S. Hegner, aka Harry Wilde

Harry Paul Schulze was born on July 16, 1899 in Zwickau, to Clara Hegner and Paul Schulze, a butcher. He became a journalist and author under the pseudonyms Harry Schulze-Wilde, Harry Schulze-Hegner and H.S. Hegner. In his youth he apprenticed as a businessman, but in the 1920's he went on his own as a city tour guide in Erfurt and Weimar. He became involved in the German leftist youth movement, becoming a member of German Labor Youth. He then became involved with the Christian Revolutionaries under the leadership of the leftist, Pleivier. Schulze was a member of the communist party until 1932. In 1933, the Hitler government jailed him for suspicious activity.

He managed to run away to Dresden, where he had an aunt; then, pretending to be a representative for a publisher, made his way to Prague. There he met Comintern representatives Willi Muenzenberg and Johannes Becher. They sent him to Amsterdam to check out the story of Marinus van der Lubbe, who was found guilty of starting the Reichstag Fire, which occurred in February 1933... In Amsterdam Hegner-Schulze became close friends with Dutchman Jef Last, and together they wrote a book about von der Lubbe, which came out in 1939. Their friendship was of a nature that indicated a homosexual relationship. After the war, Hegner-Schulze wrote a book about National Socialism against homosexuality with the title (in English): *The Fate of the Damned*. Wilde also lived in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, before fleeing to Switzerland in 1942.

After the war—He founded a magazine in 1947 in Munich called (in English) *Echo of the Week*. He also wrote biographies for the publishing house Rowohlt, under the name Harry Wilde, including a monograph about Walther Rathenau, the German-Jewish diplomat of the Weimar regime. What he wrote suggested suppressed homosexual desires in Rathenau. In 1959 his book *Die Reichskanzlei 1933-1945* came out in Germany. As best I can gather, this is where his account of the Gleiwitz incident first appeared. Later he wrote books on Rosa Luxemburg and Leon (Lev) Trotsky. From this point on, Hegner led a secluded private life with his daughter, Cordelia, while at the same time he had a boyfriend, Joachim Klose. He is categorized as a historical journalist . . . heavy on the "stori" part. One critic stated: "Where the real history ends, and where the stories of the

author Hegner, alias Schulze-Wilde, begins, no reader can tell.”

What more is left to be said?

Where are pictures of the dead man found at the radio station? The Nazis would surely have photographed the scene to document the “Polish crime.” Where are the newspaper headlines and the newsreels that are said to have been produced for the same purpose? Every false flag operation has to have these. Gunther Kumel has stated that neither Hitler, nor Goebbels, nor any other official made use of the Gleiwitz incident to vindicate the attack on Poland. The Gleiwitz incident, in which a gang of Polish irregulars occupied a German radio station on the frontier before being chased away, could not have triggered the German invasion of Poland a few hours later. By March 1939, Polish atrocities against the German minority had reached peaks unknown before. Ethnic Germans were fleeing into the woods to prevent being beaten. Seventy thousand reached Germany and were placed in camps. How many others fled to friends and relatives? The number is not known. As Germans crossed the border, the Polish Military shot at them with live ammunition, killing many. Polish artillery shot at German civilian aircraft heading for East Prussia. The Poles had prepared lists of all ethnic Germans and started to kill them in the first days of September (Bloody Sunday is an example).

Since everyone in Germany and Europe knew these facts, there was no need for an additional faked provocation. What was necessary for the Allies at Nuremberg, however, was a way to bury the Polish provocations that were aimed at forcing Germany to attack. Turning all the Polish aggressive acts into “false flags” that were really carried out by Germany to fool the world, is the solution they came up with. Since the victors were then in total control, they had no trouble pushing through anything they wished. They are still in control and still keeping it in place. The real aggressor was Poland, and it’s guarantors in case of war with Germany—France and England. Those three are the nations truly guilty of “crimes against peace.”

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Pearl Harbor

The following text illustrates what people write about Pearl Harbor today because many believe, with supporting evidence, that it was just as much a false flag attack as the Lusitania-incident from World War 1.

On 7 December 1941 the greatest disaster in United States history occurred. Truly this was and is, "A date which will live in infamy." (Costello 1), but not for the bombing of Pearl Harbor, rather for the deception and the mis-guidance used by the Government and Franklin D. Roosevelt. In a purely artificial chess game Roosevelt sacrificed over 2400 American Seamen's lives, thanks to his power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. By over-looking the obvious facts of an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was able to control both the political and economic systems of the United States. Most of American society before the Pearl Harbor bombing believed in the idea of isolationism. Franklin D. Roosevelt knew this, and knew the only way in which United States countrymen would take arms and fight in Europe's War was to be an overt action against the United States by a member of the Axis Power. Roosevelt also believed Hitler would not declare war on the United States unless he knew they were beatable. There are numerous accounts of actions by Roosevelt and his top armed forces advisors, which reveal they were not only aware of an attack by Japan, but also they were planning on it, and instigating that attack. On 7 October 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote the eight-action memo.

This memo outlined eight different steps the United States could do that he predicted would lead to an attack by Japan on the United States. The day after this memo was given to Franklin D. Roosevelt, he began to implement these steps. By the time that Japan finally attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, all eight steps had occurred (Willy 1). The eight steps consisted of two main subject areas; the first being a sign of United States military preparedness and threat of attack, the second being a forceful control on Japan's trade and economy. The main subject area of the eight-action memo was the sign of United States military preparedness and threat of attack. McCollum called for the United States to make arrangements with both Britain (Action A) and Holland (Action B), for the use of military facilities and acquisition of supplies in both Singapore and Indonesia. He also suggested for the deployment of a division of long-range heavy cruisers (Action D) and two divisions of submarines (Action E) to the Orient. The last key factor McCollum called for was to keep the United States Fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands (Action F). Roosevelt personally took charge of Action's D and E; these actions were called "pop up" cruises. Roosevelt had this to say about the cruises, "I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs

guessing (Stinnett 9).” With the fleet located around Hawaii and particularly in Pearl Harbor a double-sided sword was created; it allowed for quicker deployment times into South Pacific Water, but more importantly it lacked many fundamental military needs, and was vulnerable due to its geographic location. To understand the true vulnerability of Pearl Harbor one must look at Oahu, the Hawaiian Island that the military base is located. The North part of the island is all mountains, these mountains hinder the vision of military look out points, making an attack from the North virtually a surprise until the sound of fighter planes are over head.

There were many key military needs that were missing from Pearl Harbor, and they were: a lack of training facilities, lack of large-scale ammunition and fuel supplies, lack of support craft such as tugs and repair ships, and a lack of overhaul facilities such as dry-docking and machine shops. Commander in Chief, United States Fleet - Admiral James O. Richardson, was outraged when he was told by President Roosevelt of his plans on keeping the fleet in Hawaiian Waters. Richardson knew of the problems and vulnerability of Pearl Harbor, the safety of his men and warships was paramount. In a luncheon with Roosevelt, Richardson confronted the President, and by doing so ended his military career. Four months later Richardson was removed as commander-in-chief, and replaced by Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel (Stinnett 11). Kimmel by many top Naval personal was looked down upon on, for taking orders from Roosevelt and not considering the immediate dangers he was putting the fleet in. The second part of McCollum’s eight-action memo was a forceful control on Japans trade and economy. He insisted that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for oil (Action G), and a complete embargo of all trade with Japan (Action H), by the United States. This embargo closely represented a similar embargo that was being imposed by the British Empire. McCollum also knew that if Japan controlled the Pacific, it would put a strain on America’s resources for copper, rubber, tin, and other valuable goods. These imports from the Pacific were all essential to America’s Economy, and to protect these trading routes McCollum insisted for all possible aid to be given to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek (Action C).

Japan had some control over China due to a military operation, which took over part of the country. Thanks to the control, Japan took and used many raw goods from China that were not in abundance in their own homeland. The government of Chiang Kai-shek was completely against Japan, and with economic support from the United States, they were able to deny certain possessions from Japan. The United States Government and United States Navy by withholding important information about the bombing of Pearl Harbor have done everything they can do to protect the integrity of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the government. True nationalist believe this information is withheld from the general public in order to protect national security, and not to hide a conspiracy that was created by the United States Government some fifty years ago. This school of thought asks people and wants them to think, “How in the world could the President of the United States sacrifice over 2400 American seamen’s life’s, horrific amounts of

damages to the Fleet, and tremendous amounts of destruction to Army fighter planes?" This group also asks, "In the past fifty years why has there not be one single piece of hard evidence which links Roosevelt to Pearl Harbor, or why has there not been one person who had top security clearance to come out and say something about Roosevelt and his involvement with the bombing?"

On 5 December 1941 at a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said, "Well, you know Mr. President, we know where the Japanese fleet is?" "Yes, I know, ... Well, you tell them what it is Frank," said Roosevelt (Toland 294). Knox became extremely excited with the ok from Roosevelt, and he went to tell the group of where the Japanese were and where they were headed. Just as Knox was about to speak Roosevelt interrupted saying, " We haven't got anything like perfect information as to their apparent destination (Toland 294)." All Navy reports showed the Japanese were in Pacific Water, and were in a direction towards Hawaii and Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt knew this information, but one must wonder why in the world would he not want to tell his cabinet this information, unless he wanted to hide something? On 6 December 1941 at a White House dinner Roosevelt was given the first thirteen parts of a fifteen part decoded Japanese diplomatic declaration of war and said, "This means War (Toland 318)."

Later that night, Roosevelt along with top advisor Harry Hopkins, Henry Stimson, George Marshall, Secretary of the Navy Knox, with aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty deliberately sat through the night waiting for the Japanese to strike Pear Harbor (Toland 320). Not until the morning of 7 December 1941 at 7:55 Hawaii Time did Japan deliberately and forcefully attack the United States at Pearl Harbor, finally ending disillusioned isolationist ideas of an only European War. United States countrymen immediately ran to recruiting offices after the news of the attack, to join the armed forces and fight against the Japanese and Hitler.

Beyond a doubt Pearl Harbor was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's back door into the European War. Roosevelt's decisions and actions were very much so, deliberate and calculated, in order to lead a victorious Allied Powers in World War II. By provoking the Japanese and the foreknowledge of an attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt along with his top advisors and the Federal Government are truly to blame for the lost of American life's and American property. 7 December 1941 shall be a day in American history, which will be remembered as "a day of deceit."

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And further on Pearl Harbor: A question of honor by William Brand

For 59 years, the names of Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Gen. Walter C. Short have carried the stigma of two men who were either incompetent or simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and left way out of the loop. Just before 8 a.m. on Dec. 7, 1941, Kimmel and Short watched as carrier-launched Japanese aircraft crisscrossed above the Hawaiian Islands, their bombs, torpedoes and bullets laying virtual waste to U.S. military installations, men and machines commanded by the two career officers. It was the Sunday morning attack on Pearl Harbor, and it began the United States' direct participation in World War II and ended the careers of the islands' two top military commanders, both of whom had stellar service jackets. Now, the U.S. Congress wants to reverse the actions taken against the Navy's Kimmel and Army's Short following the attack. It is asking, by a joint resolution, that President Clinton exonerate the two men.

The key to the resolution is simple: Washington failed to warn Kimmel and Short that intercepted Japanese radio messages showed war was imminent. The resolution asks Clinton to clear Kimmel and Short of any wrongdoing and to posthumously grant them promotions - promotions that were given to every other World War II flag officer upon retirement, but were denied Kimmel and Short. Retired in disgrace, Short died in 1949; Kimmel in 1968. Both were refused courts martial - trials that would have given them a chance to clear their names.

What has brought this latest effort to restore the names and memories of Kimmel and Short to ones of respect is the relentless pleas of their families and investigations by the government and by historians. Helping the cause is a book published last year by Oakland resident Robert Stinnett, a WW II Navy Veteran turned historian. His "Days of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor," documenting for the first time the real lack of intelligence information given to Kimmel and Short, continues to draw both raves, from supporters, and objections, from those who flatly say there was no conspiracy to deprive the two commanders of needed information. The Congressional resolution cites a number of government Pearl Harbor inquiries and notes, for example, that a 1995 Department of Defense study concluded "Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications ... which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war."

Rejected by Congress previously, this version of the resolution has garnered powerful, bipartisan backing. In the U.S. Senate, Delaware's Republican William Roth and Democrat Joseph Biden Jr., carried the proposal, along with Republicans Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. In the U.S. House of Representatives,

John M. Spratt Jr., D-S.C., and Floyd Spence, R-S.C., were co-sponsors. After approval, the resolution was included in the defense appropriations bill, which cleared Congress Oct. 30. Clinton has already signed the appropriations bill, but still must sign an order concerning the Pearl Harbor commanders to put the Congressional resolution into effect.

So what are the chances of approval of the resolution this time? Perhaps a tossup at best. The White House has no comment, and a Department of Defense spokeswoman at the Pentagon said it's unsure if the Army and Navy will recommend that the President sign the resolution. "There's still a lot of opposition here," the spokeswoman, Cathy Abbott, said. U.S. Army historian Col. Fred Borsht served on the 1995 Pearl Harbor inquiry panel and retains his belief that Kimmel and Short should not be exonerated. "It's a time-honored tradition in the armed services that the senior man on the spot when something happens bears ultimate responsibility," Borsht said. "During the investigation, we went to Pearl Harbor; we looked at Battleship Row; we also looked at all the millions of pages of documents. I think there were nine investigations," he said. "Speaking only for myself, I came away convinced that both of these men - who were good men and had been very successful - simply failed to appreciate that technology had changed and it was, in fact, possible for our forces to be seriously hurt by an aerial attack," Borsht said. Opinions in the military notwithstanding, members of the Kimmel and Short families hope the resolution will be signed by Clinton. "A lot of us have been working for a long time and I'm tickled to death," said Edward R. "Ned" Kimmel, Adm. Kimmel's son.

The Kimmel and Short families say openly that Stinnett's "Days of Deceit" and its conspiracy implications helped turn sentiment in their favor in Congress. Short really died of a broken heart, and the fact that he could never clear his name haunted Kimmel, Stinnett said. If he helped, he's very pleased, he said. Stinnett's book, published by the Free Press, an imprint of the New York publisher Simon & Schuster, is based on thousands of long secret American intercepts of Japanese fleet radio messages that he obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. The documents indicate America did know an attack was coming. This is historical revisionism. For decades, revisionist historians have argued that Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark, because President Franklin D. Roosevelt needed Japan to attack the United States to inflame Americans and force the country from its isolationist stance. It worked, the argument goes. America entered the war.

The congressional resolution stops short of calling it a conspiracy. Congress cites the 1995 report which found that "the evidence of the handling of [the intercepted Japanese] messages in Washington reveals some ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and mis-estimations, limited coordination, ambiguous language and lack of clarification and follow-up at higher levels." Nuts, Stinnett says. There was a conspiracy to keep Kimmel and Short out of the intelligence circle and it extended as far as Roosevelt. Most historians, though, say Stinnett's trail of uncovered memos doesn't squarely nail Roosevelt. With or without a Roosevelt smoking gun, "Days of Deceit" has created a furor. More than 100,000 copies have been printed. It will soon be published in Japanese, and a paperback version

with a new epilogue, adding more documentation showing the attack was no surprise in Washington, is scheduled in the United States in a few months. "We're so grateful to Mr. Stinnett," said Emily Short, the general's daughter-in-law, who lives in Las Cruces, NM. "I credit "Day of Deceit" with being the needed impetus to shake the Congress loose from the forces opposing the truth," she said.

In Wilmington, Del., Ned Kimmel, 79, a retired lawyer and the admiral's only child, said the Stinnett book added another important chapter to the long struggle to vindicate his father and Short. "When "Days of Deceit" came out last December, there was a seminar about Adm. Kimmel by the Naval Historical Foundation. The book had some helpful information, and it was read by an awful lot of people," he said. Kimmel said a committee is working hard to convince Clinton to sign the proclamation. "My opinion is this," Kimmel said, "finally, after all these years, the people of the United States in the form of the House and Senate have addressed this question, and my father and Gen. Short are exonerated." Most mainstream historians say there never was a plot. But revisionists long have argued that the attack was anticipated in Washington. Dissident revisionists argue that Pearl Harbor, while horrible, did what Roosevelt wanted: It galvanized Americans and drove the country into World War II against the Axis powers. Congress was right to pass the resolution, Stinnett says. The conspiracy is no theory. It really happened, he believes.

It took Stinnett, a retired Oakland Tribune photographer who served in the Pacific in WW II, 17 years of research through volumes of previously classified U.S. intercepts of secret Japanese radio messages and government memos to produce the book. The radio intercept-code-breaking information went to Washington, but it didn't come back to Pearl, he said. He learned about America's secret code-breaking war 20 years ago during a visit to "Station Cast," a former radio signal listening post in Hawaii, while on a Tribune assignment. After retirement, Stinnett started his own investigation - interviewing former American military communications personnel and asking our government for long-classified messages, now controlled by the National Security Agency. When he was rebuffed - he began firing off Freedom of Information requests - called FOIAs and based on a law first passed by Congress in 1966, requiring the government to make records public unless it is in the modern-day security interests of the country to keep them secret. They're regularly submitted by investigative journalists, but little used by academics. Today, his office is stuffed with tens of thousands of declassified memos and messages. Despite Stinnett's exhaustive effort and support for his conclusions, his detractors are equally strong in their belief that he has not supported his case.

Stanford History Professor Barton Bernstein said Stinnett's evidence linking Roosevelt to a plot to allow the Japanese to bomb Hawaii, is flimsy. "This is a book full of speculation; the evidence seems to be lacking," Bernstein said. He admitted he knows nothing about the Navy's message intercept and code-breaking prowess. At the University of California, Berkeley, History Professor Anthony Adamthwaite takes a more neutral stand. "There really isn't enough evidence to say if the Roosevelt Administration knew of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor," Adamthwaite said. "No doubt there was monitoring of Japanese

transmissions going on - but electronic intelligence was quite new at that time. Now we have the leisure to analyze this data," he said. "But at that time - there was a tremendous amount of data coming in and the question was - who read the intercepted signals?" "I don't think the evidential chain is strong enough to reach the conclusion that the White House let the attack happen," he said. "You have to realize - for Japan to attack an American base so far away - that would seem like a crazy thing to do from the American point of view."

David Kahn, author of a definitive book on U.S. code-breaking, leveled a scathing attack on Stinnett's code research in the latest issue of the *New York Review of Books*. The operating Pearl Harbor attack story long has been that the Japanese Navy task force, commanded by Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, kept strict radio silence as the fleet crossed the Northern Pacific en route to Pearl. That's what really happened, Kahn said. No wonder. "Central to the surprise [attack] was the radio silence of the strike force," Kahn says. "The Japanese commanders and radio operators alike, say unanimously they never transmitted any messages." He adds that the Japanese code at that time, labeled JN 25, by the United States, had not been cracked, and U.S. intelligence summaries produced in Hawaii stated there was no information on submarines or carriers. Now it's Stinnett who is scoffing.

Sitting in his basement office in his house near Lake Merritt, he pulls out a sheaf of photocopied message intercepts from the days and hours before the Pearl Harbor attack. All were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act in May of this year. The intercepts show that American radio operators in Hawaii, Corregidor in the Philippines and near Half Moon Bay here in the Bay Area tracked the Japanese fleet before the Pearl Harbor attack. The information went to Washington - but it never reached the two key commanders in Hawaii, Stinnett said. He also produces a communiqué from the listening station on Corregidor: "We are redoing enough current traffic to keep two translators very busy," the station commander wrote Washington on Nov. 16, 1941.

Stinnett adds that after his book was published, four retired Navy officers who worked at the Navy listening post in San Francisco in 1941 contacted him. One is Charles Black, husband of former U.S. Ambassador and film star Shirley Temple Black. "These guys knew we had broken the Japanese code," Stinnett said. "They didn't say definitely they knew Pearl Harbor was being attacked. But they said the threat was very well-known in their department in San Francisco," he said. The admission that American cryptographers had broken the Japanese code was kept in secret U.S. Navy vaults until this May, Stinnett said. Stinnett believes that one reason the National Security Agency remains reluctant to declassify the rest of the Pearl Harbor documents is because the United States still relies on communications intelligence. "Who knows? Maybe there's some way they can track Saddam Hussein. Maybe they're monitoring his radio communications, and they don't want publicity about what our government does," he said. Meanwhile, the mystery continues.

After the book "Day of Deceit" came out, the National Security Agency reviewed doc-

uments about U.S. intercepts of coded Japanese messages before Pearl Harbor that Stinnett had requested. "They withdrew about two dozen documents," Stinnett said. "I don't know what in the world was in the text - all I have is the withdrawal slips."

13. Post War Era

Report of Friedrich Grimm concerning a visit in May 1945: 'In May 1945, a few days after the collapse, I had a memorable discussion with an important representative of the opposing side. He introduced himself to me as a university professor of his nation who wished to talk with me about the historical foundations of the war. It was a conversation on an elevated level that we were having. Suddenly, he broke off and pointed to the leaflets which were lying on the table in front of me, with which we were flooded in the first days after the surrender and which were mainly concerned with the concentration camp atrocities. 'What do you say to that?' he asked me. I replied: 'Oradour and Buchenwald? You're beating a dead horse with me. I am an attorney and condemn injustice wherever I meet it, but most of all when it occurs on our side. Nonetheless, I know how to make a distinction between facts and the political usage made of them. I know what atrocity propaganda is. After the First World War, I read all publications of your experts concerning these questions, the writings of the Northcliff bureau, the book 'From War to Peace' of the French finance minister Klotz, in which he describes how the fairy tales about the hacked-off children's hands were invented, and what use was made of them, the enlightening writings of the magazine Crapouillot, which compares the atrocity propaganda of 1870 with that of 1914/1918, and finally the classic book by Ponsonby: 'Falsehood in Wartime.'

In it, it is revealed that in the previous war they already had magazines in which artificial mountains of corpses were arranged by means of a photo montage with dolls. These pictures were distributed. In doing so, the captions were left blank. They were later inserted telephonically by propaganda headquarters according to need.' My visitor exploded: 'I see I've come across an expert. Now I also want to say who I am. I am no university professor. I am from the headquarters of which you have spoken. For months I have been conducting what you have correctly described: atrocity propaganda - and with it we have won the total victory.' I replied: 'I know and now you must stop!' He responded: 'No, now we are just properly beginning! We will continue this atrocity propaganda, we will increase it until no one will have a good word to say about the Germans any longer, until any of the sympathy you have had in other countries will have been destroyed, and until the Germans themselves will have fallen into such confusion that they no longer know what they are doing!' I ended the conversation: 'Then you will be taking a great responsibility upon yourself!'"

The British magazine Sunday Correspondent on September 17, 1989, for the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Second World War and of the reunification marking it: 'We must now be honest about the German question, as uncomfortable as it may be for the Germans, for our international partners and even ourselves [...] The question remains, in essence, the same. Not how do we prevent German tanks from rolling over the Oder or

the Marne, but how Europe will deal with a people whose number, talent, and efficiency is allowing it to become our regional super-power. We did not enter the war in 1939 in order to save Germany from Hitler or the Jews from Auschwitz or the Continent from Fascism. As in 1914, we entered the war for the no less noble reason that we were not able to accept a German predominance in Europe.“

Henry Kissinger in the *Welt am Sonntag* of November 13, 1994: 'President Clinton's idea of the USA and Germany as Partners in Leadership was not exactly very wise [...] Actually, this notion drives everyone to the barricades, for in the final analysis two world wars were waged in order to prevent just that, a dominant role of Germany.“

The citations imply that all the wars, revolutions, persecutions and expulsions of the 20th century were matter-of-factly initiated by rationally planning nations or were tolerated, for the sake of power and money. In view of the apocalyptic terror and horror resulting from these undertakings, a clear analysis appears more practical than moral accusations. For the British upper class - and their international partners - war is an entirely normal activity. The British pragmatically ask: How did our forebears hold it? What was their advantage? Did they not, for four hundred years, wage war against their main rival or the strongest continental power? One weighs, like a merchant: is it advantageous to wage war against France, can Austria hurt us? What will war against Germany bring us? 250 million pounds = 5 million marks per year? The security of our predominance? Must we fight against the USA later?

On March 12, 1948, a few days after the downfall in the CSR and the subsequent suicide of Jan Masaryk, the Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain at the Nuremberg war crime trials, Sir Hartley Shawcross, stated according to the *London Times*: 'Step by step I have been forced more and more to the conclusion that the aims of Communism in Europe are sinister and deadly aims. I prosecuted the Nazis in Nuremberg. With my Russian colleagues I condemned Nazi aggression and Nazi terror. I feel shame and humiliation now to see under a different name the same aims pursued, the same technique followed, without check.“

The international edition of the U.S. magazine *Newsweek* wrote on May 8, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the unconditional surrender of the German Armed Forces: 'The chiefs of state who are assembling this week for the solemn remembrance of the end of the Second World War, will formally dedicate themselves to the theme of reconciliation. The winners of the year 1945 showed toward the losers an unusual degree of generosity, as they had not done after the First World War - with disastrous consequences. However, the state which first brought about this reconciliation will not be taking part in the gathering. It is the Soviet Union, whose ideological menace caused the victorious Western powers to put Germany and Japan on their feet again in the framework of a free-market economy and political democracy. More closely considered, this war did not end even in 1945. Those who were waging war merely found themselves in new systems of alliances, and with modified tactics. The end did not come until 1990-91, when Germany was reunified and the Soviet Union imploded. According to this general view of the chronology, it can

be said that the war lasted seventy-five years. The Kaiser and Hitler lost and Germany has won."

And the German government? A small episode proves that those who govern there know much better than the governed what is going on globally. When then British Prime Minister John Major, in his address in Berlin for the 50th anniversary of the war's end, spoke of the second Thirty Years War from 1914-1945: 'Fifty years ago Europe saw the end of the 30 Years War, 1914 to 1945. The slaughter in the trenches, the destruction of cities and the oppression of citizens: all these left a Europe in ruins just as the other 30 Years War did three centuries before."

The Bulletin of the German government (No. 38, May 12, 1995) falsified the text of the speech into: 'Fifty years ago, Europe experienced the end of the thirty years which encompassed not one, but two world wars. The slaughter in the trenches, the destruction of cities and the oppression of citizens left behind a Europe in ruins, just as the Thirty Years War had done some centuries before.' But still weeks after the speech, the British embassy sent the upper text with the clear formulation 'the other 30 Years War'! By the will of the German Federal Government, the fact that Major sees the First and Second World War as parts of a single event, was not allowed to become publicly known in Germany.

The dark side of that triumph, however, has been all but suppressed. It is the story of the crimes and atrocities of the victors and their proteges. Since Winston Churchill played a central role in the Allied victory, it is the story also of the crimes and atrocities in which Churchill was implicated. These include the forced repatriation of some two million Soviet subjects to the Soviet Union. Among these were tens of thousands who had fought with the Germans against Stalin, under the sponsorship of General Vlasov and his 'Russian Army of Liberation.' This is what Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote in *The Gulag Archipelago*:

In their own country, Roosevelt and Churchill are honored as embodiments of statesman-like wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious ... what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens determined not to surrender. Most shameful of all was the handing over of the Cossacks. They had never been Soviet citizens, since they had fought against the Red Army in the Civil War and then emigrated. Stalin, understandably, was particularly keen to get hold of them, and the British obliged. Solzhenitsyn wrote of Winston Churchill: He turned over to the Soviet command the Cossack corps of 90,000 men. Along with them he also handed over many wagonloads of old people, women, and children. This great hero, monuments to whom will in time cover all England, ordered that they, too, be surrendered to their deaths.

The 'purge' of alleged collaborators in France was a blood-bath that claimed more victims than the Reign of Terror in the Great Revolution - and not just among those who in one

way or other had aided the Germans: included were any right-wingers the Communist resistance groups wished to liquidate. The massacres carried out by Churchill's protege Tito must be added to this list: tens of thousands of Croats, not simply the Ustasha, but any 'classenemies,' in classical Communist style. There was also the murder of some 20,000 Slovene anti-Communist fighters by Tito and his killing squads. When Tito's Partisans rampaged in Trieste, which he was attempting to grab in 1945, additional thousands of Italian anti-Communists were massacred. As the troops of Churchill's Soviet ally swept through central Europe and the Balkans, the mass deportations began. Some in the British government had qualms, feeling a certain responsibility. Churchill would have none of it. In January 1945, for instance, he noted to the Foreign Office: 'Why are we making a fuss about the Russian deportations in Rumania of Saxons [Germans] and others? ... I cannot see the Russians are wrong in making 100 or 150 thousand of these people work their passage. I cannot myself consider that it is wrong of the Russians to take Rumanians of any origin they like to work in the Russian coal-fields.' About 500,000 German civilians were deported to work in Soviet Russia, in accordance with Churchill and Roosevelt's agreement at Yalta that such slave labor constituted a proper form of 'reparations.'

Worst of all was the expulsion of some 15 million Germans from their ancestral homelands in East and West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and the Sudetenland. This was done pursuant to the agreements at Tehran, where Churchill proposed that Poland be moved west, and to Churchill's acquiescence in the Czech leader Eduard Benes's plan for the 'ethnic cleansing' of Bohemia and Moravia. Around one-and-a-half to two million German civilians died in this process. As the Hungarian liberal Gaspar Tamas wrote, in driving out the Germans of east-central Europe, 'whose ancestors built our cathedrals, monasteries, universities, and railroad stations,' a whole ancient culture was effaced. Then, to top it all, came the Nuremberg Trials, a travesty of justice condemned by the great Senator Robert Taft, where Stalin's judges and prosecutors - seasoned veterans of the purges of the 30s - participated in another great show-trial.

13.1 Gruesome Harvest

At Yalta in the Crimea, Messrs. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met to decide the fate of Europe and in their joint statement solemnly declared:

"It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany."

Again at Potsdam, the representatives of the Big Three met and in their joint Declaration, signed by Messrs. Stalin, Truman, and Attlee, officially proclaimed:

"It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people."

Despite these and other assurances, the Potsdam decisions, as we at first interpreted them, meant throwing the German people on their own, with outside assistance prohib-

ited, after the necessary means for their survival had been destroyed. This could have but one result: to blot out Germany and the German people. The life of every nation is supported by three main pillars: land (all natural resources), labor (both brawn and brains), and capital (plants and equipment). Break down any one of these and the nation is plunged into catastrophe. We have been guilty of pulling down all three in Germany.

The war started the process by destroying the flower of German manpower, shattering cities, factories, railroads, and impoverishing the soil by a five year cessation of fertilizer production. And an equally oppressive war has been waged against the German people since their unconditional surrender. The supporting power of the land has been undermined by vital territorial losses followed by overcrowding caused by the influx of millions of Germans expelled into the shrunken Reich from the lost areas and from Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Industrial capital resources have been further diminished by loss of all production facilities in the territories taken by the conquerors and by a gigantic program of sacking politely known as "deindustrialization" and "reparations in kind." The working force had been decimated by the enslavement of millions, the throwing of other millions out of posts of responsibility through "denazification," and weakened by undernourishment which causes workmen to fall at their posts of duty. Even the German race itself has been attacked by a program of mass violation of Germany's unconditionally surrendered motherhood.

In consequence, Germany lies prostrate and her people famish. After they began to die en masse, it was finally decided that the importation of some food would be necessary - unfortunately barely enough to keep the great masses of people in the twilight zone between life and death. Their agonies and despair have been perpetuated at the maximum of human capacity. The following pages portray what TIME magazine has aptly called "history's most terrifying peace", a peace which fully explains why many Germans are ready to turn to communism, or worse. For, strangely, our modern age which brought us the atom bomb has also given birth to nations which at the expense of their allies are able to derive profit from the production of human suffering.

War Devastation

Devastation of the Reich by total warfare was alone enough to cast serious doubt on Germany's postwar ability to survive. Never before in history have the life-sustaining resources of a nation been so thoroughly demolished. Returning from victory in Europe, General Bradley declared, "I can tell you that Germany has been destroyed utterly and completely." The demand for unconditional surrender had forced the desperate Germans to fight to the bitter end, until their cities had been pulverized into death-ridden rubble and their factories, railroads, canals, dams, power installations, communications, buildings, homes - all their exposed facilities - had been converted into heaps of twisted, smouldering ruins. Allied fervor to destroy everything German had been expressed by General Eisenhower with the opening of the Ruhr drive. "Our primary purpose," he de-

clared, "is destruction of as many Germans as possible. I expect to destroy every German west of the Rhine and within that area in which we are attacking."

Allied capacity to destroy became overwhelming after the American industrial colossus had been converted from peace-time to war production. American output soon surpassed that of all other belligerents in the war combined and became twice as great as the capacity of the doomed Axis. Stunned by American power, Hermann Göring confessed to his Nuremberg prison guards: "The industrial genius of America is something of which no one dreamed." A glimpse of America's smashing force when devoted to the grim business of mass production of death and destruction is provided by the following description written by a front line war correspondent:

"A cataclysmic blast of exploding, splintering steel rent the earth before us and it seemed like the world was coming to an end. "The Americans were blasting out a path for a forward drive. "Man and beast shuddered in their tracks. Whole towns were disintegrating. Life seemed to disappear from the scene. It was the most terrifying destructive force of warfare Germany has ever seen. And it was a symbol of what was to come as the U.S. 1st Army unloosed this shattering blow within the borders of Germany. "For an hour and a half more than 2,000 bombers and hundreds of guns pounded the German countryside, making the earth dance before this mighty man-made force. When the heavies and mediums were not making the earth quake for miles around, our massed artillery was giving them hell out there. They were firing at an average rate of one round every 15 seconds, blasting every conceivable obstacle in our path. Minefields went up as though touched off by an electric switch... "In the center of that frightful scene, the Germans were entrenched as a 'human wall.' They were dug in foxholes and inside houses of 'fortified towns.' Many died without knowing what had hit them. "Having seen brave men and wild beasts crack as they do sometimes in the grip of a terrible earthquake, I could have sworn there would be no opposition when the zero hour came. "Yet, when our tanks and doughboys went over the top after the barrage, as in the battle of Verdun, there were Germans still alive and they fought us with violence."

Great though it was, the destruction resulting from ground fighting pales in comparison with that caused by our gigantic air raids. The two atom bombs dropped on Japan may have been more dramatic, but they could hardly have been more destructive than the millions of phosphorous, fire, and "blockbuster" bombs dropped on Germany. Near the end we were using 11-tonners which crews said caused their planes to bounce up over 500 feet when the huge 25-foot missiles were released, sending up "a tremendous pall of black smoke and a fountain of debris" which "dwarfed the terrific explosions of the six-ton 'earthquake' bombs." During the war, more bombs by weight were dropped on Berlin alone than were released over the whole of England. So great was the ruin that General Eisenhower was constrained to say:

"I have seen many great engineering jobs during the war - such as the clearing of the port of Cherbourg - but I just wouldn't know where to begin to rebuild Berlin."

An American writer, among the first group of correspondents allowed to spend more than 24 hours in the smashed metropolis, wrote:

“The capital of the Third Reich is a heap of gaunt, burned-out, flame-seared buildings. It is a desert of a hundred thousand dunes made up of brick and powdered masonry. Over this hangs the pungent stench of death . . . It is impossible to exaggerate in describing the destruction . . . Downtown Berlin looks like no thing man could have contrived. Riding down the famous Frankfurter Allee, I did not see a single building where you could have set up a business of even selling apples.”

All German cities above 50,000 population and many smaller ones were from 50 to 80 per cent destroyed. The story of Kassel typifies the tragedy which befell the others:

“Three hundred times the people of Kassel ran terrified to their air-raid shelters as giant British and American planes dropped their bombs. Nearly 10,000 were killed in the first terrible bombing, the night of October 22, 1943. That was largely an incendiary attack, which set the whole center of the city afire. Thousands were killed in their air-shelters by the gas fumes from great piles of burning coal, never knowing why they felt sleepy, never awakening. “From that night on they never knew when; they just knew they were doomed. Sometimes they got only a few bombs; often raiding parties which couldn’t reach objectives farther east around Berlin picked Kassel on the way home. “Occasionally swarms of planes went directly overhead and nothing happened; other times they went overhead, and when the people of Kassel thought they were going on eastward, they wheeled around and came back to drop their powerful tons of TNT. “They got so they knew all the tricks, those that remained in Kassel. Steadily their town was beaten down upon their heads . . . Less than 15,000 of their 65,000 homes remained livable. They learned how to dig in, to escape the coal fumes, the fires. Somehow, I thought it was with just a touch of pride that the Burgomeister said, ‘And then our latest raid, March 8 and 9, 1945. It was by far the biggest. Perhaps a thousand big bombers, one of the biggest raids in all Germany; and we lost very few killed - less than 100.’ ““And then, just before Easter, we heard the American armies were coming and wanted to make Kassel an open city,’ said Helga Aspen, a pretty blond girl who stayed through it all. ‘But,’ she added bitterly, ‘the Fuehrerhauptquartier (Himmler) gave orders to defend to the last man.’ “And so Kassel, beaten by 300 air-raids, must know the crashing of American artillery fire. They gathered about 6,000 civilians in a deep bunker in the center of town and waited - as the rather inept German defense units gradually were driven back. “So, on April 4, 1945, Kassel surrendered, not more than 15,000 of its 250,000 still in the the city and living. Thousands lay buried under the countless tons of brick and mortar and twisted steel that had been dwellings and stores and factories. “That was a year ago and it’s no exaggeration to say that they are still dazed. Only a few have snapped out of their stupor to become real leaders. It is not uncommon to see a person burst into helpless tears, if the conversation turns to recounting the war terror.”

Some of Germany’s jobless millions have found temporary employment in clearing rubble and similar work. But genuine reconstruction is impossible without production of vast

amounts of building materials and new equipment, neither of which can be produced in Germany today, because the necessary facilities no longer exist. It takes factories and machines Germany lacks to build the factories and machines Germany needs.

Extermination by Overcrowding

As her agricultural lands became overcrowded, Germany had resorted to manufacturing. By importing iron ore and exploiting her coal and potash resources to the utmost, she had built up the world's second largest steel and chemical industries which, in turn, formed the "workshop of Europe," raised the general European standard of living, and provided direct or indirect support for fully two thirds of her own population. On account of destruction by total warfare and deliberate Allied policy, these industrial resources are now largely wiped out. Without them, over half of the German workers must resort to the soil as their only other means of life. Under the circumstances it is extremely doubtful that the land, even if all held in 1937 were left intact, could support the huge, now jobless, industrial population on even the barest subsistence level.

Without waiting to see, Germany's conquerors have ruthlessly stripped her of lands constituting 28 per cent of her living space, producing an even higher proportion of her food, and containing two of her three principal coal regions. To make matters still worse, they are expelling into the remaining Reich millions of Germans from the lost provinces, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere; are coddling a large population of "displaced persons" within stricken Germany; and, in the case of the Russians and French, are maintaining large armies of occupation which live off the land. Both the "displaced persons" and these occupation forces enjoy priority over the Germans by being able to make requisitions against them for whatever food and other items they need in order to live in comparative ease and luxury. The deplorable situation created by these actions can well be imagined.

In their Yalta statement, the Big Three reaffirm their "faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter" and say they uphold "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they live." Yet in the same pronouncement they grant Russia the eastern half of Poland and as compensation promise the Poles "substantial accessions of territory" in eastern Germany - all without regard to "the wishes of the peoples concerned," - "freely expressed" or otherwise. Although Yalta prescribes that the exact amount of such territory Poland is to receive must await final adjudication at the peace conference, Russia at Potsdam confronted her two western allies with a territorial fait accompli. She had taken a third of East Prussia as her own permanent acquisition and had placed her Polish puppet in possession of all other German territory east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. Even the drastic Morgenthau Plan had called for ceding Poland only the part of East Prussia not taken by Russia and the Upper Silesian coal and industrial region. But in addition to these areas, Poland had now possessed herself of German Posen, nearly all of Pomerania and Lower Silesia, and the eastern part of Brandenburg - the best part of

the Reich's breadbasket.

Russia's seizure of Koenigsberg and adjacent East Prussian territory was accepted at Potsdam and has since gone unopposed. Renamed Kaliningrad, the former East Prussian capital has been developed into a prized warm water port for the Soviet Union, most of the German inhabitants have been ousted, and the whole region has been thoroughly Russified.

France, meanwhile, had waged a bitter fight to deprive Germany of vital western areas. Insisting that the Reich must be permanently weakened by economic and political dismemberment, she demanded that the Ruhr be detached and internationalized, that the Rhineland be turned into an autonomous state, and that she be allowed to annex the rich Saar coal and industrial regions. Placing settlement of these questions and her exorbitant reparation claims above all bilateral agreements and alliances, she attempted to force the issue by blocking all Allied attempts to treat Germany as an economic whole. Despite this stinging Russian rejection of territorial changes in western Germany, the United States, in exchange for a French promise to cease blocking treatment of Germany as an economic whole, promised to back French claims to the Saar which France thereupon began to enlarge by annexing adjoining areas. But at Stuttgart, Mr. Byrnes, after repeating the promise to support the French claim to the Saar, followed Mr. Molotov's example and opposed detachment of the Ruhr and Rhineland. His stand, supported by both Russia and Britain, will undoubtedly force substantial moderation in future French claims.

Byrnes declared that apart from the Saar, and the eastern territories to go to Russia and to Poland as decided at the peace conference, "the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware the people of the Ruhr and the Rhineland desire to remain united with the rest of Germany. And the United States will not oppose their desire."

The Germans have long suffered from acute overpopulation. In earlier years they sought relief in colonies and heavy emigration, which incidentally brought us the large German element in our own population. Later, they resorted to intensive industrialization. After World War I, they were stripped of their colonies, emigration was impeded by barriers such as immigration quotas, and their homeland was reduced from 208,830 to 181,699 square miles. Following World War II, emigration has been entirely prohibited, and all the Germans in Europe are being jammed into a homeland further slashed to only 133,000 square miles. Although Germany's population is half as large as our own, her territory in 1937 was only one sixteenth as large as ours, or about equal to the combined areas of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Since the present losses to Poland, Russia, and France subtract an area as large as Pennsylvania, they mean that the 70 million Germans are being crammed into a territory no larger than Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. Imagine trying to force half the people of the United States into these three states with their cities, factories, railways, and, other production facilities demolished! The resultant population compression is tremendous. Thinking people in France are justly worried that

it will bring another violation of their territory impelled by millions of desperate Germans faced by extermination through overcrowding. Diplomacy which creates such powder kegs is singularly lacking in statesmanship and humanity. It makes sense only in terms of Soviet designs.

The forced exodus of Germans from the lost German territories and elsewhere in eastern Europe constitutes one of the blackest pages of history. Potsdam gives its permission by saying that the "transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be undertaken." However it adds that "any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner." Some 15 million people are victimized by this decree: a half million from Hungary, nearly three million from Czechoslovakia, and most of the rest from the German territories taken by Russia and Poland.

Winston Churchill was not exaggerating when, in referring to the expulsions some three months after V-E Day, he informed the House of Commons:

"It isn't impossible that a tragedy on a prodigious scale is imposing itself behind the iron curtain which presently divides Europe."

The conservative newsletter, REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS, quotes as follows from a confidential memorandum prepared by an eminent European economist:

"Since the end of the war about 3,000,000 people, mostly women and children and overaged men, have been killed in eastern Germany and south-eastern Europe; about 15,000,000 people have been deported or had to flee from their homesteads and are on the road. About 25 per cent of these people, over 3,000,000, have perished. About 4,000,000 men and women have been deported to eastern Europe and Russia as slaves. ... It seems that the elimination of the German population of eastern Europe - at least 15,000,000 people - was planned in accordance with decisions made at Yalta. Churchill had said to Mikolajczyk when the latter protested during the negotiations at Moscow against forcing Poland to incorporate eastern Germany: 'Don't mind the five or more million Germans. Stalin will see to them. You will have not trouble with them: they will cease to exist.'"

In describing the expulsions in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Russian officers told Chicago Daily News correspondents:

"The Poles have cleaned out all the Germans as far west as the Oder River, and now all that property is for any Poles who want it. "The Czechs have taken care of the Germans in Sudetenland in their own way - and it's not pretty. They round them up, with only what they can carry, and start them moving."

Upon returning to his post as professor of political science at the University of Michigan, after serving 14 months as director of AMG's regional government coordinating office, Dr. James K. Pollock, in August, 1946, said most of the 2-1/4 million expellees from Hungary and Sudetenland are old women and children. He said:

“The Germans we are getting are mostly from the Sudetenland or Germans whose families had been living in Hungary for some 500 years. They come in perfectly frightful condition. They even took the women’s wedding rings before they left. In many cases they have no clothes except those they are wearing.”

An officer would call at the door of the victims and order them to leave their home within a few hours, permitting them to take along 30 to 100 lbs. of luggage containing nothing of value which might help them in making a new start elsewhere. The property forcibly left behind would be confiscated by the state. Any able-bodied men found would be hustled off to slavery. The others would then start their perilous hegira to overcrowded Germany wholly without protection of law, subjected to every conceivable abuse, including robbery, beatings, rape and murder. A dispatch in December, 1945, paints a picture of the plight of the exiles in the new Poland, where hundreds of thousands had been ousted from their homes and left to wander where they would. Former German cities like Breslau are described as almost depopulated of Germans, with Poles taking their place. The dispatch goes on to say:

“Hundreds of thousands of persons in Poland are constantly on the move, restlessly seeking a spot where they can grub a living out of the war raged land. In every rail station and junction men, women, and children await transport. Clusters of human beings, almost hidden under loads of parcels and cans and other remnants of what must have been their homes, wait along the roads or in blasted villages for any transport that will carry them somewhere else. Life with its birth and death continues even in these nomadic streams and everywhere you see womenfold tending their sick or nursing babies.”

Precedent for these inhuman expulsions was set long before Potsdam in Romania where, according to a diplomatic report from Bucharest, 520,000 Romanian citizens of German ancestry, men between the ages of 17 and 45 and women between 18 and 30, were rounded up like slaves and deported to Soviet Russia. The document said “there were heart-rending scenes and many preferred suicide to an unknown fate in Soviet Russia.”

Pulling down the Pillar of Labor

Allied attacks against German manpower have proceeded along three main fronts: enslavement, denazification, and physical incapacitation through undernourishment. President Roosevelt on October 21, 1944, promised that “the German people are not going to be enslaved, because the United Nations do not traffic in human slavery.” In the preceding month of Quebec, however, he had used strong pressure to obtain Mr. Churchill’s acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan which called for “forced German labor outside Germany.” Pravda writer Boris Izakov wrote that when in the following February at Yalta the proposal was advanced to force German workers to rebuild war-damaged areas, “President Roosevelt called this a healthy idea.” It was at this meeting that Mr. Roosevelt pressed the Morgenthau Plan and won Mr. Stalin’s ominously ready acceptance.

Although at Potsdam it was solemnly promised again that "It is not the intention of the Allies to . . . enslave the German people," thousands of Germans had already been marched eastward into Russia's yawning slave camps. More than a month earlier, on June 29, 1945, the following had been published:

"German prisoners in Russian hands are estimated to number from four to five millions. When Berlin and Breslau surrendered, the long grey-green columns of prisoners were marched east. . . downcast and fearful. . . toward huge depots near Leningrad, Moscow, Minsk, Stalingrad, Kiev, Kharkov, and Sevastopol. All fit men had to march some 22 miles a day. Those physically handicapped went in handcarts or carts pulled by spare beasts. . . They will be made to rebuild the Russian towns and villages which they destroyed. They will not return home until the work is completed."

It has long been an open secret that Russia maintains under the direction of the NKVD (secret police) a vast army of Russian slaves, varying in number from 10- 20 millions, mainly recruited as "political unreliaables." The presence and importance of this huge slave force explains, among other things, the profitability and frequency of Soviet Russia's many "purges": they are primarily a device for rounding up prisoners for enslavement. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviet Union should jump at the opportunity to enslave millions of defeated enemy civilians and soldiers and, to avoid special criticism, induce her allies to do likewise. A few crippled and ailing Germans who have survived the ordeal have been returned from the Russian slave camps to Berlin where American correspondents have obtained first hand accounts of what is happening. German Red Cross girls went at 9 a.m. on the morning of September 10, 1946, to meet a 20-car trainload of returning forced laborers. As the sealed cars were opened by the armed guards who had been riding on top, the girls were greeted with thin, scabby-faced men in rags begging for water or hysterically calling for help in removing the dead.

The daily diet in Russian slave camps is soup and lectures on the glories of Communism and the evils of western democracy. The slightest disobedience is penalized by such heavy work that a third of the culprits die within three weeks from exhaustion. A tenth of the slaves died during the first year, according to those who have returned. When the war ended, we enjoyed a decided advantage over the Russians in German esteem. Aware of the barbarities of the NKVD's treatment of slaves, German soldiers did their best to avoid falling into the hands of the Red armies, preferring instead to surrender to the British or Americans. France, according to the International Red Cross, had 680,000 former German soldiers slaving for her in August, 1946. 475,000 of their number had been captured by the United States and later turned over to the French for forced labor.[10] French treatment of her slave subjects is revolting to the civilized conscience. In an article entitled, "We Should Not Resemble Them," FIGARO reveals:

"In certain camps for German prisoners of war . . . living skeletons may be seen, almost like those in German concentration camps, and deaths from undernourishment are numerous. We learn that prisoners have been savagely and systematically beaten and that some have been employed in removing mines without protection equipment so that

they have been condemned to die sooner or later. "People, of course, will point to the Gestapo tortures, the gas chambers and the mountains of human bodies found in the internment camps in Germany. But these horrors should not become the theme of sports competition in which we endeavor to outdo the Nazis. . . We have to judge the enemy, but we have a duty not to resemble him."

Gathering his facts from numerous reliable sources, Louis Clair writes in *THE PROGRESSIVE* of "the horrible conditions in the French camps of German POW's." He says:

"In a camp in the Sarthe district for 20,000 prisoners, inmates receive 900 calories a day; thus 12 die every day in the hospital. Four to five thousand are unable to work at all any more. Recently trains with new prisoners arrived in the camp: several prisoners had died during the trip, several others had tried to stay alive by eating coal that had been lying in the freight train by which they came. "In an Orleans camp, the commander received 16 francs a day per head or prisoner to buy food, but he spent only nine francs, so that the prisoners were starving. In the Charentes district, 2,500 of the 12,000 camp inmates are sick."

After we had delivered the first 320,000 prisoners, the French returned 2,474 of them to us, claiming that we had given them weaklings. Correspondents described them as "a beggar army of pale, thin men clad in vermine infested tatters." All were pronounced unfit for work - three-fourths of them on account of malnutrition - and 19 per cent had to be hospitalized. Associated Press photographer Henry Griffin, who had taken pictures of the corpses piled in all German concentration camps, including Buchenwald and Dachau, said of the men: "The only difference I can see between these men and those corpses is that here they are still breathing." Asked to investigate, the Red Cross reported the prisoners were receiving inhuman treatment.

On December, 5, 1946, it was announced that the American Government had requested the repatriation by October 1, 1947, of the 674,000 German POW's it had turned over to France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxemburg. France had agreed to release its 620,000 of this number but gave no definite pledge of when they would be freed. The French Government also disclosed that the United States, in a Dec. 21, 1945, memorandum, expressly stipulated that the Germans captured by the American Army and handed over to France were chattels to be used indefinitely for forced labor as part of France's war reparations from Germany. Meanwhile reports continued to pour into the press that conditions in the French slave camps remained as bad or worse than before - starvation diets, little protection from the elements or disease, in filthy, vermin-infested quarters.

Great Britain in August, 1946, according to the International Red Cross, had 460,000 German prisoners slaving for her, and as in the case of France bringing in a handsome profit to the War Office. Upon embarking from our ports the prisoners were given to understand that they were being sent home; when they learned upon arrival in British or French ports that they were to be worked indefinitely as slaves, they became sullen. As

one British officer said, "It takes us several weeks to bring them around where they will work hard." A British contractor employing German slaves for skilled work is reported to have remarked:

"When you see how well they do things and how awful our own Ministry of Works - we call the Ministry the O.C., short for organized chaos - messes things up, it makes you wonder how we ever won the war."

According to revelations by members of the British House of Commons, about 130,000 former German officers and men were held during the winter of 1945-46 in British camps in Belgium under conditions British officers have described as: "Not much better than Belsen." The prisoners lived through the winter in tents and slept on the bare ground under one blanket each. They say they are underfed and beaten and kicked by the guards. Many have no underclothes or boots. The official International Red Cross report in August 1946 showed that our own government, through its military branch in the German zone, was exacting forced labor from 284,000 captives, 140,000 of them in the occupation zone, 100,000 in France, 30,000 in Italy, and 14,000 in Belgium.

Slave holdings of other countries, as reported by the Red Cross, were: Yugoslavia 80,000; Belgium 48,000; Czechoslovakia 45,000; Luxemburg 4,000; Holland 1,300.

An attempt is made by British officials to justify the enslavement on the grounds that the men are prisoners of war, and that as such they can be forced to work under the Geneva Convention rules. It is said that the war is not yet legally ended, that the prisoners are still soldiers of the German Government, and that when they return to Germany it will be the responsibility of the German Government to give them their pay accumulated as soldiers and prisoners. This argument rests on the assumption that there is a German government. But they also argue that repatriation of the prisoners cannot take place, as called for by the Geneva Convention as soon as hostilities are over, because there has been no armistice or peace treaty signed with Germany, and that none can be signed at present, because there is no German Government. By similar double-talk they justify feeding the prisoners rations well below army standards on the pretext that the Geneva Convention which requires standard army rations has expired with World War II; yet, when press representatives ask to examine the prison camps, the British loudly refuse, with the excuse that the Geneva Convention bars such visits to prisoner-of-war camps.

The International Red Cross, the highest authority on the subject, roundly condemns the slave system. As related from Geneva:

"The United States, Britain, and France, nearly a year after peace, are violating International Red Cross agreements they solemnly signed in 1929. "Investigation at Geneva headquarters today disclosed that the transfer of German war prisoners captured by the American army to French and British authorities for forced labor is nowhere permitted in the statutes of the International Red Cross, which is the highest authority on the subject in the world. "Although thousands of the former German soldiers are being used in the hazardous work of clearing mine fields, sweeping sea mines, destroying

surplus ammunition and razing shattered buildings, the Geneva Convention expressly forbids employing prisoners 'in any dangerous labor or in the transport of any material used in warfare.' "Russia refused to attend the 1929 conference of the International Red Cross and Japan never ratified that convention, so neither Moscow nor Tokyo was bound by the provisions regulating war prisoners. "'The American delivery of German prisoners to the French and British for forced labor already is being cited by the Russians as justification for them to retain German army captives for as long as they are able to work,' an International Red Cross official admitted. 'The bartering of captured enemy soldiers by the victors throws the world back to the dark ages - when feudal barons raided adjoining duchies to replenish their human live stock.'"

It must be emphasized, moreover, that many of the slaves were never German soldiers. Many were civilian Germans held in America during the war, including seamen picked up before we entered the war, former legal residents of the United States, and persons brought here by force from Latin America for having pro- German sentiments. Even anti-Nazi Germans who have voluntarily returned to Germany from America to help the military government rebuild the destroyed countries and to help families and friends in dire need have been nabbed for enslavement. In sharp contrast with our treatment of German war prisoners was German treatment of American war prisoners. Allan Wood, war front correspondent of the London Express, in summarizing German treatment of their prisoners said:

"The most amazing thing about the atrocities in this war is that there have been so few of them. I have come up against few instances where the Germans have not treated prisoners according to the rules, and respected the Red Cross."

Lieutenant Newton L. Marguiles, Assistant Judge Advocate of Jefferson Barracks, said in St. Louis, Mo., April 27, 1945:

"The Germans even in their greatest moments of despair obeyed the Convention in most respects. True it is that there were front line atrocities - passions run high up there - but they were incidents, not practices; and maladministration of their American prison camps was very uncommon."

Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, on Jan. 5, 1945, wrote to the National Commander of the American Legion:

"Our treatment of them" (prisoners of war) "is governed by the Geneva convention which, among other provisions, requires them to be furnished rations equal in quality and quantity to those of American troops at base camps in this country. This is done as a matter of treaty obligation and our soldiers in German hands receive generally reciprocal treatment."

The American Red Cross in 1945 reported officially that "99 per cent of the American prisoners of war in Germany have survived and are on their way home."

German treatment of Russian war prisoners was on a par with Russian treatment of

German war prisoners. Since **Russia had not signed the Geneva Convention**, neither it nor Germany was bound by its provisions. And it must be remembered that the atrocities in German concentration camps did not involve war prisoners, but people supposed to be German, people who now proudly admit, those who have survived, that they were members of the German underground, saboteurs, doing their best to obstruct and defeat the German war effort. The treatment they received, while deplorable and inhuman in the extreme, is on a par with Russian treatment of her political prisoners.

Denazification

By placing sole blame for the war on Germany and therefore the Nazi party, by declaring the war to be one of aggression, and by outlawing aggression as a crime against humanity, Germany's conquerors have condemned the Nazi party, its affiliates, and its millions of members as criminal. The punishment meted out at Potsdam, if carried out to the letter, would mean the virtual liquidation of Germany's middle and upper classes. The blanket incrimination rests upon an infirm base, as revealed in the Potsdam denazification decrees. In one breath they order that all "discrimination on grounds of . . . political opinion shall be abolished"; yet in the next breath they permanently dissolve the Nazi party and its affiliated organizations and institutions, ban propagation of Nazi political opinion, without identifying it in particular, and call for severe punishment of all Nazis simply for being Nazis. Potsdam commands that "Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions . . . shall be arrested and interned" and that all lesser Nazis "shall be removed from public and semi-public office and former positions of responsibility in private undertakings." In attempting to carry out these unusual edicts, which were looked upon as a purge order "to throw the rascals out," the American military government issued "Law Number Eight" to denazify business and various mandatory removal edicts, the exact provisions of which were military secrets, to purge government of all Nazis. Approximately 3,000,000 German men were affected in our zone out of a total population of 16,682,000. Our occupation authorities jailed 75,000 and earmarked another 80,000 unreturned war prisoners for internment for being important Nazis; ousted more than 100,000 from public office; and denuded business of managerial and technical talent by firing and demoting hundreds of thousands of others.

In other words, we set out to ruin the lives and reputations of three million men in our zone alone because, as they see it, they made a "political mistake." In consequence, the Germans are afraid to identify themselves with any political party or to express any political views, for fear of being punished later on, just as the Nazis are being punished now. Most important of all, the zone and its people have been denied the economic benefits which would accrue if these men were permitted to do the work which they alone by talent, training, and experience are capable of performing. Putting the zone's most productive men in pick and shovel gangs and filling their places with incapables has been one of the chief contributing causes to the zone's economic paralysis.

The law turning the job of denazification in our zone over to the Germans was largely formulated by one Heinrich Schmitt, a corpulent Communist Quisling serving under AMG as Bavarian Denazification Minister. The execution of the law was also partly placed in his hands.[44] This sort of thing is a logical outgrowth of the program which automatically places political responsibility on former political neutrals or active anti-Nazis, including Communists, who, with Communist Russia signing the Potsdam Declaration, must be accepted as "democratic."

The law is designed to permit some Nazis, otherwise condemned, to prove their innocence or pay the penalties and be restored to citizenship. It sets up five categories of war criminals and potentially dangerous persons, namely: 1) Major offenders, 2) offenders broadly described as Nazi activists, militarists, and profiteers, 3) lesser offenders, 4) followers, constituting the broad membership of the party and affiliates, and 5) persons exonerated after a tribunal finds them innocent.

Penalties for those in the first category range from death or life imprisonment to imprisonment for five or more years with or without hard labor. Those in the second category may be imprisoned for a period up to ten years. Those in lower categories are subject to a variety of "sanctions," including loss of citizenship and the right to vote, debarment from public office, loss of personal rights such as the privilege to own an automobile, demotion in position with heavy cut in compensation, discharge from position, confiscation of property, and employment only at ordinary labor. To make matters easier, we granted an amnesty to all Nazis in our zone under 27 years of age who had no special charges against them. Unfortunately, most of those pardoned under the blanket order were in France, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Russia or elsewhere for indefinite terms performing forced labor in the manner of convicts.

In the autumn of 1946 the Allied Control Council's Coordinating Committee passed general denazification laws for the whole of Germany patterned after the American zonal law, with enforcement, however, left entirely to each zonal authority. This loophole permits the other occupation governments to continue to denazify as they see fit, which thus far has been with greater reasonableness and leniency than have been exercised in the American zone where enforcement, in other words, has been far more rigid and drastic than elsewhere. At Stuttgart Mr. Byrnes was able to boast that denazification in the American zone had been completed.

The denazification program in general and the Nuernberg trial in particular violates our traditional ideas of justice; on the contrary, they embody the Nazi and Communist concept of jurisprudence - the liquidation of ideological opponents. As Barron's weekly says:

". . . the punishment is being meted out one-sidedly to the vanquished. After all, except that they did not commit the same spectacular atrocities on the spot, the Russians did just about the same things in Poland that the Nazis did. Thus a combination of excusably fanatic Nazi-haters and purposeful fellow-travelers has provided a Roman holiday by exploiting our legitimate desire for a new international law. "In the eyes of the

world we have adopted the Communist view of justice."

Denazification in the Russian zone has been far more enlightened and less economically disruptive. The strong men of the Kremlin could hardly take seriously the condemnation of all Nazis as criminals when they know full well that their own party, which rules Russia much as the Nazi party ruled Germany and which demands the same blind obedience of its members, is guilty of every act for which we so strongly condemn the Nazis: wars of aggression against peaceful neighbors, wars of nerves, confiscation of property of whole classes without compensation to the owners, violation of treaties and agreements, hostility toward religion, concentration camp atrocities, slave labor, looting and abusing conquered countries, the use of fifth columns and Quislings, one-party rule by terror with the aid of civilian informers and a brutal secret police system, stifling of human rights and individual liberties of all kinds, and even the aim to conquer the world.

By eliminating the "bourgeoisie" in our zone we have played into the Kremlin's hands, for the action has removed the principle barrier to the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and ultimate absorption of the zone into the Soviet Union - the Kremlin's own United Nations. Our entire denazification procedure has been highly satisfactory to Moscow, for the greater the chaos, despair, and disgust we create, and the greater the resentment of the German people becomes, the stronger becomes the grip of Communism, and the closer we come to losing everything for which we fought the war.

Looting

The sacking of Germany after her unconditional surrender will go down in history as one of the most monstrous acts of modern times. Its excess beggars description and its magnitude defies condemnation. Allied armies that swept into Germany came with blood in their eyes and the conviction born of propaganda that the Germans had lost caste as members of the human race, were unworthy of protection afforded by human law and civilized institutions such as property rights and security of person. It was not thought of as looting, but simply as helping one's self to property the Germans had forfeited by being German. Russian soldiers were particularly ravenous, their appetites for loot being restrained only by the limitation placed on their own rights to hold property. Things the individual Russian soldier could keep, such as wrist watches, they snatched on sight, even from the arms of Yankees.

The serious looting by the Russians was conducted officially, systematically and thoroughly. Every house and apartment was entered, searched, and stripped of everything at once valuable and movable - jewelry, silverware, works of art, clothing, household appliances, money. Stores, shops, warehouses were ransacked. Farms were denuded of farm animals, machinery, seed reserves, fodder, wine and food stocks. Telephones were removed from residences, telephone and telegraph lines and equipment were dismantled. Automobiles, motor trucks, even fire engines, were seized. Everything not nailed down was hauled away. For the German standard of living must be lowered to the average of

Europe. (In 2016, one gets the feeling that “lowering to the average of the World“ might be the German governments agenda.)

All of the Allies have issued huge amounts of military currency which the Germans are forced to accept in “payment.“ It is conservatively estimated that altogether they have pumped into the country between 15 billion and 20 billion occupation marks as against a normal currency circulation of between 7 and 9 billion. This means that the four powers have obtained between 2 and 4 billion dollars worth of German property for the mere cost of printing money issued in payment.

Just as there was a preponderance of American forces in the armies that struck against the west and south of Germany, so in these sectors was the preponderance of the looting American. Chicago Daily News foreign correspondent William H. Stoneman, stationed with the U.S. 3rd Army, wrote in May, 1945, when Germany was surrendering:

“I have been impressed by the careless manner in which the booty has been handled and the way in which great stocks of foodstuffs have been left to the reckless inroads of looters.“

In one case looting resulted in arrests and trials. A WAC Captain and a Colonel were arrested in America and tried in Frankfurt, Germany, for taking \$1,500,000 worth of jewels, mostly of the House of Hesse, from a castle owned by Princess Margaret of Hesse, granddaughter of Queen Victoria. Defense attorneys at the trials made clear the extent of looting which had been done and the philosophy behind it. An on the scene account reads as follows:

“The princess scored heavily against the defense contention that the owners of the jewels were just a bunch of Nazis whose loss was a misfortune of war which should not be singled out for prosecution from among hundreds of thousands of thefts from Germans by the American army personnel.“

American Provost Marshall Lt. Col. Gerald F. Beane, whose duty it is to deal with crimes committed by our soldiers, in an official report released in Berlin late in 1945 on the nature and extent of criminality in our army of occupation stated that larceny and robbery are the crimes most frequently committed by our soldiers. A leading daily comments:

“As to the crimes against property, the explanation is fairly obvious. No effective steps were taken to discourage looting by the invading armies during the war. Officers and men alike committed this crime and for much the most part went unpunished. It was tolerated under some such euphemism as souvenir collecting. The habit of stealing, once formed, is difficult to break. The fault, of course, lies with the high command which permitted the abuse. Col. Beane’s pronouncement suggests that the army is tardily seeking to correct its error.“

The type of looting just discussed, although it has run in value into hundreds of millions of dollars and robbed the German people of comforts and necessities they have sorely needed

during the dreadful days through which they are having to pass, is but petty larceny as compared to the gigantic program of industrial sacking authorized at Potsdam.

Economic Cannibalism

Potsdam decrees that future German production shall be so limited by the Allied Control Council that the average German standard of living will not exceed the average of the standards of living of other European countries, exclusive of Britain and Russia, and that "productive capacity not needed for permitted production" shall be taken by the conquerors as plunder or destroyed. The prostrated German economy must be drawn and quartered and its flesh fed to other economies, a project which has aptly been called "economic cannibalism."

In carrying out the Potsdam mandate calling for the "elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production" and emphasis on "the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries," many ordinarily peaceful industries are entirely prohibited. These include shipbuilding, manufacture and operation of airplanes, ball and taper roller bearings, nearly all types of heavy machine tools, heavy materials, aluminum, magnesium, beryllium, vanadium, radioactive materials, hydrogen peroxide, and synthetic oil, gasoline and ammonia. Exports and imports are rigidly controlled and drastically restricted. Payments for necessary imports are given first call on proceeds from exports. Imports are confined mostly to a small amount of food and nitrates for fertilizer; exports are limited largely to coal, potash, and lumber. Foreign trade in the ordinary sense has been impossible, however, and will remain so, as long as the mark is given no value in terms of other currencies.

Future production of a large number of domestic industries is drastically restricted. Electrical engineering is cut in half; mechanical engineering by two-thirds. Synthetic textiles are sharply curtailed. Over-all chemical production is reduced to 45 per cent of the old level. Steel production may not surpass 5,800,000 ingot tons a year, against the former 54,000,000 ton capacity. Britain had argued that such a level would turn the Reich into an economic desert and had fought for a 7,500,000 ton level. Since Russia had held out for a much lower figure, however, the 5,800,000 ton ceiling was reached as a compromise. All during the negotiations Russia had fought for extremely low production ceilings. She had even asked for a sharp reduction in permitted food imports, to reduce the volume of necessary exports, and thus to free more industrial booty in which she was to share. When a little later shipment of reparations to her from the western zones was halted, she suddenly reversed her stand, however, and asked for higher ceilings. Molotov specifically demanded higher coal production and said, "The Reich must be permitted more steel, greater industry and foreign trade."

Apart from generating bitter despair through closing the door to any hope of achieving prosperity, the ceilings have had little practical significance, because actual German output has remained far below the permitted levels. Our military authorities have asserted

that it will require years for German recovery to reach the ceilings which have been set. The current effect of the program has been largely confined to repression of power to produce thorough destruction and removal of productive capacity and other measures, such as the banning of scientific research. German science, upon which German industry depended heavily, has been dealt a lethal blow, partly by direct prohibitions and partly by the operations of the denazification decrees which automatically ended the careers of the great majority of German scientists, at least within the Reich. Potsdam has ordered control of "all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities." In harmony with this decree, German science has been suppressed by orders from the Control Council.

Research (in Germany) by scientists who had been Nazis or had contributed to the development of German weapons, secret or otherwise, has been banned. Others, and they are very few, are forbidden to probe into a long list of specific, comprehensive subjects, 10 general categories of chemicals, and anything of military value or nature. Pure or theoretical science - explorations into the basic laws of nature and the like - may be conducted by the few eligibles, but only under military government surveillance. In other words, German science has been destroyed, and with it German ability to compete commercially with the war victors. German scientists, as a matter of fact, have become a highly esteemed form of war plunder. Russia, the first to recognize their value, was unable to hide her anxiety and frantic efforts to grab as many as she could. Britain, France, and the United States were not slow in following her example, entering the competition with marked success. We even managed to kidnap a large number from the western Russian zone when we retired to let the Russians take over.

In addition we have sent into Germany teams of experts to scour the country and search out all German patents, designs, and secret processes, privately owned, or otherwise. According to Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton, in testimony before a U.S. Senate committee in June 1945:

"We intend to secure the full disclosure of an existing German technology and invention for the benefit of the United Nations. . . . This Government and other governments with which Germany has been at war have reduced to their control inventions and designs both patented and unpatented which were owned and controlled by German nationals at the time of the outbreak of war It is probable that no steps will be taken by either the legislative or executive branch of this government which would have the effect of returning such rights to the former German owners."

Mr. Morgenthau called for the industrial sacking of Germany by proposing that, instead of repeating the mistake made after the last war by demanding "reparations in the form of future payments and deliveries," requiring production and sale of exports, this time

"reparations shall be effected by the transfer of existing resources and territories, e.g. . . . by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries. . . .; by the removal and distribution among

devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment . . . ; by forced German labor outside Germany; and by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany."

The deindustrialization program would automatically limit the amount of reparation to the amount to plant and equipment not ruined by war, less whatever amount would be left to the Germans. For the sake of harmony, however, the 20 billion dollar figure was accepted "as a basis for discussion." At Potsdam Russia was apportioned the lion's share of the reparation. She was to receive all from her own zone, plus 25 per cent from the other zones. Of the latter, two-fifths was to go to Russia outright and three-fifths was to be given to her "in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, day products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon," presumably to be taken from her zone. The value of Germany's bombed and battered plant and equipment remaining at the end of the war has been officially estimated at between 5 and 10 billion dollars, of which 45 per cent was located in the Russian zone where Russia was given a free hand. Under the "level of industry plan" 40 per cent of this was to be available for removal as reparation or destroyed. Total reparation, therefore, could not be more than 2 to 4 billions, and if Russia were to adhere to the general plan in her zone her total share from all Germany could not exceed 2.4 billion dollars.

America, which from the beginning had been the most zealous in carrying out deindustrialization in its own zone, made no protest to Russia until it was learned that two establishments owned by American concerns, the United Shoe Machinery Co. and the Corn Products Refining Co., had been among those seized. We then offered the suggestion that Allied owned property should be exempted from seizure and added the pious thought that plants producing civilian goods should be kept in Germany. Since Britain had come forward with a scheme to nationalize the Ruhr and other industries in her zone, potentially worth billions of dollars, in a manner that would place title to much of it in her own hands as "custodian" without one cent of compensation to the former owners, she had lost all moral ground on which to base a protest against the Russian action. Nor could the French object, in view of their avaricious, vengeful treatment of their own zone, where looting has been just as thorough as in the Russian, but far less intelligent; where, for example, they demand most of the crops to be harvested and at the same time requisition draft animals in July just when most needed to help gather the harvest.

Although America went about the business of dismantling and dynamiting German plants with more fervor than was at first exhibited in any other zone, our motive was quite different from the motives of our allies. Russia is anxious to get as much loot as possible from Germany and yet to make it produce abundantly for Russia to help make her new five year plan successful, and ultimately to absorb the Reich into the Soviet Union. France is ravenous for loot, has been anxious to destroy Germany forever and to annex as much of her territory as possible. Britain has found uses for large amounts of German booty, wants to get rid of Germany as a trade competitor, while retaining her as a market for British goods. The United States has no use for German plant and equipment as booty,

and has often said so. We consider our own abundant production equipment superior. Apart from one or two special cases, **our primary interest in German assets has been in those located outside Germany, to eliminate German competition in world trade.** We are willing to permit the German people to subsist on their own little plot of land, if they can, but we are determined that they never again shall engage in foreign commerce on an important scale. In partnership with Britain we have carried out a systematic campaign to root out all German contacts and assets located abroad and have put our own traders in their place.

We have confiscated nearly a billion dollars of property in this country believed by our Justice Department to be owned by Germans, although held in the name of citizens of neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland. Attorney General Clark says the Justice Department contends these holdings now belong to the United States Government. The external operation of the program has been illustrated by our forcing Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and other countries to hand over their German owned assets. Sweden, for example, held German wealth valued at 104 million dollars. At the same time we held 200 million dollars of Swedish assets which we had "blocked," that is, cut off from Swedish control during the war. We used these blocked funds as a club to compel Sweden to turn the assets over to us. After long negotiations, she finally did deliver 77 million dollars worth of the German resources and we in turn unblocked the 200 million dollars in Swedish funds in America. After obtaining the funds we confiscated them and divided the loot with Britain and France.

That we officially recognize that the program will also destroy Germany and exterminate the German people was made perfectly clear by Mr. Clayton in his testimony before the Kilgore Committee. Dr. Schimmel, chief investigator, had inquired of the Under-Secretary of State if it were not true that the Germans had made their successful penetration of South American trade for the purpose of acquiring superior information facilities. Mr. Clayton replied:

"With the Germans it was not a matter of information, it was largely a matter of necessity. I mean they had to have foreign trade, they had to export in order to live. The country has, as you know, very little natural resources. The only natural resources of any consequence that they have are coal and potash, and they had to export manufactured goods in order to acquire the raw materials that they needed in their economic life, in their industry, and foreign trade was an absolute necessity for the Germans."

Taking their foreign trade away from them, and making it impossible for them to export manufactured goods, the program advocated by Mr. Clayton and embodied in the Potsdam agreements, was tantamount, therefore, to pronouncing the death sentence on the German people.

Bastardizing the German Race

Not only have the conquerors set out to destroy Germany economically by pulling down the three pillars of production but they have launched an assault against the German race itself by an attack against its mothers. From the record it appears that the men who met at Yalta deliberately formulated a diabolical program of racial bastardization which they considered an appropriate response to the claim of racial superiority. A Russian General told General Ira Eaker, Commander of the Mediterranean air forces: "We've decided just to kill all the German men, take 17,000,000 German women and that will solve it." Something on this order was obviously the intent. The millions of German men of marriageable age not killed or disabled in war were marched off into slavery where they could not protect their wives, sweethearts, daughters and sisters. And then the attack began. From the east came the Bolshevized Mongolian and Slavic hordes, repeatedly raping every captured woman and girl, contaminating them with venereal diseases and impregnating them with a future race of Russo-German bastards. In the west the British used colonial troops, the French Sengalese and Moroccans, the Americans an excessively high percentage of negroes. Our own method was not so direct as the Russian: instead of using physical force, we compelled the German women to yield their virtue in order to live - to get food to eat, beds to sleep in, soap to bathe with, roofs to shelter them.

Senator Eastland of Mississippi, after a European tour of observation, told his colleagues in the U.S. Senate early in December, 1945: "The virtue of womanhood and the value of human life are civilized man's most sacred possessions, yet they are the very cheapest thing in Russian-occupied Germany today." He had learned first-hand of such incidents as the following, told by a priest in a letter smuggled out of Breslau, Germany, September 3, 1945:

"In unending succession were girls, women and nuns violated. . . . Not merely in secret, in hidden corners, but in the sight of everybody, even in churches, in the streets and in public places were nuns, women and even eight-year-old girls attacked again and again. Mothers were violated before the eyes of their children; girls in the presence of their brothers; nuns, in the sight of pupils, were outraged again and again to their very death and even as corpses."

Meanwhile newspaper headlines assured us that "Ivan and Joe Are Brothers Under the Skin." Prime Minister Churchill had told the Germans in January, 1945, just before they surrendered unconditionally:

"We Allies are no monsters. This, at least, I can say on behalf of the United Nations. . . . Peace, though based on unconditional surrender, will bring to Germany and Japan immense and immediate alleviation of suffering and agony."

When our Russian Allies "liberated" Danzig they promptly liberated all the women of their virtue and chastity - by raping all - from small girls to ladies as much as 83 years of age. A 50-year-old teacher says that her niece, 15, was violated seven times the day after

the Russians arrived, while her other niece, 22, was raped 15 times the same day. When women of the city pleaded for protection, a Russian officer told them to seek shelter in the Catholic Cathedral. After hundreds of women and girls were securely inside, the brave sons of mother Russia entered and "playing the organ and ringing the bells, kept up a foul orgy through the night, raping all the women, some more than 30 times. A Catholic pastor of Danzig states: "They even violated eight-year-old girls and shot boys who tried to shield their mothers."

It was the same in all regions overrun by the Communist Armies. When Berlin fell the Commander told his Russian soldiers the women of the city were theirs, to help themselves. They did! The only escape the women had was suicide. The following is an eye-witness account of what the Russians did in eastern Germany written by a veteran American newspaperman who had been taken prisoner by the Germans in Paris and later freed by the Russians with whom he stayed for nearly three months as they swept over eastern Germany and on to Berlin and beyond:

"REDS TERRORIZE CONQUERED WITH RAPE AND DEATH "London, August 4, 1945 - As our long line of British Army lorries (trucks) carrying American, British, and French liberated prisoners of war from the Russian to the main Anglo-American zone of Germany rolled through the main street of Brahlisdorf, the last Russian occupied-town, a pretty blond girl darted from the crowd of Germans watching us and made a dash for our truck. "Clinging with both hands to the tailboard, she made a desperate effort to climb in. But we were driving too fast and the board was too high. After being dragged several hundred yards she had to let go and fell on the cobblestone street. "That scene was a dramatic illustration of the state of terror in which women in Russian-occupied eastern Germany were living. All these women, Germans, Polish, Jewish, and even Russian girls 'freed' from Nazi slave camps were dominated by one desperate desire - to escape from the Red zone." "In the district around our internment camp - the territory comprising the towns of Schlawe, Lauenburg, and Buckow and hundreds of larger villages - Red soldiers during the first weeks of their occupation raped every woman and girl between the ages of 12 and 60. That sounds exaggerated but it is the simple truth."(emphasis added) "The only exceptions were girls who managed to remain in hiding in the woods or who had the presence of mind to feign illness - typhoid, dyptheria or some other infectious disease. Flushed with victory - and often with wine found in the cellars of rich Pomeranian land owners - the Reds searched every house for women, cowing them with pistols or tommy guns, and carried them into their tanks or trucks. "Husbands and fathers who attempted to protect their women folk were shot down and girls offering extreme resistance were murdered. "Some weeks after the invasion, Red 'political commissions' began a tour of the countryside ostensibly in search of members of the Nazi party. In every village the woman were told to report for examination of papers to these commissions, which looked them over and detained those with sex appeal. The youngest and prettiest were taken by the officers and the rest left to the mercy of the privates. "This reign of terror lasted as long as I was with the Reds in Pomerania. Several girls whom I had known during my captivity

committed suicide. Others died after having been raped by ten soldiers in succession. "In an isolated farmhouse where my French comrade and myself spent three months after joining the Reds, there were eight young girls from neighboring villages hiding from the Reds. One was always on watch and when the Russians were seen approaching they scampered off into a nearby woods and hid in the dense underbrush. This sometimes happened several times daily and the girls never had a quiet moment but while we were there the Reds never discovered them. "All of these girls already had been raped and three of them - one a little girl of 13 - were pregnant. "Inevitably the Red occupation is having a disastrous effect on the morality of the inhabitants and the existing conditions of anarchy will exert an evil influence for years. Many woman have been infected with venereal diseases and now a very few youthful girls have joined the Reds for pleasure and food and are helping them spot their compatriots. "Whenever possible, girls attach themselves to liberated Anglo-American or French prisoners of war for protection against the Russians. Curiously, the Reds seemed to have a special code of honor in this respect - they will take an Allied prisoner's watch but won't touch his girl. "When the Red Army starts a big offensive its commanders held out prospects of unrestricted rape and pillage as encouragement to the troops, but later they try to stem the tide of lust - not on grounds of humanity but because it threatens to undermine discipline. "Squadrons of Cossacks, used by the Reds as they were by the Tsar, as mounted police, periodically surrounded villages in Pomerania and searched all the houses for deserters and stragglers who had remained behind with women. The Cossacks mercilessly drove the soldiers off to jail with their 'nagaikas' - Cossack whips - but they kept the women for their own pleasure."

The Russians were not alone in violating these principles. Police records of Stuttgart show that during the French occupation, 1,198 women were raped and eight men violated by French troops, mostly Moroccans. Dr. Karl Hartenstein, prelate of the Evangelical church in the city estimated the number at 5,000. Frau Schumacher, secretary of the police woman's section, in submitting a documented report on numerous rapings, said that on the night the French evacuated the city a child of 9 was raped and killed, her mother also raped and shot, and her father killed by Moroccans. In the town of Vailhingen, with a population of 12,000, for example, 500 cases of rape were reported. So it went in areas occupied by the French. While a good number of American troops have resisted the example of others and deported themselves in a manner becoming their Christian backgrounds, the record for our occupation forces as a whole is dark.

An Associated Press dispatch from Nuernberg, Germany, quotes a letter which appeared in STARS AND STRIPES written by Capt. Frederick B. Eutsler, Chaplain of the 478th United States port battalion, charging that public behavior of American troops in Germany had become deplorable. He urged that the newspaper "launch a crusade against this disgraceful conduct which is earning a bad name for our army," and added, "I refer particularly to the assumption of many GI's that every German woman is immoral and it is their privilege to force their attentions on these women and insult them with indecent

proposals. In April, 1946, the military authorities found it necessary to “crack down” and ordered stricter adherence to soldierly standards so as not to “discredit” the “fine performance of our troops in general.” That same month an anonymous staff sergeant wrote in STARS AND STRIPES a charge that married men in the army were afraid to bring their wives to Germany because many American soldiers behaved like “supercharged wolves” toward women in public. He wrote: “Wise up, men. The hardest part of the war is now being fought, not with tommy guns, but with personalities. Let’s show the Germans that we are men, not pigs.”

One of the consequences of the immoralities of howling G.I. wolf packs is an upsurge in venereal diseases which has reached epidemic proportions. Before we arrived, although the rate had increased with the return of German soldiers from France and North Africa, it was still moderate and well under control. After our arrival, contamination soared. In December, 1945, only 7 per cent of German civilians receiving venereal disease treatment were men; by August, 1946, however, men constituted 41 per cent of the patients. In other words, contamination had spread from our troops to the German women and finally to German men. A large proportion of the contamination has originated with colored American troops which we have stationed in great numbers in Germany and among whom the rate of venereal infection is many times greater than among white troops. In July, 1946, the current rate of infections among white soldiers was 190 per 1,000 men per annum, meaning that slightly less than one in five would be infected in the course of a year. In contrast the rate among negro troops stationed in the American zone of Germany was 771 per thousand!

That the German women do not accept advances from American troops out of choice but rather out of sternest necessity is shown by the close connection between the venereal disease rate and availability of food. As one correspondent writes:

“Statistics show that the venereal rate is related to the food supply of the German civilians during our occupation. After the winter’s supply of potatoes was issued to the Germans last fall, there was a drop in the number of soldiers infected. As frauleins became more hungry, more soldiers were infected. Ration cuts last spring also were reflected in higher venereal figures.”

Dr. George N. Schuster, President of Hunter College, charged, after a visit to the American zone:

“You have said it all when you say that Europe is now a place where woman has lost her perennial fight for decency because the indecent alone live.” “Except for those who can establish contacts with members of the armed forces, Germans can get nothing from soap to shoes.”

L.F. Filewood, writing in the WEEKLY REVIEW, London, Oct. 5, 1945, stated: “Young girls, unattached, wander about and freely offer themselves, for food or bed . . . Very simply they have one thing left to sell, and they sell it . . . As a way of dying it may be worse than starvation, but it will put off dying for months - or even years.”

Significantly, the Potsdam Declaration declares:

“The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.”

It fails to declare that the crimes to be committed by the Allied armies of occupation would eclipse those of which the Nazi armies have been accused. Now that the war is over and the heat of combat has died down enough to enable us to view the cold facts again, it must be brought home to the American people that much of what they have been led to believe was born of propaganda, that the German army, for example, actually behaved itself very correctly toward the people of occupied territories whose governments were signatories of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The facts are now well known, and are beyond dispute, despite the opposite picture previously painted in the press as part of the horrendous business of war. William L. Shirer, in his *Berlin Diary* (p. 412), on June 17, 1940, in the first flush of German occupation, described how many French women had fled Paris for fear of what the German armies might do to them.

“It seems,” he wrote, “the Parisians actually believe the Germans would rape the women and do worse to the men . . . The ones who stayed are all the more amazed at the very correct behavior of the troops - so far.”

And their behavior never changed. Frederick C. Crawford, President of Thompson Products, after a tour of inspection in which he, with others of the War Department, visited areas where the Germans had been in occupation for four years, in his “REPORT FROM THE WAR FRONT”, said:

“The Germans tried to be careful in their dealings with the people . . . We were told that if a citizen attended strictly to business and took no political or underground action against the occupying army, he was treated with correctness.”

The People hunger

Months after the war had ended and the conquerors had assumed complete control of the German government and therefore responsibility for the German people and their future, the Bishop of Chichester, quoting a noted German pastor, said:

“Thousands of bodies are hanging in the trees in the woods around Berlin and nobody bothers to cut them down. Thousands of corpses are carried into the sea by the Oder and Elbe Rivers - one doesn't notice it any longer. Thousands and thousands are starving in the highways. . . Children roam the highways alone, their parents shot, dead, lost.”

Despite conditions, the German people are putting up a brave struggle for existence. After a five-week tour of Europe, including Germany, Malcolm Muir, publisher of *BUSINESS WEEK*, told the Union League Club of Chicago:

“The Germans are making every effort to help themselves . . . It is not unusual to

see a milk cow hitched to a plow, a woman leading the cow and a small boy guiding the plow."

What harvesting machinery remains is mostly small, old fashioned and run down, often useless for want of parts. Draught work is supplied by animals and men. Oxen are used where available, and a horse and cow hitched together are common. Crop yields have been reduced by the five year fertilizer famine, which continues and the fact, that the soil for the most part has been worked for 1,000 to 2,000 years.

Food reserves which were ample when the war ended were soon depleted, thanks in part to deliberate destruction by invading armies, and, in the case of the Russians and French, to armies of occupation living off the land. When we first invaded Normandy we were surprised by the large stores of food we found. It was the same elsewhere. Although his statement contrasted sharply with the current propaganda which had all Europe starving, Prof. Theodore Shultz of the University of Chicago, in November, 1943, had said that continental Europe that year had harvested good crops, that "farm production had been so well maintained despite the war that Europe will meet 90 to 95 per cent of her food requirements in the year after peace is declared." Although distribution was disrupted at the end of the war, aggregate food stocks were large. But under Allied management they were soon dissipated. The situation, worsened by the loss of the eastern "bread basket" and the large number of displaced persons and evacuees from the east, became critical and then catastrophic.

For six months our military government refused to supply any food from the outside to supplement the vanishing German stocks; however, the terrible consequences of this policy ultimately got under the tough hides of the occupation authorities to such an extent that by December they appealed to the U.S. Government to send sufficient food to prevent universal starvation. Relief was finally promised, and after many heartbreaking delays, a dribble arrived. The intensity of the famine through which Germany is passing can be gauged by comparing the German diet with our own and with what experiments prove to be the minimum to maintain life. Herbert Hoover in April, 1946, in commenting on the European situation in general called the 1,550 calorie level a "grim and dangerous base" and said: "At this level we believe most of the adults can come through the short period of four months until the next harvest. The children's health will become susceptible to disease. Many of the children and aged will fall by the wayside." The consequences of keeping the base German rations at or below the 1,500 calorie level since V-E Day are not difficult to imagine. Although some of the German workers, such as farmers and miners, are allowed somewhat higher rations, the base ration applies to the great majority, including housewives and children. Such reports as the following made by an official of the food branch of the American Military Government should therefore cause no surprise.

Karl Brandt wrote in Berlin in March 18, 1946:

"The greatest famine catastrophe of recent centuries is upon us in central Europe. Our

Government is letting down our military government in the food deliveries it promised, although what Generals Clay, Draper, and Hester asked for and were promised was the barest minimum for survival of the people. We will be forced to reduce the rations from 1,550 calories to 1,000 or less calories. "The few buds of democracy will be burned out in the agony of death of the aged, the women, and the children. "The British and we are going on record as the ones who let the Germans starve. The Russians will release at the height of the famine substantial food stores they have locked up (300,000 to 400,000 tons of sugar, large quantities of potatoes). "Aside from the inhumanity involved, it is so criminally stupid to give such a performance of incredible fumbling before the eyes of the world. It makes all the many hard-working officers of the Office of Military Government, Food and Agricultural Branch, ashamed."

The following is taken from a report prepared by the German Central Administration for Health, a German agency created by the Russian occupation authorities:

"There is growing as though by psychological compulsion, a mass hysteria, with a thousand different symptoms of drug addiction, drunkenness, perversities, sadism, murder and infantilism. . . . The situation is reaching a generally psychopathological state, through chronic hunger. We are seeing aberrations such as were previously known only among stranded and starving sailors in lifeboats, or thirsting persons forgotten by caravans in desert sands. It is increasingly impossible to discover in the masses of the people opinions. They have only animal urges. "The explanation of this mass phenomenon, this mental and spiritual paralysis, is physical. They are emaciated to the bone. Their clothes hang loose on their bodies, the lower extremities are like the bones of a skeleton, their hands shake as though with palsy, the muscles of the arms are withered, the skin lies in folds, and is without elasticity, the joints spring out as though broken. "The weight of the women of average height and build has fallen way below 110 pounds. Often women of child-bearing age weigh no more than 65 pounds. The number of still-born children is approaching the number of those born alive, and an increasing proportion of these die in a few days. Even if they come into the world of normal weight, they start immediately to lose weight and die shortly. Very often the mothers cannot stand the loss of blood in childbirth and perish. Infant mortality has reached the horrifying height of 90 per cent."

After giving Herbert Hoover, serving as Chairman of President Truman's Famine Investigating Commission, a grim report of Germany's food situation on April 13, 1946, Generals Joseph T. McNarney and Lucius Clay said in a formal statement:

"Political stability cannot develop under conditions which create political apathy. Political apathy can be overcome in a population which must devote its full effort to the daily search for food. Political stability in Germany is closely related to political stability in the rest of Europe. "German transport facilities are required to move relief supplies and exports across Europe. German workmen must be used to man available transport facilities. "German coal is vital to Europe. German potash, salt, lumber, spare parts, and other products are needed throughout Europe. Coal production in the Ruhr has declined substantially since the recent food cut. Without food Germany cannot produce coal.

Without coal Germany cannot produce fertilizer and unless it produces fertilizer it cannot improve its food supply."

The statement went on to point out that the American zone even in normal times had been a deficit area with regard to food, requiring 2,000,000 tons of imports in 1943-44. It said that the German economic pump must be primed with food imports, because the American zone and other western areas cannot produce enough to sustain life even at starvation levels. Ten months after V-E Day, only 600,000 tons of food had been imported into our zone by AMG, or about one ounce per person per meal. Yet AMG officers asked GI's to remind the Germans they owe America a debt of gratitude for feeding them.

Evidence that the German Famine is Deliberate

Senator Homer E. Capehart of Indiana in an address before the United States Senate February 5, 1946, said in part:

"The fact can no longer be suppressed, namely, the fact that it has been and continues to be, the deliberate policy of a confidential and conspirational clique within the policy-making circles of this government to draw and quarter a nation now reduced to abject misery. "In this process this clique, like a pack of hyenas struggling over the bloody entrails of a corpse, and inspired by a sadistic and fanatical hatred, are determined to destroy the German nation and the German people, no matter what the consequences. "At Potsdam the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly signed the following declaration of principles and purposes:

"It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people.' "Mr. President, the cynical and savage repudiation of these solemn declarations which has resulted in a major catastrophe, cannot be explained in terms of ignorance or incompetence. This repudiation, not only of the Potsdam Declaration, but also of every law of God and men, has been deliberately engineered with such a malevolent cunning, and with such diabolical skill, that the American people themselves have been caught in an international death trap. "For nine months now this administration has been carrying on a deliberate policy of mass starvation without any distinction between the innocent and the helpless and the guilty alike. "The first issue has been and continues to be purely humanitarian. This vicious clique within this administration that has been responsible for the policies and practices which have made a madhouse of central Europe has not only betrayed our American principles, but they have betrayed the GI's who have suffered and died, and they continue to betray the American GI's who have to continue their dirty work for them. "The second issue that is involved is the effect this tragedy in Germany has already had on the other European countries. Those who have been responsible for this deliberate destruction of the German state and this criminal mass starvation of the German people have been so zealous in their hatred that all other interests and concerns have been subordinated to this one obsession of revenge. In order to accomplish this it mattered not if the liberated countries in Europe suffered and starved. To this point this

clique of conspirators have addressed themselves: 'Germany is to be destroyed. What happens to other countries of Europe in the process is of secondary importance.'"

These remarks were interspersed with a mass of supporting evidence.

There can be no question that there has been a deliberate attempt to keep the facts from the American public. Senator Eastland of Mississippi, for example, in a stirring address to the United States Senate December 3, 1945, exposing the chaotic conditions in Germany, told of the great difficulty he had encountered in gaining access to the official report on conditions in the Reich made by Calvin Hoover. He said the State Department at first refused to furnish him a copy of the report, but that through the intercession of a high official in the department he had been able to obtain it, but only "with the understanding and the promise received from me first that the information therein would be made available to the people of this country." Senator Eastland continued:

"There appears to be a conspiracy of silence to conceal from our people the true picture of conditions in Europe, to secrete from us the fact regarding conditions of the continent and information as to our policies toward the German people . . . Are the real facts withheld because our policies are so cruel that the American people would not endorse them? "What have we to hide, Mr. President? Why should these facts be withheld from the people of the United States?"

Victor Gollancz, influential left-wing British publisher and pamphleteer, in his book "Leaving Them to Their Fate - the Ethics of Starvation," after marshalling voluminous proof explains the starvation in these words:

"The plain fact is when Spring is in the English air we are starving the German people, and we are starving them not deliberately in the sense we prefer their death to our own inconvenience. "Others, including ourselves, are to keep or be given comforts while the Germans lack the bare necessities of existence. If it is a choice between discomfort for another and suffering for the German, the German must suffer; if between suffering for another and death for the German, the German must die."

He describes the ample British diet and stocks of food while the Germans starve and says:

"Stocks of food and feeding stuffs in this country owned and controlled by the minister of food, exclusive of stocks on farms or held by secondary wholesalers and manufacturers, were estimated to total on the last day of March no less than 4,000,000 tons."

He rejects the thesis that we should starve the Germans because they would have starved us had they won, on the ground that those who reason as the Nazis are no better than the Nazis. He could have added that starvation of children of an enemy country is to admit having enemy children. One leading daily thinks Mr. Gollancz fails to plumb the depths of the infamy:

"On the contrary it [the starvation] is the product of foresight. It was deliberately planned at Yalta by Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, and the program in all its brutality

was later confirmed by Truman, Attlee, and Stalin . . . The intent to starve the German people to death is being carried out with a remorselessness unknown in the western world since the Mongol conquest."

Ample food stocks nearer to Germany even than those in England existed while the Germans starved. On the same page of a newspaper in the autumn of 1945 two articles appeared under the following headlines:

(1) "WEST GERMANS FACE HARD FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE"

(2) "COME AND GET IT, DENMARK TELLS HUNGRY EUROPE"

The article under the latter reads: "The exhausted Danish farming industry succeeded in increasing pigs to nearly two million, 60 per cent of the prewar stock, and last week 45,000 live cattle were offered to slaughtering, of which 32,000 had to be refused as the warehouses are filled to capacity and no shipping was available. "Denmark has, in vain, drawn the attention of Britain, the United States, and UNRRA to the facts, at the same time forwarding proposals, but no reply has been received so far. "The huge cold storage facilities in north Germany are not being utilized, and refrigerator ships are lying idle in north German harbors. At the same time slaughtering houses are forced to return live cattle to farmers, the cattle now consuming fodder that otherwise would be available to further increase production, as a result of the failure of distribution machinery.

An Associated Press dispatch from Copenhagen a month earlier had told the same story:

"While the rest of Europe hungers for meat, Denmark has 3,000 to 4,000 tons of surplus beef weekly which cannot be exported for lack of shipping space. Hoegsbro Holm, permanent secretary of the agricultural council of Denmark, said today that for the last six weeks farmers have had as many as 16,000 head of cattle ready for slaughter, but Denmark has been able to use and export only 10,000. Holm said, 'We have been trying to get transport for at least two months but to date nothing is ready to take the meat.'"

Senator Albert W. Hawkes, of New Jersey had made a strong appeal to the President urging that private relief packages be permitted to prevent mass starvation of the German people. In his reply, dated December 21, 1945, President Truman professed that "there is as yet no possibility of making deliveries of individual packages in Germany," because "the postal system and the communications and transportation systems of Germany are in the state of total collapse." He then said:

"Our efforts have been directed particularly toward taking care of those who fought with us rather than against us - Norwegians, Belgians, the Dutch, the Greeks, the Poles, the French. Eventually the enemy countries will be given some attention. "While we have no desire to be unduly cruel to Germany, I cannot feel any great sympathy for those who caused the death of so many human beings by starvation, disease, and outright murder, in addition to all the destruction and death of war. Perhaps eventually a decent government can be established in Germany so that Germany can again take its place in the family of nations. I think that in the meantime no one should be called upon to pay

for Germany's misfortune except Germany itself. "Until the misfortunes of those whom Germany oppressed and tortured are obliterated [sic], it does not seem right to divert our efforts to Germany itself. I admit that there are, of course, many innocent people in Germany who had little to do with the Nazi terror. However, the administrative burden of trying to locate these people and treat them differently for the rest is one which is almost insuperable."

Economic Prostration

It is difficult to imagine the depth of German depression. When the United States reached the bottom of 1932, industrial production had fallen to 60 per cent of normal. The depression was so severe - the losses so enormous, the unemployment so widespread - that it almost brought a revolution. Industrial production in Germany a year after V-E Day was 10 per cent of what used to be normal. Production in our zone has gradually risen until it reached a high of about 12 per cent of the old normal, or about 20 per cent of the new permitted levels. With the cut in rations, however, the index began a steady decline.

On May 4, Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, AMG director of economics, reported that output in our zone was "far below that necessary to maintain the minimum standard of living." The report went on to give production figures for individual industries as percentages of capacity. Here are a few samples: chemicals 25 per cent; electric power 20 per cent; building materials 20 per cent; steel products 13 per cent; ceramics 5 per cent; farm machinery 22 per cent; electrical equipment 15 per cent; automotive and industrial machinery 10 per cent. The following summer it was reported that less than 30 per cent of available industry in our zone was in operation.

Deputy Military Governor Clay at the end of August declared that it will take at least four more years for Germany to recover sufficiently to bring production up to the bare subsistence levels set under the deindustrialization program. War destruction plus the Allied program of repression have created thorough disorganization. Of the plants not bombed out completely, many were obsolete, others located in areas where residential destruction was so complete that there was no room for workers, or where available transportation and communications could serve only a fraction of production.

Bottlenecks and shortages permeate the whole German economy as the inevitable consequence of war destruction and the production prohibitions enforced under the level of industry plan. In July, 1946, for example, it was reported that the metal shortage had halted the production of plows, while the supply of horseshoes and nails was about exhausted. The number of motor trucks in Berlin, with its 3,000,000 inhabitants and area five times that of Chicago, was down to 8,000. Solder was not available even for mending pots and pans. Shoe cobblers were using old portfolios, dice boxes, helmet liners, any piece of salvage leather they could find to repair shoes. Although 50,000 school children were out of shoes, the supply of shoe nails was about exhausted. Because of lack of per-

manganate of potash, caused by dismantlement of I.G. Farben plants, the manufacture of saccharine, vitally needed on account of the sugar famine as well as by diabetics, was threatened. Manufacture of adhesive tape, muslin, bandages, and surgical dressings was halted in Thuringia because cotton mills appropriated by the Russians would not furnish raw materials. Cement production, sorely needed for reconstruction, was low because of dismantlements and shortage of machinery and tools.

Desperation for money to buy food on the black markets to supplement the starvation rations, has led the Germans to sell their assets, disposing first of what they need the least. Their rings have gone, then watches, bracelets, that other pair of shoes, dresses, jackets, suits. As one Berlin reporter put it:

“Last winter there was no coal, and Berliners burned every tree in town and for several miles around. Cold is the most miserable of all living conditions, and as people get closer and closer to the primitive, it’s natural that they look to the future. At first I was amazed to see girls walking down Berlin streets in summerclad in long coats of fox, or squirrel, or sheep. Then I realized. Remembering last winter; looking toward another winter without fuel - they’ve sold the clothing least needed. And I’m not kidding when I say a lot of these frauleins are down to their last fur coat.”

Associated Press bulletin from Hereford, Germany, dated September 9, 1946 reads: “The British officially informed Germans in their zone today they could expect no coal for heating this winter.”

In the face of this grim prospect, the best that could be hoped for in the way of food by the population living on the very edge of starvation, suffering from famine edema, swelling of joints, and all the other terrors of gradual starvation, as stated before, was an increase in rations to the “grim and dangerous” 1,500 calorie level throughout the 1946-47 winter. In June, 1946, Col. H.B. Hester, in charge of the American military government food branch, predicted a disastrous famine in Germany the next winter unless the ration level was raised by October. In the French zone 5,000 have died weekly of starvation.[20] In mid-summer of 1946, in Berlin, 19,000 very serious tuberculosis cases for whom no beds were available were reported officially by American authorities. The Senate of Hamburg issued an appeal to England and the entire world to send food and medicines to “avert terrible epidemics and mass deaths.” Hamburg motormen and conductors were imperiling safety of public transport by “fainting from hunger” and dropping at their posts from long undernourishment and weakness while on duty. The Medical Council of Cologne informed the British military authorities that the population there “is facing catastrophe” unless food was quickly provided, adding that “resistance to infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis, is vanishing.” Authorities in the Rhineland sent an appeal from Düsseldorf to the British military government to “close the murderous food gap,” in order to check rapidly spreading disease and epidemics caused by hunger.” A medical authority said:

“Many thousands of men, women, and children, who, with what reserves in strength and vitality they still possessed, managed to live through the rigors, cold and hunger of

last winter, will not survive this winter, after another year's depletion in their power of resistance to diseases fostered by starvation and semistarvation. Death's harvest indeed may be appalling."

Economic Dismemberment

Big Four officials have laid all the blame for Germany's distress on the war and zonal separation. In their view Potsdam would afford the best possible solution to all difficulties if only zonal division could be corrected. German territory west of the Oder-Neisse line was divided into four zones to be occupied and administered by the military forces of Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and France.

Russia's zone, comprising the eastern half of Prussia west of the Oder-Neisse river line is the best balanced of the four zones. In addition to containing some 45 per cent of Germany's manufacturing during the war, it produced more than enough food for its own consumption and mines brown coal and other minerals. Other sections of the Reich had been heavily dependent upon it for many key raw materials and manufactures. Stripped as it has been, it nevertheless supplies Russia with a sizable flow of goods taken as reparation.

Britain's zone comprises the western half of Prussia. Within it is the Ruhr District which contains the continent's most valuable natural resources, especially large deposits of high grade coal close to Europe's best iron ores, and lies in the midst of Europe's densest concentration of population in a region served by excellent rail and water transportation. Molotov rightly called it "Europe's workshop." Despite intensive cultivation the zone suffers a heavy food deficit, and even coal production has been at a low ebb since V-E Day. Administration costs are 320 million dollars a year above revenues.

The American zone lies in the central and southern sections of the Reich. Most of it is mountainous and largely scenic. It is not and cannot become self-sufficient in food production and is highly dependent upon various imports. It perfectly illustrates the essential interdependence of all sections of German economy. All of its hard coal requirements must be imported from the Ruhr or Saar regions, and 83 per cent of the steel required by its many manufacturing establishments must come from the outside. Lack of coal has forced partial or total closing of many industries; for example, the pharmaceutical industry, which needs coal tar; the tire business, which needs buna made from coal; and various fabricating, processing and finishing establishments. Because of the steel shortage, the largest tin can manufacturer in Bavaria closed so that some 10 million tins badly needed to put up the 1946 crop of peas, beans, and fruit, were not made. Large numbers are unemployed and administration is costing the American taxpayers 200 million dollars a year.

France's zone consists mostly of provincial fragments of former Germany bordering on France and contains no complete political or economic entities. Its chief asset is the Saar

Basin, rich in coal and steel. Although intensively cultivated, the zone is not self-sufficient in food, because of heavy specialization in vineyards and orchards. It must import its potatoes from Bavaria, for example, and other zones rely upon its food specialties.

One of the outstanding facts about Germany is the dependence of each section, and now each zone, upon all the others - for food, steel, coal, timber, and other essentials. The peace settlements did not anticipate economic separation of Germany's highly interdependent regions. Since the zones were set up strictly for administrative purposes and were not supposed to exert any divisive influence upon Germany economy, zonal boundary lines were laid out promiscuously across political and economic subdivisions. The belief that the zones would remain one thing and German economy another is clearly shown in the early statements and declarations of policy.

Although such economic dismemberment would alone guarantee economic disorganization, it cannot rightly be made to serve as a scape-goat for all the sins of Potsdam, nor for the British and American zonal deficits. Even in the absence of zonal separation the other harsh and repressive measures ordered at Potsdam would assure German economic paralysis. Disregarding this manifest fact, many officials find it convenient to lay all the blame on the zonal barriers and to argue that if they could be eliminated Potsdam would be transformed from a dismal failure into a dazzling success. The thesis may enable them to avoid admitting the colossal blunder Potsdam really is, but it also serves as a bar to taking the steps necessary to meet the trouble fundamentally. Put forward as a general panacea for all German administrative ills, economic Anschluss of as many zones as possible has become the chief objective of our zonal authorities. In the attempt to break down French and Russian objections, they offered to divide the Reich into a number of federated states and to guarantee German disarmament for 25 or even 40 years. After this proposal was rejected on the ground that it was wholly inadequate and would lead to war, they offered to merge the American zone economically "with one, two, or three other zones."

Teaching Democracy in Reverse

We first eliminated the German government, the only instrumentality through which the German people might take collective self-preservative action and then substituted a system of military absolutism, born not of free American institutions or ideals, but of the absolutisms dominant at Potsdam.

Set up to function under the heads of this alien military dictatorship is a complicated bureaucracy headed by a hierarchy of descending Caesars, forming a neat replica of the authoritarian apparatus employed by both the Soviets and Nazis. This dictatorship, as we have seen, has as its purpose not the resuscitation and rehabilitation of the fallen Reich, but rather its repression and the erection of barriers to recovery. With hundreds of thousands of heavily armed occupation troops behind it, the alien dictatorship was also prepared to prevent resistance by the Germans as they saw the ground prepared for their

extermination by their being thrown on their own, and forbidden outside assistance while the necessary means for their survival were destroyed. It has dropped a soundproof iron curtain down around its victims, virtually cutting off intercourse with the outside world, ostensibly to prevent contamination of other nations by Nazi ideas, but also to prevent the anguished cries of the German women and children from reaching and disturbing others while the gruesome program was carried into effect.

As the death noose tightened about them, the Germans were to be made to believe they are entirely to blame for their dilemma. Even the inevitable economic collapse must be laid at the door of German administrators. They must be made to spring their own trap door.

This was the craven way we were to bring self government to the Germans. We no doubt hoped, for example, that by turning denazification over to so-called "German" prosecutors and courts set up and operating under our mandate we could make the Germans blame themselves for the deleterious effects. We have said it is democratic to make the Germans conduct their own purge, which is tantamount to accepting the Russian purges as democratic. But those purges were at least Russian affairs. The German purge machinery is operated by Communists and radical Marxist Socialists placed in office by an alien dictatorship and no more representative of the Germans than Quisling's Nazi government was of the Norwegians. The Germans know full well that whatever our puppets do reflects our will and dicta. If we should by any chance convince them that this is what we mean by the democracy we came to force upon them, we could hardly blame them if they rejected it at the first opportunity.

Our military government is anything but democratic, except in the Russian sense. It is headed by well-trained military men, competent to carry out military tasks and orders received from Washington prepared by politicians and behind-the-scenes operators. Instead of a democratic body representative of free Americans, they are order takers, willing to carry out without question whatever directive they receive from above. They are identical in this respect with Hitler's loyal hierarchy of lord high executioners. Our troops of occupation have been splendid young American boys, but for the most part raw, inexperienced, teenage draftees who could be expected neither to relish their job nor to comprehend its exacting nature. The whole experience has tended to corrupt and brutalize them. As mentioned before, our use of a disproportionate number of negro troops has helped alienate the Germans and disgust our own personnel.

Zonal rule over the economic, political, and cultural life of the German people, as commanded at Potsdam, could be handled with a modicum of success only by men with long experience in totalitarian philosophy and methodology. And in this respect the Russian zonal authorities enjoy a great advantage. Whereas the rule which Potsdam orders is alien to our background, training, and philosophy, it conforms perfectly to Russian practice at home. Such rule cannot bring free enterprise to Germany; only some form of collectivist society could grow up under it.

“Re-education“

Many ardent supporters of Potsdam have become greatly upset about Communist plans for taking over the Reich. They have no right to be, because the very first signature affixed to the document is that of Joseph Stalin. The Russians, therefore, have just as much right as we to lay down the meaning of its loose provisions and undefined terms. When Potsdam calls for democratization of the Reich without specifying exactly what is meant by “democracy,” the Soviets have a perfect right to insist that the order calls for German communization. And this is but one of the pernicious features of its “re-education“ program. Potsdam, in connection with denazification, decrees that ousted Nazis “shall be replaced by persons who by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.“ But no hint is given as to what “genuine democratic institutions“ might be. It prohibits propagation of national socialist ideas, without stating what they are, and then provides that “German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas,“ again without definition.

But forbidding propagation and discussion of one political philosophy and forcing the public to accept a different one held by those in the seats of power is Nazi doctrine. It is also Communist doctrine (And obviously also Democratic doctrine....). And the Communists claim theirs is the one and only genuine democracy.

Political democracy, say the Bolsheviks, is impossible over the long run without “economic democracy,“ by which they mean abolition of private ownership of property, the foundation of free enterprise. But they call free enterprise fascism, and defenders of the American system fascists. And Nazism is a form of fascism. Denazification, in Russian eyes, therefore, is tantamount to rooting out our own system, along with all other private property systems. The Bolsheviks call any country or party fascist or Nazi if it takes or advocates measures to curb the activities of Communist parties; those which permit the Communists to go freely about their business of destroying them and building a world soviet union are denominated “democratic.“ Thus, Potsdam qualifies as a “democratic“ document. These facts were known, or should have been known, by all the principals at Potsdam. When Russia was permitted to sign the agreements without a clear definition of what was meant by “democracy,“ we were falling into a dangerous trap from which we cannot escape, unless we simply repudiate the agreements we signed. The whole thing makes us look very stupid.

If by democracy we meant our way of life - free enterprise, private property, individual liberties, the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, and government of, by, and for the people - it should have been obvious to us from the beginning that the program to establish democracy by force was foredoomed to failure. We might logically have hoped to wipe out Hitlerism by Hitlerite methods, but we certainly could never hope to establish our way of life that way. Our intolerance of Nazi political opinion, however

justified it may seem, is nevertheless the opposite of democratic in the American sense. Our determination to wipe out ideas by force is a repudiation of democracy's most sacred tenets. People who really believe in freedom of thought and opinion do not use clubs on the debating platform. We despised Hitler for burning books proscribed by the Nazis, not because we were necessarily partial toward the particular books involved, but as a matter of principle. Yet we have ourselves violated the principle, and adopted Hitlers, by burning the Nazi books. In words we denounce Hitlerism; in deeds we exonerate it! (Note: The Allied book burning of "Nazi books" was the largest destruction of books in human history)

The impression has been given by prolonged propaganda that national socialist tenets were obviously evil and criminal, that they openly called for aggressive war, for example, and conquest of the world. This is not true. Like the platform of any political party seeking support at the polls, its planks appeared to be quite innocuous. In fact, Nazism and its works were praised by many foreign notables such as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. When polled, 51 per cent of our own GI's, stationed in Germany, said they believed Hitler "did the Reich a lot of good before 1939," and 19 per cent of those questioned believed "the Germans had some or a good deal of justification for starting the war." - "It showed large percentages of the soldiers ready to accept German explanations and willing to absolve the mass of Germans from responsibility for concentration camp atrocities." - "29 per cent conceded they had grown 'more favorable' toward their former enemies since they had been in the country."

It was perfectly possible for honest, intelligent, conscientious German citizens to be party members and even enthusiasts. For us to assume differently is merely to exhibit our ignorance and gullibility for propaganda. Nazism was wrong in many fundamental respects, and these features should be exposed. The Germans should be shown in principle where these ideas were wrong and dangerous. They should be stated as general principles to be opposed no matter who advances them, even if they are communists. And the operation should be discussion by free, uncensored debate. Certainly, nothing can be gained by treating the subjects as undiscussable. The Nazis were wrong in their invasion of the schools and forcing elimination of certain ideas and texts and acceptance of certain others. They were wrong in principle. So are we, when we impose our ideas and textbooks on the Germans. We are even more so for being outsiders, whereas the Nazis were at least German. The Nazis were wrong in their strict censorship of the German press. And so are we. We cannot create a free press in Germany through rigid censorship and we look very foolish when we try it.

The German leaders applied the hideous and indefensible doctrine of collective guilt against a whole people whom they looked upon as deadly enemies. This was one of their greatest crimes. We have committed the same crime by applying the same doctrine against all the people of Germany, including unborn babies. Perhaps the reason we forbid discussion of Nazism, fail to list its features, and try to destroy it by force, goes back to our having unconsciously accepted most of its worst features since 1932, without knowing

their identity.

And so we go blithely on our way trying to stamp out Nazism while practicing it ourselves. The very stamping is Nazi like. We came as liberators to teach the Germans how to enjoy self-government and political freedom. Yet we have imposed our denazification decrees which so frighten them that they refuse to take part in politics for fear of the possible consequences under our “democratic” control. We are trying to teach them democracy, and yet we have so circumscribed what they may teach that their teachers, unless they are Communists, are afraid to say anything. Politically, German leaders are not permitted to speak freely, and even those in our military government are afraid to say what they think, for fear of the consequences. Because of our undemocratic policies regarding freedom of the press, which we preach while violating in practice, the German press is operating in a vacuum. Intellectual hunger in Germany is almost as acute as physical hunger. (Note: This text was written in 1947, and it seems that this still holds true in 2016)

While preaching democracy we have installed ourselves as an alien plutocracy, many of whose members have found blackmarket operations and other shady deals not beneath them. While the Germans around them starve, wear rags, and live in hovels, the American aristocrats live in often unaccustomed ease and luxury. Their wives must be specially marked to protect them from licentious advances; they live in the finest homes from which they drove the Germans; they swagger about in fine liveries and gorge themselves on diets three times as great as they allow the Germans, and allow “displaced persons” diets twice as great. When we tell the Germans their low rations are necessary because food is so short, they naturally either think we are lying to them or regard us as inhuman for taking the lion’s share of the short supplies while they and their children starve.

This is the way to teach democracy in reverse. If what we are doing in Germany against Nazism is right, then what we are doing here at home about Communism is wrong. If we must stamp out Nazism there, we must stamp out Communism here; if in the name of democracy and freedom of opinion we can tolerate dissemination of Communist doctrine and treasonable Communist fifth column activities here, we should treat Nazism with equal kindness over there. For the one is just as bad as the other.

Allied deletion of German History, Culture and Traditional Spirit

It is estimated that 11,075,000 volumes and patents, which is over a third of all German books, had already been destroyed by the Allied barbarous aerial bombing in West Germany alone; and this does not include those in the areas taken from Germany after the war. Added to the millions of German books destroyed worldwide during the anti-German hysteria of WWI, far more German books were destroyed in the twentieth century than likely exist today.

Until the advent of the printing press, books were hand-scribed and existed in only one or a few copies. Burning them ensured that no one would ever read them... needless

to say, thought control was simple pre-printing days. However, citing rhetoric such as 'Preventing corruption of the young' (ironically a concept often cited in the German censorship laws today), the likes of Henry VIII required printers to submit all manuscripts to the Church for approval and imported publications were outlawed in 1529. French king Francis I prohibited printing in 1535 and in 1559, the Catholic Church issued the *Librorum Prohibitorum* to guide censors as to which publications to allow. Their approved index listed only 5,000 titles which existed until 1966. Germany however, still had much of the hand-scribed books from its historical culture, but through the atrocious terror bombing of civilian cities by allied forces, they are lost forever; But it didn't stop there. We might think those days were long behind a progressive society, but not under certain circumstances, and 'Re-education' of Germans was one such circumstance. The Allied consensus upon victory was the doctrine of collective guilt: all Germans, young or old, shared the blame for the war.

All German literature found in both the Soviet and Western Occupation Zones was subjected to censorship. In the U.S. zone, it was regulated by occupation directive JCS 1067 (The Morgenthau Plan) until July 1947, and in May 1946, the order was valid for all zones. Allied Control Authority Order No. 4 stated: "Confiscation of Literature and Material of a Nazi and Militarist Nature" dictated that all confiscated literature was reduced to pulp instead of burning to avoid accusations of 'Book-Burning!' Unfortunately, those in charge of disposal often didn't know Michael Angelo from Mickey Mouse, and thousands of innocuous, even rare books were Pulped. A list of 35,000 books were banned as well as all textbooks published from 1933 to 1945. All publications and materials were ordered by the Allied 'Re-Education' teams to be "Released to the Commanders of each Zone to be destroyed." They were removed from all libraries, schools, universities, research institutes, academies, technical or academic societies, book-stores, publishing houses and even from private homes... then destroyed. This massive, haphazard vandalism was carried out by unqualified people from 1946 to 1952, and many books were lost forever due to careless storage and handling, all under the battle cry of making the world a safer place.

This was the greatest campaign of book destruction of all time and ended up being applied not only to the offending books, but to poetry, philosophy, musical verse, calendars, horse books, books about trade and agriculture, driving manuals, books about flowers, home building, barns, astronomy, plumbing, poets, tennis and books about gardening. Hundreds of years of German history and culture were lost due to this arrogant abuse of authority, brazen incompetence and total ignorance. Books about birds made the list, as well as books by Friedrich the Great, Bismarck and antique European military history books. Popular children's books, including rare editions of the Brothers Grimm, were pulped on the grounds that they "Provoked violence." Everything about the Olympic Games of 1936 was banned. Books by the ancient poets were pulped. Even books once banned (not burned) by the National Socialists were destroyed!? Sloppy handling caused the loss of the entire musical works of Richard Strauss and several Gutenberg bibles were

fried in this orgy of stupidity.

Of Morgenthau's Plan for 'Re-Education' titled, "Education and Propaganda" stated:

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated."

Beginning with 'Re-Education' at the end of the War, Germany has continued the strict censorship imposed by the Soviet and the Allied occupiers. Even today, using the 'Special history' excuse, 'Nationalistic' books, songs and symbols are illegal even in private in Austria and Germany and, Occupational Germany has been aggressive in trying to expand its own strict laws beyond its borders. Almost all prosecutions of censorship violations have taken place in connection with what they term holocaust 'Revisionism' or 'Denial.' Merely questioning an aspect, re-analyzing data, expressing a maverick theory or trying to revise a statistic pertaining to this subject is lumped under 'Holocaust Denial' and 'Hate Speech' which is illegal not only in Germany and Austria, but in most of Europe. "To have failed to write about a particular historical event in a balanced manner" (Hypocrisy?) is a crime that can send an amateur historian to jail and he will often serve a longer sentence than a child molester or serial rapist. Thousands of people have been convicted of violating European 'Denial' laws and they are currently languishing in European dungeons. Cases prosecuted under these laws go unchallenged even when the convicted parties were pacifists and never proposed violence, but were simply expressing their opinion. In the cases of scientists, artists, singers or writers convicted of this offence, their homes and businesses are raided and their work is destroyed by the state. Worse, the definition of 'Denial' is being broadened and is defined today as 'Hard-Core' and 'Soft-Core' Denial, the latter including discussion of the Allied War-Crimes of the Terror-Bombing Campaign against Germany, as well as the Expulsions of ethnic German civilians after the war. Even liberal writers extremely critical of the Third Reich have been tarnished as 'Soft-Core Deniers' when they came out with books discussing the heavy toll of Allied bombing upon the German civilian population during the war.

13.2 The International Military Tribunal (IMT): Nuremberg

From "Nuremberg: The Last Battle", the story of "Jackson" continues (he was already mentioned in the chapter about the Morgenthau Plan).

War finished, Germans captured

Rapidly staking out his own territory, Jackson persuaded General George C. Marshall to send a telegram to Europe instructing his commanders that there must be no more suicides by their prize prisoners - the Sudeten German leader Konrad Henlein had just swallowed poison - and that there were to be no more press interviews of suspected war criminals like Hermann Goering, since these might 'seriously prejudice [the] trial.' After his first talks with the other lawyers, Jackson was especially sensitive to the danger that the Nazi defendants might turn the tables on their victors during the coming trial, pointing the finger at their prosecutors and accusing the victorious powers of having committed crimes that were equal to, if not worse than, those of which they were accused.

On May 14 1945 army officers at the Pentagon showed Jackson for the first time leaflets which their bombers had dropped in millions over Japan with a picture of a Japanese family being consumed in flames; the Japanese text threatened more terror-bombing if they did not surrender. It was, noted Jackson, who was naively unaware of the millions of such leaflets dropped by the British and American air forces for five years over Germany, 'the boldest kind of violation of the Hague convention.' Jackson pointed out to these officers that in his opinion dropping such a leaflet would 'warrant the Japanese executing any American soldier' caught carrying out such a policy. (To his horror, the U.S. Army then sent a message to the Philippine theatre, quoting him as an authority; in his view this message increased the risk of such executions.)

Later in May, Brigadier-General John M. Weir, of the judge-advocate general's office, revealed to him that they had evidence of an order issued by Hitler for the killing of Allied commandos and paratroopers. The snag was, said Weir, that there were several well-documented cases where Americans had done exactly the same. An American officer in Italy had issued an order to 'take no prisoners,' and a U.S. Army sergeant had thereupon killed thirty-five German soldiers in his hands; the sergeant - but not General Patton, the officer involved - had been put on trial and, said Weir, 'narrowly escaped death,' and had recently even been restored to duty. Jackson, shocked by this revelation, recorded it in his diary and anticipated problems if the Germans should put up the defence known in Latin as *tu quoque*, roughly 'you did it too.'

There was already a subtle Cold War element involved. Jackson was conscious of the need to prevent the trials taking an 'anti-German' shape which would drive the German population into the arms of the Russians. Regardless of Stalin's personal stand on precisely this issue, Soviet newspapers now began attacking the Allies for not having executed Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, Germany's highest-ranking soldier, immediately upon capture; this kind of lawlessness made Jackson uncomfortable about any future participation of the Russians in a trial. It seems that the Kremlin had suddenly been stricken with the same kind of misgiving as had beset Churchill since 1942 - the Russians evidently fearing that if Germany were now to be charged with preparing an aggressive war against Russia, the defence would establish from German and captured

Soviet documents that Moscow had been making much more extensive preparations to attack Germany than the world was yet aware of.

Before General Donovan departed for Europe on May 17, Jackson therefore asked him to question Goering on the following topics: the Soviet preparations for war (or, failing that, the real reasons why Hitler had attacked Russia); information that might be of use to Jackson if and when Goering took the witness stand; and 'any positions he might be taking in defense.' General Donovan warned Jackson in confidence that the Russians had had 'the code of the British Foreign Office' all the time; in consequence many communications which the British had thought secure were really known to the Russians, and this might also prove an embarrassment during the coming trials. Suddenly the whole thing did not seem such an open-and-shut case to Jackson after all.

At this time the secret row about 'slave labour' boiled over again in Washington. On May 15, 1945 Jackson told President Truman that he refused to support any such provisions in the reparation instructions, except for Germans properly tried and convicted, and even then only under rigorously controlled conditions. 'I fully agree with you,' said Truman.??? Not to be outwitted so easily, Henry Morgenthau struck back. He called a second meeting between his henchmen and the judge at four o'clock on May 18, this time on home ground in his Treasury building. Justice Jackson found Morgenthau and many of his staff among the score or so officials crowded into the chamber. Morgenthau immediately pointed out the snag in Jackson's objections - supplying Russia only with those Germans duly tried and convicted would yield perhaps a couple of hundred thousand workers, whereas Stalin was thinking in terms of five million.

When John J. McCloy, a later military governor of Germany, suggested that the late president had surely been thinking of a proper trial as the only basis for the supply of forced labour, Morgenthau angrily rounded on him, protesting that this was the first time that he had heard such a limitation suggested. One of his aides, Joseph Dubois, chimed in that in view of the Yalta decision there did not appear to be any need for trials at all. Besides, a Gallup poll had shown a large percentage of Americans in favour of using the Germans for slave labour. Jackson thumped the desk with his fist. 'Just watch the Gallup poll ratings change when the first slave-labour horror stories start coming out of Russia!' Quietening, he prophesied, 'The problem of sending labour to Russia is that I don't think it would ever come back.' More pertinently he pointed out that the Geneva Convention provided no basis for holding prisoners-of-war as reparations once peace had been concluded. Morgenthau's man Dubois protested at such legalisms. 'We already know that the S.S. and Gestapo are guilty - a trial would be farcical!' 'How do you know?' challenged the justice. 'This city is full of people who tell me there's no doubt about it. But when I ask for specific evidence I can't get a single item.'

Since Truman had already signed the executive order giving Jackson his warrant for the task, Morgenthau had no option but to climb down. He did so with poor grace. 'I bet you won't have your trials through by Labour Day' - the first Monday in September - he mocked. Heading for the door, Jackson told him that Christmas 1945 was a better bet.

As the judge walked out into the Washington spring sunshine with Ralph Bard, a U.S. Navy officer who had been at Yalta, he heard still more details of the behind-the-scenes discussions there. The Russians, Bard told him, had seriously aired a proposal to deport to the Soviet Union millions of ordinary Germans - people who had not belonged to any of the organisations - sterilising the men, and breeding the women with Russians.

To the end of his days, Jackson refused to believe that the President Franklin D. Roosevelt whom he knew could have advocated the slavelabour proposal. (He kept an open mind on the castration.) 'I can't believe that a man who knew history as well as he did, and knew the American people, ever had believed that proposal was a wise thing,' he confidentially recorded. 'I think myself that it was Morgenthau's emotional reaction - I don't know about the motives of some of the men with him.' On May 22, 1945, he set off for Europe to inspect what had to be done. Where were the war criminals at this time? For diplomatic reasons, the idea of putting Italy's wartime leaders on trial seemed to have been abandoned; Benito Mussolini and his principal ministers and aides had in consequence by this time been dead already for three weeks - lynched and machine-gunned in the back shortly after their capture by communist partisans.??? It now appears possible that, pursuing his own long-held beliefs, Churchill had issued instructions to the directors of his Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) for the murder of Mussolini and his henchmen as soon as they were captured. The S.O.E. and the O.S.S. had duly passed these instructions on to their contacts amongst the partisans, and the bloody events at Lake Garda in northern Italy at the end of April 1945 were the outcome.

As for the German leaders, Adolf Hitler, Dr Joseph Goebbels, Martin Bormann and a host of others, acting wholly without consideration for Jackson and the needs of international justice, had taken their own lives before they could be put on trial. The remnants of Germany's Nazi government, including Grand- Admiral Karl Doenitz, whom Hitler had appointed Reich president, and Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (the supreme high command), had withdrawn to an enclave in and around Flensburg, just below the Danish frontier, where they were penned in by British troops under Field-Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, pending the receipt of further instructions from London. Among several career moves dictated by Hitler in his final will and testament, he had dismissed Heinrich Himmler as Reichsfuehrer S.S., and replaced Ribbentrop as foreign minister by Count Schwerin von Krosigk. Later - awaiting the gallows at Nuremberg - Keitel described these last days at Flensburg to his son. One day Himmler had come in for an hour-long talk with him and had asked Keitel to place himself at his disposal, as he was going to have to take over. The contents of Hitler's political testament however soon made clear that Himmler had been sacked as Reichsfuehrer S.S., and that Doenitz had been appointed head of state. Doenitz had asked Keitel, 'What do you make of Himmler's being here?' Keitel had replied that he'd have to go, and agreed to tell Himmler as much - that he should put on some civvies and get out of there. Dismissed from all his offices on May ?, Himmler had hung around long enough to give Keitel a letter addressed to General Eisenhower, offering his services

once the war was over. Keitel had read the letter and torn it up.

One by one the future actors in the Nuremberg drama were taken into custody. Those whom the international media had long portrayed as major criminals were not treated with kid gloves. After first beating him savagely, the GIs transported Hans Frank, the hated Nazi governor of occupied Poland, to the municipal prison at Miesbach. They flung a tarpaulin over the prisoner to hide the worst weals left by the beating. Under cover of the tarpaulin, Frank tried unsuccessfully to open an artery in his left arm. They gave the gauleiter of Franconia and newspaper publisher Julius Streicher an even rougher ride after an American army officer, Major Henry Blitt, found him at a house in Waidbruck in the Tyrol on May ?? . Challenged as to his identity, the former gauleiter admitted: 'Julius Streicher.' He was driven off to the prison at Salzburg. There he was handcuffed - the manacles were not removed for the next five days. Still manacled and dressed only in a shirt and pants he was driven on May 23 to Freising in Bavaria, where he was thrown into a windowless cell without either a bed or chair. 'Two or three times a day,' he wrote a few days later, 'I was made to stand against a wall with my handcuffed hands above my head while a Black or a military police officer beat me around the genitalia for up to one minute at a time with a leather whip. If I attempted to ward off the blows with my handcuffed hands they kicked me in the testicles. My private parts and testicles were badly swollen.'

Scarcely more pleasant was to have 'the white police officer' and the GIs order him to open his mouth two or three times a day so they could spit into it. If he kept his mouth shut, they forced it open with a wooden baton. They forced him to drink out of the urinal. When he once refused to, they beat him with the whip. 'Each time he visited my cell the white police officer ripped hairs out of my nipples and eyebrows.' Once when Streicher refused to eat the putrid leftovers that were dished out to him they threw him to the ground and forced him to lick the (Black) soldiers' feet. On May 26 they finally told him to get ready for the drive to Wiesbaden. A couple of hours before that one of the GIs said to him with a smirk, 'Now you get " kill, kill "' - and he made the appropriate cut-throat motion across his neck. Then a Black soldier marched Streicher into the lavatories, tossed his clothing into the toilet and told him to get dressed - which was easier said than done, given his handcuffed condition. The manacles were removed only after he arrived at Wiesbaden. 'Since then,' wrote Streicher, 'I have been under medical care. The prison commandant at Wiesbaden (who says he is a Jew) has behaved with complete propriety.'

It rapidly became plain to Jackson, and he remarked upon it in his diary, that Paris had suffered little or not at all under the Nazi occupation, and was suffering rather more under the American. They were housed at the Ritz Hotel, and drove over the next morning to the old Hotel Majestic which had once housed the headquarters of Field- Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt as Hitler's commander-in-chief, west. Here Betts filled him in on the latest titbits, for example that the Polish ambassador in Brussels had told him that the Russians were filling seventeen new concentration camps in Poland with those who

opposed the puppet government that they had set up in Warsaw. He said they had about six hundred war crimes cases on file, most of them little more than witness statements. About twenty cases had been tried by common law, and most of the defendants had been convicted and executed. Apart from two cases currently being tried, however, they had no others ready; and they were certainly were not prepared to mount a prosecution along the lines envisaged by Jackson - trying the conspiracy to make war as a crime in itself.

The irksome joint chiefs of staff directive 1067 was already causing major problems. Bedell Smith told Jackson that while the Americans troops were forbidden to 'fraternise' the Russians were cultivating the workers and peasants in their occupation zones to further the spread of communism. The Russians, said Bedell Smith, were refusing to cooperate in setting up the Allied Control Council as agreed. They were stripping eastern Europe bare, having rounded up and shot 'all leaders, intellectuals, lawyers, civil officials, scholars - any who might be a rallying point for opposition.' Mass shootings? Even lawyers? Jackson took note of all that Bedell Smith told him. A few days later, back in Washington, he would listen equally dispassionately to the American ambassador in Belgrade, Richard Patterson, reporting on the mass executions of intellectuals and businessmen beginning in that country on the orders of Marshal Tito, or rather of his Soviet puppet masters: 'Members of the Yugoslav government informed him that they had just executed the brother of a young woman employed in the American Embassy as a translator. He was not tried, no charges were placed against him, but they were of a family of bankers.'

6 Million?

After Paris, Jackson flew on to London. Driving into the empire's capital he found the effects of the bombing far less dramatic than he had expected, 'hardly noticeable in comparison with the total destruction visited upon the German cities.' He and his little advance party were billeted at Claridge's, the hotel where visiting kings and queens were housed, in a suite overlooking, he noted, the American embassy - several buildings in between having been removed by the German bombers. There they were talking about who was to be put officially on trial. When discussion turned to the list of names, it was Maxwell Fyfe who named Goering, Ley, Rosenberg, and Ribbentrop, to which he later added as an afterthought the name of Admiral Karl Doenitz, the German Navy's commander-in-chief and Hitler's successor as head of state; he stipulated that the British public would measure the trial's success or failure by what he called 'the disposition of Goering's case.' It was at General Donovan's suggestion that the names of Rudolf Hess and Franz von Papen were added. Jackson also had a few names jotted down, including Franz Xaver Schwarz, the Nazi party's treasurer; Wilhelm Frick, the minister of the interior; Hans Frank; Hjalmar Schacht, the former governor of the Reich Bank; and an enigmatic 'Woolf' - perhaps Karl Wolff, chief of staff of the now unavailable Heinrich Himmler. But these names were already too lowly for the Londoners' taste: they swiftly objected that the list must be restricted to the most senior officers and ministers, in order

to obviate the defence of 'superior orders' that more subordinate officers were bound to employ.

A public opinion poll conducted by the Gallup organisation revealed that sixty-seven percent of the American public wanted Hermann Goering executed without trial, and that forty-five percent would like to see the Gestapo agents and Nazi stormtroopers liquidated the same way. 'Kill them ... Hang them ... Wipe them off the face of the earth,' were typical reactions. The war department informed Eisenhower: 'Dr Gallup's overall impression is that American people want no fooling around about punishing war criminals. The people want no delay in meting out of punishment.'

A few days before leaving for London Jackson visited F.B.I. officials in New York on June 11, 1945. Here he had, probably not at his own wish, his first meeting with several powerful Jewish organisations who had already made quite clear to him they wanted a hand in running the trial. They handed him a copy of the Treaty of Sevres in which the Allies had laid down penalties on the Turks for their atrocities against the Armenians during World War One. This might serve as a useful precedent. Robinson also suggested that the tribunal prosecute Alfred Rosenberg in his capacity as chief Nazi philosopher: they were not seeking vengeance, swore Robinson, 'nor, of course, compensation for Jewish losses.'

How great were those losses? inquired Jackson, seeking a figure to use at the coming trial. 'Six million,' responded Dr Robinson, and indicated that the figure included Jews in all Nazi-occupied lands 'from the Channel to Stalingrad.' Jackson noted that day:

"I was particularly interested in knowing the source and reliability of his estimate as I know no authentic data on it."

Robinson said that he had arrived at his figure by extrapolation from the known statistics for the Jewish population in 1929 and those believed to be surviving now. In other words his figure was somewhere between a hopeful estimate and an educated guess. 'The differences are assumed to be killed or in hiding,' he said. Given the turmoils and tragedies of a war-torn Europe ravaged by bombs and plagues, it was not a data basis on which a statistician would properly have relied. Where were the shifting frontiers? Who, indeed, was a Jew? These were questions about which cartographers, ethnographers, religious fanatics, and politicians are still at each other's throats. Six million? By sad but extraordinary coincidence, the American Jewish community had raised a similar outcry about a 'holocaust' a quarter of a century earlier, after World War One. In a 1919 speech the governor of New York, Martin Glynn, had claimed that 'six million' Jews were being exterminated.

The delegation expressed to Jackson their fears that the Allies would choose the less onerous course, of merely prosecuting the Nazis for lesser offences. These men wanted a decision based on the persecution of the Jews which, they averred, all the post-war trials so far conducted had side-stepped. They even asked for a separate court to try these charges, and failing that they asked for the right to have an *amicus curiae* in Jackson's

courtroom to 'represent the six million slaughtered.' Foreseeing inevitable problems, Jackson demurred. All the other persecuted minorities would then feel entitled to the same rights. He gave the delegation no encouragement, but promised to think about it. Having obviously failed in that mission, they then asked him at least to appoint an officer on his staff specifically to handle their angle.

While in New York Jackson visited Herbert Bayard Swope, who was angling for a position in directing a publicity campaign around the trial. Swope reminded Jackson that if the Nazis had killed 'six million Jews' - it was amazing how rapidly that figure had taken hold - it would mean that the Nazis had acquired 'at least' six billion dollars of Jewish property. In mid-June a committee of American psychiatrists and neurologists contacted Jackson, asking permission to examine the prisoners and to make sound recordings of the interviews. Their premise was almost racist in its implications: 'Aggressive leaders have been recurrently produced by the German people, who then follow them blindly. Detailed knowledge of the personalities of these leaders would add to our information concerning the character and habitual desires of the German people, and would be valuable as a guide to those concerned with the reorganisation and re-education of Germany.' Rather unfairly, the writer proposed that these examinations should 'not be utilized to support pleas of insanity' - the results should remain secret until after the sentences had been executed. And, as for that, the doctors urgently recommended that 'the convicted be shot in the chest, not in the head,' as it would be desirable to have a detailed autopsy, especially of an undamaged brain.

Eventually Jackson would write to the New York committee giving its experts the go-ahead - authorising the secret examination of the defendants by qualified psychiatrists as soon as the Tribunal went into recess to consider its judgement; but again he ruled that the findings were not to be published until after any sentences had been carried out, and he was to have immediate access to them and the right to make such use of them before the Tribunal as he might 'deem desirable.'

Architect of a New International Law

The Russians insisted on several niggling changes to the trial's draft protocol. The American ambassador Winant advised Jackson to put up a strong stand against the Russians. President Truman had offered the same advice earlier, saying that the Russians only respected people who stood up to them. It soon became clear, particularly from their meeting on June 29, that the Russians had not abandoned the idea of a swift trial and even swifter execution of all the war criminals. Their argument had the benefit of simplicity. General Nikitchenko - who was to figure both as the Soviet chief prosecutor and negotiator at the London talks and as the Soviet judge at the Nuremberg trial - said with refreshing candour: 'We are dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been convicted and whose conviction has already been announced by both the Moscow and the Yalta declarations and by the heads of the governments.' He objected, he said, to

the 'fiction' that the Tribunal's judges were disinterested parties - they would have read the newspapers like the rest of the world, and the guilt of these criminals was perfectly clear. The judges should merely decide the just punishment of the criminals without time-wasting preliminaries; as for the prosecutors, their job would be, in Nikitchenko's view, merely to assist the judges. That was the Russian way of doing things.

The greatest problem that Jackson found was the conflict between the differing legal systems employed by the four powers. A compromise in this respect would have to be struck. From the very outset he had nourished an unhealthy mistrust of the Russians. For all his bluster at the London conferences about going it alone, he preferred the Russians to have a prosecutor of their own at the trials since, the Russian record in this war hardly seemed less black than the German. This was of course a conference of the victors; their purpose was to choose the defendants, and to draft the new laws they were to be accused of having broken, and the rules of the court which was retroactively to apply those laws.

The Germans were not represented at these sessions, so the trial would start with the dice already loaded against the defendants. But to Jackson it was of paramount importance to get an agreement - any agreement - between the four powers. Bit by bit he chiselled the concessions out of the others: he secured from the other prosecutors agreement to a concrete declaration that individuals who led their nations into aggressive wars should in future (and in the past, if they were Germans) be held accountable. When the final text was announced, the justice declared: 'The definitions under which we will try the Germans are general definitions. They impose liability upon war-making statesmen of all countries alike.' They were brave words, but they had not the slightest effect on the statesmen who would wage one hundred wars, large and small, in the half-century after he uttered them.

The 'all countries alike' referred only to the future. The final indictments resulting from these London conferences would narrowly state the crime to have been 'aggression or domination over other nations carried out by the European Axis in violation of international laws and treaties' - a definition that saved the Russians particularly from embarrassment (the Russian representative had insisted that the Tribunal limit the charge even more narrowly to 'aggressions started by the Nazis in this war'.) The Soviet conscience was troubled by its own actions against Poland and Finland in the first years of the war, while British consciences were no less exercised by the knowledge of Churchill's 1940 plans for the invasion of neutral Norway and Sweden.

The British and U.S. armies had begun to concentrate the prisoners most likely to be required for trial as war criminals in a requisitioned four-star hotel, the Grand Hotel, at Bad Mondorf or Mondorf-les-Bains in the duchy of Luxembourg. Eventually there would be seventy or more elite prisoners in this camp. They found that their camp commandant was a stiff-backed, crusty American cavalry colonel, Burton C. Andrus; he would move with them, and they were to remain on his charge until they left him for liberty, jail, or the gallows. Among the first prisoners to arrive at the Mondorf cage was Field-Marshal Keitel, together with Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who had been Hitler's Reich commissar in

Holland. 'One by one the others arrived,' recalled Keitel later. 'Some of them had been taken into captivity in the most humiliating manner. Stripped naked, men on one side, women on the other, though with their backs to each other.' With time, all the remaining high ranking German officers arrived at the camp.

Shortly prisoners at Mondorf were joined by Joachim von Ribbentrop. He had been captured in Hamburg on June ?? after a long search. He would spend the remaining weeks here at the Grand Hotel writing his memoirs. When he invited Goering to run his eye over eighty-five pages he had just written, the former aviator told him without undue politeness where he could file them. With the drug intake now halted completely, the Reichsmarschall had regained his old fight and joie de vivre. Ribbentrop spoke a wooden but intelligible English, having spent some time in Canada in earlier years. A British officer interviewed the ex-foreign minister on August ?, assuring him that their conversation was in secret (in fact every word was picked up and recorded.) Despite these assurances, both now and later Ribbentrop refused to talk about the non-aggression pact he had signed in Moscow in August 1939 between Germany and Russia, invoking diplomatic secrecy. The British officer changed to another, by implication more menacing, tack.

'You've seen, of course, what has happened in these concentration camps,' he began.

'I never knew,' confessed Ribbentrop, 'whether it is really true what has been published on the concentration camps.'

'It is true.'

'I only learned of all these things through the papers in Hamburg when I was not yet a prisoner. We all had not the slightest idea of it.' 'That astonishes us.'

'Would it possibly astonish you, I wonder,' questioned Ribbentrop, 'if you knew our system? If anyone had asked Himmler to visit a concentration camp, the result would have been that he would have ended up there but would never come back from there.'

'He was responsible for them?'

'Of course.'

'Who built them up?'

'He did.'

'But he alone couldn't have had the full responsibility: he must have had a staff under him. Did Bormann work on this?'

'Bormann is a man who worked a lot with Himmler. About concentration camps. You see, we knew there were concentration camps but we didn't know what was going on. Nobody knew. All these people in Mondorf - not one of them knew. Also the Jewish question.'

'You mean about the persecution?'

'We knew that there were concentration camps but we didn't know what was in them.'

'Do you think Hitler knew?'

After a long, painful pause, Ribbentrop replied: 'I have so often thought about that. It would absolutely ruin my picture of Hitler if I thought this. I know one thing, that after

the Russians [in September 1944] had taken the concentration camp in Poland, Majdanek I think it was called, that was the first time I heard of these persecutions in concentration camps, misdeeds, atrocities. This was the first thing I heard when our representatives from abroad sent telegrams that Russian propaganda was making a tremendous row in neutral countries. I got these telegrams and placed them before the Fuehrer. I said that if this were true in any respect it would be quite impossible to make foreign policy. So he took the matter in hand and said it was not my business to discuss this. That's the only thing I ever heard.' The British officer asked if he had seen any pamphlets. Ribbentrop replied: 'I have seen one film in Mondorf. It was shown to us. It was a terrible film. There is no doubt about that. There was some propaganda. You see, we saw on a number of pictures where it was quite evident that it was done after bombardment. If you ask me about Himmler,' he concluded, 'in the last years he was very touchy - sehr boese.' The adjective actually translates as wicked.

Preparing the Trials and examining Evidence

The Americans had just released 450 tons of German foreign ministry documents to the British, since the O.S.S. did not have adequate microfilming capacity. Jackson was annoyed to hear this, since he felt he had a prior claim, as he would be needing the original documents as exhibits in court. Among the documents carried to England by a Colonel R. C. Thompson of the British C.I.O.S. (Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee of the foreign office) were some that contained political dynamite - the microfilmed papers of Carl von Loesch, of Ribbentrop's staff, which Thompson and Loesch had jointly retrieved on May 19 from a house at Schoeneberg in the Soviet Zone, near Berlin. On these films were the entire surviving records of Hitler's dealings with Mussolini, Franco, Laval, and other foreign potentates (as well as, incidentally, the only surviving copy of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939). cable to the State department from Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador in Paris, dated June 15, stated that the British had so far failed to return copies of these microfilms to the American authorities in Germany. Murphy had heard that the British ambassador Lord Halifax had been instructed by London to put pressure on Washington not to insist - it seemed that there were some embarrassing items in those Nazi files which the British were not keen to see aired in public now or at any time in the future. Among the items which the British seized and never returned to Germany were interpreter Paul Schmidt's transcripts of Hitler's meetings with leading members of the British aristocracy.

With an eye to ensuring that the Americans kept the upper hand the U.S. Army had provided Jackson with his own C-?? transport plane and crew. This proved a good investment. He used it to ferry his team briefly across to Nuremberg that afternoon to make a flying inspection of the courthouse and jail. It was his first visit to the city. Over eighty-five percent of the buildings had been damaged by Allied bombing - the worst destruction Jackson had seen so far. There were few people in sight, and a sickly smell

of decaying flesh hung over the ruins. In Nuremberg, he found the Palace of Justice and the building next door could hold 1200 Prisoners, so he gave Nuremberg the go-ahead and the army began the necessary rebuilding for the coming trials.

He flew back to London. While the case that the army lawyers and O.S.S. officers were preparing was turning out to be stronger than he had dared to hope, over the next two weeks it was again the Russians who dragged their feet on the procedural preparations for the trial. 'Their whole background is so different,' sighed Jackson in a private letter. The Russians still wanted the trial to be in Berlin; but now that Jackson had seen Nuremberg he was not going to let go of that. Playing his trump card - the U.S. Army plane and crew placed at his permanent disposal - he invited the Russian, French, and British delegations to fly over from London to Nuremberg for a better look at the courthouse that weekend. The Russians, after consulting their central authorities in Moscow, cordially but firmly declined his invitation. 'So we are off for a weekend amid unbelievable destruction and desolation,' he wrote to his wife Irene.

The entire Jackson circus flew to Nuremberg on Saturday July ?? - without the Russians but this time taking along several British lawyers, including the attorney-general Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Mr G. D. Roberts, KC, and Lord Bridgeman, as well as Professor Gros and Robert Falco, a judge at the Cour de Cassation, France's supreme court. Falco was Gallic and diminutive but a man of immense charm, shrewdness, and patience. Jackson's party on this junket included Alderman, Shea, Bernays, and Dean. It is clear from Maxwell Fyfe's memoirs that it was only now that he realised what the German civilian population had been through under Allied bombing, although he never once in the trial admitted the relevance of this ordeal. General Clay warned the visitors that there were still so many corpses buried beneath the rubble that he feared the city's water supply must be contaminated.

Everybody now agreed that this city's courthouse provided the right setting for the trial of the century. The negotiations in London had become bogged down even more inextricably in small print - the actual definition of 'war crimes.' Perhaps it was hardly surprising, given that all the negotiating parties were judges or advocates.

The three power summit conference formally terminating World War Two had just begun at Potsdam, outside Berlin. On July 26 Jackson's advance party landed in Berlin after a four-hour flight from England. 'We drove through an odor of death to Potsdam,' the judge wrote. That scent seemed all pervasive in Germany, even now. Russian women acting as traffic control officers flagged them snappily through, as Jackson's convoy found its way out to the 'White House' in the Potsdam suburb of Babelsberg where Harry Truman and his new secretary of state Jimmy Byrnes, a former judge, were holding court. A small and execrable band was playing in the garden. The news from Britain was that Winston Churchill's party had lost the general election, and that Labour had swept into power in a landslide victory. As for their Russian allies, things were getting sticky. Byrnes told Judge Jackson of the problems that the Allies were already facing. The Soviet behaviour in eastern Europe was such, he said, that they could no longer sit next

to the Russians and hold court over the Germans for offences like looting a conquered country's wealth. Nor did Byrnes think much of Jackson's pious legal endeavours to get to the root of how the war began.

On the following day, Jackson tried to penetrate to the heart of the matter, driving with his party twenty miles into the centre of Berlin. The capital city had crumpled into shapeless heaps of rubble, the stinking remains of former palaces, museums, churches, and apartment buildings under which thousands of bodies still lay buried. Like Murphy, he noticed that there seemed to be no young men; everywhere were lines of women toiling through the ruins like ants in an anthill, clearing away the rubble, hammering and cleaning bricks and masonry, and passing pails of bricks in endless human bucket-chains. 'The streets were lined with dumb-looking people,' described the judge, 'most of them moving their possessions, some going in one direction, some in another.' There were horse-drawn vehicles too - but a colonel called his attention to the fact that nearly every cart had a Russian at the reins. The systematic plundering and stripping of the country was continuing apace. Hitler's Reich Chancellery, built by Albert Speer in 1939, was still a magnificent building, and although the long hall seemed neither very high nor wide to Jackson, it had a strange capacity even in its current down-at-heel condition to make him feel very insignificant inside: such was the architectural ability of Speer, now being questioned by the leisurely Allied experts in Versailles. Much of the chancellery building was still in the disordered state that Hitler's staff had left it. 'The Russians apparently had not examined with much care the papers,' observed Jackson, who wished that he could read German or indeed any language other than American. 'Hitler's overturned desk was in his room. Miss [Caroline] Fite [of the state department] picked up a number of original letters addressed to Goering, and I gathered up some typewritten documents which may or may not be important. The floor was strewn with wreckage and much motion picture film.' He reflected that if the Russians had done no better job than this in collecting evidence here, at the very fountainhead of Hitler's evil, the trial would not be getting much from them.

Down the road at Potsdam, the Big Three - Stalin, Truman, and now the mousy and unprepossessing Prime Minister Clement Attlee on behalf of the British - made no proper attempt to ventilate the topic of the enemy war criminals until the last day of July 1945. Again we have a precise transcript of what was said. 'The next item,' announced President Truman, first raising the matter, 'relates to the war criminals.' Molotov said, 'The Soviet delegation agrees to accept the British draft with one amendment. The amendment is in the last sentence after the words, " War Criminals. " We wish to add specific names, such as Goering, Hess, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, etc.' 'It is not wise,' Attlee suggested, 'to put in names.'

Stalin explained, 'We merely suggest that such people as Goering and Ribbentrop be tried. If we remain silent it will cast a shadow on our prestige. If we name persons as an example we don't leave out the others. It is no offense to the prosecution. It will be helpful politically.' Byrnes also felt that it was unwise to name names. 'Every country

has its favorite criminal. It will be difficult to explain to each country why its pet criminal was not named.'

Back in London, Jackson discussed with treasury solicitor Sir Thomas Barnes what changes might become likely in the British prosecution line-up now that Labour had won the election. Jackson found the British to be process-oriented, still haggling over definitions. More goal-oriented, the Americans had prepared a film to educate the American public on the background to the trials; Jackson thought it terrible - it showed a particularly gruesome hanging, which he felt should be excised right away. Everybody suspected that hanging was an uncomfortable end, but there was no need to say so out loud. On the last day of July 1945 the widely respected Zionist leader Dr Chaim Weizmann lunched with Robert Jackson at the Dorchester, to plead once more for the special right of the Jews to make a presentation of their case at the trial, given that they were the only people against whom, in their view, a systematic policy of extermination had been followed. Jackson advised 'rather strongly' against any idea of having Weizmann himself appear as an advocate.

His attitude to the Jews was ambivalent. Although his private papers displayed none of the antisemitism that was widely prevalent in New England and fashionable among people of his class at the time, neither did he want them muscling in on 'his' trial. He felt that his prosecuting staff was already overloaded with Jews. In fact he had set himself one perhaps surprising guideline in selecting staff, deliberately deciding to employ no Jews. Coming from a country where a substantial proportion of the legal profession was already Jewish, a percentage which would multiply over the next decades, he recognised the risk he ran, but as he explained in his most intimate post-war reminiscences: 'I had a great deal of argument and difficulty about the staff, particularly with the Jewish people and politicians.' Whenever they came individually or in committees to clamour for prominent roles in the prosecution he had to educate them about the damage this would do. 'We are prosecuting these Nazis not because they killed Jews, but because they killed men and women' - that is, for Innocenticide.

Ultimately and in order not to be accused of shunning them entirely or worse, he did relent and employ one Jew, Dr Robert Kempner, in the courtroom presentation of the prosecution case. Kempner was a lawyer of the former German ministry of the interior who had been obliged to emigrate from Nazi Germany. Robert Max Wasili Kempner, born in Freiburg on October 17, 1899, was a thoroughly embittered and rather nasty piece of work. Although a Jew, he had worked from 1928 to 1933 for the Prussian police force, so there was no doubting his intellectual qualifications. Soured by his experiences at the hands of the Nazis, he had fled Germany in 1935 and become a professor at the University of Pennsylvania. He never lost his personal hatred of Hermann Goering, whom Hitler had appointed prime minister of Prussia, and whom Kempner blamed for his expulsion.

Returning now to Nuremberg in 1945, Kempner swore revenge - revenge at any price. In doing so he put behind him the strict ethics by which he had been brought up in

the law in Weimar, Germany. Preparing the prosecution case, he frequently resorted to threats and coercion to get witnesses to change or withdraw inconvenient evidence: Dr Friedrich Gaus, Ribbentrop's legal adviser, was one witness thus intimidated: he would be suddenly stricken with 'amnesia' about the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the signing of which he had actually witnessed in Moscow. Gaus later testified that Kempner had threatened to turn him over to the Russians. In the files there is also a memorandum from Colonel Telford Taylor warning Kempner that he was not to promise inmates early release as an inducement during interrogation.

Kempner's behaviour with evidence was also highly questionable. He would later turn up in German foreign ministry files the original Copy No. 16 of the Wannsee Protocol, and bestow upon it a wholly undeserved reputation as a key document in the Final Solution of the Jewish problem - despite the aura which now surrounds it, the document contains no explicit reference to the killing of Jews. Mysteriously, a second ostensibly original 'Copy No. 16' of this document, complete with GEHEIME KOMMANDOSACHE rubber stamps, began to circulate, whose existence naturally cast doubt upon the authenticity of the first. Not only did the R.H.S.A., the agency supposedly originating the document, use the civilian classification GEHEIME REICHSSACHE on its documents, but the statistics contained in the document bore little relation either to each other or to reality. Moreover one would assume that the R.S.H.A. would have possessed at least one typewriter furnished with the special SS-runes key used by all the other S.S. offices; yet the document manifested no such runes.

There is further evidence of skulduggery in the documents collected by Kempner's office on the Final Solution. The Nuremberg document experts routinely produced 'staff evidence analysis sheets' on the documents that came into their hands, indicating where they were found, and which individuals were mentioned or incriminated by them. The sheet on document 4055-PS, a photostat of parts of the German ministry of the interior file on the Final Solution (Note: From video footage of the Trial itself one finds that the word "Gesamtloesung" was incorrectly translated into "final solution". Re-translated to "Endloesung", this word is also used in Germany till this day), shows that when first analysed by the experts it contained four important items relating to discussions on definitions of Jews; one of these four documents, originating in the spring of 1942, showed Staatssekretaer Franz Schlegelberger informing his staff at the justice ministry that Dr Hans Lammers, chief of the Reich chancellery, had phoned to inform him that the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, had 'repeatedly' ordered the solution of the Jewish problem 'postponed until after the war was over.' This did not suit Kempner at all, and when the file was returned to the document centre this particular photostat was missing.

For years the only evidence that it had ever existed was the brief summary in the 'staff evidence analysis sheet. Dr Kempner, challenged by this author to explain the gap, did not; at this author's prompting, the German historian Professor Eberhard Jaeckel located the missing original page, still in its Reich ministry of the interior file, buried deep in the German federal archives to which it had eventually been restituted. Jaeckel thereby

rendered a service to the revisionist cause for which he has never been appropriately rewarded. Another high-ranking Nazi, Dr Wilhelm Stuckart, would later succeed in turning the tables on Kempner: hinting in 1947 that he had incriminating evidence against him, a pre-war document stored safely away, he would bring Kempner, who was by then prosecuting in his own right at the subsequent war crimes proceedings, to his knees.

Stuckart, it must be stated, had attended the Wannsee Conference in his capacity as Staatssekretär in the ministry of the interior. Nonetheless, when he was indicted in the 'Wilhelmstrasse trial,' Stuckart boasted to his fellow inmates at Nuremberg that he was going to walk - and walk he did, sentenced to the time already served 'in view of his failing health.' Two years after the trial, Allen Dulles would reveal to the Jacksons that Kempner, by now working for some far-left group in Germany, was trying to extort information from various Germans in an attempt to blackmail both him and his brother John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state; in exchange for such 'testimony' Kempner had released a certain war criminal suspect, said Dulles. Allen Dulles was by then chief of the new C.I.A.

London Agreement

The Allies had undertaken in Point VII of the Potsdam Agreement to bring the German war criminals to a swift and sure justice. The document had expressed the hope that the London negotiations would rapidly lead to a consensus and emphasised the view that the trial of the principal war criminals should begin at the earliest possible opportunity. Under Jowitt's chairmanship, the London conference proceeded during July and August 1945 more briskly than under the Conservatives. The Russians swallowed the Anglo-American programme 'hook, line, and sinker,' as Barnes put it privately to Jackson afterwards. The four powers signed the London Agreement with much fanfare at Church House, Westminster, at eleven A.M. on Wednesday, August 8, 1945. Later that day the chief prosecutors held their first joint meeting to discuss once more which names should finally go onto the list of defendants.

The British representative, G. D. Roberts, wanted a 'small list,' and added dismissively: 'Everybody knows that these ten or twelve leaders of the Nazi Government are guilty.' 'In my view,' the English barrister continued, 'we ought to have a very prompt trial. The public demands it.' The Russian, Nikitchenko, agreed: 'We should hasten the first trial. Just pick out a few names which are household words and try them.' 'We would expect the first trial,' chimed in Sir Thomas Barnes, 'to kill as many of the big birds as possible.' (They were meeting in secret, so there was no need to mince their words.)

Later that day the Russian prosecutor Nikitchenko stunned them all by baldly announcing that Stalin had now appointed him as the Soviet judge for the trial, and that he would be flying to Moscow immediately to organise his staff. Lieutenant-General Roman A. Rudenko would take his place as prosecutor at these consultations. Even Jackson raised his eyebrows at this. 'The Russians did a strange stunt,' he observed in a letter to his

wife. 'Replaced Nikitchenko as prosecutor with one Rudenko, and made Nikitchenko a judge.' In case Mrs Jackson did not get the point he explained: 'He picked out the men to be prosecuted, so it is hard to see how he can be an impartial judge.'

What right for that matter had the Americans now to sit in impartial judgement on their enemies? Two days before the London Agreement was signed, they had detonated their first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. Releasing this revolutionary new killing-weapon with the foreknowledge and agreement of their British allies, they had vaporised in a nanosecond one hundred thousand human beings, nearly all of them non-combatants protected by the international laws of warfare. In an even more questionable act, on the day after signing the agreement, the Americans repeated this feat, dropping a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki. In his contemporary diary, Jackson made no reference to the atomic bombs. Truman had not told him about them. From his private writings, it is obvious that America's chief prosecution counsel was beginning to feel he had been trapped, but he resolutely addressed his mind to the narrow target he had set himself - the definition of a law to end wars, and its sanctification in blood when the time came.

The final structure, which was agreed on the fourteenth, favoured Jackson's plan, with four four-power committees: one on aggressive war and the violation of treaties, chaired by the British; two committees to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity on the eastern and western front, under Russian and French chairmanship respectively; with the Americans chairing the planning committees on organisations and on the conspiracy to wage aggressive war. These prosecution planning conferences in London would continue, on and off, throughout August. Jackson's secretary took detailed verbatim notes on them, and these revealed many of the twists and turns that the prosecution introduced to try to protect their case, and to shield their governments too from embarrassment. The German naval judge advocate Captain Otto Kranzbuehler, who would defend Grand Admiral Doenitz, would later point out that it was only after the publication of these transcripts, long after the death sentences had been handed down, that the world had learned of the very real concerns expressed by the British representatives lest the British plans against Norway in 1940 be publicly ventilated in the course of the trial.

Taking care of the Prisoners

Again using his private plane, on August 17 Jackson took another party across to Nuremberg, including Sir Hartley Shawcross and Colonel Harry J. Phillimore, secretary of the British delegation, with General Nikitchenko and his interpreter Mr Troyanovsky as the Russian guests, and a number of French lawyers whose names he did not catch. Displaying the kind of xenophobia that gets nations into trouble with their neighbours, his son Bill cheerfully described his father's other guests as 'a toad-faced slimy desinee of the French' and other members.

The Palace of Justice was a large, rambling building with endless cold stone corridors and innumerable offices. Reconstruction and remodelling for the coming trial were proceeding

at speed. 'The army,' reported Bill Jackson, 'has sent a whole regiment in there to take care of us - drivers, telephone operators, mimeograph operators, guards, post office, post exchange, tailor shop, barber shop, etc. - everything you could possibly think of, including night club!' They had torn out one wall of the courtroom, and erected public galleries in the next room. They were building a bench for the four judges and their four 'alternates' (non-voting deputy judges) along the west wall, and a thirtysix-foot-long wooden dock along the wall facing them; there was an elevator in the wall right behind the dock, through which the prisoners could be brought in from the adjacent jailhouse.

The main defendants were housed in low-ceilinged cells barely seven feet wide by thirteen; they slept on metal cots bolted to the floor along the left-hand wall. To one side of each cell's narrow steel door was a porcelain toilet bowl, set back slightly in an alcove. It was the one place which the sentinels, permanently watching their prisoner through the door's peephole, could not see. As at Mondorf, every glass window had been ripped out and replaced with Perspex. All electric wiring had also gone. Security and anti-suicide measures were paramount. While meetings with the prosecution officers were conducted across open tables, those with defence lawyers were confined to rooms where lawyer and client were separated by thick glass partitions, and a sentinel had to sniff all documents passed through the slide to make sure they had not been steeped in poison.

At seven A.M. each day a prison trusty handed each prisoner breakfast and a spoon through the Judas hole in the steel door. Water was poured through the peephole from a watering-can into a tin mug off which the handle had been ripped - another security precaution. The barber then came and shaved him. A truncheon-toting sentinel stood by to ensure that nobody spoke. 'Sentinels moving back and forth on the catwalks view the prisoners every half-minute,' reported Andrus to Jackson. At six P.M. each evening the prisoner's eye-glasses, pen, and wristwatch were removed, and the dim cell light was switched off at nine-thirty P.M.; a spotlight glared through the Judas hole all night long onto the prisoner's face, the only concession being that the current flowing through the lamps was reduced at night time from 210 to 110 volts.

Colonel Andrus had the visiting lawyers conducted through the adjoining jailhouse and they were allowed a peep at the Nazi bigwigs who had just arrived from Mondorf - Jackson, who had his son with him, recognised Hitler's haughty foreign minister among them. 'The real thrill of the trip,' wrote Bill, 'was going through the jail, where I gazed into the cell of von Ribbentrop, seated not six feet from me.' Ribbentrop was annoyed to be interrupted, as he was writing furiously, covering scores of pages in his large, jagged handwriting like Captain Nemo in the closing scenes of *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*. 'Probably,' surmised the younger Jackson, 'he was preparing his defense. It was a strange sensation to see him caged there, and he was obviously very unhappy.' Further down the corridor, they found 'Field-Marshal Jodl' just staring glassily into nowhere; the next day Bill Jackson sat in on an interrogation of Wilhelm Keitel. Keitel seemed anxious to talk: 'Give those boys another month of solitary confinement,' opined the young American lawyer, 'and they will all be telling on each other or, as the District Attorneys

say, 'singing.'" Before leaving Nuremberg, the visiting lawyers were royally wined and dined by the U.S. Army, consoling themselves that it was all at German expense (Jackson intended to present the entire bill for these proceedings as an occupation cost.)

On the flimsy table in Hermann Goering's cell stood precious photos of his first wife Carin, of Emmy, and of his parents - his father in full plumed finery as governor of German South-West Africa. There was a snapshot of Edda too; she had just turned seven. 'Dear Daddy,' she had carefully written on the back, 'come back to me again soon. I have such longing for you. Many thousand kisses from your Edda!!!!' 'His health is probably not very good,' an American officer warned higher authorities on August 15, 'and on two recent occasions he was to be found in his dressing gown and pajamas in bed, as a result first of a slight heart attack ... and bronchitis.'

The prisoners were allowed pencils and paper to write private letters; but these, Andrus admitted, were 'promptly sent to the chief of interrogation,' Colonel Amen, leaving the prisoners puzzled and disconsolate when they got no replies. 'We've been permitted to write letters and postcards for two months,' Keitel would note in October, 'but no replies have been received.' This, along with the meagre rations and lack of exercise, was part of the prosecution's programme of psychological warfare, designed to wear the prisoners down. By the end of August, the general health and morale of all the prisoners were declining. Concerned, Andrus asked the German prison doctor Ludwig Pfluecker for an explanation; Pfluecker blamed the poor food and lack of human contact. Andrus allowed an improvement in the food, and relaxed the ban on Pfluecker speaking to the prisoners. Pfluecker would later testify that Goering was suffering repeated heart attacks at this time; but he was a urologist, not a heart specialist, and he had no heart instruments to make a proper examination. On August 21 American officers marched Goering up three flights of stairs to an interrogation and to perform the meaningless ritual of 'discharging' him from the German armed forces. Short of breath and suffering stabbing heart pains when he returned to his cell, he suffered a severe heart attack that night. An American doctor ordered him to bed for two days, and confidentially warned Colonel Andrus that unless the man was permitted thirty minutes of outside exercise each day, the next heart attack might be his last.

More Documents

Under Soviet pressure at Potsdam, the victors had undertaken to publish the actual list of defendants by the first day of September. The final cast of the victors was taking shape, but still there was no agreement on precisely whom to prosecute and hang among the vanquished. Back in London on August 23, Jackson found that the British idea of committee meetings seemed to consist of debating individual items of evidence - on this particular day they were reading through an entire speech by Hitler.

As for the documentary exhibits, it seemed likely that Eisenhower's armies had seized the pick of the bunch. In Paris, Colonel Storey had begun exploring these mountains

of documents - quarrying from them the collection of trial exhibits that generations of historians have come to recognise by the initials PS, or Paris-Storey. The case was already assuming staggering proportions: 'We have just uncovered 250 tons of documents in Germany,' wrote Bill Jackson. 'In addition, we have also come across 3,000 frames of German microfilm, each frame consisting of a whole document.' He now doubted very much that they would be ready to go to trial before the end of October.

The records had indeed survived in abundance, although since they were collected only for the purposes of prosecuting war criminals it would be foolish to attempt to write a history from these alone. There is anecdotal evidence that in the forests outside Nuremberg the prosecutors made a bonfire one day of all the mitigating documents which would have aided the defence case. Volumes of private papers - among them Hitler's private correspondence with Eva Braun, her private diaries, and the diaries of Hans Lammers, Heinrich Himmler, and Hermann Goering - had however vanished into the hands of American and French looters and plunderers who had descended on the valleys around Berchtesgaden. The British had seized General Alfred Jodl's diaries at Flensburg, but many of these too had vanished into unknown hands. Robert Kempner illicitly came into possession of the entire diaries of Alfred Rosenberg; these Kempner would retain hidden until his death, making them unavailable to Rosenberg for his defence; even now only the iceberg's tip of them has ever been published.

Among the documents retrieved by the Americans were the entire war diaries kept for the governor-general of occupied Poland, Dr Hans Frank - who had earlier been Hitler's lawyer. Lieutenant Walter F. Stein, an Intelligence officer attached to the U.S. Seventh Army, found these forty typescript volumes at the Pension Berghof at Neuhaus, near Schliersee in Bavaria; Frank had used the hostelry as an office, and he himself voluntarily handed over the diaries, believing, like Speer, that such forthrightness would curry much needed favours from the prosecutors.??? The Hans Frank diaries were taken to the Document Center which the Seventh Army had established in the library of Heidelberg University; here Lieutenant Gerhard Schaefer, an Intelligence officer attached to Jackson's office, would find them and order them removed to the courthouse at Nuremberg on September 20.

To each of these Nuremberg documents was affixed a document number, from which cognoscenti can deduce its provenance. Those prefixed with a 'C' (for Crimes), namely C-1 to C-460, came from the British admiralty; those with a 'D' from the British prosecution team at Nuremberg; the 'EC' prefix went onto economic documents used by the Americans ('ECH' coming from the Heidelberg Document Center, and 'ECR' from that at Rosenheim.) 'L' signified a document from London, like the now notorious forgery 003-L, the report on Hitler's speech to his generals on August 22, 1939 which the anti-Nazi opposition had fed to Associated Press journalist Louis Lochner in Berlin. 'M', rarely used, were further documents from the British prosecution, while the 'PS' collection, from the Paris office of Colonel Storey, was the largest (4,021 items, occupying thirty feet of shelfspace) and most authoritative. A small collection of 'R' documents consisted

of 589 items screened by Lieutenant Walter Rothschild of the London Branch of the O.S.S., and finally 'TC' was a series of documents from the British foreign office's Treaty Committee dealing with international treaties like Versailles, the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact that had purported to outlaw wars.

To match these resources, the defence lawyers would have nothing but their wits and whatever papers they could dig up by their laborious researches.

The Final Lineup

To be put on trial were:

Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe and chief of the four-year plan;

Grand-Admiral Karl Doenitz, commander-in-chief of the German Navy from January 1942, and designated by Hitler in his political testament as his successor as Reich president (not 'Fuehrer');

Grand-Admiral Erich Raeder, his predecessor;

Dr Hans Frank (governor-general of occupied Poland);

Dr Wilhelm Frick, Reich minister of the interior;

Hans Fritzsche (chief radio commentator);

Dr Walter Funk (Reich minister of economics and Reichsbank president);

Rudolf Hess (until May 1941 the Fuehrer's deputy as chairman of the Nazi party);

S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer Dr Ernst Kaltenbrunner (from June 1942 chief of the Reich Main Security Office, R.S.H.A.);

Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (chief of staff, High Command of the Armed Forces, O.K.W.);

General Alfred Jodl (chief of the O.K.W. operations staff);

Dr Robert Ley, leader of the German labour front, D.A.F.;

Constantin von Neurath (Reich foreign minister until February 1945, later Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia);

Franz von Papen (until July 1934 vice-chancellor; thereafter Hitler's Special plenipotentiary in Austria and ambassador in Turkey);

Joachim von Ribbentrop (Reich foreign minister from February 1939);

Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg (Reich minister for the occupied eastern territories from July 1941);

Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel (the Fuehrer's general plenipotentiary for manpower);

Dr Hjalmar Schacht (Reich minister of economics until 1937, Reichsbank president until 1939);

Baldur von Schirach, Hitler Youth leader and gauleiter of Vienna;

Dr Arthur Seyss-Inquart (Reich commissar of the Netherlands);

Albert Speer (Reich minister of munitions from February 1942);

Gauleiter Julius Streicher (gauleiter of Franconia; publisher of the *Stuermer*.)

At the time the list was finalised, Jackson was out of the country. He spent the end of August 1945 touring southern Europe with his pretty secretary and son. True, he might have used some of the time more usefully to sit in on interrogations and soak up some of the history of the case which he was about to prosecute.

Those Boys Are Out for Blood

After the four powers signed the London Agreement on August 8, 1945, with its Statute setting up the first 'Inter national Military Tribunal' at Nuremberg, diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on other countries to associate themselves with it. Altogether nineteen of Germany's enemies, representing nine hundred million people, would join their signatures to the London Agreement. The fact that four-power agreement was secured at all was due primarily to the diplomacy and bargaining tactics of Justice Jackson. He would write privately a year later,

"Our Agreement of London of August 8, 1945 went beyond anything in history in its explicitness in outlawing aggressive war. But conditions which made for the success of those negotiations do not exist today. All governments had recently pledged to their own peoples that they would punish the Nazi war criminals. The only thing unsettled was the procedure and charges. On these matters the United States held all the aces, and we played them for all they were worth. The Americans had most of the highranking prisoners and we had captured the important evidence. Nobody else could conduct a really impressive trial without us. On the other hand we were in a position to conduct such a trial without the help of any other nation. Repeatedly during the negotiations I took the position that the United States would proceed alone to deal with its own prisoners if we could not come to an agreement. This was very persuasive in obtaining agreement on principles and methods. But even with these aces in my hand I was unable to get a definition of 'aggressive warfare' written into the Agreement, although I proposed the one which, in substance, had previously been agreed to by Soviet Russia in treaties with the Baltic States.

It was unfortunate, as he himself admitted, that the Tribunal itself was purely a four-power court, and that the victors must thus seem to be sitting in judgement on the vanquished; but he argued, 'The scale of their attack leaves no neutrals in the world' - a view with which many countries other than the Big Four would emphatically have

disagreed.

In the United States, as details of the Statute were announced during that second week of August 1945, strong legal doubts were voiced. Jackson's mail began to contain letters of condemnation from colleagues of the American Bar, who felt that he had degraded the Supreme Court by accepting the role of chief prosecutor in a political show-trial; but Jackson was convinced he could both uphold the integrity of his judicial status and push out the frontiers of international law. The chief justice of the United States disagreed, becoming quite outspoken in his criticism: Harlan F. Stone wrote that while he personally would not be disturbed if the victors put the vanquished to the sword as was customary in days of old, he was disturbed to have this action 'dressed up in the habiliments of common law.'

The plan to indict entire organisations found little favour either. In August 1945 the popular American magazine Saturday Evening Post published a finger-wagging article entitled, 'We Try Criminals - Not Classes.' In September the New Yorker added its weight with a call for frankness: 'It would be a tremendous help if the lawyers and judges entrusted with the trials would state the matter candidly and tack a big ex post facto sign over the courtroom door. It would be a help for instance if people were to grasp that the trial of a [Vidkun] Quisling or a Petain differs essentially from the trial of a Goering or a Keitel. Quisling stood trial in Norway, on Norwegian law, charged with betraying his country. This was a matter of law and order. Goering will stand trial in no man's land, on no man's law, charged with befouling the earth.'

In November the New York Times took up the assault on Jackson, quoting some of the U.S. Army's more outstanding combat generals as being wholly opposed to the prosecution of soldiers for obeying orders issued by politicians; in Germany, the newspaper pointed out, in a reference to the hated Morgenthau directive 1067 issued by the joint chiefs of staff, American officers were being ordered to accept responsibility for political measures they privately condemned as un-American, of which the worst were the 'so-called Gestapo methods used in handling Germans' employed by refugees hurriedly drafted into the U.S. Army during the war.

The cataract of criticism showed no signs of abating. In December ????, the Army and Navy Journal would bluntly describe the Nuremberg indictment of the German High Command as Jackson's attempt to discredit the military profession as such. Jackson hoped that when they saw the evidence unfold these writers would change their tune. Not only were the Allies seeking to convict their enemies under laws which had not existed at the time of the alleged offences, but under the London Statute they were specifically ruling out a number of obvious defences which would have immediately been raised: the German defendants might not plead that as soldiers in a Fuehrer state they were bound to obey the orders that were issued to them; nor could they point out that on more than one occasion each of the prosecuting powers had committed precisely the same crimes as they were alleging against the Germans. 'As far as crimes against the peace are concerned,' they declared, 'the current proceedings have no lawful basis in international

law, but are a trial based on new criminal law, a law drawn up only after the actions complained of.'

They argued further that the cast-iron principle of *nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poene sine lege* (in the absence of a law there can be neither crime nor punishment) was a general rule, which in normal circumstances would militate against the punishment of people for acts which were not against the law at the time committed. Nuremberg, said the Tribunal simply, was an exception. 'In so far as this is an appeal against the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,' ruled Lord Justice Lawrence, rejecting the defence application, 'it conflicts with Article 3 of the Statute and it can not be entertained.' The retroactive nature of the Nuremberg legislation nonetheless troubled many legal minds, and few greater than that of the Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court William O. Douglas. 'In our view of the law,' he would write,

"nobody can be convicted on the basis of having broken an *ex post facto* law. In my view the Nuremberg trials applied this kind of law against the defendants. Hitler and his ilk were guilty of multiple murders and under common law deserved the death penalty. But they were not indicted under the relevant national laws. Before the Nuremberg trials the crime of which the Nazis were convicted was never considered to have been such an act under our criminal laws, nor was it held by the international community to be under threat of the death penalty."

As already mentioned the lawyers who had drafted the London Statute had taken good care to exclude in advance the defence of 'higher orders.' Article 7 of the Statute had laid down that the official position of a defendant whether as a head of state or as a responsible official of a government department would not be accepted either in exculpation or in mitigation of punishment. Under Article 8 moreover it was allowed that where a defendant could prove he had acted on the orders of his government or a superior officer this would not be accepted as exculpation, but could be used in mitigation of sentence if this appeared proper in the opinion of the Tribunal. This rule conflicted with the manuals of military law existing at the outbreak of World War Two on both the German and the Anglo-American side. Article 47 of the German *Militaerstrafgesetzbuch* provided: 'If a criminal law is violated in the execution of an order the superior issuing that order is alone responsible. But the subordinate obeying that order is liable to punishment as an accomplice, firstly if he exceeds the terms of the order issued to him, or secondly if it was known to him that his superior's order meant committing an act which would be a crime or misdemeanour under civil or military law.' After the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 the Allied legal authorities had their attention drawn to the fact that if there were plans to put as many Axis war criminals on trial as possible, the principle of 'superior orders' could prove 'very troublesome.' The clause was therefore surreptitiously changed in the British manual in April 1944 and in the American manual seven months later to strike this potential weapon out of any enemy defence counsel's hands after an Allied victory.

At Nuremberg, the defence attorneys would also be prohibited from referring in mitigation

to illegal acts committed during the war by the victors. Lord Justice Lawrence would interrupt the lawyer defending the High Command to say, 'We are not trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes, but whether these defendants have.'

Thus lawyers were refused permission to introduce a captured British official Handbook of Instruction on How to Conduct Irregular Warfare, instructing commandos on how to treat German prisoners: 'Adopt some of the methods of gangsters.' 'Remember, you are not a wrestler trying to render your enemy helpless, you have to kill.' 'Kick him or knee him as hard as you can in the groin. While he is doubled up in pain get him on the ground and stamp his head in.' Following diagrams in this booklet, German prisoners taken during the Dieppe raid of August 1942 were trussed in such a way that every movement would result in slow strangulation, the so-called 'death slings.'

As for Allied saboteurs, the German High Command knew that these men parachuted into occupied Europe with revolvers strapped under their armpits designed to fire forwards when the arms were raised in apparent surrender; German records contained at least one such proof, where the saboteur's parachute had failed to open and circumstances allowed the internal device to be inspected at close quarters. Any properly constituted British or American court would have considered this to be information of material value in assessing the background of Hitler's orders for the ruthless execution of commandos and saboteurs falling into German hands.

A paralysing regime of psycho-terror had been enforced on the defendants even before the indictment was served on them. They were held in solitary confinement in the Nuremberg jailhouse. Like the millions of ordinary German prisoners in American hands, they were kept on a near-starvation diet. Field-Marshal Keitel, sixty-three years old, lost thirty-three pounds between May and October, eighteen of them during the eight weeks after his arrival at Nuremberg. Hess was an empty husk of his former robust self. Ribbentrop was gaunt, hollow-cheeked and frail. It was self-evident that all of these factors were not without effect on the prisoners' health, morale, nerves, and powers of resistance. 'The conditions we are living under here,' wrote Keitel in his private papers, 'are not enviable given the last five months of uncertainty about the fate of our people, our family, and our own person. Apart from the interrogations we hear nothing whatever about what is going on in the world outside the prison and even then only by chance. We have been allowed to write letters and postcards for two months now; no replies have been received.'

From five-thirty P.M., as dusk fell, the older inmates could only sit and brood in the dark in their cells, because after their eye-glasses were taken away it was impossible to read in the light coming in from outside. Every evening on Andrus' orders the tables and chairs were removed from the cells. As there was nothing to hang clothing and underwear on, the prisoners were forced to lay the clothes on the dirty stone floors. 'The needs of personal hygiene which are provided for with soap, toothpaste, and a once-weekly shower are incapable of keeping pace with the unhygienic side of life in a prison cell - the filthy mattress, blankets, towels etcetera.' Exercise in the open air or outside in the gangway

was limited to ten minutes a day.

The IMT wasn't even military either. Jackson said 'He would let them sit as civilians.' While in Washington Jackson also warned John J. McCloy, undersecretary of war, that General Betts, the judge advocate-general in Europe, had shown him the latest instructions issued under the joint chiefs of staff directive 'XXXX', whereby as many as two million Germans were to be rounded up as criminals. Jackson had urged that the instructions be regarded as authority rather than an obligation. The Pentagon confirmed his suspicions, that the treasury officials of Henry Morgenthau had pressed the 'severe and sweeping' terms of the directive on them.

Under article 2 of the London Statute there were to be four judges, one for each of the four powers, each provided with an alternate without voting rights. There was still some feeling that the judges on the Tribunal should have military rank. In fact three of them were civilians. Only the Soviet judge was a soldier - the same General I. T. Nikitchenko who had left London as the chief prosecutor early in August. The French and British prosecuting teams arrived at Nuremberg on the morning of September 21. Jackson detailed his son to show them over the jailhouse. 'Those boys are out for blood,' wrote Bill privately later that day. 'They've even suggested we use a guillotine!!'

As the expert on international law Dr Alfred-Maurice de Zayas has pointed out, although the tribunal regarded itself as a court of international law, in reality it was an inter-Allied occupation court as Germany had not agreed to the establishment of such an extra-national authority. The make-up of the Tribunal flew in the face of the separation of powers which democracies had preached ever since the French revolution as the sole guarantee for the individual against the excesses of the state. 'If legislator, judge, and prosecutor are one and the same person,' naval judge advocate Otto Kranzbuehler, Doenitz's attorney, later argued, 'this fact alone will be enough to entertain powerful misgivings as to the outcome of their activity.'

Jackson, Maxwell Fyfe, Falco, and Nikitchenko had all participated in the negotiations on the London Statute: together these jurists had drafted the retroactive laws to be applied and had even compiled the list of defendants. Jackson and Fyfe would now surface in Nuremberg as chief prosecutors; Nikitchenko first as chief prosecutor and then as the Soviet judge, and Falco as the French alternate judge. On top of this was the fact that Francis Biddle, who would appear here as judge, had drafted a memorandum in his capacity as U.S. attorney-general at the time of the Yalta conference in which he had set out basic propositions for the Statute and added the declaration that in his view certain Nazi organisations were criminal. 'It would be turning a blind eye on harsh reality,' said Kranzbuehler, 'if one were to argue that under these circumstances the judges were independent and unprejudiced.' In any other legal system it would have been possible to reject such judges because of their evident bias. At Nuremberg however this relief was, said Kranzbuehler, denied to the defence attorneys by the Statute itself.

While Jackson was warmly surprised by the high calibre of the Soviet jurists he was to meet

here at Nuremberg, as a team they remained an enigma to him - they were from a different world. The Americans had equipped the Russians, like the other prosecutors, with Hitler's automobiles to drive around in. With their secret-police commissar, Rasunova, they were however a law unto themselves. Counter-Intelligence Corps officers reported to Jackson that they had traced the source of a flood of counterfeit Deutschmarks in Nuremberg back to members of the Soviet prosecution team. These Russians feigned complete ignorance of the English language until untoward incidents occurred, and of these there were several. In Nuremberg the driver of the Russian chief prosecutor, General Roman Rudenko, would be shot and fatally injured while sitting in his car outside the Grand Hotel late on December ?; he said an American soldier had opened the door and shot him. There were immediate rumours of an attempt on Rudenko's life; but more likely the intended victim was Likhatchev, a chief examining magistrate attached to the Soviet prosecution team. Likhatchev, a former interrogator at Moscow's notorious Lubyanka jailhouse, had conducted Russian pre-trial interrogations of Hans Frank among others.

The Soviet communist party organ Pravda published an angry article, and Jackson wrote to Rudenko apologising and promising an investigation. ??? Nothing came of it. In 1953 Likhatchev's career came to an untimely end when he and three others were shot by firing squad for falsifying evidence.

Discussions how to frame the indictment had continued all summer. In its final form it ran to 25,000 words, composed in a language that was often lurid and emotional. It contained allegations which no serious historian would now unblushingly venture to sustain, but which were designed to feed the appetite of the mass media. Life magazine summarised some of the main points. For instance, Hitler had forged a Hindenburg last testament in his own favour. Keitel had conspired to assassinate Germany's own envoy to Czechoslovakia to create an 'incident.' Goering, it continued, had suggested that Nazi hoodlums kill more Jews instead of wrecking property. He had dictated over the telephone a fake telegram of Austrian capitulation. Hitler had threatened to kick Chamberlain in the belly before the eyes of all the photographers. Keitel had ordered in ???? that Japan be drawn into the war. Most outrageously, on General Rudenko's insistence at the very last meeting of the prosecuting staffs the indictment was amended to include the murder in the Katyn forest of 11,000 Polish officers. Point 3, paragraph C of the indictment would read: 'In September 1941 eleven thousand Polish prisoners-of-war were killed in the Katyn forest, near Smolensk.' The Russians were fully aware at that time - as Mikhail Gorbachev would formally confirm on April 15, 000 - that Stalin had personally ordered his secret service, the N.K.V.D., to massacre altogether fifteen thousand Polish officers and intellectuals in April 1940. The former N.K.V.D. officer Pyotr Soprunenko, who signed the death warrant, still lives (1996) in Moscow as an old-age pensioner.

Jackson was aghast at this Russian effrontery. The exiled Polish leaders strongly advised the prosecution against any mention of Katyn. For several days Jackson argued with the Russian prosecution team; but the omission of Katyn would, conversely, have pointed an accusing finger at Stalin, and adamant as Rudenko was that the British should not refer

to the Stalin-Hitler pact, he was equally insistent that Katyn must be charged to the Nazi account. In the event, the other three prosecutors left it entirely to the Russians to state the Katyn charge in the trial, and the Tribunal was notably silent about the murders in its judgement.

Deportations, Slave-Labour and Slave-Trade

On the count accusing the Germans of deporting populations, the indictment also displayed a troubling double-standard, branding this without hesitation as a 'crime against humanity' - when committed by the Germans. When the trial began, the French and Russian prosecutors would not mince their language as they described the deportations of one hundred thousand French Alsations to Vichy France, and of a million Poles from Hitler 'Warthegau' into the Generalgouvernement of Poland. Thus the French chief prosecutor Francois de Menthon would charge in January 1946: 'Within a few hours the Alsations were hounded out of their homes with scarcely any baggage and robbed of their possessions.' 'This inhuman transportation of entire populations,' he continued, 'will remain one of the horrors of our century.' And referring to the deportation of Poles the Soviet deputy prosecutor L. N. Smirnov would allege, a few weeks further into the trial, 'In the occupied Polish territories village after village, town after town, city after city was evacuated of its Polish inhabitants. This process began in October 1939 as the village of Orlowo was purged of all the Poles who lived and worked there. Next came the turn of the Polish port of Gdingen. In February 1940 the forty thousand inhabitants of the city of Poznan were driven out. Thirty-six thousand Baltic Germans took their place.'

At the same time as these thunderous words were echoing in the courtroom at Nuremberg about the deportation crimes of the Nazis, the Poles were doing precisely the same in their newly acquired territories, driving the native Germans out of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia, relying on the Allied decision announced in Article XII of the Potsdam agreement of August 2, 1945. The German government now accepts that in the course of this chaotic, brutal, mindless 'population transfer' of fourteen million civilians more than two million lost their lives.

The Allied indictment of the Nazis for the use of slave labour was even more cynical. Roosevelt himself had indeed approved at Yalta the deportation to the Soviet Union of hundreds of thousands of able-bodied Germans as slave labourers. With an eye to the coming trial, Jackson had been able to hinder the worst excesses, but pursuant to the Allied Control Council Proclamation No. 2 of September 1945, two hundred thousand German prisoners had been shipped to the Soviet Union. In April 1947 it was estimated that the Russians still held two-and-a-half million prisoners-of-war, while no estimate was possible of the number of civilians who had been deported for forced labour from the Russian Zone of Germany. The Americans were not entirely innocent of this charge either; they were not only supplying Italian prisoners to Belgian coal mines but demanding

three marks per man, five marks per N.C.O., and nine marks for each officer; a few weeks later the Americans had to halt the similar 'slave trade' in German prisoners- of war with France until they were better fed.

These looked like flagrant infractions of international conventions willingly entered into, and solemnly signed and ratified. The Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners-of-war prohibited any country from transferring its captives to the custody of any other country. Yet when the British war minister warned the cabinet that there were 'obvious political reasons' why Britain could not give any of her 160,000 German prisoners to the Soviet Union, Lord Cherwell - famous for his role in advocating the unrestricted bombing of civilians in 1942 - discounted this and wrote to Churchill a week after the war ended recommending that 'the Germans can be used in gangs and the ardent Nazis transferred to the Russians, who, I am sure, will be able to alter their views.'

Monetary considerations - the adjustment of the reparations balance- sheet to Britain's advantage - underlay this proposal too. In official British files is a cabinet-level memorandum on reparations, in which the transfer of two million German prisoners 'as slaves' to Russia was to be reckoned in the final settlement at 200 British Pounds per head. The cabinet's basic agreement to such deportations was communicated to Washington a week later, on May 27, 1945. A copy of the TOP SECRET memorandum is in Jackson's private files: the British cabinet would raise no objection to 'the use of German labour as reparation,' and recommended that fresh 'impressment of German labour' should continue for six months. As a sop to the moralists, the cabinet expressed the pious hope that countries using this labour would sign a declaration laying down 'certain minimum standards as to food, lodging, medical treatment, work, pay and period of service.' Under this agreement, the British and American administrations transferred to France hundreds of thousands of German prisoners. As stated, the French treated them so abominably that the other Allies finally had to protest.

With the Nuremberg trial only half over, the Allied Control Council would promulgate a new law in the western zones in February 1946, under which all German males aged fourteen to sixty-five and all women aged fifteen to fifty were subject to forced labour. Refusal to work would lead to the confiscation of ration cards - a penalty declared to be 'inhuman' by the Tribunal when applied by the Germans.

In the Prison

While the lawyers thus bargained and haggled, the prisoners languished in Nuremberg jailhouse under conditions of considerable discomfort. Neither age nor rank nor former eminence sufficed to excuse a prisoner from harassment by Andrus' bored sentinels and NCOs, most of whom nourished grievances that because of these prisoners they were being retained in Europe long after their comrades had been returned home and demobilised. The prisoners were at first not permitted to approach within ten yards of each other. For a time it was mooted that the prisoners be handcuffed even in the dock. An-

drus refused to permit the International Red Cross access to the prisoners; the Red Cross Christmas packets were confiscated when they arrived. The elderly Hjalmar Schacht was forbidden to sleep on his side; Field-Marshal Keitel, aged sixty-three years, of which he had been a soldier for forty-three, was plagued by boils on his neck, which went untreated for there were no medicines. 'In the absence of a chair with a back-rest,' wrote Keitel, 'the permanent back pains are a physical torment for a man of sixty years and more.' Most of the prisoners suffered agonies of hunger and cold, for the cell windows were unglazed and the Perspex sheeting ill-fitting and draughty.

Field-Marshal Werner von Blomberg was dying a slow and agonising death from an untreated cancer. On February 13, the first anniversary of the devastating Allied air raids on Dresden, Field-Marshal Milch learned that Blomberg had not eaten anything for days, and that he was growing weak and apathetic; Milch told the German doctor that the field-marshal must be taken out to a hospital. 'The American doctor says the same thing,' Milch wrote that evening in his diary, 'but he's frightened that'out of general hatred'Andrus won't allow it.' 'It's terrible,' Milch continued, 'to see these people suffering so badly and not be able to help them!' That afternoon Blomberg was evacuated from the prison, and he died of cancer on March 13 - on the Ides of March, the very day that Reichsmarschall Goering opened his last major counter-offensive for his country in this trial.

Only Speer found his conditions suddenly alleviated. After the first week or two of solitary confinement in a filthy cell with a straw palliasse and stinking, ragged blankets, directly across the gangway from Goering's cell, he was transferred to the sunny side of the prison and given a room with a proper bed. Here he was visited for the first time by Colonel Andrus. In part the uncomfortable conditions were a result of the necessarily stringent anti-suicide precautions enforced by Colonel Andrus. A chair was permitted in the cells only during the day time and the table was of flimsy cardboard; neither was allowed within four feet of the windows. When the Tribunal later ordered that prisoners were to be allowed the use of eye-glasses, pens, and pencils in their cells to work on their cases, a sentinel was posted over each prisoner throughout the time he possessed these instruments. They were allowed to use the eye-glasses in court in case they had to read any documents. Knives were forbidden. All meals were chopped up fine to enable them to be eaten with a spoon. A prison barber shaved each prisoner with a safety razor in the presence of a GI.

Despite all their security measures, there were occurrences that gave Andrus nightmares. A five-inch blade from a butcher's knife was found in the lining of witness Walter Buch's suitcase. The sharp, wafer-thin metal diaphragm from one of Goering's earphone headsets in the courtroom was found to have been removed. Each episode resulted in fresh strain on the prison guards, a strain which they then took out on their prisoners. Andrus later recorded that he had particularly felt the stress after the first of his prisoners committed suicide; two of his chief prison officers suffered breakdowns and had to be hospitalised. The prisoners inevitably protested at this treatment, and more than one wrote letters

addressed to the protecting power (they were not forwarded); Andrus nipped further protests in the bud by stoutly and unilaterally declaring the Geneva Convention suspended - an impropriety which only the prevailing conditions and atmosphere of mutual hatred can explain.

Higher authority had evidently enforced new regulations during the intervening weeks since they had left the ASHCAN camp at Mondorf. In rules and regulations issued there in May 1942, Andrus had stated: 'All persons incarcerated within CCPWE#32 [ASHCAN] are considered to be PWs.' After warning that any prisoner-of-war attempting to escape would be shot, Andrus concluded: 'Violations will be punished in accordance with the Geneva Convention and Rules and Articles of War.' Here at Nuremberg there was no more talk of Geneva or prisoner- of-war status. The number of showers per week had however been raised from one to two; and Andrus ruled that, though saluting between prisoners and Allied personnel had been forbidden, bowing was still appropriate. Since this Tribunal had been set up to conserve and further the rule of international law, it deserves more than a passing comment that the Geneva Convention to which the Allied nations and Nazi Germany were parties provided expressly that no signatory could suspend its provisions for one full year after the cessation of hostilities, precisely in order to prevent such excesses. Moreover, far from repudiating the Geneva Convention, as Hitler had been invited to do by his minister Dr Goebbels after the fire-bombing of Dresden, he had refused (after representations made by, among others, Doenitz and Ribbentrop, two of the defendants at Nuremberg); he had also refrained from making use of his huge stocks of nerve-gases because of the conventions forbidding their use. In short, the status of prisoner-of-war, with all the rights accruing to it, was protected by the Convention, and in law it was not within the gift of either Eisenhower or his superiors or his junior officers like Colonel Andrus to abrogate it.

Evidence?

During October and November 1945 the O.S.S. had laboured alongside the army lawyers to perfect the case against the accused. Their methods were often more foul than fair. The private files of Justice Jackson provide disturbing evidence of tampering with and distortion of evidence. After the main film, *The Nazi Plan*, prepared by the O.S.S. to illustrate the conspiracy charge in count I of the indictment, was shown secretly to Jackson's staff on November 14 they warned him that there was probably little the defendants would seriously wish to deny, and there was much that would benefit the defence which should be cut. 'I would,' wrote one expert to Jackson, 'in the cutting process eliminate the scenes which follow the [German] movement across the border in Austria, Sudetenland, and the Rhine, in all of which flag-waving, smiling faces and the presentation of flowers help to nullify our notion that by these acts the people were planning or waging a war against their neighbors.'

A German film on the Warsaw Ghetto was also going to be shown. A major on Jackson's

staff viewed it and was taken aback by the shots of mental defectives and of the ghetto police collaborating with the Nazis. He recommended that the film be totally suppressed for that reason. This was certainly the fate of another film, specially made to illustrate 'Reichsbank loot' at Frankfurt, since at the last moment it was found that there was no proof that the loot really had come, as claimed, from concentration camp victims. Naturally there were many among the prosecution team who continued, or wanted, to believe the more far-fetched atrocity legends. One American lawyer on Kempner's team wrote home at this time from Nuremberg: 'Imagine making dentists pull out all the gold dental work from the teeth of victims before they were killed and while still conscious! We have pictures of a soap factory where they hit the victims, mostly Poles, with a blunt instrument, and the heads are cut off and boiled in one vat and the bodies in other vats. Three hundred heads were found in one vat at the time of discovery.' All of this was fiction.

So was much else that was sworn at Nuremberg. The Polish member of the United Nations War Crimes Commission had sworn an affidavit that human beings had been killed by steam in the Treblinka and Belzec extermination camps. Three members of Jackson's own staff had provided a sworn affidavit testifying to the existence of lethal gas chambers at Dachau concentration camp - James B. Donovan, Lieutenant-Colonel Calvin A. Behle, of the judge-advocate general's department, and Lieutenant Hugh Daly, of the 32nd U.S. Rainbow Division. The Czech prisoner Dr Franz Blaha had sworn to the same chamber's existence. (The German government has long since certified that no lethal gas chamber was ever operated at Dachau.)

Similarly the Tribunal readily accepted the propaganda legend first inspired by the brilliant Soviet propagandist Ilya Ehrenburg to the effect that the Nazis had fabricated soap from the remains of their victims, and even stamped the soap with the initials RJF, 'pure Jewish fat.' The Russians submitted to the Tribunal exhibits USSR-196 ('recipe for making soap from human bodies'), 197 ('statement of Zyg and Mazur'), and 393 ('samples of soap made from human bodies') to support this contention. For years since, such bars of soap have been part of an unwholesome trade among curiosity-collectors in Israel, and occasionally some are even ceremonially buried to the chants of the khaddish. Why the Nazis should have wanted to rub their faces in the boiled-down detritus of their sworn enemies remains an imponderable mystery. Although it is fixed in the final judgement of Nuremberg - and hence a criminal offence in modern France to contest the historical existence of such soap - Israeli archival experts publicly announced once more in 1990 that this 'soap story' too was and always had been a propaganda lie.

As the German saying has it, 'Lies have long legs,' however. As late as May 1995 the soap legend was once more being obediently touted around by authoritative newspapers in Germany.

Preparations continue

Pre-trial interrogations of the Nazi generals were in full spate. It never occurred to these men who regarded themselves as upright Prussian soldiers to demand to have a lawyer of their own present. The prisoners were prize booty just like the Nazi medals and Mausers, and nobody read any Miranda formula to them: they were never cautioned as to their rights, because they had none. Bill Jackson sat in on some of the sessions, watching Colonel Amen's technique of extracting information from the more prominent witnesses. The prisoners had their own views of the interrogators. 'There wasn't one single Jew among the British,' the obsessive Julius Streicher was pleased to note. 'Nothing but Jews among the Americans . . . and only one of the Russians.' To the former gauleiter, a veritable plague of them seemed to be infesting the jail building. 'Twice a day a uniformed female lieutenant (a Jewess) walks past and smirks into my cell as though to say, "There he is. He's not getting away from us this time!"' 'The interpreter with the pince-nez is a J., a professor at Columbia University. He often comes into my cell. He thinks I haven't spotted he's a J.' Streicher was impressed by the Russians, however: They radiated an enormous energy. It was just a question of time before all of Europe belonged to them.

The indictments, some spanning more than 100 pages, were given to the prisoners with varying reactions. The deepest insight was shown in the private reaction of General Alfred Jodl, former chief of the operations staff. He wrote: 'I am seething with rage now that I have read the indictment. It's 1918 all over again. If this war is to have any meaning for the advance of mankind, then it has got to be that it leads eventually to a lasting peace for Europe, if not the whole world. But in that case, instead of the brute force that led to the war and brought final victory, there has to be an international system of justice that is recognised by all sides. Otherwise the nations of this world will not have advanced one step. – Well,' he added, betraying the still flickering flame of hope within him, 'the prosecution is not the same thing as the Tribunal.' And: 'What has particularly infuriated me is the summary allegation that all the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied territories.'

Soon first prisoners cracked under the pressure. Only a few hours later Robert Ley scattered suicide notes around his cell, tore rags from his clothing and stuffed them into his mouth, then twisted a sodden army towel round his neck and waited until it strangled him. It cannot have been a pleasant death. The Americans buried him like a dog in an unmarked grave. They found in his cell a bulky folder containing hundreds of pages of partly demented writings – it included letters penned by him to his beautiful wife, who had killed herself during the war. Jackson locked it away and it was never forwarded to the next-of-kin; it is still among his private files. Embarrassed by this further proof that his defendants were going out of their mind, he instructed his staff: 'I do not think we should release [the Ley file] because of the effect on the case.' The simple fact of Ley's suicide was announced to the twenty-one surviving defendants and each was ordered to sign the announcement as having been read to them.

Hjalmar Schacht scrutinised the column of signatures. He added his own, then laconically offered to the American sergeant: 'If you wanted me to, I'd make an "X" after each one you ought to shoot.' Streicher too seems to have toyed with the idea of hanging himself, but then he decided it was worth seeing this fight through. 'I think L. hanged himself,' he mused in his diary, 'because we aren't getting anything whatever from outside, not even shirts. I'm writing on a table which consists of a cardboard on a few strips of wood.'

On the day of Ley's suicide Judge Biddle went down to Rome, following in Jackson's footsteps, for a vacation. Stringy as a dried-up fruit, the pope gave him a fifteen-minute audience, for which the judge dressed in striped trousers and a black jacket. His Holiness mentioned that Mrs von Papen had been in touch with him, and he asked the American judge to do what he could to see that the former vice-chancellor of Germany was given a fair trial. He mentioned too his distress that Robert Ley, another of his flock, had been driven to suicide. Biddle lunched with Eisenhower at his villa at Bad Homburg – sipping the first fresh milk since arriving in Germany. 'He told us many interesting things,' noted Biddle, adding without further comment: 'He had to take back from the French prison camps 100,000 prisoners-of-war because the French had stolen their coats, clothes, and food. Many were litter [stretcher] cases.' The French were not however alone in such excesses. Wilfully misinterpreting the terms of joint chiefs of staff directive 1067, many of Eisenhower's officers had begun the systematic starvation of prisoners who had entered American captivity at the end of the war. Up to one million of them died of malnutrition, hypothermia, and disease. In the eastern territories too, something like the Morgenthau Plan was being implemented with mindless savagery: seeking revenge, the officers of some camps in what had now become Poland had begun the systematic murder of their German prisoner-of-war internees.

Intimidatory American tactics appear to have been routine. Years later the former S.S. judge-advocate Konrad Morgen, whose fearless investigations had led to the wartime arrest and execution of the commandant of Buchenwald camp, rendered to the American Pulitzer prize-winning author John Toland a similar account of his experiences at the hands of the interrogators at Nuremberg. 'The officers in the [Auschwitz] camp made it easy for themselves,' reported Morgen, referring to his own wartime investigation of S.S. wrongdoing under Rudolf Höss, the commandant at Auschwitz. 'When new inmates arrived and he had no room, they took out the last batch, put them up against the wall and shot them, and made room for the new batch.' Asked however about the Six Million figure, Morgen told Toland: 'It is hard to believe such a figure.' He recalled that the Jews had 'helped to kill their own people.' But he refused to give perjured testimony at Nuremberg to the effect that Ilse Koch, widow of the commandant hanged by the S.S., had made lampshades out of human skin. That was a legend, he said: totally untrue. 'The Americans almost killed me,' recalled Morgen. 'They threatened three times to turn me over to the Russians or French or Poles.'

Garnering usable documentary evidence became a mounting nightmare for Jackson. He had become disenchanted with the productivity and intelligence of General Donovan's

O.S.S. They had promised much but had delivered little. What Donovan regarded as evidence, he certainly would not: 'I never had any feeling that anybody had trapped me into the thing,' Jackson commented later. 'But I was in the trap!' It soon became clear that the O.S.S. had intended all along to stagemanage the whole trial along the lines of an N.K.V.D. show-trial, with Jackson little more than a professional actor. As part of the stage-management they proposed to run a pre-trial propaganda campaign in the United States, with 'increasing emphasis on the publication of atrocity stories to keep the public in the proper frame of mind.' To this end the O.S.S. devised and scripted for the education of the American public a two-reel film on war crimes, called *Crime and Punishment*; it was designed to put the case against the leading Nazis. Jackson declined to participate. He refused even to read the speech that the O.S.S. had scripted for him to read into the cameras. 'As you know,' he wrote to the O.S.S. officer concerned, 'the British are particularly sensitive about lawyers trying their cases in the newspapers and other vehicles of communication.' The film proposal was followed by an explicit O.S.S. suggestion for launching a 'black propaganda' campaign during the course of the trial, with agents in selected foreign countries starting rumours designed to influence public opinion in favour of the trial and against the defendants. This would be far more effective, they pointed out, than mounting a straightforward public relations campaign which would obviously be seen as emanating from the powers conducting the trials. One of Jackson's staff secretly notified him that the suggestion was 'fantastic, if not extremely dangerous,' and the justice himself pencilled a pithy comment on the letter: 'The scheme is cock-eyed. Give them no encouragement.'

Vestiges of the unsavoury methods of the O.S.S. can still be seen among the earlier Nuremberg records – for instance, at the pre-trial interrogations the defendants were not accompanied by lawyers, and were frequently persuaded by trickery or intimidation to subscribe to testimonies incriminating others which we now know to have been false. The files are full of curiosities – for instance anonymous typed extracts of documents instead of the originals, and sworn statements by witnesses like Höss, commandant of Auschwitz, in which all the 'witnesses to his signature' have signed, but not Höss himself. The Americans also submitted as exhibit 1553-PS a file of invoices for substantial monthly consignments of Zyklon (hydrogen cyanide pellets) supplied to the pest-control office at Auschwitz; they concealed the fact that the same file contained invoices for identical quantities of Zyklon delivered to the camp at Oranienburg, outside Berlin, where it was never alleged there had been any gas chambers.

The defendants were sometimes first interrogated under circumstances designed to make them believe the trial had already begun. Thus Keitel referred in one private note at this time to 'interrogations by the officers (judges) of the Allied military tribunal.' The transcript shows that in one August interrogation Göring challenged the interrogator: 'I would like to know if this is only a questioning, or if this is already a regular trial.' The interrogator, Colonel Amen, evaded direct reply.

Judge Jackson's squabble with Donovan came to a head in the autumn of 1945 after the

general returned from a long absence in China on O.S.S. business. By this time Jackson's team was well on the way to establishing on the basis of documents alone a cast-iron case against the Nazis. But Donovan was a showman and he wanted the case to rest principally on the public testimony of witnesses like Schacht and Gisevius – a documentary trial was less likely to sustain the public imagination. He had even established with Göring relations that seemed to Jackson altogether too chummy. Interrogated on the day following the service of the indictments about the truth of the sordid affair resulting in the dismissals of Field-Marshal Werner von Blomberg and General Werner von Fritsch in 1938, Göring had said he would discuss it only in privacy. This intimate special interrogation duly took place on November 6 with General Donovan but no reporter present; Göring gave testimony broadly in accordance with the now well-known facts, but 'requested that [it] be kept a secret.'

Relations between Jackson and Donovan now touched bottom. an abrupt letter to Jackson Donovan had set out his contrary ideas on stage-managing the trial. The justice replied the next day, no less abruptly. The general then tried to push through his own concept by issuing orders to the predominantly military personnel on Jackson's staff. He also ordered the prison commandant Colonel Andrus not to permit any further interrogations of Göring, causing great difficulties for Jackson since the French and Russian prosecutors were naturally clamouring for the same interrogation rights as the Americans were enjoying. 'From the beginning,' Jackson huffed in a letter to Donovan, informing him he had overruled the general's instructions, 'control of these prisoners has been in the hands of Colonel Amen who has controlled the time, place of interrogation, who could be present, etc.' As the trial opening approached, General Donovan became increasingly disaffected, because he was not in the centre of things. Three days later the prisoner Schacht wrote an oily letter to Donovan offering assistance. Receiving a copy of this from the general's secretary, Jackson was furious. This was not what he was planning for the banker at all. On the same date Jackson received a letter from Donovan renewing his suggestion that they give Schacht 'the opportunity to fight his way out' by testifying as prosecution witness against Göring. Jackson had already once turned this idea down: to him, Schacht was one of the worst criminals, and he did not propose to let him save his own skin. He now learned that Donovan had entertained one of the senior prisoners-of-war, Lieutenant-General Erwin Lahousen, one of his opposite numbers in Nazi Intelligence, as a guest at his Nuremberg mansion; Colonel Amen had questioned Lahousen there with the German lawyer Leverkühn of Hamburg as intermediary.

For Jackson this was the last straw. The integrity of the trial in the eyes of history was at stake. He issued an order putting a stop to the entertainment of and negotiations with the Nazi prisoners. When the general wrote him formally requesting permission to confer with Göring, Jackson sent a blunt refusal, and informed him: 'I won't be able to use you in any position of prominence when the trial begins. Donovan had all the fury of the woman scorned; he had hoped to be in charge of the fiery and spectacular trial examination of witnesses. For a few days he intrigued with Jackson's enemies, and

tried to win them round to his point of view. Over dinner with Colonel Andrus and Judge Biddle on November 27 – in itself an impropriety on a scale worth noting here – Donovan stated that Jackson's case was 'confused and flat' from relying on so much paper evidence (the trial had by then begun, but no witnesses had been called.) '[He] is eager,' noted Biddle, 'to get Jackson to put on Göring, who he thinks would come through.'

Jackson would have none of it, and the O.S.S. general stormed out of Germany. He took vital documents with him, threatening to discredit Jackson in Washington if he could. His departure forced the justice to rush a long letter to explain to President Truman on December 1, 1945 his position. 'When I asked him to work with me,' wrote Jackson, explaining Donovan's motivations, 'I was repeatedly told that he would not work in second place with anybody... But he was the head of O.S.S. and I needed what help that organization could give.' A letter came from the United States at the end of March 1946 warning Justice Jackson that Donovan was now searching New York for a suitable public relations expert whom he could hire to sabotage the Nuremberg trial.

The Russians were particularly conscious of the risk to their persons if at any time the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact became the subject of open debate during the trial. After this meeting the Soviet deputy prosecutor Colonel Yuri V. Pokrovsky assured Vyshinsky, his Soviet controller, formally by telephone, 'The chief prosecutors are determined to avoid awkward questions and to give the defendants no opportunity of starting debates or dragging the tribunal into discussions. In this connection it has been mentioned as desirable to exchange a list, before the trial begins, of all topics which are not to be mentioned before this tribunal, so that we have the opportunity to slap these questions down immediately during the proceedings.' The local Soviet prosecutors, Rudenko and Pokrovsky, were not their own masters. Behind closed doors there was a Soviet body remotecontrolling all their decisions, identified as the 'Supervisory Commission for the Nuremberg Trial.' Among its less appetising members were the chief prosecutor of the Soviet Union K. P. Gorschenin, the minister of justice I. T. Golyakov, and the president of the Soviet Supreme Court Rytschkov, who had signed many a death sentence in his time; as well as even uglier creatures like Kobulov, Merkulov, and Abakumov (who would go before a firing squad at the same time as Likhatchev in 1953.)

On Gustav Krupp, Jackson was in agonies: he had personally promised President Truman that he would prosecute the industrialists, influenced, as he secretly admitted to his fellow chief prosecutors, by the campaign at home against U.S. munitions manufacturers like DuPont, who were rumoured to have sent a certain Mr Scherrer to Europe pre-war to break up the disarmament conferences. Industrialists everywhere had to get a warning. 'There is more dynamite in this question than Krupp ever produced out of his plant!' he said on November 12, 1945, a few days before the trial began. Therefore a Krupp, any Krupp, had to go on trial – he would have preferred Alfried, but Gustav was good enough in default. At the Tribunal's first session, behind closed doors in Nuremberg on November 14, Gustav Krupp's lawyers moved to dismiss him from the case on the ground

that he was too ill to understand what was going on. Jackson rather weakly contended that absent-mindedness was no defence – that the London Charter would allow even this Krupp to be tried in absentia, or that in the alternative they should replace him with his son Alfried. Sir Hartley Shawcross objected that this was a court of justice, not a game where they could substitute one man for another.

Lord Justice Lawrence reserved a decision, but clearly disagreed with Jackson. One member of the American prosecution team wrote privately: 'My guess is that the elder Krupp will be dismissed, and the younger Krupp substituted, as he was head of the firm since 1943. The Krupps were unscrupulous in their dealings with forced labor, and such men and women were inhumanly treated, worse than any Georgia chain gang one used to read about.' That the British and Americans had gone to very great lengths with their air forces to burn and blast to death those selfsame workers was the irony of such 'war crimes' trials as this. Ultimately the British united front – Shawcross and Lawrence – refused to have Alfried stand in for his father, earning a grudging tribute from an unexpected quarter, Julius Streicher, who wrote in his diary: 'The British carried the day with their opinion that although one might be able to replace one NCO with another, it was just not done to have one defendant who was unfit to plead or dead replaced in the dock by his son as successor. This episode shows that the British judges at least have the good intention not to put their morals entirely on one side in the events now beginning to unroll.' There were other signs of problems to come. When defence counsel applied for one particular witness to prove that the Russians had deported slave labour from Latvia, just as the Nazis were now accused of having done, the Russian alternate judge Lieutenant-Colonel Volchkov flew into a temper and called it libellous. 'We postpone a decision,' noted Biddle, 'till a full meeting.'

The world's press was informed that the show would begin on the morning of November 20, 1945. Jackson's opening speech was already a masterpiece. He had reviewed it a dozen times, Elsie had worked on it every night for weeks, and Bill had been up until five A.M. seeing it through the duplicating machine. On the nineteenth however news arrived from Moscow which threatened the entire opening performance. The Russian chief prosecutor, General Rudenko, had been stricken by malaria, so Moscow now claimed; the Russians were demanding at least ten days' postponement, failing which they would pull out of the trial completely. Justice Jackson, who had now experienced Russian methods for five months, suddenly sensed that the Russians had got cold feet – for some reason they were trying to stop the trial. The French deputy chief prosecutor, Monsieur Dubost – piqued by the Tribunal's refusal to allow old Alfried Krupp to be included among the defendants – supported the Russian demand for a postponement, adding that if the Soviets pulled out so would the French. 'He has orders,' Biddle recorded, 'to absent himself if the Russians are not present. The French and Russians have particularly suffered.' 'It was generally believed,' Jackson privately recorded, 'that he [Dubost] was a Communist and it looked as though their position had been settled in advance.'

Unexpectedly Rudenko's deputy Colonel Yuri V. Pokrovsky arrived and announced with

a completely deadpan face that he had just telephoned Moscow, and that 'due to a marvellous new medical discovery' Rudenko's malaria had been cured and he was on his way to Nuremberg where he would arrive five days from now. (Moscow called all the shots: In an eloquent little scene, Pokrovsky, an elegant hand-kissing former officer of the Imperial Russian Army, once wrapped his wrists in the latest ticker-tape instructions from Moscow, like a pair of manacles, and apologised to Maxwell Fyfe, 'That's how I am.') 'The trial will open,' Biddle recorded the Russian as saying, 'in a high solemn moment, of extreme importance.' Pokrovsky insisted that Rudenko must be present personally, and was refusing to delegate that function. The trial could begin next day.

From the records of the Soviet government's Supervisory Commission for the Nuremberg Trial it is possible to speculate on the reasons for the Soviet agonising over the opening of the trial. Once again they were terrified of an undisciplined defence lawyer lifting the lid off politically delicate matters. The possibility of effective counter-attacks by the defence lawyers against the Soviet Union continued to worry Vyshinsky, who was ultimately answerable to Stalin himself. On November 26, he would preside over another such secret meeting. This time the minutes read:

Subject: List of questions to be avoided during the trial examinations (Comrade Vyshinsky):

1. Confirmation of the list of questions provided by Comrade Vyshinsky which are to be regarded as not permissible for discussion before the Tribunal.
2. Demand to Comrade Rudenko that he reaches agreement with the other chief prosecutors that a series of topics should not be addressed, to avoid the USSR, the United States, Britain, France and other Allied nations becoming the butt of defence criticisms.

Those present additionally insisted that for each document introduced by the other prosecution teams Comrades Rudenko and Nikitchenko – the Soviet prosecutor and judge respectively – should be required to render opinions on their admissibility with regard to the protection of Soviet interests and if necessary prevent the defence from submitting or even reading out in open court those documents ruled as 'undesirable.'

Showtime

The International Military Tribunal at long last held its first session in the Palace of Justice at Nuremberg at ten A.M. on Tuesday, November 20, 1945. The twenty defendants sat in two rows in the dock, with their backs to the wall. Göring took the most prominent place, at the right-hand end of the front row. Three defendants, in addition to Kaltenbrunner, were missing. The seventy-five-year old Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach had been formally found unfit to plead; Robert Ley was dead; Martin Bormann could not be found. The Nuremberg lawyer Dr Friedrich Bergold had been appointed at the dictate of British deputy prosecutor Airey Neave* to represent the absent (and in fact dead) Reichsleiter.

A question-mark hung over the fitness of several other defendants. Streicher's lawyer Dr Hans Marx appealed to the Tribunal to examine his client's sanity, but three of the prosecuting powers' medical experts pronounced him fit to stand trial. Kaltenbrunner had been rushed to hospital two days before with a subarachnoid hæmorrhage; during the next few months the former S.S. Obergruppenführer attended court only a few hours at a time. Göring remarked, 'If he's fit, then I'm an Atlas.' Hess' fitness to plead was no less open to question.

Three hundred press and radio correspondents crowded the courtroom for this first day. A newsreel camera whirred, recording every minute, and powerful floodlights bathed the tables crowded with prosecutors, interpreters, and German defence counsel in their traditional gowns and caps. On the bench sat the judges of the four powers together with their alternates, in chairs now of equal height, in front of their national flags – the British in wing collars, the Americans like rather anxious New York businessmen, Professor Henri Donnedieu sporting his magnificent moustache, and the two Russians in full uniform, as befitted a military tribunal. Julius Streicher was impressed by these Russians – they had a soldierly bearing which was quite in keeping with their uniforms, which were designed on the old Tsarist model.

The chief Russian prosecutor General Rudenko was absent in Moscow, his malaria having ostensibly returned despite the earlier miracle cure; he had authorised the trial to open this day on the understanding that the Tribunal would not tolerate the German defendants making any statement in his absence. Jackson studied the prisoners' faces intently. He wondered if Göring would try to challenge the court's jurisdiction. If he did not, the others would follow his lead. Judge Lawrence asked him how he pleaded to the charges. Göring took the microphone and began, 'Before I answer – ' Lawrence interrupted him. Jackson was in suspense. Göring repeated his opening words, and was again stopped by the judge. Göring then muttered, 'Not Guilty,' adding: 'In the sense of the indictment.' Clutched in Göring's hand, unread, was a one-page declaration. In it, he refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. There is no reason not to record for posterity what he had wanted to say:

“As Reichsmarschall of the Greater German Reich, I assume political responsibility for my own acts. Although answerable for these acts only to the German people and to the German courts, I am nevertheless willing, without recognising the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, to provide it with any explanations that are desired and to speak the whole truth. I do however refuse to accept responsibility for acts committed by others – acts of which I was unaware and of which I would not have approved or been able to prevent if I had known of them. Hermann Göring.”

The Tribunal passed on to Rudolf Hess. To the excruciating irritation of the solemn-faced prosecution lawyers, Hess, called upon to plead, merely sprang to his feet (in a temper, as he admitted in his diary) and shouted 'Nein!' The hundreds of spectators packing the galleries roared with laughter. Jackson was furious, feeling that Hess had 'stolen the show' – and a show it indeed was. The Tribunal president Lord Justice Lawrence, with

his half-moon reading glasses every inch the Hollywood fuddy-duddy of an English judge, articulated: 'That will be entered as a plea of Not Guilty.'

With his son Bill at his side at the table still checking the pages, Robert H. Jackson began his opening speech. His speech was later praised as one of the world's great pieces of legal literature; The speech was a brave attempt at laying the foundations for the indictment on the conspiracy to wage aggressive war; it was well received, and Jackson was greatly relieved. He said that the Nazis had killed an estimated 5.7 million Jews (that sounded more precise than the popular figure of Six Million.) Asked during the adjournment who had ordered this, Göring was overhead saying, 'Himmler, I suppose.' He had not confronted this issue at all in his own mind until now. JACKSON INTENDED to make little use of live witnesses, preferring to have the documentary evidence speak for itself. At a private meeting after the trial began, Jackson offered this additional interesting explanation to the other chief prosecutors: 'Though the United States has the largest collection of potential witnesses – a whole jail full, in fact – most of them would do us more harm than good.'

We shall perhaps use four more witnesses in addition to [Lieutenant-General Erwin] Lahousen [chief of the Abwehr's sabotage and counter-espionage Section II], particularly on concentration-camp matters, but we shall make the bulk of our case on documents.' At one such closed session on the twenty-fourth Lawrence asked Jackson to state the political purpose of the trial. Jackson replied to the question in this sense: 'We want to prove to Germany and to the world that the Nazi regime was as wicked and as criminal as we have always maintained.' (so to prove Allied propaganda is truth) Moreover, 'We want to make clear to the Germans why our policies toward them will have to be very harsh indeed for many years to come.'

This motivation for the trial must never be forgotten in contemplating the printed record. The Nuremberg archives are a historical source to be used only with caution: the published volumes contain only the prosecution's documents, and none of the defence. In the course of the trial Dr Hans Laternser, defence counsel for the General Staff and the O.K.W., would submit to the Tribunal no fewer than 3,186 affidavits sworn by field-m Marshals, generals and other key witnesses. Not one would be published in the blue IMT volumes.

The reading of the documents into the record began. On November 29 the court was in fits of laughter over Göring's cheeky telephone conversations with Ribbentrop (in London) and Prince Philipp of Hesse during the Austria crisis of March 1938; he had ordered his Forschungsamt to monitor and transcribe these telephone conversations. This put the Reichsmarschall in a boisterous mood, but it was dashed when Jackson called that afternoon for the showing of the first film exhibits prepared by the O.S.S. and by his own staff. The most effective was the film on Nazi concentration camps, a grim record made by military photographers who had accompanied the Allied armies advancing through Germany. Now the defendants knew there was little hope for any of them – the last vestige of public sympathy was dispelled by the horrors that the films portrayed.

From his private writings it is clear that Jackson by now regarded the participation of the Russian judges in the trial which he had staged as a mixed blessing at best, and as a mockery of international justice at worst. The shorthand notes of his last secret conferences with the Russians before the trial began revealed him bluntly reminding them of their own sins and warning that the United States would not identify itself with Soviet misdeeds: if the defence counsel succeeded in making capital from the secret Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact of August 1939, the Russians had only themselves to blame. He himself proposed to make no reference to it in his opening speech. As a lawyer, he was uneasy about this suppression of the truth, but he saw no alternative.

THE NIGHTMARE of awkward documents lurking in the captured German records continued to beset the Allied prosecutors throughout the trial. Fortunately the British had captured the most incriminating files, those of the German admiralty and foreign ministry, and had whisked them out of the country; they had released portions of these only with the utmost reluctance to Nuremberg. At one secret meeting of the chief prosecutors at Nuremberg we find the British representatives insisting, on instructions from London, that the archives of the German admiralty and foreign ministry be returned as soon as possible to their safes in London, because of the 'embarrassment' that their publication would cause to the British government if they should fall into the wrong hands.

The dice were heavily loaded against the defendants in other ways, too. A basic difficulty for the defence lawyers was their unfamiliarity with the Anglo-American trial procedure adopted at Nuremberg: German lawyers were wholly inexperienced in the techniques of examination and cross-examination, and they were profoundly surprised by the latitude to object and interrupt shown to counsel under the Anglo-American system. A more fundamental distinction was that even during the Third Reich the German trial procedures had been conducted with the primary objective of ascertaining truth, and all parties had united with that aim – the judges conducting the principal examination of witnesses, the opposing counsel being there to underline aspects that favoured the defence or prosecution. As Otto Kranzbühler, Dönitz's young attorney, would later comment. it was an essential feature of the Anglo- American criminal trial that it was confrontational, with each side introducing only the evidence which benefited its own case. Unlike the German custom, there was practically no obligation on the court to investigate the truth for itself. When the defence made their desiderata known to Jackson, he robustly turned them down, stating that he had no intention of 'serving two masters.'

Were the scales not loaded in advance against one side or the other, this would not normally cause an injustice. In Nuremberg, it was as though the scales had only one scale-pan, on the side of the victorious powers. 'When the German defence attorneys arrived in Nuremberg in September 1945,' observed Kranzbühler, 'they had literally nothing. The prosecution on the other hand had already seized all available archives and documents and they were screening them with a huge army of experts for incriminating evidence.' Only this incriminating material was then made available to the defence attorneys; they were allowed no opportunity to look in the captured archives for defence documents in

mitigation or exoneration. The foreign archives were also inaccessible to them.

In a German court it would be unthinkable – and illegal – for one party to withhold part of a document which might tend to aid the other party's case. But here at Nuremberg documents which might aid the defence were routinely concealed from them, or even destroyed. (It is quite wrong for Sir David Maxwell Fyfe to claim in his memoirs that 'all the documents were available to the Defence.') Dr Alfred- Maurice de Zayas has expressed the view that the verdict on many of the points charged against the High Command (O.K.W.) would probably have been very different if the German defence lawyers had been allowed access to the captured records of the O.K.W.'s Office of Special Investigations into Violations of International Law (Wehrmachts- Untersuchungsstelle für Verletzungen des Völkerrechts) and permitted to select documents from those files in mitigation of the High Command's actions: 'But these files were "classified" and they were not finally released to the public domain until the seventies.'

If the robust, devious, and confrontational atmosphere of British and American court-rooms was unfamiliar to the German lawyers, they had one great advantage: they spoke the language of the documents, and they were familiar through their clients with the real facts of the case, while the Allies were forced to learn the facts for themselves and to grope their way through often highly inadequate translations and interpreters. Against that, the Allies monopolised the captured documents and libraries, and the Germans could get no access to books and documents from abroad except through the offices of the prosecution. A vital book by Romania's former foreign minister Gafencu was on sale throughout Switzerland, but was denied to the defence lawyers in Nuremberg, as was the published war dispatch of the U.S. Army chief of staff, in which General George C. Marshall confirmed that no concerted plan had existed between Germany and Italy prior to Pearl Harbor – refuting one important point of the indictment. When Göring's lawyer invited the Polish exile general Wladyslaw Anders to supply his evidence that the Russians themselves were the murderers of thousands of Poles at Katyn, Anders' Allied superiors forbade him to comply. Documents which Sir David Maxwell Fyfe had printed in three hundred copies for the press were virtually unavailable to the German lawyers. On January 11, 1946, Hans Frank's lawyer Alfred Seidl would apply to the court for the former governor-general of Poland to be allowed to use his own diaries, of which he had voluntarily turned over forty volumes to the Seventh Army. Those volumes were now in the courthouse document room, but he too was allowed to use only those extracts that had been picked by the prosecution. Permission was refused.

There was too a marked difference in the treatment of defence and prosecution witnesses. Hostile witnesses found they were housed in the main jailhouse under conditions no better than the defendants' – unless they had to be kept out of sight of the more inquisitive, in which case they were moved into a 'detention home' nearby under somewhat better conditions. If they were friendly witnesses, they were treated to luxury accommodation and special rations. The latter practice stopped only after this first trial, when U.S. prosecutor Walter Rapp circulated a notice warning that they were not to be coddled

even if they chose to 'sing.' Key witnesses applied for by the defence were routinely declared to be untraceable. The Americans accused Keitel of involvement in the murder of a French general – S.S. Gruppenführer Hans Jüttner was said to have acted on Keitel's orders. His lawyer Dr Nelte demanded that Jüttner be called as a witness; the Americans claimed they did not know where he was. 'Nelte announced he would drive up to see Jüttner immediately,' Keitel told his son months later, 'and only then did the Americans admit that Jüttner had been interrogated months earlier.' Jüttner confirmed that he had never received any order whatever from Keitel in this connection. The same thing happened to one of General Jodl's key witnesses. Needing expert evidence of British plans to invade neutral Norway in 1940, they contacted Colonel Soltmann of the O.K.W.'s intelligence branch Fremde Heere West. The German naval High Command had deciphered Britain's naval signals; and Britain's own operational plans had been captured during WESERÜBUNG, Hitler's invasion of Norway. Subsequently Britain's aggressive intentions had been laid bare by the records of the 1940 Supreme War Council meetings, captured by the Germans in a boxcar in railroad sidings at Le Charité outside Paris. Soltmann cabled his willingness to testify – and was immediately arrested by the Americans. In February 1946 Göring's lawyers asked for General Karl Koller, the last chief of air staff, as a witness; the Americans made out that the general could not be traced, although their interrogator Ernst Engländer had himself questioned him at a C.S.D.I.C. (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre) in England. Those defence witnesses that did arrive at Nuremberg were softened up by the prosecution interrogators before being turned over to the defence. Some ended up in solitary confinement in the prison wing. S.S. Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, who volunteered to defend Kaltenbrunner and the S.S., was whisked away by the Americans to a lunatic asylum until, summoned to give evidence at a subsequent trial (the Milch Case) a year later, he was able to establish his sanity and released on the trial judge's orders to a normal prison.

True, the defence lawyers were usually well treated by their colleagues of the prosecution: they were provided with accommodation, American rations, and transportation. But they were outnumbered and outgunned. The American prosecution team now employed hundreds of men and women. Dr Nelte wrote sorrowfully to the wife of his client Field-Marshal Keitel: 'The trial effort being mounted by the victors is colossal. The evidence that has been amassed by the prosecution is a crippling burden for us, because we have no documents of comparable quality on the German side to put in against them. All we can do is to try to piece together opposing evidence by an intricate process of mosaic work.'

What loaded the scales of justice most heavily against the defence however was the London Statute itself, which had established the trial procedure. Most of the usual devices open to a capable defence counsel had been smitten from his hands in advance by the skilful advance planning of their opponents the prosecutors, meeting in London to draw up the Statute. The writ of habeas corpus was not available. The Statute ruled inadmissible in advance many defences which would have been open to the Germans. The lawyers

were not allowed to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the judges' impartiality. Streicher commented in his diary: 'The usual court practice is that a defendant can challenge a judge for lack of impartiality. That would be the case if for instance the judge was related to a trial adversary. In this show trial the victors are the prosecutors and the judges of the vanquished and inevitably prejudiced. Because they are fully aware of this, they have laid down an appropriate rule denying to the defendants in advance the opportunity of challenging them.' 'And that is the purpose of the whole farce,' continued this unusually articulate gauleiter. 'In this trial there is no question of according to the defendant a blind and impartial justice; the trial has been set the task of giving to an injustice a veneer of legality by cloaking it in the language of the law.'

The Tribunal also squelched every attempt by the prisoners to raise the question of their conditions of imprisonment. When Streicher tried to protest from the witness box about the beatings he had received, Jackson had the allegation struck from the record. The mood was one of revenge: an eye for an eye. A letter reached the justice from a rich New York merchant, Ernest Schoenfeld, begging him: 'If it would be permissible [sic], if and when Julius Streicher is doomed to die, my most ardent wish would be to not only witness his execution, but participate in it.'

The biggest surprise for the defence came after the trial began. In a section titled 'A Fair Trial' the London Statute provided for the prosecution to make an 'opening statement'; in the event, this lasted for many weeks, while day after day press and radio accorded to the statement the widest publicity. When defence counsel then also asked to deliver an opening statement they were told there was no such provision in the Statute. At the end of the trial the process would be repeated: the defence lawyers were each allowed to make only a brief speech, followed by a lengthy closing argument by the prosecution to which the defence could make no reply. The defendants were allowed to make a brief speech, a 'final statement' before judgement was passed, but Justice Jackson bitterly begrudged them even this; surprisingly, the Russians insisted on allowing it, since the last word was a fundamental right of the defendant in Russian procedure. (In a private letter to President Truman, Jackson predicted: 'I anticipate that this privilege will be used for propaganda purposes' – as though this were not the Allied purpose in staging the whole trial.)

In the course of the trial, as they were entitled to under their Statute, the judges rejected every attempt by the defendants and their counsel to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Professor Hermann Jahrreiss, the eminent Cologne expert on international law, did however devote his closing speech – the first defence speech and as such bound to attract some publicity – to a comprehensive attack on the new laws that underlay this trial. The British prosecution were more apprehensive about Jahrreiss' speech than the American, who knew that at home the trial had long vanished from newspapers' front pages.

The faces gaunt and eyes hollow as once those of their own prisoners had been, the Nuremberg defendants languished in solitary confinement in their cells awaiting the re-

sumption of the trial. The Red Cross packages mailed to them had been seized by the Americans. There were still no letters from their families. On what was to prove his final birthday, January 12, Göring wrote to the president of the Tribunal to complain that he had received only three letters from his wife and daughter, Emmy and Edda, since his capture. He asked the international Tribunal to order the U.S. Army to allow the letters through. 'Before my voluntary surrender to American custody,' he protested, 'I wrote asking General Eisenhower to take care of my family. Upon arrival at Seventh Army headquarters (General Patch) I was expressly promised that my request would be honoured. My wife, daughter, relatives, and next of kin were taken to Veldenstein Castle, my family property north of Nuremberg, and interned there. They were able to move around the castle freely, though isolated from the outside world, which was very satisfactory to me.' There was a reason why Emmy's letters were not reaching Göring and the others. In mid-October Counter-Intelligence Corps agent Paul H. Goldenberg had arbitrarily arrested her and her little daughter; the mother had been thrown into Straubing prison (now designated a 'civilian internment camp') and Edda had been snatched away from her and put in an orphanage. On November 24 Edda had been locked up in Straubing with her mother. The C.I.C. had also arrested Emmy's niece, sister, and nurse. The other Nuremberg prisoners' children had also been taken away and put in foster homes, while their womenfolk were sent to prison.

Hans Frank was subjected to the same kind of psychological blackmail. He learned that his sister Elisabeth had been held in Straubing since September. 'My sister is completely innocent of any involvement in the accusations levelled against me,' he protested in a letter to Biddle – it never reached the judge. 'She has never been politically active and was not even a member of the Nazi Party.' Their seventyyear- old mother, he wrote, was now quite defenceless. 'Please be so good as to attend to this case,' Frank pleaded. 'God will reward you!' These cases were not exceptions. Dr Schacht heard that his two children had been taken away from his wife. Baldur von Schirach, who had been ready to denounce Hitler and the whole Nazi ideology before the trial started, learned that his wife Henriette had been arrested on December 22 and taken to prison at Bad Tölz; under Göring's influence Schirach now wavered, and began to harden against the Americans (even though his mother was an American.) IT HAS to be said on Andrus' behalf that when he learned that the Counter-Intelligence Corps had begun this vindictive round-up of the prisoners' wives and families his blood boiled and he wrote a furious official letter to higher headquarters to protest. The colonel demanded to know the reasons for these arrests, failing which he asked for the release of the womenfolk and children. 'Otherwise,' he predicted, 'during progress of the defense, testimony would be offered in the trial which would place the Americans on the defensive.' 'You see,' Dr Gustave M. Gilbert, Jackson's resident army psychiatrist, a Jew who had fled Germany before the war, overheard Göring telling the others, 'they are just as bad as the Gestapo themselves. Don't let them pretend that they are democratic. The Americans are still our enemies. What have women and children got to do with this?' A few days later the U.S. Army ordered Henry F. Gerecke, the fiftyfour- year-old Lutheran pastor, to visit Emmy at Straubing prison, and he returned

with greetings for her embattled husband. 'Now I am feeling calmer,' Göring wrote in reply. 'It's obvious why you're all in custody – just because you are mine. As the Führer is dead, I am the No. 1 principal war criminal, and you are my relatives. The hatred and the thirst for revenge – you can imagine whose – are boundless... But I am not going to let them bend or break me... How often I go to you in my thoughts and try to imagine the life you are leading! Have you enough books? My treasure, I cannot express how much I love you. You and Edda have always been my pride and joy. I am filled with gratitude to you both.' Why on earth, he added, had they arrested his nurse Christa?

The trial reopened on January 2, 1946. There was immediate unpleasantness for the defence on the third, as S.S. Obergruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, an officer with a clever but criminal brain, testified about the mass shootings of Jews which he had himself directed on the eastern front. Worse followed that afternoon. Albert Speer's defence lawyer rose to his feet and asked Ohlendorf whether he was aware that his client had plotted in 1945 to assassinate the Führer. Speer and Ohlendorf had been close friends. Göring spluttered with rage when he realised what Speer was up to. He stormed over to Speer as soon as the court adjourned, but the former minister turned away from him. In direct testimony later, Speer would boast of how he had sabotaged Hitler's instruction for the scorched-earth defence of the Reich, vetoed Hitler's instructions to destroy strategic bridges, and plotted with General Gotthard Heinrici to countermand Hitler's orders for the relief of Berlin. When the trial ended Speer would admit in a wry letter to his wife: 'Most of the other defendants made things as tough as they could for me after they had heard details of my activities in the final phase of the war. It wasn't hard to imagine what they would have done if they had found out about them before the war was over. There wouldn't have been much left of my family.' Questioned in open court about his plan to assassinate Hitler and his staff, Speer feigned shyness. 'I'd prefer not to go into further details on this,' he replied, which obliged the Tribunal, after consultation, to insist: 'The Tribunal would very much like to hear the details.' After the recess which then followed Speer said alluringly: 'I am divulging these details only with the utmost reluctance, because there is a lot that is unattractive about such things. I am going to do so only because the Tribunal insists... It is not my intention that my own case should profit from this episode.' 'Gott im Himmel!' roared Göring to Dr Gilbert afterward. 'I nearly died of shame. To think that a German could be so rotten, just to prolong his wretched life – to put it crudely, to piss in front and crap behind a little longer. Herrgott! Donnerwetter! For myself,' he added, 'I don't care if I get executed... But there is still such a thing as honour.' Several of the American officers took quite a liking to him after this – particularly one six-foot-two Texan officer, Lieutenant Jack G. Wheelis, whom Göring befriended upon finding that they had much in common: a love of hunting, and of the freedom of the outdoors.

The Allied military circles had been uneasy all along about putting on trial the admirals and generals who had opposed them, unless clearly specified war crimes of the old-fashioned kind could be laid against them. Grand-Admiral Karl Dönitz, the German navy's

commander-in-chief, had surrendered to them in Flensburg; but the British and American experts had then found from the captured records that he was virtually blameless of any crimes. Nevertheless Dönitz was indicted and the British lawyers – in whose hands the case against him lay – solemnly put to him the very documents which their own admiralty had secretly declared in August 1945 to be insufficient to procure a conviction. The case boiled down to trying to implicate him in the so-called Peleus incident: one of his U-boats, U-852, had torpedoed a Greek freighter of that name, and the submarine's commander Kapitänleutnant Heinz Eck had ordered the survivors machine-gunned; he and his two senior officers were eventually court-martialled and shot by a British firing squad in Hamburg. Jackson had been shown the entry in the diary of the commander of the Submarine Force (B.d.U.) for September 17, 1942, reading: 'The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive requirements for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing-in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand.' Dönitz had signed this volume at the end in pencil, as was the custom.

Against the burden of this entry however the defence could set several entries from his diary for 1945 which showed him ordering crews to adhere strictly to the Geneva Convention 'even in the present circumstances,' and to resist efforts by the S.S. to trespass on naval affairs. Dönitz was one of those who had persuaded Hitler to abandon the plan to repudiate the Geneva Convention after the violation of Dresden by R.A.F. Bomber Command in February 1945. The record of the British interrogations of Dönitz's chief of staff Admiral Eberhard Godt and his staff officer Fregattenkapitän Hessler states: 'Both men categorically denied that Dönitz ever countenanced the killing of survivors in cold blood.' Since the documents on the Peleus incident were 'insufficient' against Dönitz the prosecution interrogators made spirited efforts to procure adequate oral evidence. Their methods were not edifying. An American army captain of Czech origin using the name 'Dr Korda' interrogated Godt at a camp code-named Fort Washington. When Godt turned down the specific demand that he testify against Dönitz he was told: 'Think about it, if you would. We've got so much against you that things could get quite nasty for you too. Your situation is extremely simple. Either you testify against Dönitz – and then we'll leave you in peace. Or you don't – and then we'll string you up alongside Dönitz.' Finally the large and by now well-known War Crimes Commission bluntly confronted Godt with the question: 'Are you willing to testify against Dönitz: yes or no?' Since the admiral stood by his refusal, they left him with the parting words: 'You're going to regret this.' The British tried similar methods on the submarine crews in their captivity.

In the Nuremberg courtroom Dönitz's witnesses found themselves confronted by Colonel Phillimore. English trial observers disapproved of the 'cavalier fashion' in which Phillimore treated the witnesses. As an American historian would comment, Dönitz had to go before the court 'to show, if he could, that he had waged war according to rules that England herself was not always ready to follow.' Had not the British themselves machine-gunned

the unarmed German seamen fleeing across the ice from the freighter *Altmark* in 1940, and had they not shot at the drowning seamen from the minesweeper *Ulm* after she went down in 1942? The American submarine crews, it turned out moreover, had operated under precisely the same rules and instructions as the German. This line of defence ultimately impressed the Tribunal, as will be seen: alone of all the defendants, Dönitz was tacitly allowed the defence of *tu quoque* and he was exonerated over his conduct of submarine warfare. He was convicted on what was seemingly a technicality, of having failed to question Hitler's order for the execution of Allied saboteurs and commandos. Scores of Allied naval officers later wrote to Admiral Dönitz, disowning the Tribunal's verdict. Judge Biddle drafted a dissenting verdict with regard to Counts Two and Three against the admiral, but was dissuaded from putting it in.

Hitler's 1940 invasion of Norway, Operation *WESERÜBUNG*, produced a classic example of how unresponsive the victorious governments were to the needs of justice. Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel's lawyers challenged the British government in March 1946 to produce certain foreign office and cabinet documents relating to Churchill's identical plans for the invasion of neutral Scandinavia. The request caused a mild panic in Whitehall. Cabinet secretary Sir Norman Brooke warned the foreign office that when he took the stand Keitel was expected to claim that Hitler's invasion of Norway had been undertaken to anticipate a Franco-British plan to go into Norway. The embarrassing thing, said Brooke, was that this defence claim was true – it would 'be supported by documents captured by the Germans in France including records of the meetings of the Supreme War Council.'

Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin took the matter up with Attlee, his prime minister. 'I spoke to you the other day,' he wrote, 'about the likelihood that the Germans at the Nuremberg trial would use various documents which they captured in France to justify their invasion of Norway on the ground that they thereby forestalled an Allied invasion and I mentioned that the attorney-general wishes to have authority to put in at Nuremberg certain Foreign Office telegrams and a cabinet document to refute this defence.' Although no partisan of Churchill, Bevin was flatly opposed to allowing such documents to be produced. Like the Russians, he feared that the Nuremberg trial might open up a can of worms. 'If we once begin,' he argued, 'it might be very difficult to know where we could call a halt as one telegram refers to another and we might bring up embarrassing references to the Finnish phase of our war plans.' (In 1940 both Churchill and his predecessor Neville Chamberlain had planned to join the Finnish war against the Soviet Union.) Sir Norman Brooke advised the prime minister candidly, 'It would be very much better not to be drawn at all into the business of establishing arguments by the production of documents – especially when we do not know precisely what captured documents the other side may have.' Thus real history went by the board. Britain's name was protected, and Keitel and Jodl, denied the documents they asked for, could hang.

Note: I think this gives already enough insight about what went on at the trials. Should the reader be interested in more information, they are to be found in the last 250 pages

of "Nuremberg: The Last Battle" by Irving.

Summary

"The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value." Article 19. of the so-called "tribunal".

"The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof [...]" Article 21. of the "tribunal".

The Nuremberg show trials refers to a series of orchestrated lynchings held after World War II, in which the prominent members of the political, military and economic leadership of National Socialist Germany were tried for the purpose of public amusement, to make it look like Allied/Soviet propaganda was the truth and to justify Allied/Soviet war crimes. The USSR commonly held show trials of the same nature for its citizens. According to the victors' opinion, the "courts" had to judge sins against humanity, unbelievable vicious sins, that never-ever occurred before. No wonder, that serving such a majestic purpose, the "courts" had no time and energy for petty, unimportant details like lawfulness, correct evidence procedure, impartial court and judges. The "laws" according to which they "judged", were inaugurated after the 'sins' happened, on a completely other place, than where the 'sins' happened. Certain key evidence did not need any kind of proof, and the "court" decided, which evidence fell into the "apparent" category. To "prove" such "apparent facts" any confession was a proof, also such ones, that were extorted from tortured defendants.

In summary, the courts were highly-politicized kangaroo courts, who usually gave the death penalty or lengthy prison sentences for activities, that were not under penalty, when they were committed and where they were committed. Therefore these "courts" turned law upside down, and were completely illegal. Defendants were tortured before the process, especially Julius Streicher, who was kept four days long naked in Freising in a prison cell in February, with the windows opened, chained, negroes and whites spew into his mouth, he was not given water to drink, and was forced to drink from the latrine. He lost 40% of his hearing capability due to the torture. After he mentioned his tortures at the 'court', they ordered to exclude his report from the records due to 'contravention' of the 'court'. With this they implicitly acknowledged, that they ordered the tortures. The trials were held in the city of Nuremberg, Germany, from 1945 to 1949, at the Nuremberg Palace of "Justice". The first and best known of these trials was the "Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (IMT)", which tried 24 of the most important captured leaders of Germany. It was held from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946. The second set of trials of lesser "war criminals" was conducted under Control Council Law No. 10 at the U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT), among them included the Doctors' Trial and the Judges' Trial.

Papers released on January 2, 2006 from the British War Cabinet in London have shown that as early as December 1942, the Cabinet had discussed their policy for the punishment of the leading Germans, if captured. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had then advocated a policy of summary execution with the use of an Act of Attainder to circumvent legal obstacles, and was only dissuaded from this by pressure from the U.S. later in the war. In late 1943, during the Tripartite Dinner Meeting at the Tehran Conference, the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, proposed executing 50,000-100,000 German staff officers. Not realizing that Stalin was serious, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt? joked that perhaps 49,000 would do. Churchill denounced the idea of “the cold blooded execution of soldiers who fought for their country.” However, he also stated that “war criminals” must pay for their crimes, and that in accordance with the Moscow Document which he himself had written, they should be tried at the places where the crimes were committed. Churchill was vigorously opposed to executions “for political purposes.”

U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., suggested a plan for the total denazification of Germany; this was known as the Morgenthau Plan. The plan advocated the forced de-industrialization of Germany, along with forced labour and other draconian measures similar to those that allegedly the Germans themselves had planned for Jews. Both Churchill? and Roosevelt? supported this plan, and went as far as attempting its authorization at the Quebec Conference in September 1944. However, the Soviet Union announced its preference for a judicial process. Later, details were leaked to the public, generating widespread protest. Roosevelt, seeing strong public disapproval, abandoned the plan, but did not proceed to adopt support for another position on the matter. The demise of the Morgenthau Plan created the need for an alternative method of dealing with the National socialist leadership. The plan for the “Trial of European War Criminals” was drafted by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and the War Department. Roosevelt died in April 1945. The new president, Harry S. Truman, gave strong approval for a judicial process. After a series of negotiations between the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, details of the trial were worked out. The trials were set to commence on November 20, 1945, in the city of Nuremberg.

At the meetings in Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam (1945), the three major wartime powers, the United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, agreed on the format of punishment for those responsible for by the victors defined “war-crimes” during World War II. France was also awarded a place on the tribunal. The legal basis for the trial was established by the London Charter, issued on August 8, 1945, which restricted the trial to “punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries”. Some 200 German “war crimes” defendants were tried at Nuremberg, and 1,600 others were tried under the traditional channels of military justice. The legal basis for the jurisdiction of the court was that defined by the Instrument of Surrender of Germany, political authority for Germany had been transferred to the Allied Control Council, which according to its own opinion having sovereign power over Germany could choose to punish violations of international law and the laws of war. Because the court was limited to violations of the

self defined laws of war, it did not have jurisdiction over crimes that took place before the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939.

The restriction of trial and punishment by the international tribunal to personnel of the Axis countries has led to accusations of victor's justice and that Allied war crimes could not be tried. It is, however, usual that the armed forces of a "civilized" country issue their forces with detailed guidance on what is and is not permitted under their military code. These are drafted to include any international treaty obligations and the customary laws of war. For example at the trial of Otto Skorzeny his defence was in part based on the Field Manual published by the War Department of the United States Army, on 1 October 1940, and the American Soldiers' Handbook. If a member of the armed forces breaks their own military code then they can expect to face a court martial. When members of the Allied armed forces broke their military codes, they could be and were tried, as, for example, at the Biscari Massacre trials. The by terror forced unconditional surrender of the Axis powers was unusual and led directly to the formation of the "international" tribunals. Usually international wars end conditionally and the treatment of suspected war criminals makes up part of the peace treaty. In most cases those who are not prisoners of war are tried under their own judicial system if they are suspected of committing war crimes – as happened the end of the concurrent Continuation War. In restricting the international tribunal to trying suspected Axis war crimes, the Allies were acting within their self defined "international" law.

The main Nuremberg Trial had 24 accused. They were mostly widely unknown lower officers of the third Empire, since Hitler and Goebbels committed suicide, Bormann disappeared, and Himmler was presumably murdered by Britons. The only accused high national socialist officer was Hermann Göring.

Martin Bormann, Successor to Hess as Party Secretary. Sentenced to death in absentia, remains found in 1972: Sentenced to death.

Karl Dönitz, Leader of the Kriegsmarine from 1943, succeeded Raeder. Initiator of the U-boat campaign. Became President of Germany following Hitler's death. In evidence presented at the trial of Karl Dönitz on his orders to the U-boat fleet to breach the London Rules, Admiral Chester Nimitz stated that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that nation entered the war. Dönitz was found guilty of breaching the 1936 Second London Naval Treaty, but his sentence was not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare: 10 years imprisonment.

Hans Frank, Reich Law Leader 1933-1945 and Governor-General of the General Government in occupied Poland 1939-1945. Expressed repentance: Sentenced to death.

Wilhelm Frick, Hitler's Minister of the Interior 1933-1943 and Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia 1943-1946. Authored the Nuremberg Race Laws: Sentenced to death.

Hans Fritzsche, Popular radio commentator, and head of the news division of the Pro-

paganda Ministry. Tried in place of Joseph Goebbels: Acquitted.

Walther Funk, Hitler's Minister of Economics. Succeeded Schacht as head of the Reichsbank. Released due to ill health on May 16, 1957: Life imprisonment.

Hermann Göring, Reichsmarschall, Commander of the Luftwaffe 1935-1945, Chief of the 4-Year Plan 1936-1945, and several departments of the SS. Committed suicide the night before his execution: Sentenced to death.

Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, flew to Scotland in 1941 in attempt to broker peace with Great Britain. After trial, committed to Spandau Prison; died in 1987, murdered in prison at the age of 93: Life imprisonment.

Alfred Jodl, Wehrmacht Generaloberst, Keitel's subordinate and Chief of the O.K.W.'s Operations Division 1938-1945. Subsequently exonerated by German court in 1953: Sentenced to death.

Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Highest surviving SS-leader. Chief of RSHA 1943-45, the central intelligence organ. Also, commanded many of the Einsatzgruppen and several labour camps: Sentenced to death.

Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Major industrialist. C.E.O of Krupp A.G 1912-45. Medically unfit for trial. The prosecutors attempted to substitute his son Alfried (who ran Krupp for his father during most of the war) in the indictment, but the judges rejected this as being too close to trial. Alfried was tried in a separate Nuremberg trial for his use of slave labor, thus escaping the worst notoriety and possibly death: Unfit for trial.

Baron Konstantin von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1932-1938, succeeded by Ribbentrop. Later, Protector of Bohemia and Moravia 1939-43. Resigned in 1943 due to dispute with Hitler. Released (ill health) November 6, 1954: 15 years imprisonment.

Franz von Papen, Chancellor of Germany in 1932 and Vice-Chancellor under Hitler in 1933-1934. Ambassador to Austria 1934-38 and ambassador to Turkey 1939-1944. Although acquitted at Nuremberg, von Papen was reclassified as a war criminal in 1947 by a German de-Nazification court, and sentenced to eight years' hard labour. He was acquitted following appeal after serving two years: Acquitted.

Erich Raeder, Commander In Chief of the Kriegsmarine from 1928 until his retirement in 1943, succeeded by Dönitz. Released (ill health) September 26, 1955: Life imprisonment.

Joachim von Ribbentrop, Ambassador-Plenipotentiary 1935-1936. Ambassador to the United Kingdom 1936-1938. Minister of Foreign Affairs 1938-1945: Sentenced to death.

Alfred Rosenberg, Racial theory ideologist. Later, Minister of the Eastern Occupied Territories 1941-1945: Sentenced to death.

Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia 1927-1945. Plenipotentiary of the labor program

1942-1945, that also used concentration camp inmates: Sentenced to death.

Hjalmar Schacht, Prominent banker and economist. Pre-war president of the Reichsbank 1923-1930 & 1933-1938 and Economics Minister 1934-1937. Admitted to violating the Treaty of Versailles: Acquitted.

Baldur von Schirach, Head of the Hitlerjugend from 1933 to 1940, Gauleiter of Vienna 1940-1943. Expressed repentance: 20 years imprisonment.

Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Instrumental in the Anschluss and briefly Austrian Chancellor 1938. Deputy to Frank in Poland 1939-1940. Later, Reich Commissioner of the occupied Netherlands 1940-1945. Expressed repentance: Sentenced to death.

Albert Speer, Hitler's favorite architect and personal friend, and Minister of Armaments from 1942. In this capacity, he was ultimately responsible for the use of so called slave labourers from the occupied territories in armaments production. Expressed repentance: 20 years imprisonment.

Julius Streicher, Gauleiter of Franconia 1922-1945. According to the court, he incited hatred against the Jews through his weekly newspaper, *Der Stürmer*: Sentenced to death.

The Chief Justice of the United States Harlan Fiske Stone called the Nuremberg trials a fraud. He said "Chief US prosecutor Jackson is away conducting his high-grade lynching party in Nuremberg," he wrote. "I don't mind what he does to the Nazis, but I hate to see the pretense that he is running a court and proceeding according to common law. This is a little too sanctimonious a fraud to meet my old-fashioned ideas." Associate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas charged that the Allies were guilty of "substituting power for principle" at Nuremberg. "I thought at the time and still think that the Nuremberg trials were unprincipled," he wrote. "Law was created ex post facto to suit the passion and clamor of the time."

- The main Soviet judge, Nikitchenko, had taken part in Stalin's show trials of 1936-1938.

- One of the charges, brought against Keitel, Jodl, and Ribbentrop included conspiracy to commit aggression against Poland in 1939. Poland's belligerent and provocative activities towards Germany between 1919 - 1939 were disregarded. The Secret Protocols of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, proposed the partition of Poland between the Germans and the Soviets (which was subsequently executed in September 1939); however, Soviet leaders were not tried for being part of the same conspiracy. Instead, the Tribunal outrageously and falsely proclaimed the Secret Protocols of the Non-Aggression Pact to be a "forgery". Moreover, Allied Powers Britain and Soviet Union were not tried for preparing and conducting the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the Winter War, respectively.

- The court agreed to relieve the Soviet leadership from attending these trials as war criminals in order to hide their crimes against war civilians, crimes that were committed by their army that included "carving up Poland in 1939, subsuming the Baltic States, and attacking Finland three months later." This "exclusion request" was initiated by the

Soviets and subsequently approved by the court's administration.

- The trials were conducted under their own rules of evidence; the indictments were created ex post facto and were not based on any nation's law; the tu quoque defense was removed; and some claim the entire spirit of the assembly was "victors' justice". The Charter of the International Military Tribunal permitted the use of normally inadmissible "evidence". Article 19 specified that "The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence... and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value". Article 21 of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) Charter stipulated that:

- "The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the United [Allied] Nations, including acts and documents of the committees set up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes, and the records and findings of military and other Tribunals of any of the United [Allied] Nations"

- The chief Soviet prosecutor submitted false documentation in an attempt to indict defendants for the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn forest near Smolensk. However, the other Allied prosecutors refused to support the indictment and German lawyers promised to mount an embarrassing defence. No-one was charged nor found guilty at Nuremberg for the Katyn Forest massacre. In 1990, the Soviet government acknowledged that the Katyn massacre was carried out, not by the Germans, but by the Soviet secret police.

According to British Field-Marshal Montgomery, the Germans had one sin: They lost the war. Maurice Bardeche wrote in his book, that a judgement signed by victors cannot be acceptable. U.S. Senator Robert Taft condemned the postwar Nuremberg Trials as "victors' justice" in which the people who won the war were the prosecutors, the judges and the alleged victims, all at the same time. Taft condemned the trials as a violation of the most basic principles of American justice and internationally accepted standards of justice. Senator John F. Kennedy in his best-selling Profiles in Courage, applauded Taft's principled stand, even in the face of great criticism.

Indicative of the largely political nature of the Nuremberg process was the important Jewish role in organizing these trials. Nahum Goldmann, one-time president of both the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization, reported in his memoir that the Nuremberg Tribunal was the brain-child of World Jewish Congress officials. Only after persistent effort were WJC officials able to persuade Allied leaders to accept the idea, he added. The World Jewish Congress also played an important but less obvious role in the day to day proceedings. Above all, the powerful but secretive organization made sure that Germany's persecution of the Jews was a primary focus of the trials, and that the defendants were punished for their involvement in that process.

Two Jewish officers in the US Army: Lieutenant Colonel Murray Bernays and Colonel David "Mickey" Marcus, played key roles in the Nuremberg enterprise. In the words of

historian Robert Conot, Bernays was “the guiding spirit leading the way to Nuremberg.” Bernays, a successful New York attorney, persuaded US War Secretary Henry Stimson and others to accept the idea of putting the defeated German leaders on trial. /10 Marcus, a fervent Zionist, became the “number three man in making American policy” in occupied Germany. As chief of the US government’s War Crimes Branch in 1946 and 1947, he selected almost all of the judges, prosecutors and lawyers for the Nuremberg NMT Trials. (He later became a commander of Zionist “Haganah” military forces in Palestine.)

Dodd, the second judge at Nuremberg, had his private letters published by his son, Senator Dodd. In it, Dodd sen. stated that IMT staffers were 75% jewish and will be accused later of undue manipulation since they will not hold back influencing the trial. An also interesting read is the 55 page book “Not guilty at Nuremberg” by Carlos Porter which can be found as PDF with a quick online search.

13.3 The Marshall Plan

When establishment historians consider the Marshall Plan, its intents and purposes and alleged successes, they typically make at least two errors—one in logic and the other in history. First, they assume that since Europe began to revive at about the time the Marshall Plan was implemented then that revival must have been because of the plan, not in spite of it. Second, they fail to make any mention of the forces in the background that had a much different purpose in mind: specifically, how to use the Marshall Plan to further their internationalist agenda. One example of a “court historian” providing his readers with the accepted view of the Marshall Plan is Robert V. Remini, professor emeritus at the University of Chicago, and author of numerous books on the American republic’s early figures, such as Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams and Daniel Webster. In 2005 Remini was appointed the Historian of the U.S. House of Representatives. Remini thus serves as the perfect example of someone who knows his history but fails to tell all he knows, especially when it comes to the Marshall Plan. In his “A Short History of the United States” Remini had this to say about the Marshall Plan:

“Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, then devised a plan, which he outlined in a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, by which the United States would assist European nations to rebuild their shattered economies. . . . Between April 1948 and December 1951, the United States contributed a little over \$12 billion to Europe... By 1951 Europe had not only achieved its prewar level of production but its level of industrial production rose to virtually guarantee prosperity for the future.”

There it is: the United States, out of the goodness of its heart, gave five percent of its gross national product with no strings attached to European nations to help them get back on their feet. And it worked! Look! By 1951 Europe had fully recovered!

It is tempting to ascribe malevolent intentions to Remini. But that does not preclude asking some questions and pointing out some errors of commission and omission in

his establishment view. For instance, who wrote Marshall's speech? What was that ghost writer's intentions? Did he have connections to others behind the scenes who had differing purposes? And did Europe begin to recover because of Marshall Plan aid, or had that recovery begun long before any aid arrived? And what about the miracle of Germany—known as *Wirtschaftswunder*, or “economic miracle”—that began on Sunday, June 20th, 1948? (This was the day that Germany's economic director, Ludwig Erhard, eliminated all price controls which unleashed Germany's economy, entirely independently of any Marshall Plan aid.) And what about the Marshall Plan's alleged success as creating the justification for decades of additional foreign aid because it had been so successful in reviving Europe? Let's get some perspective. VE (Victory in Europe) Day was May 7, 1945. VJ (Victory over Japan) Day was August 14, 1945. President Franklin Roosevelt had died on April 12, 1945 and the new president, Harry Truman was sworn into office that same day. The national elections in November 1946 shifted control of the House of Representatives to the Republicans, gaining 55 seats compared to the previous Congress. The nation was weary of war. 418,000 Americans had died in that conflict and had cost the nation \$288 billion. In today's money, that's nearly \$5 trillion! The very last thing Americans wanted was any further involvement in world affairs. It just wanted to get back to whatever normal used to be.

It was not to be. The Soviet Union began to flex its muscles when it refused to withdraw its troops from Iran under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement. Truman had sent his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, to the Moscow Conference in December of 1945 asking him to confront Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin on the matter, and when Byrnes returned he told Truman of his “success.” It turned out that there had been no discussion about Iran after all, and Truman blew up. In a letter to Byrnes, Truman wrote:

“Without these supplies furnished by the United States, Russia would have been ignominiously defeated. Yet now Russia stirs up rebellion and keeps troops on the soil of her friend and ally—Iran. . . Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand: “how many divisions do you have?” I do not think we should play compromise any longer. . . I am tired of babying the Soviets.”

James Byrnes is the first in a long list of characters who were heavily involved in setting post-war foreign policy under the new president. Byrnes had deep ties to the Progressive movement dating back to the Wilson administration. In fact, Byrnes had become so close to Wilson that the president would often entrust important political tasks to him rather than to older, more experienced individuals. Years later Byrnes supported President Roosevelt in his efforts to pack the Supreme Court in 1937, and Roosevelt returned the favor by appointing Byrnes to that court in 1941. The next on that list involved in influencing American foreign policy was George Kennan, Deputy Chief of the Mission of the United States to the USSR. It was his mission to confirm Truman's suspicions that the Soviets weren't to be trusted, and that only a policy of “containment” would serve American interests best. In his long telegram to the U.S. Treasury Department in

February, 1946, he noted that relations with the Soviets

“involve questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into [a] single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be a dangerous degree of oversimplification. I hope, therefore, [that you] will bear with me if I submit an answer [in] five parts“

Among those “five parts” were Kennan’s perceptions that the USSR “perceived itself [to be] at perpetual war with capitalism,” that the USSR would use friendly Marxists residing in the west as allies in that war, that Soviet aggression was rooted in “historic Russian nationalism and neurosis,” and that its governmental structure “prohibited objective or accurate pictures of internal and external reality.” In other words, it was going to be impossible to deal rationally with them and so the United States would have to “contain” their aggressions by building up nation states around them as a protective shield. Not surprisingly, Kennan’s long telegram was published in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* magazine, the print mouthpiece for the now well-known internationalist Council on Foreign Relations. Kennan’s influence in cementing America’s rejection of non-interventionism was noted by historian John Lewis Gaddis who said that Kennan supported the notion that “only the prospect of an undifferentiated global threat could shake Americans out of their isolationist tendencies that remained latent among them.”

Kennan was certainly up to the task of removing those latent isolationist tendencies. Near the end of his life (he died in March 2005 at age 101), establishment journal *Foreign Policy* (part of the liberal Washington Post empire) called Kennan “the most influential diplomat of the 20th century,” while internationalist Henry Kissinger said that Kennan “came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.” Kennan was one of the six insiders exposed in the 1986 book “*The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*” which included Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson, FDR’s “special envoy” W. Averill Harriman, Truman’s Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, US High Commissioner to Germany John J. McCloy and Soviet ambassador Charles “Chip” Bohlen. Authors Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas described them as the hidden architects behind the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the entire concept of Soviet power “containment” which ruled America’s foreign policy for 40 years. The authors’ favorable treatment of these “hidden architects” earned high praise (once again from the Council on Foreign Relations) which called it

“a sober and straight-forward account of what actually happened and why. . . In this context the book does a great service. It restores balance to our recent history, and some sheen to its heroes. It may generate a much-needed movement to correct revisionist history. It should be read.“

The first step towards the yet to be formalized Marshall Plan was the Truman Doctrine, officially announced by the president in March 1947 to the Congress. At that moment in time both Greece and Turkey were allegedly being threatened by communist insurgents

supported directly and indirectly by Stalin. The Greek Civil War of 1946 was raging, and Truman was told that if Greece went communist, then Turkey would be next. These two countries controlled both the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, gateways from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Truman saw this as a “pincer” movement that could threaten the west’s access to the Middle East’s oil, and so it was therefore in the national interest of the United States to intervene. In his speech to Congress Truman echoed the sentiments of Kennan and said that it was now “the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

Support by Joseph Stalin of the local communist bands would later be questioned but by that time the die had been cast: it was now in America’s interests to intervene in other countries’ affairs in the name of fighting Soviet communism. Some \$400 million in technical and military aid was approved by Congress to Greece and Turkey which was enough to neutralize the unproved communist threat and the Greek Civil War ended in 1949. But to implement the border of states “containing” the Soviet threat would take huge amounts of money and none of the war-devastated economies of France, Germany, Italy or England were in a position to help. That left the United States as the funding mechanism. With the help of two of the “Wise Men,” George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, George C. Marshall designed and then formally announced his plan in a speech (written by Bohlen) at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. Bohlen was an insider and a “specialist” in Soviet affairs almost from the moment he graduated from Harvard in 1927. He joined the State department in 1929, learning Russian and joining the staff of the American embassy in Moscow in 1934. He worked on Soviet “issues” in the State Department, accompanying Soviet spy Harry Hopkins on numerous trips to visit with Joseph Stalin. Unfavorable attention was focused on him by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1953 when President Eisenhower named him as ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Once Bohlen’s speech was given by General Marshall, formally launching the plan to aid Europe, representatives from 16 countries lined up at the trough, putting forth budgets for reconstruction that would require between *16 billion and 22 billion* of American money to accomplish. Initially called the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA), but later renamed the European Recovery Program (ERP), the plan ran into stiff resistance in Congress which debated the matter for ten months. This was enough time for the “Wise Men” and the heads of major corporate and union interests to persuade the newly-elected and firmly isolationist Congress to change their minds. President Truman enlisted the help of Hiland Vatcheller (president of Allegheny-Ludlum Steel), W. Randolph Burgess (vice-chairman of National City Bank of New York), Paul G. Hoffman (president of Studebaker Corporation) and Will Clayton (partner in Anderson, Clayton and Company, the world’s largest cotton trading company). When the idea of the Marshall Plan began to develop in the minds of Kennan and Bohlen, Clayton and his business cohorts saw an opportunity. With potentially billions of dollars of taxpayer monies in the offing, Clayton said: “Let us admit right off, we need markets—big markets—in which to buy and sell.” And so

Clayton led the charge to change Congress' mind, support the budding Marshall Plan and in so doing, also implement the "Wise Men's" plan to implement the new internationalist American foreign policy.

In what stands as one of the most convenient and coincidental accidents of history, Czechoslovakia was seized by the communists in February of 1948—thus "proving" the need for American intervention through the Marshall Plan—and Congress caved in, passing ERP—the Marshall Plan—overwhelmingly, on March 31st. President Truman signed it into law three days later, committing the U. S. government to "invest" \$13 billion of taxpayer monies in "rebuilding" Europe as part of Kennan's plan to defend the United States against Soviet aggression. In effect, the Marshall Plan, as Tucker put it, "was a political maneuver to loot American taxpayers to keep influential American corporations on the government dole. The plan's legacy was the egregious and perpetual use of foreign aid for domestic [political] and economic purposes."

Seen then in the light of the "revisionist history" decried by Foreign Affairs, it is clear what the Marshall Plan was really all about. The plan's official intentions included 1) meeting the immediate needs of citizens of those countries ravaged by the recent war for food, medicine and housing, 2) rebuilding infrastructure such as factories, railroads and bridges and 3) establishing financial stability in the ravaged economies. But buried in the language was its primary purpose: "create a common market free of national trade barriers," the birth of the now increasingly discredited and devolving European Union. Modern historians have not only failed to see the real purposes behind the Marshall Plan but have lauded its perceived successes. In his highly entertaining book, "The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History," noted revisionist historian Thomas Woods explained what really happened:

"The fact is that this program worked no better than any other government giveaway program. France, Germany and Italy began their economic recoveries before any Marshall Plan aid was disbursed. Austria and Greece, which received sizable amounts of Marshall Plan aid. . . began to recover only as it was being phased out."

Some economists saw through the sham. Henry Hazlitt, writing in his weekly column for Newsweek magazine in November, 1947, warned that what Europe needed was not foreign aid dumped onto governments to be dispersed according to some grand central plan developed by government "experts." The problem Europe faced in rebuilding its economies was that the governments were themselves strangling the economy with controls, limits, regulations and price controls left over from Hitler's domination of those countries.

Myth 1: The Marshall Plan was a significant factor in West European recovery.

"In nearly every country occupied by Germany during the war, the stringent system of Nazi economic controls was continued even after the country was liberated. And in each case, rapid economic growth occurred only after the controls were lifted and sound economic policy [was] established. This happened irrespective of the timing [or the]

extent of Marshall Plan aid.”

In fact, the German economic recovery had nothing to do with any such aid. It had to do with a radical and abrupt return to sound economic principles, and sanity. That return took place on Sunday, June 20th, 1948, when Germany’s economic director, Ludwig Erhard (following the advice of his mentor, Wilhelm Röpke) replaced the Reichsmark with the Deutschemark which effectively reduced the money supply by 93 percent, and eliminated the deadly price controls that had inflicted inevitable shortages on the German people. When American advisor U.S. General Lucius Clay learned about Erhard’s unilateral decision, the following conversation took place:

Clay: Herr Erhard, my advisers tell me what you have done is a terrible mistake. What do you say to that?

Erhard: Herr General, pay no attention to them! My advisers tell me the same thing!

A few days later Erhard was confronted by U.S Army Colonel Oberst:

Oberst: How dare you relax our rationing system, when there is a widespread food shortage?

Erhard: But, Herr Oberst, I have relaxed nothing. I have abolished it! Henceforth, the only rationing ticket people will need will be the [new] Deutschemark. And they will work hard to get those Deutschemarks, just wait and see.

Within days the German economy began to revive. Within the first month production increased by an estimated 50 percent, and monthly gains exceeded many later yearly gains, according to Cowen.

Myth 2: The Marshall Plan encouraged the development of free enterprise and sound economic policy.

“The truth is that those directing postwar U.S. foreign economic policy had strong interventionist sympathies: when faced with any problem, their instinct was to see a governmental solution. . . . Example: for every dollar that the ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] gave a foreign government, that government had to set aside on equivalent amount. . . . to be used for public works, public investments, and similar state projects. As a result, every US dollar sent to a foreign government [forced] that government to take another from its own private sector.”

The Marshall Plan disrupted and sometimes severely damaged local economies. For instance, prior to the war half of Greece’s export earnings came from tobacco. But as Cowen pointed out, during the first year:

“The Marshall Plan funded the export of 40,000 tons of American tobacco to Europe [and] Greek exports fell to 2,500 tons a year and never recovered.”

And as far as “sound economic policy” was concerned, the Marshall Plan funds were simply government-to-government transfers which encouraged political chicanery. Noted Cowen:

“As more American aid was funneled through the Greek government, graft and corruption increased. Major scandals were being uncovered monthly. It was only in 1953 that Greece began to recover—the year when U.S. aid was cut to \$25 million.”

Myth 3: The Marshall Plan boosted the American economy.

“The \$13 billion given to the Marshall Plan resulted in the loss of \$13 billion worth of goods and services to the U.S. domestic economy.”

Actually the losses to the American taxpayer were much greater due to slippage, overcharging, fraud, and the failure to account for aid given prior to the enactment of the Marshall Plan. Current estimates of American aid to Europe approach *44 billion, or about 420 billion* in today’s money. Cowen further noted that “a year after the Marshall Plan began sucking private capital out of the economy, the U.S. fell into recession, precisely the opposite of what its proponents predicted.”

Myth 4: The operation of the Marshall Plan was not strongly influenced by domestic U.S. special interests.

“The very conception of the Marshall Plan implied that it was partially designed to serve special business interests. . . All of the aid channeled through the ECA was linked to purchases of particular U.S. goods and services. In this regard, the Marshall Plan subsidized some U.S. businesses at the expense of the U.S. taxpayer. The original Marshall Plan legislation, for instance, required that at least half of all U.S.-financed ECA goods be shipped in vessels of American registry with American insurance. Even Paul Hoffman, head of the ECA, admitted that this stipulation cost “millions of dollars” because American vessels were not always the cheapest available. . . This period also saw the shipment of 65,000 trucks to Europe, despite the dreadful condition of Western Europe’s roads and the serious gas shortage.”

Even American oil companies got in on the act. Said Cowen:

“When U.S. companies started selling Mideast oil through the ECA, it was sold at the higher price of Texas Gulf oil plus the transport price of shipping the oil from the Texas Gulf across the Atlantic. . . If the Europeans tried to buy their oil elsewhere. . . they would lose the ECA subsidy...”

Myth 5: American postwar foreign economic policy was one of free trade and the “Open Door.”

“During this time, only 55 percent of U.S. imports [from Europe] were duty-free, and most of the tariffs were not trivial. . . On manufactured items, the tariff ranged as high as 30 to 40 percent [while] tariffs on minerals and raw materials were [only] slightly lower. . . Contrary to popular belief, U.S. trade policy was dominated by restrictive, bilateral trading agreements, not “Open Door” multilateralism.”

The Marshall Plan failed, then, to bring the publicly stated relief that was used to sell the plan to the United States Congress, but succeeded greatly in furthering the goals of

the “Wise Men” and their crony capitalist accomplices. In sum, the Marshall Plan worked against the interests of those who needed help the most, the citizens of the war-torn European continent as well as against the U.S. taxpayer. But through their close ties to the “Wise Men,” people like Vatcheller, Burgess, Hoffman and Clayton turned Marshall Plan aid into their own private chocolate waterfall of government aid, and leaving, as Tucker noted:

“the actual legacy of the Marshall Plan [as] a vast expansion of government at home, the beginnings of the Cold War rhetoric that would sustain the welfare-warfare state for 40 years, a permanent global troop presence, and an entire business class on the take from Washington. It also created a belief on the part of the ruling elite in D.C. that it could trick the public into backing anything, including the idea that government and its connected interest groups should run the world at taxpayer expense.”

Now that the Marshall Plan can be seen for what it was, it can accurately be claimed to have been a success: for the crony capitalists and their enablers, the internationalists. (Note: Estimates regarding the total damage done to Germany’s economy (plunder of patents, de-industrialization, removal of labor etc) reach as high as 300 billion Deutschmark (Germany’s currency after WW2). Germany received around 15 billion Deutschmark through the Marshall Plan.)

13.4 Light in the Darkness

General George S. Patton, Junior, was born 11th November 1885. His homeschooling concentrated on classical literature. Later he went to Virginia Military Academy and a year later was admitted to United States Military Academy at West Point, entering in 1904. Apart from his athletic achievements, he was a member of the riding, fencing, rifle and track teams. In 1909, he was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 15th Cavalry Regiment. In 1912, George Patton represented the United States in Pentathlon, in the Olympic Games, in Stockholm, Sweden. The Pentathlon included 5 classic military skills: horse riding, running, swimming, marksmanship and fencing. In fencing he came first, in riding, third, and he rated overall 5th of the 43 international contestants.

After touring Europe, he returned to the USA as a Weapons Instructor at the Cavalry School. He designed a new sabre, which was adopted for service. In 1916, he was posted to Texas and took part in the Mexican War as aide-de-camp to General Pershing. It is at this time that Patton began to wear two revolvers on his belt. On 14th May 1916, he encountered three mounted bandits and shot two of them dead. Patton returned to HQ with their bodies draped across the bonnet of his car. One of the dead bandits turned out to be General Cardenas, Chief of Pancho Villa’s bodyguard.

In May 1917, Patton sailed to France in command of Pershing’s Head Quarters detachment. Requesting a transfer to a combat post, Patton was assigned by Pershing to establish the tank corp. The US did not have any tanks at this time, and it was Lieutenant

Patton who obtained the first two-man Renault tanks from the French, learnt to operate them and trained other Americans in this new martial art. When Patton accepted the posting, he did not join the Tank Corp, he was the Tank Corp. Overcoming tremendous logistical complications, and now a Major, Patton managed to field 144 Renault tanks in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, September 1918. He was wounded in action and hospitalised for the last days of the war. Between the war years, Patton continued to pioneer Tank Warfare in the U.S. Army. General Patton thought so highly of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, that he kept a copy of Rommel's book on Infantry Tactics near his bedside for night time reading.

General George S. Patton was recognised as the most ferocious General on the Allied side. Known as the man who had never lost a battle, the hero of North Africa and Sicily, Patton was temporarily relieved of command for slapping two uninjured privates convalescing in military hospitals. After distinguishing himself in North Africa, he engaged in a contest against his arch-rival, British General Bernard Law Montgomery. In the race across Sicily to be the first to take Messina, Patton took dangerous tactical chances and pushed his men to the limit. Visiting a field hospital in the crags of Sicily's central highlands, he went from stretcher to stretcher, encouraging the wounded soldiers being treated. He then encountered a Private Charles Kuhl, who was sitting, apparently, uninjured, on a stool.

"Why are you here?", the General demanded. "I guess I can't take it, Sir." The General was furious. "You coward!" he bellowed. "Leave this tent at once!" As Kuhl remained motionless, the General slapped him hard across the face with his gloves. He then lifted the man off the stool by the collar of his uniform and shoved him towards the exit and kicked him in the rear. "You hear me, you yellow bastard, you are going back to the front!" In his Journal, Patton wrote: "If men shirk their duty, they should be tried for cowardice and shot." Two days later, the General wrote a Memo to each of his commanders, Cowards are not to be Tolerated Smallordering them not to allow men suffering from "so-called combat fatigue" to receive medical care. "Such men are cowards and bring disgrace to their comrades, whom they heartlessly leave to endure the dangers of battle, while they themselves use the hospital as a means of escape. You will see that such cases are not sent to the hospital."

On 10th August 1943, Patton encountered a 21-year old, Private Paul Bennett, who was shaking from convulsions and in tears, but apparently uninjured, in a field hospital. "It's my nerves, Sir, I can't stand the shelling anymore." Patton roared: "Your nerves! Hell! You are just a God-damned coward!" As Bennett began sobbing the General slapped him. "Shut-up! I won't have these brave men here who have been shot, see a yellow-bastard sitting here crying!" As the General hit him again, Bennett's helmet fell to the floor. "You are a disgrace to the Army and you are going back to the front to fight. You ought to be lined up against the wall and shot. In fact, I ought to shoot you right now." Patton pulled out his ivory-handled revolver from its holster, with his right hand, as he back-handed Bennett across the face. The medical staff rushed in to intervene and usher the private

out of the tent for his own safety.

When word reached General Eisenhower, he wrote a stern rebuke to General Patton who personally apologised to both soldiers and to the medical staff who had witnessed his actions. A media campaign in the U.S.A. led to such public outrage, that the American Congress called for Patton's immediate dismissal, despite his tremendous achievements on the battlefield. Patton wrote in his journal: "It is sad and shocking to think that victory and the lives of thousands of men are pawns to the writings of a group of unprincipled reporters and weak-kneed congressman, but so it is."

American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, turned to one of his classmates from Columbia Law School, Wild Bill Donovan, to establish the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which became the precursor to the CIA. The OSS did the dirty work of assassinations on FDR's instructions. Donovan ensured that Tito's Communist partisans waging guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia received lavish quantities of American tanks, trucks and jeeps, hundreds of tonnes of armaments and ammunition, landmines and heavy machine guns. This undercover battle, led by Donovan and the OSS, ensured that Eastern Europe fell into the hands of the Soviet Union. General Walter Bedell Smith, wrote to Winston Churchill that Donovan was "out of control" with "a predilection for political intrigue". Donovan reported only to the president of the United States. FDR authorised Donovan to set up the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Donovan had no moral, or ethical, qualms about dealing with communists. He channelled millions of Dollars to the Chinese communists of Mao Tse Tung, to fight against America's official ally, Nationalist China, under General Chiang Kai-Shek. Donovan operated a secret slush fund provided by congress and its War Agencies Appropriations Act 1944. Donovan spent it anyway he liked, without any regard to oversight, or legality. The money was meant to cover his far-flung spy and sabotage operations throughout Europe and Asia. Under the authority of FDR, Wild Bill ordered many political assassinations.

General Dwight Eisenhower ordered the 4 million Allied soldiers in Germany to halt on the West bank of the Elbe River, 60 miles short of Berlin, to enable the Red Army to seize the German capital. General Patton was seized with fury: "Some of our leaders are just damn fools who have no idea of Russian history. Hell, I doubt if they even knew that Russia, just less than 100 years ago, owned Finland, sucked the blood out of Poland and were using Siberia as a prison for their own people. How Stalin must have sneered when he got through with them at all those phony conferences." "Letting the Russians take Berlin is folly" declared Patton, "We should push on as far to the East as possible. We shouldn't stop before Moscow." The Soviets maintained a strangle-hold on Eastern Europe for 45 years. Millions of civilian refugees fleeing towards the American lines were turned back at bayonet point. Millions ended up as slave labour in Soviet Concentration camps.

On 17th April, Patton's single engine L5 Sentinel propeller plane was attacked head on, by a Spitfire bearing British Royal Air Force markings. Despite Patton's Spitfire attack SmallL5 being an unarmed American staff plane with American markings, the Spitfire

fired the whole nine yards, tracers flying past the sides of Patton's aircraft as his pilot took evasive action. During the manoeuvres, the British fighter plane crashed into the ground. The General was nagged by a question: Was this Spitfire attack an accident? Or a deliberate assassination attempt?

It was only in the final days of the war and during his tenure as military governor of Germany – after he had gotten to know both the Germans and America's "gallant Soviet allies" – that Patton's understanding of the true situation grew and his opinions changed. In his diary and in many letters to his family, friends, various military colleagues, and government officials, he expressed his new understanding and his apprehensions for the future. His diary and his letters were published in 1974 by the Houghton Mifflin Company under the title *The Patton Papers*. Several months before the end of the war, General Patton had recognized the fearful danger to the West posed by the Soviet Union, and he had disagreed bitterly with the orders which he had been given to hold back his army and wait for the Red Army to occupy vast stretches of German, Czech, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav territory, which the Americans could have easily taken instead.

On May 7, 1945, just before the German capitulation, Patton had a conference in Austria with U.S. Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Patton was gravely concerned over the Soviet failure to respect the demarcation lines separating the Soviet and American occupation zones. He was also alarmed by plans in Washington for the immediate partial demobilization of the U.S. Army. Patton said to Patterson: "Let's keep our boots polished, bayonets sharpened, and present a picture of force and strength to the Red Army. This is the only language they understand and respect." Patterson replied, "Oh, George, you have been so close to this thing so long, you have lost sight of the big picture."

Patton rejoined:

"I understand the situation. Their (the Soviet) supply system is inadequate to maintain them in a serious action such as I could put to them. They have chickens in the coop and cattle on the hoof – that's their supply system. They could probably maintain themselves in the type of fighting I could give them for five days. After that it would make no difference how many million men they have, and if you wanted Moscow I could give it to you. They lived on the land coming down. There is insufficient left for them to maintain themselves going back. Let's not give them time to build up their supplies. If we do, then . . . we have had a victory over the Germans and disarmed them, but we have failed in the liberation of Europe; we have lost the war!"

Patton's urgent and prophetic advice went unheeded by Patterson and the other politicians and only served to give warning about Patton's feelings to the alien conspirators behind the scenes in New York, Washington, and Moscow. The more he saw of the Soviets, the stronger Patton's conviction grew that the proper course of action would be to stifle communism then and there, while the chance existed. Later in May 1945 he attended several meetings and social affairs with top Red Army officers, and he evaluated them carefully. He noted in his diary on May 14:

"I have never seen in any army at any time, including the German Imperial Army of 1912, as severe discipline as exists in the Russian army. The officers, with few exceptions, give the appearance of recently civilized Mongolian bandits."

And Patton's aide, General Hobart Gay, noted in his own journal for May 14: "Everything they (the Russians) did impressed one with the idea of virility and cruelty." Nevertheless, Patton knew that the Americans could whip the Reds then – but perhaps not later. On May 18 he noted in his diary:

"In my opinion, the American Army as it now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because, while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air, tanks, and in the knowledge of the use of the combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these. If it should be necessary to fight the Russians, the sooner we do it the better."

Two days later he repeated his concern when he wrote his wife: "If we have to fight them, now is the time. From now on we will get weaker and they stronger." Having immediately recognized the Soviet danger and urged a course of action which would have freed all of eastern Europe from the communist yoke with the expenditure of far less American blood than was spilled in Korea and Vietnam and would have obviated both those later wars not to mention World War III – Patton next came to appreciate the true nature of the people for whom World War II was fought: the Jews.

Most of the Jews swarming over Germany immediately after the war came from Poland and Russia, and Patton found their personal habits shockingly uncivilized. He was disgusted by their behavior in the camps for Displaced Persons (DP's) which the Americans built for them and even more disgusted by the way they behaved when they were housed in German hospitals and private homes. He observed with horror that "these people do not understand toilets and refuse to use them except as repositories for tin cans, garbage, and refuse . . . They decline, where practicable, to use latrines, preferring to relieve themselves on the floor."

He described in his diary one DP camp,

"where, although room existed, the Jews were crowded together to an appalling extent, and in practically every room there was a pile of garbage in one corner which was also used as a latrine. The Jews were only forced to desist from their nastiness and clean up the mess by the threat of the butt ends of rifles. Of course, I know the expression 'lost tribes of Israel' applied to the tribes which disappeared – not to the tribe of Judah from which the current sons of bitches are descended. However, it is my personal opinion that this too is a lost tribe – lost to all decency."

Patton's initial impressions of the Jews were not improved when he attended a Jewish religious service at Eisenhower's insistence. His diary entry for September 17, 1945, reads in part:

"This happened to be the feast of Yom Kippur, so they were all collected in a large,

wooden building, which they called a synagogue. It behooved General Eisenhower to make a speech to them. We entered the synagogue, which was packed with the greatest stinking bunch of humanity I have ever seen. When we got about halfway up, the head rabbi, who was dressed in a fur hat similar to that worn by Henry VIII of England and in a surplice heavily embroidered and very filthy, came down and met the General . . . The smell was so terrible that I almost fainted and actually about three hours later lost my lunch as the result of remembering it."

These experiences and a great many others firmly convinced Patton that the Jews were an especially unsavory variety of creature and hardly deserving of all the official concern the American government was bestowing on them. Another September diary entry, following a demand from Washington that more German housing be turned over to Jews, summed up his feelings:

"Evidently the virus started by Morgenthau and Baruch of a Semitic revenge against all Germans is still working. Harrison (a U.S. State Department official) and his associates indicate that they feel German civilians should be removed from houses for the purpose of housing Displaced Persons. There are two errors in this assumption. First, when we remove an individual German we punish an individual German, while the punishment is – not intended for the individual but for the race. Furthermore, it is against my Anglo-Saxon conscience to remove a person from a house, which is a punishment, without due process of law. In the second place, Harrison and his ilk believe that the Displaced Person is a human being, which he is not, and this applies particularly to the Jews, who are lower than animals."

One of the strongest factors in straightening out General Patton's thinking on the conquered Germans was the behavior of America's controlled news media toward them. At a press conference in Regensburg, Germany, on May 8, 1945, immediately after Germany's surrender, Patton was asked whether he planned to treat captured SS troops differently from other German POW's. His answer was:

"No. SS means no more in Germany than being a Democrat in America – that is not to be quoted. I mean by that that initially the SS people were special sons of bitches, but as the war progressed they ran out of sons of bitches and then they put anybody in there. Some of the top SS men will be treated as criminals, but there is no reason for trying someone who was drafted into this outfit..."

Despite Patton's request that his remark not be quoted, the press eagerly seized on it, and Jews and their front men in America screamed in outrage over Patton's comparison of the SS and the Democratic Party as well as over his announced intention of treating most SS prisoners humanely. With great reluctance, and only after repeated promptings from Eisenhower, he had thrown German families out of their homes to make room for more than a million Jewish DP's but he balked when ordered to begin blowing up German factories, in accord with the infamous Morgenthau Plan to destroy Germany's economic basis forever. In his diary he wrote:

"I doubted the expediency of blowing up factories, because the ends for which the factories are being blown up – that is, preventing Germany from preparing for war – can be equally well attained through the destruction of their machinery, while the buildings can be used to house thousands of homeless persons."

Similarly, he expressed his doubts to his military colleagues about the overwhelming emphasis being placed on the persecution of every German who had formerly been a member of the National Socialist party. In a letter to his wife of September 14, 1945, he said:

"I am frankly opposed to this war criminal stuff. It is not cricket and is Semitic. I am also opposed to sending POW's to work as slaves in foreign lands (i.e., the Soviet Union's Gulags), where many will be starved to death."

Despite his disagreement with official policy, Patton followed the rules laid down by Morgenthau and others back in Washington as closely as his conscience would allow, but he tried to moderate the effect, and this brought him into increasing conflict with Eisenhower and the other politically ambitious generals. In another letter to his wife he commented:

I have been at Frankfurt for a civil government conference. If what we are doing (to the Germans) is 'Liberty, then give me death.' I can't see how Americans can sink so low. It is Semitic, and I am sure of it."

And in his diary he noted:

"Today we received orders . . . in which we were told to give the Jews special accommodations. If for Jews, why not Catholics, Mormons, etc? . . . We are also turning over to the French several hundred thousand prisoners of war to be used as slave labor in France. It is amusing to recall that we fought the Revolution in defense of the rights of man and the Civil War to abolish slavery and have now gone back on both principles."

His duties as military governor took Patton to all parts of Germany and intimately acquainted him with the German people and their condition. He could not help but compare them with the French, the Italians, the Belgians, and even the British. This comparison gradually forced him to the conclusion that World War II had been fought against the wrong people. After a visit to ruined Berlin, he wrote his wife on July 21, 1945: "Berlin gave me the blues. We have destroyed what could have been a good race, and we are about to replace them with Mongolian savages. And all Europe will be communist. It's said that for the first week after they took it (Berlin), all women who ran were shot and those who did not were raped. I could have taken it (instead of the Soviets) had I been allowed."

This conviction, that the politicians had used him and the U.S. Army for a criminal purpose, grew in the following weeks. During a dinner with French General Alphonse Juin in August, Patton was surprised to find the Frenchman in agreement with him. His

diary entry for August 18 quotes Gen. Juin: "It is indeed unfortunate, mon General, that the English and the Americans have destroyed in Europe the only sound country – and I do not mean France. Therefore, the road is now open for the advent of Russian communism." Later diary entries and letters to his wife reiterate this same conclusion. On August 31 he wrote: "Actually, the Germans are the only decent people left in Europe. It's a choice between them and the Russians. I prefer the Germans." And on September 2: "What we are doing is to destroy the only semi-modern state in Europe, so that Russia can swallow the whole."

By this time the Morgenthauists and media monopolists had decided that Patton was incorrigible and must be discredited. So they began a non-stop hounding of him in the press, a la Watergate, accusing him of being "soft on Nazis" and continually recalling an incident in which he had slapped a shirker two years previously, during the Sicily campaign. A New York newspaper printed the completely false claim that when Patton had slapped the soldier who was Jewish, he had called him a "yellow-bellied Jew." Then, in a press conference on September 22, reporters hatched a scheme to needle Patton into losing his temper and making statements which could be used against him. The scheme worked. The press interpreted one of Patton's answers to their insistent questions as to why he was not pressing the Nazi-hunt hard enough as: "The Nazi thing is just like a Democrat-Republican fight." The New York Times headlined this quote, and other papers all across America picked it up. The unmistakable hatred which had been directed at him during this press conference finally opened Patton's eyes fully as to what was afoot. In his diary that night he wrote:

"There is a very apparent Semitic influence in the press. They are trying to do two things: first, implement communism, and second, see that all businessmen of German ancestry and non-Jewish antecedents are thrown out of their jobs... "They have utterly lost the Anglo-Saxon conception of justice and feel that a man can be kicked out because somebody else says he is a Nazi. They were evidently quite shocked when I told them I would kick nobody out without the successful proof of guilt before a court of law... "Another point which the press harped on was the fact that we were doing too much for the Germans to the detriment of the DP's, most of whom are Jews. I could not give the answer to that one, because the answer is that, in my opinion and that of most nonpolitical officers, it is vitally necessary for us to build Germany up now as a buffer state against Russia. In fact, I am afraid we have waited too long."

And in a letter of the same date to his wife: "I will probably be in the headlines before you get this, as the press is trying to quote me as being more interested in restoring order in Germany than in catching Nazis. I can't tell them the truth that unless we restore Germany we will insure that communism takes America."

Eisenhower responded immediately to the press outcry against Patton and made the decision to relieve him of his duties as military governor and "kick him upstairs" as the commander of the Fifteenth Army. In a letter to his wife on September 29, Patton indicated that he was, in a way, not unhappy with his new assignment, because "I would

like it much better than being a sort of executioner to the best race in Europe." On October 22 he wrote a long letter to Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, who was back in the States. In the letter Patton bitterly condemned the Morgenthau policy; Eisenhower's pusillanimous behavior in the face of Jewish demands; the strong pro-Soviet bias in the press; and the politicization, corruption, degradation, and demoralization of the U.S. Army which these things were causing. He saw the demoralization of the Army as a deliberate goal of America's enemies:

"I have been just as furious as you at the compilation of lies which the communist and Semitic elements of our government have leveled against me and practically every other commander. In my opinion it is a deliberate attempt to alienate the soldier vote from the commanders, because the communists know that soldiers are not communistic, and they fear what eleven million votes (of veterans) would do."

In his letter to Harbord, Patton also revealed his own plans to fight those who were destroying the morale and integrity of the Army and endangering America's future by not opposing the growing Soviet might:

"It is my present thought . . . that when I finish this job, which will be around the first of the year, I shall resign, not retire, because if I retire I will still have a gag in my mouth . . . I should not start a limited counter attack, which would be contrary to my military theories, but should wait until I can start an all-out offensive..."

General Marshall ordered that Patton's phones to be tapped and requested a psychoanalyst, from the Navys's Medical Corp, to observe General Patton. Eisenhower wrote scathingly of Patton, regarding him as a "loose cannon" because of how he distrusted the Soviets. Will Bill Donovan, who had travelled in and out of Moscow and had direct access to Marshall Stalin, loathed Patton. The OSS and NKVD exchanged information, helping one another in espionage projects, including spying on General Patton. Army Intelligence warned General Patton that his life was in danger from the NKVD. Marshall Stalin had ordered Patton to be assassinated.

OSS agent, Duncan Lee, was assigned to spy on General Patton when he was military governor of the US occupation zone in Southern Germany, providing regular reports on Patton's movements and recordings of wire-taps of his phone and office. Duncan Lee was a double agent, also working for the Soviet's spy agency, the NKVD. Duncan Lee had provided the Soviets with advance warning of the D-Day landings date and the exact location of the atomic bomb research in the US. On 16 May, Ukrainian Nationalist Leader, Stepan Bandera, defected to the Americans and informed Stephen Skubik, of the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp, that "Soviet High Command has been ordered by Marshall Stalin to kill U.S. Army General George Patton." Rather than being shocked by Skubik's news, Donovan ordered Bandera returned to the Russians, thereby silencing the man who was warning about an attempt on General Patton's life!

Ukrainian Diplomat Professor Roman Smal-Stocki said that "The NKVD will soon attempt to kill General George Patton. Stalin wants him dead." Professor Smal-Stocki

was expelled by the Americans from Germany and sent back to the NKVD in Russia. Ukrainian General Pavlo Shandruk informed Special Agent Skubik, that he had vital intelligence. "Please tell General Patton to be on guard. He is at the top of the NKVD list to be killed." The Americans betrayed General Shandruk into the hands of the NKVD to be killed.

In Berlin, Patton learned that more than 20,000 American prisoners of war who fell into Russian hands at the end of the war, were being used as leverage in negotiations with the Allies to ensure that all 3 million Russians, Ukrainians and other East Europeans in Western Europe be forced across the border into Soviet hands. This included women and children. The Russians denied the Americans and British access to the Prisoner of War Camps, where their own men were being held, and the Allied governments suppressed the information that their men were being held hostage by their "ally" Marshall Stalin. All 3 million Russians and Ukrainians in Western Europe were betrayed into the hands of the Soviets. General Patton insulted Soviet Marshall Zhukov. Patton publically stated that the Soviets were the real enemy. Patton became convinced that the only way he could speak freely about these issues was to retire from the military "So that I can go home and say what I have to say." Patton saw his battlefield as changing. He was still a warrior but now the podium and the pen would be his main weapons to expose the treachery of the US government and the danger of their Soviet allies.

The collision on 9th December 1945, occurred when a two and a half tonne GMC Army truck, which had been parked facing the General's car, roared into life and violently collided with the Small General's staff car, by suddenly and inexplicably careening directly into the opposite lane and into Patton's vehicle (On the Autobahn between Mannheim and Heidelberg). The actions of the truck driver seemed designed to intentionally injure, or kill, the General. Both the driver of the truck and his two passengers quickly vanished. No criminal charges were ever filed. No accountability was ever recorded. The official accident reports and key-witnesses went missing.

Despite General Patton's rank and fame as America's most audacious and successful combat general, there was no formal inquest, and all official reports on the incident vanished. The MP who first arrived on the scene of the car accident, Lieutenant Peter Babalas, treated the incident like a fender bender. Although Patton's driver testified that the truck driver and his passengers were drunk, Sergeant Robert Thompson's blood levels were never tested and he was never charged with driving under the influence. Thompson's illegal possession of the Signals company truck also went unquestioned, despite the fact that he was 60 miles North of his duty station, with no apparent reason for being in Mannheim. Thompson's drunkenness, negligence and apparent larceny, went unquestioned. Numerous investigators and authors have attempted to find the official Accident Reports, unsuccessfully. Sergeant Robert Thompson and his two friends who were responsible for ploughing the truck into Patton's car were flown to England by Army Intelligence. However, just four days after the collision, Thompson mysteriously reappeared in Germany where he spoke to American journalist, Howard Smith, claiming

that he was alone in the truck when it struck Patton's vehicle. However, General Hobart Gay and PFC Horace Woodring swear there were two other people in the truck with Thompson.

PFC Horace Woodring, a 19 year-old son of a dairy farmer in Kentucky, grew up racing cars and flying stunt planes. Patton spoke highly of him as his trusted driver. Woodring was driving just 20 miles per hour when Robert Thompson swerved the military truck hard to the left, driving his vehicle directly into the path of Patton's Cadillac. As there was no turning on the road in the direction he was pointing the heavy army truck and as he did not signal before taking action, the action seemed deliberate. Woodring testified "I was not more than 20 feet from the truck when he began to turn." Thompson made no attempt to break, instead he accelerated directly into the Cadillac. General Patton was flung forward from his back seat, his head slamming violently into the steel partition behind Woodring's drivers compartment. His nose broke and he felt a sharp pain in the back of his neck and no sensation in his lower body. Instantly George Patton knew that he was paralysed. He was the only person injured in the collision. General Patton was paralysed in the vehicle collision on 9th December 1945 at 11:45am. He arrived at the U.S. Army 130th station hospital in Heidelberg at 12:43pm.

There was no medical staff waiting at the hospital to rush Patton into surgery. No team of spinal specialists assembled to deal with this life-threatening traumatic injury. Two days later his wife, Beatrice, and a spinal cord specialist, arrived to be at his side. The doctors were confident that the General would survive his injury. Hope of recovery Smallles and might be able to regain some mobility. They were also convinced that he would be able to travel soon. General Patton urged his wife to get him out of the hospital: "They are going to kill me here!" he said to her emphatically. He did not recover and on 21st December 1945, General Patton's body was wheeled down to the makeshift morgue in the hospital basement and it was announced to the journalists that had descended on the tiny military hospital, that General George Patton had died.

There was no autopsy and although Beatrice wanted him buried at West Point, the Army insisted that he be buried at the American Military cemetery in Hamm, Luxemburg. Neither General Dwight Eisenhower, nor President Harry Truman, attended the military funeral for General George Patton, America's most famous and successful combat General. General Patton had made many high ranking enemies in Moscow, Berlin, London and Washington D.C.: Patton's fiery determination to speak the truth had made many powerful men squirm, not only during the war, but afterwards. His public statements praising the German Army for their matchless skills as fighting men, while criticizing the Soviet Union as the real enemy of freedom led some to see Patton as a threat to the New World Order.

From the beginning, many did not believe that Patton's death was accidental. He had already survived several remarkable accidents, including when his personal aircraft had almost been shot down by British Spitfire in April 1945. Sergeant Robert Thompson's military records were burned 12th July 1973, when fire swept through the National Personnel

Records Centre in St. Louis, Missouri, destroying 18 million official military personnel files. Lieutenant Babala's accident report also vanished. A 1953 request for a copy of the report received the official response noting Report of Investigation is not on file. Casualty branch has no papers on file regarding the accident and there is no information on the accident in Patton's Aide, General Hobart Gay's, personnel file. The report organised by General Geoffrey Keys, Commander of the 7th Army, also went missing.

In fact, the only report that remained in circulation was a document allegedly written in 1952 and signed by P.F.C. Horace Woodring, Patton's driver. However, when asked about it, in 1979, Woodring swore that he had never made any such statement, or signed his name, to any such report. He believed the paperwork was fabricated. The vehicle on display at the Patton Museum at Fort Knox, Kentucky, has been proven to not be the vehicle in which General Patton was driving on that fateful day, and the serial number has been scratched out!

In 1979, OSS Agent, Major Douglas Bazata, asserted that he had been part of a hit team that was tasked to assassinate General Patton. He had fired a low velocity projectile into the back of the General's neck, in order to snap it and cause him paralysis. When Patton failed to die and was showing signs of recovery, he was murdered in the hospital by Soviet NKVD agents. Bazata swore that Wild Bill Donovan (the head of the Officers Secret Service - OSS) paid him 10,000 *plus another* 800 in expenses, for his role in Patton's death.

Douglas Bazata, who left the Army as a Major in 1947, had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, 4 Purple Hearts and France's Croix de Guerre, with two palms. He was later hired to work for the US government as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. OSS Agent, Douglas Bazata later wrote of his meeting at Claridges Hotel, in London, with Wild Bill Donovan: "Douglas, I do indeed have a problem, it is the extreme disobedience of General George Patton, and of his very serious disregard of orders for the common cause." "Shall I kill him Sir?" Bazata asked. "Yes, Douglas, you do exactly what you must." Later William Colby, a former OSS agent who went on to become head of the Central Intelligence Agency, praised Bazata in his 1978 book, Honourable Men. Some have come to recognise General Patton as the first casualty of the Cold War. Patton's insights and convictions were considered a threat to the New World Order. (What you will learn about in the last chapter of this book).

13.5 A Jewish Defector warns America

by Benjamin H. Freedman

The following speech can also be listened to by looking on Youtube for "Benjamin Freedman 1961", it should be a video roughly 45 minutes in length.

Mr. Freedman, born in 1890, was a successful Jewish businessman of New York City who

was at one time the principal owner of the Woodbury Soap Company. He broke with organized Jewry after the Judeo-Communist victory of 1945, and spent the remainder of his life and the great preponderance of his considerable fortune, at least 2.5 million dollars, exposing the Jewish tyranny which has enveloped the United States. Mr. Freedman knew what he was talking about because he had been an insider at the highest levels of Jewish organizations and Jewish machinations to gain power over our nation. Mr. Freedman was personally acquainted with Bernard Baruch, Samuel Untermyer, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Kennedy, and John F. Kennedy, and many more movers and shakers of our times.

This speech was given before a patriotic audience in 1961 at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., on behalf of Conde McGinley's patriotic newspaper of that time, Common Sense. Though in some minor ways this wide-ranging and extemporaneous speech has become dated, Mr. Freedman's essential message to us – his warning to the West – is more urgent than ever before. – K.A.S. —

[Freedman's speech]

What I intend to tell you tonight is something that you have never been able to learn from any other source, and what I tell you now concerns not only you, but your children and the survival of this country and Christianity. I'm not here just to dish up a few facts to send up your blood pressure, but I'm here to tell you things that will help you preserve what you consider the most sacred things in the world: the liberty, and the freedom, and the right to live as Christians, where you have a little dignity, and a little right to pursue the things that your conscience tells you are the right things, as Christians.

Now, first of all, I'd like to tell you that on August 25th 1960 – that was shortly before elections – Senator Kennedy, who is now the President of the United States, went to New York, and delivered an address to the Zionist Organization of America. In that address, to reduce it to its briefest form, he stated that he would use the armed forces of the United States to preserve the existence of the regime set up in Palestine by the Zionists who are now in occupation of that area. In other words, Christian boys are going to be yanked out of their homes, away from their families, and sent abroad to fight in Palestine against the Christian and Moslem Arabs who merely want to return to their homes. And these Christian boys are going to be asked to shoot to kill these innocent [Arab Palestinians] people who only want to follow out fifteen resolutions passed by the United Nations in the last twelve years calling upon the Zionists to allow these people to return to their homes.

Now, when United States troops appear in the Middle East to fight with the Zionists as their allies to prevent the return of these people who were evicted from their homes in the 1948 armed insurrection by the Zionists who were transplanted there from Eastern Europe... when that happens, the United States will trigger World War III. You say, when will that take place? The answer is, as soon as the difficulty between France and Algeria has been settled, that will take place. As soon as France and Algeria have been settled,

that will take place. As soon as France and Algeria have settled their difficulty, and the Arab world, or the Moslem world, has no more war on their hands with France, they are going to move these people back into their homes, and when they do that and President Kennedy sends your sons to fight over there to help the crooks hold on to what they stole from innocent men, women and children, we will trigger World War III; and when that starts you can be sure we cannot emerge from that war a victor. We are going to lose that war because there is not one nation in the world that will let one of their sons fight with us for such a cause. I know and speak to these ambassadors in Washington and the United Nations – and of the ninety-nine nations there, I've consulted with maybe seventy of them – and when we go to war in Palestine to help the thieves retain possession of what they have stolen from these innocent people we're not going to have a man there to fight with us as our ally.

And who will these people have supporting them, you ask. Well, four days after President Kennedy – or he was then Senator Kennedy – made that statement on August 28, 1960, the Arab nations called a meeting in Lebanon and there they decided to resurrect, or reactivate, the government of Palestine, which has been dormant more or less, since the 1948 armed insurrection by the Zionists. Not only that... they ordered the creation of the Palestine Army, and they are now drilling maybe a half a million soldiers in that area of the world to lead these people back to their homeland. With them, they have as their allies all the nations of what is termed the Bandung Conference Group. That includes the Soviet Union and every Soviet Union satellite. It includes Red China; it includes every independent country in Asia and Africa; or eighty percent of the world's total population. Eighty percent of the world's population. Four out of five human beings on the face of the earth will be our enemies at war with us. And not alone are they four out of five human beings now on the face of this earth, but they are the non-Christian population of the world and they are the non-Caucasians... the non-white nations of the world, and that's what we face. And what is the reason? The reason is that here in the United States, the Zionists and their co-religionists have complete control of our government. For many reasons too many and too complex to go into here at this – time I'll be glad to answer questions, however, to support that statement – the Zionists and their co-religionists rule this United States as though they were the absolute monarchs of this country.

Now, you say, 'well, that's a very broad statement to make', but let me show what happened while you were – I don't want to wear that out — let me show what happened while WE were all asleep. I'm including myself with you. We were all asleep. What happened? World War I broke out in the summer of 1914. Nineteen-hundred and fourteen was the year in which World War One broke out. There are few people here my age who remember that. Now that war was waged on one side by Great Britain, France, and Russia; and on the other side by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. What happened? Within two years Germany had won that war: not alone won it nominally, but won it actually. The German submarines, which were a surprise to the world, had swept all the convoys from the Atlantic Ocean, and Great Britain stood there without

ammunition for her soldiers, stood there with one week's food supply facing her – and after that, starvation. At that time, the French army had mutinied. They lost 600,000 of the flower of French youth in the defense of Verdun on the Somme. The Russian army was defecting. They were picking up their toys and going home, they didn't want to play war anymore, they didn't like the Czar. And the Italian army had collapsed. Now Germany – not a shot had been fired on the German soil. Not an enemy soldier had crossed the border into Germany. And yet, here was Germany offering England peace terms. They offered England a negotiated peace on what the lawyers call a status quo ante basis. That means: "Let's call the war off, and let everything be as it was before the war started."

Well, England, in the summer of 1916 was considering that. Seriously! They had no choice. It was either accepting this negotiated peace that Germany was magnanimously offering them, or going on with the war and being totally defeated. While that was going on, the Zionists in Germany, who represented the Zionists from Eastern Europe, went to the British War Cabinet and – I am going to be brief because this is a long story, but I have all the documents to prove any statement that I make if anyone here is curious, or doesn't believe what I'm saying is at all possible – the Zionists in London went to the British war cabinet and they said: "Look here. You can yet win this war. You don't have to give up. You don't have to accept the negotiated peace offered to you now by Germany. You can win this war if the United States will come in as your ally." The United States was not in the war at that time. We were fresh; we were young; we were rich; we were powerful. They [Zionists] told England: "We will guarantee to bring the United States into the war as your ally, to fight with you on your side, if you will promise us Palestine after you win the war." In other words, they made this deal: "We will get the United States into this war as your ally. The price you must pay us is Palestine after you have won the war and defeated Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey."

Now England had as much right to promise Palestine to anybody, as the United States would have to promise Japan to Ireland for any reason whatsoever. It's absolutely absurd that Great Britain – that never had any connection or any interest or any right in what is known as Palestine – should offer it as coin of the realm to pay the Zionists for bringing the United States into the war. However, they made that promise, in October of 1916. October, nineteen hundred and sixteen. And shortly after that – I don't know how many here remember it – the United States, which was almost totally pro-German – totally pro-German – because the newspapers here were controlled by Jews, the bankers were Jews, all the media of mass communications in this country were controlled by Jews, and they were pro-German because their people, in the majority of cases came from Germany, and they wanted to see Germany lick the Czar. The Jews didn't like the Czar, and they didn't want Russia to win this war. So the German bankers – the German-Jews – Kuhn Loeb and the other big banking firms in the United States refused to finance France or England to the extent of one dollar. They stood aside and they said: "As long as France and England are tied up with Russia, not one cent!" But they poured money into

Germany, they fought with Germany against Russia, trying to lick the Czarist regime.

Now those same Jews, when they saw the possibility of getting Palestine, they went to England and they made this deal. At that time, everything changed, like the traffic light that changes from red to green. Where the newspapers had been all pro-German, where they'd been telling the people of the difficulties that Germany was having fighting Great Britain commercially and in other respects, all of a sudden the Germans were no good. They were villains. They were Huns. They were shooting Red Cross nurses. They were cutting off babies' hands. And they were no good. Well, shortly after that, Mr. Wilson declared war on Germany.

The Zionists in London sent these cables to the United States, to Justice Brandeis: "Go to work on President Wilson. We're getting from England what we want. Now you go to work, and you go to work on President Wilson and get the United States into the war." And that did happen. That's how the United States got into the war. We had no more interest in it; we had no more right to be in it than we have to be on the moon tonight instead of in this room. Now the war – World War One – in which the United States participated had absolutely no reason to be our war. We went in there – we were railroaded into it – if I can be vulgar, we were suckered into – that war merely so that the Zionists of the world could obtain Palestine. Now, that is something that the people in the United States have never been told. They never knew why we went into World War One. Now, what happened?

After we got into the war, the Zionists went to Great Britain and they said: "Well, we performed our part of the agreement. Let's have something in writing that shows that you are going to keep your bargain and give us Palestine after you win the war." Because they didn't know whether the war would last another year or another ten years. So they started to work out a receipt. The receipt took the form of a letter, and it was worded in very cryptic language so that the world at large wouldn't know what it was all about. And that was called the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration was merely Great Britain's promise to pay the Zionists what they had agreed upon as a consideration for getting the United States into the war. So this great Balfour Declaration, that you hear so much about, is just as phony as a three dollar bill. And I don't think I could make it more emphatic than that. Now, that is where all the trouble started. The United States went in the war. The United States crushed Germany. We went in there, and it's history. You know what happened. Now, when the war was ended, and the Germans went to Paris, to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, there were 117 Jews there, as a delegation representing the Jews, headed by Bernard Baruch. I was there: I ought to know. Now what happened?

The Jews at that peace conference, when they were cutting up Germany and parceling out Europe to all these nations that claimed a right to a certain part of European territory, the Jews said, "How about Palestine for us?" And they produced, for the first time to the knowledge of the Germans, this Balfour Declaration. So the Germans, for the first time realized, "Oh, that was the game! That's why the United States came into the war."

And the Germans for the first time realized that they were defeated, they suffered this terrific reparation that was slapped onto them, because the Zionists wanted Palestine and they were determined to get it at any cost. Now, that brings us to another very interesting point. When the Germans realized this, they naturally resented it. Up to that time, the Jews had never been better off in any country in the world than they had been in Germany. You had Mr. Rathenau there, who was maybe 100 times as important in industry and finance as is Bernard Baruch in this country. You had Mr. Balin, who owned the two big steamship lines, the North German Lloyd's and the Hamburg-American Lines. You had Mr. Bleichroder, who was the banker for the Hohenzollern family. You had the Warburgs in Hamburg, who were the big merchant bankers – the biggest in the world. The Jews were doing very well in Germany. No question about that. Now, the Germans felt: "Well, that was quite a sellout."

It was a sellout that I can best compare – suppose the United States was at war today with the Soviet Union. And we were winning. And we told the Soviet Union: "Well, let's quit. We offer you peace terms. Let's forget the whole thing." And all of a sudden Red China came into the war as an ally of the Soviet Union. And throwing them into the war brought about our defeat. A crushing defeat, with reparations the likes of which man's imagination cannot encompass. Imagine, then, after that defeat, if we found out that it was the Chinese in this country, our Chinese citizens, who all the time we thought they were loyal citizens working with us, were selling us out to the Soviet Union and that it was through them that Red China was brought into the war against us. How would we feel, in the United States against Chinese? I don't think that one of them would dare show his face on any street. There wouldn't be lampposts enough, convenient, to take care of them. Imagine how we would feel. Well, that's how the Germans felt towards these Jews. "We've been so nice to them"; and from 1905 on, when the first Communist revolution in Russia failed, and the Jews had to scramble out of Russia, they all went to Germany. And Germany gave them refuge. And they were treated very nicely. And here they sold Germany down the river for no reason at all other than they wanted Palestine as a so-called "Jewish commonwealth."

Now, Nahum Sokolow – all the great leaders, the big names that you read about in connection with Zionism today – they, in 1919, 1920, '21, '22, and '23, they wrote in all their papers – and the press was filled with their statements – that "the feeling against the Jews in Germany is due to the fact that they realized that this great defeat was brought about by our intercession and bringing the United States into the war against them." The Jews themselves admitted that. It wasn't that the Germans in 1919 discovered that a glass of Jewish blood tasted better than Coca-Cola or Muenschner Beer. There was no religious feeling. There was no sentiment against those people merely on account of their religious belief. It was all political. It was economic. It was anything but religious. Nobody cared in Germany whether a Jew went home and pulled down the shades and said "Shema' Yisrael" or "Our Father." No one cared in Germany any more than they do in the United States. Now this feeling that developed later in Germany was due to one

thing: that the Germans held the Jews responsible for their crushing defeat, for no reason at all, because World War One was started against Germany for no reason for which they [Germans] were responsible. They were guilty of nothing. Only of being successful. They built up a big navy. They built up world trade.

You must remember, Germany, at the time of Napoleon, at the time of the French Revolution, what was the German Reich consisted of 300 – three hundred! – small city-states, principalities, dukedoms, and so forth. Three hundred little separate political entities. And between that time, between the period of . . . between Napoleon and Bismarck, they were consolidated into one state. And within 50 years after that time they became one of the world's great powers. Their navy was rivalling Great Britain's, they were doing business all over the world, they could undersell anybody and make better products. And what happened? What happened as a result of that? There was a conspiracy between England, France, and Russia that: "We must slap down Germany", because there isn't one historian in the world that can find a valid reason why those three countries decided to wipe Germany off the map politically. Now, what happened after that? When Germany realized that the Jews were responsible for her defeat, they naturally resented it. But not a hair on the head of any Jew was harmed. Not a single hair. Professor Tansill, of Georgetown University, who had access to all the secret papers of the State Department, wrote in his book, and quoted from a State Department document written by Hugo Schoenfelt, a Jew who Cordell Hull sent to Europe in 1933 to investigate the so-called camps of political prisoners. And he wrote back that he found them in very fine condition.

They were in excellent shape; everybody treated well. And they were filled with Communists. Well, a lot of them were Jews, because the Jews happened to be maybe 98 per cent of the Communists in Europe at that time. And there were some priests there, and ministers, and labor leaders, Masons, and others who had international affiliations. Now, the Jews sort of tried to keep the lid on this fact. They didn't want the world to really understand that they had sold out Germany, and that the Germans resented that. So they did take appropriate action against them [against the Jews]. They. . . shall I say, discriminated against them wherever they could? They shunned them. The same as we would the Chinese, or the Negroes, or the Catholics, or anyone in this country who had sold us out to an enemy and brought about our defeat. Now, after a while, the Jews of the world didn't know what to do, so they called a meeting in Amsterdam. Jews from every country in the world attended in July 1933. And they said to Germany: "You fire Hitler! And you put every Jew back into his former position, whether he was a Communist, no matter what he was. You can't treat us that way! And we, the Jews of the world, are calling upon you, and serving this ultimatum upon you." Well, the Germans told them. . . you can imagine. So what did they [the Jews] do?

They broke up, and Samuel Untermyer, if the name means anything to people here. . . (You want to ask a question? — Uh, there were no Communists in Germany at that time. they were called 'Social Democrats.) Well, I don't want to go by what they were

called. We're now using English words, and what they were called in Germany is not very material. . . but they were Communists, because in 1917, the Communists took over Germany for a few days. Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht, and a group of Jews in Germany took over the government for three days. In fact, when the Kaiser ended the war, he fled to Holland because he thought the Communists were going to take over Germany as they did Russia, and that he was going to meet the same fate that the Czar did in Russia. So he left and went to Holland for safety and for security. Now, at that time, when the Communist threat in Germany was quashed, it was quiet, the Jews were working, still trying to get back into their former – their status – and the Germans fought them in every way they could, without hurting a hair on anyone's head. The same as one group, the Prohibitionists, fought the people who were interested in liquor, and they didn't fight one another with pistols, they did it every way they could. Well, that's the way they were fighting the Jews in Germany. And, at that time, mind you, there were 80 to 90 million Germans and there were only 460,000 Jews. . . less than one half of one percent of Germany were Jews. And yet, they controlled all of the press, they controlled most of the economy, because they had come in and with cheap money – you know the way the Mark was devalued – they bought up practically everything.

Well, in 1933 when Germany refused to surrender, mind you, to the World Conference of Jews in Amsterdam, they broke up and Mr. Untermeyer came back to the United States – who was the head of the American delegation and the president of the whole conference – and he went from the steamer to ABC and made a radio broadcast throughout the United States in which he said: "The Jews of the world now declare a Holy War against Germany. We are now engaged in a sacred conflict against the Germans. And we are going to starve them into surrender. We are going to use a world-wide boycott against them, that will destroy them because they are dependent upon their export business."

And it is a fact that two thirds of Germany's food supply had to be imported, and it could only be imported with the proceeds of what they exported. Their labor. So if Germany could not export, two thirds of Germany's population would have to starve. There just was not enough food for more than one third of the population. Now in this declaration, which I have here, it was printed on page – a whole page – in the New York Times on August 7, 1933, Mr. Samuel Untermeyer boldly stated that: "this economic boycott is our means of self-defense. President Roosevelt has advocated its use in the NRA" . [National Recovery Administration] – which some of you may remember, where everybody was to be boycotted unless they followed the rules laid down by the New Deal, which of course was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court at that time. Nevertheless, the Jews of the world declared a boycott against Germany, and it was so effective that you couldn't find one thing in any store anywhere in the world with the words "made in Germany" on it.

In fact, an executive of the Woolworth Company told me that they had to dump millions of dollars worth of crockery and dishes into the river; that their stores were boycotted. If anyone came in and found a dish marked "made in Germany," they were picketed with

signs: "Hitler", "murderer", and so forth, and like – something like these sit-ins that are taking place in the South. R. H. Macy, which is controlled by a family called Strauss who also happen to be Jews. . . . a woman found stockings there which came from Chemnitz, marked "made in Germany". Well, they were cotton stockings. They may have been there 20 years, because since I've been observing women's legs in the last twenty years, I haven't seen a pair with cotton stockings on them. So Macy! I saw Macy boycotted, with hundreds of people walking around with signs saying "MURDERS" and "HITLERITES", and so forth. Now up to that time, not one hair on the head of any Jew had been hurt in Germany. There was no suffering, there was no starvation, there was no murder, there was nothing.

Now, that. . . naturally, the Germans said, "Why, who are these people to declare a boycott against us and throw all our people out of work, and our industries come to a standstill? Who are they to do that to us?" They naturally resented it. Certainly they painted swastikas on stores owned by Jews. Why should a German go in and give their money to a storekeeper who was part of a boycott who was going to starve Germany into surrender into the Jews of the world, who were going to dictate who their premier or chancellor was to be? Well, it was ridiculous. That continued for some time, and it wasn't until 1938, when a young Jew from Poland walked into the German embassy in Paris and shot one of the officials [a German official] that the Germans really started to get rough with the Jews in Germany. And you found them then breaking windows and having street fights and so forth.

Now, for anyone to say that – I don't like to use the word 'anti-Semitism' because it's meaningless, but it means something to you still, so I'll have to use it – the only reason that there was any feeling in Germany against Jews was that they were responsible: number one, for World War One; number two, for this world-wide boycott, and number three – did I say for World War One, they were responsible? For the boycott – and also for World War II, because after this thing got out of hand, it was absolutely necessary for the Jews and Germany to lock horns in a war to see which one was going to survive. In the meanwhile, I had lived in Germany, and I knew that the Germans had decided [that] Europe is going to be Christian or Communist: there is no in between. It's going to be Christian or it's going to be Communist. And the Germans decided: "We're going to keep it Christian if possible". And they started to re-arm. And their intention was – by that time the United States had recognized the Soviet Union, which they did in November, 1933 – the Soviet Union was becoming very powerful, and Germany realized: "Well, our turn is going to come soon, unless we are strong." The same as we in this country are saying today, "Our turn is going to come soon, unless we are strong."

And our government is spending 83 or 84 billion dollars of your money for defense, they say. Defense against whom? Defense against 40,000 little Jews in Moscow that took over Russia, and then, in their devious ways, took over control of many other governments of the world. Now, for this country to now be on the verge of a Third World War, from which we cannot emerge a victor, is something that staggers my imagination. I know

that nuclear bombs are measured in terms of megatons. A megaton is a term used to describe one million tons of TNT. One million tons of TNT is a megaton. Now, our nuclear bombs have a capacity of 10 megatons, or 10 million tons of TNT. That was when they were first developed five or six years ago. Now, the nuclear bombs that are being developed have a capacity of 200 megatons, and God knows how many megatons the nuclear bombs of the Soviet Union have. So, what do we face now? If we trigger a world war that may develop into a nuclear war, humanity is finished. And why will it take place? It will take place because Act III. . . the curtain goes up on Act III. Act I was World War I. Act II was World War II. Act III is going to be World War III.

The Jews of the world, the Zionists and their co-religionists everywhere, are determined that they are going to again use the United States to help them permanently retain Palestine as their foothold for their world government. Now, that is just as true as I am standing here, because not alone have I read it, but many here have read it, and it's known all over the world. Now, what are we going to do? The life you save may be your son's. Your boys may be on their way to that war tonight; and you you don't know it any more than you knew that in 1916 in London the Zionists made a deal with the British War Cabinet to send your sons to war in Europe. Did you know it at that time? Not a person in the United States knew it. You weren't permitted to know it. Who knew it? President Wilson knew it. Colonel House knew it. Other 's knew it. Did I know it? I had a pretty good idea of what was going on: I was liaison to Henry Morgenthau, Sr., in the 1912 campaign when President Wilson was elected, and there was talk around the office there.

I was 'confidential man' to Henry Morgenthau, Sr., who was chairman of the Finance Committee, and I was liaison between him and Rollo Wells, the treasurer. So I sat in these meetings with President Wilson at the head of the table, and all the others, and I heard them drum into President Wilson's brain the graduated income tax and what has become the Federal Reserve, and also indoctrinate him with the Zionist movement. Justice Brandeis and President Wilson were just as close as the two fingers on this hand, and President Woodrow Wilson was just as incompetent when it came to determining what was going on as a newborn baby. And that's how they got us into World War I, while we all slept. Now, at this moment... at this moment they may be planning this World War III, in which we don't stand a chance even if they don't use nuclear bombs. How can the United States – about five percent of the world – go out and fight eighty to ninety percent of the world on their home ground? How can we do it... send our boys over there to be slaughtered? For what? So the Jews can have Palestine as their 'commonwealth'? They've fooled you so much that you don't know whether you're coming or going.

Now any judge, when he charges a jury, says, "Gentlemen, any witness that you find has told a single lie, you can disregard all his testimony." That is correct. I don't know from what state you come, but in New York state that is the way a judge addresses a jury. If that witness said one lie, disregard his testimony. Now, what are the facts about the

Jews? The Jews – I call them Jews to you, because they are known as Jews. I don't call them Jews. I refer to them as so-called Jews, because I know what they are. If Jesus was a Jew, there isn't a Jew in the world today, and if those people are Jews, certainly our Lord and Savior was not one of them, and I can prove that. Now what happened? The eastern European Jews, who form 92 per cent of the world's population of those people who call themselves Jews, were originally Khazars. They were a warlike tribe that lived deep in the heart of Asia. And they were so warlike that even the Asiatics drove them out of Asia into eastern Europe – and to reduce this so you don't get too confused about the history of Eastern Europe – they set up this big Khazar kingdom: 800,000 square miles. Only, there was no Russia, there were no other countries, and the Khazar kingdom was the biggest country in all Europe – so big and so powerful that when the other monarchs wanted to go to war, the Khazars would lend them 40,000 soldiers. That's how big and powerful they were.

Now, they were phallic worshippers, which is filthy. I don't want to go into the details of that now. It was their religion the way it was the religion of many other Pagans or Barbarians elsewhere in the world. Now, the [Khazar] king became so disgusted with the degeneracy of his kingdom that he decided to adopt a so-called monotheistic faith – either Christianity, Islam – the Moslem faith – or what is known today as Judaism – really Talmudism. So, like spinning a top and calling out “eeny, meeny, miney, moe,” he picked out so-called Judaism. And that became the state religion. He sent down to the Talmudic schools of Pumbedita and Sura and brought up thousands of these rabbis with their teachings, and opened up synagogues and schools in his kingdom of 800,000 people – 800,000 thousand square miles – and maybe ten to twenty million people; and they became what we call Jews. There wasn't one of them that had an ancestor that ever put a toe in the Holy Land, not only in Old Testament history, but back to the beginning of time. Not one of them! And yet they come to the Christians and they ask us to support their armed insurrection in Palestine by saying:

“Well, you want to certainly help repatriate God's chosen people to their Promised Land, their ancestral homeland, It's your Christian duty. We gave you one of our boys as your Lord and Savior. You now go to church on Sunday, and kneel and you worship a Jew, and we're Jews.”

Well, they were pagan Khazars who were converted just the same as the Irish [were converted]. And it's just as ridiculous to call them “people of the Holy Land,” as it would be. . . there are 54 million Chinese Moslems. Fifty four million! And, Mohammed only died in 620 A.D., so in that time, 54 million Chinese have accepted Islam as their religious belief. Now imagine, in China, 2,000 miles away from Arabia, where the city of Mecca is located, where Mohammed was born. . . imagine if the 54 million Chinese called themselves 'Arabs'. Imagine! Why, you'd say they're lunatics. Anyone who believes that those 54 million Chinese are Arabs must be crazy. All they did was adopt as a religious faith; a belief that had its origin in Mecca, in Arabia. The same as the Irish. When the Irish became Christians, nobody dumped them in the ocean and imported from the

Holy Land a new crop of inhabitants that were Christians. They weren't different people. They were the same people, but they had accepted Christianity as a religious faith.

Now, these Pagans, these Asiatics, these Turko-Finns. . . they were a Mongoloid race who were forced out of Asia into eastern Europe. They likewise, because their king took the faith – Talmudic faith – they had no choice. Just the same as in Spain: If the king was Catholic, everybody had to be a Catholic. If not, you had to get out of Spain. So everybody – they lived on the land just like the trees and the bushes; a human being belonged to the land under their feudal system – so they [Khazars] all became what we call today, Jews! Now imagine how silly it was for the Christians. . . for the great Christian countries of the world to say, "We're going to use our power, our prestige to repatriate God's chosen people to their ancestral homeland, their Promised Land." Now, could there be a bigger lie than that? Could there be a bigger lie than that? And because they control the newspapers, the magazines, the radio, the television, the book publishing business, they have the ministers in the pulpit, they have the politicians on the soap boxes talking the same language . . . so naturally you'd believe black is white if you heard it often enough. You wouldn't call black black anymore – you'd start to call black white. And nobody could blame you.

Now, that is one of the great lies. . . that is the foundation of all the misery that has befallen the world. Because after two wars fought in Europe – World War I and World War II – if it wasn't possible for them to live in peace and harmony with the people in Europe, like their brethren are living in the United States, what were the two wars fought for? Did they have to – like you flush the toilet – because they couldn't get along, did they have to say, "Well, we're going back to our homeland and you Christians can help us"? I can't understand yet how the Christians in Europe could have been that dumb because every theologian, every history teacher, knew the things that I'm telling you. But, they naturally bribed them, shut them up with money, stuffed their mouths with money, and now. . . I don't care whether you know all this or not. It doesn't make any difference to me whether you know all these facts or not, but it does make a difference to me. I've got, in my family, boys that will have to be in the next war, and I don't want them to go and fight and die... like they died in Korea. Like they died in Japan. Like they've died all over the world. For what? To help crooks hold on to what they stole from innocent people who had been in peaceful possession of that land, those farms, those homes for hundreds and maybe thousands of years? Is that why the United States must go to war? Because the Democratic Party wants New York State – the electoral vote? Illinois, the electoral vote? And Pennsylvania, the electoral vote?... which are controlled by the Zionists and their co-religionists?. . . the balance of power?

In New York City there are 400,000 members of the liberal party, all Zionists and their co-religionists. And New York State went for Kennedy by 400,000 votes. Now, I don't blame Mr. Kennedy. I'm fond of Mr. Kennedy. I think he's a great man. I think he can really pull us out of this trouble if we get the facts to him. And I believe he knows a great deal more than his appointments indicate he knows. He's playing with the enemy.

Like when you go fishing, you've got to play with the fish. Let 'em out and pull 'em in. Let 'em out and pull 'em in. But knowing Mr. Kennedy's father, and how well informed he is on this whole subject, and how close Kennedy is to his father, I don't think Mr. Kennedy is totally in the dark. But I do think that it is the duty of every mother, every loyal Christian, every person that regards the defense of this country as a sacred right, that they communicate – not with their congressman, not with their senator, but with President Kennedy. And tell him, "I do not think you should send my boy, or our boys, wearing the uniform of the United States of America, and under the flag that you see here, our red, white and blue, to fight there to help keep in the hands of these that which they have stolen". I think everyone should not alone write once, but keep writing and get your friends to write.

Now, I could go on endlessly, and tell you these things to support what I have just asked you to do. But I don't think it's necessary to do that. You're above the average group in intelligence and I don't think it's necessary to impress this any more. But. . . I want to tell you one more thing. You talk about... "Oh, the Jews. Why the Jews? Christianity. Why, we got Christianity from the Jews and the Jews gave us Jesus, and the Jews gave us our religion". But do you know that on the day of atonement that you think is so sacred to them, that on that day... and I was one of them! This is not hearsay. I'm not here to be a rabble-rouser. I'm here to give you facts. When, on the Day of Atonement, you walk into a synagogue, the very first prayer that you recite, you stand – and it's the only prayer for which you stand – and you repeat three times a short prayer. The Kol Nidre. In that prayer, you enter into an agreement with God Almighty that any oath, vow, or pledge that you may make during the next twelve months – any oath, vow or pledge that you may take during the next twelve months shall be null and void. The oath shall not be an oath; the vow shall not be a vow; the pledge shall not be a pledge. They shall have no force and effect, and so forth and so on.

And further than that, the Talmud teaches: "Don't forget – whenever you take an oath, vow, and pledge – remember the Kol Nidre prayer that you recited on the Day of Atonement, and that exempts you from fulfilling that". How much can you depend on their loyalty? You can depend upon their loyalty as much as the Germans depended upon it in 1916. And we're going to suffer the same fate as Germany suffered, and for the same reason. You can't depend upon something as insecure as the leadership that is not obliged to respect an oath, vow or pledge. Now I could go on and recite many other things to you, but I would have a little respect for your time, and you want to really, uh, get through with all of this. Tomorrow's going to be a long day. Now I want to say one thing. You ask me. . . well, you think to yourself: "well how did this fellow get mixed up in this the way he got mixed up in it." Well, I opened my mouth in 1945, and I took big pages in newspapers and tried to tell the American people what I'm telling you. And one newspaper after another refused the advertisement. And when I couldn't find a newspaper to take them – I paid cash, not credit – what happened? My lawyer told me, "There's an editor over in Jersey with a paper who will take your announcement". So, I

was brought together with Mr. McGinley, and that's how I met him.

So somebody told me the lawyer who introduced me, who was the son of the Dean of the Methodist Bishop, he said: "Well, I think he's a little anti-Semitic. I don't know whether I can get him over here. So he brought him over to my apartment and we hit it off wonderfully, and have since then. Now, I say this, and I say it without any qualifications. I say it without any reservations. And I say it without any hesitation. . . if it wasn't for the work that Mr. Conley McGinley did with "Common Sense" – he's been sending out from 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 every year – if it wasn't for the work he's been doing sending those out for fifteen years now, we would already be a communist country. Nobody has done what he did to light fires. Many of the other active persons in this fight learned all about it for the first time through "Common Sense". Now, I have been very active in helping him all I could. I'm not as flush as I was. I cannot go on spending the money. . . I'm not going to take up a collection. Don't worry. I see five people getting up to leave. (laughter)

I haven't got the money that I used to spend. I used to print a quarter of a million of them out of my own pocket and send them out. Mr. McGinley, when I first met him, had maybe 5,000 printed and circulated them locally. So I said, "With what you know and what I know, we can really do a good job". So I started printing in outside shops of big newspaper companies, a quarter of a million, and paid for them. Well, there's always a bottom to the barrel. I suppose we've all reached that at times. I'm not so poor that I can't live without working and that's what worries the Anti-Defamation League. I can just get by without going and asking for a job or getting on the bread line. But Mr. McGinley is working. He's sick and he's going at this stronger than ever. And all I want to say is that they want to close up "Common Sense" more than any other single thing in the whole world, as a death-blow to the fight Christians are making to survive. So I just want to tell you this. All they do is circulate rumors: "Mr. Benjamin H. Freedman is the wealthy backer of 'Common Sense'." The reason they do that is to discourage the people in the United States: don't send any money to Common Sense. They don't need it. They've got the wealthy Mr. Freedman as a backer. That all has strategy. They don't want to advertise me so that people that have real estate or securities to sell will come and call on me. They just want people to lay off "Common Sense". And all I'm telling you is, I do try to help him, but I haven't been able to. And I will be very honest. One thing I won't do is lie. In the last year I've had so much sickness in my family that I could not give him one dollar.

How he's managed to survive, I don't know. God alone knows. And he must be in God's care because how he's pulled through his sickness and with his financial troubles, I don't know. But that press is working. . . and every two weeks about a hundred or a hundred-fifty-thousand of "Common Sense" go out with a new message. And if that information could be multiplied. . . if people that now get it could buy ten or twenty five, or fifty, give them around. Plow that field. Sow those seeds, you don't know which will take root, but for God's sake, this is our last chance. [Freedman then discusses the

importance of people forgoing unnecessary purchases to 'buy more stuff', play golf, etc., and use the money to keep "Common Sense" going. He explains that the paper is going in debt; could be closed down and he (Freedman) no longer has the funds, having spent some \$2,400,000 in his attempt to bring the information to the American public and elected officials. He then asks for questions from the audience.)

Question inaudible] Freedman: All right, I'll comment on that. This is rather deep, but you all have a very high degree of intelligence, so I'm going to make an attempt. In the time of Bible history, there was a geographic area known as Judea. Judea was a province of the Roman Empire. Now, a person who lived in Judea was known as a Judean, and in Latin it was Judaeus; in Greek it was Judaius. Those are the two words, in Greek and Latin, for a Judean. Now, in Latin and Greek there is no such letter as 'j', and the first syllable of Judaeus and Judaius starts 'ghu'. Now, when the Bible was written, it was first written in Greek, Latin, Panantic, Syriac, Aramaic... all those languages. Never Was the word Jew in any of them because the word didn't exist. Judea was the country, and the people were Judeans, and Jesus was referred to only as a Judean. I've seen those early... the earliest scripts available. In 1345, a man by the name of Wycliffe in England thought that it was time to translate the Bible into English. There was no English edition of the Bible because who the Devil could read? It was only the educated church people who could read Latin and Greek, Syriac, Aramaic and the other languages. Anyhow, Wycliffe translated the Bible into English. But in it, he had to look around for some words for Judaeas and Judaius.

There was no English word because Judea had passed out of existence. There was no Judea. People had long ago forgotten that. So in the first translation he used the word, in referring to Jesus, as 'gyu', "jew". At the time, there was no printing press. Then, between 1345 and the 17th century, when the press came into use, that word passed through so many changes... I have them all here. If you want I can read them to you. I will. That word 'gyu' which was in the Wycliffe Bible became. . . first it was 'gyu', then 'giu', then 'iu' (because the 'i' in Latin is pronounced like the 'j'. Julius Caesar is 'lul' because there is no 'j' in Latin) then 'iuw', then 'ieuu', then 'ieuy', then 'iwe', then 'iow', then 'iewe', all in Bibles as time went on. Then 'ieue', then 'iue', then 'ive', and then 'ivw', and finally in the 18th century... 'jew'. Jew. All the corrupt and contracted forms for Judaius, and Judaeas in Latin. Now, there was no such thing as 'Jew', and any theologian – I've lectured in maybe 20 of the most prominent theological seminaries in this country, and two in Europe – there was no such word as Jew. There only was Judea, and Jesus was a Judean and the first English use of a word in an English bible to describe him was 'gyu' – Jew. A contracted and shortened form of Judaeus, just the same as we call a laboratory a 'lab', and gasoline 'gas'... a tendency to short up.

So, in England there were no public schools; people didn't know how to read; it looked like a scrambled alphabet so they made a short word out of it. Now for a theologian to say that you can't harm the Jews, is just ridiculous. I'd like to know where in the

scriptures it says that. I'd like to know the text. Look at what happened to Germany for touching Jews. What would you, as a citizen of the United States, do to people who did to you what the so-called Jews – the Pollacks and Litvaks and Litzianers – they weren't Jews, as I just explained to you. They were Eastern Europeans who'd been converted to Talmudism. There was no such thing as Judaism. Judaism was a name given in recent years to this religion known in Bible history as Torah [inaudible]. No Jew or no educated person ever heard of Judaism. It didn't exist. They pulled it out of the air. . . a meaningless word. Just like 'anti-Semitic'. The Arab is a Semite. And the Christians talk about people who don't like Jews as anti-Semites, and they call all the Arabs anti-Semites. The only Semites in the world are the Arabs. There isn't one Jew who's a Semite. They're all Turkothean Mongoloids. The Eastern european Jews. So, they brainwashed the public, and if you will invite me to meet this reverend who told you these things, I'll convince him and it'll be one step in the right direction. I'll go wherever I have to go to meet him.

—Next Question— Yes, ma'am. Well... I can answer that. First of all, your first premise is wrong. Your first premise that all the Jews are loyal to each other is wrong. Because, the Eastern European Jews outnumber all the rest by so many that they create the impression that they are the Jewish 'race'; that they are the Jewish nation; that they are the Jewish people. . . and the Christians swallow it like a cream puff. But in 1844 the German rabbis called a conference of rabbis from all over the world for the purpose of abolishing the Kol Nidre from the Day of Atonement religious ceremony. In Brunswick, Germany, where that conference was held in 1844, there was almost a terrific riot. A civil war. The Eastern Europeans said, "What the hell. We should give up Kol Nidre? That gives us our grip on our people. We give them a franchise so they can tell the Christians, 'Go to hell. We'll make any deal you want', but they don't have to carry it out. That gives us our grip on our people". So, they're not so united, and if you knew the feeling that exists. . .

Now, I'll also show you from an official document by the man responsible for. . . uh, who baptized this race. Here is a paper that we obtained from the archives of the Zionist organization in New York City, and in it is the manuscript by Sir James A. Malcolm, who – on behalf of the British Cabinet – negotiated the deal with these Zionists. And in here he says that all the jews in England were against it. The Jews who had been there for years, the [inaudible - probably Sephardim], those who had Portuguese and Spanish ad Dutch ancestry... who were monotheists and believed in that religious belief. That was while the Eastern European Jews were still running around in the heart of Asia and then came into Europe. But they had no more to do with them than. . . can we talk about a Christian 'race'? or a Christian religion?... or are the Christians united? So the same disunity is among the Jews. And I'll show you in this same document that when they went to France to try and get the French government to back that Zionist venture, there was only one Jew in France who was for it. That was Rothschild, and they did it because they were interested in the oil and the Suez Canal.

—Next Question— [Question inaudible] Freedman: You know why? Because if they don't, they're decked up. They come around and they tell you how much you must give, and if you don't . . . oh, you're anti-Semitic. Then none of their friends will have anything to do with them, and they start a smear campaign. . . and you have got to give. In New York city, in the garment center, there are twelve manufacturers in the building. And when the drive is on to sell Israel Bonds, the United Jewish Drive, they put a big scoreboard with the names of the firms and opposite them, as you make the amount they put you down for, they put a gold star after the name. Then, the buyers are told, "When you come into that building to call on someone and they haven't got a gold star, tell them that you won't buy from them until they have the gold star". BLACKMAIL. I don't know what else you can call it. Then what do they do? They tell you it's for 'humanitarian purposes' and they send maybe \$8 billion dollars to Israel, tax exempt, tax deductible. So if they hadn't sent that eight billion dollars to Israel, seven billion of it would have gone into the U.S. Treasury as income tax. So what happens? That seven billion dollars deficit – that air pocket – the gullible Christians have to make up.

They put a bigger tax on gas or bread or corporation tax. Somebody has to pay the housekeeping expenses for the government. So why do you let these people send their money over there to buy guns to drive people out of their ancient homeland? And you say, "Oh, well. The poor Jews. They have no place to go and they've been persecuted all their lives". They've never been persecuted for their religion. And I wish I had two rows of Rabbis here to challenge me. Never once, in all of history, have they been persecuted for their religion. Do you know why the Jews were driven out of England? King Edward the First in 1285 drove them out, and they never came back until the Cromwell Revolution which was financed by the Rothschilds. For four-hundred years there wasn't a Jew. But do you know why they were driven out? Because in the Christian faith and the Moslem faith it's a sin to charge 'rent' for the use of money. In other words - what we call interest [usury] is a sin.

So the Jews had a monopoly in England and they charged so much interest, and when the Lords and Dukes couldn't pay, they [Jews] foreclosed. And they were creating so much trouble that the king of England finally made himself their partner, because when they they came to foreclose, some of these dukes bumped off the Jews. . . the money-lenders. So the king finally said – and this is all in history, look up Tianson [Tennyson?] or Rourke, the History of the Jews in England; two books you can find in your library. When the king found out what the trouble was all about, and how much money they were making, he declared himself a fifty-percent partner of the money lenders. Edward the First. And for many years, one-third of the revenues of the British Treasury came from the fifty-percent interest in money-lending by the Jews. But it got worse and worse. So much worse that when the Lords and Dukes kept killing the money-lenders, the King then said, "I declare myself the heir of all the money-lenders. If they're killed you have to pay me, because I'm his sole heir". That made so much trouble, because the King had to go out and collect the money with an army, so he told the Jews to get out. There were

15,000 of them, and they had to get out, and they went across to Ireland, and that's how Ireland got to be part of the United Kingdom.

When King Edward found out what they were doing, he decided to take Ireland for himself before someone else did. He sent Robert Southgard with a mercenary army and conquered Ireland. So, show me one time where a Jew was persecuted in any country because of his religion. It has never happened. It's always their impact on the political, social, or economic customs and traditions of the community in which they settle.

——Next Question—— [Question inaudible] Freedman: Yes, sir. Well, they say most of those things themselves. It was unnecessary for Benjamin Franklin to say it. Most of those things they say themselves. But Benjamin Franklin observed, and by hearsay understood, what was happening in Europe. When Russia, in 920 was formed, and gradually surrounded the Khazar Kingdom, and absorbed them, most of the well-to-do Khazars fled to Western Europe and brought with them the very things to which you object and I object and a lot of other people object. The customs, the habits, the instincts with which they were endowed. When Benjamin Franklin referred to them as Jews because that's the name that they went by, and when the Christians first heard that these people who were fleeing from Russia – who they were – that they had practiced this Talmudic faith – the Christians in Western Europe said, "They must be the remnants of the lost ten tribes!" And Mr. Grutz, the greatest historian amongst the Jews, said that – and he's probably as good an authority on that subject as there is. So when Ben Franklin came to Europe in the 18th century, he already saw the results of what these people had done after they left their homeland. And every word of it is true... they say it themselves. I can give you half a dozen books they've written in which they say the same thing: When they have money they become tyrants. And when they become defeated, they become ruthless. They're only barbarians. They're the descendants of Asiatic Mongols and they will do anything to accomplish their purpose. What right did they have to take over Russia the way they did? The Czar had abdicated nine or ten months before that. There was no need for them. . . . they were going to have a constitutional monarchy. But they didn't want that. When the constitutional monarchy was to assemble in November, they mowed them all down and established the Soviet Union.

There was no need for that. But they thought, "Now is the time", and if you will look in the Encyclopedia Britannica under the word 'Bolshevism', you'll find the five laws there that Lenin put down for a successful revolution. One of them is, "Wait for the right time, and then give them everything you've got". It would pay you to read that. You'd also find that Mr. Harold Blacktree, who wrote the article for the Encyclopedia Britannica states that the Jews conceived and created and cultivated the Communist movement. And that their energy made them the spearhead of the movement. Harold Blacktree wrote it and no one knew more about Communism than he. And the Encyclopedia Britannica for 25 years has been printing it.

——Next Question—— [Question inaudible] Freedman: Well, I can't advocate that you do anything that's criminal, but I can tell you this. You can start what I call an

endless chain. If you can get your friends to write, objectively, here is the statement: Mr. Kennedy's office gave me this himself. Mr. Smith, who succeeded Mr. Kennedy, took over his office – was in his office – and gave me this. He delivered this on the 25th, and it says here: "For release to AM (that means morning papers), August 25th". "Israel is here to stay. It is a national commitment, special obligation of the Democratic Party. The White House must take the lead. American intervention. We will act promptly and decisively against any nation in the Middle East which attacks its neighbor. I propose that we make clear to both Israel and the Arab states our guarantee that we will act with whatever force and speed are necessary to halt any aggression by any nation".

Well, do you call the return of people to their homeland [the Arab Palestinians] aggression? Is Mr. Kennedy going to do that? Suppose three million Mexicans came into Texas and drove the six million Texans into the deserts of Arizona and New Mexico. Suppose these Mexicans were slipped in there armed – the Texans were disarmed – and one night they drove them all out of Texas and declared themselves the Republic of the Alamo. What would the United States say? Would we say it's aggression for these Texans to try to get their homes back from the Mexican thieves? Suppose the Negroes in Alabama were secretly armed by the Soviets and overnight they rose up and drove all the whites into the swamps of Mississippi and Georgia and Florida. . . . drove them out completely, and declared themselves the Republic of Ham, or the Republic of something-or-other. Would we call it aggression if these people, the whites of Alabama, tried to go back to their homes? Would we. . . . what would we think if the soviet Union said, "No, those Negroes now occupy them! Leave them there!", or "No, those Mexicans are in Texas. they declared themselves a sovereign state. Leave them there. You have plenty of room in Utah and Nevada. Settle somewhere else".

Would we call it aggression if the Alabama whites or the Texans wanted to go back to their homes? So now, you've got to write to President Kennedy and say, "We do not consider it aggression in the sense that you use the word, if these people want to return to their homes as the United Nations – fifteen times in the last twelve years – called upon the Zionists in occupation of Palestine to allow the Arab Palestinians to return to their former homes and farms".

[End of transcript of Benjamin Freedman speech, given in 1961 at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C.]

14. Subverting Western Civilization

This chapter is a summary of the relevant points in “The Culture of Critique” which focuses on Jewish influence trying to subvert traditional western culture with “intellectual” methods.

14.1 Jews and the Radical Critique of Gentile Culture: Introduction

For 1,500 years Jewish society had been designed to produce intellectuals. . . Jewish society was geared to support them. . . Rich merchants married sages’ daughters; . . . Quite suddenly, around the year 1800, this ancient and highly efficient social machine for the production of intellectuals began to shift its output. Instead of pouring all its products into the closed circuit of rabbinical studies, . . . it unleashed a significant and evergrowing proportion of them into secular life. This was an event of shattering importance in world history.

There is no implication here of a unified Jewish “conspiracy” to undermine gentile culture, as portrayed in the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Since the Enlightenment, Judaism has never been a unified, monolithic movement, and there has clearly been a great deal of disagreement among Jews as to how to protect themselves and attain their interests during this period.

The movements discussed in this volume (Boasian anthropology, political radicalism, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New York Intellectuals) were advanced by relatively few individuals whose views may not have been known or understood by the majority of the Jewish community. The argument is that Jews dominated these intellectual movements, that a strong sense of Jewish identity was characteristic of the great majority of these individuals, and that these individuals were pursuing a Jewish agenda in and participating in these movements. Thus there is no implication that Judaism constitutes a unified movement or that all segments of the Jewish community participated in these movements. Jews may constitute a predominant or necessary element in radical political movements or movements in the social sciences, and Jewish identification may be highly compatible with or even facilitate these movements without most Jews being involved in these movements. As a result, the question of the overall effects of Jewish influences on gentile culture is independent of the question of whether most or all Jews supported the movements to alter gentile culture. This distinction is important because on the one hand anti-Semites have often implicitly or explicitly assumed that Jewish involvement in radical political movements was part of an overarching Jewish strategy that also included wealthy Jewish capitalists, as well as Jewish involve-

ment in the media, the academy, and other areas of public life. On the other hand, Jews attempting to defuse the anti-Semitism resulting from the fact that Jews have played a predominant role in many radical political movements have often pointed to the fact that only a minority of Jews are involved and that gentiles are also involved in the movements.

Similarly, the fact that most Jews prior to the 1930s were not Zionists, at least overtly, surely does not imply that Jewish identification was irrelevant to Zionism, or that Jews did not in fact constitute a predominant influence on Zionism, or that Zionism did not have effects on gentile societies, or that some gentiles did not become ardent Zionists. Political radicalism has been one choice among many available to Jews in the post-Enlightenment world, and there is no implication here that Judaism constitutes a monolithic unified group in the post-Enlightenment world. That Jews have been more likely than gentiles to choose radical political alternatives and that Jews have been a predominant influence in some radical political movements are therefore facts highly relevant to the present project. That some gentiles were involved in these movements is not surprising either. Judaism may come to be viewed as subversive when Jews attempt to inculcate negative perceptions of gentile culture among gentiles. The association of Judaism with subversive ideologies has a long history. Noting the association between Jews and subversive ideas in Muslim countries, Lewis (1984, 104) states that the theme of Jewish subversion is also familiar in "other times and places." Johnson (1988, 214-215) finds that beginning in the Middle Ages converted Jews, especially those forced to convert, were "a critical, questing, disturbing element within the intelligentsia. . . [Thus] the claim that they were intellectually subversive had an element of truth." The title of a recent book on Jewish art in the Middle Ages expresses this theme well: *Dreams of Subversion in Medieval Jewish Art and Literature* (M. M. Epstein 1997). Epstein comments that "One can sense the anger Jews of the late Middle Ages must have felt when they called for the destruction of Christendom".

This association of Jews with subversive ideologies continued during and after the Enlightenment as Jews were able to participate in public intellectual debate in Western Europe. Paul Johnson (1988, 291-292), writing of Baruch Spinoza, terms him "the first major example of the sheer destructive power of Jewish rationalism once it escaped the restraints of the traditional community." Similarly, Heinrich Heine is "both the prototype and the archetype of a new figure in European literature: the Jewish radical man of letters, using his skill, reputation and popularity to undermine the intellectual confidence of the established order". his "sheer destructive power" of the Jewish intellect was an important aspect of the pre-National Socialist era in Germany. A prominent feature of anti-Semitism among the Social Conservatives and racial anti-Semites in Germany from 1870 to 1933 was their belief that Jews were instrumental in developing ideas that subverted traditional German attitudes and beliefs. Jews were vastly overrepresented as editors and writers during the 1920s in Germany, and "a more general cause of increased anti-Semitism was the very strong and unfortunate propensity of dissident Jews to attack national institutions and customs in both socialist and non-socialist publications"

Jews were not simply overrepresented among radical journalists, intellectuals, and “producers of culture” in Weimar Germany, they essentially created these movements. “They violently attacked everything about German society. They despised the military, the judiciary, and the middle class in general”. Anti-Semitism among university professors during the Weimar period was partially fueled by the perception that “the Jew represented the critical or ‘negative’ aspects of modern thought, the acids of analysis and skepticism that helped to dissolve the moral certainties, patriotic commitment, and social cohesion of modern states”.

Reflecting this perception, National Socialist propaganda during the period claimed that Jews attempted to undermine the social cohesion of gentile society while remaining committed to a highly cohesive group themselves—an intellectual double standard in which the basis of social cohesion among gentiles was subjected to intense criticism while the Jews “would retain their international cohesiveness, blood ties, and spiritual unity” (Aschheim 1985, 239). Viewed from this perspective, an important goal of Jewish intellectual effort may be understood as attempting to undermine cohesive gentile group strategies while continuing to engage in their own highly cohesive group strategy.

Jews have also been at the forefront of the adversarial culture in the United States, England, and France since the mid-1960s, especially as defenders of the adversary culture in the media and the academic world. Stein (1979, 28; see also Lichter et al. 1994; Powers et al. 1996) shows that his sample of predominantly Jewish writers and producers of television shows in the 1970s had very negative attitudes toward what they viewed as a gentile-dominated cultural establishment, although their most negative comments were elicited in informal conversation rather than during formal interviews. Television portrayals of gentile establishment figures in business and the military tended to be very negative. For example, “the writers clearly thought of military men as clean-shaven, blond, and of completely WASP background. In the minds of a few of the people I interviewed, these blond officers were always a hair’s breadth away from becoming National Socialists. They were thought of as part of an Aryan ruling class that actually or potentially repressed those of different ethnic backgrounds”

Indeed, Glazer and Moynihan (1963/1970) credit the emergence of the adversary culture in the United States as a triumph of the New York Jewish cultural-political perspective. Jewish writers and visual artists (including E. L. Doctorow, Norman Mailer, Joseph Heller,⁵¹ Frederick Wiseman, and Norman Lear) were disproportionately involved in attempts to portray American society as “sick” (Rothman & Lichter 1982, 120). A common technique of cultural subversion “involves an attack upon genuine inequities or irrationalities. Since all societies abound in both, there is never an absence of targets. However, the attack is generally not directed at the particular inequity or irrationality per se. Rather, such inequities or irrationalities are used as a means for achieving a larger purpose: the general weakening of the social order itself”.

In this volume I will concentrate on Jewish involvement in movements opposed to evolutionary, biological, and genetic findings in the social sciences, radical political ideology,

psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School of Social Research, and the New York Intellectuals. In several of the movements discussed in the following chapters it is of considerable importance that their propagators have attempted to clothe their rhetoric in the garb of science—the modern arbiter of truth and intellectual respectability. As White (1966, 2) notes with respect to the Boasian school of anthropology, the aura of science is deceptive: “They would make it appear and would have everyone believe that their choice of premises and goals has been determined by scientific considerations. This is definitely not the case. . . . They are obviously sincere. Their sincerity and group loyalty tend, however, to persuade and consequently to deceive.”

Conceptualizing the Jewish Radical Criticism of Gentile Society

The foregoing has documented a general tendency for Jewish intellectuals in a variety of periods to be involved with social criticism, and I have hinted at an analysis in terms of social identity theory. More formally, two quite different types of reasons explain why Jews might be expected to advocate ideologies and political movements aimed at undermining the existing gentile social order.

First, such ideologies and movements may be directed at benefiting Jews economically or socially. Clearly one of the themes of post-Enlightenment Judaism has been the rapid upward mobility of Jews and attempts by gentile power structures to limit Jewish access to power and social status. Given this rather conspicuous reality, practical reasons of economic and political selfinterest would result in Jews being attracted to movements that criticized the gentile power structure or even advocated overthrowing it entirely. Thus the czarist government of Russia enforced restrictions on Jews mainly out of fear that Jews would overwhelm gentile Russians in free economic competition. These czarist restrictions on Jews were a prominent rallying point for Jews around the world, and it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that Jewish participation in radical movements in Russia was motivated by perceived Jewish interest in overthrowing the czarist regime. Indeed, Arthur Liebman (1979, 29ff) notes that Jewish political radicalism in czarist Russia must be understood as resulting from economic restrictions on Jews that were enforced by the government in the context of considerable Jewish poverty and a very rapid Jewish demographic increase. Similarly, well into the 1930s the Jewish socialist labor movement in the United States aimed at bettering the working conditions of its predominantly Jewish membership.

Another practical goal of Jewish political and intellectual movements has been to combat anti-Semitism. For example, Jewish attraction to socialism in many countries in the 1930s was motivated partly by communist opposition to fascism and anti-Semitism. The general association between anti-Semitism and conservative political views has often been advanced as an explanation for Jewish involvement with the left, including the leftist tendencies of many wealthy Jews. Combating anti-Semitism also became a prime goal of Jewish radicals in the United States after Jews had predominantly moved into the middle

class Rising anti-Semitism and consequent restrictions on Jewish upward mobility during the 1930s also resulted in an attraction of Jews to the left.

Jewish involvement in social criticism may be influenced by social identity processes independent of any practical goal such as ending anti-Semitism. From the social identity perspective, the Jewish tendency to subvert the social order is thus expected to extend beyond developing ideologies and social programs that satisfy specific Jewish economic and social interests and extend to a general devaluation and critique of gentile culture—"the sheer destructive power of Jewish rationalism once it escaped the restraints of the traditional community".

Social identity processes would therefore be intensified by Jewish perceptions that gentile culture was hostile to Jews and that Jews had often been persecuted by gentiles. Thus Feldman finds very robust tendencies toward heightened Jewish identification and rejection of gentile culture consequent to anti-Semitism at the very beginnings of Judaism in the ancient world and throughout Jewish history. In *Lord George Bentinck: A Political Biography* (1852, 489), the nineteenth-century racial theorist Benjamin Disraeli, who had a very strong Jewish identity despite being a baptized Christian, stated that "persecution. . . although unjust may have reduced the modern Jews to a state almost justifying malignant vengeance. They may have become so odious and so hostile to mankind as to merit for their present conduct, no matter how occasioned, the obloquy and ill-treatment of the communities in which they dwell and with which they are scarcely permitted to mingle." The result, according to Disraeli, is that Jews would perceive gentile society in extremely negative terms and may attempt to overthrow the existing social order:

But existing society has chosen to persecute this race which should furnish its choice allies, and what have been the consequences? They may be traced in the last outbreak of the destructive principle in Europe. An insurrection takes place against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property. . . 52 The people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skillful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe! And all this because they wish to destroy that ungrateful Christendom which owes to them even its name, and whose tyranny they can no longer endure.

Indeed, Theodore Herzl espoused socialism in the 1890s as a Jewish response to continuing anti-Semitism, not because of its political goal of economic leveling, but because it would destroy the anti-Semitic gentile power structure: "From outcasts of society they [Jews] will become enemies of society. Ah, they are not protected in their civic honor, they are permitted to be insulted, scorned and on occasion also a bit plundered and maimed—what prevents them from going over to the side of anarchy?" Jews "no longer have a stake in the state. They will join the revolutionary parties, supplying or sharpening their weapons. They want to turn the Jews over to the mob—good, they themselves will go over to the people. Beware, they are at their limit; do not go too far".

The suggestion, consistent with social identity theory, is that a fundamental motivation

of Jewish intellectuals involved in social criticism has simply been hatred of the gentile-dominated power structure perceived as anti-Semitic. This deep antipathy toward the non-Jewish world can also be seen in sociologist and New York Intellectual Michael Walzer's (1994, 6-7) comment on the "pathologies of Jewish life," particularly "the sense that 'all the world is against us,' the resulting fear, resentment, and hatred of the goy, the secret dreams of reversal and triumph.

Indeed, intense hatred of perceived enemies appears to be an important psychological characteristic of Jews. It is remarkable that Schatz finds that while all Polish communists in the interwar period hated their enemies, Jewish communists had more perceived enemies and hated them more intensely. Jewish communists had more intensely negative feelings toward their enemies, indicating that Jews may be viewed as having hypertrophied social identity systems and an exaggerated proneness toward collectivist social structures. The greater intensity of Jewish hatred toward outgroups and perceived enemies may be simply an affective manifestation of these tendencies. There is evidence that Jews were highly compartmentalized in their emotional lives prone to alterations between positive social interactions (paradigmatically directed toward members of a perceived ingroup) and intense interpersonal hostility (paradigmatically directed toward members of a perceived outgroup). Social identity theory also predicts that Jewish intellectual activity will be directed at developing ideologies that affirm their own social identity in the face of the social categories developed by anti-Semites.

The other side of the coin is that Jews have often reacted quite negatively to Jewish writers who portray Jewish characters as having negative or disapproved traits. For example, Philip Roth has been extensively criticized by Jews and Jewish organizations for portraying such characters, or at least for portraying such characters in America, where his work could be read by anti-Semites.

The importance of social identity processes in Jewish intellectual activity was recognized some time ago by Thorstein Veblen (1934). Veblen described the preeminence of Jewish scholars and scientists in Europe and noted their tendency to be iconoclasts. He noted that the Enlightenment had destroyed the ability of Jewish intellectuals to find comfort in the identity provided by religion, but they do not therefore simply accept uncritically the intellectual structures of gentile society. By engaging in iconoclasm, Veblen suggests, Jews are in fact subjecting to criticism the basic social categorization system of the gentile world—a categorization system with which the gentile, but not the Jew, is comfortable. The Jew "is not... invested with the gentile's peculiar heritage of conventional preconceptions which have stood over, by inertia of habit, out of the gentile past, which go, on the one hand, to make the safe and sane gentile conservative and complacent, and which conduce also, on the other hand, to blur the safe and sane gentile's intellectual vision, and to leave him intellectually sessile".

Indeed, Jewish social scientists have at least sometimes been aware of these linkages: Peter Gay quotes the following from a 1926 letter written by Sigmund Freud, whose antipathy to Western culture is described in Chapter 4:

“Because I was a Jew, I found myself free from many prejudices which limited others in the employment of their intellects, and as a Jew I was prepared to go into opposition and to do without the agreement of the ‘compact majority.’” In a later letter, Freud stated that to accept psychoanalysis “called for a certain measure of readiness to accept a situation of solitary opposition—a situation with which nobody is more familiar than a Jew” There is a sense of alienation vis-à-vis the surrounding society. The Jewish intellectual, in the words of New York Intellectual and political radical Irving Howe, tends “to feel at some distance from society; to assume, almost as a birthright, a critical stance toward received dogmas, to recognize oneself as not quite at home in the world”.

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A critical component of minority group influence is intellectual consistency, and an important theme in the following will be that Jewishdominated intellectual movements have had a high degree of internal group cohesion and have often been typified by high levels of ingroup-outgroup thinking—a traditional aspect of Judaism. However, because these movements were intended to appeal to gentiles, they were forced to minimize any overt indication that Jewish group identity or Jewish group interests were important to the participants.

Such a result is also highly compatible with social identity theory: The extent to which individuals are willing to be influenced depends on their willingness to accept the social category from which the divergent opinion derives. For Jews intent on influencing the wider society, overt Jewish group identity and overtly stated Jewish interests could only detract from the ability of these movements to influence their intended targets. As a result, Jewish involvement in these movements was often actively concealed, and the intellectual structures themselves were phrased in universalist terms to minimize the importance of the social category of Jew-gentile.

14.2 The Boasian School of Anthropology and the Decline of Darwinism in the Social Sciences

Several writers have commented on the “radical changes” that occurred in the goals and methods of the social sciences consequent to the entry of Jews to these fields (Liebman 1973, 213; see also Degler 1991; Hollinger 1996; Horowitz 1993, 75; Rothman & Lichter

1982). Degler (1991, 188ff) notes that the shift away from Darwinism as the fundamental paradigm of the social sciences resulted from an ideological shift rather than from the emergence of any new empirical data. He also notes that Jewish intellectuals have been instrumental in the decline of Darwinism and other biological perspectives in American social science since the 1930s. The opposition of Jewish intellectuals to Darwinism has long been noticed.

In sociology, the advent of Jewish intellectuals in the pre-World War II period resulted in “a level of politicization unknown to sociology’s founding fathers. It is not only that the names of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim replaced those of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, but also that the sense of America as a consensual experience gave way to a sense of America as a series of conflicting definitions“. In the post-World War II period, sociology “became populated by Jews to such a degree that jokes abounded: one did not need the synagogue, the minyan [i.e., the minimum number of Jews required for a communal religious service] was to be found in sociology departments; or, one did not need a sociology of Jewish life, since the two had become synonymous“.

Indeed, the ethnic conflict within American sociology parallels to a remarkable degree the ethnic conflict in American anthropology that is a theme of this chapter. Here the conflict was played out between leftist Jewish social scientists and an old-line, empirically oriented Protestant establishment that was eventually eclipsed:

American sociology has struggled with the contrary claims of those afflicted with physics envy and researchers... more engaged in the dilemmas of society. In that struggle, midwestern Protestant mandarins of positivist science often came into conflict with East Coast Jews who in turn wrestled with their own Marxist commitments; great quantitative researchers from abroad, like Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia, sought to disrupt the complacency of native bean counters.

Degler emphasizes the role of Franz Boas (1858-1942) in the anti-Darwinian transformation of American social science: “Boas’ influence upon American social scientists in matters of race can hardly be exaggerated.“ Boas engaged in a “life-long assault on the idea that race was a primary source of the differences to be found in the mental or social capabilities of human groups. He accomplished his mission largely through his ceaseless, almost relentless articulation of the concept of culture“ . “Boas, almost single-handedly, developed in America the concept of culture, which, like a powerful solvent, would in time expunge race from the literature of social science“.

As Frank points out, “The preponderance of Jewish intellectuals in the early years of Boasian anthropology and the Jewish identities of anthropologists in subsequent generations has been downplayed in standard histories of the discipline.“ Jewish identifications and the pursuit of perceived Jewish interests, particularly in advocating an ideology of cultural pluralism as a model for Western societies, has been the “invisible subject“ of American anthropology - invisible because the ethnic identifications and ethnic interests of its advocates have been masked by a language of science in which such identifications

and interests were publicly illegitimate.

Boas was reared in a “Jewish-liberal” family in which the revolutionary ideals of 1848 remained influential.⁵⁹ He developed a “left-liberal posture which . . . is at once scientific and political”. Boas married within his ethnic group and was intensely concerned with anti-Semitism from an early period in his life . Alfred Kroeber recounted a story “which [Boas] is said to have revealed confidentially but which cannot be vouched for, . . . that on hearing an anti-Semitic insult in a public cafe, he threw the speaker out of doors, and was challenged. Next morning his adversary offered to apologize; but Boas insisted that the duel be gone through with. Apocryphal or not, the tale absolutely fits the character of the man as we know him in America.” In a comment that says much about Boas’s Jewish identification as well as his view of gentiles, Boas stated in response to a question regarding how he could have professional dealings with anti-Semites such as Charles Davenport, “If we Jews had to choose to work only with Gentiles certified to be a hundred percent free of anti-Semitism, who could we ever really work with?”

Moreover, as has been common among Jewish intellectuals in several historical eras, Boas was deeply alienated from and hostile toward gentile culture, particularly the cultural ideal of the Prussian aristocracy. I conclude that Boas had a strong Jewish identification and that he was deeply concerned about anti-Semitism. On the basis of the following, it is reasonable to suppose that his concern with anti-Semitism was a major influence in the development of American anthropology.

Boas’s theories were also meant to counter the racist theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and American eugenicists like Madison Grant, whose book, *The Passing of the Great Race*, was highly critical of Boas’s research on environmental influences on skull size. The result was that “in message and purpose, [Boas’s anthropology] was an explicitly antiracist science”. Grant characterized Jewish immigrants as ruthlessly self-interested whereas American Nordics were committing racial suicide and allowing themselves to be “elbowed out” of their own land (1921). Grant also believed Jews were engaged in a campaign to discredit racial research:

It is well-nigh impossible to publish in the American newspapers any reflection upon certain religions or races which are hysterically sensitive even when mentioned by name. . . . Abroad, conditions are fully as bad, and we have the authority of one of the most eminent anthropologists in France that the collection of anthropological measurements and data among French recruits at the outbreak of the Great War was prevented by Jewish influence, which aimed to suppress any suggestion of racial differentiation in France.

An important technique of the Boasian school was to cast doubt on general theories of human evolution, such as those implying developmental sequences, by emphasizing the vast diversity and chaotic minutiae of human behavior, as well as the relativism of standards of cultural evaluation. The Boasians argued that general theories of cultural evolution must await a detailed cataloguing of cultural diversity, but in fact no general theories emerged from this body of research in the ensuing half century of its dominance

of the profession.

Boas and his students were intensely concerned with pushing an ideological agenda within the American anthropological profession. Boas and his associates had a sense of group identity, a commitment to a common viewpoint, and an agenda to dominate the institutional structure of anthropology. They were a compact group with a clear intellectual and political agenda rather than individualist seekers of disinterested truth. The defeat of the Darwinians “had not happened without considerable exhortation of ‘every mother’s son’ standing for the ‘Right.’”

By 1915 the Boasians controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its Executive Board. In 1919 Boas could state that “most of the anthropological work done at the present time in the United States” was done by his students at Columbia. By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish. His protégé Melville Herskovits noted that the four decades of the tenure of [Boas’s] professorship at Columbia gave a continuity to his teaching that permitted him to develop students who eventually made up the greater part of the significant professional core of American anthropologists, and who came to man and direct most of the major departments of anthropology in the United States. In their turn, they trained the students who... have continued the tradition in which their teachers were trained.

According to Leslie White, Boas’s most influential students were Ruth Benedict, Alexander Goldenweiser, Melville Herskovits, Alfred Kroeber, Robert Lowie, Margaret Mead, Paul Radin, Edward Sapir, and Leslie Spier. All of this “small, compact group of scholars... gathered about their leader” were Jews with the exception of Kroeber, Benedict, and Mead. Frank also mentions several other prominent first-generation Jewish students of Boas (Alexander Lesser, Ruth Bunzel, Gene [Regina] Weltfish, Esther Schiff Goldfrank, and Ruth Landes). Montagu, whose original name was Israel Ehrenberg, was a highly visible crusader in the battle against the idea of racial differences in mental capacities. He was also highly conscious of being Jewish, stating on one occasion that “if you are brought up a Jew, you know that all non-Jews are anti-Semitic... I think it is a good working hypothesis”.

Montagu asserted that race is a socially constructed myth. Humans are innately cooperative (but not innately aggressive) and there is a universal brotherhood among humans—a highly problematic idea for many in the wake of World War II. Mention also should be made of Otto Klineberg, a professor of psychology at Columbia. Klineberg was “tireless” and “ingenious” in his arguments against the reality of racial differences. He came under the influence of Boas at Columbia and dedicated his 1935 book *Race Differences* to him. Klineberg “made it his business to do for psychology what his friend and colleague at Columbia [Boas] had done for anthropology: to rid his discipline of racial explanations for human social differences”.

It is interesting in this regard that the members of the Boasian school who achieved the

greatest public renown were two gentiles, Benedict and Mead. As in several other prominent historical cases, gentiles became the publicly visible spokespersons for a movement dominated by Jews. Indeed, like Freud, Boas recruited gentiles into his movement out of concern “that his Jewishness would make his science appear partisan and thus compromised”. Boas devised Margaret Mead’s classic study on adolescence in Samoa with an eye to its usefulness in the nature-nurture debate raging at the time. The result of this research was *Coming of Age in Samoa* – a book that revolutionized American anthropology in the direction of radical environmentalism. Its success stemmed ultimately from its promotion by Boas’s students in departments of anthropology at prominent American universities. This work and Ruth Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture* were also widely influential among other social scientists, psychiatrists, and the public at large, so that “by the middle of the twentieth century, it was a commonplace for educated Americans to refer to human differences in cultural terms, and to say that ‘modern science has shown that all human races are equal’”.

The Boasian school of anthropology thus came to resemble in a microcosm key features of Judaism as a highly collectivist group evolutionary strategy: a high level of ingroup identification, exclusionary policies, and cohesiveness in pursuit of common interests. Boasian anthropology, at least during Boas’s lifetime, also resembled traditional Judaism in another critical manner: It was highly authoritarian and intolerant of dissent. As in the case of Freud, Boas was a patriarchal father figure, strongly supporting those who agreed with him and excluding those who did not. As in the case of Freud, in the eyes of his disciples virtually everything Boas did was of monumental importance and justified placing him among the intellectual giants of all time. Like Freud, Boas did not tolerate theoretical or ideological differences with his students. Individuals who disagreed with the leader or had personality clashes with him, such as Clark Wissler and Ralph Linton, were simply excluded from the movement.

The entire enterprise may thus be characterized as a highly authoritarian political movement centered around a charismatic leader. The results were extraordinarily successful: “The profession as a whole was united within a single national organization of academically oriented anthropologists. By and large, they shared a common understanding of the fundamental significance of the historically conditioned variety of human cultures in the determination of human behavior”. Research on racial differences ceased, and the profession completely excluded eugenicists and racial theorists like Madison Grant and Charles Davenport. By the mid-1930s the Boasian view of the cultural determination of human behavior had a strong influence on social scientists generally. The followers of Boas also eventually became some of the most influential academic supporters of psychoanalysis. Marvin Harris notes that psychoanalysis was adopted by the Boasian school because of its utility as a critique of Euro-American culture, and, indeed, as we shall see in later chapters, psychoanalysis is an ideal vehicle of cultural critique. In the hands of the Boasian school, psychoanalysis was completely stripped of its evolutionary associations and there was a much greater accommodation to the importance of cultural variables.

Cultural critique was also an important aspect of the Boasian school. Stocking shows that several prominent Boasians, including Robert Lowie and Edward Sapir, were involved in the cultural criticism of the 1920s which centered around the perception of American culture as overly homogeneous, hypocritical, and emotionally and esthetically repressive (especially with regard to sexuality). Central to this program was creating ethnographies of idyllic cultures that were free of the negatively perceived traits that were attributed to Western culture. Cultural criticism was a central feature of the two most prominent Boasian ethnographies, *Coming of Age in Samoa* and *Patterns of Culture*. These works are not only erroneous but systematically misrepresent key issues related to evolutionary perspectives on human behavior. For example, Benedict's Zuni were described as being free of war, homicide, and concern with accumulation of wealth. Children were not disciplined. Sex was casual, with little concern for virginity, sexual possessiveness, or paternity confidence. Contemporary Western societies are, of course, the opposite of these idyllic paradises, and Benedict suggests that we should study such cultures in order "to pass judgment on the dominant traits of our own civilization". Mead's similar portrayal of the Samoans ignored her own evidence contrary to her thesis. Negatively perceived behaviors of Mead's Samoans, such as rape and concern for virginity, were attributed to Western influence.

Indeed, one consequence of the triumph of the Boasians was that there was almost no research on warfare and violence among the peoples studied by anthropologists. Warfare and warriors were ignored, and cultures were conceived as consisting of myth-makers and gift-givers. (Orans shows that Mead systematically ignored cases of rape, violence, revolution, and competition in her account of Samoa.) Only five articles on the anthropology of war appeared during the 1950s. Revealingly, when Harry Turney-High published his volume *Primitive Warfare* in 1949 documenting the universality of warfare and its oftentimes awesome savagery, the book was completely ignored by the anthropological profession - another example of the exclusionary tactics used against dissenters among the Boasians and characteristic of the other intellectual movements reviewed in this volume as well. Turney-High's massive data on non-Western peoples conflicted with the image of them favored by a highly politicized profession whose members simply excluded these data entirely from intellectual discourse.

The result was a "pacified past" and an "attitude of self-reproach" in which the behavior of primitive peoples was bowdlerized while the behavior of European peoples was not only excoriated as uniquely evil but also as responsible for all extant examples of warfare among primitive peoples. From this perspective, it is only the fundamental inadequacy of European culture that prevents an idyllic world free from between-group conflict. The reality, of course, is far different. Warfare was and remains a recurrent phenomenon among prestate societies. Surveys indicate over 90 percent of societies engage in warfare, the great majority engaging in military activities at least once per year.

Beyond Boas: Recent examples

Jewish influence on the social sciences has extended far beyond Boas and the American Anthropological Association. Hollinger notes “the transformation of the ethno-religious demography of American academic life by Jews” in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, as well as the Jewish influence on trends toward the secularization of American society and in advancing an ideal of cosmopolitanism. As early as the early 1940s, this transformation resulted in “a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-center intelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communities of philosophy and the social sciences” By 1968, Jews constituted 20 percent of the faculty of elite American colleges and universities and constituted 30 percent of the “most liberal” faculty. At this time, Jews, representing less than 3 percent of the population, constituted 25 percent of the social science faculty at elite universities and 40 percent of liberal faculty who published most. Jewish academics were also far more likely to support “progressive” or communist parties from the 1930s to the 1950s. In 1948 30 percent of Jewish faculty voted for the Progressive Party, compared to less than 5 percent for gentile faculty.

The attraction of Jewish intellectuals to the left is a general phenomenon and has typically co-occurred with a strong Jewish identity and sense of pursuing specifically Jewish interests. Stephen Jay Gould and Leon Kamin are good examples of these trends. Gould himself would appear to be a prime example of this conflation of personal and ethno-political interests in the construction of science. Gould (1992) has been an ardent, highly publicized opponent of evolutionary approaches to human behavior. Like many of the other prominent critics of sociobiology, Gould is Jewish, and Michael Ruse notes that a very prominent theme of Gould’s *The Mismeasure of Man* was how hereditarian views on intelligence had been used by “Teutonic supremacists” to discriminate against Jews early in the century. Gould’s views on the IQ debates of the 1920s and their link to the immigration issue and eventually the Holocaust bear scrutiny. They illustrate how skill as a propagandist and ethnic activist can be combined with a highly visible and prestigious academic position to have a major influence on public attitudes in an area of research with great implications for public policy. Ruse points out that Gould’s book was very passionately written and was “widely criticized” by historians of psychology, suggesting that Gould had allowed his feelings about anti-Semitism to color his scientific writings on genetic influences on individual differences in intelligence. Ruse goes on as follows:

It does not seem to me entirely implausible to suggest that Gould’s passion against human sociobiology was linked to the fear that it was yet another tool which could be used for antisemitic purposes. I did ask Gould about this once. . . . He did not entirely repudiate the idea, but inclined to think that the opposition stemmed more from Marxism, and as it so contingently happens, most American Marxists are from Eastern European Jewish families. Perhaps both factors were involved.

Gould’s comments highlight the fact that the role of Jewish academics in opposing Darwinian approaches to human behavior has often co-occurred with a strong commitment

to a leftist political agenda. Indeed, Gould has acknowledged that his theory of evolution as punctuated equilibria was attractive to him as a Marxist because it posited periodic revolutionary upheavals in evolution rather than conservative, gradualist change. Gould learned his Marxism “at his Daddy’s knee“, indicating that he grew up as part of the Jewish- Marxist subculture. In a recent article Gould (1996c) reminisces fondly about the Forward, a politically radical but also ethnically conscious Yiddish newspaper (see Ch. 3), stating that he recalls that many of his relatives bought the newspaper daily. As Arthur Hertzberg notes, “Those who read the Forward knew that the commitment of Jews to remain Jewish was beyond question and discussion.”

Kamin, the son of an immigrant rabbi from Poland, acknowledges that “the experience growing up Jewish in a small and predominantly Christian town strongly sensitized him to the power of the social environment in shaping personality” - a comment that also suggests that Kamin grew up with a strong Jewish identity. While at Harvard, Kamin joined the Communist Party and became the New England editor of the party’s newspaper. After resigning from the party, he became a target of Joseph McCarthy’s Senate Subcommittee Hearings in 1953. Kamin was charged and acquitted on technical grounds of charges of criminal contempt of Congress for failing to answer all the questions of the subcommittee. Fancher describes Kamin’s work on IQ as having “little pretense to ‘objectivity’” and suggests a link between Kamin’s background and his position on IQ: “No doubt reflecting that his own middle-European family [and, I suppose, other Jews] could have been excluded by the restrictive immigration laws, Kamin concluded that an arrogant and unfounded assumption of IQ heritability had helped produce an unjust social policy in the 1920s“.

Kamin and Gould have been in the forefront of spreading disinformation about the role of IQ testing in the immigration debates of the 1920s. Moreover, Kamin and Gould present a highly exaggerated and largely false account of the general attitudes of the testing community on the subject of ethnic group differences in intelligence as well as the role of IQ testing in the congressional debates of the period. This false picture of the 1920s debates was then used by Gould, Kamin, and others to argue that the “overtly racist immigration act” of 1924 (was passed because of racist bias emanating from the IQ-testing community and that this law was a primary cause of the death of Jews in the Holocaust. Thus Kamin (1974, 27) concluded that “the law, for which the science of mental testing may claim substantial credit, resulted in the deaths of literally hundreds of thousands of victims of the Nazi biological theorists. The victims were denied admission to the United States because the ‘German quota’ was filled.“

Similarly, Gould proposes a link between hereditarian views on IQ and the 1924 U.S. immigration law that restricted immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and biased immigration in favor of the peoples of Northwestern Europe. The 1924 immigration law is then linked to the Holocaust:

The quotas...slowed immigration from southern and eastern Europe to a trickle. Throughout the 1930s, Jewish refugees, anticipating the holocaust, sought to emigrate,

but were not admitted. The legal quotas, and continuing eugenical propaganda, barred them even in years when inflated quotas for western and northern European nations were not filled. Chase (1977) has estimated that the quotas barred up to 6 million southern, central, and eastern Europeans between 1924 and the outbreak of World War II (assuming that immigration had continued at its pre-1924 rate). We know what happened to many who wished to leave but had nowhere to go. The paths to destruction are often indirect, but ideas can be agents as sure as guns and bombs.

Indeed, although there is no evidence that IQ testing or eugenic theories had anything more than a trivial influence on the 1924 immigration law, there is evidence that the law was perceived by Jews as directed against them. Perhaps most egregiously of all, Gould makes the amazing argument that he will continue to ignore all recent scholarship on IQ in favor of the older "classical" research because of the "transient and ephemeral" nature of contemporary scholarship (1996a, 22). The argument is that there is no progress in IQ research but only a recurrence of the same bad arguments—a comment that I doubt Gould would apply to any other area of science. Thus Gould continues to denigrate studies linking brain size with IQ despite a great deal of contrary research both prior to and especially since his 1981 edition. Using Magnetic Resonance Imaging to get a more accurate measure of brain size, modern research thus vindicates the discoveries of nineteenth-century pioneers like Paul Broca, Francis Galton, and Samuel George Morton who are systematically defamed by Gould.

In an article entitled "Homo deceptus: Never trust Stephen Jay Gould," journalist Robert Wright (1996), author of *The Moral Animal* (Basic Books, 1994), makes the same charge (that Gould takes credit for the work of others) in a debate over a flagrantly dishonest interpretation by Gould (1996b) of the evolutionary psychology of sex differences. Wright notes that Gould "has convinced the public he is not merely a great writer, but a great theorist of evolution. Yet among top-flight evolutionary biologists, Gould is considered a pest—not just a lightweight but an actively muddled man who has warped the public's understanding of Darwinism." A false picture perhaps, but one that is not without its usefulness in satisfying political and, I suppose, ethnic agendas.

Another prominent biologist, John Alcock (1997), provides an extended and, I think, accurate analysis of several aspects of Gould's rhetorical style: demonstrations of erudition - foreign phrases, poetry - irrelevant to the intellectual arguments but widely regarded even by his critics; branding the opposition with denigrating labels, such as "pop science," "pop psychology," "cardboard Darwinism," or "fundamentalist Darwinians" (similarly, Pinker [1997,] decries Gould's hyperbolic rhetoric, including his description of the ideas of evolutionary psychology as "'fatuous,' 'pathetic,' and 'egregiously simplistic' and his use of some twenty-five synonyms for 'fanatical' "); oversimplifying his opponents' positions in order to set up straw-man arguments, the classic being labeling his opponents as "genetic determinists"; protecting his own position by making illusory concessions to give the appearance of fairmindedness in the attempt to restrict debate; claiming the moral high ground; ignoring relevant data known to all in the scientific community; proposing non-

adaptationist alternatives without attempting to test them and ignoring data supporting adaptationist interpretations; arguing that proximate explanations (i.e., explanations of how a trait works at the neurophysiological level) render ultimate explanations (i.e., the adaptive function of the trait) unnecessary.

Richard Lerner (1992) in his *Final Solutions: Biology, Prejudice, and Genocide* is perhaps the most egregious example of a scientist motivated to discredit evolutionary-biological thinking because of putative links with anti-Semitism. Lerner is a prominent developmental psychologist, and his volume indicates an intense personal involvement directed at combating anti-Semitism by influencing theory in the behavioral sciences. Prior to discussing the explicit links between Lerner's theoretical perspective and his attempt to combat anti-Semitism, I will describe his theory and illustrate the type of strained thinking with which he has attempted to discredit the application of evolutionary thinking to human behavior. Central to this program is Lerner's rejection of biological determinism in favor of a dynamic, contextualist approach to human development. Lerner also rejects environmental determinism, but there is little discussion of the latter view because environmental determinism is "perhaps less often socially pernicious". In this regard, Lerner is surely wrong. A theory that there is no human nature would imply that humans could easily be programmed to accept all manner of exploitation, including slavery.

From a radical environmentalist perspective, it should not matter how societies are constructed, since people should be able to learn to accept any type of social structure. Women could easily be programmed to accept rape, and ethnic groups could be programmed to accept their own domination by other ethnic groups. The view that radical environmentalism is not socially pernicious also ignores the fact that the communist government of the Soviet Union murdered millions of its citizens and later engaged in officially sponsored anti-Semitism while committed to an ideology of radical environmentalism.

Lerner's dynamic contextualism pays lip service to biological influences while actually rendering them inconsequential and unanalyzable. This theory has strong roots in the developmental psychobiological tradition described above, and there are numerous references to these writers. The dynamic contextualist perspective conceptualizes development as a dialectical interaction between organism and environment. Biological influences are viewed as a reality, but they are ultimately unanalyzable, since they are viewed as being inextricably fused with environmental influences. The most notable conclusion is that any attempt to study genetic variation as an independently analyzable influence on individual differences (the program of the science of quantitative behavior genetics) is rejected. Many of the critics of sociobiology have also been strong opponents of behavior genetic research (e.g., S. J. Gould, J. Hirsch, L. Kamin, R. C. Lewontin, and S. Rose). For a particularly egregious example embodying practically every possible misunderstanding of basic behavior genetic concepts, see Gould (1998).

In his foreword to Lerner's book, Lewontin states that developmental contextualism is "the alternative to biological and cultural determinism. It is the statement of the developmental contextual view that is the important central point of *Final Solutions*, and it

is the full elaboration of that point of view that is a pressing program for social theory. Nowhere has this world view been put more succinctly than in Marx's third Thesis on Feurbach". Lewontin goes on to quote a passage from Marx that does indeed express something like the fundamental idea of developmental contextualism. Gould has also endorsed a Marxist dialectical perspective in the social sciences.

Lerner devotes much of his book to showing that dynamic contextualism, because of its emphasis on plasticity, provides a politically acceptable perspective on racial and sexual differences, as well as promising a hope for ending anti-Semitism. This type of messianic, redemptionist attempt to develop a universalist theoretical framework within which Jewish-gentile group differences are submerged in importance is a common feature of other predominantly Jewish movements in the twentieth century, including radical political theories and psychoanalysis. The common theme is that these ideologies have been consistently promoted by individuals who, like Lerner, are self-consciously pursuing a Jewish ethnic and political agenda. There is no question that Lerner strongly believes in the moral imperative of his position, but his moral crusade has led him well beyond science in his attempts to discredit biological theories in the interests of combating anti-Semitism.

The point here is that there is every reason to suppose that a major impetus for these attacks is an attempt to combat anti-Semitism. Lerner begins his preface to *Final Solutions: Biology, Prejudice, and Genocide* with an emotionally wrenching portrait of his childhood surrounded by stories of Nazi atrocities. "As a Jewish boy growing up in Brooklyn in the late 1940's and early 1950's I could not escape Hitler. He, Nazis, the Gestapo, Auschwitz were everywhere" Lerner re-creates a conversation with his grandmother describing the fate of some of his relatives at the hands of the Nazis. He asks why the Nazis hated the Jews, and his grandmother responds by saying, "Just because." Lerner states, "In the time that has passed since that afternoon in my grandmother's apartment I have learned—and increasingly so as the years go by—how deeply I was affected by these early lessons about Nazi genocide. I now understand that much of my life has been shaped by my attempts to go beyond the answer of 'Just because'".

The central message of Lerner's book is that there is a possible causal chain linking Darwinism to an ideology of genetic determinism, to the legitimization of the status quo as a biological imperative, to negatively evaluating individuals with "inferior" genotypes, to eugenics, and finally to destruction of those with inferior genes. This story line is said to have been played out in several historical instances, including the massacres of Native Americans and the Ottoman genocide of Armenians, and most particularly in the Holocaust. It is nowhere mentioned that an ideology of genetic determinism is hardly a necessary condition for genocide, since there are a great many historical examples of genocide in societies where Darwin was unknown, including the annihilation of the Amorites and Midianites by the Israelites described in the Tanakh - examples that are ignored by Lerner.

Lerner's agenda is to discredit evolutionary thinking because of its association with

Nazism. Lerner correctly describes Nazi ideology as essentially an ideology of group impermeability, "the belief that the world... may be divided unequivocally into two major groups: an ingroup comprising those possessing the best features of human existence, and an outgroup comprising the worst features of human existence. There can be no crossing-over between these groups, because blood, or genes, divides them". Similarly, Lewontin, in his foreword to Lerner's book, states that "whatever the generating forces that keep nationalism alive... they must, in the end, assert the unchanging and unchangeable nature of social identity... Exploiters and exploited alike share in the consciousness of a cultural and biological heritage that marks out indelible group boundaries that transcend human historical development".

Conclusion

A common thread of this chapter has been that scientific skepticism and what one might term "scientific obscurantism" have been useful tools in combating scientific theories one dislikes for deeper reasons. Thus, the Boasian demand for the highest standards of proof for generalizations about culture and for establishing a role for genetic variation in the development of individual differences coincided with the acceptance of an "anti-theory" of culture that was fundamentally in opposition to attempts to develop classifications and generalizations in the field.

Scientific skepticism regarding politically sensitive issues has also been a powerful trend in the writings of S. J. Gould. Jensen states of Gould's work on intelligence testing, "I believe that he has succeeded brilliantly in obfuscating all the important open questions that actually concern today's scientists." We have seen how R. C. Lewontin has linked theories of behavioral development with Marxist political ideology. As do Lerner and Gould, Lewontin advocates theories proposing that nature consists of extremely complex dialectical interactions between organism and environment. Lewontin rejects reductionistic scientific methods, such as quantitative behavioral genetics or the use of analysis of variance procedures, because they inevitably oversimplify real processes in their use of averages (Seegerstråle 1986). The result is a hyperpurism that settles for nothing less than absolute certainty and absolutely correct methodology, epistemology, and ontology. In developmental psychology such a program would ultimately lead to rejection of all generalizations, including those relating to the average effects of environments. By adopting this philosophy of science, Lewontin is able to discredit attempts by scientists to develop theories and generalizations and thus, in the name of scientific rigor, avoid the possibility of any politically unacceptable scientific findings.

Scientific skepticism is a powerful approach, since a very basic feature of science is an openness to criticism and a requirement that arguments be supported with evidence. As E. O. Wilson notes, "By adopting a narrow criterion of publishable research, Lewontin freed himself to pursue a political agenda unencumbered by science. He adopted the relativist view that accepted truth, unless based on ineluctable fact, is no more than a

reflection of dominant ideology and political power." Nevertheless, Lewontin portrays his ideologically inspired efforts as deriving from a concern for scientific rigor: "We demand certain canons of evidence and argument that are formal and without reference to empirical content... the logic of statistical inference; the power of replicating experiments; the distinction between observations and causal claims." Similarly, Gould rejects all accounts of the empirical data in the area of intelligence testing but provides no alternatives.

As with Boas, Lewontin holds biologically oriented research on humans to an extremely rigorous standard but is remarkably lenient in the standards required to prove biology has very little influence. Lewontin claims, for example, that "nearly all the biology of gender is bad science". And Lewontin states without argument or reference that "no one has ever found a correlation between cognitive ability and brain size". At this writing there have been at least 26 published studies on 39 independent samples showing a correlation of approximately 0.20 between head circumference and IQ (see Wickett et al. 1994); there have also been at least 6 published studies showing a correlation of approximately 0.40 between brain size and IQ using the more accurate technique of magnetic resonance imaging to directly scan the brain.

Given this body of findings, it is at least misleading to make such a statement, although Lewontin would presumably argue that none of these studies reach acceptable levels of scientific proof. Franz Boas would be proud.

14.3 Jews and the Left

The association between Jews and the political left has been widely noticed and commented on beginning in the nineteenth century. "Whatever their situation... in almost every country about which we have information, a segment of the Jewish community played a very vital role in movements designed to undermine the existing order" On the surface at least, Jewish involvement in radical political activity may seem surprising. Marxism, at least as envisaged by Marx, is the very antithesis of Judaism. Marxism is an exemplar of a universalist ideology in which ethnic and nationalist barriers within the society and indeed between societies are eventually removed in the interests of social harmony and a sense of communal interest. Moreover, Marx himself, though born of two ethnically Jewish parents, has been viewed by many as an anti-Semite.⁷¹ His critique of Judaism (*On the Jewish Question*) conceptualized Judaism as fundamentally concerned with egoistic money seeking; it had achieved world domination by making both man and nature into salable objects. Marx viewed Judaism as an abstract principle of human greed that would end in the communist society of the future. However, Marx argued against the idea that Jews must give up their Jewishness to be German citizens, and he envisioned that Judaism, freed from the principle of greed, would continue to exist in the transformed society after the revolution.

The Soviet Union and Communist Poland

The hypothesis that Jewish radicalism is compatible with Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy implies that radical Jews continue to identify as Jews. There is little doubt that the vast majority of the Jews who advocated leftist causes beginning in the late nineteenth century were strongly self-identified as Jews and saw no conflict between Judaism and radicalism. Indeed, the largest Jewish radical movements in both Russia and Poland were the Jewish Bunds which had an exclusively Jewish membership and a very clear program of pursuing specifically Jewish interests. The proletarianism of the Polish Bund was really part of an attempt to preserve their national identity as Jews.

Moreover, many Jewish members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union appear to have been intent on establishing a form of secular Judaism rather than ending Jewish group continuity. The postrevolutionary Soviet government and the Jewish socialist movements struggled over the issue of the preservation of national identity. Despite an official ideology in which nationalism and ethnic separatism were viewed as reactionary, the Soviet government was forced to come to grips with the reality of very strong ethnic and national identifications within the Soviet Union. As a result, a Jewish Section of the Communist Party (Evseksiya) was created. This section “fought hard against the Zionist-Socialist Parties, against democratic Jewish communities, against the Jewish faith and against Hebrew culture. It had, however, succeeded in shaping a secular life pattern based on Yiddish as the recognized national language of the Jewish nationality; in fighting for Jewish national survival in the 1920s; and in working in the 1930s to slow down the assimilatory process of the Sovietization of Jewish language and culture”.

The result of these efforts was the development of a state-sponsored separatist Yiddish subculture, including Yiddish schools and even Yiddish soviets. This separatist culture was very aggressively sponsored by the Evseksiya. Reluctant Jewish parents were forced “by terror” to send their children to these culturally separatist schools rather than schools where the children would not have to relearn their subjects in the Russian language in order to pass entrance examinations. Despite their complete lack of identification with Judaism as a religion and despite their battles against some of the more salient signs of Jewish group separatism, membership in the Soviet Communist Party by these Jewish activists was not incompatible with developing mechanisms designed to ensure Jewish group continuity as a secular entity. In the event, apart from the offspring of interethnic marriages, very few Jews lost their Jewish identity during the entire Soviet era and the post-World War II years saw a powerful strengthening of Jewish culture and Zionism in the Soviet Union.

The conflict in the 1920s between Stalin and the Left Opposition, led by Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Grigory Solkolnikov (all of whom were ethnic Jews), had strong overtones of a Jewishgentile group conflict: “The obvious ‘alienness’ allegedly uniting an entire bloc of candidates was a glaring circumstance”. For all of the participants, the Jewish or gentile backgrounds of their adversaries was highly salient, and indeed

Sidney Hook (1949, 464) notes that non-Jewish Stalinists used anti-Semitic arguments against the Trotskyists. Throughout this period into the 1930s “for the Kremlin and the Lubyanka [the Russian secret police] it was not religion but blood that determined Jewishness“. Indeed, the secret police used ethnic outsiders (e.g., Jews in the traditionally anti-Semitic Ukraine) as agents because they would have less sympathy with the natives - a policy that makes excellent evolutionary sense. Jewish ethnic background was thus important not only to gentiles but was subjectively important to Jews as well.

In terms of social identity theory, anti-Semitism would make it difficult to adopt the identity of the surrounding culture. Traditional Jewish separatist practices combined with economic competition tend to result in anti-Semitism, but anti-Semitism in turn makes Jewish assimilation more difficult because it becomes more difficult for Jews to accept a non-Jewish identity. Thus in the interwar period in Poland Jewish cultural assimilation increased substantially; by 1939 one half of Jewish high school students called Polish their native language. However, the continuation of traditional Jewish culture among a substantial proportion of Jews and its correlative anti-Semitism resulted in a barrier for Jews in adopting a Polish identification.

From the standpoint of gentiles, however, anti-Semitic reactions to individuals like Luxemburg and other outwardly assimilating Jews may be viewed as resulting from an attempt to prevent deception by erring on the side of exaggerating the extent to which people who are ethnically Jews identify as Jews and are consciously attempting to advance specifically Jewish interests. Such perceptions of secular Jews and Jews who converted to Christianity have been a common feature of anti-Semitism in the post- Enlightenment world, and indeed, such Jews often maintained informal social and business networks that resulted in marriages with other baptized Jews and Jewish families who had not changed their surface religion.

Several factors favor our supposing that Jewish identification occurred in a substantial percentage of ethnic Jews: (1) People were classified as Jews depending on their ethnic background at least partly because of residual anti-Semitism; this would tend to impose a Jewish identity on these individuals and make it difficult to assume an exclusive identity as a member of a larger, more inclusive political group. (2) Many Jewish Bolsheviks, such as those in Evsektsiya and the JAC, aggressively sought to establish a secular Jewish subculture. (3) Very few Jews on the left envisioned a postrevolutionary society without a continuation of Judaism as a group; indeed, the predominant ideology among Jewish leftists was that postrevolutionary society would end anti-Semitism because it would end class conflict and the peculiar Jewish occupational profile. (4) The behavior of American communists shows that Jewish identity and the primacy of Jewish interests over communist interests were commonplace among individuals who were ethnically Jewish communists (see below). (5) The existence of Jewish crypsis in other times and places combined with the possibility that self-deception, identificatory flexibility, and identificatory ambivalence are important components of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy.

Schatz's (1991) work on the group of Jewish communists who came to power in Poland

after World War II (termed by Schatz “the generation”) is important because it sheds light on the identificatory processes of an entire generation of communist Jews in Eastern Europe. Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union where the predominantly Jewish faction led by Trotsky was defeated, it is possible to trace the activities and identifications of a Jewish communist elite who actually obtained political power and held it for a significant period. The great majority of this group were socialized in very traditional Jewish families whose inner life, customs and folklore“, religious traditions, leisure time, contacts between generations, and ways of socializing were, despite variations, essentially permeated by traditional Jewish values and norms of conduct. . . . The core of cultural heritage was handed down to them through formal religious education and practice, through holiday celebrations, tales, and songs, through the stories told by parents and grandparents, through listening to discussions among their elders. . . . The result was a deep core of their identity, values, norms, and attitudes with which they entered the rebellious period of their youth and adulthood. This core was to be transformed in the processes of acculturation, secularization, and radicalization sometimes even to the point of explicit denial. However, it was through this deep layer that all later perceptions were filtered.

Note the implication that self-deceptive processes were at work here: Members of the generation denied the effects of a pervasive socialization experience that colored all of their subsequent perceptions, so that in a very real sense, they did not know how Jewish they were. Most of these individuals spoke Yiddish in their daily lives and had only a poor command of Polish even after joining the party. They socialized entirely with other Jews whom they met in the Jewish world of work, neighborhood, and Jewish social and political organizations. After they became communists, they dated and married among themselves and their social gatherings were conducted in Yiddish.

Jews who joined the communist movement did not first reject their ethnic identity, and there were many who “cherished Jewish culture. . . [and] dreamed of a society in which Jews would be equal as Jews“ (p. 48). Indeed, it was common for individuals to combine a strong Jewish identity with Marxism as well as various combinations of Zionism and Bundism. Moreover, the attraction of Polish Jews to communism was greatly facilitated by their knowledge that Jews had attained high-level positions of power and influence in the Soviet Union and that the Soviet government had established a system of Jewish education and culture.

In both the Soviet Union and Poland, communism was seen as opposing anti-Semitism. In marked contrast, during the 1930s the Polish government developed policies in which Jews were excluded from public-sector employment, quotas were placed on Jewish representation in universities and the professions, and government-organized boycotts of Jewish businesses and artisans were staged. Clearly, Jews perceived communism as good for Jews: It was a movement that did not threaten Jewish group continuity, and it held the promise of power and influence for Jews and the end of state-sponsored anti-Semitism.

While Jewish members saw the KPP (Polish Communist Party) as beneficial to Jewish interests, the party was perceived by gentile Poles even before the war as “pro-Soviet,

antipatriotic, and ethnically 'not truly Polish'". The KPP backed the Soviet Union in the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1920 and in the Soviet invasion of 1939. It also accepted the 1939 border with the USSR and was relatively unconcerned with the Soviet massacre of Polish prisoners of war during World War II, whereas the Polish government in exile in London held nationalist views of these matters. The Soviet army and its Polish allies "led by cold-blooded political calculation, military necessities, or both" allowed the uprising of the Home Army, faithful to the noncommunist Polish government-in-exile, to be defeated by the Germans resulting in 200,000 dead, thus wiping out "the cream of the anti- and noncommunist activist elite". The Soviets also arrested surviving non-communist resistance leaders immediately after the war.

Moreover, as was the case with the CPUSA, actual Jewish leadership and involvement in Polish Communism was much greater than surface appearances; ethnic Poles were recruited and promoted to high positions in order to lessen the perception that the KPP was a Jewish movement. This attempt to deceptively lower the Jewish profile of the communist movement was also apparent in the ZPP. (The ZPP refers to the Union of Polish Patriots—an Orwellian-named communist front organization created by the Soviet Union to occupy Poland after the war.) Apart from members of the generation whose political loyalties could be counted on and who formed the leadership core of the group, Jews were often discouraged from joining the movement out of fear that the movement would appear too Jewish. However, Jews who could physically pass as Poles were allowed to join and were encouraged to state they were ethnic Poles and to change their names to Polish-sounding names.

When this group came to power after the war, they advanced Soviet political, economic, and cultural interests in Poland while aggressively pursuing specifically Jewish interests, including the destruction of the nationalist political opposition whose openly expressed anti-Semitism derived at least partly from the fact that Jews were perceived as favoring Soviet domination.

The Jewish-dominated communist government actively sought to revive and perpetuate Jewish life in Poland so that, as in the case of the Soviet Union, there was no expectation that Judaism would wither away under a communist regime. Jewish activists had an "ethnopolitical vision" in which Jewish secular culture would continue in Poland with the cooperation and approval of the government. Thus while the government campaigned actively against the political and cultural power of the Catholic Church, collective Jewish life flourished in the postwar period. Yiddish and Hebrew language schools and publications were established, as well as a great variety of cultural and social welfare organizations for Jews. A substantial percentage of the Jewish population was employed in Jewish economic cooperatives. Advancing communism went hand in hand with increasing Jewish influence and removing the traditional values of the host nation.

Moreover, the Jewish-dominated government regarded the Jewish population, many of whom had not previously been communists, as "a reservoir that could be trusted and enlisted in its efforts to rebuild the country." Jewish ethnic background was particularly

important in recruiting for the internal security service: The generation of Jewish communists realized that their power derived entirely from the Soviet Union and that they would have to resort to coercion in order to control a fundamentally hostile noncommunist society. The core members of the security service came from the Jewish communists who had been communists before the establishment of the Polish communist government.

As in the case of post-World War II Hungary (see below), Poland became polarized between a predominantly Jewish ruling and administrative class supported by the rest of the Jewish population and by Soviet military power, arrayed against the great majority of the native gentile population. The situation was exactly analogous to the many instances in traditional societies where Jews formed a middle layer between an alien ruling elite, in this case the Soviets, and the gentile native population. However, this intermediary role made the former outsiders into an elite group in Poland. Although attempts were made to place a Polish face on what was in reality a Jewish-dominated government, such attempts were limited by the lack of trustworthy Poles able to fill positions in the Communist Party. Jews who had severed formal ties with the Jewish community, or who had changed their names to Polish-sounding names, or who could pass as Poles because of their physical appearance or lack of a Jewish accent were favored in promotions.

It is revealing that when Jewish economic and political domination gradually decreased in the mid- to late-1950s, many of these individuals began working in the Jewish economic cooperatives, and Jews purged from the internal security service were aided by Jewish organizations funded ultimately by American Jews. There can be little doubt of their continuing Jewish identity and the continuation of Jewish economic and cultural separatism. Indeed, after the collapse of the communist regime in Poland, “numerous Jews, some of them children and grandchildren of former communists, came ‘out of the closet’”, openly adopting a Jewish identity and reinforcing the idea that many Jewish communists were in fact crypto-Jews.

In conclusion, Schatz’s treatment shows that the generation of Jewish communists and their ethnically Jewish supporters must be considered as an historic Jewish group. The evidence indicates that this group pursued specifically Jewish interests, including especially their interest in securing Jewish group continuity in Poland while at the same time attempting to destroy institutions like the Catholic Church and other manifestations of Polish nationalism that promoted social cohesion among Poles.

United States and England

From the origins of the movement in the late nineteenth century, a strong sense of Jewish identification also characterized American Jewish radicals (e.g., the Union of Hebrew Trades and the Jewish Socialist Federation). In Sorin’s (1985) study of Jewish radicals who immigrated to the United States early in the twentieth century, only 7 percent were hostile to any form of Jewish separatism. Over 70 percent “were imbued with positive Jewish consciousness. The great majority were significantly caught up in a

web of overlapping institutions, affiliations, and Jewish social formations“.

Twentieth-century American Jewish radicalism was a specifically Jewish subculture. The American Jewish left never removed itself from the wider Jewish community, and, indeed, membership of Jews in the movement fluctuated depending on whether these movements clashed with specifically Jewish interests. Fundamentally, the Jewish Old Left, including the unions, the leftist press, and the leftist fraternal orders (which were often associated with a synagogue, were part of the wider Jewish community, and when the Jewish working class declined, specifically Jewish concerns and identity gained increasing prominence as the importance of radical political beliefs declined.

This tendency for Jewish members of leftist organizations to concern themselves with specifically Jewish affairs increased after 1930 primarily because of recurring gaps between specific Jewish interests and universalist leftist causes at that time. This phenomenon occurred within the entire spectrum of leftist organizations, including organizations such as the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, whose membership also included gentiles. Jewish separatism in leftist movements was facilitated by a very traditional aspect of Jewish separatism - the use of an ingroup language. Yiddish eventually became highly valued for its unifying effect on the Jewish labor movement and its ability to cement ties to the wider Jewish community, the Yiddish press and theatre, East Side socialist cafés, literary societies and fereyns, which were so much a part of Jewish socialist culture, created an unmistakable Jewish milieu, which the shop, union, or Socialist party could not possibly duplicate. Even the class enemy - the Jewish employer, spoke Yiddish“.

the communist-oriented Jewish subculture, including organizations such as the International Workers Order (IWO), included Yiddish-speaking sections. One such section, the Jewish Peoples Fraternal Order (JPFO), was an affiliate of the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress) and was listed as a subversive organization by the U.S. Attorney General. The JPFO had 50,000 members and was the financial and organizational “bulwark“ to advance their cause. Consistent with the present emphasis on the compatibility of communism-radicalism and Jewish identity, it funded children’s educational programs that promulgated a strong relationship between Jewish identity and radical concerns. The IWO Yiddish schools and summer camps, which continued into the 1960s, stressed Jewish culture and even reinterpreted Marxism not as a theory of class struggle but as a theory of struggle for Jewish freedom from oppression.

A strong sense of Jewish peoplehood was also characteristic of the leftist Yiddish press. The Freiheit, which was an unofficial organ of the Communist Party from the 1920s to the 1950s, “stood at the center of Yiddish proletarian institutions and subculture. . . [which offered] identity, meaning, friendship, and understanding“. The newspaper lost considerable support in the Jewish community in 1929 when it took the Communist Party position in opposition to Zionism, and by the 1950s it essentially had to choose between satisfying its Jewish soul or its status as a communist organ.

The relationship of Jews and the CPUSA (Communist Party USA) is particularly interest-

ing because the party often adopted anti-Jewish positions, especially because of its close association with the Soviet Union. From 1921 to 1961, Jews constituted 33.5 percent of the Central Committee members, and the representation of Jews was often above 40 percent. Jews were the only native-born ethnic group from which the party was able to recruit. At least half of the CPUSA membership of around 50,000 were Jews into the 1950s and that the rate of turnover was very high; thus perhaps ten times that number of individuals were involved in the party and there were “an equal or larger number who were Socialists of one kind or another.”

As in the case of the Soviet Union in the early years, the CPUSA had separate sections for different ethnic groups, including a Yiddish-speaking Jewish Federation. In the following years Jewish support for the CPUSA rose and fell depending on party support for specific Jewish issues. During the 1930s the CPUSA changed its position and took great pains to appeal to specific Jewish interests, including a primary focus against anti-Semitism, supporting Zionism and eventually Israel, and advocating the importance of maintaining Jewish cultural traditions. As in Poland during this period, “The American radical movement glorified the development of Jewish life in the Soviet Union. . . . The Soviet Union was living proof that under socialism the Jewish question could be solved”. Communism was thus perceived as “good for Jews.” Despite temporary problems caused by the Soviet-German nonaggression pact of 1939, the result was an end to the CPUSA’s isolation from the Jewish community during World War II and the immediate postwar years.

At the time of the creation of Israel in 1948, part of the CPUSA’s appeal to Jews was due to its support for Israel at a time when Truman was waffling on the issue. In 1946 the CPUSA even adopted a resolution advocating the continuation of the Jewish people as an ethnic entity within socialist societies. Arthur Liebman describes CPUSA members during the period as being elated because of the congruity of their Jewish interests and membership in the party. Feelings of commonality with the wider Jewish community were expressed, and there was an enhanced feeling of Jewishness resulting from interactions with other Jews within the CPUSA: During the postwar period “Communist Jews were expected and encouraged to be Jews, to relate to Jews, and to think of the Jewish people and the Jewish culture in a positive light. At the same time, non-Communist Jews, with some notable exceptions [in the non-communist Jewish left]. . . . accepted their Jewish credentials and agreed to work with them in an all-Jewish context”.

This period of easy compatibility of Jewish interests with CPUSA interests evaporated after 1948, especially because of the altered Soviet position on Israel and revelations of state-sponsored anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many Jews abandoned the CPUSA as a result. As in the case of Poland, there is every reason to suppose that American Jewish Communists regarded the USSR as generally satisfying Jewish interests at least until well into the post-World War II era. Beginning in the 1920s the CPUSA was financially supported by the Soviet Union, adhered closely to its positions, and engaged in a successful espionage effort against the United States

on behalf of the Soviet Union, including stealing atomic secrets. In the 1930s Jews “constituted a substantial majority of known members of the Soviet underground in the United States” and almost half of the individuals prosecuted under the Smith Act of 1947. The CPUSA had important effects on U.S. history. Without excusing the excesses of the anti-communist movement, they note that “the peculiar and particular edge to American anticommunism cannot be severed from the CPUSA’s allegiance to the Soviet Union; the belief that American communists were disloyal is what made the communist issue so powerful and at times poisonous.”

The liberal defense of communism during the Cold War era also raises issues related to this volume. Nicholas von Hoffman (1996) notes the role of the liberal defenders of communism during this period, such as the editors of *The New Republic* and Harvard historian Richard Hofstadter (1965) who attributed the contemporary concern with communist infiltration of the U.S. government to the “paranoid style of American politics.” (Rothman and Lichter [1982, 105] include *The New Republic* as among a group of liberal and radical publications with a large presence of Jewish writers and editors.) The liberals had seized the intellectual and moral high ground during this period. Supporters of McCarthy were viewed as intellectual and cultural primitives: “In the ongoing kulturkampf dividing the society, the elites of Hollywood, Cambridge and liberal thank-tankery had little sympathy for bow-legged men with their American Legion caps and their fat wives, their yapping about Yalta and the Katyn Forest. Catholic and kitsch, looking out of their picture windows at their flock of pink plastic flamingos, the lower middles and their foreign policy anguish were too infra dig to be taken seriously”

However, besides poisoning the atmosphere of domestic politics, communist espionage had effects on foreign policy as well:

It is difficult to overstate the importance of Soviet atomic espionage in shaping the history of the Cold War. World War II had ended with Americans confident that the atomic bomb gave them a monopoly on the ultimate weapon, a monopoly expected to last ten to twenty years. The Soviet explosion of a nuclear bomb in 1949 destroyed this sense of physical security. America had fought in two world wars without suffering serious civilian deaths or destruction. Now it faced an enemy led by a ruthless dictator who could wipe out any American city with a single bomb. Had the American nuclear monopoly lasted longer, Stalin might have refused to allow North Korean Communists to launch the Korean War, or the Chinese Communists might have hesitated to intervene in the war. Had the American nuclear monopoly lasted until Stalin’s death, the restraint on Soviet aggressiveness might have alleviated the most dangerous years of the Cold War.

The original impetus of the 1960s student protest movement (The University of Chicago sit-ins were a series of nonviolent protests at the University of Chicago in Chicago, Illinois in 1962. The protests were called to end the reported segregation of students in the university.) “almost necessarily began with the scions of the relatively well-to-do, liberal-to-left, disproportionately Jewish intelligentsia—the largest pool of those ideologically disposed to sympathize with radical student action in the population” found that 45

percent of students involved in a protest at the University of Chicago were Jewish, but his original sample was “‘adjusted’ to obtain better balance“.

Jews constituted 80 percent of the students signing a petition to end ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corpse) at Harvard and 30-50 percent of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)—the central organization of student radicals. 90 percent of his sample of radical students at the University of Michigan were Jewish, and it would appear that a similar rate of participation is likely to have occurred at other schools, such as Wisconsin and Minnesota. 43 percent of the SDS membership in his sample of ten universities had at least one Jewish parent and an additional 20 percent had no religious affiliation. The latter are most likely to be predominantly Jewish: Rothman and Lichter (1982, 82) found that the “overwhelming majority“ of the radical students who claimed that their parents were atheists had Jewish backgrounds. Jews also tended to be the most publicized leaders of campus protests.

As a group, radical students came from relatively well-to-do families, whereas conservative students tended to come from less affluent families. Liberal movements were therefore initiated and led by an elite, but it was not aimed at advancing the interests of the unionized lower middle class. Indeed, the New Left regarded the working class as “fat, contented, and conservative, and their trade unions reflected them“. Moreover, although mild forms of Jewish anti-Semitism and rebellion against parental hypocrisy did occur among Jewish New Left radicals, the predominant pattern was a continuity with parental ideology. (Similarly, during the Weimar period the Frankfurt School radicals rejected their parents’ commercial values but did not personally reject their family. Indeed, their families tended to provide moral and financial support for them in their radical political activities.)

Many of these “red diaper babies“ came from “families which around the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the United States is. (Note from author of this copy paste book: Sounds a bit like the USA today, but with the difference that all these liberals now occupy most of the mainstream media in the US, still crying about immorality and racism. Yet, corruption and being undemocratic “suddenly“ isn’t an issue anymore. Really makes you think...). Many Jewish parents live in the lily-white suburbs, go to Miami Beach in the winter, belong to expensive country clubs, arrange Bar Mitzvahs costing thousands of dollars - all the while espousing a left-liberal ideology“. 1 million Jews were members of the CPUSA or were socialists prior to 1950. The result was that among Jews there was “a substantial reservoir of present-day parents for whose children to be radical is not something shocking and strange but may well be seen as a means of fulfilling the best drives of their parents“.

The New Left lost Jewish members when it advocated positions incompatible with specific Jewish interests (especially regarding Israel) and attracted members when its positions coincided with these interests. Leaders often spent time at Kibbutzim in Israel, and there is some indication that New Leftists consciously attempted to minimize the more overt

signs of Jewish identity and to minimize discussion of issues on which Jewish and non-Jewish New Leftists would disagree, particularly Israel. Eventually the incompatibility of Jewish interests and the New Left resulted in most Jews abandoning the New Left, with many going to Israel to join kibbutzim, becoming involved in more traditional Jewish religious observances, or becoming involved in leftist organizations with a specifically Jewish identity.

Jews were also a critical component of the public acceptance of the New Left. Jews were overrepresented among radicals and their supporters in the media, the university, and the wider intellectual community, and Jewish leftist social scientists were instrumental in conducting research that portrayed student radicalism in a positive light. However, in their recent review of the literature on the New Left, Rothman and Lichter (1996) note a continuing tendency to ignore the role of Jews in the movement and that when the Jewish role is mentioned, it is attributed to Jewish idealism or other positively valued traits. The media almost completely ignored the Jewish infighting that occurred during the Chicago Seven trial. He also describes several evaluations of the trial written by Jews in the media (New York Times, New York Post, Village Voice) that excused the behavior of the defendants and praised their radical Jewish lawyer, William Kunstler.

Finally, a similar ebb and flow of Jewish attraction to communism depending on its convergence with specifically Jewish interests occurred also in England. During the 1930s the Communist Party appealed to Jews partly because it was the only political movement that was stridently anti-fascist. There was no conflict at all between a strong Jewish ethnic identity and being a member of the Communist Party: "Communist sympathy among Jews of that generation had about it some of the qualities of a group identification, a means, perhaps, of ethnic self-assertion". In the post-World War II period, virtually all the successful communist political candidates represented Jewish wards. However, Jewish support for communism declined with the revelation of Stalin's anti-Semitism, and many Jews left the Communist Party after the Middle East crisis of 1967 when the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. The conclusion must be that Jewish identity was generally perceived to be highly compatible with radical politics. When radical politics came in conflict with specific Jewish interests, Jews eventually ceased being radical, although there were often instances of ambivalence and rationalization.

Conclusion

It is of some interest to attempt to understand the ultimate fate of Judaism in situations where society became organized according to a politically radical universalist ideology. In the Soviet Union, individual Jews "played an important and sometimes decisive part in the leadership of the three main socialist parties," including the Bolsheviks. Jews "dominated" Lenin's first Politburo. Jews made up a greater percentage of other Russian revolutionary parties than they did the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, Jews were prominently represented as leaders of the Bolsheviks and within the Bolshevik movement "citing the

absolute numbers of Jews, or their percentage of the whole, fails to recognize certain key if intangible factors: the assertiveness and often dazzling verbal skills of Jewish Bolsheviks, their energy, and their strength of conviction". Five of the top seven leaders were ethnic Jews, as were approximately one-third of the top fifty.

Among gentile Russians there was a widespread perception that "whereas everybody else had lost from the Revolution, the Jews, and they alone, had benefited from it", as indicated, for example, by official Soviet government efforts against anti-Semitism. As in the case of post-World War II Poland, Jews were considered trustworthy supporters of the regime because of the very great change in their status brought about by the revolution. As a result, the immediate postrevolutionary period was characterized by intense anti-Semitism, including the numerous pogroms carried out by the White Army. However, Stalin "decided to destroy the 'myth' of the decisive role of the Jews in the planning, organization, and realization of the revolution" and to emphasize the role of Russians.

Jews were highly overrepresented among the political and cultural elite in the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and, indeed, into the 1950s era of the purges of Jews from the economic and cultural elite. Stalin was an anti-Semite from very early on, but that because of the powerful presence of Jews at the top reaches of the government and other areas of Soviet society as well as the need to appeal to Western governments, his efforts to remove Jews from top levels of government developed only slowly, and he was forced to engage in considerable deception. Thus Stalin mixed his measures against Jews with overt expressions of philo-Semitism and often included a few non-Jews to mask the anti-Jewish intent. The campaign to remove Jews from administrative positions in the cultural establishment began as early as 1942, again accompanied by prizes and awards to prominent Jewish scientists and artists to deflect charges of anti-Semitism. Fullblown state-sponsored anti-Semitism emerged in the post-World War II era, complete with quotas on Jewish admission to universities that were harsher than in czarist times.

Jews were also highly overrepresented as leaders among the other communist governments in Eastern Europe as well as in communist revolutionary movements in Germany and Austria from 1918 to 1923. In the short-lived communist government in Hungary in 1919, 95 percent of the leading figures of Bela Kun's government were Jews. This government energetically liquidated predominantly gentile counterrevolutionaries and the ensuing struggle led by Admiral Horthy eventuated in the execution of most of the Jewish leadership of the communist government—a struggle with clear anti-Semitic overtones. Moreover, Jewish agents in the service of the Soviet Union featured prominently in Western communist parties: "Even within the various and often violently contending factions of the nascent communist parties of the West, 'foreign Jews, taking orders from Moscow' became a hot issue. It remained mostly taboo in socialist ranks to refer openly to Moscow's agents as Jewish, but the implication was often that such foreign Jews were destroying western socialism".

Anti-Semitism increased dramatically toward the end of the 1960s in Poland . Jews

were gradually downgraded in status and Jewish communists were blamed for Poland's misfortunes. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion circulated widely among party activists, students, and army personnel. The security force, which had been dominated by Jews and directed toward suppressing Polish nationalism, was now dominated by Poles who viewed Jews "as a group in need of close and constant surveillance". Jews were removed from important positions in the government, the military, and the media. Elaborate files were maintained on Jews, including the crypto-Jews who had changed their names and adopted non-Jewish external identities.

In the long run, radical individualism among gentiles and the fragmentation of gentile culture offer a superior environment for Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, and this is indeed an important direction of current Jewish intellectual and political activity.

In this regard it is interesting that many neoconservative Jewish intellectuals in the contemporary United States have rejected corporate, statist ideologies as a direct consequence of the recognition that these ideologies have resulted in corporate, state-sponsored anti-Semitism. Indeed, the beginnings of the neoconservative movement can be traced to the Moscow Trials of the 1930s in which many of the old Jewish Bolsheviks, including Trotsky, were convicted of treason. The result was the development of the New York Intellectuals as an anti-Stalinist leftist movement, parts of which gradually evolved into neoconservatism.

The neoconservative movement has been fervently anti-communist and has opposed ethnic quotas and affirmative action policies in the United States—policies that would clearly preclude free competition between Jews and gentiles. Part of the attraction neoconservatism held for Jewish intellectuals was its compatibility with support for Israel at a time when Third World countries supported by most American leftists were strongly anti-Zionist. Many neoconservative intellectuals had previously been ardent leftists, and the split between these previous allies resulted in an intense internecine feud.

When an experiment in ideology and political structure fails, another experiment is launched. Since the Enlightenment, Judaism has not been a unified, monolithic movement. Judaism is a series of experiments in living, and since the Enlightenment there have been a variety of Jewish experiments in living. There has clearly been a great deal of disagreement among Jews as how best to attain their interests during this period, and certainly the interests of Jewish radicals conflicted at times with the interests of wealthy Jews.

14.4 Jewish Involvement in the Psychoanalytic Movement

The thesis of this chapter is that it is impossible to understand psychoanalysis as a "science," or more properly as a political movement, without taking into account the role of Judaism. Sigmund Freud is a prime example of a Jewish social scientist whose writings were influenced by his Jewish identity and his negative attributions regarding

gentile culture as the source of anti-Semitism.

The Jewish involvement in psychoanalysis, the “Jewish science“, has been apparent to those inside and outside the movement since its inception:

History made psychoanalysis a “Jewish science.“ It continued to be attacked as such. It was destroyed in Germany, Italy, and Austria and exiled to the four winds, as such. It continues even now to be perceived as such by enemies and friends alike. Of course there are by now distinguished analysts who are not Jews... But the vanguard of the movement over the last fifty years has remained predominantly Jewish as it was from the beginning. (Yerushalmi 1991)

In addition to constituting the core of the leadership and the intellectual vanguard of the movement, Jews have also constituted the majority of the movement’s members. In 1906 all 17 members of the movement were Jewish, and they strongly identified as Jews. In a 1971 study, Henry, Sims and Spray found that 62.1 percent of their sample of American psychoanalysts identified themselves as having a Jewish cultural affinity, compared with only 16.7 percent indicating a Protestant affinity and 2.6 percent a Catholic affinity. An additional 18.6 percent indicated no cultural affinity, a percentage considerably higher than the other categories of mental health professional and suggesting that the percentage of psychoanalysts with a Jewish background was even higher than 62 percent.

We have seen that a common component of Jewish intellectual activity since the Enlightenment has been to criticize gentile culture. Freud’s ideas have often been labeled as subversive. Indeed, “[Freud] was convinced that it was in the very nature of psychoanalytic doctrine to appear shocking and subversive. On board ship to America he did not feel that he was bringing that country a new panacea. With his typically dry wit he told his traveling companions, ‘We are bringing them the plague’“.

Peter Gay labels Freud’s work generally as “subversive“, his sexual ideology in particular as “deeply subversive for his time“, and he describes his Totem and Taboo as containing “subversive conjectures“ in its analysis of culture. “While the implications of Darwin’s views were threatening and unsettling, they were not quite so directly abrasive, not quite so unrespectable, as Freud’s views on infantile sexuality, the ubiquity of perversions, and the dynamic power of unconscious urges“.

There was a general perception among many anti-Semites that Jewish intellectuals were subverting German culture in the period prior to 1933 and psychoanalysis was one aspect of this concern. A great deal of hostility to psychoanalysis centered around the perceived threat of psychoanalysis to Christian sexual ethics, including the acceptance of masturbation and premarital sex. Psychoanalysis became a target of gentiles decrying the Jewish subversion of culture—“the decadent influence of Judaism,“ as one writer termed it. In 1928 Carl Christian Clemen, a professor of ethnology at the University of Bonn, reacted strongly to *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud’s analysis of religious belief in terms of infantile needs. Clemen decried the psychoanalytic tendency to find sex everywhere, a tendency he attributed to the Jewish composition of the movement.

Freud's books were burned in the May 1933 book burnings in Germany, and when the Nazis entered Vienna in 1938, they ordered Freud to leave and abolished the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. In the United States, by the second decade of the twentieth century Freud was firmly associated with the movement for sexual freedom and social reform, and had become the target of social conservatives. As late as 1956 a psychiatrist writing in the *American Journal of Psychiatry* complained, "Is it possible that we are developing the equivalent of a secular church, supported by government monies, staffed by a genital-level apostolate unwittingly dispensing a broth of existential atheism, hedonism, and other dubious religio-philosophical ingredients?"

Although he rejected religion, Freud himself had a very strong Jewish identity. In a 1931 letter he described himself as "a fanatical Jew," and on another occasion he wrote that he found "the attraction of Judaism and of Jews so irresistible, many dark emotional powers, all the mightier the less they let themselves be grasped in words, as well as the clear consciousness of inner identity, the secrecy of the same mental construction". In a revealing comment, Freud stated "I have often felt as though I inherited all the obstinacy and all the passions of our ancestors when they defended their temple, as though I could throw away my life with joy for a great moment".

His identity as a Jew was thus associated with a self-concept in which he selflessly does battle with the enemies of the group, dying in an act of heroic altruism defending group interests—a mirror-image Jewish version of the grand finale of Wagner's *Nibelungenlied* that was an ingredient in Nazi ideology.

Freud's sense of Jewish superiority can also be seen in a diary entry by Joseph Wortis based on an interview with Freud in 1935: Freud commented that he viewed gentiles as prone to "ruthless egoism," whereas Jews had a superior family and intellectual life. Wortis then asked Freud if he viewed Jews as a superior people. Freud replied: "I think nowadays they are. . . . When one thinks that 10 or 12 of the Nobel winners are Jews, and when one thinks of their other great achievements in the sciences and in the arts, one has every reason to think them superior".

The psychoanalytic movement was an important example of these tendencies. It was characterized by ideas of Jewish intellectual superiority, racial consciousness, national pride, and Jewish solidarity (see Klein 1981, 143). Freud and his colleagues felt a sense of "racial kinship" with their Jewish colleagues and a "racial strangeness" to others. Freud and other early psychoanalysts frequently distinguished themselves as Jews on the basis of race and referred to non-Jews as Aryans, instead of as Germans or Christians.

During the 1920s Jones was viewed as a gentile outsider even by the other members of the secret Committee of Freud's loyalists and even though he had married a Jewish woman. "In the eyes of all of [the Jewish members of the committee], Jones was a Gentile. . . . [T]he others always seized every opportunity to make him aware that he could never belong. His fantasy of penetrating the inner circle by creating the Committee was an illusion, because he would forever be an unattractive little man with his ferret face

pressed imploringly against the glass". Early in their relationship Freud also had suspicions about Jung, the result of "worries about Jung's inherited Christian and even anti-Jewish biases, indeed his very ability as a non-Jew to fully understand and accept psychoanalysis itself".

Freud's powerful racial sense of ingroup-outgroup barriers between Jews and gentiles may also be seen in the personal dynamics of the psychoanalytic movement. We have seen that Jews were numerically dominant within psychoanalysis, especially in the early stages when all the members were Jews. Freud himself noted in his letters that "from all sides and places, the Jews have enthusiastically seized me for themselves." "He was embarrassed by the way they treated him as if he were 'a God-fearing Chief Rabbi,' or 'a national hero,'" and by the way they viewed his work as "genuinely Jewish".

As in the case of several Jewish movements and political activities reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, Freud took great pains to ensure that a gentile, Jung, would be the head of his psychoanalytic movement—a move that infuriated his Jewish colleagues in Vienna, but one that was clearly intended to deemphasize the very large overrepresentation of Jews in the movement during this period. To persuade his Jewish colleagues of the need for Jung to head the society, he argued, "Most of you are Jews, and therefore you are incompetent to win friends for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest role of preparing the ground. It is absolutely essential that I should form ties in the world of science". "To put it very crudely, Freud needed a goy, and not just any goy but one of genuine intellectual stature and influence." Later, when the movement was reconstituted after World War I, another gentile, the sycophantic and submissive Ernest Jones, became president of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

Deception is also indicated by the evidence that Freud felt that one reason psychoanalysis needed highly visible gentiles was because he viewed psychoanalysis as subverting gentile culture. After publishing *Little Hans* in 1908, he wrote to Karl Abraham that the book would create an uproar: "German ideals threatened again! Our Aryan comrades are really completely indispensable to us, otherwise psychoanalysis would succumb to anti-Semitism".

Freud's powerful sense of Jewish group identity resulted in negative stereotypical thinking regarding the gentile outgroup. Gentile society, and particularly the most salient institutions of gentile culture, were viewed stereotypically as evil. These institutions were not only viewed negatively, but the accentuation effect (see SAID, Ch. 1) came into play and resulted in a general attribution of homogeneity to the outgroup, so that these institutions are seen as much less divided than they actually were.

Attesting to the intensity of Freud's Jewish identification and his self-concept as a Jewish hero, all of Freud's childhood heroes were related to Judaism: Hannibal, the Semitic combatant against Rome; Cromwell, who allowed the Jews to enter England; and Napoleon, who gave Jews civil rights. Early on he described himself as a "conquistador" rather than as a man of science. This type of messianic thought was common in *fin de siècle*

Vienna among Jewish intellectuals who were attempting to bring about a “supranational, supraethnic world”, a characterization that, would also apply to Jewish involvement in radical political movements.

Responsible for the fate of humanity in the twentieth century” (p. 31). Many early proponents viewed psychoanalysis as a redemptive messianic movement that would end anti-Semitism by freeing the world of neuroses produced by sexually repressive Western civilization. Klein shows that some of Freud’s closest associates had a very clearly articulated conception of psychoanalysis as a Jewish mission to the gentiles—what one might view as a uniquely modern version of the ancient “light of the nations” theme of Jewish religious thought very common among intellectual apologists of Reform Judaism during the same period.

The cure for the aggression characteristic of anti-Semitism was therefore believed to lie in freeing gentiles from their sexual repressions. Although Freud himself eventually developed the idea of a death instinct to explain aggression, a consistent theme of the Freudian critique of Western culture, as exemplified for example by Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse, and Wilhelm Reich, has been that the liberation of sexual repressions would lead to lowered aggression and usher in an era of universal love. It is therefore of interest that when Jung and Alfred Adler were expelled from the movement for heresy, the issue that appears to have been most important to Freud was their rejection of the interrelated ideas of the sexual etiology of neurosis, the Oedipal complex, and childhood sexuality.

Western societies during this period was highly salient and undeniable. Freud’s theory may thus be viewed as an invention whose utility in the assault on Western culture derived from the intuitive plausibility of supposing that the suppression of sexual urges would result in major changes in behavior that could possibly have psychotherapeutic effects. Moreover, the Oedipal complex idea proved to be critical to Freud’s thesis for the centrality of sexual repression. This belief in the curative powers of sexual freedom coincided with a leftist political agenda common to the vast majority of Jewish intellectuals of the period and reviewed throughout this book. This leftist political agenda proved to be a recurrent theme throughout the history of psychoanalysis. Support of radical and Marxist ideals was common among Freud’s early followers, and leftist attitudes were common in later years among psychoanalysts. The apex of the association between Marxism and psychoanalysis came in the 1920s in the Soviet Union, where all the top psychoanalysts were Bolsheviks, Trotsky supporters, and among the most powerful political figures in the country.

This group organized a government-sponsored State Psychoanalytical Institute and developed a program of “pedology” aimed at producing the “new Soviet man” on the basis of psychoanalytic principles applied to the education of children. The program, which encouraged sexual precocity in children, was put into practice in state-run schools. There is also evidence that Freud conceptualized himself as a leader in a war on gentile culture. We have seen that Freud had a great deal of hostility to Western culture, especially the Catholic Church and its ally, the Austrian Habsburg monarchy. In a remarkable passage

from the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud, in attempting to understand why he has been unable to set foot in Rome, proposes that he has been retracing the footsteps of Hannibal, the Semitic leader of Carthage against Rome during the Punic wars:

“Hannibal. . . had been the favourite hero of my later school days. . . And when in the higher classes I began to understand for the first time what it meant to belong to an alien race. . . the figure of the semitic general rose still higher in my esteem. To my youthful mind Hannibal and Rome symbolized the conflict between the tenacity of Jewry and the organisation of the Catholic Church.” The passage clearly indicates that Freud was self-identified as a member of “an alien race” at war with Rome and its daughter institution, the Catholic Church, a central institution of Western culture.

All religions may be symptoms of neurosis, but Freud clearly believed that Judaism is an ethically and intellectually superior form of neurosis: According to Freud, the Jewish religion “formed their [the Jews’] character for good through the disdaining of magic and mysticism and encouraging them to progress in spirituality and sublimations. The people, happy in their conviction of possessing the truth, overcome by the consciousness of being the chosen, came to value highly all intellectual and ethical achievements”. In contrast, “The Christian religion did not keep to the lofty heights of spirituality to which the Jewish religion had soared”.

Freud’s theory of anti-Semitism in *Moses and Monotheism* contains several assertions that anti-Semitism is fundamentally a pathological gentile reaction to Jewish ethical superiority. But *Moses and Monotheism* traces the deeper causes of anti-Semitism to the unconscious: “The jealousy which the Jews evoked in other peoples by maintaining that they were the first-born, favourite child of God the Father has not yet been overcome by those others, just as if the latter had given credence to the assumption” Further, the Jewish ceremony of circumcision is said to remind gentiles of “the dreaded castration idea and of things in their primeval past which they would fain forget”. And finally, anti-Semitism is said to result from the fact that many Christians have become Christians only recently as the result of forced conversion from even more barbarically polytheistic folk religions than Christianity itself is. Because of the violence of their forced conversions, these barbarians “have not yet overcome their grudge against the new religion which was forced upon them, and they have projected it on to the source from which Christianity came to them [i.e., the Jews]”

As was the case with some of Freud’s close associates described above, Freud viewed himself as a sexual reformer against this most Western of cultural practices, the suppression of sexuality. Freud wrote in 1915: “Sexual morality, as society, in its extreme form, the American, defines it, seems to me very contemptible. I advocate an incomparably freer sexual life”.

The Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis

There is a long history of well-argued claims that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Even ignoring the long-standing objections of experimentally inclined researchers in mainstream psychology, there is a distinguished pedigree of highly critical accounts of psychoanalysis that began appearing in the 1970s by scholars such as Henri Ellenberger (1970), Frank Sulloway (1979a), Adolph Grünbaum (1984), Frank Cioffi (1969, 1970, 1972), Hans Eysenck (1990), Malcolm Macmillan (1991), E. Fuller Torrey (1992), and perhaps most famously, Frederick Crews (1993; Crews et al. 1995). The following passages sum up this tradition of scholarship:

Should we therefore conclude that psychoanalysis is a science? My evaluation shows that at none of the different stages through which it evolved was Freud's theory one from which adequate explanations could be generated. From the beginning, much of what passed as theory was found to be description, and poor description at that. . . . In every one of the later key developmental theses, Freud assumed what had to be explained. . . . None of his followers, including his revisionist critics who are themselves psychoanalysts, have probed any deeper than did Freud into the assumptions underlying their practice, particularly the assumptions underlying "the basic method"—free association. None question whether those assumptions hold in the therapeutic situation; none has attempted to break out of the circle. What passes today for Freud bashing is simply the longpostponed exposure of Freudian ideas to the same standards of noncontradiction, clarity, testability, cogency, and parsimonious explanatory power that prevail in empirical discourse at large. Step by step, we are learning that Freud has been the most overrated figure in the entire history of science and medicine—one who wrought immense harm through the propagation of false etiologies, mistaken diagnoses, and fruitless lines of inquiry. Still the legend dies hard, and those who challenge it continue to be greeted like rabid dogs.

Even those within the psychoanalytic camp have often noted the lack of scientific rigor of the early psychoanalysts, and indeed, lack of scientific rigor is a continuing concern even in psychoanalytic circles. Gay (1988, 235), who clearly regards psychoanalysis as a science, states of the first-generation psychoanalysts that they "fearlessly interpreted one another's dreams; fell on the others' slips of the tongue or pen; freely, much too freely, employed diagnostic terms like 'paranoid' and 'homosexual' to characterize their associates and indeed themselves. They all practiced in their circle the kind of wild analysis they decried in outsiders as tactless, unscientific, and counterproductive." However, by means of these speculative leaps, Freud managed to diagnose Western culture as essentially neurotic while apparently, on the basis of the argument in *Moses and Monotheism*, holding the view that Judaism represents the epitome of mental health and moral and intellectual superiority. Freud appears to have been well aware that his highly subversive conjectures in *Totem and Taboo* were entirely speculative. When the book was called a "just so" story by a British anthropologist in 1920, Freud was "amused" and stated only that his

critic “was deficient in phantasy”.

The theory of the Oedipal complex, childhood sexuality, and the sexual etiology of the neuroses—the three central doctrines that underlie Freud’s radical critique of gentile culture—play absolutely no role in contemporary mainstream developmental psychology. From the standpoint of evolutionary theory, the idea that children would have a specifically sexual attraction to their opposite sex parent is highly implausible, since such an incestuous relationship would result in inbreeding depression and be more likely to result in disorders caused by recessive genes (see MacDonald 1986). The proposal that boys desire to kill their fathers conflicts with the general importance of paternal provisioning of resources in understanding the evolution of the family: Boys who had succeeded in killing their fathers and having sex with their mothers would not only be left with genetically inferior offspring, but also be deprived of paternal support and protection. Modern developmental studies indicate that many fathers and sons have very close, reciprocated affectional relationships beginning in infancy, and the normative pattern is for mothers and sons to have very intimate and affectionate, but decidedly nonsexual, relationships.

The continued life of these concepts in psychoanalytic circles is testimony to the continuing unscientific nature of the entire enterprise. Research inspired by these basic Freudian tenets ceased long ago and in a sense never started: Fundamentally, psychoanalysis has not inspired any significant research on these three basic Freudian constructs. Interestingly, there is evidence that Freud fraudulently portrayed the data underlying these concepts.

The seduction stories that provide the empirical basis of the Oedipal complex were a construction by Freud, who then interpreted his patients’ distress on hearing his constructions as proof of the theory. Freud then engaged in deception to obscure the fact that his patients’ stories were reconstructions and interpretations based on an a priori theory. Freud also retroactively changed the identity of the fancied seducers from nonfamily members (such as servants) because the Oedipal story required fathers. Any theorist on the contemporary scientific scene who proposed that children are normally sexually attracted to their opposite sex parent would be ostracized for providing a psychological basis for supposing that children would seek such contact. Modern approaches support instead a discrete systems perspective in which sexual desire and affection (and other sources of pleasure) involve quite separate, independent systems. From an evolutionary perspective, the powerful affectional (love) relationships between spouses and between parents and children function as a source of social cohesiveness whose ultimate purpose is to provide a high level of support for children.

Finally, another general mistake, and one that illustrates the political nature of Freud’s entire agenda, is that sexual urges are viewed as having a powerful biological basis (the id), while traits such as responsibility, dependability, orderliness, guilt, and delay of gratification (i.e., the conscientiousness system of personality theory) are imposed by a repressive, pathology-inducing society.

In a comment indicating the usefulness of these psychoanalytic notions in the war on gentile culture, James Q. Wilson (1993a, 104) correctly states that the belief that conscience “is the result of repression is a useful thing to believe if you would like to free yourself of the constraints of conscience—conscience becomes a ‘hang-up’ that prevents you from ‘realizing yourself.’” In fact, conscientiousness is a critical biological system which has been under intensive eugenic selection within the Jewish community. An evolutionary perspective implies, rather, that both systems have a powerful biological basis and both serve critical adaptive functions. No animal and certainly no human has ever been able to be devoted entirely to self-gratification, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that our biology would solely be directed toward obtaining immediate gratification and pleasure. In the real world, achieving evolutionary goals demands that attention be paid to details, careful plans be made, and gratification be deferred.

The continued life of these notions within the psychoanalytic community testifies to the vitality of psychoanalysis as a political movement. The continued self-imposed separation of psychoanalysis from the mainstream science of developmental psychology, as indicated by separate organizations, separate journals, and a largely nonoverlapping membership, is a further indication that the fundamental structure of psychoanalysis as a closed intellectual movement continues into the present era.

Psychoanalysis as a Tool in the Radical Criticism of Western Culture

Because Freud’s ideology was self-consciously subversive and, in particular, because it tended to undermine Western institutions surrounding sex and marriage, it is of some interest to consider the effects of these practices from an evolutionary perspective. Western marriage has long been monogamous and exogamous, and these features contrast strongly with features of other stratified societies, especially societies from the Near East, such as ancient Israel. Freud’s views in *Totem and Taboo and Civilization and Its Discontents* represent a failure to grasp the uniqueness of Roman and later Christian institutions of marriage and the role of Christian religious practices in producing the uniquely egalitarian mating systems characteristic of Western Europe.

In Western Europe the repression of sexual behavior has fundamentally served to support socially imposed monogamy, a mating system in which differences in male wealth are much less associated with access to females and reproductive success than in traditional non-Western civilizations where polygyny has been the norm. Polygyny implies sexual competition among males, with wealthy males having access to vastly disproportionate numbers of women and lower-status men often being unable to mate at all. This type of marriage system is very common among the traditional stratified human societies of the world, such as classical China, India, the Muslim societies, and ancient Israel. While poor males cannot find a mate in such a system, women are reduced to chattel and are typically purchased as concubines by wealthy males. Socially imposed monogamy thus represents a relatively egalitarian mating system for men.

Moreover, because of higher levels of sexual competition among males, the status of women in non-Western societies is immeasurably lower than in Western societies where monogamy has developed. It is no accident that the recent movement toward women's rights developed in Western societies rather than in the other stratified societies of the world. The massive confusion characteristic of psychoanalysis is also apparent in Freud's close colleague, Fritz Wittels. Wittels expected an era of liberation and sexual freedom to be ushered in by a group of Jewish psychoanalytic messianists, but his expectation was based on a profound misunderstanding of sex and human psychology. Wittels condemned "our contemporary goddamned culture" for forcing women into "the cage of monogamy", a comment that completely misunderstands the effects of inter-male sexual competition as represented by polygyny.

There are sound reasons for supposing that monogamy was a necessary condition for the peculiarly European "low-pressure" demographic profile described by Wrigley and Schofield (1981). This demographic profile results from late marriage and celibacy of large percentages of females during times of economic scarcity. The theoretical connection with monogamy is that monogamous marriage results in a situation where the poor of both sexes are unable to mate, whereas in polygynous systems an excess of poor females merely lowers the price of concubines for wealthy males. Thus, for example, at the end of the seventeenth century approximately 23 percent of individuals of both sexes remained unmarried between ages 40 to 44, but, as a result of altered economic opportunities, this percentage dropped at the beginning of the eighteenth century to 9 percent, and there was a corresponding decline in age of marriage. Like monogamy, this pattern was unique among the stratified societies of Eurasia.

In turn, the low pressure demographic profile appears to have had economic consequences. Not only was marriage rate the main damper on population growth, but, especially in England, this response had a tendency to lag well behind favorable economic changes so that there was a tendency for capital accumulation during good times rather than a constant pressure of population on food supply. There is thus some reason to suppose that monogamy, by resulting in a low pressure demographic profile, was a necessary condition for industrialization. This argument suggests that socially imposed monogamy—embedded in the religious and cultural framework of Western societies—may indeed be a central aspect of the architecture of Western modernization. Another important effect of Western institutions of sex and marriage was to facilitate high-investment parenting. As already indicated, perhaps the most basic mistake Freud made was the systematic conflation of sex and love. This was also his most subversive mistake, and one cannot overemphasize the absolutely disastrous consequences of accepting the Freudian view that sexual liberation would have salutary effects on society.

The psychoanalytic emphasis on legitimizing sexuality and premarital sex is fundamentally a program that promotes low-investment parenting styles. Low-investment parenting is associated with precocious sexuality, early reproduction, lack of impulse control, and unstable pair bonds. Ecologically, high-investment parenting is associated with the need

to produce competitive offspring, and we have seen that one aspect of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy has been a strong emphasis on high-investment parenting. Applied to gentile culture, the subversive program of psychoanalysis would have the expected effect of resulting in less-competitive children; in the long term, gentile culture would be increasingly characterized by low-investment parenting, and, as indicated below, there is evidence that the sexual revolution inaugurated, or at least greatly facilitated, by psychoanalysis has indeed had this effect.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that an important aspect of the social imposition of monogamy in Western Europe has been the development of companionate marriage. One of the peculiar features of Western marriage is that there has been a trend toward companionate marriage based on affection and consent between partners. In view of Freud's animosity toward Western culture and the Catholic Church in particular, it is interesting that the Church's policy on marriage included a largely successful attempt to emphasize consent and affection between partners as normative features of marriage. Anti-hedonism and the idealization of romantic love as the basis of monogamous marriage have also periodically characterized Western secular intellectual movements.

Indeed, one sees in these findings a fundamental difference between Judaism as a collectivist group strategy, in which individual decisions are submerged to the interests of the group. Until after World War I arranged marriages were the rule among Jews because the economic basis of marriage was too important to leave to the vagaries of romantic love. Jews also continued to practice consanguineous marriages—a practice that highlights the fundamentally biological agenda of Judaism well into the twentieth century whereas, as we have seen, the Church successfully countered consanguinity as a basis of marriage beginning in the Middle Ages. Judaism thus continued to emphasize the collectivist mechanism of the social control of individual behavior in conformity to family and group interests centuries after the control of marriage in the West passed from family and clan to individuals. In contrast to Jewish emphasis on group mechanisms, Western culture has thus uniquely emphasized individualist mechanisms of personal attraction and free consent.

I conclude that Western religious and secular institutions have resulted in a highly egalitarian mating system that is associated with high-investment parenting. These institutions provided a central role for pair bonding, conjugality, and companionship as the basis of marriage. However, when these institutions were subjected to the radical critique presented by psychoanalysis, they came to be seen as engendering neurosis, and Western society itself was viewed as pathogenic. Freud's writings on this issue are replete with assertions on the need for greater sexual freedom to overcome debilitating neurosis. As we shall see, later psychoanalytic critiques of gentile culture pointed to the repression of sexuality as leading to anti-Semitism and a host of other modern ills.

Psychoanalysis and the Criticism of Western Culture

Psychoanalysis influenced thought in a wide range of areas, including sociology, child rearing, criminology, anthropology, literary criticism, art, literature, and the popular media. Kurzweil (1989, 102) notes that “something like a culture of psychoanalysis was being established.” Torrey (1992) describes in some detail the spread of the movement in the United States, originally through the actions of a small group of predominantly Jewish activists with access to the popular media, the academic world, and the arts, to a pervasive influence in the 1950s: “It is a long road from a beachhead among New York intellectuals to a widespread influence in almost every phase of American life”.

The vast majority of the New York Intellectuals not only had Jewish backgrounds but also strongly identified as Jews: “The surprising thing about the Jewish intellectuals is not that their expressions of Jewish identity were so pale but that they rejected the easy path of assimilation. That supposedly ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectuals should concern themselves with such a parochial matter as Jewish identity reveals the hold which Jewishness has had on even the most acculturated.” As indicated in Chapter 6, the New York Intellectuals were politically radical and deeply alienated from American political and cultural institutions.

Psychoanalysis was a major component of the *Weltanschauung* of these intellectuals. Torrey’s (1992) study indicates a strong overlap among psychoanalysis, liberal-radical politics, and Jewish identification among the American intellectual elite since the 1930s.

Moreover, the material reviewed by Torrey indicates that the preponderance of psychoanalytically inclined Jews among the intellectual elite continued in the post-World War II era. Torrey studied 21 elite American intellectuals identified originally by Kadushin (1974) on the basis of peer ratings as being the most influential. Of the 21, 15 were Jewish, and questionnaires and analysis of the writings of these 15 indicated that 11 had been “significantly influenced by Freudian theory at some point in their careers”. In addition, 10 of these 11 were identified as having liberal or radical political beliefs at some period of their career.

The link between psychoanalysis and the political left, as well as the critical role of Jewish-controlled media in the propagation of psychoanalysis, can be seen in the recent uproar of Frederick Crews’s critiques of the culture of psychoanalysis. Publication in the NYRB (New York Review of Books), as Crews notes, is “almost like pet owners who had negligently or maliciously consigned their parakeet to the mercies of an ever-lurking cat”. The implication is that publications like the NYRB and the other journals associated with the New York Intellectuals have been instrumental in propagating psychoanalytic and similar doctrines as scientifically and intellectually reputable for decades, and it also suggests that had Crews published his articles in a less visible and less-politicized medium, they could have been safely ignored, as has commonly been the practice over the long history of psychoanalysis.

Several prominent Freudian critiques of culture remained fairly true to Freud's original premises. Herbert Marcuse, a countercultural guru of the 1960s, was a member of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse accepts Freud's theory that Western culture is pathogenic as a result of the repression of sexual urges, paying homage to Freud, who "recognized the work of repression in the highest values of Western civilization, which presuppose and perpetuate unfreedom and suffering". Like Freud, Marcuse points the way to a nonexploitative utopian civilization that would result from the complete end of sexual repression, but Marcuse goes beyond Freud's ideas in *Civilization and Its Discontents* only in his even greater optimism regarding the beneficial effects of ending sexual repression.

Indeed, Marcuse ends the book with a ringing defense of the fundamental importance of sexual repression in opposition to several "neo-Freudian revisionist" theorists such as Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Henry Stack Sullivan. These neo-Freudian revisionists must thus be seen as continuing the psychoanalytic critique of culture, but in a manner that deemphasizes the exclusive concern with sexual repression. These theorists—and particularly Erich Fromm, who had a very strong Jewish identity and very selfconsciously attempted to use psychoanalysis to further a radical political agenda—can be viewed as optimistic-utopian.

Like Marcuse, Fromm was a member of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. A cornerstone of this approach is to view contemporary society as pathogenic and the development of socialism as ushering in a new era of loving human relationships. These writers were highly influential: For example, "A whole generation of college-educated Americans was deeply influenced by Erich Fromm's argument, in *Escape From Freedom*, that National Socialism was the natural outcome of the interplay between a Protestant sensibility and the contradictions inherent in capitalism".

Fromm (1941) essentially viewed authoritarianism as resulting from an unconscious fear of freedom and a consequent need to seek certainty by joining fascist movements—an example of the tendency among Jewish intellectuals to develop theories in which anti-Semitism is fundamentally the result of the individual or social pathology of gentiles. Fromm, like the other Frankfurt School theorists reviewed in Chapter 5, developed a view in which psychological health was epitomized by individualists who achieved their potentials without relying on membership in collectivist groups: "Progress for democracy lies in enhancing the actual freedom, initiative, and spontaneity of the individual, not only in certain private and spiritual matters, but above all in the activity fundamental to every man's existence, his work". Radical individualism among gentiles is an excellent prescription for the continuation of Judaism as a cohesive group. The irony (hypocrisy?) is that Fromm and the other members of the Frankfurt School, as individuals who strongly identified with a highly collectivist group (Judaism), advocated radical individualism for the society as a whole.

The central role of psychoanalysis as cultural criticism can also be seen in its role in Germany after World War II. T. W. Adorno, an author of *The Authoritarian Personality*,

is an excellent example of a social scientist who utilized the language of social science in the service of combating anti-Semitism, pathologizing gentile culture, and rationalizing Jewish separatism. Returning to Germany after World War II, Adorno expressed his fears that psychoanalysis would become “a beauty no longer able to disturb the sleep of humanity”.

Eventually psychoanalysis became state supported in Germany, with every German citizen eligible for up to 300 hours of psychoanalysis (more in severe cases). In 1983 the government of Hesse sought empirical data on the success of psychoanalysis in return for funding a psychoanalytic institute. The response of the offended analysts is a revealing reminder of two central aspects of the psychoanalytic agenda, the pathologization of enemies and the centrality of social criticism: “They rose to the defense of psychoanalysis as a social critique. . . [They attacked the] unconscious lies of (unnamed but recognizable) psychoanalysts, their unhappy relationship to power, and their frequent neglect of the countertransference.” The result was a reinvigoration of psychoanalysis as a social critique and the production of a book that “enlarged their critiques to every political topic”. Psychoanalysis can be justified solely by its usefulness in cultural criticism independent of data on its effectiveness in therapy.

The most influential psychoanalyst in post-World War II Germany was the leftist Alexander Mitscherlich, who viewed psychoanalysis as necessary to humanize Germans and “defend against the inhumanities of civilization”. Regarding the necessity to transform Germans in the wake of the Nazi era, Mitscherlich believed that only psychoanalysis held out the hope of redemption for the German people: “Each German had to face this past individually via a more or less ‘pragmatic’ Freudian analysis”). His journal *Psyche* adopted a generally adversarial stance toward German culture, combining Marxist and psychoanalytic perspectives in an attempt to further “antifascist thinking”.

As is typical of the field generally, these psychoanalysts also produced a plethora of theories of anti-Semitism with no way to decide among them. In 1962 Mitscherlich organized a conference entitled “The Psychological and Social Assumptions of Anti-Semitism: Analysis of the Psychodynamics of a Prejudice,” which offered several highly imaginative psychoanalytic theories in which anti-Semitism was analyzed as essentially a social and individual pathology of gentiles. For example, in his contribution Mitscherlich proposed that children developed hostility when required to obey teachers, and that this then led to identification with the aggressor and ultimately to a glorification of war. Mitscherlich believed that German anti-Semitism was “just one more manifestation of German infantile authoritarianism”.

Conclusion

I conclude that psychoanalysis has fundamentally been a political movement that has been dominated throughout its history by individuals who strongly identified as Jews. A consistent theme has been that psychoanalysis has been characterized by intense personal

involvement. The intense level of emotional commitment to psychoanalytic doctrines and the intense personal identification with Freud himself as well as with others in the direct line of descent from Freud suggest that for many of its practitioners, participation in the psychoanalytic movement satisfied deep psychological needs related to being a member of a highly cohesive, authoritarian movement. It is also not surprising, given the clear sense of Jewish intellectual, moral, and, indeed, racial superiority to gentiles that pervaded the early phases of the movement, that outsiders have proposed that psychoanalysis not only had powerful religious overtones but also was directed at achieving specific Jewish interests.

I have noted that Jewish intellectual activity involving the radical criticism of gentile culture need not be conceptualized as directed at attaining specific economic or social goals of Judaism. From this perspective, the psychoanalytic subversion of the moral and intellectual basis of Western culture may simply result from social identity processes in which the culture of the outgroup is negatively valued. This does not appear to be the whole story, however.

One way in which psychoanalysis has served specific Jewish interests is the development of theories of anti-Semitism that bear the mantle of science but deemphasize the importance of conflicts of interest between Jews and gentiles. Although these theories vary greatly in detail—and, as typical of psychoanalytic theories generally, there is no way to empirically decide among them—within this body of theory anti-Semitism is viewed as a form of gentile psychopathology resulting from projections, repressions, and reaction formations stemming ultimately from a pathology-inducing society. The psychoanalysts who emigrated from Europe to the United States during the Nazi era expected to make psychoanalysis “into the ultimate weapon against fascism, anti-Semitism, and every other antiliberal bias”.

However, beyond this overt agenda in pathologizing anti-Semitism, it is noteworthy that within psychoanalytic theory, Jewish identity is irrelevant to understanding human behavior. As in the case of radical political ideology, psychoanalysis is a messianic universalist ideology that attempts to subvert traditional gentile social categories as well as the Jewish-gentile distinction itself, yet it allows for the possibility of a continuation of Jewish group cohesion, though in a cryptic or semi-cryptic state. As with radical political ideology, the Jew-gentile social categorization is of diminished salience and of no theoretical significance. As in the case of psychoanalytic theories of anti-Semitism, to the extent that psychoanalysis becomes part of the worldview of gentiles, social identity theory predicts that anti-Semitism would be minimized.

Freud himself believed that Jewish intellectual and moral superiority resulted from Lamarckian inheritance and were thus genetically based, psychoanalysis officially denied the importance of biologically based ethnic differences or indeed the theoretical primacy of ethnic differences or ethnic conflict of any kind. Ethnic conflict came to be viewed within psychoanalytic theory as a secondary phenomenon resulting from irrational repressions, projections, and reaction formations and as an indication of gentile pathology rather than

as a reflection of actual Jewish behavior.

I have noted that there was often an overlap between psychoanalysis and radical political beliefs among Jews. This is not at all surprising. Both phenomena are essentially Jewish responses to the Enlightenment and its denigrating effect on religious ideology as the basis for developing an intellectually legitimate sense of group or individual identity. Both movements are compatible with a strong personal sense of Jewish identity and with some form of group continuity of Judaism; indeed, Yerushalmi (1991, 81ff) argues persuasively that Freud saw himself as a leader of the Jewish people and that his “science” provided a secular interpretation of fundamental Jewish religious themes.

The similarities between these movements is far deeper, however. Both psychoanalysis and radical political ideology present critiques in which the traditional institutions and socio-religious categorizations of gentile society are negatively evaluated. Both movements, and especially psychoanalysis, present their intellectual critiques in the language of science and rationality, the lingua franca of post-Enlightenment intellectual discourse. However, both movements have a pronounced political atmosphere despite the scientific veneer. Such a result is perhaps scarcely surprising in the case of Marxist political ideology, although even Marxism has often been touted by its proponents as “scientific” socialism. Psychoanalysis has from the beginning been burdened in its quest for scientific respectability by the clear overtones of its being a sectarian political movement masquerading as science.

Both psychoanalysis and radical political ideology often resulted in a sense of a personal messianic mission to gentile society promising a utopian world free of class struggle, ethnic conflict, and debilitating neuroses. Both movements characteristically developed conceptions of Jewish group identity as leading gentiles to a utopian society of the future, the familiar “light of the nations” concept represented here in completely secular and “scientific” terms. The social categorizations advocated by these movements completely obliterated the social categorization of Jew-gentile, and both movements developed ideologies in which anti-Semitism was fundamentally the result of factors entirely extraneous to Jewish identity, Jewish group continuity, and Jewish-gentile resource competition. In the promised utopian societies of the future, the category of Jewgentile would be of no theoretical importance, but Jews could continue to identify as Jews and there could be continuation of Jewish group identity while at the same time a principle source of gentile identity—religion and its concomitant supports for high-investment parenting—would be conceptualized as an infantile aberration. The universalist ideologies of Marxism and psychoanalysis thus were highly compatible with the continuation of Jewish particularism.

Although other factors are undoubtedly involved, it is remarkable that the increasing trend toward low-investment parenting in the United States largely coincides with the triumph of the psychoanalytic and radical critiques of American culture represented by the political and cultural success of the countercultural movement of the 1960s. Since 1970 the rate of single-parenting has increased from one in ten families to one in three families, and there have been dramatic increases in teenage sexual activity and teenage childbearing

without marriage. There is excellent evidence for an association among teenage single-parenting, poverty, lack of education, and poor developmental outcomes for children (e.g., Dornbusch & Gray 1988; Furstenberg & Brooks-Gunn 1989; McLanahan & Booth 1989; J. Q. Wilson 1993b).

Indeed, all the negative trends related to the family show very large increases that developed in the mid-1960s including increases in trends toward lower levels of marriage, “cataclysmic” increases in divorce rates, and rates of illegitimacy. The sexual revolution is “the most obvious culprit” underlying the decline in the importance of marriage and its concomitant increase in low-investment parenting:

What is striking about the 1960s “sexual revolution,” as it has properly been called, is how revolutionary it was, in sensibility as well as reality. In 1965, 69 percent of American women and 65 percent of men under the age of thirty said that premarital sex was always or almost always wrong; by 1972, these figures had plummeted to 24 percent and 21 percent. . . . In 1990, only 6 percent of British men and women under the age of thirty-four believed that it was always or almost always wrong.

Although there is little reason to suppose that the battle for sexual freedom so central to psychoanalysis had the intention of benefiting the average resource competition ability of Jews vis-à-vis gentiles, the psychoanalytic intellectual war on gentile culture may indeed have resulted in an increased competitive advantage for Jews beyond merely lessening the theoretical importance of the Jew-gentile distinction and providing a “scientific” rationale for pathologizing anti-Semitism. It is also a war that has resulted in a society increasingly split between a disproportionately Jewish “cognitive elite” and a growing mass of individuals who are intellectually incompetent, irresponsible as parents, prone to requiring public assistance, and prone to criminal behavior, psychiatric disorders, and substance abuse.

14.5 The Frankfurt School of Social Research

The Political Agenda

The Authoritarian Personality, a classic work in social psychology was sponsored by the Department of Scientific Research of the American Jewish Committee (hereafter, AJ-Committee) in a series entitled Studies in Prejudice. Studies in Prejudice was closely connected with the so-called Frankfurt School of predominantly Jewish intellectuals associated with the Institute for Social Research originating during the Weimar period in Germany. The first generation of the Frankfurt School were all Jews by ethnic background and the Institute of Social Research itself was funded by a Jewish millionaire, Felix Weil.

Weil’s efforts as a “patron of the left” were extraordinarily successful: By the early 1930s the University of Frankfurt had become a bastion of the academic left and “the place

where all the thinking of interest in the area of social theory was concentrated". During this period sociology was referred to as a "Jewish science," and the Nazis came to view Frankfurt itself as a "New Jerusalem on the Franconian Jordan". The Nazis perceived the Institute of Social Research as a communist organization and closed it within six weeks of Hitler's ascent to power because it had "encouraged activities hostile to the state". Even after the emigration of the Institute to the United States, it was widely perceived as a communist front organization with a dogmatic and biased Marxist perspective, and there was a constant balancing act to attempt not to betray the left "while simultaneously defending themselves against corresponding suspicions".

Gershom Scholem, the Israeli theologian and religious historian, termed the Frankfurt School a "Jewish sect," and there is good evidence for very strong Jewish identifications of many members of the school. *Studies in Prejudice* was under the general editorship of Max Horkheimer, a director of the Institute. Horkheimer was a highly charismatic "'managerial scholar' who constantly reminded his associates of the fact that they belonged to a chosen few in whose hands the further development of 'Theory' lay". Horkheimer had a strong Jewish identity that became increasingly apparent in his later writings. However, Horkheimer's commitment to Judaism, as evidenced by the presence of specifically Jewish religious themes, was apparent even in his writings as an adolescent and as a young adult. At the end of his life Horkheimer completely accepted his Jewish identification and achieved a grand synthesis between Judaism and Critical Theory. (Critical Theory is the name applied to the theoretical perspective of the Frankfurt School.) As an indication of his profound sense of Jewish identity, Horkheimer (1947, 161) stated that the goal of philosophy must be to vindicate Jewish history: "The anonymous martyrs of the concentration camps are the symbols of humanity that is striving to be born. The task of philosophy is to translate what they have done into language that will be heard, even though their finite voices have been silenced by tyranny."

T. W. Adorno, first author of the famous Berkeley studies of authoritarian personality reviewed here, was also a director of the Institute, and he had a very close professional relationship with Horkheimer to the point that Horkheimer wrote of their work, "It would be difficult to say which of the ideas originated in his mind and which in my own; our philosophy is one". Jewish themes became increasingly prominent in Adorno's writings beginning in 1940 as a reaction to Nazi anti-Semitism. Indeed, much of Adorno's later work may be viewed as a reaction to the Holocaust, as typified by his famous comment that "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric".

A consistent theme of Horkheimer and Adorno's Critical Theory was the transformation of society according to moral principles. From the beginning there was a rejection of value-free social science research ("the fetishism of facts") in favor of the fundamental priority of a moral perspective in which present societies, including capitalist, fascist, and eventually Stalinist societies, were to be transformed into utopias of cultural pluralism. Indeed, long before *Studies in Prejudice* Critical Theory developed the idea that positivistic (i.e., empirically oriented) social science was an aspect of domination and oppression.

Horkheimer wrote in 1937 that “if science as a whole follows the lead of empiricism and the intellect renounces its insistent and confident probing of the tangled brush of observations in order to unearth more about the world than even our well-meaning daily press, it will be participating passively in the maintenance of universal injustice”.

The social scientist must therefore be a critic of culture and adopt an attitude of resistance toward contemporary societies. The unscientific nature of the enterprise can also be seen in its handling of dissent within the ranks of the Institute. Writing approvingly of Walter Benjamin’s work, Adorno stated, “I have come to be convinced that his work will contain nothing which could not be defended from the point of view of dialectical materialism”.

Erich Fromm was excised from the movement in the 1930s because his leftist humanism (which indicted the authoritarian nature of the psychoanalyst-patient relationship) was not compatible with the leftist authoritarianism that was an integral part of the current Horkheimer-Adorno line: “[Fromm] takes the easy way out with the concept of authority, without which, after all, neither Lenin’s avant-garde nor dictatorship can be conceived of. I would strongly advise him to read Lenin. . . . I must tell you that I see a real threat in this article to the line which the journal takes”.

Fromm was excised from the Institute despite the fact that his position was among the most radically leftist to emerge from the psychoanalytic camp. Throughout his career, Fromm remained the embodiment of the psychoanalytic left and its view that bourgeois-capitalist society and fascism resulted from (and reliably reproduced) gross distortions of human nature. Similarly, Herbert Marcuse was excluded when his orthodox Marxist views began to diverge from the evolving ideology of Adorno and Horkheimer. These exclusionary trends are also apparent in the aborted plans to reinstitute the Institute’s journal in the 1950s. It was decided that there were too few contributors with the Horkheimer-Adorno line to support a journal and the plans foundered. Throughout its history, to be a member of the Institute was to adopt a certain view and to submit to heavy editing and even censorship of one’s works to ensure conformity to a clearly articulated ideological position.

As might be expected from a highly authoritarian political movement, the result was a speculative, philosophical body of work that ultimately had no influence on empirically oriented sociology, although, as indicated below, it has had a profound influence on theory in the humanities. (The *Authoritarian Personality* is not included in this statement; it was very influential but had an empirical basis of sorts.) This body of work does not qualify as science because of its rejection of experimentation, quantification, and verification, and because of the priority of moral and political concerns over the investigation of the nature of human social psychology.

The priority of the moral and political agenda of Critical Theory is essential to understanding the Frankfurt School and its influence. Horkheimer and Adorno eventually rejected the classical Marxist perspective on the importance of class struggle for the development of fascism in favor of a perspective in which both fascism and capitalism were funda-

mentally conceptualized as involving domination and authoritarianism. Further, they developed the theory that disturbed parent-child relations involving the suppression of human nature were a necessary condition for domination and authoritarianism.

Obviously, this is a perspective that is highly compatible with psychoanalytic theory, and indeed psychoanalysis was a basic influence on their thinking. Virtually from the beginning, psychoanalysis had a respected position within the Institute for Social Research, particularly under the influence of Erich Fromm. Fromm held positions at the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute as well as at the Institute for Social Research, and along with other "left-Freudians" such as Wilhelm Reich and eventually Marcuse, he developed theories that incorporated both Marxism and psychoanalysis essentially by developing a theoretical link between the repression of instincts in the context of family relationships (or, as in the case of Fromm, the development of sado-masochistic and anal personality traits within the family) and the development of oppressive social and economic structures. It is interesting that although the Horkheimer group developed a very strong hostility to empirical science and the positivistic philosophy of science, they felt no need to abandon psychoanalysis. Indeed, psychoanalysis was "a central factor in giving Horkheimer and the most important of his fellow theoreticians the sense that important insights could also be achieved.

We shall see that psychoanalysis as a nonempirically based hermeneutic structure (which nevertheless masqueraded as a science) turned out to be an infinitely plastic tool in the hands of those constructing a theory aimed at achieving purely political objectives. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the fundamental shift from the sociological to the psychological level that occurred during the 1940s was motivated by the fact that in Germany the proletariat had succumbed to fascism and in the Soviet Union socialism had not prevented the development of an authoritarian government that failed to guarantee individual autonomy or Jewish group interests. The formal outline of the theory can be seen in philosophical form in the earlier work *Studies on Authority and the Family* of 1936, a work that presented Fromm's psychoanalytic theory of authoritarian "sado-masochistic" family relationships and their putative linkages with bourgeois capitalism and fascism.

This philosophical-speculative approach to anti-Semitism was refined in the chapter on anti-Semitism in Horkheimer and Adorno's (1944/1990) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. In addition to being highly abstract and written in what might be termed a Hegelian manner, the style of writing is assertional: Statements about anti-Semitism are simply asserted with no attempt to provide any empirical justification. The non-empirical nature of the theory of anti-Semitism was quite clear to Adorno as well: "[W]e never regarded the theory simply as a set of hypotheses but as in some sense standing on its own feet, and therefore did not intend to prove or disprove the theory through our findings but only to derive from it concrete questions for investigation, which must then be judged on their own merit and demonstrate certain prevalent socio-psychological structures".

Fundamentally *The Authoritarian Personality* studies resulted from a felt need to develop an empirical program of research that would support a politically and intellectually

satisfying a priori theory of anti-Semitism in order to influence an American academic audience. As Horkheimer stated in 1943, "When we became aware that a few of our American friends expected of an Institute of Social Sciences that it engage in studies on pertinent social problems, fieldwork, and other empirical investigations, we tried to satisfy these demands as well as we could, but our heart was set on individual studies in the sense of *Geisteswissenschaften* [i.e., the humanities] and the philosophical analysis of culture".

Indeed, the goal of producing political propaganda by using the methods of social science was self-consciously articulated by Horkheimer. Thus Horkheimer reacted with enthusiasm to the idea of including criminals in the study: "Research would be able here to transform itself directly into propaganda, i.e., if it could be reliably established that a particularly high percentage of criminals were extreme anti-Semites, the result would as such already be propaganda. I would also like to try to examine psychopaths in mental hospitals". Both groups were eventually included in the study.

A general theme in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is that anti-Semitism is the result of "the will to destroy born of a false social order" (p. 168). The ideology that Jews possess a variety of negative traits is simply a projection resulting in a self-portrait of the anti-Semite: Anti-Semites accuse the Jews of wanting power, but in reality the anti-Semites "long for total possession and unlimited power, at any price. They transfer their guilt for this to the Jews". There is a recognition that anti-Semitism is associated with gentile movements for national cohesiveness (pp. 169-170). The anti-Semitism arising along with such movements is interpreted as resulting from the "urge to destroy" carried out by "covetous mobs" that are ultimately manipulated by ruling gentile elites to conceal their own economic domination. Anti-Semitism is without function except to serve as a means of discharging the anger of those who are frustrated economically and sexually.

Horkheimer and Adorno propose that modern fascism is basically the same as traditional Christianity because both involve opposition to and subjugation of nature. While Judaism remained a "natural religion" concerned with national life and self-preservation, Christianity turned toward domination and a rejection of all that is natural. This tendency to interpret anti-Semitism as fundamentally deriving from suppressing nature is central to *Studies in Prejudice*, and particularly *The Authoritarian Personality*. Suppression of nature results in projection of qualities of self onto the environment and particularly onto the Jews. "Impulses which the subject will not admit as his own even though they are most assuredly so, are attributed to the object—the prospective victim". Particularly important for this projection process are sexual impulses: "The same sexual impulses which the human species suppressed have survived and prevailed—in individuals and in nations—by way of the mental conversion of the ambient world into a diabolical system". Christian self-denial and, in particular, the suppression of sex result in evil and anti-Semitism via projection.

Psychoanalytic theory is invoked as an explanation of this process in a manner that,

in its emphasis on suppressed hatred for the father, also anticipates the theory utilized in *The Authoritarian Personality*. Psychoanalytic theory is invoked as an explanation of this process in a manner that, in its emphasis on suppressed hatred for the father, also anticipates the theory utilized in *The Authoritarian Personality*. Aggressive urges originating in the id are projected onto the external world by actions of the superego. "The forbidden action which is converted into aggression is generally homosexual in nature. Through fear of castration, obedience to the father is taken to the extreme of an anticipation of castration in conscious emotional approximation to the nature of a small girl, and actual hatred to the father is suppressed" Forbidden actions underlain by powerful instincts are thus turned into aggression, which is then projected onto victims in the external world, with the result that "he attacks other individuals in envy or persecution just as the repressed bestialist hunts or torments an animal". A later passage decries the "suppression of animal nature into scientific methods of controlling nature". Domination of nature, viewed as central to Christianity and fascism, thus derives ultimately from suppressing our animal nature.

Horkheimer and Adorno then attempt to explain the role of conformity in fascism. They argue that cohesive gentile group strategies are fundamentally based on a distortion of human nature central theme of *The Authoritarian Personality*. They posit a natural, non-conforming, reflective self in opposition to society that has been corrupted by capitalism or fascism. The development of large industrial interests and the culture industry of late capitalism have destroyed in most people the inner-directed, reflective power that can produce "self-comprehending guilt", which could oppose the forces leading to anti-Semitism. This inner directed reflection was "emancipated" from society and even directed against society, but under the above-mentioned forces, it conforms blindly to the values of the external society. Thus humans are portrayed as naturally opposed to the conformity demanded by a highly cohesive society. As indicated below, a consistent theme of *The Authoritarian Personality* is the idea that gentile participation in cohesive groups with high levels of social conformity is pathological, whereas similar behavior of Jews with respect to the group cohesiveness characteristic of Judaism is ignored: Indeed, we have seen that Judaism is portrayed in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* as morally superior to Christianity.

The end of anti-Semitism is thus viewed as a precondition for the development of a utopian society and the liberation of humanity perhaps the closest that the Frankfurt School ever came to defining utopia.¹¹⁸ The envisioned utopian society is one in which Judaism can continue as a cohesive group but in which cohesive, nationalistic, corporate gentile groups based on conformity to group norms have been abolished as manifestations of psychopathology. Horkheimer and Adorno developed the view that the unique role of Judaism in world history was to vindicate the concept of difference against the homogenizing forces thought to represent the essence of Western civilization: "The Jews became the metaphoric equivalent of that remnant of society preserving negation and the non-identical" (Jay 1980, 148). Judaism thus represents the antithesis of Western univer-

salism. The continuation and acceptance of Jewish particularism becomes a precondition for the development of a utopian society of the future.

Within this perspective, the roots of anti-Semitism are therefore to be sought in individual psychopathology, not in the behavior of Jews. Nevertheless, there is some acknowledgment that the actual characteristics of Jews may be involved in historical anti-Semitism, but Horkheimer and Adorno theorize that the Jewish characteristics that have led to anti-Semitism were forced on Jews. Jews are said to have incurred the wrath of the lower classes because Jews were the originators of capitalism: "For the sake of economic progress which is now proving their downfall, the Jews were always a thorn in the side of the craftsmen and peasants who were declassed by capitalism. They are now experiencing to their own cost the exclusive, particularist character of capitalism". (Note from Author: There are some serious mental gymnastics going on here. Marking themselves as the eternal victim, saying that Gentiles way of suppressing nature (i.e. A Philosophy probably aligned with Nietzsche's *Übermensch*) leads to anti-semitism...).

However, this Jewish role is viewed as forced on the Jews who were completely dependent on gentile elites for their rights even into the nineteenth century. Under these circumstances, "Commerce is not their vocation, it is their fate" (p. 175). The success of the Jews then constituted a trauma to the gentile bourgeoisie, "who had to pretend to be creative"; their anti-Semitism is thus "self-hatred, the bad conscience of the parasite".

I have noted that a powerful tendency in both radical politics and psychoanalysis has been a thoroughgoing critique of gentile society. An important theme here is that *Studies in Prejudice* and, especially, *The Authoritarian Personality* attempt to show that gentile group affiliations, and particularly membership in Christian religious sects, gentile nationalism, and close family relationships, are an indication of psychiatric disorder. At a deep level the work of the Frankfurt School is addressed to altering Western societies in an attempt to make them resistant to anti-Semitism by pathologizing gentile group affiliations. And because this effort ultimately eschews the leftist solutions that have attracted so many twentieth-century Jewish intellectuals, it is an effort that remains highly relevant to the current post-Communist intellectual and political context.

The opposition of Jewish intellectuals to cohesive gentile groups and a homogeneous gentile culture has perhaps not been sufficiently emphasized. I have noted in Chapter 1 that the Conversos were vastly overrepresented among the humanist thinkers in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spain who opposed the corporate nature of Spanish society centered around the Christian religion. I have also noted that a central thrust of Freud's work was to continue to strongly identify as a Jew while at the same time developing a theory of Christian religious affiliation in which the latter is conceptualized as fulfilling infantile needs. Similarly, another way of conceptualizing the Jewish advocacy of radical political movements consistent with the material in Chapter 3 is that these political movements may be understood as simultaneously undermining gentile intrasocietal group affiliations, such as Christianity and nationalism, at the same time allowing for the continuation of Jewish identification. For example, Jewish Communists consistently opposed

Polish nationalist aspirations, and after they came to power in the post-World War II era they liquidated Polish nationalists and undermined the role of the Catholic Church while simultaneously establishing secular Jewish economic and social structures.

It is of some historical interest to note that an important feature of the rhetoric of German anti-Semites throughout the nineteenth century into the Weimar period was that Jews advocated political forms such as liberalism, which opposed structuring society as a highly cohesive group, at the same time they themselves retained an extraordinary group cohesiveness that enabled them to dominate Germans. During the Weimar period the Nazi propagandist Alfred Rosenberg complained that Jews advocated a completely atomized society while at the same time exempting themselves from this process. Whereas the rest of society was to be prevented from participating in highly cohesive groups, the Jews “would retain their international cohesiveness, blood ties, and spiritual unity”.

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler clearly believed that Jewish advocacy of liberal attitudes was a deception overlaying a commitment to racialism and a highly cohesive group strategy: “While he [the Jew] seems to overflow with ‘enlightenment,’ ‘progress,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘humanity,’ etc., he himself practices the severest segregation of his race”. The conflict between Jewish advocacy of Enlightenment ideals and actual Jewish behavior was noted by Klein (1981, 146): “Annoyed by the parochial attachments of other people, and unresponsive to the idea of a pluralistic state, many non-Jews interpreted the Jewish assertion of pride as a subversion of the ‘enlightened’ or egalitarian state. The Jewish stress on national or racial pride reinforced the non-Jewish perception of the Jew as a disruptive social force.”

In the event, National Socialism developed as a cohesive gentile group strategy in opposition to Judaism, a strategy that completely rejected the Enlightenment ideal of an atomized society based on individual rights in opposition to the state. In this regard National Socialism was very much like Judaism, which has been throughout its history fundamentally a group phenomenon in which the rights of the individual have been submerged in the interests of the group. As evident in the material reviewed here and in the previous chapters, at least some influential Jewish social scientists and intellectuals have attempted to undermine gentile group strategies while leaving open the possibility that Judaism continue as a highly cohesive group strategy. This theme is highly compatible with the Frankfurt School’s consistent rejection of all forms of nationalism. The result is that in the end the ideology of the Frankfurt School may be described as a form of radical individualism that nevertheless despised capitalism—an individualism in which all forms of gentile collectivism are condemned as an indication of social or individual pathology.

Thus in Horkheimer’s essay on German Jews (see Horkheimer 1974), the true enemy of the Jews is gentile collectivities of any kind, and especially nationalism. Although no mention is made of the collectivist nature of Judaism, Zionism, or Israeli nationalism, the collectivist tendencies of modern gentile society are deplored, especially fascism and communism. The prescription for gentile society is radical individualism and the acceptance of pluralism. People have an inherent right to be different from others and to

be accepted by others as different. Indeed, to become differentiated from others is to achieve the highest level of humanity.

Congruent with this stress on individualism and the glorification of difference, Adorno embraced a radical form of philosophical skepticism which is completely incompatible with the entire social science enterprise of The Authoritarian Personality. Indeed, Adorno rejected even the possibility of ontology (“reification”) because he viewed the contrary positions as ultimately supporting totalitarianism. Given Adorno’s preoccupation with Jewish issues and strong Jewish identity, it is reasonable to suppose that these ideological structures are intended to serve as a justification of Jewish particularism. In this view, Judaism, like any other historically particular entity, must remain beyond the reach of science, forever incomprehensible in its uniqueness and ever in opposition to all attempts to develop homogeneous social structures in the society as a whole. The prescription that gentile society adopt a social organization based on radical individualism would indeed be an excellent strategy for the continuation of Judaism as a cohesive, collectivist group strategy. Research summarized by Triandis (1990, 1991) on cross-cultural differences in individualism and collectivism indicates that anti-Semitism would be lowest in individualist societies rather than societies that are collectivist and homogeneous apart from Jews.




Figure 14.1: The agenda of the Frankfurt School spread to to the United States and created a wide network of “convinced academia” who further pushed to dissolve western traditions in the name of “progress”. This movement is labeled as “Cultural Marxism” and was subject in literature in the 1940s and 1950s and then “suddenly” disappeared from the public eye.

Collectivist cultures explicitly includes Judaism in this category) place a much greater emphasis on the goals and needs of the ingroup rather than on individual rights and interests. Collectivist cultures develop an “unquestioned attachment” to the ingroup, including “the perception that ingroup norms are universally valid (a form of ethnocentrism), automatic obedience to ingroup authorities, and willingness to fight and die for the ingroup. These characteristics are usually associated with distrust of and unwillingness to cooperate with

outgroups". In collectivist cultures morality is conceptualized as that which benefits the group, and aggression and exploitation of outgroups are acceptable (Triandis 1990, 90).

People in individualist cultures, in contrast, show little emotional attachment to ingroups. Personal goals are paramount, and socialization emphasizes the importance of self-reliance, independence, individual responsibility, and "finding yourself". Individualists have more positive attitudes toward strangers and outgroup members and are more likely to behave in a prosocial, altruistic manner to strangers. Because they are less aware of ingroup-outgroup boundaries, people in individualist cultures are less likely to have negative attitudes toward outgroup members. They often disagree with ingroup policy, show little emotional commitment or loyalty to ingroups, and do not have a sense of common fate with other ingroup members. Opposition to outgroups occurs in individualist societies, but the opposition is more "rational" in the sense that there is less of a tendency to suppose that all of the outgroup members are culpable for the misdeeds of a few. Individualists form mild attachments to many groups, whereas collectivists have an intense attachment and identification to a few ingroups.

The expectation is that individualists will tend to be less predisposed to anti-Semitism and more likely to blame any offensive Jewish behavior as resulting from transgressions by individual Jews rather than stereotypically true of all Jews. However Jews, as members of a collectivist subculture living in an individualistic society, are themselves more likely to view the Jewish-gentile distinction as extremely salient and to develop stereotypically negative views about gentiles.

In Triandis's terms, then, the fundamental intellectual difficulty presented by *The Authoritarian Personality* is that Judaism itself is a highly collectivist subculture in which authoritarianism and obedience to ingroup norms and the suppression of individual interests for the common good have been of vital importance throughout its history. Such attributes in gentiles tend to result in anti-Semitism because of social identity processes. Jews may, as a result, perceive themselves to have a vital interest in advocating a highly individualist, atomized gentile culture while simultaneously maintaining their own highly elaborated collectivist subculture. This is the perspective developed by the Frankfurt School and apparent throughout *Studies in Prejudice*.

The Influence of the Frankfurt School

Although it is difficult to assess the effect of works like *The Authoritarian Personality* on gentile culture, there can be little question that the thrust of the radical critique of gentile culture in this work, as well as other works inspired by psychoanalysis and its derivatives, was to pathologize high-investment parenting and upward social mobility, as well as pride in family, religion, and country, among gentiles. Certainly many of the central attitudes of the largely successful 1960s countercultural revolution find expression in *The Authoritarian Personality*, including idealizing rebellion against parents, low-investment sexual relationships, and scorn for upward social mobility, social status, family pride, the

Christian religion, and patriotism.

We have seen that despite this antagonistic perspective on gentile culture, Jewish 1960s radicals continued to identify with their parents and with Judaism. The countercultural revolution was in a very deep sense a mission to the gentiles in which adaptive behavior and group-identifications of gentiles were pathologized while Jewish group identification, ingroup pride, family pride, upward social mobility, and group continuity retained their psychological importance and positive moral evaluation. In this regard, the behavior of these radicals was exactly analogous to that of the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* and Jewish involvement in psychoanalysis and radical politics generally: Gentile culture and gentile group strategies are fundamentally pathological and are to be anathemized in the interests of making the world safe for Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. As with political radicalism, only a rarified cultural elite could attain the extremely high level of mental health epitomized by the true liberal.

Stated goals of the Frankfurt School

1. The creation of racism offences
2. Continual change to create confusion
3. The teaching of sex and homosexuality to children
4. The undermining of schools' and teachers' authority
5. Huge immigration to destroy identity
6. Promotion of excessive drinking
7. Emptying of churches
8. An unreliable legal system with bias against victims of crime
9. Dependency on the state or state benefits (welfare and/or socialism)
10. Control and dumbing down of media
11. Encouraging the breakdown of the family

"The revolution won't happen with guns, rather it will happen incrementally, year by year, generation by generation. We will gradually infiltrate their educational institutions and their political offices, transforming them slowly into Marxist entities as we move towards universal egalitarianism."

- Max Horkheimer

One of the main ideas of the Frankfurt School was to exploit Freud's idea of "pansexualism" - the search for pleasure, the exploitation of the differences between the sexes, the overthrowing of traditional relationships between men and women. To further their aims they would:

- attack the authority of the father, deny the specific roles of father and mother, and wrest away from families their rights as primary educators of their children
- abolish differences in the education of boys and girls
- abolish all forms of male dominance - hence the presence of women in the armed forces
- declare women to be an oppressed class and men as oppressors

Munzberg summed up the Frankfurt School's long-term operation thus: "We will make the West so corrupt it stinks."

The School believed there were two types of revolution: (a) political and (b) cultural. Cultural revolution demolishes from within. "Modern forms of subjection are marked by mildness". They saw it as a long-term project and kept their sights clearly focused on the family, education, media, sex and popular culture.

In the post-World War II era *The Authoritarian Personality* became an ideological weapon against historical American populist movements, especially McCarthyism. These trends are exemplified in *The Politics of Unreason*, a volume in the *Patterns of American Prejudice Series* funded by the ADL and written by Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab (1970). As indicated by the title, *The Politics of Unreason* analyses political and ideological expressions of ethnocentrism by Europe-derived peoples as irrational and as being unrelated to legitimate ethnic interests in retaining political power. "Right-wing extremist" movements aim at retaining or restoring the power of the European-derived majority of the United States, but "Extremist politics is the politics of despair". For Lipset and Raab, tolerance of cultural and ethnic pluralism is a defining feature of democracy, so that groups that oppose cultural and ethnic pluralism are by definition extremist and anti-democratic. Indeed, citing Edward A. Shils (1956, 154), they conceptualize pluralism as implying multiple centers of power without domination by any one group—a view in which the self-interest of ethnic groups in retaining and expanding their power is

conceptualized as fundamentally antidemocratic.

Attempts by majorities to resist the increase in the power and influence of other groups are therefore contrary to “the fixed spiritual center of the democratic political process”. “Extremism is anti-pluralism. . . . And the operational heart of extremism is the repression of difference and dissent”. Right-wing extremism is condemned for its moralism, an ironic move given the centrality of a sense of moral superiority that pervades the Jewish-dominated intellectual movements reviewed here, not to mention Lipset and Raab’s own analysis in which right-wing extremism is labeled “an absolute political evil” because of its links with authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Right-wing extremism is also condemned for its tendency to advocate simple solutions to complex problems, which, as noted by Lasch (1991), is a plea that solutions to social problems should be formulated by an intellectual elite.

And finally, rightwing extremism is condemned because of its tendency to distrust institutions that intervene between the people and their direct exercise of power, another plea for the power of elites: “Populism identifies the will of the people with justice and morality”. **The conclusion of this analysis is that democracy is identified not with the power of the people to pursue their perceived interests. Rather, democracy is conceptualized as guaranteeing that majorities will not resist the expansion of power of minorities even if that means a decline in their own power.**

Another good example of this intellectual onslaught on the lower middleclass associated with the Frankfurt School is Erich Fromm’s (1941) *Escape from Freedom*, in which the lower middle-class is regarded as highly prone to developing “sado-masochistic” reaction formations (as indicated by participating in authoritarian groups!) as a response to their economic and social status frustrations. It is not surprising that the lower middle-class target of this intellectual onslaught—including, one might add, the mittlestand of Wilhelminian German politics—has historically been prone to anti-Semitism as an explanation of their downward social mobility and their frustrated attempts to achieve upward social mobility. This group has also been prone to joining cohesive authoritarian groups as a means of attaining their political goals. But within the context of *The Authoritarian Personality*, the desire for upward social mobility and the concern with downward social mobility characteristic of many supporters of populist movements is a sign of a specific psychiatric disorder, a pathetic result of inappropriate socialization that would disappear in the liberalized utopian society of the future.

Although Critical Theory ceased to be a guide for protest movements by the early 1970s, it has retained a very large influence in the intellectual world generally. In the 1970s, the Frankfurt School intellectuals continued to draw the fire of German conservatives who characterized them as the “intellectual foster-parents of terrorists” and as fomenters of “cultural revolution to destroy the Christian West”. “The inseparability of concepts such as Frankfurt School, Critical Theory, and neo-Marxism indicates that, from the 1930’s onwards, theoretically productive leftwing ideas in German-speaking countries had focused

on Horkheimer, Adorno and the Institute of Social Research". The Institute of Social Research" (Wiggershaus 1994, 658). However, the influence of the Frankfurt School has gone well beyond the German-speaking world, and not only with The Authoritarian Personality studies, the writings of Erich Fromm, and the enormously influential work of Herbert Marcuse as a countercultural guru to the New Left. In the contemporary intellectual world, there are several journals devoted to this legacy, including *New German Critique*, *Cultural Critique*, and *Theory, Culture, and Society: Explorations in Critical Social Science*. The influence of the Frankfurt School increased greatly following the success of the New Left countercultural movement of the 1960s.

Reflecting its current influence in the humanities, the Frankfurt School retains pride of place as a major inspiration at the meetings of the notoriously postmodern Modern Language Association held in December 1994. Kramer and Kimball (1995) describe the large number of laudatory references to Adorno, Horkheimer, and especially Walter Benjamin, who had the honor of being the most-referred-to scholar at the convention. Marxism and psychoanalysis were also major influences at the conference. One bright spot occurred when the radical Marxist Richard Ohmann acknowledged that the humanities had been revolutionized by the "critical legacy of the Sixties". The strategy of the Frankfurt School was to deconstruct universalist, scientific thinking by the use of "critical reason," postmodernism has opted for complete relativism and the lack of objective standards of any kind in the interests of preventing any general theories of society or universally valid philosophical or moral systems.

Contemporary postmodernism and multiculturalist ideology have adopted several central pillars of the Frankfurt School: the fundamental priority of ethics and values in approaching education and the social sciences; empirical science as oppressive and an aspect of social domination; a rejection of the possibility of shared values or any sense of universalism or national culture a "hermeneutics of suspicion" in which any attempt to construct such universals or a national culture is energetically resisted and "deconstructed", essentially the same activity termed by Adorno "negative dialectics."

It is immensely ironic that this onslaught against Western universalism effectively rationalizes minority group ethnocentrism while undercutting the intellectual basis of ethnocentrism. Intellectually one wonders how one could be a postmodernist and a committed Jew at the same time. Intellectual consistency would seem to require that all personal identifications be subjected to the same deconstructing logic, unless, of course, personal identity itself involves deep ambiguities, deception, and self-deception. This in fact appears to be the case for Jacques Derrida, the premier philosopher of deconstruction, whose philosophy shows the deep connections between the intellectual agendas of postmodernism and the Frankfurt School.

14.6 The Jewish Criticism of Gentile Culture: A Reprise

The material in the previous four chapters indicates that individuals who strongly identified as Jews have been the main motivating force behind several highly influential intellectual movements that have simultaneously subjected gentile culture to radical criticism and allowed for the continuity of Jewish identification. Together these movements comprise the intellectual and political left in this century, and they are the direct intellectual ancestors of current leftist intellectual and political movements, particularly postmodernism and multiculturalism.

Collectively, these movements have called into question the fundamental moral, political, and economic foundations of Western society. A critical feature of these movements is that they have been, at least in the United States, top-down movements in the sense that they were originated and dominated by members of a highly intelligent and highly educated group. These movements have been advocated with great intellectual passion and moral fervor and with a very high level of theoretical sophistication. Each movement promised its own often overlapping and complementary version of utopia: a society composed of people with the same biological potential for accomplishment and able to be easily molded by culture into ideal citizens as imagined by a morally and intellectually superior elite; a classless society in which there would be no conflicts of interest and people would altruistically work for the good of the group; a society in which people would be free of neuroses and aggression toward outgroups and in tune with their biological urges; a multicultural paradise in which different racial and ethnic groups would live in harmony and cooperation—a utopian dream that also occupies center stage in the discussion of Jewish involvement in shaping U.S. immigration policy.

The originators of these movements were all vitally concerned with anti-Semitism, and all of the utopias envisioned by these intellectual and political movements would end anti-Semitism while allowing for Jewish group continuity. A generation of Jewish radicals looked to the Soviet Union as an idyllic place where Jews could rise to positions of preeminence and where anti-Semitism was officially outlawed while Jewish national life flourished. The psychoanalytic movement and the Frankfurt School looked forward to the day when gentiles would be inoculated against anti-Semitism by a clinical priesthood that could heal the personal inadequacies and the frustrations at loss of status that gentiles murderously projected onto the Jews. And the Boasians and the Frankfurt School and their descendants would prevent the development of anti-Semitic ideologies of majoritarian ethnocentrism.

A palpable sense of intellectual and moral superiority of those participating in these movements is another characteristic feature. This sense of intellectual superiority and hostility to gentiles and their culture was a recurrent theme of the leftist movements. Documented is also a profound sense of intellectual superiority and estrangement from gentile culture that characterized not only Freud but also the entire psychoanalytic movement. Regarding moral superiority, the central pose of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals

is a sense that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest of humanity. Moral indictments of their opponents are a prominent theme in the writings of political radicals and those opposing biological perspectives on individual and group differences in IQ. A sense of moral superiority was also prevalent in the psychoanalytic movement, and we have seen that the Frankfurt School developed a moral perspective in which the existence of Judaism was viewed as an a priori moral absolute and in which social science was to be judged by moral criteria.

Current psychological theory and data are highly compatible with supposing that viewpoints advocated by minorities are able to influence attitudes held by the majority, especially when possessing a high degree of internal consistency and especially when they are disseminated from the most prestigious academic and media institutions in the society. Several features of these intellectual movements can be viewed as serving Jewish interests. The greatest danger for a minority group strategy is the development of a highly cohesive, sectarian majority group that views the minority group as a negatively evaluated outgroup. In combating this potential threat, one type of strategy has been to actively promote universalist ideologies within the larger society in which the Jewish-gentile social categorization is of minimal importance. Judaism as a cohesive, ethnically based group strategy continues to exist, but in a cryptic or semi-cryptic state. The exemplar of this strategy is leftist political ideology; however psychoanalysis and even forms of Judaism that minimize phenotypic differentiation between Jews and gentiles, adopt a similar strategy.

Jewish interests are also served by facilitating radical individualism (social atomization) among gentiles while retaining a powerful sense of group cohesion among Jews—the agenda of the Frankfurt School. Gentile group identifications are regarded as an indication of psychopathology. An important component of this strategy is the deconstruction of majoritarian intellectual movements that are incompatible with the continuation of Judaism. These majoritarian intellectual movements may range from radical assimilationism (e.g., the forced conversions to Christianity) to exclusivist majority group strategies based on majority group ethnocentrism (e.g., National Socialism).

Jewish interests are also served by the Frankfurt School ideology that gentile concerns about losing social status and being eclipsed economically, socially, and demographically by other groups are an indication of psychopathology. As an exceptionally upwardly mobile group, this ideology serves Jewish interests by defusing gentile concerns about their downward mobility, and we shall see in the next chapter that Jewish organizations and Jewish intellectuals have been at the forefront of the movement to eclipse the demographic and cultural dominance of European-derived peoples in Western societies. Several themes common to these Jewish intellectual movements bear mentioning. An important thread apparent in the discussions of psychoanalysis, Boasian anthropology, the Frankfurt School, and radical intellectual and political circles has been that Jewish intellectuals have formed highly cohesive groups whose influence derives to great extent from the solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. Intellectual activity is like any other

human endeavor: Cohesive groups outcompete individualist strategies. Indeed, the fundamental truth of this axiom has been central to the success of Judaism throughout its history.

Indeed, Jewish associational patterns in science go well beyond the cohesive intellectual movements discussed here. Recently Greenwald and Schuh (1994) demonstrated a pattern of ethnic discrimination in scientific citations whereby Jewish authors were 40 percent more likely to cite Jewish authors than were non-Jewish authors. Jewish first authors of scientific papers were also approximately three times more likely to have Jewish coauthors than were non-Jewish first authors. Although the methods used in the study did not allow determination of the direction of discrimination, the findings reported throughout this volume strongly suggest that a large proportion of the discrimination originates with Jewish scientists. This is also suggested by the disproportionate representation of Jewish coauthors, presumably the result of Jewish ingroup associational patterns both as mentors and colleagues. Moreover, where there are proportionate differences in group size, individuals in minority groups are generally more prone to ingroup bias than are majority group members (Mullen 1991), suggesting that Jews would be more strongly inclined toward ethnic discrimination than gentiles.

Jews have also been greatly overrepresented as editors, publishers and contributors to a variety of radical and liberal periodicals, including *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, and *The Progressive*. In 1974 *The New Republic* (TNR) was purchased by Martin Peretz, son of a "devoted Labor Zionist and right-wing Jabotinskyist" and himself a leftist student activist before moving in the direction of neoconservatism. The only consistent theme in Peretz's career is a devotion to Jewish causes, particularly Israel. He reflects a major theme of Chapter 3 in that he abandoned the New Left when some in the movement condemned Israel as racist and imperialist. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, he told Henry Kissinger that his "dovishness stopped at the delicatessen door", and many among his staff feared that all issues would be decided on the basis of what was "good for the Jews".

Similarly, in the literary world, the highly influential left-wing journal *Partisan Review* (PR) was a principle showcase of "the New York Intellectuals," a group dominated by editors and contributors with a Jewish ethnic identity and a deep alienation from American political and cultural institutions. Clement Greenberg, the highly influential art critic whose work helped establish the Abstract Expressionist movement in the 1940s, is a prototypical member of this group. He made his reputation entirely within what one might term a Jewish intellectual milieu. Greenberg was a writer for PR, managing editor of *Contemporary Jewish Record* (the forerunner of *Commentary*), long-time editor of *Commentary* under Elliot Cohen, as well as art critic for *The Nation*. Because of the overlap among several contributors and editors, the following are considered the magazines associated with the New York Intellectuals: PR, *Commentary*, *Menorah Journal*, *Dissent*, *The Nation*, *Politics*, *Encounter*, *The New Leader*, *The New York Review of Books*, *The Public Interest*, *The New Criterion*, *The National Interest*, and *Tikkun*.

PR originated as an offshoot of the Communist Party, its central figures all Marxists and admirers of Trotsky. There was, however, an increasingly heavy dose of psychoanalysis beginning in the 1940s. The New York Intellectuals gradually evolved away from advocacy of socialist revolution toward a shared commitment to anti-nationalism and cosmopolitanism, “a broad and inclusive culture” in which cultural differences were esteemed. It would be difficult to overestimate the New York Intellectuals’ influence on American high culture in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in the areas of literary criticism, art criticism, sociology, and “intellectual high journalism”.

ving Kristol writes of PR’s “intimidating presence” among his college friends. In the words of art critic Hilton Kramer:

For certain writers and intellectuals of my generation. . . drawn to PR in the late forties and early fifties. . . it was more than a magazine, it was an essential part of our education, as much a part of that education as the books we read, the visits we made to the museums, the concerts we attended, and the records we bought. It gave us an entrée to modern cultural life—to its gravity and complexity and combative character—that few of our teachers could match. . .

Philosopher Sidney Hook also had a strong Jewish identification; he was a Zionist, a strong supporter of Israel, and an advocate of Jewish education for Jewish children. Hook played a decisive leadership role in the group, and, as indicated above, he had an editorial position at *Commentary*. In his “Reflections on the Jewish Question” he wrote, “the causes of antisemitism are not to be found in the behavior of Jews”. Rather, the sources of anti-Semitism are to be found “in the beliefs and habits and culture of the non-Jews” (p. 468), particularly Christianity. Anti-Semitism “is endemic to every Christian culture whose religions made Jews the eternal villain in the Christian drama of salvation”. (Jews, the eternal victim) Hook felt that one had a moral obligation to remain a Jew:

[For most Jews] escape [from being Jewish] was practically impossible, that where it was possible the psychological costs were usually too burdensome, and that morally it was intrinsically degrading to capitulate to irrational prejudice and deny kinship with their own fathers and mothers who, often against heroic odds, had courageously kept their integrity and faith whatever it was.

Like many leftists, Hook approved of the dream of human universalism, but the dream “overlooks the fact that human beings live as Jews and non-Jews here and now and will continue to do so for a long time to come; that the dream itself is based upon the acceptance of differences among men and not on the hope of an undifferentiated unity. Jews would thus continue to exist as Jews long after Hook’s utopia of democratic socialism had been created. For Hook, leftist universalism properly understood implies an acceptance of cultural diversity as not only central to a philosophy of Judaism but central to the idea of democracy itself.

The New York Intellectuals included the following prominent Jewish participants, clas-

sified roughly according to main area of involvement, although they tended to be generalists rather than specialists: Elliot Cohen (editor of *Menorah Journal* and founding editor of *Commentary*); Sidney Hook, Hannah Arendt (political philosophy, political and intellectual journalism); William Phillips and Philip Rahv (editors of *PR*; literary criticism, intellectual journalism); Lionel Trilling, Diana Trilling, Leslie Fiedler, Alfred Kazin, and Susan Sontag (literary criticism); Robert Warshow (film criticism and cultural criticism); Isaac Rosenfeld, Delmore Schwartz, Paul Goodman, Saul Bellow, and Norman Mailer (fiction and poetry, literary criticism); Irving Howe (political journalism, literary criticism); Melvin J. Lasky, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol (political journalism); Nathan Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, David Riesman, and Michael Walzer (sociology); Lionel Abel, Clement Greenberg, George L. K. Morris, Meyer Schapiro, and Harold Rosenberg (art criticism).

The New York Intellectuals spent their careers entirely within a Jewish social and intellectual milieu. Cultural critique was central to the work of the New York Intellectuals. To Rahv, modernist culture was important because of its potential for cultural critique. Modernism encouraged “the creation of moral and aesthetic values running counter to and often violently critical of the bourgeois spirit.” “What is modern literature if not a vindictive, neurotic, and continually renewed dispute with the modern world?” Such pronouncements on the critical potential of even the most abstract art reflected the views of Frankfurt School theorists Adorno and Horkheimer, the latter of whom noted that “An element of resistance is inherent in the most aloof art”.

This condescension and failure to respect others’ ideas are particularly obvious in the New York Intellectuals’ attitudes toward traditional American culture, especially the culture of rural America. There is a large overlap between the New York Intellectuals and the anti-populist forces who, as discussed in Chapter 5, used *The Authoritarian Personality* to pathologize the behavior of gentile Americans and particularly the lower middle class. The New York Intellectuals were cultural elitists who abhorred cultural democracy and feared the masses while nevertheless remaining consistently left-of-center politically. The movement was “a leftist elitism—a leftist conservatism, we might say—that slowly evolved into . . . neoconservatism.

Intellectuals associated rural America with “nativism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, and fascism as well as with anti-intellectualism and provincialism; the urban was associated antithetically with ethnic and cultural tolerance, with internationalism, and with advanced ideas. . . . The New York Intellectuals simply began with the assumption that the rural—with which they associated much of American tradition and most of the territory beyond New York—had little to contribute to a cosmopolitan culture. . . . By interpreting cultural and political issues through the urban-rural lens, writers could even mask assertions of superiority and expressions of anti-democratic sentiments as the judgments of an objective expertise”.

Once an organization becomes dominated by a particular intellectual perspective, there is enormous intellectual inertia created by the fact that the informal networks dominat-

ing elite universities serve as gatekeepers for the next generation of scholars. Aspiring intellectuals, whether Jewish or gentile, are subjected to a high level of indoctrination at the undergraduate and graduate levels; there is tremendous psychological pressure to adopt the fundamental intellectual assumptions that lie at the center of the power hierarchy of the discipline. As discussed in Chapter 1, once a Jewish-dominated intellectual movement attains intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that gentiles would be attracted to Jewish intellectuals as members of a socially dominant and prestigious group and as dispensers of valued resources.

It is interesting to note other examples of cohesive groups of Jewish intellectuals besides those considered in the previous chapters. In sixteenth-century Spain a concentrated group of Converso intellectuals were intimately involved in making the University of Alcalá into a bastion of nominalism—a doctrine widely viewed as subversive of religion.

George Mosse describes a group of predominantly Jewish leftist intellectuals in the Weimar period that “attained a certain cohesion through the journals it made its own.” Similarly, Irving Louis Horowitz describes an “organic group” of Austrian Marxist intellectuals during the pre-World War II period who “shared in common Jewish ancestry if not Zionist persuasions.” Horowitz notes that the Austrian Marxist group and the Frankfurt School had “shared ethnic and religious backgrounds. . . not to mention overlapping networks and cohorts” resulting ultimately from the unity of prewar European German Jewish life.

Another interesting example is a highly cohesive group of neo-Kantian Jewish intellectuals centered at the University of Marburg under the leadership of Hermann Cohen in late-nineteenth-century Germany (Schwarzchild 1979, 136). Cohen (1842-1918), who ended his career teaching at a rabbinical seminary, rejected the historicism of the Volkisch thinkers and the Hegelians in favor of an idealistic version of Kantian rationalism. A primary intellectual goal was to suppose that the ideal Germany must be defined in universal moral terms that rationalized the continued existence of Jewish particularism: “A Germanism that might demand of me that I surrender my religion and my religious inheritance, I would not acknowledge as an ideal peoplehood in which the power and dignity of the state inhere. . . [A] Germanism that might demand such a surrender of religious selfhood, or that could even approve of and project it, simply contradicts the world-historical impulsion of Germanism”.

During the 1920s, there was “a distinct coterie” of Jewish intellectuals (Lionel Trilling, Herbert Solow, Henry Rosenthal, Tess Slesinger, Felix Morrow, Clifton Fadiman, Anita Brenner) centered around the *Menorah Journal* under the leadership of Elliot Cohen (later the founding editor of *Commentary*). This group, which later overlapped a great deal with the New York Intellectual group described above, was devoted to promoting the ideas of cultural pluralism. Reflecting its fundamentally Jewish political agenda, during the 1930s this group gravitated to the Communist Party and its auxiliary organizations, believing that, in the words of one observer, “the socialist revolution and its extension held out the only realistic hope of saving the Jews. Further, while adopting an ideology of revolutionary internationalism, the group “shared with cultural pluralism a hostility to

assimilation by the dominant culture“, another indication of the compatibility of leftist universalism and Jewish non-assimilation.

In the cases of psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School, and to a lesser extent Boasian anthropology, we have seen that these cohesive groups typically had strong overtones of authoritarianism, and like traditional Judaism itself, they were highly exclusionary and intolerant of dissent. These movements tended to center around a charismatic leader (Boas, Freud, or Horkheimer) with a powerful moral, intellectual, and social vision, and the followers of these leaders had an intense devotion toward them. There was an intense psychological sense of missionary zeal and, as we have seen, moral fervor. This phenomenon occurred in the case of psychoanalysis and the Boasian movement, and (with massive irony) this was also the case with Critical Theory: “The theory which filled Adorno and Marcuse with a sense of mission both before and after the war was a theory of a special sort: in the midst of doubts it was still inspiring, in the midst of pessimism it still spurred them on towards a kind of salvation through knowledge and discovery. The promise was neither fulfilled nor betrayed—it was kept alive“.

Like Freud, Horkheimer inspired intense loyalty combined with personal insecurity (at least partly because of his control over the Institute’s budget, so that his underlings at the Institute, like Adorno, became fixated on him and intensely jealous of their rivals for their master’s favors. Adorno “was prepared to identify himself completely with the great cause of the Institute, measuring everything by that standard“.

Moreover, Jewish influence in the popular media was an important source of favorable coverage of Jewish intellectual movements, particularly psychoanalysis and 1960s political radicalism (Rothman & Lichter 1982). Favorable media depictions of psychoanalysis were common during the 1950s, peaking in the midsixties when psychoanalysis was at the apex of its influence in the United States. “Popular images of Freud revealed him as a painstaking observer, a tenacious worker, a great healer, a truly original explorer, a paragon of domestic virtue, the discover of personal energy, and a genius“. Psychiatrists were portrayed in movies as “humane and effective. The number of Hollywood stars, directors, and producers who were ‘in analysis’ was legion“.

It is thus not surprising that although these theories were directed at achieving specific Jewish interests in the manipulation of culture, they “could not tell their name“; that is, they were forced to minimize any overt indication that Jewish group identity or Jewish group interests were involved, and they could not develop a specific rationale for Judaism acceptable within a post-Enlightenment intellectual context. In the case of the Frankfurt School, “What strikes the current observer is the intensity with which many of the Institute’s members denied, and in some cases still deny, any meaning at all to their Jewish identities“. The originators and practitioners of these theories attempted to conceal their Jewish identities, as in the case of Freud, and to engage in massive self-deception, as appears to have been common among many Jewish political radicals. Recall the Jewish radicals who believed in their own invisibility as Jews while nevertheless appearing as the quintessential ethnics to outside observers and at the same time taking steps to ensure

that gentiles would have highly visible positions in the movement.

The technique of having gentiles as highly visible exemplars of Jewish-dominated movements has been commonly used by Jewish groups attempting to appeal to gentiles on a wide range of Jewish issues and is apparent in the discussion of Jewish involvement in influencing immigration policy in the following chapter.

14.7 Jewish Involvement in Shaping U.S. Immigration Policy

Immigration policy is a paradigmatic example of conflicts of interest between ethnic groups because immigration policy determines the future demographic composition of the nation. Ethnic groups unable to influence immigration policy in their own interests will eventually be displaced by groups able to accomplish this goal. Immigration policy is thus of fundamental interest to an evolutionist. Immigration policy is, however, only one aspect of conflicts of interest between Jews and gentiles in the United States. The skirmishes between Jews and the gentile power structure beginning in the late nineteenth century always had strong overtones of anti-Semitism. These battles involved issues of Jewish upward mobility, quotas on Jewish representation in elite schools beginning in the nineteenth century and peaking in the 1920s and 1930s, the anti-communist crusades in the post-World War II era, as well as the very powerful concern with the cultural influences of the major media extending from Henry Ford's writings in the 1920s to the Hollywood inquisitions of the McCarthy era and into the contemporary era.

The Jewish involvement in influencing immigration policy in the United States is especially noteworthy as an aspect of ethnic conflict. Jewish involvement in influencing immigration policy has had certain unique qualities that have distinguished Jewish interests from the interests of other groups favoring liberal immigration policies. Throughout much of the period from 1881 to 1965, one Jewish interest in liberal immigration policies stemmed from a desire to provide a sanctuary for Jews fleeing from anti-Semitic persecutions in Europe and elsewhere. Anti-Semitic persecutions have been a recurrent phenomenon in the modern world beginning with the Russian pogroms of 1881 and continuing into the post-World War II era in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As a result, liberal immigration has been a Jewish interest because "survival often dictated that Jews seek refuge in other lands". For a similar reason, Jews have consistently advocated an internationalist foreign policy because "an internationally-minded America was likely to be more sensitive to the problems of foreign Jewries".

There is also evidence that Jews, much more than any other Europe-derived ethnic group in the United States, have viewed liberal immigration policies as a mechanism of ensuring that the United States would be a pluralistic rather than a unitary, homogeneous society. Pluralism serves both internal (within-group) and external (between-group) Jewish interests. Pluralism serves internal Jewish interests because it legitimates the internal Jewish interest in rationalizing and openly advocating an interest in overt rather than

semi-cryptic Jewish group commitment and nonassimilation, what Howard Sachar terms its function in “legitimizing the preservation of a minority culture in the midst of a majority’s host society.”

Ethnic and religious pluralism also serves external Jewish interests because Jews become just one of many ethnic groups. This results in the diffusion of political and cultural influence among the various ethnic and religious groups, and it becomes difficult or impossible to develop unified, cohesive groups of gentiles united in their opposition to Judaism. Historically, major anti-Semitic movements have tended to erupt in societies that have been, apart from the Jews, religiously or ethnically homogeneous.

Although ethnic and cultural pluralism are certainly not guaranteed to satisfy Jewish interests, it is nonetheless the case that ethnically and religiously pluralistic societies have been perceived by Jews as more likely to satisfy Jewish interests than are societies characterized by ethnic and religious homogeneity among gentiles. Indeed, at a basic level, the motivation for all the Jewish political and intellectual activity reviewed throughout this volume is intimately linked to fears of anti-Semitism.

Explicit statements linking immigration policy to a Jewish interest in cultural pluralism can be found among prominent Jewish social scientists and political activists. In his review of Horace Kallen’s (1956) *Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea* appearing in *Congress Weekly* (published by the AJCongress), Joseph L. Blau noted that “Kallen’s view is needed to serve the cause of minority groups and minority cultures in this nation without a permanent majority”—the implication being that Kallen’s ideology of multiculturalism opposes the interests of any ethnic group in dominating the United States. The well-known author and prominent Zionist Maurice Samuel, writing partly as a negative reaction to the immigration law of 1924, wrote, “If, then, the struggle between us [i.e., Jews and gentiles] is ever to be lifted beyond the physical, your democracies will have to alter their demands for racial, spiritual and cultural homogeneity with the State. But it would be foolish to regard this as a possibility, for the tendency of this civilization is in the opposite direction. There is a steady approach toward the identification of government with race, instead of with the political State.”

A congruent opinion is expressed by prominent Jewish social scientist and ethnic activist Earl Raab, who remarks very positively on the success of American immigration policy in altering the ethnic composition of the United States since 1965. Raab notes that the Jewish community has taken a leadership role in changing the Northwestern European bias of American immigration policy (1993a, 17), and he has also maintained that one factor inhibiting anti-Semitism in the contemporary United States is that “an increasing ethnic heterogeneity, as a result of immigration, has made it even more difficult for a political party or mass movement of bigotry to develop”. Or more colorfully:

The Census Bureau has just reported that about half of the American population will soon be non-white or non-European. And they will all be American citizens. We have tipped beyond the point where a Nazi-Aryan party will be able to prevail in this country.

We [Jews] have been nourishing the American climate of opposition to bigotry for about half a century. That climate has not yet been perfected, but the heterogeneous nature of our population tends to make it irreversible—and makes our constitutional constraints against bigotry more practical than ever.

Positive attitudes toward cultural diversity have also appeared in other statements on immigration by Jewish authors and leaders. Charles Silberman (1985, 350) notes, “American Jews are committed to cultural tolerance because of their belief—one firmly rooted in history—that Jews are safe only in a society acceptant of a wide range of attitudes and behaviors, as well as a diversity of religious and ethnic groups. It is this belief, for example, not approval of homosexuality, that leads an overwhelming majority of U.S. Jews to endorse ‘gay rights’ and to take a liberal stance on most other so-called ‘social’ issues.”

Similarly, in listing the positive benefits of immigration, the director of the Washington Action Office of the Council of Jewish Federations stated that immigration “is about diversity, cultural enrichment and economic opportunity for the immigrants”. Because liberal immigration policies are a vital Jewish interest, it is not surprising that support for liberal immigration policies spans the Jewish political spectrum. We have seen that Sidney Hook, who along with the other New York Intellectuals may be viewed as an intellectual precursor of neoconservatism, identified democracy with the equality of differences and with the maximization of cultural diversity.

Neoconservatives have been strong advocates of liberal immigration policies, and there has been a conflict between predominantly Jewish neoconservatives and predominantly gentile paleoconservatives over the issue of Third World immigration into the United States. Neoconservatives Norman Podhoretz and Richard John Neuhaus reacted very negatively to an article by a paleo-Conservative concerned that such immigration would eventually lead to the United States being dominated by such immigrants. Other examples are neoconservatives Julian Simon (1990) and Ben Wattenberg (1991) both of whom advocate very high levels of immigration from all parts of the world, so that the United States will become what Wattenberg describes as the world’s first “Universal Nation.” Based on recent data, Fetzer (1996) reports that Jews remain far more favorable to immigration to the United States than any other ethnic group or religion.

It should be noted as a general point that the effectiveness of Jewish organizations in influencing U.S. immigration policy has been facilitated by certain characteristics of American Jewry that are directly linked with Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy, and particularly an IQ that is at least one standard deviation above the Caucasian mean. High IQ is associated with success in a broad range of activities in contemporary societies, including especially wealth and social status. As Neuringer (1971) notes, Jewish influence on immigration policy was facilitated by Jewish wealth, education, and social status. Reflecting its general disproportionate representation in markers of economic success and political influence, Jewish organizations have been able to have a vastly disproportionate effect on U.S. immigration policy because Jews as a group are highly organized, highly intelligent and politically astute, and they were able to command a high level of financial,

political, and intellectual resources in pursuing their political aims.

Similarly, Hollinger (1996, 19) notes that Jews were more influential in the decline of a homogeneous Protestant Christian culture in the United States than Catholics because of their greater wealth, social standing, and technical skill in the intellectual arena. In the area of immigration policy, the main Jewish activist organization influencing immigration policy, the AJCommittee, was characterized by “strong leadership [particularly Louis Marshall], internal cohesion, well-funded programs, sophisticated lobbying techniques, well-chosen non-Jewish allies, and good timing”.

Goldberg (1996) notes that presently there are approximately 300 national Jewish organizations in the United States with a combined budget estimated in the range of \$6 billion—a sum, Goldberg notes, greater than the gross national product of half the members of the United Nations. The Jewish effort toward transforming the United States into a pluralistic society has been waged on several fronts.

If you want to further investigate the Jewish involvement in shaping the United States in detail, I suggest looking directly into the book “The Culture of Critique” itself. The author gives another 50 pages of details information on this.

Jewish Pro-Immigration Efforts in other Western Countries

Jewish organizations have pursued similar policies regarding immigration in other Western societies. In France, the official Jewish community has consistently been in favor of immigration by non-Europeans. Recently the French Jewish community reacted strongly to pronouncements by actress Bridgette Bardot that “my country, France, has been invaded again by a foreign population, notably Muslims”. Chaim Musiquant, executive director of CRIF, the umbrella organization for French Jewry, stated that Bardot’s statement “skirt[ed] at the edge of racism.”

Jewish attitudes toward anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany can be seen by the following incident. A common (presumably self-deceptive) aspect of contemporary Jewish self-conceptualization is that Israel is an ethnically and culturally diverse society as a result of large scale immigration of Jews from different parts of the world, so much so that it should be held up as a model of ethnic relations and pro-immigrant attitudes for the rest of the world. Recently B’nai B’rith, acting in response to what it viewed as indications of a resurgence of neo-Nazism and anti-immigration sentiment in Germany, received a grant from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization to bring German representatives to Israel because Israel is “a diverse, formative society, which, under strains of war, terrorism and massive, deprived, immigration, has strived to develop a just, democratic and tolerant society”. “Our view was that the multicultural, multi-ethnic, multireligious and multi-fissured, democratic society of Israel. . . could provide a credible and worthwhile point of comparison for others coming from a similarly highly-charged society.”

In England, as in the United States, there was an ethnic battle beginning around 1900 in response to the influx of Eastern European Jews fleeing czarist anti-Semitism. Jewish political activity was instrumental in defeating an immigration restriction bill introduced by the Conservative government in 1904. In this case, the Anglo-Jewish political establishment represented by the Board of Deputies took a moderate stance, presumably because of fears that further immigration of Eastern European Jews would fan the flames of anti-Semitism. However, by this time the majority of the British Jewish community consisted of recent immigrants, and the Jewish Chronicle, the principle newspaper of the British Jewish community, campaigned vigorously against the bill. The anti-restrictionist forces won when Nathan Laski, president of the Manchester Old Hebrew Congregation, got Winston Churchill to oppose the bill. "Later Churchill freely admitted that, in the Grand Committee of the House of Commons, he had 'wrecked the Bill.' Led by Churchill, the Liberals, Evans- Gordon [a restrictionist Conservative MP] asserted, 'choked it [the Bill] with words until the time-limit was reached.' . . . A jubilant Laski wrote to Churchill: 'I have had over 20 years experience in elections in Manchester, & without flattery I tell you candidly, there has not been a single man able to arouse the interest that you have already done, thus I am sure of your future success'". In the following month Churchill won election from West Manchester, a district with a large Jewish electorate. This might already show just how Churchill's agenda might play out in the future.

Alderman shows that restrictionist legislation was popular except among the recent immigrants who had quickly become a numerical majority of the Jewish community, and, as indicated above, were already able to have a decisive influence on immigration legislation. However, a more moderate bill passed in 1905 despite Jewish opposition. In this case Jewish pressure succeeded in securing exemptions for victims of "prosecution" on religious or political grounds, but not "persecution". Again the Board of Deputies failed to make a major effort in opposition to the legislation, and Jewish Ministers of Parliament did not rise in opposition. However, for the recent immigrants, many of whom were on the electoral registers illegally, this was a major issue, and "at the general election of January 1906 these electorates wreaked a terrible vengeance upon those politicians who had supported the passage of the Aliens' Immigration Act"

Jews overwhelmingly supported candidates who opposed the legislation, and in at least two districts their votes were decisive, including the West Manchester district that returned Winston Churchill. The new Liberal government did not repeal the legislation, but enforced it more leniently. Since the law was directed against "undesirables," there is considerable doubt that it prevented any significant number of Jews from entering, although it probably did encourage many Jews to go to the United States rather than England. It is noteworthy that in 1908 Churchill lost an election in his Manchester district when there were defections among his Jewish supporters displeased about his opposition to repealing the law as a prospective member of the cabinet and attracted to the Conservative position on support for religious schools. Churchill nonetheless remained a staunch supporter of Jewish interests.

As in the case of America, there are also indications that Jewish support for immigration extended beyond advocating Jewish immigration into England. The Jewish Chronicle, the principle Jewish newspaper in England, opposed restriction on Commonwealth immigration in an editorial in the October 20, 1961 edition. The editorial noted that Jews perceived the 1905 legislation as directed against them and stated, "all restrictions on immigration are in principle retrogressive steps, particularly for this country, and a disappointment to those throughout the world who would like to see the limitations on the freedom of movement reduced rather than increased. The issue is one of moral principle."

During the 1970s the Conservative Party opposed immigration into Britain because, in the words of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Britain was in danger of being "swamped" by peoples who lacked "fundamental British characteristics". Conservative politicians attempted to obtain Jewish support on this issue, but the anti-immigration policy was condemned by official Jewish organizations, including the Board of Deputies, on the basis that "Since all British Jews are, or are descended from, immigrants, it was unethical—even immoral, for a Jew to support immigration control, or at least tighter immigration control". the Jewish Chronicle supported a non-restrictionist immigration policy, but was careful to avoid framing the issue as a Jewish issue, presumably because a Conservative Jewish Minister of Parliament, Keith Joseph, had appealed to Jews as Jews to support restriction. The Chronicle was most concerned to deny the existence of a Jewish vote.) Jews who did support the government policy did so out of fear that increased immigration would lead to a fascist backlash and therefore increased anti-Semitism.

In the case of Canada, Abella (1990, 234-235) notes the important contribution of Jews in bringing about a multicultural Canada and, in particular, in lobbying for more liberal immigration policies. Reflecting this attitude, Arthur Roebuck, attorney general of Ontario, was greeted "with thunderous applause" at a 1935 convention for the Zionist Organization of Canada when he stated that he looked "forward to the time when our economic conditions will be less severe than they are today and when we may open wide the gates, throw down the restrictions and make of Canada a Mecca for all the oppressed peoples of the world".

Earlier in the century, there were conflicts between Jews and gentiles over immigration that were entirely analogous to the situation in England and the United States, including the anti-Semitic motivation of many attempting to restrict immigration. As in the United States, Jews have strongly opposed majoritarian ethnocentric and nationalist movements, such as the Parti Quebecois, while remaining strong supporters of Zionism. Indeed, in the very close 1995 vote on Quebec separatism, the overwhelming support of Jews and other minorities for preserving links with Canada was blamed by separatist leader Jaques Parizeau for their defeat. It is remarkable that the sea change in immigration policy in the Western world occurred at approximately the same time (1962-1973), and in all countries the changes reflected the attitudes of elites rather than the great mass of citizens. In the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia public opinion polls of European-derived peoples have consistently shown overwhelming rejection of immigration

by non-European-derived peoples (Betts 1988; Brimelow 1995; Hawkins 1989; Layton-Henry 1992). A consistent theme has been that immigration policy has been formulated by elites with control of the media and that efforts have been made by political leaders of all major parties to keep fear of immigration off the political agenda (e.g., Betts 1988; Layton-Henry 1992, 82).

In Canada the decision to abandon a "White Canada" policy came from government officials, not from elected politicians. The White Canada policy was effectively killed by regulations announced in 1962, and Hawkins (1989, 39) comments, "This important policy change was made not as a result of parliamentary or popular demand, but because some senior officials in Canada, including Dr. [George] Davidson [Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and later a senior administrator at the United Nations] rightly saw that Canada could not operate effectively within the United Nations, or in the multiracial Commonwealth, with the millstone of a racially discriminatory immigration policy round her neck." In neither Australia nor Canada was there ever any popular sentiment to end the older European bias of immigration policy.

Given the elite origins of the non-European immigration policies that emerged throughout the West during this period despite popular opposition, it is of considerable interest that very little publicity was given to certain critical events. In Canada, the Report of the Special Joint Committee of 1975 was a critical event in shaping non-European immigration policy of the 1978 immigration law, but "sad to say, since the press failed to comment on the report and the electronic media had remained uninvolved, the Canadian public heard little of it". Only after the 1978 law was in effect did the government embark on a public information campaign to inform Canadians of their new immigration policy. Hawkins (1989) and Betts (1988) make similar points about the changes in Australian immigration policy. In Australia the impetus for change in immigration policy came from small groups of reformers that began appearing in some Australian universities in the 1960s. Betts in particular emphasizes the idea that the intellectual, academic, and media elite "trained in the humanities and social sciences" (p. 100) developed a sense of being a member of a morally and intellectually superior ingroup battling against Australian parochial nonintellectuals as an outgroup. As in the United States, there is a perception among Jews that a multicultural society will be a bulwark against anti-Semitism: Miriam Faine, an editorial committee member of the Australian Jewish Democrat stated, "The strengthening of multicultural or diverse Australia is also our most effective insurance policy against antisemitism. The day Australia has a Chinese Australian Governor General I would feel more confident of my freedom to live as a Jewish Australian".

As in the United States, family unification became a centerpiece of immigration policy in Canada and Australia and led to the "chaining" phenomenon mentioned above. Hawkins shows that in Canada, family reunion was the policy of liberal Ministers of Parliament desiring higher levels of Third World immigration. In Australia, family reunion became increasingly important during the 1980s, which also saw a declining importance of Australian development as a criterion for immigration policy. Reflecting these trends, the

Executive Council of Australian Jewry passed a resolution at its December 1, 1996, meeting to express “its support for the proposition that Australia’s long term interests are best served by a non-discriminatory immigration policy which adopts a benevolent attitude to refugees and family reunion and gives priority to humanitarian considerations.” The main Jewish publication, the *Australia/Israel Review*, has consistently editorialized in favor of high levels of immigration of all racial and ethnic groups. It has published unflattering portraits of anti-restrictionists and, in an effort at punishment and intimidation, published a list of 2000 people associated with Pauline Hanson’s anti-immigration One Nation party. It seems fair to conclude that Jewish organizations have uniformly advocated high levels of immigration of all racial and ethnic groups into Western societies and have also advocated a multicultural model for these societies.

14.8 Conclusion: Whither Judaism and the West?

One conclusion of this volume is that Jews have played a decisive role in developing highly influential intellectual and political movements that serve their interests in contemporary Western societies. These movements are only part of the story however. There has been an enormous growth in Jewish power and influence in Western societies generally, particularly the United States. Ginsberg (1993) notes that Jewish economic status and cultural influence have increased dramatically in the United States since 1960. Shapiro (1992, 116) shows that Jews are overrepresented by at least a factor of nine on indexes of wealth, but that this is a conservative estimate, because much Jewish wealth is in real estate, which is difficult to determine and easy to hide. While constituting approximately 2.4 percent of the population of the United States, Jews represented half of the top one hundred Wall Street executives and about 40 percent of admissions to Ivy League colleges. Lipset and Raab (1995) note that Jews contribute between one-quarter and one-third of all political contributions in the United States, including one-half of Democratic Party contributions and one-fourth of Republican contributions.

The general message of Goldberg’s (1996) book *Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment*, is that American Judaism is well organized and lavishly funded. It has achieved a great deal of power, and it has been successful in achieving its interests. There is a great deal of consensus on broad Jewish issues, particularly in the areas of Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties. Indeed, the consensus on these issues among Jewish activist organizations and the Jewish intellectual movements reviewed here despite a great deal of disagreement on other issues is striking. Massive changes in public policy on these issues beginning with the counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s coincide with the period of increasing Jewish power and influence in the United States.

While specifically ethnic organizations devoted to the ethnic interests of gentile European Americans are essentially political fringe groups with meager funding and little influence

on the mainstream political process, Salter notes that the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee ranked second out the 120 most powerful lobbies as rated by members of Congress and professional lobbyists, with no other ethnic organization rated in the top 25. Furthermore, AIPAC is one of the few lobbies that relies heavily on campaign contributions to win allies. As indicated above, Jews contribute between one-third and one-half of all campaign money in federal elections, the donations motivated by "Israel and the broader Jewish agenda".

Jews are thus overrepresented in campaign contributions by a factor of at least 13 based on their percentage of the population and are overrepresented by a factor of approximately 6.5 if adjustment is made for their higher average income. In overseas donations, the Jewish lead is even greater. For example, in the 1920s, before the post-World War II explosion of Jewish giving to Israel, Jewish Americans may have given as much as 24 times more per capita to assist overseas Jews than did Irish Americans to assist Ireland in its struggle for independence from Great Britain. Yet this was the period of peak Irish ethnic philanthropy (Carroll 1978). The disparity has become much greater since World War II. Salter has adopted a preliminary conservative estimate of Jewish ethnic mobilization as four times that of white gentiles, based on comparison of per capita donations to non-religious ethnic causes.

n the Blalock equation influence is affected not only by mobilization but also by the resources held by the group. Salter estimates that Jews control approximately 26 percent of the "cybernetic resources" of the United States (i.e., resources as measured by representation in key areas such as government, media, finance, academia, corporations, and entertainment). This average level of resource control reflects both areas of high (> 40 percent) Jewish representation (e.g., mass media, high finance, the legal profession, the intellectual elite, entertainment) and low (\leq 10 percent) Jewish representation (e.g., corporate elite, military leaders, religious leaders, legislators).

There is a broad Jewish consensus on such issues as Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties. This implies that Jewish influence and Jewish interests dominate these issues—a result that is highly compatible with the discussion of Jewish influence on immigration policy discussed Chapter 7 as well as the fact that all of these areas have seen enormous swings in public policy in accordance with Jewish interests that coincide with the rise of Jewish influence in the United States.

The movement toward ethnic separatism is of considerable interest from an evolutionary point of view. Between-group competition and monitoring of outgroups have been a characteristic of Jewish-gentile interactions not only in the West but also in Muslim societies, and there are examples of between-group competition and conflict too numerous to mention in other parts of the world. Historically, ethnic separatism, as seen in the history of Judaism, has been a divisive force within societies. It has on several occasions unleashed enormous intra-societal hatred and distrust, ethnically based warfare, expulsions, pogroms, and attempts at genocide. Moreover, there is little reason to suppose that the

future will be much different. At the present time there are ethnically based conflicts on every continent, and clearly the establishment of Israel has not ended ethnically based conflict for Jews returning from the diaspora.

Given the assumption of ethnic separatism, it is instructive to think of the circumstances that would, from an evolutionary perspective, minimize group conflict. Theorists of cultural pluralism such as Horace Kallen (1924) envision a scenario in which different ethnic groups retain their distinctive identity in the context of complete political equality and economic opportunity. The difficulty with this scenario from an evolutionary perspective (or even a common sense perspective) is that no provision is made for the results of competition for resources and reproductive success within the society.

Extraordinary efforts would have to be made to attain this steady state of ethnic balance of power and resources. Interestingly, the ideology of Jewish-gentile coexistence has sometimes included the idea that the different ethnic groups develop a similar occupational profile and implicitly control resources in proportion to their numbers. If one adopts a cultural pluralism model involving free competition for resources and reproductive success, differences between ethnic groups are inevitable; from an evolutionary perspective, there is the very strong prediction that such differences will result in animosity from the losing groups. After emancipation there was a powerful tendency for upward mobility among Jews in Western societies, including a large overrepresentation in the professions as well as in business, politics, and the production of culture. Concomitantly there were outbreaks of anti-Semitism originating often among groups that felt left behind in this resource competition or who felt that the culture being created did not meet their interests. If the history of Judaism tells us anything, it is that self-imposed ethnic separatism tends to lead to resource competition based on group membership, and consequent hatred, expulsions, and persecutions. Assuming that ethnic differences in talents and abilities exist, the supposition that ethnic separatism could be a stable situation without ethnic animosity requires either a balance of power situation maintained with intense social controls, as described above, or it requires that at least some ethnic groups be unconcerned that they are losing in the competition.

Although multiculturalist ideology was invented by Jewish intellectuals to rationalize the continuation of separatism and minority-group ethnocentrism in a modern Western state, several of the recent instantiations of multiculturalism may eventually produce a monster with negative consequences for Judaism. It has been noted here that Jews have played a prominent role in the political left in this century. We have also seen that as a result of anti-Semitism among gentiles on the left and on the part of Communist governments, eventually Jews either abandoned the left or they developed their own brand of leftism in which leftist universalism was compatible with the primacy of Jewish identity and interests.

Gore Vidal (1986) is a prominent example of a gentile leftist intellectual who has been highly critical of the role of neoconservative Jews in facilitating the U.S. military buildup of the 1980s and allying themselves with conservative political forces to aid Israel—charges

interpreted as implying anti-Semitism because of the implication that American Jews place the interests of Israel above American interests. Vidal also suggests that neoconservatism is motivated by the desire of Jews to make an alliance with gentile elites as a defense against possible anti-Semitic movements emerging during times of economic crisis.

As anti-Semitism develops, Jews begin to abandon the very movements for which they originally provided the intellectual impetus. This phenomenon may also occur in the case of multiculturalism. Indeed, many of the most prominent opponents of multiculturalism are Jewish neoconservatives, as well as organizations such as the National Association of Scholars (NAS), which have a large Jewish membership. (The NAS is an organization of academics opposed to some of the more egregious excesses of feminism and multiculturalism in the university.) It may well be the case, therefore, that the Jewish attempt to link up with secular political ideologies that appeal to gentiles is doomed in the long run.

The present tendencies lead one to predict that unless the ideology of individualism is abandoned not only by the multicultural minorities (who have been encouraged to pursue their group interests by a generation of American intellectuals) but also by the European-derived peoples of Europe, North America, New Zealand, and Australia, the end result will be a substantial diminution of the genetic, political, and cultural influence of these peoples. It would be an unprecedented unilateral abdication of such power and certainly an evolutionist would expect no such abdication without at least a phase of resistance by a significant segment of the population. As indicated above, European-derived peoples are expected to ultimately exhibit some of the great flexibility that Jews have shown throughout the ages in advocating particular political forms that best suit their current interests. The prediction is that segments of the European-derived peoples of the world will eventually realize that they have been ill-served and are being ill-served both by the ideology of multiculturalism and by the ideology of de-ethnicized individualism.

14.9 Ideological Subversion

The following chapter the book "Love Letter to America" written Yuri Bezmenov (search this name on Youtube and you get an interview with the author of "The Creature of Jekyll Island"), also known as Thomas Schuman.

TOMAS SCHUMAN has been personally involved with the world-wide propaganda efforts of the Soviet regime. Like a true-life Winston Smith, from George Orwell's "1984", Tomas Schuman worked for for the communist equivalent of Orwell's Ministry of Truth -The Novosti Press Agency. Novosti, which means "News" in Russian, exists to produce slanted and false stories to plant in the foreign media. The term for this K.G.B. effort is "disinformation". Mr. Schuman was born under the name of Yuri Bezmenov in Moscow in 1939, the son of a senior officer in the Red Army. Consequently, he went to good schools. At the age of 17 he entered the Institute of Oriental Languages of Moscow

State University.

After graduating, he worked for Novosti, then spent two years in India as an interpreter and public relations officer with Soviet Refineries Constructions. He returned to Moscow in 1965 to work for Novosti, serving as Economic Editor for the Hindi, Urdu and English Editions of Sovietland Magazine. In 1969 he went back to India and continued propaganda efforts for Novosti in New Delhi, working out of the Soviet Embassy in a department called Research and Counter-Propaganda. Due to his growing disgust, he began to plan defection. In February of 1970 he disguised himself as a hippie complete with beads and wig and joined a tour group to escape to Athens. He contacted the United States Embassy and, after a long debriefing by U.S. Intelligence, was granted asylum and went to Canada. In Canada, he studied political science at the University of Toronto for two years, taught Russian language and literature and in 1972 was hired by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's International Service as a Producer/Announcer, broadcasting to the Soviet Union. The K.G.B. forced him out of the job in 1976, so he began free-lance journalism and worked on a variety of projects. Here are his words:

As a war-time child. I survived partly thanks to such "decadent capitalist" (as the Soviets say) things as "Spam" "meat, condensed milk and egg powder that were supplied to my country by the USA through the lend-lease program of World War II. In the Soviet Union we secretly but proudly called ourselves "the Spam generation". Too prosaic? Who cares about "Spam" "in today's USA, apart from "underprivileged" "welfare recipients? Well, for me these foods are not merely the nostalgic delight of my troubled childhood, but rather, a symbol of love from a friend when I was in need. No amount of communist propaganda against America has ever been able to convince me that the United States out to "colonize and exploit". I will tell you — many people have been more than willing to be "exploited" "the American way. For what other reason have thousands risked their lives, gone to unimaginable troubles, left behind their families their motherland and traditional ways of life to come to America? Have you ever heard of "illegal aliens" "risking their lives crossing the border at midnight into Socialist USSR? Or the "boat people" "swimming oceans and drowning by the thousands just to reach the shores of Communist China? Or defectors like me, leaving behind relative affluence and risking bullets in the back in order to join the "progressive workers paradise" "in Russia? No, we all come here to America, obviously willing to be "exploited by capitalists" "and enjoy "oppression" "together with you. Because we believe and KNOW — America IS A BETTER place.

I am writing this not to please you with words you want to hear. The rest of my message may be more unpleasant to you than even Communist propaganda, or more offensive than the speeches of "leaders" "in Kremlin. But as a true friend of America, I want to help. My dear friends, I think you are in big trouble. Whether you believe it or not, YOU ARE AT WAR. And you may lose this war very soon, together with all your affluence and freedoms, unless you start defending yourselves. I hope you have noticed on your color televisions that there is in fact war going on right now all over the planet. This war has many faces, but it's all the same — it's war. Some call it "national liberation

“, some title it “class struggle “or “political terrorism “. Others call it “anticolonialism “or “struggle for majority rule “. Some even come up with such fancy names as “war of patriotic forces “or “peace movement “. I call it World Communist Aggression. I know what I am talking about, because I was on the side of the aggressor before I decided to take YOUR side. I do not believe — I KNOW — that in this war no one is being “liberated, decolonised or made equal “, as Soviet doctrine proclaims. You may notice, if you give yourselves the trouble to observe, that the only “equality “and “liberation “this war produces is the equality of death and the “liberation “from freedom. Look at Russia, Poland, Hungary, Afghanistan — would you say the people of those countries celebrated and rejoiced when the Soviets brought them equality and liberation? Of course not. We must take a clear and honest look at what Soviet “liberation “actually means. This war of Communist World Aggression is not fought against some mythological “capitalists “as Communist propaganda claims. No, my dear friends, this war is fought against YOU — personally.

Communist wars of world aggression are not fought for liberty and equality. We have thousands of unequivocal examples of the horrendous human suffering, torture and mass death that occur after a Soviet “liberation “. The final stage of Communist aggression — military confrontation — has very little to do with rivalry for territorial or geopolitical gains in order to free and liberate. Communist world aggression is a total war against humanity and human civilization. In Communist propaganda terms, this is “the final struggle for the victory of Communism “. The driving force of this war has very little to do with natural aspirations of people for better lives and greater freedoms. If at all, these aspirations are being used and taken advantage of by the manipulators and progenitors of the war. The real driving force of this war of aggression is IDEOLOGY — something you cannot eat, wear or store for a “rainy day “. An integral part of this war of ideology is IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION — the process of changing the perception of reality in the minds of millions of peoples all over the world. The late comrade Andropov, the former head of the Soviet KGB called this war of Communist aggression, “the final struggle for the MINDS and hearts of the people “. The reason that I am so certain of the real goal of Communist aggression is that I was actually a part and an unwilling instrument of Soviet subversion tactics. Having been trained and used by the KGB for their global ideological subversion campaign, I have some firsthand knowledge about the people behind this war and the methods they use. I know very well the way the Communists, whom the Western media call “freedom fighters “and “rebels “, operate. I know their mentality and their methods, I know their ultimate goals, which are very far from the liberty, equality and freedom they verbally espouse. “What’s in it for Tomas Schuman, “you may ask. Well, I’ve asked myself. What do I get for defecting from the winning side (the Soviets) ... and joining the losers? (I hope I don’t have to tell you, that at least a dozen countries have succumbed to the Communists since my defection.) In reality, dear friends, I have gained nothing materially from my defection. What I have gained is a firm commitment to the United States as the last real frontier of freedom. This is it, dear Americans, your country (and mine now) will be the last to be “liberated “by Marxists, socialists,

and domestic “do-gooders “. If the “liberationists “succeed in bringing their “New Order “to America, chances are you and I will meet in front of a firing squad — or worse in a “re-education “forced labor camp in the Alaskan Peoples Democratic Republic.

My Life Story

I was born in Moscow in 1939 under the name of Yuri Bezmenov. My father was an officer of the Soviet Army General Staff. As inspector of the Land Forces, he was stationed in “fraternal countries “such as Mongolia, Cuba and East Germany. Were he alive today, he would most likely be checking the status of Soviet troops in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Syria, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua and the ever-growing number of other “liberated “countries of the world. I was brought up under the shadow of comrade Stalin, to the echo of the World War II. As a loyal and patriotically-minded young Communist, I loved my country, good or bad. However, unlike certain Western intellectuals and liberals, I did not require half a century to realize that the “leaders “of my country are self-imposed dictators — mass murderers, and that the ideology of Marxism- Leninism is an absolutely false system that produces none of the advantages or benefits of the “worker’s paradise “that it promises. It was a simple matter for me to compare the Soviet propaganda claims given to all Russian citizens of glorious “socialist achievements “with the surrounding realities — early morning bread lines, because we had so little to eat; the frequent arrests of “enemies of the people “and the omnipresent fear of the KGB.

Because of my war-time childhood spent in the Asian section of the USSR, I developed an early affection for the oriental way of life and at the age of 17 after graduating from elementary school, I entered the Institute of Oriental Languages, an affiliate of Moscow State University. The Institute was actually under the direct control of KGB and Communist Central Committee — an elitist nest for future Soviet diplomats, foreign correspondents and spies. At the Institute, while studying several foreign language and mass media, I was required to also take compulsory military training. During training, we students were taught how to play “strategic war games “using the maps of foreign countries. Civil Defense and anti-nuclear training were also essential parts of our education. In addition, we took “interrogation classes “which were designed to teach us how to interrogate prisoners of war. In particular, we were instructed to interrogate prisoners as to their reaction to a Soviet nuclear strike aimed at their country — it was for me a bizarre experience. Upon graduating, I was sent to India as a translator for the Soviet Economic Aid Group which was building oil refineries in two Indian states. Here, during my first foreign assignment, I realized the great discrepancy between my country’s proclaimed goals of “selfless fraternal cooperation “and the actual ruthless exploitation of India by Soviet neo-colonialists. As an example of this exploitation, the Soviets, in purchasing Indian manufactured goods, would pay the Indians only in rubles.

Unfortunately, rubles are non-convertible currency on the international market, meaning that the Indian manufacturer would be unable to purchase anything on the international

market with his Soviet rubles. On the other hand, the Soviets would take the Indian manufactured goods and sell them at a substantial profit on the international market for "hard currency" such as dollars or pounds which are easily negotiable. So basically, the Indian manufacturer received only a fraction of the actual worth of his product, while the Soviets reaped the rewards of their duplicity. Is it that the Indians are stupid, ignorant people, that they allow the Soviets to deceive them in this manner? On the contrary — for the most part, they are innocent victims of one of the world's most sophisticated con games — Ideological Subversion. They have been psychologically manipulated through media, politics, etc. into believing that the Soviets are their friends who are protecting them from the "Western imperialists." This same subversion game is being played all over the world — even in America, KGB influence in our media, politics and nearly every phase of our life has produced a growing conviction on the part of many Americans that we are the "bad guys" — again I have to remind you that to date, there has never been a single defection from the United States. The Soviets have produced an absolutely ludicrous global lie that people are believing — why? Because the tactics of ideological subversion work.

Even after witnessing the ruthless tactics used by my country I still naively hoped that things would turn out for the better eventually. After all, I was a product of the post-Stalin era of "thaw" and liberalization started by Krushchev. I believed in "Socialism with a human face". That faith was shattered irreparably only five years later, when I witnessed the brutal Soviet military intervention into "fraternal" Czechoslovakia in 1968. After completing my first assignment in India, in 1965 I was recalled to Moscow and immediately joined the "Novosti Press Agency (Novosti means "news" in Russian) — the biggest and most powerful propaganda, espionage and ideological front of the KGB. I was employed by Novosti as an apprentice for their classified department of 'Political Publications' (GRPP) under comrade Norman Borodin. After working a short time I discovered that about 75% of the Novosti's staffers were actually KGB officers; the other 25% were "co-optees", or KGB freelance writers / P.R. officers / informers like myself. The other interesting fact I discovered was that there was no "news" at Novosti. My main job, apart from writing, editing and translating propaganda materials to be planted in foreign media, was accompanying delegations of Novosti's guests — journalists, editors, publishers, writers, politicians and businessmen from foreign countries on tours of the USSR or to international conferences held in the Soviet Union. In actuality, as a freelance journalist, I did absolutely no writing or news coverage at all. After several months I was formally recruited by the KGB as an informer, while still maintaining my position as a Novosti journalist. My work with the KGB entailed combining my journalistic duties with the collection of intelligence data, and the spreading of "disinformation" to foreign countries for the purposes of Soviet propaganda and subversion. It was only a matter of time before the KGB realized that my personal friendships with guests of Novosti Press Agency could also be utilized for their operations.

Why did I allow myself to be recruited? There really is no simple answer. For one thing,

a Soviet journalist cannot simply say “no” to the KGB. If he wants to remain alive, free, pursue his career and travel abroad, he simply must cooperate with the KGB, or suffer the consequences. Secondly, apart from monetary and material gains, a Soviet journalist co-opted (hired) by the KGB has a rare chance to become IMPORTANT in his own country, and in 1965, the USSR was still my country. Many of my colleagues, both cynicists and true patriots, joined the KGB, naively believing that they could promote themselves to the higher positions of power, while maintaining their secretly kept moral principles and disguising their actual disgust of the system. By the time most of them realized that ‘power corrupts’ and that allegiance with the Soviet Communist power corrupts absolutely — it was too late. The majority of my former colleagues are now firmly entrenched in the ‘privileged class’ and their humanistic ideals have all been traded one by one for small comforts such as a private car (a rare thing in the USSR), a free apartment, a country house (“dacha “), free trips abroad and freedom to socialize with foreigners, none of which would be possible or available to the average Russian worker.

So despite my early dislike of the Soviet Communist system, I joined the KGB, hoping in some way to ‘outsmart them’, to play the game until I could see more clearly how to proceed. My rapid promotion followed. I was once again assigned to India, this time as a USSR press-officer and a ‘P. R.’ agent for the KGB. Because of my knowledge of India and her languages — Hindi and Urdu, I became deeply involved in the KGB operations in India. I was directed by my superiors to slowly but surely establish the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’ in India. In addition to the bribery and corruption of Indian officials, blackmail and intrusion into the internal affairs of India, the Soviets went one step further in their ‘brotherly assistance’ to India. In 1969 by a secret directive of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), all embassies of the USSR all over the world, including India, opened a new secret department innocently titled “Research and Counter-Propaganda Group “. I became a deputy chief of that department, working under a KGB officer, comrade. Valeri Neyev.

It did not take me long to discover that our group was engaged in , neither “research “nor “counter-propaganda “: behind locked doors we accumulated intelligence from various sources, including Indian informers and agents, regarding virtually EVERY important and politically significant citizen of India — members of Parliament, civil servicemen, military and public figures, media people, businessmen, university professors, radical or otherwise students and writers — in other words EVERYONE instrumental in shaping the PUBLIC OPINION and policies of the nation. Those who were “friendly “and ready to invite the Soviet expansionist policy into their own country were promoted to higher positions of power, affluence and prestige through various operations by KGB-Novosti. Large groups, of the so-called “progressive and sober-thinking “Indians were on a regular basis, generously supplied with duty-free booze from the embassy stocks. Soviet sympathizers were invited to the USSR for free trips and numerous “international conferences “where they not only received substantial sums of money in the form of “literary awards “or “Nehru Peace and Friendship “prizes, but were also medically treated for VD or hernias

acquired in the perpetual “class struggle “against “American imperialism “. Those who refused to be “flexible “and take a voluntary role in this cruel farce were thoroughly character-assassinated in the sensation-hungry media and press.

Let me give you an example of how the KGB uses the information it collects. One day in 1968, I was routinely scanning through the backlog of USA Information Service releases and classified documentation, generously supplied to us by our Indian and American “friends “. In one of the dispatches I read that the South Vietnamese city of Hue had been captured by the Hanoi Communists. When it was re-captured by the US Army and allied forces, only two days later, the CIA discovered to their horror that several thousand Vietnamese teachers, priests, Buddhists, businessmen, and educated citizens everyone who was “pro-American “, had been rounded up by the invaders and IN ONE NIGHT, taken out of the city limits and executed collectively. Some were shot. Others, with their hands tied by electric wire, were found with their skulls crushed-in by shovels and iron bars. “How could they possibly have located all of these people within only a few hours in a large city? “— the Americans wondered. I thought I knew the answer. Long before the invasion there was an extensive network of Communist informers working under the guidance of the Soviet embassy in Hanoi — that is under the KGB. The Communists filed every bit of information: addresses, personal habits, political affiliations, expressed ideas, unexpressed thoughts revealed in informal and private conversations, even the names and addresses of relatives, friends, even lovers and mistresses of the future victims of “liberation “. After reading the news release I was sick, physically, with the realization that the department I was working for in New Delhi was engaged in exactly the same activity that had been used in the city of Hue. I realized fully that I was a part of a heinous crime against our host country. Adding to my nausea, I discovered that some of our files contained data of a personal nature; intimate information such as “sexual preferences “e.g. homosexuality, of certain Indian VIPs — even radicals and Communists openly sympathetic to Soviet policies. Were they also listed for execution if a Soviet-backed revolution in India should occur?

My frustration was compounded by my KGB supervisor who coached me in a fatherly tone: “Don’t bother with these prostitutes, the Indian Communists Don’t waste your time with them. There is nothing more dangerous than disillusioned “true believers “in Communism. They turn into the most bitter enemies and counter-revolutionaries — aim higher - at respectable “conservative “well-established “capitalists “and pro-American elements! “So, as you can see, the KGB/ Soviets have absolutely no respect for the majority of their new “converts “. One event in particular that solidified my increasing horror of KGB tactics concerned one of my closest Indian friends, a journalist who represented one of the most influential newspapers in India. When I discovered that my friend had been targeted for a KGB character assassination campaign I felt a tremendous desire to escape from the USSR embassy immediately and to confide to my Indian friend the situation confronting him, and also my desire to break my ties with the KGB — which meant defection. However, such an impulse scheme could have hardly succeeded. The Indian

government, under strong pressure from the Soviet embassy, had adopted a law which stated that no defector from any country has a right of political asylum in ANY embassy in the territory of the Republic of India. This masterpiece of political hypocrisy had been created by Mrs. Indira Gandhi after Stalin's daughter Svetlana, defected to the West while residing in India. Because of this situation I knew full well that my defection would not be a simple matter, and as a result, it required a carefully thought-out plan. To be caught by the KGB while attempting defection would mean that I would be forcefully returned to Russia and imprisoned — perhaps worse. I therefore resolved to wait until I had formed a definite plan for my escape.

However my patience was running thin. One of the last straws for me was a story I heard from one of my KGB colleagues: I learned that the Soviet Union was importing Soviet trained subversives to East Pakistan in preparation for a revolution there. My colleague further informed me that Soviet cases marked "printed matter — to Dacca University "stored in the basement of the USSR consulate in Calcutta were accidentally discovered to contain, not university texts, but rather Kalashnikov guns (AK-47s) and ammunition for the anticipated communist revolution in Pakistan. This incident occurred in December of 1969. Two months later I "disappeared "from the USSR embassy in New Delhi. In order to avoid detection by the Indian Police and the KGB, I had disguised myself as an American "hippie ". This method of defection was actually a guaranteed success — no -KGB detective in his "right mind "would have thought to look for a missing Soviet diplomat among the crowds of long-haired, bearded, barefoot, hashishsmoking Americans who had invaded India in search of 'enlightenment'. And so I escaped to the West. I landed successfully in Canada in July 1970. There, I studied history and political science, taught Russian language and literature, and worked for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as an announcer/ producer for RadioCanada International (an equivalent of the 'Voice of America'). I was later forced to resign from my position with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation due to a complaint made by the USSR ambassador to Canada to the Canadian government stating that I was anti-Soviet. Realizing that I did not have the support of the Canadian government for having made my choice not to perform acts for the KGB and Soviet Russia that violated my sense of justice and right action; I came to America.

Presently I am a freelance writer and political analyst, trying, though not always successfully, to awaken the Western populace to the realities of life under the Soviet system and to the IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION that is being practiced upon them daily. It is my hope that this booklet, and the follow-up booklets that I am now writing will make clear to all who read them, the real facts behind the barrage of false media, ideas and information from the Soviet Union that represent the Communist state as a "workers paradise ". Believe me when I say, having lived through it — it was no paradise.

Prelude to Subversion

The art of duping the masses into doing things to their own disadvantage and making them believe it is “the will of people” is as ancient as mankind itself. The essence of subversion is best expressed in the famous Marxist slogan, (if you substitute “proletarians” for a more appropriate word): “Useful idiots of the world — UNITE! To achieve the desired effect, the subverter must first — make idiots out of normal people, and DIVIDE them, before turning the people into a homogenized mass of useful and united idiots. Tanks and missiles may or may not be needed at final stage. For the time being they are simply the means of terrorising people into inaction and submission. 500 years before Christ, the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu formulated the principle of subversion this way:


1. Cover with ridicule all of the valid traditions in your opponent’s country.
2. Implicate their leaders in criminal affairs and turn them over to the scorn of their populace at the right time;
3. Disrupt the work of their government by every means;
4. Do not shun the aid of the lowest and most despicable individuals of your enemy’s country.
5. Spread disunity and dispute among the citizens.
6. Turn the young against the old.
7. Be generous with promises and rewards to collaborators and accomplices.

Sound familiar? About 2500 years later we can read this very same instruction in a secret document, allegedly authored by the Communist International for their “young revolutionaries”. The document is titled “Rules of Revolution”:

1. Corrupt the young, get them interested in sex, take them away from religion. Make them superficial and enfeebled.
2. Divide the people into hostile groups by constantly harping on controversial issues of no importance.
3. Destroy people’s faith in their national leaders by holding the latter up for contempt, ridicule and disgrace.
4. Always preach democracy, but seize power as fast and as ruthlessly as possible.
5. By encouraging government extravagances, destroy its credit, produce years of inflation with rising prices and general discontent.
6. Incite unnecessary strikes in vital industries, encourage civil disorders and foster a lenient and soft attitude on the part of the government towards such disorders.
7. Cause breakdown of the old moral virtues: honesty, sobriety, self-restraint, faith in the

pledged word.

I can not vouch for authenticity of this document, which, according to American conservative media was captured by the Allied forces after WW II in defeated Germany, in Dusseldorf. But I can assure you, that these “rules “are almost a literal interpretation of those “theories and practices “which I learned from my KGB superiors and colleagues within the ‘Novosti’ Press Agency. Yes, I am well aware of the possibility, that nothing I write here is a “sensational revelation “to many of you. What I did was simply to structure my knowledge and experience with the Soviet subversion system into a simple and graphic record. To help you to get an overall picture of the SUBVERSION process, let me first outline for you the movement of a target nation from the state of “open society “to a “closed “one. This outline is taken from secret, not so secret and absolutely non-secret Marxist literature: An “open society “is the one you are living now. You can work in it, or choose not to work, have private property or have nothing at all, love it or leave it, criticize it without fear of being declared an “enemy of people. “It is a society, based on free individual initiative and the free market system.



All you have to do to “screw up “the status quo of a free nation, is to borrow ON E false idea from the ideology of a communist or totalitarian government. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen the idea of “egalitarianism “. “People born equal therefore must be equal “. Sounds great. But look at yourselves. Were you born equal? Some of you weighed 7 pounds at birth, others 6 or 5 . . . Are you NOW equal? In any way? Physically, mentally, emotionally, racially, spiritually? Some are tall and dumb, others — short, bald and clever. Now, let’s figure out what will happen if we LEGISLATE EQUALITY, and make the concept of “equality “a cornerstone and pillar of socioeconomical and political system. All right? You don’t have to be a great economist or sociologist to foresee that some of the people who are “less equal “would demand as much as those who are “more equal “BY LAW!

Aha, now you’ve got it. There will be some who get more for GIVING less and take advantage of those, who are even “less equal “, say, in the art of TAKING. And to avoid the squabble for “equal redistribution “you will have to introduce a THIRD FORCE — the State. Why? Because people were never equal, are not equal and if God wanted us

to be equal He would probably have made us equal. No. He provided a difference. “Vive la Difference! “— said the French before the French Revolution. And they were right.

The beauty of the best, most successful political/ economic system, created by the Fathers of America has nothing to do with LEGISLATED or enforced equality. The American Republic is based on the principle of EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES for UNEQUAL and very much DIFFERENT and diverse individuals to develop their abilities and to coexist in mutually beneficial cooperation. And that is entirely different story. That much I knew even from the Soviet textbooks of American history. Now let's move faster. People who have declared themselves to be equal will inevitably come to expect more for their individual needs, which sooner or later will tragically come to conflict with the “unequal “reality. That will automatically produce discontent. Unhappy and discontent masses are less productive than those who are happy being what they are and making the best of it. Decreased productivity, as we all know, leads to such unpleasant things as inflation, unemployment and recession. These, in turn, cause social unrest and instability, both economical and political.

Chronic instability breeds radicalism as a means of solving problems. Radicalism is the precondition of a power struggle which may (and has often) resulted in violent and forceful replacements of power structures. If the situation deteriorates badly, this replacement takes ugly forms of internal civil war, or revolution, or invasion of a “friendly and fraternal “neighbor, and finally ends up in the traditional way — namely, state control. Depending on maturity of a nation, and the amount (or absence) of common sense, this control will manifest itself in the creation of a “closed society “— the opposite of what we had in the beginning. Borders are closed, censorship of the media is established, “irritants “and “enemies “of the state are executed, etc. This is my 'simplistic' and highly 'unscientific' outline of the events which have happened in many countries of the world. Any nation is able to do this to herself without any help from comrades Andropov and Brezhnev and their numerous KGB agents. Any one of you can easily observe this vicious chain of events by simply reading your newspapers regularly or even watching the TV.

The four Stages of Subversion

What many of you do not see, is the second “chain “of events which I graphically represent in the following chart of the FOUR STAGES OF SUBVERSION: 1) DEMORALIZATION, 2) DESTABILIZATION, 3) CRISIS , 4) “NORMALIZATION “.

What has all this to do with the KGB? Very simple: these are the 'most favourable conditions' listed in any Marxist textbook of revolutionary struggle. I have simply placed them in chronological order and divided them into three vertical columns: the areas of application, the methods of subversion and the expected (or achieved) results. In the context of the USA, most of these nasty things are done to America by Americans . . . with the IDEOLOGICAL help of the Communist subverters. Most of the actions are overt, legitimate, and easily identifiable. The only trouble is — they are “stretched

in time “. In other words, the process of subversion is such a long-term process that an average individual, due to the short time-span of his historical memory, is unable to perceive the process of subversion as a CONSISTENT and willful effort. That is exactly how it is intended to be: like the small hand of your watch. You know it moves, but you CAN NOT SEE it moving.

The main principle of ideological subversion is TURNING A STRONGER FORCE AGAINST ITSELF. Just like in the Japanese martial arts: you do not stop the blow of a heavier more powerful enemy with an equally forceful blow. You may simply hurt your hand. Instead you catch the striking fist with your hand and PULL the enemy in the direction of his blow until he crashes into a wall or any other heavy object in his way. America is obviously a “stronger force “that Communism is unable to defeat. But it is possible to conquer this nation using the preconditions I have described, created by Americans themselves, and diverting America’s attention away from these mortally dangerous preconditions. The situation is similar to a house, the owners of which have stored explosives and inflammable materials INSIDE. To destroy this house the enemy does not have to intrude physically into it. It is enough to start a fire next door and wait till the wind blows in the right direction. Meanwhile the enemy may “throw in some great ideas “for the owners to argue about in order to take their attention off the actual fire: environmental protection, gay liberation or emancipation of house pets are the types of non-critical arguments that divert America’s attention from the real danger. Smart people would notice the fire and remove the inflammable objects and materials BEFORE the house catches the fire. Useful idiots will keep arguing about whether it is constitutional or not to pay firefighters, or the equality of husband and wife in domestic chores (who should remove the combustibles), until the actual explosion blows their enfeebled brains all over the neighbourhood.

Now, let us get back to my chart. I know it is going to be somewhat boring. But my purpose is not to entertain you but to explain what my former KGB bosses consider important for your “liberation “.

STAGE ONE: DEMORALIZATION

This process has many names: psychological warfare, ideological aggression, propaganda warfare etc. The KGB calls it “Active Measures “. Since my defection from the USSR embassy in 1970, I have been trying desperately to explain to the Western media, politicians, “intelligence community “and your “academic-sovietologists “that Active Measures are more important and dangerous than classic espionage — James Bond style. At long last, in 1983, in his new book “KGB Today “John Barron accurately and excellently described the process of demoralization, basing some of his analysis on the data supplied by another KGB defector, KGB official, Stanislav Levchenko — incidentally, my former schoolmate from the Oriental Studies Institute who was later stationed in Tokyo, Japan under the guise of correspondent with “New Time “magazine.

Stanislav Levchenko succeeded where I failed: he brought the Active Measures to the

attention of American public. The purpose of this process is to change your perception of reality to such an extent, that even despite an abundance of information and evidence about the danger of Communism, you are unable to come to sensible conclusions in your own interests and in the interests of your nation. John Barron ominously titled one chapter of his book, dedicated to analysis of the Active Measures, "Reality Upside Down". Excellent title! This is exactly what my KGB gurus of subversion in 'Novosti' Press Agency taught me. One of the main tactics in this process is to develop, establish and consistently enforce a set of 'double standards': one in relation to the USSR, another to the USA.

Western analysts have already pointed out the diverse tactics of "Active Measures. "Some of these were exactly the ones I was trained to use while working with foreign delegations in Moscow and the USSR embassy in New Delhi: overt and covert propaganda; use of "Agents of Influence, "faked 'International Forums' created by KGB/ Novosti to bring the atmosphere of legitimacy and respectability to Soviet operations; . provoking and manipulating mass demonstrations and assemblies; spreading rumours and 'reliable information from circles close to Politbureau'; forgeries of USA Information Service press-releases; planting phony stories in local media; creating hundreds of tabloid newspapers subsidized by the USSR embassy through front organizations and fake 'advertising' companies for the purpose of 'legally' financing groups of subversives and radicals, etc. Other tactics, such as sabotage, character assassination of 'stubborn' Indians resisting Soviet subversion, terrorism and even occasional killings of 'reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries' for the psychological effect of 'paralyzing with fear' — these also were used by my KGB colleagues from other departments of the USSR embassy.

I am less familiar with these aspects of the subversion process. My role as a 'legitimate' and overt public relations man and a 'charismatic' socializer was directed by the KGB mainly at the initial stage of subversion. After a certain period of befriending and 'cultivating' foreigners, I had to provide my KGB supervisor with my 'psychological assessment' of the target individual (or group) and pass them over to the "professionals" for further 'processing' and recruitment. Nevertheless, I was able to reconstruct the overall picture of the process rather accurately, and, unlike the Western 'sovietologists', come to more systematic and logical description of subversion. What I offer you now is a chart as simple as a multiplication table and as complex as calculus. This is the first time this chart has ever been published, in its entirety.

Let us start with the first stage of DEMORALIZATION. It takes about 15 to 20 years to demoralize a nation. Why that many (or few)? Simple: this is the minimum number of years needed to 'educate' ONE GENERATION of students in a target country (America, for example) and expose them to the ideology of the subverter. It is imperative that any sufficient challenge and counter-balance by the basic moral values and ideology of this country be eliminated. In absence of ANY cohesive and consistent national ideology, the task of the subverter becomes even easier. In the USA, as we all know, there is MULTIPLICITY of ideas and ideologies today, without proper emphasis on the main

The Subversion Process		
Areas	Methods	Results
Ideas 1. Religion 2. Education 3. Media 4. Culture	Demoralization (15 to 20 Years) Politicize, Commercialize, Entertainment Permissiveness, Relativity Monopolize, Manipulate, Discredit, Non-Issues False Heroes and Role Models	Death Wish Ignorance Uninformed Myopia Addictive Fads, "Mass"
Structure 1. Law and Order 2. Social Relations 3. Security 4. Internal Politics 5. Foreign	Legislative, not Moral Rights vs. Obligations Intelligence, Police, Military Party, Antagonisms Salt. . . Friends	Mistrust "Justice" Less Individual Response Defenselessness Disunity Isolation
Life 1. Family, Society 2. Health 3. Race 4. Population 5. Labor	Break Up Sports, Medicare, Junk Food Lower the Uppers, Bible? Genetics vs. Environment De-Land, Urbanize Unions vs. Society	No Loyalty (State) Enfeebled Masses Hatred, Division Alienation Victimization
1. Power Struggle 2. Economy 3. Society Fiber, Law 4. Foreign	Destabilization (2 to 5 Years) Populism, Irresponsible Power Struggle Destruction of Bargaining Process Grass Roots Participation Isolation, Multi-Nations, and Central Comm.	Big Brother Yield to Big Brother Mobocracy Prestige, Belligerent, Encirclement
Crisis (2 to 6 Months)		
Normalization		By Tomas Schuman

Figure 14.2: This chart shows the four stages of Soviet ideological subversion: demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization. The methods used by the subverter in the different areas of life produce their desired results in a country that does not resist the subversion process.

and basic American ideology of the original republic and the free market system. It is not even considered 'intellectual' or fashionable these days to subscribe entirely to this 'outmoded' set of ideas. To be successful, the process of subversion at the stage of DEMORALIZATION must be always and only a TWO-WAY street which means that the target nation MUST be made a RECIPIENT — passive or active — of the IDEAS of the subverter. Democracy is by definition a RECIPIENT of a multiplicity of ideologies and values, whether good or bad. Unfortunately 'bad' ideas are often proven and revealed only after a long period of time, during which many have absorbed them and allowed them to change their nation's attitudes and behaviour. Ancient Japanese rulers understood this principle very well when they virtually ISOLATED their nation from ANY foreign influence — good, bad or neutral. Imperial Japan was 'preserved' in its own set of historical values long enough to bring up a mature and morally stable nation able to make the change to an entirely new technological civilization with negligible damage to national fibre. More than

that: the Japanese, although reluctantly, opened up to Western values and surpassed the West in the shortest possible historical span since the World War II, becoming one of the greatest industrialized and technologically advanced powers in the world. Without such 'maturity' a nation may illconceive even the most favourable foreign influence which is clearly demonstrated by; a number of 'decolonized' Third World countries prematurely embracing parliamentary democracy.

But if and when an outside influence is purposely ill-intended, an immature nation — or a nation with a neglected indigenous ideology (America) — automatically becomes a recipient of SUBVERSION in its early stage of DEMORALIZATION. The successful demoralization is an IRREVOCABLE process, at least for another generation. Why? Let us take an example: the semiliterate and unstable American generation of the 'crazy' 1960's is now approaching the age of 40. These people, who were too preoccupied with protesting the Vietnam war, the drug/ rock music scene, taking part in 'love-ins' etc., to study and prepare for assuming their civil responsibilities, are now in positions of power and decision-making in government, business, media, social life, entertainment (Hollywood), military, and intelligence services. Not all of them? OK, some of them are. You are STUCK with them, until they retire or resign. You can not fire them — it's against union regulations. You cannot, unlike the USSR, send them to Alaska, after declaring them 'enemies of people'. You can not even openly and effectively criticize them — they have invaded the media and control public opinion. Unless you want to be called 'McCarthyist', you cannot change their attitudes and mores. At this age people are usually 'set' in their ways as individuals. YOU ARE STUCK with them. THEY change your attitudes and opinions, they navigate the domestic and foreign affairs, they are making decisions and choices for YOU, whether you like it or not.

To change the direction of America's future and to return to the basic American values, proven to be efficient and productive for almost 200 years of historically unprecedented freedom and affluence, you have to educate a NEW generation of Americans, this time in the spirit of patriotism and CAPITALISM. All right, you don't want to 'return'. You'd rather have something new and progressive AND constructive, to make America once again respected and loved all over the world, so that the recipients of the U.S. aid no longer shout 'Yankee Go Home'? In any case, even if you start the education of a NEW generation of Americans RIGHT THIS MINUTE, it will take you the next 15 to 20 years to raise this new generation to the levels of power and authority. You may reduce this period of time if you can make an enormous ALL-NATION effort in an atmosphere of prevailing UNITY and CONSENSUS. It will take a miracle (or another national disaster, such as a new world war, God forbid) to make Americans embrace ONE American ideology and to act in ONE direction after decades of disunity, dispute, partisan antagonisms and self-castigation. Therefore, let's be realistic: the DEMORALIZATION, whether self-inflicted or imported, is usually an IRREVERSIBLE — for one generation at least — process.

The three Levels of Demoralization

Now, let us see the same stage of demoralization from the standpoint of the SUBVERTER. Communist manipulators divide the areas of APPLICATION of their efforts into THREE LEVELS. The process of demoralization operates simultaneously on all three levels, which I call for the sake of simplicity: 1) the level of IDEAS (consciousness); 2) the level of STRUCTURES (socio-political set up of a nation); and 3) the level of LIFE (which includes all the areas of MATERIAL existence of a nation, the 'fibre of life' so to say). Level One: Ideas Rule The World. The level of IDEAS, the highest level of subversion, affects such vital areas as religion, education, media, and culture, to name just a few of the most important ones. If we look back in history of mankind, we may notice that the greatest upheavals and changes were caused by IDEAS, by faiths and beliefs, not by KNOWLEDGE or THINGS. Few people sacrifice their comforts and lives for such trivial things as a new car. Scientific knowledge seldom generates strong collective emotions. Many scientists have preferred life and affluence to death for scientific truth. I have never heard of a man who would staunchly face a firing squad for the sake of defending the truth of the Law of Gravity or $2 \times 2 = 4$. But FAITH in the seemingly irrelevant (at the time) and immaterial teachings of Jesus Christ generated such tremendous MORAL FORCE in MILLIONS of human beings for the past TWO THOUSAND YEARS, that people willingly and happily accept violent death and tortures rather than deny their belief in Christ!

Communism and its Marxist- Leninist dogma, according to some thinkers (Dr. George Steiner for one), is another distorted form of FAITH, able to inspire martyrdom in millions. Substituting the traditional values of the Judeo-Christian heritage with this Marxist-Satanic faith is one of the basic principles of subversion at the stage of DEMORALIZATION — the highest and most effective level of IDEAS. The methods are as primitive as they are predictable. You do not have to be a graduate of a KGB school or Harvard University to figure out what kind of INTERACTION between the subverter (KGB) and target (American brains) occurs on this level. All the SUBVERTER — be it Andropov's KGB or any other purposeful group or organization hell-bent on the idea of a "New World Order"— has to do is to study the areas where your nation's IDEAS could be eroded and substituted, and then slowly but consistently affect these areas by sending infiltrating Agents of Influence to inject new ideas, disseminate propagandist literature, and encourage self-destructive tendencies. All subverter has to do to remove the spiritual backbone of America is to help you to POLITICIZE, COMMERCIALIZE and 'ENTERTAINMENT-ALIZE' the dominant religions. There are many other contributing factors the subverter can also take advantage of, such as the development and spreading of various religious cults, including Satanic and Death cults; preaching moral relativity and removing religion (and prayer, ANY prayer) from schools; creating 'personality cults' in religion whereby the preacher becomes the center and object of divine worship, not God (often your religious charlatans claims to be 'incarnations' of God, or even God Himself) etc.

I have selected the above three main methods because I am most familiar with them. These methods were used by myself and my KGB-Novosti colleagues and these methods have proven to be sufficiently efficient. We did not have to bother with such silliness for example as recruiting Billy Graham and forcing him to tell outrageous lies about “the existence of religious freedom in the Soviet Union“ in state-run churches in Moscow. Let’s start with the most ‘innocent’ method of destroying religion, namely, making it ENTERTAINING. To attract people AND MONEY to ‘established’ religious organizations some churches have literally become theaters conducting variety shows featuring celebrities from the entertainment ‘industry’ who perform for ‘fees’. The KGB Agents of Influence may or may not have to physically manipulate these entertainment arrangements. The indiscriminate choice of the ‘celebrities’ for these church ‘performances’ is usually quite pleasing to the KGB. A group of rock or pop-musicians with a message of ‘social-justice’ sugar-coated in popular ‘spiritual’ tunes can be actually more helpful to the KGB than someone standing in the pulpit preaching Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The sugar-sweet messages of social equality from the crooning mouths of the entertainers is quite enough to accomplish the aims of the KGB without any overt activity on their part.

COMMERCIALIZATION of religion does the same thing. If the church has to SOLICIT your money and remind you over and over again in every TV show to contribute (with telephone numbers to pledge donations), that only means and infers that there is something basically wrong with your faith. Faithful people do not have to be ASKED for money, they tithe to their churches voluntarily and eagerly. Unhealthy competition for donations between various ‘electronic churches’ does two things beneficial to the subverter: (KGB): 1) it makes religion dependent on the most successful ‘salesmen’ of God (and these salesman may not necessarily be, they DONT HAVE to be, of the highest moral standards) thus, truly moral, God -centered people are turned off by organized religion and 2) it EMPTIES regular churches, where you have to practice your religion by personal physical presence and participation and involvement. All the subverter has to do now is to keep on further discrediting the main body of the church, by harping at religion in general as “just another means of the capitalist exploitation of masses, and a profit-oriented opiate of the people“. And the Soviet propaganda, and its fronts such as ‘Novosti’ Press Agency does exactly that, and quite successfully, through thousands of ‘liberal’ and ‘leftist’ media establishments in the USA.

Politicizing religion is the most efficient method of demoralizing a target nation. Once a nation starts giving to Caesar what belongs to God, and getting God involved in such things as ‘social justice’ and partisan political squabbles, it predictably loses what religion calls mercy and the grace of God. To put it in ‘atheistic’ terms, a target country allows the subverter to use the area of moral values for dissemination and enforcement of amoral ideas and policies. The most powerful instrument of this process is an organization called World Council of Churches, infiltrated by the KGB to such extent, that it is hard to distinguish, these days, a priest from a spy. Being a public relations officer for Novosti, I accompanied many foreign members of the WCC during their visits to the USSR. Some

of them struck me as individuals pathologically unable to say or hear truth. They were simply allergic to any facts or opinions which would 'undermine' their 'spiritual' affiliation with the Soviet manipulators. Archbishop and president (!) Macarios of Cyprus was one such 'religious' visitor. Skillfully combining both God's and Caesar's things, Macarios was extremely effective in bringing the desperately needed air of legitimacy and 'holiness' to the junta of the Soviet mass murderers and oppressors of religion. His photogenic presence at various 'international forums' in Moscow greatly promoted ACCEPTABILITY of the Soviet influence in the 'non-aligned' and 'developing' countries.

When, after my defection to the West, I find Trotskyite publications in a United Church of Canada, or see Nicaraguan Catholic Church 'fathers' with Soviet-made Kalashnikov machine guns hung over their church robes, or read about 'humanitarian' aid from the American Council of Churches given to African mass-murderers and terrorists, who were trained in my old country by the KGB, I do not 'suspect' I KNOW these things to be what they are — direct results of the Communist SUBVERSION of religion. I do not need any 'evidence' of 'links' between the KGB and the church. The complete confusion of God-related and politically subverted related goals are obvious. In the extreme left column of my chart you can see the RESULTS of DEMORALIZATION in each individual area on each level of subversion. The result of the demoralization of religion is a phenomenon referred to as the "death wish". This expression is borrowed from a book by a Soviet dissident writer, Igor Shafarevich, titled "Socialism as a Historical Phenomenon". (YMCA Press, Paris, 1977) Dr. Shafarevich in analyzing the 'dead' civilizations of Egypt, Maya, Mohenjo-Dara, Babylon, etc., comes to an ominous conclusion: EVERY ONE OF THESE CIVILIZATIONS DIED WHEN PEOPLE REJECTED RELIGION AND GOD, AND TRIED TO CREATE 'SOCIAL JUSTICE' ALONG THE SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES. Thus, Socialism, according to Shafarevich, may be a manifestation of an inborn human instinct of SELF-DESTRUCTION, if unrestrained — leading ultimately to PHYSICAL DEATH OF ALL MANKIND.

'Mass' education

This is another area of subversion at the stage of demoralization. The Marxist-Leninist concept of education emphasizes 'environment' and 'mass' character of education over individual abilities and quality. When American media enthusiastically reports (repeating Soviet propaganda cliches) about 'achievements of Soviet science', they usually obscure the IDEOLOGICAL aspects and purposes of the Communist system of education. 'Massiveness' and 'universality' of education attracts Western sociologists and governmental bureaucracies alike. For the 'developing' nations this seems to be the easiest short-cut to many contemporary problems. The Western public seldom receives the explanation of THE PRICE of the state-controlled Socialist-type education: political conformity to dictatorship, ideological brainwashing, lack of individual initiative in 'educated masses', lagging behind in development of science and technology. It is a commonly known fact that most of the Soviet 'technological marvels' are stolen, bought or 'borrowed' from the West. Most of the scientific and technological research in the USSR is 'productive' only

and always in the most destructive area: the military. My motherland is still, after more than half century of 'victorious Socialism', a country without even common household refrigerators, and yet boasts of their 'space exploration' and tremendous military might, which have done absolutely nothing to improve the day to day life of Soviet citizens.

The American romance with state-run education as encouraged by KGB subverters has already produced generations of graduates who cannot spell, cannot find Nicaragua on a world map, cannot THINK creatively and independently. I wonder if Albert Einstein would have arrived at his Theory of Relativity if he had been educated in one of today's American public schools. Most likely he would have 'discovered' marijuana and variant methods of sexual intercourse instead. Wouldn't you agree that KGB sponsored demoralization is no? going to produce the dynamic, talented and fruitful young Americans of the future? Contemporary American permissiveness and moral relativity in education have greatly facilitated Soviet ideological subversion tactics. The main methods of Soviet DEMORALIZATION of American education are:

1. Student Exchanges whereby American students and professors go to Moscow and are exposed to ideological brainwashing sometimes lacking the proper education that would allow them to assess the Soviet information they receive objectively.
2. Flooding of campus bookstores with Marxist and Socialist literature published both in the USSR and by domestic 'fellow travellers';
3. International seminars and conferences with Soviet participation, where Soviet propaganda seldom is balanced by opposing viewpoints;
4. Infiltration of schools and universities by radicals, leftists, and simply 'disturbers', often functioning unknowingly under the direct guidance of KGB Agents of Influence.
5. Establishing numerous 'student' newspapers and magazines, staffed with Communists and sympathizers;
6. Organizing 'study groups' and 'circles' for dissemination of Soviet propaganda and Communist ideology.

The eventual result is very predictable: ignorance combined with anti-Americanism. That's good enough for the KGB at this stage of subversion.

Lords of Public Opinion

The American media is a willing recipient of Soviet subversion. I know this, because I worked with American journalists and correspondents in Moscow while on the Soviet side, and after my defection to the West. People habitually refer to the American media as 'free', ignoring the obvious and commonly known fact that most of the most powerful media in the USA, is already MONOPOLIZED both financially and ideologically by what are referred to as 'liberals'. American media 'chains' BELONG to fewer and fewer owners, who, do not seem to mind that the media is being almost totally 'liberalized'. Liberalism,

in its old classical sense, means above all, respect to individual opinion and tolerance to opposing views. However, in my own experience, communist defectors who have requested and sometimes literally begged, to have stories of their life in the Soviet Union told to the American people via the major American media have been completely ignored.

One of the most devastating methods of Soviet subversion in American media is the DISCREDITING of authors like myself and the information and opinion of those who come up with clear evidence of Communist crimes against mankind. This method is well described in my forthcoming book entirely dedicated to the activity of the 'Novosti' Press Agency. Introduction of NON-ISSUES is another powerful method of demoralizing at the level of IDEAS. It will take another full size book to describe in detail this method. Suffice it will be here to give a brief definition of NON-ISSUES. An issue, the solution of which creates more and bigger problems for majority of a nation, even though it may benefit a few, is a non-issue (civil rights of homosexuals is not an issue; defending sexual morality is the larger, real issue).

The main purpose of non-issues and the devastating result of their introduction is the SIDE-TRACKING of public opinion, energy (both mental and physical), money and TIME from the constructive solutions. Soviet propaganda elevated the art of infiltrating and emphasizing non-issues in American public life to the level of actual state policy.

Addictive 'mass culture'

Years ago, when I was scanning through a pile of Western newspapers in Novosti's Moscow headquarters, I came across a column written by a Canadian writer, Gregory Clark in the "Toronto Star". Here it is in full. I have saved it for my files;

"If I were a Communist agent in America with millions of dollars to spend annually I would not waste it in bribing public servants to give away state secrets. But I would lavish and encourage the sleazy tune-smiths of that region to turn out more and more garbage 'culture' . . . Gaggled-headed and obscure musicians would be helped to prominence. I would seek out the more questionable publishers of the dirtier paperbacks and slip them a few hundred thousand so they could set up more respectable head offices. Wherever trend shows towards the beat generation I would offer it a helping hand. Anything that prompted the insubordination of teenagers, anything that contributes to the confusion and exasperation of parents would be most liberally endowed. The basic intention of my spending would be to break down the discipline, encourage relaxation of authority of every kind so as to build up, in as short time as possible, an adult generation that could easily go out of control. America would look desperately around for any kind of discipline to rescue them and THERE — pretty as a picture, would be Communism, the most iron-fisted discipline since Sparta. The victory would be bloodless . . . Except of course in concentration camps, torture, prisons, and few things like that. But nobody would know about that because of censorship of the press."

This was written in 1959! The accuracy of this description of OUR activity stunned me. We had just completed 'helping a gaggled-headed' Communist entertainer, Yves Montand

to 'prominence' in Moscow and were halfway through with publicly elevating 'obscure' Indian filmmaker — Raj Kapoor to 'fame'. The editorial offices of Novosti were teaming with 'sleazy' foreign singers, poets, writers, artists, musicians and 'intellectuals' coming to my country for support in their 'progressive struggle' against their own 'decadent capitalist' societies ... There is not much I can add to that statement of a wise Canadian columnist today. Yes, KGB encourages DEMORALIZATION of America through the 'mass culture' by relying upon the help of the "useful idiots" of the entertainment business. No, the Beatles, Punks and Michael Jackson are not on the KGB payroll. They are on YOUR payroll. All the KGB had to do is to slowly and gradually CHANGE YOUR ATTITUDES and kill your RESISTANCE to the demoralizing addiction your kids call 'music', make it acceptable, NORMAL; make it a part of 'American culture' where it does not belong and never did.

The second Level of Demoralization: Structures

There is a Russian proverb which says: "The sly head gives no rest to the arms". Let us see what Communist subversion does to your "arms" — the socio/ political/ economical STRUCTURES of America. The areas of application for demoralizing American structures are: 1. Judicial and Law-enforcement system; 2. Public organizations and institutions dealing with RELATIONS between individuals, groups and classes of the society; 3. Security and defense organs; 4. Internal political parties and groups; 5. Foreign policy formulating bodies both governmental and non-governmental ("think-tanks", academia, "sovietology advisors" etc.) In the area of "Law and Order", the method of demoralization is to promote and enforce the prevalence of the "legalistic" approach over the "moral" one. Several generations of American lawyers and law-makers, graduating from the 'liberal' (that is LEFTIST, Socialist- oriented) schools, after long-time exposure to the Socialist IDEOLOGY, have already created an atmosphere in the U.S. judicial system whereby "underprivileged" criminals are treated as a "victims" of the "cruel American society", and the real victim (the law-abiding society) is turned into defenseless and very underprivileged citizens and taxpayers, PAYING for a comparatively comfortable life of the criminal in or outside prison. The result is as predictable as it is desirable for the subverter: MISTRUST of the American population towards their own judicial and law-enforcement system, and people demanding harsher punishments and stricter CONTROLS in order to fight crime. And what could be better than Soviet or Communist-type control? Even your 'liberal' media claims that there is no street crime in Moscow and no drug problem in the USSR.

Similarly, in the area of social life, by encouraging you to put your individual RIGHTS over your OBLIGATIONS (any obligations — private, financial, moral, patriotic etc.) the subverter achieves the desired effect: a society composed of IRRESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS, each one "doing his own thing", and acting according to the "law of jungle". Such subversion of society is the first step to tyranny. To demoralize America's PROTEC-

TIVE FORCES it is enough to make your kids call the police “pigs” and “fascists” for a decade, disband police agencies watching over subverters and radicals by calling them “spies” (that is exactly what American Union of Civil Liberties did), stage campaign after campaign of discreditation and “investigation” of the wrongdoings” of the police, and in 20 years you arrive at the present situation, when the majority of civilian population of this nation is virtually without civil laws or protection from murderers, lunatics, criminals, etc. Can you now expect your police and civil authorities to protect you and your family in case of terrorist attack or a major civil disturbance?

The American FBI and CIA have had no better treatment. Americans are MADE to believe that your own security agencies pose more danger than the Soviet KGB. There were dozens of “revelations” and exposes on the CIA during the last 10 to 15 years. But there was not a SINGLE public trial of any Soviet agent of the KGB caught in the USA “red-handed”. There were numerous expulsions of Soviet ‘diplomats’ yes. But an equal or greater number of them came to America to replace their ‘fallen comrades’. There is not a SINGLE law in America which could be used to legally persecute KGB agents for ideological subversion. But there is a law that prevents your CIA from using YOUR media to vindicate their acts to protect YOU against the KGB subversion. Your media and your Hollywood entertainers lovingly repeat every fabrication of Soviet propaganda regarding the CIA ‘atrocities’, mixing it with truth, half-truth and blatant lie. Demoralizers like Larry Flint regularly entertain the public with juicy stories about ‘CIA assassinations’ sandwiched between pornographic pictures in his magazine. Do you remember when you saw an American film or read a book about the ‘good CIA’? I do not imply that pornographer Flint or members of Rockefeller commission on CIA are on the KGB payroll. But obviously pornography, as well as political prostitution pays. It sells ‘Hustler’ magazine, it sells politicians . . . and it kills the security of America. Criticism of the KGB does not pay. In fact, critics of KGB subverters may get killed in the process. What are you, my dear Americans? A nation of masochists and cowards? When you read and listen to all this dirt poured upon your security agencies by the media and politicians, can’t you realize, that the most just and factual criticism of the CIA is wrongly addressed? Security agencies of America (unlike the KGB) are INSTRUMENTS in the hands of a nation and her elected POLITICIANS. One should not blame an instrument, when it is the OPERATOR’S fault. If the instrument malfunctions — CORRECT it, and don’t use a hammer where a fine screwdriver is needed.

Very often American media presents a picture of CIA and FBI as a ‘mirror reflection’ of the KGB and its ‘fraternal services’. False. The KGB is a POWER which systematically and ruthlessly MURDERED about SIXTY MILLION of my countrymen, and still engages in the killing of innocent defenseless people all over the world. How many were killed by the CIA? Do numbers (and ‘quality’ too) matter at all to you? Or was comrade Stalin right, when he said that ONE person shot is a tragedy, but 1 million is statistics Now let’s look at how you treat your military. What is the image of the military presented to you and the rest of the world in the American press and the electronic media? If there is

a U.S. general, he is called a trigger-happy 'warmonger', a 'hawk' and 'aggressor'. One of the most popular TV series — M.A.S.H. — presents your military as a bunch of very humorous, hysterically funny bunch of psychotics, queers, alcoholics and otherwise rather unruly characters. Recently I saw a film titled "Rage", where the Pentagon is depicted as a cruel experimenter, testing chemical weapons on unsuspecting American farmers. And it is shown on TV exactly at the very same time when Soviets are using chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Laos, and provide the same to their Iraqi 'brothers' for their fraternal genocide in Persian Gulf. Have you EVER seen a movie or a TV series about THAT? Every American student knows the name of the Vietnamese village Mi-Lai and what it stands for, namely, - an "American war crime." Do you remember the name of the Soviet pilot who shot down the Korean passenger airliner with 269 passengers aboard, including some 60 Americans and a US senator? Do you remember the name of that senator? Does anybody in America EVER learn from American media the names of thousands of Cambodian and Afghani villages TOTALLY EXTERMINATED by the Soviet military? Where is Jane Fonda and Dr. Spock, who used to express so much concern and love for Vietnamese and Cambodians when the US military was there?

The 'double standard' applied and enforced and LEGITIMIZED by the manipulators of public opinion in the USA is a direct result of the long-term process of the DEMORALIZATION of the IMAGE of the US MILITARY in the minds of millions all over the world. The result? Study the chart...

'Quiet Diplomacy' or surrender?

There are hundreds of volumes written about the ways Communists use foreign relations for their purposes. There are NONE which reveal the link between the failures of American diplomacy and the process of demoralization. From time to time defectors from the Communist side, such as Arkady Shevchenko, the USSR representative in the UN, give breath-taking accounts on how the Communists are using 'diplomacy' for subversion. And yet all the crowds of "experts" and "kremlinologists" are seemingly unable to put the pieces together and to raise their voices AGAINST dealing with the Communists in a 'diplomatic' way. Many public figures have noted that most of Americans do not want to hear unpleasant things. Politicians in the USA know this. So does the KGB. Every American administration has contributed to the process of DEMORALIZATION of their own foreign policy by continuously negotiating and SIGNING "peace treaties" From the "Lend Lease" to the "Helsinki Accord" to the "SALT" treaties, creating false expectations and voter complacency and NEVER openly and honestly admitting that NONE of those agreements and treaties EVER WORKED — for America that is — They ALL benefited the USSR however. In the process America has lost MOST of her foreign friends to the 'Socialist camp' — Concentration camp, to be precise. Presently the USA is rapidly nearing a situation of TOTAL ISOLATION from the rest of the world. Even our long-time friend Great Britain did not support America, even verbally, on the liberation of Grenada, despite the obvious fact that America was on the British side in the ridiculous war over the Falkland Islands.

What could be more amoral than the 'peace with honor' signed by Kissinger with Hanoi Communists? — ask the Vietnamese 'boat people'. When someone makes a deal with a murderer we call him 'accomplice in crime', we don't award him with 'Nobel Peace Prize'. Or do we? What should we call this kind of foreign policy which is both amoral AND hurts America?

Level Three: Unhealthy Body — Unhealthy Mind

Demoralization in such areas as family life, health services, interracial relations, population control and distribution and labor relations I call the 'LIFE' level. Marxist-Leninist ideology coated in various indigenous "social theories" have greatly contributed to the process of American family break-up. The trend recently is changing in the opposite direction, but many generations of Americans, brought up in broken families, are already adults lacking one of the most vital qualities for the survival of a nation —LOYALTY. A child who has not learned to be loyal to his family will hardly make a loyal citizen. Such child may grow into adult who is loyal to the State though. The USSR example is rather revealing in this case. In the struggle for the 'final victory of Communism', the goal of the subverter is to substitute, as slowly and painlessly as possible, the concept of loyalty for NATION with loyalty to the "Big Brother" welfare state, who gives everything and is able to TAKE everything, including personal freedom — from every citizen. If that objective is successfully achieved, the subverter does not need any nuclear warheads and tanks and may not even need the physical military INVASION. All that will be needed is to 'elect' a 'progressive thinking' president who will be voted to power by Americans, who have been addicted to welfare and 'security' as defined by Soviet subverters.

Very similar methods are being used in the area of medical and health services and sports, (as part of an activity meant to keep the population healthy). By encouraging 'professionalism' in spectator sports 'rather than encouraging individual sports participation, America enfeebles herself as a nation. Most American adults who 'love sports' watch TV sports programs, while munching pretzels with their beer, and NOT taking physical participation in sports activity. Unlike in the USSR, sports is not a COMPULSORY part of elementary education in America. Impressive victories of Soviet athletes at international competitions further facilitate the IDEAS OF THE SUPREMACY of SOCIALISM in the area of public health, thus convincing more and more Americans of the need to emulate the Soviet system and introduce it into the American schools. What many Americans do not realize, is that what they see on their TV screens is not REAL Soviet sport. The majority of the USSR population is not 'athletic' at all; they are sick from the lack of correct nutrition and alcoholism. Soviet athletes are state-created exceptions to the general national deterioration in the USSR.

A similar myth is being promoted in the U.S. about 'free health care' in the USSR. While working in Moscow, accompanying numerous foreign delegations and showing them 'regular' medical facilities in clinics and kolkhos hospitalsr-my guests did not all realize that I was taking them to specially prepared 'exclusive' medical establishments, 'only for the eyes of foreigners'. When I arranged interviews with Soviet doctors, telling my

guests about the 'glorious achievements' of Soviet surgery, some of them had no way of checking if these 'achievements' were available to USSR collective farmers or workers in Siberia. They are not. And many Americans know about this, although they have never visited my old country. Yet the tendency of U.S. bureaucrats is to enlarge the state-run medicare, despite the fact that, as shown in the USSR and elsewhere, socialized medicine is sub-standard, less efficient, and most definitely less progressive than privately owned and operated medical facilities within a properly functioning free market system. Demoralization in the area of food CONSUMPTION patterns is also effective in the introduction of such things as 'junk foods'. No, KGB agents do not put chemicals into American food and drink. It is done by some American mega-monopolies who operate along the same principles as Soviet 'Obshchepit' (Public Food Service): they look at consumers as 'units of consumers', not individuals. Abolishing freely competing SMALL food companies, who HAD TO TREAT YOU INDIVIDUALLY to survive economically, these giants of indigestion artificially CREATE consumers' tastes and demands which may not be in the interests of your health but surely in the interests of the monopoly profit. And here I tend to agree, at least in part, with America's Ralph Naders, and consumer protection groups, although I do not share their ideas on the solution of the problem.

Racial and ethnic interrelations is one of the most vulnerable areas for demoralization. There is not a single Communist country where racial groups are 'equal' and enjoy as much freedom to develop themselves culturally and economically as in America. Actually, there are not too many "capitalist" countries where ethnic minorities have it as good as in the U S A. I have been to many countries of the world and I can state to you, my dear Americans, that your society is the least discriminatory. The Communist 'solution' for racial problem is 'final': they simply murder those who are different AND stubbornly insist on remaining different. Stalin played with whole populations of 'ethnics' — 'resettling' Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians in Siberia, relocating Crimean Tartars from the tropics to permafrost and Koreans from the Far East to the Kazakhstan deserts. But unfortunately, an 'average' American never recalls these commonly known facts when his attention is drawn to domestic 'racial discrimination' issues by those who profess 'racial harmony' along the socialist principle guidelines. Why? Simple: because American 'race discrimination fighters' NEVER MENTION these facts. If the USA were located on a separate planet from the Communists, I would probably agree with Martin Luther King when he said that "America is a racist country'. But when these statements are made on THIS planet and in THE MOST INTEGRATED NATION IN THE WORLD, I say to your 'fighters for racial equality': you are hypocrites and instruments (even if unwilling) of DEMORALIZATION.

The American traditional solution of racial and ethnic problems is slow but efficient: the 'melting pot' which raises the less developed groups to a HIGHER level. It has worked for more than a century of American history and created the most harmonious and productive nation on Earth. The present day 'solution' to racial inequality is borrowed from Communist mythology: EQUALITY of all racial and ethnic groups LEGISLATED

by the government and ENFORCED by state bureaucracies. We know perfectly well that neither races nor INDIVIDUALS are equal, in every respect. We know that every nation and race has its peculiar character, abilities, traditions, mentality, and ability to learn and its individual PACE OF DEVELOPMENT. By mimicking the Soviet 'national policy' of equality America simply erases the distinct racial characteristics that have made this country great. Very briefly on population distribution: urbanization and "delandization" (the taking away of private land) is the greatest threat to American nationhood. Why? Because the poor farmer often is a greater PATRIOT than an affluent dweller of a large congested American city. Communists know this very well. The Soviets keep a very tight control over the size of their cities by the system of 'police registration of residence' called 'propiska'. They know perfectly well that the farmer will fight an invader until last bullet ON HIS LAND. "Underprivileged" or urbanized masses on the other hand, may feel like meeting an invader with flowers and red banners. ALIENATION of people from privately-owned land is one of the very important methods of DEMORALIZATION.

And, finally, we have come to the last but not least important area: labor relations. I don't think I have to tell you about ideological infiltration of some labour unions in the USA. This is a well documented part of your history. Moscow 'International Trade-Union School', a KGB incubator for agents, takes care of physical infiltration of labor unions. And that is also well known (even to the CIA) in fact. What I would like you to think about today is this: what sort of MORALITY it takes to make medical nurses leave sick and dying patients in hospital beds and walk out to strike for fifty cents an hour more in pay? OK, for a full DOLLAR more? What makes unionized electricians leave a city without power in the middle of a severe winter and let several children in "under privileged" slums freeze to DEATH? How desperate for money must a unionized truck driver be to SHOOT TO DEATH a strike-breaking colleague, father of five? Surely, each individual American, who commits these outrageously AMORAL acts is not that cruel and egocentric. And, let's face it, not THAT broke. So, why? My answer is — IDEOLOGICAL DEMORALIZATION.

The bargaining process in American labor in many instances is no longer motivated by the desire to IMPROVE working conditions and wages. In many cases it is not bargaining at all — it's blackmail. And in the process of the unlimited growth of union POWER, the American worker loses the only relevant and real freedom he has in this country: the freedom to choose, to work or not to work, and for how much. If an individual prefers to work for LOWER pay (and it must be his free individual choice), he often is no longer able to do so. I have just mentioned what happens to strike-breakers in America.

Stage Two of the four Stages of Subversion: Destabilization

Here the efforts of subverter narrow down to the "essentials": the internal power structures of a target nation; the nation's foreign relations; economy and "social fiber". If the preceding stage of DEMORALIZATION is successful, the subverter no longer has to

bother about your IDEAS and your LIFE. Now he gets to the 'spinal cord' of your country and helps YOU to bring your own society into the state of DESTABILIZATION. That may take from 2 to 5 years, depending on the maturity of a nation and its ability to mobilize for resistance.

Power Struggle

The first symptom of instability is expressed as the desire of the population to bring to power those politicians and parties who are charismatic, act like good "caretakers" and promise more "security" — not from external and foreign enemies, but rather, job "security", "free" social services and other "pleasure strokes" provided by "Big Brother". By concentrating the attention of a nation on short-term solutions and "improvements", such irresponsible politicians simply procrastinate on facing "the moment of truth", when the nation will have to pay a much higher price for the main and basic problem — bringing country back to stability and restoring the moral fiber. A compounding factor at this stage is the so-called "grass root" participation of the 'masses' in the political process. Demoralized and enfeebled 'masses' tend to grab the 'easiest' short-cut solution to social ills and socialism seems to them to be the best answer. Traditional national institutions no longer appear efficient. They are gradually replaced by artificially created 'citizen's committees' and 'boards' which acquire more and more political power. These bodies which are in essence, mirror reflections of the totalitarian structures of power, are more and more 'responsive' to mob-ocracy, the rule of of the crowd of radicalized CONSUMERS. At the same time, the backbone of the economy — the free bargaining process — gradually yields to the principle of 'planned economy' and 'centralization'.

With the final destruction of the free bargaining process the predominant economic power moves into the hands of "Big Brother", the State, which functions more and more 'in cahoots' with mega-mono- polies and monopolized labor unions. The famous 'division of powers' no longer governs the judicial, legislative and executive lines, but rather is replaced by bureaucracy in goverment, bureaucracy in business and bureaucracy in labor. In the area of foreign relations America is being pushed further and further into isolationism and defeatism. Few remaining friends look with horror at the destiny of those nations who were betrayed and abandoned by the USA and try to find 'their own solutions', which often comes as 'establishing friendly relations' with the USSR and its Communist empire. The belligerent encirclement of America proceeds with an ever-increasing pace and demoralized politicians are no longer able or willing to face the inevitable reality. Soviet and Cuban military supplies and direct intervention seem to the US legis- lators to be less dangerous, than America's 'losing face' by 'violating international laws' by mining Nicaraguan ports to prevent the export of Communist revolution to the region. The majority of Americans are made to believe that it is their country — America — who 'violates' international law, not the USSR and its surrogates. The average American may not even realize that the 'International Court' is nothing but an artificial creature of the Soviet-controlled General Assembly of the UN.

All through this stage of DESTABILIZATION, Western 'multinational' monopolies con-

tinue to trade, extend credits, supply technology and 'diplomatically' appease the SUBVERTER — the Central Committee of the USSR. In total disregard of the interests of the peoples of America and the USSR, these two giants continue to extend aid to each other. American media keeps talking about 'frictions' between the NATIONS (USA—USSR)! What 'frictions'? Comrade Petrov in Omsk has NO FRICTIONS with Mr. Smith in Pittsburg. In fact, they never had a chance to meet each other thanks to Helsinki Accord. Comrade Petrov, though HAS FRICTIONS with his oppressors — the Kremlin junta, which sends him to make war on Afghanistan, Vietnam, Angola and Nicaragua. Comrade Petrov does not want war with America. Neither does Mr. Smith want to fight 'Russia'. But they may have to if the DESTABILIZATION process is successful in America. Once it is, the situation inevitably slides into...

Crisis: Stage Three

It may take only 2 to 6 months, to bring America to the same situation which now exists South of the border in Central America. At this third stage of subversion you will have all your American 'radicals' and Soviet 'sleeper' agents springing into action, trying to 'seize power as quickly and ruthlessly as possible' (see the 'Rules of Revolution' in the beginning of this booklet). If all the previous stages of Soviet subversion have been successfully completed by that time, the majority of Americans will be so totally confused that they may even WELCOME some "strong' leaders who 'know how to talk to the Russians'. Chances are these leaders will be elected and given almost unlimited 'emergency powers'. A forceful change of the U.S. system may or may not be accomplished through a civil war or internal revolution, and a physical MILITARY invasion by the USSR may not even have to take place at all. But change it will be, and rather a drastic one, with all the familiar attributes of Soviet 'progress' being instituted such as NATIONALIZATION of vital industries, the reduction of the 'private sector' of the economy to the bare minimum, the redistribution of wealth and a massive propaganda campaign by the newly 'elected' government to 'explain' and justify the reforms.

No — no concentration camps and executions. Not yet. That will come later at the stage of...

Normalization: The fourth and last Stage

Any normal nation would definitely resist such a 'progressive change'. As I have just described. And according to the 'classics of Marxism-Leninism' there will arise pockets of resistance, shortly after the takeover consisting of the 'enemy classes and counter-revolutionaries' who will physically resist the new system. Some Americans may take to arms and flee to the mountains (as in Afghanistan). Reforms (or DESTRUCTION to be more accurate) of the security agencies, (police and military) by the new government may lead to a situation of 'split loyalties' among law enforcement officers and render

the majority of the population defenseless. At this point, to avoid 'the bloodshed', the subverter moves to NORMALIZATION, a term borrowed from the Soviet propaganda of 1968 — from the time of the Soviet 'fraternal' invasion of Czechoslovakia. Comrade Brezhnev called that 'NORMALIZATION'. And he was right: the vanquished country was brought BY FORCE into the NORMAL state of SOCIALISM: namely, subjugation.

This is when my dear friends, you will start seeing 'friendly' Soviet soldiers in the streets of our cities working together with American soldiers and the 'new' police force to 'restore law and order'. Very soon your yesterday's American socialist radicals and 'do-gooders' who were working so hard to bring 'progress' to their own country will find themselves IN PRISONS and hastily-built concentration camps. Many of them will be EXECUTED, quietly or publicly. Why? Simple: the Soviet 'liberators' will have no further use for the 'disturbers'. The 'useful idiots' will have completed their work. From then on the New Order will need STABILITY and NEW MORALITY. No more 'grass roots' movements. No more criticism of the State. The Press will obediently censor itself. In fact, this censorship is already existing NOW, imposed by the so-called U.S.'liberals' and socialist do-gooders. You will now have the opportunity to 'enjoy' exactly the same life as the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Angolans and Nicaraguans, betrayed by you enjoy NOW. This state of social 'NORMALIZATION' may last forever, that is — your life-time and life-times of you children and grandchildren...

IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN HERE!

What if it does happen here? Why take chances? What are the SOLUTIONS? There are different solutions for different stages of subversion. If a nation has enough common sense to STOP subversion at the very beginning of the DEMORALIZATION stage, you may never need the painful and drastic solutions needed to deal with the CRISIS stage. The most general solution I can offer — for the whole process of SUBVERSION — is to STOP AIDING THE SUBVERTER. You are still living in a free society and you are able to force your elected politicians to change their policies toward the Communist world if you so choose. But if YOU, personally do not see anything wrong in dealing with the Communists and HELPING them in their global expansion, I feel that you should begin learning more about the reality of the Communist/ Socialist situation, not from your monopolized media, but from the independent media and press who have no vested interest in making out the Soviet Union to be the 'good guys,' and from people like myself, who have experienced Communism first-hand for many years. There are numerous American patriotic groups and organizations who are well informed and who already have many SOLUTIONS, to combat the damage done by ideological subversion some of which are as good or even better than mine. Seek these groups, join them and DO something.

This booklet is my love letter to America. I did not write it to frighten or threaten the nation that I love for its freedom, its principles, its ideals. But if you were walking across the street with a friend and saw a car barreling down upon you both that your friend did not see, would you say nothing to your friend and move out of the way, leaving

him to be hit? Of course not and I do not intend to do that to you. Un my next booklet, I will cover the full solutions to the problem of ideological subversion. I sincerely hope you will be reading it.

Love,

Tomas Schuman

If one is interested to find more recent information about Communism/Socialism in modern times, one just has do to a serious online search about "Saul Alinsky", his works and his connections to "Hillary Clinton". Some insight:

From a Newspaper article called "Beware the Useful Idiots" by Garret Geer, we learn:

Recall that Hillary did her college thesis on his writings and Obama writes about him in his books. Saul Alinsky died about 43 years ago, but his writings influenced those in political control of our nation today. Died: June 12, 1972, Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA; Education: University of Chicago; Books: Rules for Radicals, Reveille for Radicals.

Anyone out there think that this stuff isn't happening today in the U.S.? All eight rules are currently in play. How to create a social state by Saul Alinsky: There are eight levels of control that must be obtained before you are able to create a social state. The first is the most important.

- 1) Healthcare - Control healthcare and you control the people.
- 2) Poverty - Increase the Poverty level as high as possible; poor people are easier to control and will not fight back if you are providing everything for them to live.
- 3) Debt - Increase the debt to an unsustainable level. That way you are able to increase taxes and this will produce more poverty.
- 4) Gun Control - Remove the ability to defend themselves from the government. That way you are able to create a police state.
- 5) Welfare - Take control of every aspect of their lives (Food, Housing and Income)
- 6) Education - Take control of what people read and listen to - take control of what children learn in school.
- 7) Religion - Remove the belief in the God from the government and schools.
- 8) Class Warfare - Divide the people into the wealthy and the poor. This will cause more discontent, and it will be easier to take (tax) the wealthy with the support of the poor.

Does any of this sound like what is happening to the United States? Alinsky merely simplified Vladimir Lenin's original scheme for world conquest by communism, under Russian rule. Stalin described his converts as "Useful Idiots". The Useful Idiots have destroyed every nation in which they have seized power and control. It is presently happening at an alarming rate in the U.S.

"It is difficult to free fools from the chains they revere."

15. The New World Order

The term New World Order (NWO) has been used by numerous politicians through the ages, and is a generic term used to refer to a worldwide conspiracy being orchestrated by an extremely powerful and influential group of genetically-related individuals (at least at the highest echelons) which include many of the world's wealthiest people, top political leaders, and corporate elite, as well as members of the so-called Black Nobility of Europe (dominated by the British Crown) whose goal is to create a One World (fascist) Government, stripped of nationalistic and regional boundaries, that is obedient to their agenda. The Zionist banker, Paul Warburg, who was involved in World war 1 and 2 and the Federal Reserve (among other things):

“We will have a world government whether you like it or not. The only question is whether that government will be achieved by conquest or consent.” (February 17, 1950, as he testified before the US Senate).

Their intention is to effect complete and total control over every human being on the planet and to dramatically reduce the world's population by two thirds. While the name New World Order is the term most frequently used today to loosely refer to anyone involved in this conspiracy. In 1992, Dr John Coleman published *Conspirators Hierarchy: The Story of the Committee of 300*. With laudable scholarship and meticulous research, Dr Coleman identifies the players and carefully details the New World Order agenda of worldwide domination and control. On page 161 of the *Conspirators Hierarchy*, Dr Coleman accurately summarizes the intent and purpose of the Committee of 300 as follows:

“A One World Government and one-unit monetary system, under permanent non-elected hereditary oligarchists who self-select from among their numbers in the form of a feudal system as it was in the Middle Ages. In this One World entity, population will be limited by restrictions on the number of children per family, diseases, wars, famines, until 1 billion people who are useful to the ruling class, in areas which will be strictly and clearly defined, remain as the total world population. There will be no middle class, only rulers and the servants. All laws will be uniform under a legal system of world courts practicing the same unified code of laws, backed up by a One World Government police force and a One World unified military to enforce laws in all former countries where no national boundaries shall exist. The system will be on the basis of a welfare state; those who are obedient and subservient to the One World Government will be rewarded with the means to live; those who are rebellious will simply be starved to death or be declared outlaws, thus a target for anyone who wishes to kill them. Privately owned firearms or weapons of any kind will be prohibited.”

The sheer magnitude and complex web of deceit surrounding the individuals and orga-

nizations involved in this conspiracy is mind boggling, even for the most astute among us. Most people react with disbelief and skepticism towards the topic, unaware that they have been conditioned (brainwashed) to react with skepticism by institutional and media influences. Author and de-programmer Fritz Springmeier (The Top 13 Illuminati Bloodlines) says that most people have built in "slides" that short circuit the mind's critical examination process when it comes to certain sensitive topics. "Slides", Springmeier reports, is a CIA term for a conditioned type of response which dead ends a person's thinking and terminates debate or examination of the topic at hand. For example, the mention of the word "conspiracy" often solicits a slide response with many people. What most people believe to be "Public Opinion" is in reality carefully crafted and scripted propaganda designed to elicit a desired behavioral response from the public. Public opinion polls are really taken with the intent of gauging the public's acceptance of the New World Order's planned programs. A strong showing in the polls tells them that the programming is "taking", while a poor showing tells the NWO manipulators that they have to recast or "tweak" the programming until the desired response is achieved.

The NWO Modus Operandi

The NWO global conspirators manifest their agenda through the skilful manipulation of human emotions, especially fear. In the past centuries, they have repeatedly utilized a contrivance that NWO researcher and author David Icke has characterized in his latest book, *The Biggest Secret*, as Problem, Reaction, and Solution. The technique is as follows: NWO strategists create the Problem - by funding, assembling, and training an "opposition" group to stimulate turmoil in an established political power (sovereign country, region, continent, etc.) that they wish to impinge upon and thus create opposing factions in a conflict that the NWO themselves maneuvered into existence. In recent decades, so called opposition groups are usually identified in the media as 'freedom fighters' or 'liberators'.

At the same time, the leader of the established political power where the conflict is being orchestrated is demonized and, on cue, referred to as 'another Hitler' (take your pick: Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Kadaffi, etc.). The 'freedom fighters' are not infrequently assembled from a local criminal element (i.e. KLA, drug traffickers). In the spirit of true Machiavellian deceit, the same NWO strategists are equally involved in covertly arming and advising the leader of the established power as well (the NWO always profits from any armed conflict by loaning money, arming, and supplying all parties involved in a war). The conflict is drawn to the world stage by the controlled media outlets with a barrage of photos and video tape reports of horrific and bloody atrocities suffered by innocent civilians. The cry goes up "Something has to be done!" And that is the desired Reaction.

The NWO puppeteers then provide the Solution by sending in UN 'Peace Keepers' (Bosnia) or a UN 'Coalition Force' (Gulf War) or NATO Bombers and then ground troops (Kosovo), or the military to 'search for Weapons of Mass Destruction', which of

course are never found. Once installed, the 'peace keepers' never leave. The idea is to have NWO controlled ground troops in all major countries or strategic areas where significant resistance to the New World Order takeover is likely to be encountered.

15.1 Who is the NWO?

The corporate portion of the NWO is dominated by international bankers, oil barons and pharmaceutical cartels, as well as other major multinational corporations. Also possibly the Royal Family of England, namely Queen Elizabeth II and the House of Windsor, (who are, in fact, descendants of the German arm of European Royalty - the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha family - changed the name to Windsor in 1914), are high level players in the oligarchy which controls the upper strata of the NWO. The decision making nerve centers of this effort are in London (especially the City of London), Basel Switzerland, and Brussels (NATO headquarters). The United Nations, along with all the agencies working under the UN umbrella, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), are full time players in this scheme. Similarly, NATO is a military tool of the NWO.

The leaders of all major industrial countries like the United States, England, Germany, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, etc. (members of the "G7/G8") are active and fully cooperative participants in this conspiracy. In this century, the degree of control exerted by the NWO has advanced to the point that only certain hand-picked individuals, who are groomed and selected are even eligible to become the prime minister or president of countries like England, Germany, or The United States. It didn't matter whether Bill Clinton or Bob Dole won the Presidency in 1996, the results would have been the same. Both men are playing on the same team for the same ball club. Anyone who isn't a team player is taken out: i.e. President Kennedy, Ali Bhutto (Pakistan) and Aldo Moro (Italy).

As shown in this book, the NWO, the Money Lenders, the men behind the curtain, the bankers, the globalists, whatever you want to call them, play a scheme to fool the masses and the end goal is world domination.

Timeline of the NWO

1912 – Colonel Edward M. House, a close advisor of President Woodrow Wilson, publishes Phillip Dru: Administrator in which he promotes "socialism as dreamed of by Karl Marx."

1913 – The Federal Reserve (neither federal nor a reserve) is created. It was planned at a secret meeting in 1910 on Jekyll Island, Georgia by a group of bankers and politicians, including Col. House. This transferred the power to create money from the American government to a private group of bankers. It is probably the largest generator of debt in the world.

July 28, 1914 – World War I is triggered by the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdi-

nand of Austria.

May 27, 1916 – President Woodrow Wilson proposes at the League of Nations in a speech before the League to Enforce Peace, a world needed to prevent the recurrence of a similar war was a world government.

November 11, 1918 – The end of World War I, after the signing of the Armistice at the 11th hour on the 11th day of the 11th month.

May 30, 1919 – Prominent British and American personalities establish the Royal Institute of International Affairs in England and the Institute of International Affairs in the U.S. at a meeting arranged by Col. House attended by various Fabian socialists, including noted economist John Maynard Keynes. Two years later, Col. House reorganizes the Institute of International Affairs into the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

December 15, 1922 – The CFR endorses World Government in its magazine Foreign Affairs. Author Philip Kerr, states:

“Obviously there is going to be no peace or prosperity for mankind as long as [the earth] remains divided into 50 or 60 independent states until some kind of international system is created...The real problem today is that of the world government.”

1928 – The Open Conspiracy: Blue Prints for a World Revolution by H.G. Wells is published. A former Fabian Socialist, Wells writes:

“The political world of the into a Open Conspiracy must weaken, efface, incorporate and supersede existing governments... The Open Conspiracy is the natural inheritor of socialist and communist enthusiasms; it may be in control of Moscow before it is in control of New York... The character of the Open Conspiracy will now be plainly displayed... It will be a world religion.”

1931 – Students at the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow are taught:

“One day we shall start to spread the most theatrical peace movement the world has ever seen. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent...will fall into the trap offered by the possibility of making new friends. Our day will come in 30 years or so... The bourgeoisie must be lulled into a false sense of security.

1932 – New books are published urging New World Order:

Toward Soviet America by William Z. Foster. Head of the Communist Party USA, Foster indicates that a National Department of Education would be one of the means used to develop a new socialist society in the U.S.

The New World Order by F.S. Marvin, describing the League of Nations as the first attempt at a New World Order. Marvin says, “nationality must rank below the claims of mankind as a whole.”

Dare the School Build a New Social Order? is published. Educator author George Counts asserts that: “...the teachers should deliberately reach for power and then make the most

of their conquest“ in order to “influence the social attitudes, ideals and behavior of the coming generation...The growth of science and technology has carried us into a new age where ignorance must be replaced by knowledge, competition by cooperation, trust in Providence by careful planning and private capitalism by some form of social economy.“

Plan for Peace by American Birth Control League founder Margaret Sanger (1921) is published. She calls for coercive sterilization, mandatory segregation, and rehabilitative concentration camps for all “dysgenic stocks“ including Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians and Catholics.

1933 – The first Humanist Manifesto is published. Co-author John Dewey, the noted philosopher and educator, calls for a synthesizing of all religions and “a socialized and cooperative economic order.“

Co-signer C.F. Potter said in 1930: “Education is thus a most powerful ally of humanism, and every American public school is a school of humanism. What can the theistic Sunday schools, meeting for an hour once a week, teaching only a fraction of the children, do to stem the tide of a five-day program of humanistic teaching?

1933 – The Shape of Things to Come by H.G. Wells is published. Wells predicts a second world war around 1940, originating from a German-Polish dispute. After 1945 there would be an increasing lack of public safety in “criminally infected“ areas. The plan for the “Modern World-State“ would succeed on its third attempt (about 1980), and come out of something that occurred in Basra, Iraq.

The book also states, “Although world government had been plainly coming for some years, although it had been endlessly feared and murmured against, it found no opposition prepared anywhere.“

1934 – The Externalization of the Hierarchy by Alice A. Bailey is published. Bailey is an occultist, whose works are channeled from a spirit guide, the Tibetan Master [demon spirit] Djwahl Kuhl. Bailey uses the phrase “points of light“ in connection with a “New Group of World Servers“ and claims that 1934 marks the beginning of “the organizing of the men and women...group work of a new order...[with] progress defined by service...the world of the Brotherhood...the Forces of Light...[and] out of the spoliation of all existing culture and civilization, the new world order must be built.“

The book is published by the Lucis Trust, incorporated originally in New York as the Lucifer Publishing Company. Lucis Trust is a United Nations NGO and has been a major player at the recent U.N. summits. Later Assistant Secretary General of the U.N. Robert Mueller would credit the creation of his World Core Curriculum for education to the underlying teachings of Djwahl Kuhl via Alice Bailey’s writings on the subject.

October 28, 1939 – In an address by John Foster Dulles, later U.S. Secretary of State, he proposes that America lead the transition to a new order of less independent, semi-sovereign states bound together by a league or federal union.

1939 – New World Order by H. G. Wells proposes a collectivist one-world state“ or “new

world order“ comprised of “socialist democracies.“ He advocates “universal conscription for service“ and declares that “nationalist individualism...is the world’s disease.“ He continues: “The manifest necessity for some collective world control to eliminate warfare and the less generally admitted necessity for a collective control of the economic and biological life of mankind, are aspects of one and the same process.“ He proposes that this be accomplished through “universal law“ and propaganda (or education).“

Wells speaks openly about his utopian dream. Some excerpts: “This new and complete Revolution we contemplate can be defined in a very few words. It is outright world-socialism; .scientifically planned and directed.”... Countless people will hate the new world order and will die protesting against it. .When we attempt to evaluate its promise, we have to bear in mind the distress of a generation or so of malcontents.The term Internationalism has been popularized in recent years to cover an interlocking financial, political, and economic world force for the purpose of establishing a World Government.”

1940 – The New World Order is published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and contains a select list of references on regional and world federation, together with some special plans for world order after the war.

December 12, 1940 – In The Congressional Record an article entitled A New World Order John G. Alexander calls for a world federation.

September 11, 1941 – Construction officially began at the Pentagon. 60 years later to the day, the Pentagon was to be attacked on the fateful September 11, 2001.

1942 – The leftist Institute of Pacific Relations publishes Post War Worlds by P.E. Corbett:

“World government is the ultimate aim...It must be recognized that the law of nations takes precedence over national law...The process will have to be assisted by the deletion of the nationalistic material employed in educational textbooks and its replacement by material explaining the benefits of wiser association.“

June 28, 1945 – President Truman endorses world government in a speech:

“It will be just as easy for nations to get along in a republic of the world as it is for us to get along in a republic of the United States.“

October 24, 1945 – The United Nations Charter becomes effective. Also on October 24, Senator Glen Taylor (D-Idaho) introduces Senate Resolution 183 calling upon the U.S. Senate to go on record as favoring creation of a world republic including an international police force.

1946 – Alger Hiss is elected President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hiss holds this office until 1949. Early in 1950, he is convicted of perjury and sentenced to prison after a sensational trial and Congressional hearing in which Whittaker Chambers, a former senior editor of Time, testifies that Hiss was a member of his Communist Party cell.

1946 – The Teacher and World Government by former editor of the NEA Journal (National Education Association) Joy Elmer Morgan is published. He says:

“In the struggle to establish an adequate world government, the teacher...can do much to prepare the hearts and minds of children for global understanding and cooperation...At the very heart of all the agencies which will assure the coming of world government must stand the school, the teacher, and the organized profession.”

1947 – The American Education Fellowship, formerly the Progressive Education Association, organized by John Dewey, calls for the:

“...establishment of a genuine world order, an order in which national sovereignty is subordinate to world authority...”

October, 1947 – NEA Associate Secretary William Carr writes in the NEA Journal that teachers should:

“...teach about the various proposals that have been made for the strengthening of the United Nations and the establishment of a world citizenship and world government.”

1948 – Walden II by behavioral psychologist B.F. Skinner proposes “a perfect society or new and more perfect order” in which children are reared by the State, rather than by their parents and are trained from birth to demonstrate only desirable behavior and characteristics. Skinner’s ideas would be widely implemented by educators in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s as Values Clarification and Outcome Based Education.

July, 1948 – Britain’s Sir Harold Butler, in the CFR’s Foreign Affairs, sees “a New World Order” taking shape:

“How far can the life of nations, which for centuries have thought of themselves as distinct and unique, be merged with the life of other nations? How far are they prepared to sacrifice a part of their sovereignty without which there can be no effective economic or political union?...Out of the prevailing confusion a new world is taking shape... which may point the way toward the new order... That will be the beginning of a real United Nations, no longer crippled by a split personality, but held together by a common faith.”

1948 – UNESCO president and Fabian Socialist, Sir Julian Huxley, calls for a radical eugenic policy in UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy. He states:

“Thus, even though it is quite true that any radical eugenic policy of controlled human breeding will be for many years politically and psychologically impossible, it will be important for UNESCO to see that the eugenic problem is examined with the greatest care and that the public mind is informed of the issues at stake that much that is now unthinkable may at least become thinkable.”

1948 – The preliminary draft of a World Constitution is published by U.S. educators advocating regional federation on the way toward world federation or government with England incorporated into a European federation.

The Constitution provides for a "World Council" along with a "Chamber of Guardians" to enforce world law. Also included is a "Preamble" calling upon nations to surrender their arms to the world government, and includes the right of this "Federal Republic of the World" to seize private property for federal use.

J. Edgar Hoover, ex-FBI director on the New World Order conspiracy: "The individual is handicapped by coming face-to-face with a conspiracy so monstrous he cannot believe it exists."

George H.W. Bush's comment: "if the American people knew what we have done, they would string us up from the lamp posts."

February 9, 1950 – The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee introduces Senate Concurrent Resolution 66 which begins:

"Whereas, in order to achieve universal peace and justice, the present Charter of the United Nations should be changed to provide a true world government constitution."

The resolution was first introduced in the Senate on September 13, 1949 by Senator Glen Taylor (D-Idaho). Senator Alexander Wiley (R-Wisconsin) called it "a consummation devoutly to be wished for" and said, "I understand your proposition is either change the United Nations, or change or create, by a separate convention, a world order." Senator Taylor later stated:

"We would have to sacrifice considerable sovereignty to the world organization to enable them to levy taxes in their own right to support themselves."

April 12, 1952 – John Foster Dulles, later to become Secretary of State, says in a speech to the American Bar Association in Louisville, Kentucky, that "treaty laws can override the Constitution." He says treaties can take power away from Congress and give them to the President. They can take powers from the States and give them to the Federal Government or to some international body and they can cut across the rights given to the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights.

A Senate amendment, proposed by GOP Senator John Bricker, would have provided that no treaty could supersede the Constitution, but it fails to pass by one vote.

1954 – Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands establishes the Bilderbergers, international politicians and bankers who meet secretly on an annual basis, even to this day. The 2003 meeting took place over the weekend of 15 to 18 May in Versailles, Paris.

1958 – World Peace through World Law is published, where authors Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn advocate using the U.N. as a governing body for the world, world disarmament, a world police force and legislature.

1959 – The Council on Foreign Relations calls for a New International Order. Study Number 7, issued on November 25, advocated:

"...new international order [which] must be responsive to world aspirations for peace, for

social and economic change...an international order...including states labeling themselves as 'socialist' [communist]."

1959 – The World Constitution and Parliament Association is founded which later develops a Diagram of World Government under the Constitution for the Federation of Earth.

1959 – The Mid-Century Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy is published, sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund. It explains that the U.S.:

"...cannot escape, and indeed should welcome...the task which history has imposed on us. This is the task of helping to shape a new world order in all its dimensions – spiritual, economic, political, social."

September 9, 1960 – President Eisenhower signs Senate Joint Resolution 170, promoting the concept of a federal Atlantic Union. Pollster and Atlantic Union Committee treasurer, Elmo Roper, later delivers an address titled, The Goal Is Government of All the World, in which he states:

"For it becomes clear that the first step toward World Government cannot be completed until we have advanced on the four fronts: the economic, the military, the political and the social."

1961 – The U.S. State Department issues a plan to disarm all nations and arm the United Nations. State Department Document Number 7277 is entitled Freedom From War: The U.S. Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. It details a three-stage plan to disarm all nations and arm the U.N. with the final stage in which "no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force."

1962 – New Calls for World Federalism. In a study titled, A World Effectively Controlled by the United Nations, CFR member Lincoln Bloomfield states:

"...if the communist dynamic was greatly abated, the West might lose whatever incentive it has for world government."

The Future of Federalism by author Nelson Rockefeller is published. The one-time Governor of New York, claims that current events compellingly demand a "new world order," as the old order is crumbling, and there is "a new and free order struggling to be born." Rockefeller says there is:

"a fever of nationalism...[but] the nation-state is becoming less and less competent to perform its international political tasks....These are some of the reasons pressing us to lead vigorously toward the true building of a new world order... [with] voluntary service...and our dedicated faith in the brotherhood of all mankind....Sooner perhaps than we may realize...there will evolve the bases for a federal structure of the free world."

The New World Order is also mentioned in the introduction of the book "Backdoor to War", written by the Professor of American Diplomatic History Charles Tansill:

“The old followers of Woodrow Wilson had never renounced their allegiance to a one-world ideal, and they were fervent in their belief that America should take an active part in the preservation of world peace. They received strong support from many “liberals” and “intellectuals” who believed that modern science had banished the old barriers of time and space and had brought the peoples of the world into such close communion that some form of world government was an international imperative.”

1963 – J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee speaks at a symposium sponsored by the Fund for the Republic, a left-wing project of the Ford Foundation:

“The case for government by elites is irrefutable...government by the people is possible but highly improbable.”

November 22, 1963 – President Kennedy is assassinated on November 22, 1963. He was killed according to the occult number signature of eleven [11]. He was killed in the 11th month, on the 22nd day, and on the 33rd parallel. He was also killed in the Masonic Dealey Plaza, the most powerful secret society in the world today to whom the number 11 is extremely important. See cuttingedge for details.

1964 – Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II is published. Author Benjamin Bloom states:

“...a large part of what we call ‘good teaching’ is the teacher’s ability to attain affective objectives through challenging the students’ fixed beliefs.”

His Outcome-Based Education (OBE) method of teaching would first be tried as Mastery Learning in Chicago schools. After five years, Chicago students’ test scores had plummeted causing outrage among parents. OBE would leave a trail of wreckage wherever it would be tried and under whatever name it would be used. At the same time, it would become crucial to globalists for overhauling the education system to promote attitude changes among school students.

1964 – Visions of Order by Richard Weaver is published. He describes:

“progressive educators as a ‘revolutionary cabal’ engaged in ‘a systematic attempt to undermine society’s traditions and beliefs.’”

1967 – Richard Nixon calls for New World Order. In Asia after Vietnam, in the October issue of Foreign Affairs, Nixon writes of nations’ dispositions to evolve regional approaches to development needs and to the evolution of a “new world order.”

1968 – Joy Elmer Morgan, former editor of the NEA Journal publishes The American Citizens Handbook in which he says:

“the coming of the United Nations and the urgent necessity that it evolve into a more comprehensive form of world government places upon the citizens of the United States an increased obligation to make the most of their citizenship which now widens into active world citizenship.”

July 26, 1968 – Nelson Rockefeller pledges support of the New World Order. In an Associated Press report, Rockefeller pledges that, “as President, he would work toward international creation of a new world order.”

1970 – Education and the mass media promote world order. In *Thinking About A New World Order for the Decade 1990*, author Ian Baldwin, Jr. asserts that:

“...the World Law Fund has begun a worldwide research and educational program that will introduce a new, emerging discipline – world order – into educational curricula throughout the world...and to concentrate some of its energies on bringing basic world order concepts into the mass media again on a worldwide level.”

1972 – President Nixon visits China. In his toast to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, former CFR member and now President, Richard Nixon, expresses “the hope that each of us has to build a new world order.”

May 18, 1972 – In speaking of the coming of world government, Roy M. Ash, director of the Office of Management and Budget, declares that:

“within two decades the institutional framework for a world economic community will be in place...[and] aspects of individual sovereignty will be given over to a supernational authority.”

September 11, 1972 – The world was introduced to terrorism at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. There were 11 Israeli athletes killed. Exactly 29 years after this attack, another more despicable horror occurred - the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

1973 – The Trilateral Commission is established. Banker David Rockefeller organizes this new private body and chooses Zbigniew Brzezinski, later National Security Advisor to President Carter, as the Commission’s first director and invites Jimmy Carter to become a founding member.

1973 – Humanist Manifesto II is published:

“The next century can be and should be the humanistic century...we stand at the dawn of a new age...a secular society on a planetary scale....As non-theists we begin with humans not God, nature not deity...we deplore the division of humankind on nationalistic grounds....Thus we look to the development of a system of world law and a world order based upon transnational federal government....The true revolution is occurring.”

September 11, 1973 – Chilean President Salvador Allende is killed in a brutal, violent military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. Henry Kissinger was strongly implicated in this attack, and if he were to ever stand trial in an International Court, it is likely he would be charged with masterminding this coup and ordering the assassination of Allende.

April, 1974 – Former U. S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Trilateralist and CFR member Richard Gardner’s article *The Hard Road to World Order* is published in the CFR’s *Foreign Affairs* where he states that:

“the ‘house of world order’ will have to be built from the bottom up rather than from the top down...but an end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much more than the old-fashioned frontal assault.”

1974 – The World Conference of Religion for Peace, held in Louvain, Belgium is held. Douglas Roche presents a report entitled *We Can Achieve a New World Order*.

The U.N. calls for wealth redistribution: In a report entitled *New International Economic Order*, the U.N. General Assembly outlines a plan to redistribute the wealth from the rich to the poor nations.

1975 – A study titled, *A New World Order*, is published by the Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Studies, Princeton University.

1975 – In Congress, 32 Senators and 92 Representatives sign A Declaration of Interdependence, written by historian Henry Steele Commager. The Declaration states that:

“we must join with others to bring forth a new world order... Narrow notions of national sovereignty must not be permitted to curtail that obligation.”

Congresswoman Marjorie Holt refuses to sign the Declaration saying:

“It calls for the surrender of our national sovereignty to international organizations. It declares that our economy should be regulated by international authorities. It proposes that we enter a ‘new world order’ that would redistribute the wealth created by the American people.”

1975 – Retired Navy Admiral Chester Ward, former Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Navy and former CFR member, writes in a critique that the goal of the CFR is the “submergence of U. S. sovereignty and national independence into an all powerful one-world government...”

1975 – *Kissinger on the Couch* is published. Authors Phyllis Schlafly and former CFR member Chester Ward state:

“Once the ruling members of the CFR have decided that the U.S. government should espouse a particular policy, the very substantial research facilities of the CFR are put to work to develop arguments, intellectual and emotional, to support the new policy and to confound, discredit, intellectually and politically, any opposition...”

1976 – *RIO: Reshaping the International Order* is published by the globalist Club of Rome, calling for a new international order, including an economic redistribution of wealth.

1977 – *The Third Try at World Order* is published. Author Harlan Cleveland of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies calls for:

“changing Americans’ attitudes and institutions” for “complete disarmament (except for international soldiers)” and “for individual entitlement to food, health and education.”

[Sound like America today?]

1977 – Imperial Brain Trust by Laurence Shoup and William Minter is published. The book takes a critical look at the Council on Foreign Relations with chapters such as: Shaping a New World Order: The Council's Blueprint for Global Hegemony, 1939-1944 and Toward the 1980's: The Council's Plans for a New World Order.

1977 – The Trilateral Connection appears in the July edition of Atlantic Monthly. Written by Jeremiah Novak, it says:

“For the third time in this century, a group of American schools, businessmen, and government officials is planning to fashion a New World Order...”

1977 – Leading educator Mortimer Adler publishes *Philosopher at Large* in which he says: “...if local civil government is necessary for local civil peace, then world civil government is necessary for world peace.”

1979 – Barry Goldwater, retiring Republican Senator from Arizona, publishes his autobiography *With No Apologies*. He writes:

“In my view The Trilateral Commission represents a skillful, coordinated effort to seize control and consolidate the four centers of power – political, monetary, intellectual, and ecclesiastical. All this is to be done in the interest of creating a more peaceful, more productive world community. What the Trilateralists truly intend is the creation of a worldwide economic power superior to the political governments of the nation-states involved. They believe the abundant materialism they propose to create will overwhelm existing differences. As managers and creators of the system they will rule the future.”

1984 – *The Power to Lead* is published. Author James McGregor Burns admits:

“The framers of the U.S. constitution have simply been too shrewd for us. They have outwitted us. They designed separate institutions that cannot be unified by mechanical linkages, frail bridges, tinkering. If we are to 'turn the Founders upside down' – we must directly confront the constitutional structure they erected.”

1985 – Norman Cousins, the honorary chairman of Planetary Citizens for the World We Chose, is quoted in *Human Events*:

“World government is coming, in fact, it is inevitable. No arguments for or against it can change that fact.”

Cousins was also president of the World Federalist Association, an affiliate of the World Association for World Federation (WAWF), headquartered in Amsterdam. WAWF is a leading force for world federal government and is accredited by the U.N. as a Non-Governmental Organization.

1987 – *The Secret Constitution and the Need for Constitutional Change* is sponsored in part by the Rockefeller Foundation. Some thoughts of author Arthur S. Miller are:

“...a pervasive system of thought control exists in the United States...the citizenry is indoctrinated by employment of the mass media and the system of public education...people

are told what to think about...the old order is crumbling... Nationalism should be seen as a dangerous social disease...A new vision is required to plan and manage the future, a global vision that will transcend national boundaries and eliminate the poison of nationalistic solutions...a new Constitution is necessary."

1988 – Former Under-secretary of State and CFR member George Ball in a January 24 interview in the New York Times says:

"The Cold War should no longer be the kind of obsessive concern that it is. Neither side is going to attack the other deliberately...If we could internationalize by using the U.N. in conjunction with the Soviet Union, because we now no longer have to fear, in most cases, a Soviet veto, then we could begin to transform the shape of the world and might get the U.N. back to doing something useful...Sooner or later we are going to have to face restructuring our institutions so that they are not confined merely to the nation-states. Start first on a regional and ultimately you could move to a world basis."

December 7, 1988 – In an address to the U.N., Mikhail Gorbachev calls for mutual consensus:

"World progress is only possible through a search for universal human consensus as we move forward to a new world order."

May 12, 1989 – President Bush invites the Soviets to join World Order. Speaking to the graduating class at Texas A&M University, Mr. Bush states that the United States is ready to welcome the Soviet Union "back into the world order."

1989 – Carl Bernstein's (Woodward and Bernstein of Watergate fame) book *Loyalties: A Son's Memoir* is published. His father and mother had been members of the Communist party. Bernstein's father tells his son about the book:

"You're going to prove [Sen. Joseph] McCarthy was right, because all he was saying is that the system was loaded with Communists. And he was right...I'm worried about the kind of book you're going to write and about cleaning up McCarthy. The problem is that everybody said he was a liar; you're saying he was right...I agree that the Party was a force in the country."

November 9, 1989 – The much hated Berlin Wall comes tumbling down, completing the deliberate dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and of Communism.

1990 – The World Federalist Association faults the American press. Writing in their Summer/Fall newsletter, Deputy Director Eric Cox describes world events over the past year or two and declares:

"It's sad but true that the slow-witted American press has not grasped the significance of most of these developments. But most federalists know what is happening...And they are not frightened by the old bug-a-boo of sovereignty."

April 11, 1990 – Russian President Gorbachev announced Russia would join New World Order.

August 2, 1990 – Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

August 17, 1990 – President Bush [Senior] announces that the Iraqi invasion “shall not stand, because it threatens the New World Order”.

September 11, 1990 – President Bush calls the Gulf War an opportunity for the New World Order. In an address to Congress entitled Toward a New World Order, Mr. Bush says:

“The crisis in the Persian Gulf offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times... a new world order can emerge in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.... Today the new world is struggling to be born.”

September 25, 1990 – In an address to the U.N., Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze describes Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as “an act of terrorism [that] has been perpetrated against the emerging New World Order.” On December 31, Gorbachev declares that the New World Order would be ushered in by the Gulf Crisis.

October 1, 1990 – In a U.N. address, President Bush speaks of the:

“...collective strength of the world community expressed by the U.N...an historic movement towards a new world order... a new partnership of nations... a time when humankind came into its own... to bring about a revolution of the spirit and the mind and begin a journey into a... new age.”

1991 – Author Linda MacRae-Campbell publishes *How to Start a Revolution at Your School in Context*. She promotes the use of “change agents” as “self-acknowledged revolutionaries” and “co-conspirators.”

1991 – President Bush praises the New World Order in a State of Union Message:

“What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea – a new world order... to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind... based on shared principles and the rule of law.... The illumination of a thousand points of light.... The winds of change are with us now.”

February 6, 1991 – President Bush tells the Economic Club of New York:

“My vision of a new world order foresees a United Nations with a revitalized peacekeeping function.”

June, 1991 – The Council on Foreign Relations co-sponsors an assembly *Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order* which is attended by 65 prestigious members of government, labor, academia, the media, military, and the professions from nine countries. Later, several of the conference participants joined some 100 other world leaders for another closed door meeting of the Bilderberg Society in Baden Baden, Germany. The Bilderbergers also exert considerable clout in determining the foreign policies of their respective governments.

July, 1991 – The Southeastern World Affairs Institute discusses the New World Order. In a program, topics include, Legal Structures for a New World Order and The United Nations: From its Conception to a New World Order. Participants include a former director of the U.N.'s General Legal Division, and a former Secretary General of International Planned Parenthood.

Late July, 1991 – On a Cable News Network program, CFR member and former CIA director Stansfield Turner (Rhodes scholar), when asked about Iraq, responded:

“We have a much bigger objective. We’ve got to look at the long run here. This is an example – the situation between the United Nations and Iraq – where the United Nations is deliberately intruding into the sovereignty of a sovereign nation...Now this is a marvelous precedent (to be used in) all countries of the world...”

October 29, 1991 – David Funderburk, former U. S. Ambassador to Romania, tells a North Carolina audience:

“George Bush has been surrounding himself with people who believe in one-world government. They believe that the Soviet system and the American system are converging.”

The vehicle to bring this about, said Funderburk, is the United Nations, “the majority of whose 166 member states are socialist, atheist, and anti-American.” Funderburk served as ambassador in Bucharest from 1981 to 1985, when he resigned in frustration over U.S. support of the oppressive regime of the late Rumanian dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu.

October 30, 1991: – President Gorbachev at the Middle East Peace Talks in Madrid states:

“We are beginning to see practical support. And this is a very significant sign of the movement towards a new era, a new age... We see both in our country and elsewhere...ghosts of the old thinking...When we rid ourselves of their presence, we will be better able to move toward a new world order... relying on the relevant mechanisms of the United Nations.”

Elsewhere, in Alexandria, Virginia, Elena Lenskaya, Counsellor to the Minister of Education of Russia, delivers the keynote address for a program titled, Education for a New World Order.

1992 – The Twilight of Sovereignty by CFR member (and former Citicorp Chairman) Walter Wriston is published, in which he claims:

“A truly global economy will require ...compromises of national sovereignty... There is no escaping the system.”

1992 – The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit takes place in Rio de Janeiro this year, headed by Conference Secretary-General Maurice Strong. The main products of this summit are the Biodiversity Treaty and Agenda 21, which the U.S. hesitates to sign because of opposition at home due to the threat to sovereignty and economics. The summit says the first world's wealth must

be transferred to the third world.

July 20, 1992 – TIME magazine publishes *The Birth of the Global Nation* by Strobe Talbott, Rhodes Scholar, roommate of Bill Clinton at Oxford University, CFR Director, and Trilateralist, in which he writes:

“All countries are basically social arrangements... No matter how permanent or even sacred they may seem at any one time, in fact they are all artificial and temporary... Perhaps national sovereignty wasn't such a great idea after all... But it has taken the events in our own wondrous and terrible century to clinch the case for world government.”

As an editor of Time, Talbott defended Clinton during his presidential campaign. He was appointed by President Clinton as the number two person at the State Department behind Secretary of State Warren Christopher, former Trilateralist and former CFR Vice-Chairman and Director. Talbott was confirmed by about two-thirds of the U.S. Senate despite his statement about the unimportance of national sovereignty.

September 29, 1992 – At a town hall meeting in Los Angeles, Trilateralist and former CFR president Winston Lord delivers a speech titled *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World*, in which he remarks:

“To a certain extent, we are going to have to yield some of our sovereignty, which will be controversial at home... [Under] the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)... some Americans are going to be hurt as low-wage jobs are taken away.”

Lord became an Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration.

Winter, 1992-93 – The CFR's *Foreign Affairs* publishes *Empowering the United Nations* by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who asserts:

“It is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands... Underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all humanity... It is a sense that increasingly finds expression in the gradual expansion of international law... In this setting the significance of the United Nations should be evident and accepted.”

December 31, 1992 – Formation of Western Europe as the first nation to be formed in the global 10-Nation Reorganization Plan.

1993 – Strobe Talbott receives the Norman Cousins Global Governance Award for his 1992 TIME article, *The Birth of the Global Nation* and in appreciation for what he has done “for the cause of global governance.” President Clinton writes a letter of congratulation which states:

“Norman Cousins worked for world peace and world government... Strobe Talbott's lifetime achievements as a voice for global harmony have earned him this recognition... He will be a worthy recipient of the Norman Cousins Global Governance Award. Best wishes... for future success.”

Not only does President Clinton use the specific term, “world government,” but he also expressly wishes the WFA “future success” in pursuing world federal government. Talbott proudly accepts the award, but says the WFA should have given it to the other nominee, Mikhail Gorbachev.

July 18, 1993 – CFR member and Trilateralist Henry Kissinger writes in the Los Angeles Times concerning NAFTA:

“What Congress will have before it is not a conventional trade agreement but the architecture of a new international system... a first step toward a new world order.”

August 23, 1993 – Christopher Hitchens, Socialist friend of Bill Clinton when he was at Oxford University, says in a C-Span interview:

“...it is, of course the case that there is a ruling class in this country, and that it has allies internationally.”

October 30, 1993 – Washington Post ombudsman Richard Harwood does an op-ed piece about the role of the CFR’s media members:

“Their membership is an acknowledgment of their ascension into the American ruling class [where] they do not merely analyze and interpret foreign policy for the United States; they help make it.”

January/February, 1994 – The CFR’s Foreign Affairs prints an opening article by CFR Senior Fellow Michael Clough in which he writes that the “Wise Men” (e.g. Paul Nitze, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and John J. McCloy) have:

“assiduously guarded it [American foreign policy] for the past 50 years...They ascended to power during World War II...This was as it should be. National security and the national interest, they argued must transcend the special interests and passions of the people who make up America... How was this small band of Atlantic-minded internationalists able to triumph?... Eastern internationalists were able to shape and staff the burgeoning foreign policy institutions... As long as the Cold War endured and nuclear Armageddon seemed only a missile away, the public was willing to tolerate such an undemocratic foreign policy making system.”

1995 – The State of the World Forum took place in the fall of this year, sponsored by the Gorbachev Foundation located at the Presidio in San Francisco. Foundation President Jim Garrison chairs the meeting of who’s-whos from around the world including Margaret Thatcher, Maurice Strong, George Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev and others. Conversation centers around the oneness of mankind and the coming global government. However, the term “global governance” is now used in place of “new world order” since the latter has become a political liability, being a lightning rod for opponents of global government.

April 19, 1995 – Oklahoma City bombing of the Federal Murrah Building.

1996 – The United Nations 420-page report Our Global Neighborhood is published. It outlines a plan for “global governance,” calling for an international Conference on Global

Governance in 1998 for the purpose of submitting to the world the necessary treaties and agreements for ratification by the year 2000.

1996 – State of the World Forum II takes place in the fall in San Francisco. Many of the sessions are closed to the press.

December 31, 1999 – Washington Monument sprays colored light into the black night sky, symbolizing the 'impregnation' of the New World Order.

September 10, 2000 – The conclusion of a 13-day summit – August 28 - September 10, 2000 – which officially gave birth to the New World Order, which was 'conceived' 9 months earlier at the Washington Obelisk in DC. See cuttingedge.org for details.

September 11, 2001 – Eleven years to the day after President Bush [Senior] delivers his speech to Congress entitled *Toward a New World Order*, and 1 year and 1 day after the official birth of the New World Order, "terrorists" attack and destroy the World Trade Center and severely damage the Pentagon.

Interestingly, the date could also have been chosen to celebrate the birth of The Knights Templar, formed by 9 European separatists who forbade new members for 9 years in 1111 AD.

September 12, 2001 – "There is a chance for the President of the United States to use this disaster to carry out what his father - a phrase his father used I think only once, and it hasn't been used since - and that is a new world order." - Senator Gary Hart, Council on Foreign Relations meeting.

September 13, 2001 – Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the retaliation [re: Sept 11] would be continued until the roots of terrorism are destroyed. "These people try to hide. They won't be able to hide forever ... They think their harbors are safe, but they won't be safe forever ... it's not simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism."

October 11, 2001 – Tom Brokaw (popular US news anchor) announces the world now has formed into the New World Order.

October 26, 2001 – President Bush signs legislation into law that gives Federal Government dictatorial powers and severely – if not fatally – erodes individual liberties and rights.

January 29, 2002 – Bush, in his State of the Union Address, lists Iraq, Iran and North Korea as constituting an 'axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger'.

September 12, 2002 – Bush tells UN that Iraq is a "grave and gathering danger" and that the US "will not allow any terrorist or tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of mass murder".

February 01, 2003 – Space shuttle Columbia breaks up on re-entry over Dallas, Texas.

February 2003 – First reported cases of SARS. A massive media blitz attempts to create a pandemic, but by May 2003, only 600 people worldwide have died. Compared to the Influenza Pandemic of 1917-1919 which killed 800,000 Americans and 25 million people worldwide, SARS is hardly a pandemic.

March 17, 2003 – At 8:15pm, EST, President Bush announces a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave the country with his sons, or suffer the invasion.

March 20, 2003 – US starts invasion of Iraq, exactly 555 days after September 11, 2001. The start of World War III?

February 14, 2006 – Bill is introduced in the United States House of Representatives to reinstate compulsory military service.

May 19, 2006 – Bush considering creating a North American Union. Will this replace the United States?

New World Order Goals summarized

Creation of one World Government.

Creation of a single unified monetary system which includes the abolishment of cash money.

Destruction of Religions and creation of their own.

Destruction of all national identity and national pride.

Drastic population reduction.

Merger of Capitalism and Communism.

Return to feudalism.

Dissemination of cultural norms.

Creation of a post industrial zero growth society.

Destruction of racial identities.

Removal of personal choice and destiny by the constant creation and management of crisis.

15.2 Foundations

World peace through world government and world law. It is an ancient idea that has fastened itself mightily on the minds of men in many ages. "The abolition of war and the establishment of a world government are the two main themes of contemporary

utopianism," notes philosopher Thomas Molnar in *Utopia: The Perennial Heresy*. "These objectives are as old as Utopian thought itself."² Never before, however, has our human race been so close to inaugurating this Utopian "ideal" — to establishing and empowering government on a planetary scale. Global "crises" — environmental decay, poverty, overpopulation, economic and political instability — and the still-present threat of war and nuclear holocaust demand "global solutions." Transnational problems and growing interdependence defy our antiquated "world order" of nation states. So say a growing chorus of media-designated "experts." But our planet and our age have had more than passing acquaintance with Utopias empowered. And without exception, the promises of the Utopian dream have yielded to dystopian nightmares. The tens of millions of victims of Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Ho, Kim, Fidel, Pol Pot, Amin, Lumumba, Qaddafi, Khomeini, and dozens of other murderous despots cry out to us. They warn us against the Utopian siren call. They warn us of the fundamental truth embodied in George Washington's definition of government:

"Government is not reason; it is not eloquence; it is force! Like fire, it is a dangerous servant and a fearful master."

World government, of course, would necessitate worldwide force — unprecedented power on a global scale. Make no mistake about it, that is what the advocates of "an empowered United Nations" are really after. And what is most disturbing is that they have very nearly succeeded in grasping hold of this power, without most inhabitants of this planet having the slightest idea of the "happiness" being planned for them. A chilling insight into the kind of future we might expect under the global regime of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent United Nations is provided in a presentation on "world order" given by a high UN official to the American Association of Systems Analysts.

The official, Robert Muller, held many top UN posts over a 35-year career at the UN, including that of Secretary of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In his book *New Genesis: Shaping a Global Spirituality*, Muller recounts how he explained to the systems analysts the myriad activities in which the UN was even at that time (the 1970s) deeply involved:

"Yes, the UN is concerned with our globe's climate....

Yes, the UN is concerned with the total biosphere through project Earthwatch, the Global Environment Program of UNEP and UNESCO's program, "Man and the Biosphere."

Yes the UN is dealing with our planet's seas and oceans....

Yes, the UN is dealing with the world's deserts....

Yes, the UN is dealing with the human person, that alpha and omega of our efforts....

The person's basic rights, justice, health, progress and peace are being dealt with from the fetus to the time of death.

Yes, the UN is dealing with the atom in the International Atomic Energy Agency....

Yes, the UN is dealing with art, folklore, nature, the preservation of species, germ banks, labor, handicrafts, literature, industry, trade, tourism, energy, finance, birth defects, sicknesses, pollution, politics, the prevention of accidents, of war and conflicts, the building

of peace, the eradication of armaments, atomic radiation, the settlement of disputes, the development of worldwide cooperation, the aspirations of East and West, North and South, black and white, rich and poor, etc.

Muller then records: "I went on like this for more than an hour. When I finished, I still had a bagful to say, but I was exhausted by my exaltation at the vastness of the cooperation I had seen develop.... Something gigantic was going on, a real turning point in evolution ... glorious and beautiful like Aphrodite emerging from the sea. This was the beginning of a new age.... The great hour of truth had arrived for the human race." The epiphany appears to have nearly overwhelmed him. Later upon reflection, however, Muller found to his dismay that there were vital spheres of human and planetary concern not yet brought within the UN's superintending care. "I had found several gaps," he records. Gaps? What possible "gaps" could there be? A great many, it seems. For "there was no worldwide cooperation for the globe's cold zones, the mountains, our topsoil, standardization, world safety ... the family, morality, spirituality, world psychology and sociology, the world of senses, the inner realm of the individual, his needs, values, perceptions, love and happiness ... on consumer protection ... on the world's elderly, on world law, on the ultimate meaning of human life and its objectives."

Muller fumed that "political men were still dragging their feet in antiquated, obsolete quarrels which prevented them from seeing the vast new universal scheme of evolution which was dawning upon the world." Indeed. Parochial politicians were stifling the messianic mission of Mr. Muller and his fellow UN savants, whose only desire is to "transform" the world. Much has been done to alleviate those hindrances and deficiencies, however. New United Nations treaties and conventions are rushing to fill in the "gaps" Muller was so worried about. The colossal UN bureaucracy Muller outlined in his book has been greatly augmented. One UN program alone, the massive Agenda 21, "proposes an array of actions which are intended to be implemented by every person on Earth." And the UN's newly created International Criminal Court poses the very real prospect of American citizens being delivered up for trial before international tribunals, without any of the protections guaranteed in our Constitution.

Although his name is not universally known, Mr. Muller is not some inconsequential UN bureaucrat whose Utopian rantings can be lightly dismissed. He is author of the "World Core Curriculum," now used in many schools worldwide, and is chancellor of the UN's University for Peace in Costa Rica. Muller, who is a self-professed disciple of the theosophist/satanist Alice Bailey, is revered in globalist circles and is one of the most frequently quoted "sages" and architects of the UN's new world religion. In his book *My Testament to the UN*, Muller pays tribute to the UN's New Age spiritual guru, Sri Chinmoy, and approvingly quotes Chinmoy's "prophecy" regarding the UN's ultimate destiny:

"No human force will ever be able to destroy the United Nations, for the United Nations is not a mere building or a mere idea; it is not a man-made creation. The United Nations is the vision-light of the Absolute Supreme, which is slowly, steadily and

unerringly illumining the ignorance, the night of our human life. The divine success and supreme progress of the United Nations is bound to become a reality. At his choice hour, the Absolute Supreme will ring His own victory-bell here on Earth through the loving and serving heart of the United Nations.”

Yes, for Muller and his fellow votaries of one-world paganism, who populate the higher echelons of the UN and the globalist movement, the United Nations is divine and is leading us to, as Muller says, “the apotheosis [deification] of human life on earth.”¹⁰ Human life, that is, personified by Muller and the UN’s spiritual elites, who, naturally, will lead and rule in this new world order. Professor Molnar dissects this idolatry and monumental conceit with piercing precision: “At Utopia’s roots there is defiance of God, pride unlimited, a yearning for enormous power and the assumption of divine attributes with a view to manipulating and shaping man’s fate.”

Where does this supreme arrogance invariably lead? The record of history is pitiless. Dr. Molnar continues: “In a raving moment, the story goes, Caligula wished that mankind had only one head so that he might chop it off with one blow. So, too, the Utopian: he wants to deal with one entity so as to simplify his own task of transforming indomitable human nature into a slave.” The UN’s Robert Muller fully recognizes the revolutionary nature of his mission. “As on the eve of the French Revolution,” he exclaims, “... we must outgrow the increasingly erroneous notion of good and bad as seen by a particular group ... and define new concepts of what is good or bad for the entire human family. This is absolutely essential.” Muller and other enthusiasts for a “new world order” under UN hegemonic rule invariably share this sympathetic fascination and fixation with the abominations and terror of the French Revolution.

Appeals to “empower” the United Nations are worse than foolish; they are evil and must be opposed by all honorable people. History more than amply vindicates Lord Acton’s axiom that “power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This has proven true even when rulers have started out as relatively virtuous; even more so when already-corrupt men grasp hold of absolute power. The primary movers in the ongoing drive to “transform” the United Nations, and to transfer the powers of sovereign governments to this global monstrosity, are not misguided, well-intentioned Utopians. We will not dissuade them with facts, arguments, and debates pointing out the errors and dangers inherent in their tyrannical proposals. They are not interested in facts, arguments, and debates — except as it serves as a cover for their totalitarian agenda. We are dealing with a self-perpetuating conspiracy of immensely wealthy, utterly wicked, power-mad megalomaniacs who want to rule the world. It is that simple. During the course of the past century, this cabal of one-world insiders has gradually gained control of the levers of power in the federal government, the Democrat and Republican Parties, and many major corporations, universities, think tanks, media, and tax-exempt foundations. Operating through respectable-appearing front groups — principally the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Trilateral Commission (TC), the Bilderberg Group (BG), and the Committee for Economic Development (CED) — these oneworlders have hijacked

our country. While systematically destroying our constitutional republic and gradually converting it into a socialist dictatorship, they also have been busily fomenting wars and revolutions, toppling free governments that were friendly to America, and repeatedly aiding ruthless Communist dictators and Third World thugs who are America's enemies. The blood of millions of victims is on their hands.

Now they are pressing forward with ever-increasing audacity, demanding the power to refashion the world according to their Procrustean logic. If we do not stop their megalomaniacal scheme, they will, in the words of the French Revolutionist Carrier, turn the world "into a cemetery rather than fail in her regeneration." Yes, these are very serious charges, but they reflect a very grim reality. They are, unfortunately, more than sustained by mountains of evidence. We have attempted here to clear away some of the haze that has long hidden these mountains, so that you, the reader, may make some very serious decisions based upon historical facts, perspective, and truth that previously have been denied to you. History is a very bloody and unforgiving crucible that we ignore at our own great peril. However, history need not fatalistically repeat itself. Informed, courageous, responsible individuals can and do change the course of history.

The Threat

We are talking about a revolutionary transformation that has been gathering steam since World War II (Note: More like even before World War I) and is now entering its final stages. It is a revolution that, if completed, will mean the end of the United States of America — as well as the abolition of every other sovereign, independent nation. This radical revolution is simultaneously overturning the nation-state system that has been the foundation for governance on this planet for the past several hundred years, and forging a world government with unprecedented powers. If allowed to proceed to completion, it will usher in an Orwellian global tyranny under the United Nations. We know that to many people this is an astounding statement. You, dear reader, may be among those who find such a claim to be "ridiculous," "absurd," "nutty." After all, you reason, the United States is the most powerful nation on earth, "the last superpower".

The UN has no military of its own to impose global laws or regulations upon unwilling Americans. In fact, the UN must come hat in hand to the U.S. every time it determines to send peacekeepers into some new area torn by conflict. And hasn't the UN been complaining for years about U.S. refusals to pay dues? The UN looks like a pretty helpless, toothless "threat," you say. And you would be right — except for one very important thing: You would have completely misunderstood the nature of the danger and direction from which the threat is coming. Observers who have carefully followed and analyzed international developments and the policies and institutions of the UN have never worried that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan — or one of his predecessors or successors — would impose a UN dictatorship upon a strong and resistant United States. That is not going to happen. We are not worried that an imminent UN tyranny is about

to be militarily imposed upon Americans against the wishes of our own government. The danger is very real, nonetheless, but it emanates not so much from Kofi Annan, the UN itself, or any foreign, external source as it does from those within our own government who seek to impose a “new world order” upon us. As one of our more famous former U.S. presidents accurately noted:

“Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step the ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined ... could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years. At what point, then, is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.” - Abraham Lincoln, 1838

The danger has indeed sprung up amongst us. There are many who go by the name “American” who prefer to think of themselves as “global citizens” or “citizens of the world” and who consciously are leading us to national suicide. An alarming number of American citizens who hold high elective and appointive office, and who have taken oaths to defend our nation, our Constitution, and our laws, are now committed to a “new world order” which does not allow for a free, independent, sovereign United States of America. They are joined by prominent individuals holding influential positions of trust in many of our private institutions. In the new “interdependent” world order they envision, a U.S.A. with continuing superpower status is viewed as a “threat” to global peace and security.

In every case, a small circle of power-lusting conspirators used large movements of idealists and dupes to accomplish their schemes. In every instance, the danger signs were there for those who were willing to see. The opportunities were there for those with courage to stop the madness by exposing and opposing the criminals before they could seize total political power. Alas, in each case, too few citizens were willing to see and to act courageously. For this they paid a horrendous price. The signs are here for us to see today; we will have no excuse if we fail to act with responsibility and courage. Our price for failing to do so will be far more terrible than anything this planet has yet seen.

In September 2000, some 150 presidents, premiers, dictators, and potentates converged on New York City for the UN Millennium Summit, the most spectacular UN gathering ever. Serving as cochairman of the week-long political gala was Sam Nujoma, the Communist terrorist who was installed as “President” of Namibia in 1990 by the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. State Department. The Summit attendees all received a copy of *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, a report “authored” by Kofi Annan to guide the UN’s “reform agenda” at the event. Annan’s *We the Peoples* proposed nothing less than a global, socialist superstate dressed in New Deal verbiage. The Annan plan even adopted Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Brain Trust rhetoric of “Freedom from Fear” and “Freedom from Want” as titles for the report’s sub-themes. *We the Peoples* also proposed “new forms of global governance,” “global norms,” “global rules” — all of which infer a role for the UN as global legislator. None

of this surprises us, of course; UN poohbahs like Annan are well known for their self-aggrandizing pontifications and appeals for new global powers. However, this was not a typical, run-of-the-mill summit; something new and more sinister was at work here. The Millennium

Summit showcased a frightening new level of capability for sophisticated orchestration of an intensive, worldwide, multipronged, multi-level propaganda campaign. This astonishing process is capable of mobilizing and coordinating the activities of an impressive number of politicians, UN officials, corporate leaders, major organs of the media, academic institutions, think tanks and innumerable private, special-interest groups. Thus a relatively small but noisy, lavishly funded, and incredibly well organized minority has shown that it can generate tremendous, synchronized pressure completely out of proportion to its real size. This pressure is generated by deception, by falsely presenting the appearance of irresistible, universal support for UN proposals. The concentrated pressure is aimed at intimidating, silencing, and neutralizing all active and potential opposition, among both elected officials and private citizens. And it works with frightening effect. The element of surprise, together with concerted force, overwhelms the opposition.

Meanwhile, outside the UN, crowds composed of members of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) clamored for the creation of a Global Peoples Assembly, a sort of UN Congress to enact global legislation. A few blocks away another global confab was underway promoting the same one-world agenda. The State of the World Forum 2000, sponsored by the Gorbachev Foundation, featured a weeklong series of symposia with prominent participants from the worlds of international business and finance, labor, academe, philanthropy, religion, environmental activism, government, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations — all beating the drums for world government under an empowered and greatly expanded UN. However, all of these meetings, symposia, demonstrations and speeches might be dismissed as bluster, globaloney, rant and cant — except for several important facts:

- They were preceded and accompanied by similar one-world endorsements from some of America's top officials and political and intellectual leaders;
- They were preceded and accompanied by concrete actions and proposals by leading U.S. political and intellectual leaders to implement these proposals;
- Very wealthy and powerful U.S. individuals, companies, and institutions have committed massive financial support to establishing "global governance";
- The UN system has been expanding dramatically in size and scope and now constitutes a huge planetary bureaucracy;
- Equally important (and dangerous) as the expanding superstructure of the UN itself is the proliferation of the UN's subordinate international organizations and institutions, such as NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), etc.;
- A huge network of radical NGOs, financed by governments and tax-exempt foundations,

and masquerading as authentic representatives of “global civil society,” can now assemble mobs at will to “lobby” for the cause du jour;

- This drive for an empowered UN is the culmination of plans set in motion decades earlier by a power-seeking cabal

On February 18, 2000, the World Federalist Association (WFA), one of the largest and most ardent organizations promoting world government, took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times to proclaim triumphantly that “Cronkite and Clinton make a strong case for recasting the United Nations as a world federation.” The World Federalist Association ad noted: “Last October, President Clinton applauded federalism — the basis for the U.S. Constitution — as ‘the arrangement of government most likely to give us the best of all worlds. What kind of “federalism” was Mr. Clinton predicting and endorsing? He cited “as Exhibit A the European Union,” or EU, which is rapidly subsuming its member countries in a colossal, socialist, and increasingly tyrannical superstate.

The WFA’s New York Times ad noted that in the same month that Clinton was making his above-mentioned federalism speech, former CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite received the WFA’s “Norman Cousins Global Governance Award for his promotion of world government in his autobiography *A Reporter’s Life*.” In accepting the award, Cronkite said: “Those of us who are living today can influence the future of civilization. We can influence whether our planet will drift into chaos and violence, or whether through monumental educational and political effort we will achieve a world of peace under a system of law where individual violators of that law are brought to justice.... We need a system of enforceable world law — a democratic federal world government — to deal with world problems.”

However, Bill Clinton himself had already praised an earlier recipient of the Norman Cousins Global Governance Award: his old Oxford University roommate, Strobe Talbott, whom he had appointed U.S. Ambassador at Large. That praise came in the form of a letter dated June 22, 1993, which was read at the WFA awards ceremony two days later. Mr. Clinton’s letter praised WFA founder Norman Cousins’ lifetime effort “for world peace and world government”. Specifically, the World Federalists were honoring Talbott for a pro-world government essay he had written for *Time* magazine entitled “The Birth of the Global Nation” (July 20, 1992 issue). Therein Talbott approvingly forecast that in the future “nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single, global authority.” Talbott’s advocacy of world government did not prevent President Clinton from appointing him Deputy Secretary of State. That should not surprise anyone. Clinton, like Talbott, is a member of the world-government-promoting Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as were over 400 other members of his administration. In addition, both are also “members in public service” of the Trilateral Commission (TC), an even more exclusive establishmentarian club greasing the skids for global governance. These groups have orchestrated an outpouring of symphonic appeals for world government and have been preparing the American psyche for a major globalist push to provide the United Nations, the WTO, and other international institutions with legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The vast majority of Americans (or rather all members of the UN) have no idea that a huge array of UN schemes — some of which we have already become officially a party to, and others which are awaiting action by the U.S. government — pose very real threats to their freedom. These include:

- The World Trade Organization
- The massive environmental manifesto, Agenda 21
- The Biodiversity Treaty
- The Global Warming Convention
- Programs for national and personal disarmament
- The Tobin Tax and global income tax
- The vast expansion of UN military operations
- Proposals for a standing UN military force
- The UN's new International Criminal Court
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child
- The UN's global Education for All program

Disarmament and Submission

“A world effectively controlled by the United Nations is one in which “world government“ would come about through the establishment of supranational institutions.... [T]he present UN Charter could theoretically be revised in order to erect such an organization equal to the task envisaged, thereby codifying a radical rearrangement of power in the world.... National disarmament is a condition sine qua non for effective UN control.... The overwhelming central fact would still be the loss of control of their military power by individual nations. - Lincoln P. Bloomfield (CFR), 1962 U.S. Department of State Study Memorandum No. 7, A World Effectively Controlled By the United Nations.

Following World War I, a powerful cabal of one-world internationalists offered humanity a “solution“ to the horrible ravages of war: world government. The League of Nations was their instrument of salvation and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was their prophet. The U.S. Senate, however, refused to ratify the League of Nations Covenant. Americans were suspicious of entanglements with the constantly warring European powers and wanted no part of submersion in a world super-state. They saw through the sophistry and the seductive “peace“ appeals. Any League strong enough to “enforce peace“ globally would also possess the power to impose tyranny worldwide. There would be no way to limit its power. Without U.S. membership, the League of Nations was doomed. However, in the wake of the even more massive death and destruction wrought by World War II, the organized one-world forces succeeded in pulling the United States into the League's successor, the United Nations. In the decades since, these advocates of a “new world order“ have been working assiduously to invest the United Nations gradually with legislative, executive, and judicial powers that will transform it into a global government.

professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is very important to our consideration here for his revelations about this conspiracy for world conquest. Unintended revelations, we hasten to add. Dr. Bloomfield is the author of one of the most critical and damning pieces of evidence to fall into our hands concerning the conspiracy by Insiders in our own government to destroy the United States and subject the American people, along with the people of all the world, to an all-powerful United Nations. What is so astounding is that even four decades after this scheme was discovered and exposed, Dr. Bloomfield and his coconspirators are not only still free (in fact they have never even been officially investigated) but are actively pursuing the same criminal scheme. Even more extraordinary still, as the reader will soon see, the treasonous scheme Bloomfield devised is quite obviously still serving as a guiding light to official U.S. policies. We are referring to the secret 1962 study Dr. Bloomfield authored for the Kennedy State Department entitled Study Memorandum No. 7, A World Effectively Controlled By the United Nations. The title itself is startling, but the contents are absolutely shocking for their audacity and treachery. In the study's opening summary, Professor Bloomfield writes:

“A world effectively controlled by the United Nations is one in which “world government“ would come about through the establishment of supranational institutions, characterized by mandatory universal membership and some ability to employ physical force. Effective control would thus entail a preponderance of political power in the hands of a supranational organization.... [T]he present UN Charter could theoretically be revised in order to erect such an organization equal to the task envisaged, thereby codifying a radical rearrangement of power in the world..... The principal features of a model system would include the following: (1) powers sufficient to monitor and enforce disarmament, settle disputes, and keep the peace — including taxing powers ... ; (2) an international force, balanced appropriately among ground, sea, air, and space elements, consisting of 500,000 men, recruited individually, wearing a UN uniform, and controlling a nuclear force composed of 50-100 mixed land-based mobile and undersea-based missiles, averaging one megaton per weapon; (3) governmental powers distributed among three branches...; (4) compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court...”

In this blueprint for global tyranny financed by the U.S. government, Bloomfield repeatedly stated a key point, that “it is world government we are discussing here — inescapable.“ And he leaves no doubt that the scheme would mean subjecting the U.S. to this omnipotent “contemplated regime“ (his words). He emphasizes, for instance, that:

“National disarmament is a condition sine qua non for effective UN control.... The essential point is the transfer of the most vital element of sovereign power from the states to a supranational government.... The overwhelming central fact would still be the loss of control of their military power by individual nations.“

Dr. Bloomfield lamented that it would be extremely difficult to sell this program for world government to the American people. However, it would be possible, he wrote, if our national leaders utilized “a grave crisis or war to bring about a sudden transformation

in national attitudes sufficient for the purpose." The MIT professor went on to suggest that "the order we examine may be brought into existence as a result of a series of sudden, nasty, and traumatic shocks." The Bloomfield scheme is as old as tyranny itself: Create a crisis and then offer a solution. That solution always entails, of course, "temporary" seizure of total power.

Dr. Bloomfield's study was not just a professorial pipe dream destined to be unread and forgotten in some musty, dusty archive.* It describes what has become the operational policy of the U.S. government. Bloomfield, we should point out, was, and is, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and it was his fellow CFR members in President Kennedy's CFR-dominated State Department who initiated the official implementation of this scheme. In 1961, the Kennedy administration promulgated the nowinfamous disarmament plan entitled Freedom From War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. Also known as Department of State Publication 7277, this plan, which is very similar to the Bloomfield study, presented a three-stage program for the transfer of U.S. arms to the United Nations. During Stage II (the stage we are currently in), the document mandates: "The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened." This will be accomplished "to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

This incredible, treasonous policy — which has been actively but quietly brought along toward completion during successive administrations — concludes as follows:

"In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament ... would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force."

Pause and reflect for a moment on the enormity of the audacity and treason involved in such an incredible plot. It says that under the system it envisions, "no state" (meaning no country, including the United States) would be able to challenge the UN's power. This means that the U.S., like every other nation, would become a vassal of an omnipotent UN. Who would actually be in control of this power?

Besides conspiring to deliver our nuclear arsenal to the UN, oneworld architects like Cleveland, Bloomfield, et al., also have been pushing full tilt to build a globe-straddling UN conventional army. Everyone who wasn't hibernating for the past 10 years or stranded on a desert isle has heard of Operation Desert Storm, the massive, U.S.-led, UN-sanctioned 1991 invasion of Iraq, which President George Bush (CFR) declared was necessary to liberate Kuwait, stop the "naked aggression" of Saddam Hussein, and promote "a new world order." But how many people have heard of, or remember, Operations Desert Spring, Laser Strike, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Eagle Eye, Joint Falcon, Joint Forge, Deliberate Forge, or Determined Forge? Probably not very many. And yet these are all ongoing multinational military operations — in Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina — involving large numbers of U.S. military personnel and assets. And how many people have

heard of, or remember, Operations Shining Hope, Noble Anvil, Desert Fox, Desert Thunder, Bevel Edge, Noble Obelisk, Joint Endeavor, Deliberate Guard, Determined Guard, Decisive Enhancement, Decisive Edge, Desert Strike, Desert Focus, or any of the dozens of other UN, NATO, and other multilateral deployments of U.S. armed forces throughout the world over the past decade?

The Secret Network of Power

“We are at present working discreetly with all our might to wrest this mysterious force called sovereignty out of the clutches of the local nation states of the world.” - Arnold Toynbee, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1931

“We shall have world government, whether or not we like it. The question is only whether world government will be achieved by consent or by conquest.” — James P. Warburg (CFR), testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, 1950

“I know of the operations of this network [the international Round Table groups, including the Council on Foreign Relations] because I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960’s, to examine its papers and secret records.” - Professor Carroll Quigley of Georgetown University, “mentor” to Bill Clinton, 1966

The strands that are multiplying about the American people and gradually being forged into steel manacles are the work not of a single night but of decades. The network of individuals and organizations leading this effort for global conquest has worked patiently and assiduously to build a worldwide “movement” which, on the surface, appears to be a completely absurd mixture of incongruous and opposing parts. It is a fusion of radical socialists, feminists, pacifists, environmentalists, and communists together with international bankers, industrialists, and corporate CEOs, including some of the world’s wealthiest capitalists. Yet the disparate members of this odd alliance chant the one-world mantra in unison: “Global problems require global solutions.” And global solutions, they assure us, can only be provided by a world government — one with ever-increasing powers.

UN: Creature of the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR)

The United Nations, we learn as schoolchildren, represents mankind’s highest aspirations and ideals. According to textbook lore and steady propaganda in the major media, the UN is the world’s “last best hope for peace.” Following World War II, we are told, the heroic and visionary UN founders came together to save humanity from the certain annihilation that would result if a nuclear war were allowed to occur. That is a myth, a lie. The UN, as we will show, is completely a creature of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and was created for purposes entirely different from the noble ones usually cited. It was created to accumulate and usurp power so that eventually it could become a vehicle for imposing totalitarian control over our entire planet. The plans for the United Nations

were drafted in 1943 by the Informal Agenda Group (IAG), a secret steering committee set up by FDR's Secretary of State Cordell Hull. At the UN's founding San Francisco Conference, 43 of the U.S. delegates — virtually our entire contingent — were, or would later become, members of the CFR, including also Nelson Rockefeller. Of course, the top man at that conference, serving as acting Secretary-General, was Soviet agent Alger Hiss, also a CFR member. Hiss not only ran the UN show at San Francisco and appointed many of the delegates and UN officers, but he also played a key role in drafting the UN Charter.

Secret Shadow Government

From FDR's administration to the present, the CFR's pernicious influence in American society and government has grown dramatically. The CFR has become in effect the secret shadow government of the United States; its members have dominated every administration since World War II. Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Bush, and Clinton were members, as were hundreds of their appointments. No other organization even comes close to exercising this kind of political power in the United States. Author/journalist Richard Rovere (CFR) has described the Council as "a sort of Presidium for that part of the Establishment that guides our destiny as a nation." Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (CFR) has termed it a "front organization [for] the heart of the American Establishment."⁹ Newsweek has referred to the Pratt House* one-world coterie as "the foreign policy establishment of the U.S."

In his 1979 memoir *With No Apologies*, Senator Barry Goldwater noted that despite the heated rhetoric and change in party label from one administration to the next, the same internationalist policies continue unabated:

"When a new President comes on board, there is a great turnover in personnel but no change in policy. Example: During the Nixon years Henry Kissinger, CFR member and Nelson Rockefeller's protege, was in charge of foreign policy. When Jimmy Carter was elected, Kissinger was replaced by Zbigniew Brzezinski, CFR member and David Rockefeller's protege."

On October 30, 1993, the *Washington Post* printed one of the most candid (and rare) admissions against interest by the Establishment: a column by *Post* writer Richard Harwood, entitled "Ruling Class Journalists." Mr. Harwood openly conceded that the CFR's "members are the nearest thing we have to a ruling establishment in the United States." To illustrate his claim, Harwood pointed to the Clinton administration. "The president is a member," Harwood noted. "So is his secretary of state, the deputy secretary of state, all five of the undersecretaries...." And on and on he went, through a litany of the CFR membership roster in the Clinton regime. How can it be that an organization that has gained such incredible influence and power, that has virtually hijacked the American government, is so little known to the American public? The *Post*'s Mr. Harwood provides the answer:

"The editorial page editor, deputy editorial page editor, executive editor, managing edi-

tor, foreign editor, national affairs editor, business and financial editor and various writers as well as Katharine Graham, the paper's principal owner, represent The Washington Post in the council's membership."

Ditto for the other media giants: the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Time, US News & World Report, NBC, CBS, ABC, et al. CFR members Tom Brokaw, Dan Rather, Ted Koppel, Diane Sawyer, James Lehrer, Bernard Kalb, Irving R. Levine, David Brinkley, Barbara Walters, and Morton Kondracke, along with hundreds of other influential "journalists" and media executives, serve as propagandists for the Pratt House thought cartel.* In the words of Harlan Cleveland, they make sure the CFR's subversive operations stay "mostly below the surface of public attention."

Bilderberg Group: Power-mad Elitists

David Rockefeller gratefully acknowledged this indispensable "cloaking" service provided by the CFR/TC-dominated media at a meeting of the secretive Bilderberg Group (BG). Gathering at Sand, Germany in June 1991, this coterie of elite one-worlders had important global intrigues to plan and coordinate for the final decade of the millennium. Many top media Insiders were in attendance, but as in years past, they would reveal not a word of what they had heard at the confab to their readers or viewers. Despite the Bilderbergers' elaborate security precautions, however, the word did leak out in two French publications, Minute and Lectures Francaises. What did David Rockefeller, then the chairman emeritus of the American Establishment, have to say to the assembled aristocracy of the U.S. media? An amazing, stunning mouthful, that's what. We'll let you judge for yourself. This is part of Rockefeller's greeting to his Bilderberg boon companions:

"We are grateful to the Washington Post, the New York Times, Time magazine, and other great publications whose directors have attended our meetings and respected their promises of discretion for almost forty years. It would have been impossible for us to develop our plan for the world if we had been subject to the bright lights of publicity during these years. But the world is now more sophisticated and prepared to march towards a world government which will never again know war but only peace and prosperity for the whole of humanity. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national autodetermination practiced in the past centuries. It is also our duty to inform the press of our convictions as to the historic future of the century."

Incredible, no? Well, what else would you expect from a cabal of power-mad elitists who consider the whole world to be their own private oyster? These "enlightened ones," these illuminati, have been busily redesigning, reshaping, and "transforming" the world according to their own desires throughout the past century. They intend to be the planetary overlords in the new world order. As Mr. Rockefeller said, it would have been "impossible" for them to have come so far with their super-subversive plot except that their coconspirators in the media kept "the bright lights of publicity" off their dark schemes. The Post's Richard Harwood noted concerning the CFR media oligarchy: "They

do not merely analyze and interpret foreign policy for the United States; they help make it." He might also have said that they smother, suppress, censor, quash, and kill much of the real news (and grossly distort the rest) in order to help make "policy."

CFR Historian Speaks Out

One of the most informative and penetrating revelations concerning the CFR power network came in 1966 with publication of *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* by Professor Carroll Quigley of Georgetown University. As already pointed out in one of the entrance quotes to this chapter, Quigley was allowed for two years to examine the papers of the CFR. And what are the "aims" of this network? According to Dr. Quigley:

"[N]othing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole."

The network to which Quigley referred had provided the "brain trust" and the financial impetus behind the drive for the League of Nations, the effort Mr. Cleveland referred to as the "First Try" at world order. Leading that drive for the network was Col. Edward Mandell House (the reader should remember him even from the pre World War 1 era), the key advisor and "alter ego" of President Woodrow Wilson. When the League of Nations was thwarted by the U.S. Senate, Col. House and his colleagues determined to continue their struggle by other means. House was part of a cabal called "The Inquiry," a group of 100 "forwardlooking" social engineers who created the Versailles Peace Treaty at the close of World War I.

This group formed the American nucleus of what was to become the Council on Foreign Relations. The Inquiry's British counterparts created a companion organization - the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA). These groups were the product of an earlier secret society formed in February 1891 by Cecil Rhodes, the legendary "diamond king" and "colossus" of Africa, with British journalist William Stead. Rhodes, although famous as "the richest man in the world," was an ardent disciple of socialist Professor John Ruskin, under whom he had studied at Oxford. Dr. Quigley explains: "In this secret society Rhodes was to be leader; Stead, Brett (Lord Esher), and Milner were to form an executive committee; Arthur (Lord) Balfour, (Sir) Harry Johnston, Lord Rothschild, Albert (Lord) Grey, and others were listed as potential members of a 'Circle of Initiates'; while there was to be an outer circle known as the 'Association of Helpers' (later organized by Milner as the Round Table organization).... Thus the central part of the secret society was established by March 1891."

The plan developed by Rhodes and his small circle of co-conspirators was one in which "a world system of financial control in private hands" would be used to bring about world government. "This system," notes Quigley, "was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private meetings and conferences."27 Professor Quigley explained further:

“The apex of the system was the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland, a private bank owned and controlled by the worlds’ central banks which were themselves private corporations. Each central bank, in the hands of men like Montagu Norman of the Bank of England, Benjamin Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Charles Rist of the Bank of France, and Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank (during the Weimar Republic, not under Hitler. But he was an informant to British intelligence), sought to dominate its government by its ability to control Treasury loans, to manipulate foreign exchanges, to influence the level of economic activity in the country, and to influence cooperative politicians by subsequent economic rewards in the business world.”

In January 1924, Reginald McKenna, who was then chairman of the board of the Midland Bank (and had been Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1915-16), confirmed that the British system was completely dominated by the conspiratorial monied aristocracy. “I am afraid the ordinary citizen will not like to be told that the banks can, and do, create money,” said McKenna. “And they who control the credit of the nation direct the policy of Governments and hold in the hollow of their hands the destiny of the people.” On November 11, 1927, the Wall Street Journal called Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England, “the currency dictator of Europe.” Norman, a strange, furtive intriguer given to wearing disguises, using assumed names, and incessantly flitting about the world on mysterious missions, confirmed the Journal’s assertion before the Macmillan Committee on March 26, 1930.

A Higher Power

But as Professor Quigley points out, Norman answered to powers who stood in the shadows. “It must not be felt that these heads of the world’s chief central banks were themselves substantive powers in world finance,” writes Quigley. “They were not. Rather, they were the technicians and agents of the dominant investment bankers of their own countries, who had raised them up and were perfectly capable of throwing them down.” Those bankers to whom Quigley refers were members of the Rhodes-Milner network. Their immense power and influence were exercised through the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the CFR, and their many other levers of control in the government, the major political parties, academe, business, and the media. As Rhodes biographer Sarah Millin put it: “The government of the world was Rhodes’ simple desire.” The Rhodes Scholarships, like the Round Table groups, were integral to this global scheme. Part of Rhodes’ plan was to bring bright, ambitious young men to Oxford University for indoctrination and recruitment into his grand conspiracy. Co-conspirator William Stead said that Rhodes’ own words were that after 30 years there would be “between two and three thousand men [mathematically selected] in the prime of life scattered all over the world, each one of whom will have had impressed upon his mind in the most susceptible period of his life the dream of the Founder [Rhodes].” What were the qualities looked for in these specially selected “scholars”? According to Rhodes himself: “smugness, brutality, unctuous rectitude, and tact.” Which pluperfectly described the ruthless Cecil Rhodes. And just as aptly fit his most famous Rhodes Scholar and one-world acolyte: Bill Clinton.

Over the years, Round Table-style groups parallel to the CFR have been established in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, India, Canada, Japan and dozens of other countries. Rhodes' disciples have thus built a global network of unprecedented power, capable of influencing, manipulating, sabotaging, and controlling political and economic events on a scale previously unimaginable. "When the influence which the [Royal] Institute wields is combined with that controlled by the Milner Group in other fields — in education, in administration, in newspapers and periodicals — a really terrifying picture begins to emerge," wrote Quigley in *The Anglo-American Establishment*, which was published posthumously in 1981. He explained:

"The picture is terrifying because such power, whatever the goals at which it may be directed, is too much to be entrusted safely to any group.... No country that values its safety should allow what the Milner Group accomplished in Britain — that is, that a small number of men should be able to wield such power in administration and politics, should be given almost complete control over the publication of the documents relating to their actions, should be able to exercise such influence over the avenues of information that create public opinion, and should be able to monopolize so completely the writing and the teaching of the history of their own period."

"Capitalists" and the Communist Dimension

[T]he American Communists worked energetically and tirelessly to lay the foundations for the United Nations which we were sure would come into existence. - Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA

This task is the task of the world proletarian revolution, the task of the creation of the world Soviet republic. - V.I. Lenin, 1920 Congress of the Communist International

The ultimate object of the parties of the Socialist International is nothing less than world government. As a first step towards it, they seek to strengthen the United Nations.... - Declaration of the Socialist International 1962 Conference, Oslo, Norway

It is also beyond dispute that the leaders of the world Communist conspiracy were solidly behind the formation of the UN and have supported every effort to enlarge, strengthen, and empower it over the past half century. This is plainly evident from the official speeches, writings, and actions of top Soviet leaders and Communist leaders worldwide, as well as from official documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). We have also very extensive testimony to this effect from numerous top Soviet defectors and former American Communist officials. That the Communists would support an institution for world government is no mystery; the essence and substance of the whole Communist program has been the pursuit of that very object. As long ago as 1915, before the Bolshevik Revolution, Vladimir Lenin himself proposed a "United States of the World."

Soviet dictator and mass murderer Joseph Stalin, as far back as 1922, stated: "Let us

hope that by forming our confederate republic we shall be creating a reliable bulwark against international capitalism and that the new confederate state will another step towards the amalgamation of the toilers of the hole world into a single World Socialist Soviet Republic." The leader of the American Communist Party declared:

"It can be said, without exaggeration, that ever closer relations between our nation and the Soviet Union are an unconditional requirement for the United Nations as a world coalition.... The United Nations is the instrument for victory. Victory is required for the survival of our nation. The Soviet Union is an essential part of the United Nations. Mutual confidence between our country and the Soviet Union and joint work in the leadership of the United Nations are absolutely necessary."

Clearly, Communist leaders have always advocated, supported, and promoted the goal of world government generally, and the United Nations particularly, in word and deed. Dr. Bella Dodd, a former top CPUSA official, told of her role in the Communist campaign for the UN: "When the Yalta conference had ended, the Communists prepared to support the United Nations Charter which was to be adopted at the San Francisco conference to be held in May and June, 1945. For this I organized a corps of speakers and we took to the street corners and held openair meetings in the millinery and clothing sections of New York where thousands of people congregate at the lunch hour. We spoke of the need for world unity and in support of the Yalta decisions."¹⁵ Shortly after the founding of the UN, in March of 1946, Stalin declared: "I attribute great importance to U.N.O. [United Nations Organization, as it was then commonly called] since it is a serious instrument for preservation of peace and international security."

On one level, Stalin's expressed desire for "peace" and "security" is an obviously disingenuous propaganda ploy devoid of any meaning, in the sense that most people ascribe to those words. However, in the Communist sense, where "peace" and "security" are defined as an absence of resistance to Communism, Stalin's endorsement of the UN is perfectly understandable. He knew that the UN's very nature and structure would contribute to Communist advantage, since his agents had helped design it. And he knew that the UN was permeated with Communist agents who would assure that it remained a Communist instrument.

Communists Among the Founders

Of course, the Communists were not only working outside the UN to stir up support for the new global organization, they were also running things on the inside — in concert with their like-minded, one-world CFR cohorts. Keep in mind that it was Soviet agent Alger Hiss (CFR), acting director of the State Department's Office of Special Political Affairs, who served as executive secretary of the critically important 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where the UN Charter was drafted. In that "noble" endeavor, Stalin's secret agent Hiss and Stalin's open agent V. M. Molotov were the two prime players. The Communists couldn't lose: "our guy" and "their guy" were both "Stalin's guys," two hands on the same hairy body.

But it was much worse than that; Hiss was far from the only Communist agent in (not under) the UN bed. The July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference was as important for the about-to-beborn UN as was the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Bretton Woods established the post-World War II global economic policies and architecture, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank group of institutions. Bretton Woods was planned and initiated by the Economic and Finance Group of the Council on Foreign Relations. The leader of the conference and the head of the U.S. delegation was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White (the guy having a hand in getting Japan towards attacking Pearl Harbor), a secret member of a Soviet espionage ring.

In his important book on the UN, *The Fearful Master*, author G. Edward Griffin wrote:

“In 1950 the State Department issued a document entitled *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-45*.... This and similar official records reveal that the following men were key government figures in UN planning within the U.S. State Department and Treasury Department: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Virginius Frank Coe, Dean Acheson, Noel Field, Lawrence Duggan, Henry Julian Wadleigh, John Carter Vincent, David Weintraub, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Harold Glasser, Victor Perlo, Irving Kaplan, Solomon Adler, Abraham George Silverman, William L. Ullman and William H. Taylor. With the single exception of Dean Acheson, all of these men have since been identified in sworn testimony as secret Communist agentsj’

UN Charter: A Marxist-Leninist Blueprint

With the pedigrees of these designers in mind, it should come as no surprise that the great UN Charter, so reverentially extolled by all internationalists, is a purely Marxist-Leninist blueprint. But you needn't take our word for it; that's the assessment of former top Communist Party member Joseph Z. Kornfeder. In his sworn testimony before Congress in 1955, 10 years after the founding of the UN, Mr. Kornfeder stated:

“I need not be a member of the United Nations Secretariat to know that the UN “blueprint“ is a Communist one. I was at the Moscow headquarters of the world Communist party for nearly three years and was acquainted with most of the top leaders.... I went to their colleges; I learned their pattern of operations, and if I see that pattern in effect anywhere, I can recognize it.... From the point of view of its master designers meeting at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods, and which included such masterful agents as Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie, and others, the UN was, and is, not a failure. They and the Kremlin masterminds behind them never intended the UN as a peace-keeping organization. What they had in mind was a fancy and colossal Trojan horse.... Its [the UN's] internal setup, Communist designed, is a pattern for sociological conquest; a pattern aimed to serve the purpose of Communist penetration of the West. It is ingenious and deceptive.“

Kornfeder's evaluation of the UN is backed up by no less an authority than former UN Secretary-General U. Thant. Mr. Thant was a Marxist, winner of the Soviet Union's Lenin

Peace Prize. "Lenin was a man with a mind of great clarity and incisiveness," Thant said, "and his ideas have had a profound influence on the course of contemporary history." The Burmese Marxist continued: "[Lenin's] ideals of peace and peaceful coexistence among states have won widespread international acceptance and they are in line with the aims of the U.N. Charter." There you have it, and from an unimpeachable source: The aims of the UN Charter are "in line" with the "ideals of peace" of Lenin, the Communist dictator and butcher.

Serving Red Imperialism

The Kremlin's agents wasted no time in using the newly created UN machinery to advance global Communist imperialism. Innumerable examples have been documented of UN agencies providing concrete, material aid to Communist regimes and revolutionary efforts, and, conversely, opposing, thwarting, and destroying non-Communist and anti-Communist governments and movements.

A condensed survey of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which was established by the CFR Insiders in our government even before the founding of the UN, provides a tragic look at what was to follow. Under the direction of Herbert H. Lehman (CFR), the UNRRA staff was turned into an international cabal of Communists from various countries who applied the billions of dollars of UNRRA's "humanitarian aid" (taken from U.S. taxpayers) to Communist revolutionary purposes. The U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, told what he had witnessed of UNRRA's pro-Communist actions at the end of World War II. "Over my personal protest," said Ambassador Lane, "Lehman had appointed as director of the first UNRRA mission to Poland the Soviet member of the UNRRA council, Mr. Menshikov, whose first duty would be ... distribution of UNRRA supplies." As a result, supplies could be obtained "only by those persons holding a specified type of ration card issued solely to government employees or to members of the Workers and Socialist parties." Which greatly assisted the Red takeover of Poland.

"With a total disregard of our national interests," wrote author and investigative reporter Eugene W. Castle, "UNRRA money was unreservedly given to the Communist-ruled nations behind the Iron Curtain. It fed discontented peoples and strengthened the Red grip on their governments."

In China, millions of dollars in UNRRA funds and supplies were going to Communist Madame Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung for their ultimate triumph over General Chiang Kai-shek. This same pattern would appear again and again over the following decades through such UN institutions as UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO, UNHCR, FAO, UNFPA, IMF, the World Bank, etc.

Red Trojan Horse

Millions of lives could have been saved and untold misery, murder, terror, and destruction averted, if U.S. officials had been forced by an informed American public to heed the

warnings of credible witnesses and an incredible trail of evidence. The tragic history that has unfolded since the testimonies of Dr. Bella Dodd, Col. Bukar, Mr. Kornfeder, and others has more than vindicated their most frightening alarms. The UN has indeed proven to be a gigantic and deadly Trojan horse. The following are but a few of the many advantages that the Communists expected to realize from the creation of the UN:

- Economic assistance through the vast array of UN agencies.
- Enormous potential for expansion of espionage, subversion, and terrorism through the diplomatic immunity offered UN officials.
- Use of the UN podium for Communist propaganda purposes.
- Use of UN diplomatic and propaganda machinery to attack and undermine anti-Communist countries and to support pro-Communist regimes and organizations.
- Transfer of tremendous sums of money from the American producers to corrupt, collectivist projects and potentates throughout the world.
- Steady erosion of U.S. sovereignty through a myriad of UN treaties and agreements.
- Depletion and weakening of U.S. military resources in UN operations worldwide.
- Gradual subordination of U.S. military command to international authority (UN, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, OAS, etc.).

Who Is Really in Charge?

As our preceding chapters demonstrate, there was another force at work on this grandiose and malevolent project as well — represented by the “one-world-global-government ideologists” described by Admiral Ward. Many of these individuals obviously were not Communists; in fact they were arch-capitalists, titans of Wall Street, with names like Rockefeller, Morgan, Carnegie, Lamont, Warburg, and Schiff. And yet, they did indeed work hand in hand with the masters of the Kremlin to establish a system that they intended would supplant our own constitutional system of government and grow into a global leviathan state. And their successors have continued this subversive cooperation with both overt Communist leaders (as in China) and “ex-Communist” leaders (as in Russia), who now claim to be “democratic reformers.” Professor Carroll Quigley, the Insider historian we met in the previous chapter, conceded that anti-Communists who had pointed to this strange and diabolic Communist-capitalist symbiosis were not hallucinating:

“There does exist, and has existed for a generation, an international Anglophile network which operates, to some extent, in the way the radical Right believes the Communists act. In fact, this network, which we may identify as the Round Table Groups, has no aversion to cooperating with the Communists, or any other groups, and frequently does so.”

“It was this group of people,” said Quigley, “whose wealth and influence ... provided much of the framework of influence which the Communist sympathizers and fellow travelers took over in the United States in the 1930s. It must be recognized that the power that these energetic Left-wingers exercised was never their own power or Communist power

but was ultimately the power of the international financial coterie....“

Congressional Investigations

The treasonous workings of this elite were partially revealed, the professor noted, by congressional investigators in the 1950s who, “following backward to their source the threads which led from admitted Communists like Whittaker Chambers, through Alger Hiss and the Carnegie Endowment to Thomas Lamont and the Morgan Bank, fell into the whole complicated network of the interlocking tax-exempt foundations.” “It soon became clear,” Quigley observed, “that people of immense wealth would be unhappy if the investigation went too far and that the ‘most respected’ newspapers in the country, closely allied with these men of wealth, would not get excited enough about any revelations to make the publicity worth while....“ Here the professor sins by gross understatement and distortion. These “people of immense wealth“ and their “closely allied“ media did indeed get “excited,“ so much so that they went to incredible lengths to sabotage and stop the investigation, smear its principal players, and smother the facts it had uncovered.

Thus, it is not surprising that the Reece Committee, established by Congress in 1953 to investigate the tax-exempt foundations, fell far short of fully exposing the mounting peril. Nevertheless, the committee’s report did sound a serious alarm, warning that the major foundations (Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller) and interlocking organizations like the CFR “have exercised a strong effect upon our foreign policy and upon public education in things international.“ The committee stated: “The net result of these combined efforts has been to promote ‘internationalism’ in a particular sense — a form directed toward ‘world government’ and derogation of American ‘nationalism.’“

The Reece Committee also charged that these foundations (which were invariably directed by CFR members) “have actively supported attacks upon our social and government system and financed the promotion of socialism and collectivist ideas.“ It declared, moreover, that the CFR had become “in essence an agency of the United States Government“ and that its “productions [books, periodicals, study guides, reports, etc.] are not objective but are directed overwhelmingly at promoting the glob-alist concept.“ A far more important revelation disclosed by the committee’s chief investigator never made it into congressional testimony or the committee’s published report. Investigator Norman Dodd recounted that during his visit to the Ford Foundation, the institution’s president, Rowan Gaither (CFR), unexpectedly admitted that he and his colleagues were operating under directives “to the effect that we should make every effort to so alter life in the United States as to make possible a comfortable merger with the Soviet Union.“

Common Ground: Power

At this point a great many readers undoubtedly are scratching their heads in bewilderment. “I don’t get it,“ they say. “Why would wealthy capitalists conspire with Communists and promote Communism? Don’t they stand to lose the most if Communism were to triumph? If you are among the bewildered head scratchers, don’t feel bad. The confusion is understandable; the idea of wealthy capitalists scheming with bloody Bolsheviks

does challenge some longaccepted and basic assumptions and definitions most of us hold concerning socio-economic-political relationships and the way the world works. We agree that all capitalists should oppose collectivism in all its forms (i.e., communism, socialism, fascism), but it is a fact that many do not. Many “capitalists,” while paying lip service to “free enterprise” and “market economics,” actually abhor the competition of the marketplace. They would much rather use government force (laws and regulations) to beat their competition than try to produce better widgets more efficiently and constantly have to come up with improvements, innovations, and better management, marketing, and production.

They realize that communism, socialism, and fascism are never the “share the wealth” schemes they pretend to be; they are inevitably and invariably “control the wealth” schemes, in which an elite oligarchy employs political power (backed up by military and police force) to control all the wealth. They realize that step one in any “share the wealth” program is to “collect the wealth” (or “collectivization,” as the Communists call it). And they realize that once “step one” is completed no collectivist regime ever proceeds to “step two”: share the wealth. The collectivized wealth remains in the hands of the ruling elite and their managerial class underlings (the privileged nomenklatura in the Soviet Union) while the toiling masses remain mired in grinding poverty, unable to escape by any amount of honest effort.

15.3 Stealth Strategies for Building the Superstate

Orchestrating the Globalist Concert

More and more, NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] are helping to set public policy agendas.... It is this movement ... that has such significance for governance.... What is generally proposed is the initial setting up of an assembly of parliamentarians ... and the subsequent establishment of a world assembly through direct election by the people. - Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood*, 1995

National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing powers - including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty - with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizen groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).... Increasingly, NGOs are able to push around even the largest governments. - Jessica T. Mathews (CFR, TC), *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 1997

Especially significant, of course, is the development of an NGO network worldwide and its increasing role in the development of a culture of democracy throughout the world.... Civil society, in order to be an effective partner with government and business in providing global governance in the 21st century, must develop a clear vision of basic values and a better future. - Steven C. Rockefeller, Chairman of the Earth Charter

Drafting Committee and Chairman of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, addressing the UN Millennium Forum, May 2000

During World War II, a Soviet spy network in Nazi-occupied Europe kept Stalin supplied with first-rate intelligence on German military plans and political developments. It came to be known as the Red Orchestra (Rote Kapelle). The network sent its information to its Moscow superiors via secret radio transmitters that operated only for short bursts and moved constantly to avoid detection by the Gestapo. Nazi intelligence referred to the transmitters as “music boxes” and assigned the names of musical instruments to the distinctive, but elusive, operators. The elaborate Red Orchestra espionage operation was set up several years before the start of the war and involved agents who were military personnel, Nazi officials, clerks, janitors, and housewives, as well as “businessmen” in a network of corporations (both real and dummy companies) throughout Europe. A similar Red Orchestra was established in the United States, and, as noted in previous chapters, its agents succeeded in penetrating to the highest levels of the federal government. A few top agents were exposed in high-profile cases — Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Victor Perlo, the Rosenbergs — but, according to both Communist defectors and U.S. intelligence officials, dozens of Red cells involving hundreds of high-level Soviet agents were never exposed.

Many of these agents were not engaged merely in the lower level aspects of espionage such as stealing state secrets and reporting on military plans and weapons development. They were performing a more critical role for the Kremlin as “agents of influence”: misinforming and misdirecting America’s leaders and actually influencing and formulating U.S. policies concerning the most sensitive areas of our national security. The Art of War by Sun Tzu has long served as a primary textbook for Soviet military and intelligence strategists. Written over 2,000 years ago, it is one of the most famous studies of strategy ever written. The Communists have especially focused on Sun Tzu’s lessons on strategic deception and the supreme importance of espionage and intelligence. They are completely familiar with what Sun Tzu described as the “five sorts of spies”: Native spies; internal spies; double spies; doomed spies; and surviving spies. “Native spies are those from the enemy country’s people whom we employ,” explained Sun Tzu. “Internal spies are enemy officials whom we employ. Double spies are enemy spies whom we employ. Doomed spies are those of our own spies who are deliberately given false information and told to report it to the enemy. Surviving spies are those who return from the enemy camp to report information.” “When all these five types of spies are at work and their operations are clandestine, it is called the ‘divine manipulation of threads’ and is the treasure of a sovereign,” continued China’s master strategist.

The Net That Covers the World

In 1955, British intelligence expert and author E. H. Cookridge aptly described the global Soviet apparatus as “the net that covers the world,” in his book by that title. As he pointed out, the Communists had at that time established a worldwide militant organization of tens of millions of members, operating aggressively in virtually every country toward a

centrally directed common objective — an accomplishment without parallel at any time in history. Besides controlling these millions of disciplined members, who could be ordered into coordinated global action on short notice, the Communist leaders had developed an intelligence apparatus of unparalleled, massive proportions. Cookridge noted:

“The number of men and women employed by the Soviet government on intelligence work has been estimated at about 250,000 — this quite apart from the internal political police. The number is at least ten times larger than that of agents used by all Western nations combined. But even this is only part of the Communist secret army.... A suggestion that there are 750,000 men and women in the world — semiprofessional agents, informants, fifth-columnists, fellow-travelers, and sympathizers — whom the Soviet secret service succeeded in ensnaring in some way into the spy net — is probably an underestimate. It is a formidable army, combined with a quarter of a million of full-time agents and officials, and led by an elite of 10,000 to 12,000 trained master spies.”

“No other nation,” Cookridge noted, “devotes anything approaching the proportion of its manpower and resources to secret service work as do the Soviet Union and the satellite countries.” Likewise, no other nation comes close to matching the size of the internal secret police forces required by the Communists to maintain their Total State. Through innumerable movies, documentaries, novels, articles, and history books, Hitler’s dreaded Gestapo has been cast as the epitome of evil incarnate in the long drama of human existence. It has become synonymous with totalitarian brutality and malevolence, and rightly so. Yet most Americans have never even heard of Stalin’s even more murderous and evil NKVD. Historian Martin Malia points out that German National Socialism, for all of its cruelty and viciousness, was “distinctly less murderous than Communism.”¹⁰ A major reason for this can be seen in the relative strength of the Nazi and Soviet secret police organs at the time of the Hitler/Stalin Pact: In 1939, Hitler’s Gestapo employed a total of 7,500 people; Stalin’s NKVD employed 366,000!

During the 1940s, '50s, and '60s, the U.S. Congress and many state legislatures held extensive investigative hearings into Communist penetration and subversion in the United States. These official inquiries produced a large number of important reports that included testimony from top military and intelligence authorities, as well as Communist defectors. Reports by the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, such as “The Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry” (1947), “Communist Political Subversion” (1956), “Soviet Total War” (1956), and “Communist Target — Youth” (1960) provided explosive, detailed information about the Soviet attack on America. As did reports of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), such as “The Institute of Pacific Relations” (1951), “Expose of Soviet Espionage” (1960), and “The Soviet Empire” (1965). The voluminous 1953 SISS report entitled “Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments” labeled the Communist operations in our government “a conspiracy” and concluded:

“Policies and programs laid down by members of this Soviet conspiracy are still in effect within our government and constitute a continuing hazard to our national security.”

The massive scope and insidious nature of the Communist offensive was so far beyond what most Americans imagined that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated in 1956 that “the individual is handicapped by coming face to face with a conspiracy so monstrous he cannot believe it exists.”¹² That handicap, however was largely the work of the CFR-dominated media, which made sure that the American public remained largely unaware of the shocking information uncovered by the congressional investigations. The same media subversives attacked the congressional investigators and characterized proper concern over Communist and socialist advances as “right-wing paranoia.” (sounds just like 2016 where you have right-wing parties on the rise in Europe and every “useful idiot” is just parroting the official anti-conservative narrative, also just like with the US elections, where Trump vs. Clinton resembled Patriotism/Nationalism vs. Globalism/NWO)

Many Tentacles, One Brain

In 1960, the Kremlin hosted the Congress of 81 Communist Parties from around the world. Those parties boasted a collective strength of more than 40 million members. But their real strength then, as now, lay in their ability to get non-Communists to do their work for them. In the U.S., as elsewhere, the Communists created hundreds of front organizations and penetrated virtually all existing organizations and institutions, with the intent of gradually gaining significant influence, if not total control. Labor unions were especially targeted because they offered: 1) huge sources of funds, in the form of members’ dues; 2) major political clout to elect sympathetic politicians and influence legislation and policy; 3) an important conduit of propaganda for class warfare; 4) the ability to paralyze governments and economies through strikes; and 5) the ability to mobilize large numbers of non-Communists (in marches and demonstrations) to give the appearance of popular support for Communist causes.

Similarly, the Communists and their various Marxist-socialist brethren have, during the past century particularly, targeted the colleges and universities — with amazing success. They have gained such influence in academia that from the 1960s onward they have been able to generate mass demonstrations of students, and even violent riots, by exploiting emotional issues such as war, nuclear weapons, the environment, homosexual rights, feminism, civil rights, race, etc. This was precisely the message of Soviet Premier Konstantin Chernenko, when, in his June 1983 address to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), he made this noteworthy remark:

“The battle of ideas in the international arena is going on without respite. We will continue to wage it vigorously ... our entire system of ideological work should operate as a well-arranged orchestra in which every instrument has a distinctive voice and leads its theme, while harmony is achieved by skillful conducting.”

Despite the supposed “collapse” of Communism, that global orchestra has continued playing, with the same “skillful conducting” continuing from the background.

Pressure From Above and Below

The one-world architects know that they must create the appearance of popular support for their global designs in order to pave the way for national governments to surrender political power to the UN. To accomplish this surrender, they have devised a giant pincer strategy in the form of a huge NGO network (pressure from below) on the one hand, and sympathetic political and corporate leaders (pressure from above) on the other. The NGOs clamor for “world governance,” and their orchestrated clamor is portrayed as the collective voice of the peoples of the world expressing a global consensus. The political and corporate leaders — according to plan - then “respond” to the “will of civil society.”

The use of this pincer strategy to seize power was explained by Communist Party “theoretician” Jan Kozak. In his instructions for “revolutionary parliamentarianism,” written in the early 1950s, Kozak detailed how he and his fellow Communist conspirators overthrew a democratically elected, mainly non-Communist government in Czechoslovakia and turned it into a Communist dictatorship — legally. Kozak explained how his Communist minority in parliament (in coalition with socialists and “liberals”) worked in concert with the street-level activists and grassroots revolutionaries. Utilizing demonstrations, strikes, rallies, petitions, threats, and - sometimes — sabotage, the radicals (like the NGOs today) provided “pressure from below.” Meanwhile Kozak and his coconspirators provided coordinated “pressure from above” to get parliament to institute Communism piecemeal, by centralizing power and taking over more and more functions that had previously been left to local governments and the private sector. It is important to understand that this takeover was accomplished by a small minority. But this minority was highly organized and disciplined. And it was also highly skilled in the art of deception, in creating the false appearance of having overwhelming numbers on their side.

A similar operation is underway today on a global scale. The war is on, but for the most part only one side is fighting. The UN-CFR axis is organizing NGOs, churches, educational institutions, labor unions, business groups, and other organizations into a force that it calls “global civil society.” At the UN’s World Civil Society Conference in Montreal in 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained to the professional NGO activists their new “partnership” with the UN. Annan explained that the NGOs must serve as “strategic partners in policy — in areas where you can persuade your Governments to work through the United Nations. You can tell them that our goals are your goals, and that you want them to give us the means to achieve those goals.” Kofi Annan is not the mastermind of this UN pincer strategy, of course; he is merely a factotum carrying out the program for the Insiders who have posted him as their front man. The magnitude of this global pincer strategy and the incredibly deceptive processes employed in the pursuit of their monstrous goals is mind-boggling.

Why This Orchestration Works!

Why do the CFR elites go through such elaborate charades, creating these multitudes of radical front groups (or co-opting existing ones) and funding them with piles of money? And why all of the orchestrated media support? The CFR elites know, of course, that they wouldn’t get very far if they were honest and straightforward about their intent:

“People of the world: Our global political, economic, and social arrangements are all wrong. However, our elite group of superior thinkers have a plan. All you have to do is relinquish all political and financial power to us so we can fix everything. Trust us.” Wouldn’t work, obviously.

However, what if they employ a different strategy? What if they fund a gaggle of radical groups, with various elements calling for the transfer of power in one area or another to international authorities? What if they also fund another gaggle of even more radical groups to make the first gaggle appear “moderate” and “reasonable”? And suppose they saturate the print and broadcast media with the antics and propaganda of these groups for a sufficient length of time. And suppose that this propaganda clamors for government to address outrageous problems while ignoring any possible danger to freedom in the new “arrangements.” Then the pressure from below will reach the point that the Insiders above can have their political agents in Congress and the White House respond to the “will of the people” with “compromise” legislation. These “compromise” solutions always move the whole political arena further leftward, toward ever bigger, more oppressive government.

In his 1968 book *The Strawberry Statement: Notes of a College Revolutionary*, radical activist/author James Kunen made an interesting admission about this process. Concerning the campus riots then rocking the nation, he wrote:

“In the evening, I went up to the U. to check out a strategy meeting. A kid was giving a report on an SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] convention. He said that... at the convention, men from Business International Round Tables ... tried to buy up a few radicals. These men are the world’s leading industrialists and they convene to decide how our lives are going to go.... They offered to finance our demonstrations in Chicago. We were also offered ESSO (Rockefeller) money. They want us to make a lot of radical commotion so they can look more in the center as they move to the left.”

Another similar revelation was provided by Jerry Kirk, who, as a student, was active in the SDS, the DuBois Club, the Black Panthers, and the Communist Party. In a 1970 interview, Kirk said:

“Young people have no conception of the conspiracy’s strategy of “pressure from above and pressure from below”.... They have no idea that they are playing into the hands of the Establishment they claim to hate.... The radicals think they are fighting the forces of the super-rich, like Rockefeller and Ford, and they don’t realize that it is precisely such forces which are behind their own revolution, financing it, and using it for their own purposes.”

Writing in 1975, retired Admiral Chester Ward, a veteran CFR member who had grown sharply critical of the organization wrote:

“Once the ruling members of CFR have decided that the U.S. Government should adopt a particular policy, the very substantial research facilities of CFR are put to work to develop arguments, intellectual and emotional, to support the new policy, and to

confound and discredit, intellectually and politically, any opposition. The most articulate theoreticians and ideologists prepare related articles, aided by the research, to sell the new policy and to make it appear inevitable and irresistible. By following the evolution of propaganda in the most prestigious scholarly journal in the world, *Foreign Affairs*, anyone can determine years in advance what the future defense and foreign policies of the United States will be."

Millennium Summit Pressure

As the UN Millennium Summit got underway, the pressure from above and below increased. Following the pattern from past Summits, it was a well-honed, multi-level, multi-pronged, multidimensional attack aimed at multiple targets. Prime targets, of course, were the heads of state in attendance; if they could be induced to sign the disarmament treaties, declarations, and resolutions, it would add to the international momentum and legitimacy of the UN disarmament agenda. Among the profusion of programs circulating at the Summit, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) is particularly noteworthy. Claiming to represent the non-nuclear "middle-power" countries of the world, it describes itself as "a carefully focused campaign established by a network of international citizens organizations to encourage ... leaders of the nuclear weapons states to break free from their Cold War mindset" and embrace disarmament — as defined by the MPI and the UN. But, as we shall see, MPI's "independence" is all illusion; while posing as a "citizens network," MPI is, in reality, nothing less than a front group for the one-world internationalists.

Independence Sham

MPI's primary spokesperson is New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, whose Labour Party is affiliated with the Socialist International. The eloquent Mrs. Clark championed the MPI disarmament campaign both at the UN Summit and at the Gorbachev Foundation-sponsored "State of the World Forum," which ran concomitantly with the UN affair, a few blocks away at the Hilton Towers. Many UN leaders and heads of state jockeyed back and forth between the UN and the Gorbachev confab, where they shmoozed and "brainstormed" with corporate titans, academics, NGO rabble-rousers, and New Age gurus. As it turns out, Gorbachev's State of the World Forum is also one of the original eight co-sponsors of the MPI, as well as a funder of the group.

And we see the same repetitious pattern emerge in the MPI case: funding for the Initiative comes from the Rockefeller Foundation, Samuel Rubin Foundation, and the W Alton Jones Foundation. MPI's International Steering Committee includes Comrade Peter Weiss, and it included the late Senator Alan Cranston (TC, WFA), a veteran one-worlder. Other "Establishment" activists at the Initiative include General Lee Butler, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara (all CFR). The "anti-Establishment" activists at MPI include a host of revolutionary radicals. Among the MPI co-sponsors are the Parliamentarians for Global Action, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and

the International Peace Bureau. All of these groups have been long connected to the KGB-created-and-controlled World Peace Council (WPC), which, since its founding in 1949 by Communist mass-murderer Joseph Stalin, has served the dual purpose of leading the drive for U.S. disarmament and providing support for terrorist groups and regimes worldwide.

Of course, the MPI does not represent the “middle power” states at all; its whole purpose (and the reason that it has been so bountifully funded and promoted) is to provide orchestrated pressure from below so that the Insiders of the “weapons states” will have the excuse to do what they have wanted to do all along. Our home-grown internationalists realize that by having the disarmament pressure appear to come from an independent citizens network, the motives and agendas of those who must implement the changes will not be seriously challenged. As a journalist covering the UN Millennium Summit, the Gorbachev State of the World Forum, and a number of additional programs that took place in New York City in September 2000, this reporter had a front-row seat to this amazing spectacle. The diabolic “manipulation of the threads” was both fascinating and frightening to behold. It was not the first time that I had observed this phenomena; I had seen it in operation at previous summits. Still, it was evident that, with practice, the Kremlin-Pratt House one-worlders are perfecting their pincer strategy. They have become very adept at managing their rangy NGO rent-a-mob, which, on cue, either chants and demonstrates in the streets, or comes inside the halls of power and negotiates like a genuine “superpower.” At the same time, they have assembled an amazing array of politicians-and-professors-for-hire, who can be counted on to spout the proper globalist slogans, and reporters who reliably retail every line of internationalist propaganda handed to them.

With the orchestra so lavishly funded and skillfully conducted, they are able to give the appearance that their position truly does “represent the will of global civil society.” Politicians who might normally do battle are completely outgunned and overwhelmed; there is no way they can match, by themselves, the intellectual firepower of the assembled think tanks and universities that have been preparing their positions for months — or even years. And when their congressional offices are besieged with an orchestrated campaign of telephone calls, e-mails, faxes, and letters; while CNN, C-Span, and the other networks are all spewing forth the same story — even the stalwart begin to crumble before such an onslaught. That is what has been happening, and what we can expect to see a great deal more of, as the advocates of “global democracy” continue to press their fraudulent and totalitarian agenda.

We hasten to add, however, that this totalitarian agenda can be stopped, and it must. In fact, the plans of this cabal have been disrupted many times through well-organized exposure of the hidden agendas and the phony orchestration. The good news is that these deceptions cannot stand the light of day. The bad news is that credible evidence to support this story will never reach sufficient numbers of Americans through disorganized action. However, the existence of strong organizational leadership opens up real

opportunities (like electing a nationalist US President).

Enviromania

“World Federalists believe that the environmental crisis facing planet earth is a global problem and therefore calls for a “global“ solution — a worldwide United Nations Environmental Agency with the power to make its decisions stick.” - World Association of World Federalists, 1972

“[T]he great enemy is not the Soviet Union but the rapid deterioration of our planet as a supporting structure for civilized life.” - George F. Kennan (CFR), Washington Post column, November 12, 1989

“We’ve got to ride the global warming issue. Even if the theory is wrong, we will be doing the right thing in terms of economic and environmental policy.” - Timothy Wirth (CFR), former U.S. Senator and Under Secretary of State, now head of Ted Turner’s UN Foundation

“In searching for a new enemy to unite us, we came up with the idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water shortages, famine and the like would fit the bill.... All these dangers are caused by human intervention.... The real enemy, then, is humanity itself.” - The Council of the Club of Rome, 1991

Global warming, ozone depletion, deforestation, species extinction, wildlife habitat destruction, resource exhaustion, overpopulation. Since the 1960s, these and a host of other supposed environmental “crises“ have exploded onto the world scene, mobilizing millions of people in a global crusade to “save the planet.“ The environmental movement has grown into a global green juggernaut involving millions of activists and wielding enormous political, social, and economic power. Contrary to popular misconceptions, this has not been a healthy development for “Mother Earth“ or her human inhabitants. As my colleague William Norman Grigg has rightly noted, “the environmental movement is animated by a desire to regiment human society rather than ‘save the planet.’ The movement’s economic outlook is socialist, its political ambitions are totalitarian, and its religious affinities are unmistakably pagan.“

The Big Green agenda is about power and control, not clean air and saving whales. While the vast majority of pedestrian-level environmentalists may genuinely care about local ecology issues and really believe in the apocalyptic scenarios regarding the so-called “ozone hole“ and the alleged dangers from greenhouse gases, clearly the elites guiding these concerned cadres know such threats are bogus or vastly exaggerated. Certainly, the sci-entific evidence does not support the charges that these alleged “crises“ are so imminent and of such planet-threatening magnitude as to justify totalitarian solutions. In fact, the overwhelming weight of real science and the bulk of honest scientists argue that genuine environmental problems are best solved not by draconian governmental fiat but by market forces and the enforcement of private property rights. Conversely, it is

also true that the worst environmental degradation on the planet has taken place under those Communist and socialist regimes where free markets and property rights have been most ruthlessly suppressed.

Earth Summit Eyewitness

This blatant deception and censorship by the “ruling class journalists” was especially crucial to the “success” of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the so-called Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro. This writer can claim the dubious distinction of being, perhaps, the only “non-greenie” journalist amongst the thousands of reporters and media personalities who converged on this global orgy of environmental extremism. Providentially, I met up with one of the few other “contrarian” souls attending the Summit almost immediately upon exiting my plane onto the sweltering tarmac of the Rio airport. As the long passenger lines from the various airliners converged under the airport’s shade cover for the two-hour Customs process, I had the good fortune to “converge” with Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, who had just deplaned from another aircraft. Dr. Ray, who died in 1993, was one of my heroes: a genuine, eminent scientist who boldly challenged the absurd claims and dangerous proposals of the environmental fanatics and calmly disregarded the vicious, personal attacks that she received in return. As a distinguished professor of zoology, author and commentator, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, former governor of the state of Washington, and recipient of many awards (including the United Nations Peace Prize), one might be forgiven for naively assuming that this woman would be mobbed by reporters seeking her learned opinion on the weighty matters under discussion at the Summit. Hardly! Dr. Ray was virtually ignored, as were other noted scientists and scholars, while the CFR Establishment press drooled over every sacred syllable uttered by the likes of Fidel Castro, Mikhail Gorbachev, Jerry “Governor Moonbeam” Brown, then-Senator Al “I invented the Internet” Gore, Jacques Cousteau, and Maurice Strong.

During the course of the Summit, I had the opportunity to meet with, interview, and compare notes with Dr. Ray several times. I noted that with her background in zoology she should be better prepared than most for the profusion of weird specimens populating the conference. “I’ve never seen a bigger zoo,” the feisty scientist responded, in a comment intended to convey both the absurdity and seriousness of what was transpiring at the UN confab. Although ignored by most of the media (and even pointedly censored and rebuked by some) at Rio, Dr. Ray did successfully expose some of the dangerous UNCED policies and proposals. Through her columns and live talk-radio interviews from the Earth Summit, and by her speeches and explosive book expose following the event, she alerted many Americans to the perils of the global green agenda. In *Environmental Overkill*, she wrote: “First, we must recognize that the environmental movement is not about facts or logic. More and more it is becoming clear that those who support the so-called ‘New World Order’ or World Government under the United Nations have adopted global environmentalism as a basis for the dissolution of independent nations and the international realignment of power.”

The opinions of other prominent scientists were also censored or suppressed by the Insider-run media. Shortly before the convening of the Earth Summit, a group of more than 250 distinguished scientists, including 27 Nobel Laureates, released a statement called the Heidelberg Appeal to Heads of States and Governments. The statement, which was subsequently signed by hundreds of additional scientists worldwide, said, in part: "We are, however, worried at the dawn of the twenty-first century, at the emergence of an irrational ideology which is opposed to scientific and industrial progress and impedes economic and social development." This private ad hoc group appealed to government officials to base ecological proscriptions "on scientific criteria and not on irrational preconceptions," and carried a warning "to the authorities in charge of our planet's destiny against decisions which are supported by pseudoscientific arguments or false and non-relevant data." Forgive the political naivete of these well-meaning scientists. But appealing to venal politicians and the prostitute press on the basis of facts is almost like trying to sell compassion to Mafia thugs or morality to the studio execs of Hollywood Babylon. What was the reaction of the CFR media cartel to the Heidelberg Appeal? Predictable: They ignored it.

The same blackout occurred later when an even larger group of scientists signed a petition opposing the half-baked "science" undergirding the incredibly dangerous UN Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Headed by Dr. Frederick Seitz, former president of the National Academy of Sciences and president emeritus of Rockefeller University, the petition was signed by more than 18,000 scientists, including thousands of meteorologists, climatologists and atmospheric scientists. The scientists' statement said, in part:

"We urge the United States government to reject the global warming agreement that was written in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997, and any other similar proposals. The proposed limits on greenhouse gases would harm the environment, hinder the advance of science and technology, and damage the health and welfare of mankind.... There is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth's atmosphere and disruption of the Earth's climate. Moreover, there is substantial scientific evidence that increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide produce many beneficial effects upon the natural plant and animal environments of the Earth."

Nonstop Propaganda and Censorship

But the "ruling class journalists" are more than willing to play the scientist numbers game when it suits the one-world agenda. Before, during, and after Rio, the media mavens trumpeted the supposed findings of the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).¹² Then-Senator Al Gore, who led the U.S. Senate delegation to Rio, repeatedly cited the "authoritative" IPCC report in his fervent pleas of support for the global warming treaty. At his major press conference at the Rio Hilton, this writer challenged his citation of the IPCC report and his repeated ludicrous claim that 98 percent of the scientific community endorsed the global warming idea as fact. The IPCC report had been fraudulently altered, I pointed out, and many of the scientists who had

worked on the project had publicly disavowed its political agenda disguised as science. This easily verified fact had been reported (albeit in “small print”) in the “mainstream” press. Gore evaded the tough question like a true politician, stating: “I don’t want to open a debate on this, but let me say that I will stay after [the press conference] if you like....”

Thanks to Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho), who took the microphone following Al Gore, I was able to ask Gore a follow-up question, zeroing in on the well-documented IPCC fraud and pointing out that the Gallup poll of climatologists and meteorologists taken a few months earlier found that only 19 percent, not 98 percent, believed in global warming.¹³ Again Gore evaded, snidely remarking that there are a lot of people who “still argue that NASA staged the moon landing in a movie lot.” I replied that the poll I had just cited was not a survey of wild-eyed cranks, but, on the contrary, represented the vast majority of climatic scientists, including internationally recognized authorities like Hugh Ellsaesser at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, William Reifsnyder at Yale, Nathaniel Guttman at the National Climatic Data Center, Robert Balling, director of the Arizona Climatology Laboratory, and many others. Senator Gore, who otherwise never missed an opportunity to pontificate on his favorite subject, was suddenly under great pressure to leave.

Although Gore’s evasiveness and slippery exit were frustrating, they were not surprising; it was precisely what one would have expected of him. What was harder to take (though not totally unexpected) was the reaction of the press corps. It was obvious to this correspondent — and should have been, as well, to all others present — that my questions had caught him off balance. I had refuted his claims with fact, backed up with citations and sources. I had even challenged one of his prized documents as fraudulent. He was caught in a lie and was clearly uncomfortable. This is the kind of “blood in the water” situation that normally sets off the shark sensors of journalists and sends them into a “feeding frenzy.” If Senator Symms, a conservative, had been similarly caught, you can be sure the shark pack would have been all over him in a split second. That didn’t happen with Gore, of course, because the horde of “journalists” in attendance had come not as news reporters but as advocates and propagandists. They were there to regurgitate and retail as gospel whatever globaloney the UN and its proponents dished out.

Allow us to provide a few more examples. One of the major scare stories that had received a major buildup prior to Rio, and was a key focal point of the Summit, concerned the alleged massive destruction of the Amazon rain forest. According to the militant enviro-lobby and its media allies, we could expect cataclysmic global environmental consequences unless UN authority over the world’s forests was established. So, again, one might naively think that the man of the hour would be Professor Evaristo Eduardo de Miranda, the world’s leading expert on Amazon deforestation. Dr. Miranda, an ecologist at the University of Sao Paulo, is a former consultant to the UN who heads Brazil’s center for monitoring the Amazon region by satellite. His laboratory was the only source for complete satellite data on the status of Amazon deforestation. But to the U.S. media, Dr. Miranda and his fellow scientists didn’t exist. Small wonder: His data did not

support the apocalyptic paradigm the Insider-managed media were selling. In fact, Dr. Miranda's data showed that the studies sponsored by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, World Wildlife Fund, and the Conservation Foundation were exaggerating the rate of deforestation by 300 to 400 percent and grossly misrepresenting other data. Moreover, much of the destructive deforestation decried by the green extremists was the result of the socialist policies of Brazil's socialist government. The solution, Dr. Miranda pointed out, would not be found in international socialist policies implemented by the UN's bureaucracy. Moreover, he noted, not all deforestation is bad; converting some of the massive jungle for farming, livestock, timber harvest, and other productive uses is a good thing and necessary for food, jobs, and economic progress.

Another expert "pariah" at Rio was Dr. Alexander Bonilla of Costa Rica. A world-famous ecologist and former recipient of the United Nations' top environmental honor, the GLOBAL 500 Award, Dr. Bonilla was a natural to respond to questions about "biodiversity" and "sustainable development," which were major watchwords at the Summit. However, as with Drs. Ray and Miranda, Dr. Bonilla's science did not fit the reigning paradigm. The outspoken scientist urgently warned of the danger posed by the "greening of the Reds." Even more than in the U.S. and Europe, he noted, the Communists and "former" Communists in Latin America had poured into the environmental movement, where they exploited environmental issues to promote Marxist ideology and "class struggle." Dr. Bonilla was angry and disturbed over the usurpation of science by those who would use it for purely political purposes. "We have many poor people with very substandard living conditions," he explained. "They need jobs, decent housing, clothes, food, drinkable water, things that can be provided in a manner compatible with sound economic and ecological practices." But the environmental leftists, he said, want to stop all economic development, in the name of environmental protection. This will consign many people to lives of grinding poverty, sickness, illiteracy, and early death. "The knowledge and technology is available to enable a stewardship of natural resources that allows both prosperity and environmental integrity," Bonilla asserted. As expected, Dr. Bonilla's message was deemed unimportant by the "ruling class journalists"; instead, the American people needed to hear and see and read the blatherings of "experts" like Castro, Gorbachev, and Gore.

The New York-Moscow Green Axis

Environmentalism offers the would-be global dictators unparalleled opportunities to exercise their statist ambitions. Three of the broad primary objectives they expect to realize through their environmental agenda are:

- Abolition of private property, the keystone of every socialist political-economic system (see next chapter).
- Global regimentation, with draconian regulation, in minute detail, of (in the words of one of their favorite eco-programs) "every person on earth."

- World government, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, including military and police to enforce “world law.”

The internationalist elite of the New York-Moscow Axis have been working in tandem to convince the peoples of the world that, in the words of the World Federalist Association, “Global Problems Require Global Governance.” Through the influence of their symbiotic power networks, this one-world slogan has become universally adopted by Communists, socialists, feminists, environmentalists, human rights activists, disarmament advocates, and others worldwide. As usual, the coordinating brain center is Pratt House, the CFR.

Previously we noted that CFR braintruster Lincoln P. Bloomfield, in his 1962 study for the CFR-dominated Kennedy State Department, *A World Effectively Controlled by the United Nations*, had conceded that it would be difficult to bring about a merger between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Obviously, Americans would not go for union with a murderous, totalitarian system. That is why the threat of nuclear annihilation, “mutually assured destruction,” had to be built into a credible threat more to be feared than Communism itself. Then, at the critical point, the Soviets would come to their senses and realize that only “collective security,” under which national armaments were transferred to UN authority, offered a viable future. The Kremlin would mellow and democratize. However, Bloomfield saw that this scheme posed a major problem. He wrote: “if the communist dynamic were greatly abated, the West might lose whatever incentive it has for world government.”

Indeed, if the nasty, blood-soaked Reds convincingly demonstrate that they are “mellowing,” then much of the pressure for surrendering our arms evaporates. Obviously another sufficiently grave threat (or threats) must be found to substitute for, or augment the nuclear holocaust fear. As Bloomfield saw it, the drive for world government would require “a crisis, a war, or a brink-of-war situation so grave or commonly menacing that deeply rooted attitudes and practices are sufficiently shaken to open the possibility of a revolution in world political arrangements.” (Note: Are we currently in that scenario in 2016? During the US elections the threat of Civil War is mentioned, Europe has basically a domestically created migrant “crisis”, possible war between Russia and the US over Syria, war between Saudi-Arabia and Yemen, border incidents between India and Pakistan...)

Dr. Bloomfield is not alone in recognizing the utility of war and crisis in the service of totalitarianism. Another Insider strategist who has expounded on this subject is the late Herman Kahn (CFR), physicist/futurist founder of the Hudson Institute. In his essay, “World Federal Government,” co-authored with Anthony J. Wiener, Kahn acknowledges that building world government requires “intense external dangers.” Echoing Bloomfield, Kahn stated that “a world government could only be created out of war or crisis — an emergency that provided an appropriate combination of the motivations of fear and opportunity.” The Kahn/Wiener essay so impressed the leaders of the World Federalist Association that they have reprinted and promoted it.

Still another voice in the crisis choir is Brian Urquhart, a former UN under secretary-

general and now a full-time UN propagandist at the Ford Foundation. Urquhart has lamented, "There are moments when I feel that only an invasion from outer space will reintroduce into the Security Council that unanimity and spirit which the founders of the Charter were talking about." Mr. Urquhart's one-world colleagues have actually considered the feasibility of creating such a unifying extra-terrestrial "threat." That was one of the considerations pondered by the "Special Study Group" (SSG) convened in 1963 by the same Pratt House gang in the Kennedy administration who commissioned Bloomfield's study. The SSG produced a secret report that created a storm of controversy when it was anonymously released in 1967 as the Report From Iron Mountain. According to the Iron Mountain report, the SSG considered whether "such a menace would offer the 'last, best hope of peace,' etc., by uniting mankind against the danger of destruction by 'creatures' from other planets or from outer space." But the group decided such far-out scenarios lacked "credibility." Ditto for most other contrived "menaces." However, they decided, "the environmental-pollution model" offered hopeful potential. "It may be," said the Report, "... that gross pollution of the environment can eventually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear weapons as the principal apparent threat to the survival of the species."

The line adopted by the CFR Establishment press was that the Report From Iron Mountain was a hoax, a "brilliant satire." But was it? At the very time that they were dismissing the report as a delightful joke, the Pratt House illuminati were implementing the game plan it proposed. Through their power and influence in government, academe, the media, tax-exempt foundations, and Wall Street, they were furiously building the threat of environmental destruction into "a credible substitute for war capable of directing human behavior patterns in behalf of social organization." 30 Three years after the publication of Iron Mountain the first Earth Day was held, launching a global crusade that has had a dramatic impact on our world — politically, economically, socially, philosophically, morally, and religiously.

We Are All One

But mere crises are not enough; they must be GLOBAL CRISES! Traditionally, war has been the ultimate crisis for mankind. During war the people yield vast powers to the government for the welfare and survival of the tribe, city, or nation. The environmental "crises" we face, say the one-world eco-saviors, are global crises, presenting a global threat as deadly as war. Obviously, handling this threat is beyond the capabilities of individual nation states. Ergo, we must have global government with global powers. This was the theme of Mikhail Gorbachev's celebrated "End of the Cold War" speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1992. "The prospect of catastrophic climatic changes, more frequent droughts, floods, hunger, epidemics, national-ethnic conflicts, and other similar catastrophes compels governments to adopt a world perspective and seek generally applicable solutions," he declared. This could only be accomplished, said Gorbachev, through "some kind of global government." "I believe," said the CFR-approved "former" Communist, "that the new world order will not be fully realized unless the United Nations and its Security

Council create structures ... which are authorized to impose sanctions and make use of other measures of compulsion."

Amongst environmentalists and many other one-world "grievance" agitators, these slogans have become incessant mantras. "The first law of ecology tells us that 'everything is connected to everything else,'" proclaims environmental radical Jeremy Rifkin in his book *Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World*.³⁴ This thesis of global "interconnectedness," "unity," and "oneness" - a new "paradigm shift" - now permeates all discussion of things economic, political, social, environmental, moral, and spiritual - thanks to the promotion it has received from the Insider elite. School children are inculcated with this message from their textbooks. Children and adults receive daily doses of interdependence from television "news" and "nature" programs. This is a conscious, subversive effort to reorient the public to a "one-world" view.

If we "follow the money," we quickly see that the funding for the groups and individuals singing this tune comes from the usual sources: the big CFR-dominated tax-exempt foundations and corporations.³⁹ The tune is amplified in the political realm by CFR politicians like Senators John Kerry, Charles Schumer and John D. Rockefeller. And the CFR media cartel dutifully publicizes the apocalyptic scenarios of the doomsayers and praises them as courageous "prophets." Fright peddlers and one-world apostles such as Gorbachev, Rifkin, Toffler, Ferencz, et al., are favorably reviewed, sympathetically quoted, and provided with national media platforms to trumpet their nonsense and disinformation. Their twaddle is assigned as required reading to millions of students as though it is gospel. As at Rio, genuine scientists and scholars representing the authentic voice of scientific consensus are ignored or even vilified when they refute the hysterical nonsense and claptrap of the environmental gurus. Because of this blatant bias of the controlled media, these lunatic ravings and New Age mystic musings are no longer relegated to the wacky fringes of society, where they belong; they are expounded by supposedly "serious" think tanks, "respected" journals, and "mainstream" politicians, and form the basis for international treaties and federal policies and law.

The Work of Decades

This "cultural shift," as McLaughlin and Davidson put it in *Spiritual Politics*, has not happened overnight; it has been the patient work of more than a generation. Earth Day 1970 marked the launch of an ongoing offensive by an "ecology movement" that the Insiders had been building for years. 1972 marked another major watershed. In that year, the Club of Rome, an international coterie of one-world elitists (including many of the usual CFR regulars) came out with a much-heralded study, *The Limits to Growth*. This eco-socialist jeremiad proclaimed: "Entirely new approaches are required to redirect society toward goals of equilibrium rather than growth." In order to save the earth, said the Club report, "joint long-term planning will be necessary on a scale and scope without precedent." A "supreme effort" by all would be required "to organize more equitable distribution of wealth and income worldwide."

Interestingly, that same year, 1972, Gus Hall, National Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), released a book entitled *Ecology* with a similar message. "Human society cannot basically stop the destruction of the environment under capitalism," said Comrade Hall. "Socialism is the only structure that makes it possible." He continued: "Socialism corrects the basic flaw of capitalism. It sets human society on a new path. The means of production, factories, mines and mills become the property of the people. They operate and produce only to fulfill human needs.... This is the foundation for a new set of priorities, for new values.... What is involved is a 'conflict of values.'"

1972 was also the year of the first "Earth Summit," the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden. Serving as secretary-general of that event was Canadian billionaire-socialist Maurice Strong (whom we will see, later on, become a high-level Insider). The conference was hosted by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, one of the many leaders of the Socialist International in attendance. An immediate outcome of that summit was the creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), with Mr. Strong as its first executive director. Other summit results included a socialist-environmentalist manifesto called the Stockholm Declaration, consisting of 26 principles, and the Stockholm Plan of Action, a set of 109 (mostly Marxist) recommendations. One of the key intellectuals advising the conference and helping write its reports was Rockefeller University microbiologist Rene Dubos. That same year, Dubos came out with the celebrated book *Only One Earth*, which was co-authored with the British Fabian Socialist Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson). Thus, in 1972, the same eco-socialist "marching orders" were given to the hard-core Communist cadres, the worldwide socialist parties, and the great global mainstream of environmentalists and concerned citizens. In the years since those reports by the Club of Rome, the Communist Party, the UN, and Dubos/Ward, a deluge of similar and increasingly militant reports and books appeared from the Communist-socialist left paralleling, and at times converging with, the themes espoused in reports, articles, and books by the CFR "capitalist" elites. Although these "opposing sides" may attack each other rhetorically, what's important is the bottom line: Both sides are advocating central planning (socialism) and internationalism (world government). The Red-Green orchestra was playing furiously.

By the mid-1980s, we see U.S.-Soviet "convergence" in full swing, with Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. leaders engaged in large-scale cooperative propaganda efforts to push the same global environmental agenda. Gorbachev's subsequent replacement by Boris Yeltsin, and then Vladimir Putin, did not derail the CFR-Kremlin cooperation in this ongoing venture; in fact, it accelerated the agenda. Comrade Gorbachev, acting ostensibly as a private citizen, launched his "global brain trust" (his words), the Gorbachev Foundation, staffed in Moscow with 150 "former" Communist apparatchiks, and with affiliated institutes in the U.S. and other nations. During the 1990s, which leading worldorder theorist Professor Richard Falk (CFR) said would be the "decade of transformation," Gorbachev was in constant motion, along with the leading lights of Pratt

House, pushing the CFRKremlin one-world line.

In his 1992 book *Voting Green*, Rifkin wrote: “[T]he new Green vision places the environment at the center of public life, making it the context for both the formulation of economic policies and political decisions.”⁵² That was penned to coincide with the UN’s Earth Summit. And the CFR media orchestra made sure that that message was delivered repeatedly to the American public, to opinion molders, and to policy makers and legislators by a gaggle of different messengers. This kind of orchestrated saturation is essential if you are going to effect a real “cultural shift” or “paradigm shift.” A cascade of enviro-Marxist offerings mushroomed out of nowhere with the same theme. On the plane to Rio de Janeiro and at the Earth Summit itself, everywhere I looked, delegates, activists, and reporters were ravenously devouring (and later parroting) the contents of a host of new books and reports. The *State of the World*, an annual environmental fright report put out by the Worldwatch Institute (WI), was everywhere cited as holy writ.

One of the most celebrated books to come out at the time of the Summit was produced by then-Senator Al Gore. In *Earth In The Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit*, Gore insisted that “the effort to save the global environment” must become the “single shared goal [and] the central organizing principle for every institution in society.” The book is a perfervid piece of socialist ecopropaganda larded with an incredible number of errors, ludicrous claims, and blatant misrepresentations. But it was exactly what the Pratt House globalists wanted, and it was a relatively easy matter for them to provide the hype necessary to turn it into a bestseller. Gore, a protege of Communist billionaire Armand Hammer, led the U.S. Senate delegation to Rio and was launched on his way to becoming Vice President of the United States.

Gorbachev’s Toxic Globaloney

Mikhail Gorbachev, who is the darling of new world order promoters, and was one of the superstars of the Earth Summit, had also been thumping this theme for a couple of years. Addressing the 1990 Global Forum in Moscow, he called for “ecologizing” society and said: “The ecological crisis we are experiencing today — from ozone depletion to deforestation and disastrous air pollution - is tragic but convincing proof that the world we all live in is interrelated and interdependent.” “This means,” Gorbachev continued, “that we need an appropriate international policy in the field of ecology. Only if we formulate such a policy shall we be able to avert catastrophe. True, the elaboration of such a policy poses unconventional and difficult problems that will affect the sovereignty of states.” In a 1994 interview with the significant title, “From Red to Green,” in the Insider-funded Audubon magazine, Gorbachev stated: “We must change all our values.... What we are talking about is creating new forms of life on the basis of new values.” In a 1995 interview with the environmental magazine *Grassroots*, Gorbachev insisted that the only hope for saving our planet lay in “the development and implementation of an Earth Charter, a body of international ecological laws that would guide the actions of individuals, corporations and governments ... the time has come for a code of ethical and moral principles that will govern the conduct of nations and people with respect to

the environment.”

Let’s take a look at the values and principles of the “Prophet of Perestroika.” This is the same Gorbachev who, in November 1987, proclaimed: “In October 1917, we parted with the Old World, rejecting it once and for all. We are moving toward a new world, the world of Communism. We shall never turn off that road.” (Emphasis added.) “Perestroika,” he said then, “is a continuation of the October Revolution.” By which he means V. I. Lenin’s bloody, murderous Bolshevik Revolution. As we will see below, Gorbachev is an unrepentant, unregenerate, militant, atheist Communist. In 1989, Gorbachev declared: “I am a Communist, a convinced Communist, For some that may be a fantasy. But for me it is my main goal.” The following year, even as he was being hailed as the “man who ended Communism,” he reiterated this conviction, stating, “I am now, just as I’ve always been, a convinced Communist.” Are the CFR cognoscenti promoting Gorby illiterates? Are they unaware that his “ex-Communist” act is a ruse? Of course not; they are fully aware of the deception involved here. It is the Pratt House plutocracy that has been his main sponsor and the primary force assisting his deception. (In his famous book *Perestroika*, he plainly admitted: “We are not going to change Soviet power, of course, or abandon its fundamental principles, but we acknowledge the need for changes that will strengthen socialism.” (Emphasis added.) In the same revered text he explained that “according to Lenin, socialism and democracy are indivisible,” and the “essence of perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice.”

Agenda 21’s Terrifying Agenda

This mammoth program for global social engineering and ecotyrranny is a massive blueprint for regimenting all life on Planet Earth in the 21st century — in the name of protecting the environment. *Agenda 21: The Earth Summit Strategy to Save the Planet* (EarthPress, 1993), one of the UN-approved editions of the program, makes this brazen assertion:

“Effective execution of Agenda 21 will require a profound reorientation of all human society, unlike anything the world has ever experienced — a major shift in the priorities of both governments and individuals and an unprecedented redeployment of human and financial resources. This shift will demand that a concern for the environmental consequences of every human action be integrated into individual and collective decision-making at every level.”

With breathtaking audacity, the document continues:

“There are specific actions which are intended to be undertaken by multinational corporations and entrepreneurs, by financial institutions and individual investors, by high-tech companies and indigenous people, by workers and labor unions, by farmers and consumers, by students and schools, by governments and legislators, by scientists, by women, by children — in short, by every person on Earth.”

If Gorbachev is a “socialist,” a “Communist,” a “Leninist” — which he says he is, and

vindicates that claim with many actions — it is perfectly understandable that he would be very pleased with the direction that the United States is going with the UN environmental agenda. As a Leninist, he is comfortable with longterm strategy, and, as his idolizing biographer, Gail Sheehy, noted, he has long been known for “his emulation of Lenin’s policy of two steps forward, one step backward.”

But Comrade Mikhail, as we’ve noted, is getting plenty of help from “our” side. He and his Russian colleagues are provided with continuous tutoring and infusions of cash from world order heavyweights such as George Soros (CFR), Zbigniew Brzezinski (CFR, TC), George Shultz (CFR, TC), Henry Kissinger (CFR, TC), David Rockefeller (CFR, TC), and Richard N. Gardner* (CFR, TC). It was Professor Gardner who penned the now-famous article, “The Hard Road to World Order,” in the April 1974 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. One of the boldest calls for world government ever to appear in the CFR’s journal, it proposed building the “house of world order” through “an end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece.” What’s more, it set out the CFR Insider plans for exploiting fears about environmental calamity as a vehicle for expanding the UN’s power. In this 1974 article, Gardner wrote:

“The next few years should see a continued strengthening of the new global and regional agencies charged with protecting the world’s environment. In addition to comprehensive monitoring of the earth’s air, water and soil and of the effects of pollutants on human health, we can look forward to new procedures to implement the principle of state responsibility for national actions that have transnational environmental consequences, probably including some kind of “international environmental impact statement...”

The UN’s War on Private Property

Private land ownership is also a principal instrument of accumulation and concentration of wealth and therefore contributes to social injustice.... Public control of land use is therefore indispensable.... - United Nations “Habitat I” Conference Report, 1976

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend. - Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848

Property is theft! - P. J. Proudhon, the “Father of Anarchy,” 1840

Property struck the first blow at Equality; ... the supporters of Governments and property are the religious and civil laws; therefore, to reinstate man in his primitive rights of Equality and Liberty, we must begin by destroying all Religion, all civil society, and finish by the destruction of all property. - Adam Weishaupt, founder of the Order of the Illuminati, 1776

According to Karl Marx, “the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: abolition of private property.”⁵ That’s pretty plain, and it’s directly out of the *Communist Manifesto*. It has been the rallying cry of collectivists of all stripes

— communists, socialists, anarchists, fascists — and has guided the most ruthless and bloody regimes of the past century. Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Ceausescu, Tito, Gomulka, Castro, Pol Pot, Mengistu, Ortega, and dozens of other Communist dictators and satraps all fervently espoused that Marxian precept and applied it with a vengeance. And in so doing, they produced mountains of corpses and rivers of blood unequalled in all history.

Conversely, the champions of freedom have ever recognized that private property is essential both to human liberty and to the material well-being and economic advancement of all classes of people. “Let the people have property,” observed Noah Webster, “and they will have power — a power that will for ever be exerted to prevent a restriction of the press, and abolition of trial by jury, or the abridgement of any other privilege.” Justice Joseph Story, who was appointed to the Supreme Court by President James Madison and became one of America’s most revered jurists, put it this way: “That government can scarcely be deemed to be free when the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.”

In our own day, this same powerful truth was expounded clearly by the great economist Friedrich A. Hayek. “What our generation has forgotten,” he said in his 1944 Nobel Prize-winning classic, *The Road to Serfdom*, “is that the system of private property is the most important guaranty of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves.”

It is easy, then, to see why those who have totalitarian ambitions always attempt to destroy private property (Note: This holds true for leftist totalitarianism, National Socialism and Fascism both promoted private property). Because, like Hayek, they understand that as long as “the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently,” their plans for total power will remain frustrated. The millions of farmers, homeowners, businessmen, shopkeepers, artisans, laborers, and professionals who own their own property form a natural obstacle to tyrannical aspirations. If people are allowed to own their land, grow their food, manufacture whatever products they choose, live in homes of their own, and freely exchange their goods, services, and labor — why, they just might not meekly yield to the dictates of central planners, whether of the fascist, communist, or socialist variety!

So whom do you think the folks at the United Nations and their Insider sponsors choose to follow: Adams, Webster, Leo XIII, and Hayek? Or Marx, Mao, Lenin, and Stalin? You guessed it: Time after time after time, they’ve chosen the path of power, slaughter, tyranny, and destruction, rather than liberty, morality, and justice. As we will see next, with an examination of a few of the UN’s eco-Marxist programs.

The UN Gets Into the Act

We begin with “Habitat I,” the Conference Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held in Vancouver, Canada, during June 1976. The Preamble of this important document, endorsed by the United States and the other participating nations, declares:

“Land ... cannot be treated as an ordinary asset, controlled by individuals and subject to the pressures and inefficiencies of the market. Private land ownership is also a principal instrument of accumulation and concentration of wealth and therefore contributes to social injustice.... Public control of land use is therefore indispensable....“

The main body of the text then proposes the following Marxist policies, among others:

Recommendation D.1 Land resource management (a) Public ownership or effective control of land in the public interest is the single most important means of... achieving a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development whilst assuring that environmental impacts are considered.

(b) Land is a scarce resource whose management should be subject to public surveillance or control in the interest of the nation....

(c) ... Governments must maintain full jurisdiction and exercise complete sovereignty over such land with a view to freely planning development of human settlements....

Then there is Agenda 21, the massive environmental manifesto that came out of the 1992 UN Earth Summit. This is a monstrous socialist scheme for micromanaging every square centimeter of the planet’s surface — not to mention the air and space above it and the ground and seas below it. This green communist manifesto holds that “land must be regarded primarily as a set of essential terrestrial ecosystems and only secondly as a source of resources.” We must develop new social systems, it says, because “traditional systems have not been able to cope with the sheer scale of modern activities.” These new systems will “have as their goal both the effective management of land resources and their socially-equitable use.” Agenda 21 states further: “All countries should undertake a comprehensive national inventory of their land resources in order to establish a system in which land will be classified according to its most appropriate uses....“ Moreover: “All countries should also develop national land-management plans to guide development.“

Another frightful creature to emerge from the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) was the Global Biodiversity Assessment (GBA). The GBA is a huge, 1,140-page instrument that claims to provide a “scientific“ basis for implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity. “Property rights are not absolute and unchanging,“ it informs us, “but rather a complex, dynamic and shifting relationship between two or more parties, over space and time.“ And the UN ecocrats are determined to make any property rights they don’t abolish outright as “complex, dynamic and shifting“ as possible. “We should accept biodiversity [i.e., plants and animals] as a legal subject, and supply it with adequate rights. This could clarify the principle that biodiversity is not available for uncontrolled human use.“

Translation: We must assign legal “rights” to animals, trees, bugs, bushes, weeds, birds, fishes, even mountains, and then appoint “custodians,” “guardians,” or “trustees” (all of whom must be watermelon Marxists, of course) to look out for and speak for these rights.

“Contrary to current custom,” says the GBA, “it would therefore become necessary to justify any interference with biodiversity, and to provide proof that human interests justify the damage caused to biodiversity.” In other words, under this socialist scheme, a “guardian” or “stakeholder” (someone claiming to represent a plant or animal species on the property) can assert a priority right over that of the actual property owner, and force the owner to “prove” that any activity he contemplates for “his” property will not adversely impact the flora and fauna which constitute the “biodiversity” in that “ecosystem.”

U.S. Pressure From Above

In 1993, President Clinton (CFR) created the President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD) by executive order. The PCSD joined five Cabinet members with the leaders of the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Nature Conservancy and charged them to “develop policy recommendations for a national strategy for sustainable development that can be implemented by the public and private sectors.” They were to use as their guide the UN Convention on Biodiversity, which Clinton signed in June 1993 (but which the Senate has yet to ratify). That same year, President Clinton demonstrated how such internationalist socialist policies can play out when he brought in a team of UN bureaucrats (at U.S. taxpayer expense) from the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC). Their mission was to close down a proposed gold mine on private property in the vicinity of Yellowstone National Park, which the UN lists as a World Heritage Site. Militant eco-fanatics together with the Clinton-Gore administration had been trying for years to stop the Crown Butte Mining Company from starting operations there. The company had jumped through all of the costly and convoluted state and federal environmental impact analyses and presented no risk to the park or surrounding area.

But before Crown Butte could begin operation, the UNESCOWHC “scientists” came up with a finding that allowing the project to go forward would be ecologically disastrous. That was the only pretext President Clinton needed to issue an executive order stopping all new mining permits within a 19,000-acre area of federal land near Yellowstone. The UNESCO delegation went even further, seeking to review all policies involving mining, timber, wildlife, and tourism within an area of nearly 18 million acres surrounding the park, including millions of acres of private land. They and their U.S. enviro-Leninist allies want to create the “Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem,” an enormous “biodiversity reserve.” This is part of the UN's global Wildlands Project, aimed at “re-wilding” literally half of the U.S. land area.

It's important to recognize that this U.S.-UN eco-entangle-ment didn't begin with Bill Clinton and it won't end now that he has left office. George Bush the Elder (CFR) occupied the White House in 1992, and his main representative at the Earth Summit that

year was EPA Administrator William Reilly (CFR), a militant greenie. Before coming on board the Bush team, Reilly had served as president of both the Conservation Foundation and the World Wildlife Fund-U.S. And he had served as executive director of a land-use task force chaired by Laurance S. Rockefeller, which promoted Marxist land-use controls and expropriation. Reilly's contempt for private property was evident not only from the EPA policies he promulgated, but also from his own words. In his introduction to the 1985 book *National Parks for a New Generation*, for example, he advocated "greenline parks." Under this concept, closely akin to the UN schemes, privately owned land adjacent to federal or state parks could be declared part of the park system by executive fiat and its use restricted to conform to park purposes — in blatant disregard and violation of constitutional protections against such abuse.

This "watermelon Marxism" — green on the outside, red on the inside — has been promoted and supported continuously in the highest levels of our federal government, through both Republican and Democratic administrations, by the CFR Establishment. And the same one-world coterie also has continuously provided the "pressure from below" as well.

More Establishment Radicals

Take, for instance, watermelon Marxist Jeremy Rifkin, whose book, *Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World*, we mentioned in the previous chapter. It was published by Bantam New Age Books, a division of Bantam Books, one of the largest Establishment publishing houses, and was highly praised in the CFR press. And who is Mr. Rifkin? A radical activist in the Vietnam anti-war movement, he was a founder of the Johnny Appleseed Brigades. In 1976 he headed up the Peoples Bicentennial Commission (PBC), a thoroughly Marxist operation funded by the usual taxexempt foundations and the federal government. He has lectured for the KGB-front Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and written for the radical socialist *Mother Jones* magazine. All of which, of course, has qualified him to join the august company of savants who participate in the Gorbachev State of the World Forum palavers. It also guarantees him Insider foundation funding for his Washington, D.C.-based Foundation on Economic Trends. And what type of economics does Comrade Rifkin espouse? Because of the worsening greenhouse crisis, he says in *Entropy*, "For the first time in our country's history we will have to deal with the ultimate political and economic question — redistribution of wealth." (Though rest assured it is not his or Mr. Rockefeller's wealth he wants to redistribute.) Under the system he favors, "The long-accepted practice of private exploitation of 'natural' property is replaced with the notion of public guardianship." This is also the message of Peter Bahouth, the former head greenie at Greenpeace. Now he is director of the Turner Foundation, where he ladles out millions of dollars to his comrades at Greenpest, Fiends of the Earth, the Environmental Defense Fraud, and other eco-fascist extortionists. The Turner Foundation insists that property rights are responsible for a host of problems associated with urban and suburban sprawl and further insists that state governments must impose more restrictions on property rights. "States must insist localities determine ...defined urban growth boundaries," says

a recent Foundation statement. Indeed, says the Foundation, “politically potent bubbles about free markets and property rights must be popped.” The Turner Foundation, of course, is the eco-hobbyhorse of Citizen Ted Turner, whose multi-million dollar palatial estates on several continents are not to be counted among the private property bubbles to be popped by Turner’s Greenpest lackies. Turner, Rockefeller, and other members of the ruling elite smugly believe that their money and political clout will protect them from the Marxist programs they are foisting on us lesser folk of the middle class. As Marx pointed out in his Manifesto, his immediate target was “not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property.”

Yes, it is the property of the bourgeois — the middle class — that is the principal target of Marx and his present-day disciples. We have already seen the “future” envisioned by these one-world corporate socialists. It is an Orwellian nightmare world in which Soviet Commissars luxuriate in their Black Sea villas and the upper-level Communist nomenklatura enjoy pampered, privileged lives — while the vast majority of the Russian people exist in misery and grinding poverty. But the Pratt House billionaires already possess greater wealth and enjoy more luxury than their Soviet counterparts could ever dream of, you say. True, but the Communist elite enjoy something that the top Insiders crave more than wealth and luxury: power — raw, unchallenged power. The power of the master over the slave. The power of the tyrant over the masses. Blocking their path to totalitarian power is the middle class. Thus the ongoing attack on middle class property by the would-be global overlords and their watermelon Marxist minions.

The UN’s International Court of Criminals

[The proposed International Criminal Court] repudiates the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence and cancels the 4th of July... What are the limits on the ICC? There are none. It’s insane! - Professor Charles Rice, Notre Dame University School of Law

With the stroke of a pen, President Bill Clinton has a last chance to safeguard humankind.... He must simply sign a treaty, finalized in Rome in 1998, to create a permanent International Criminal Court. - Robert S. McNamara (CFR, TC) and Benjamin B. Ferencz, New York Times op-ed, December 12, 2000

On December 31, 2000, David Scheffer (CFR), President Clinton’s Ambassador for the International Criminal Court, signed the ICC Rome Treaty for the United States. This was an incredibly radical, revolutionary act, which will bring devastating consequences for the American people, if they allow the U.S. Senate to ratify it. If ratified and implemented, this brazenly treasonous scheme by the CFR Insiders would rend asunder our constitutional protections and cause American citizens to be vulnerable to prosecution before international UN tribunals for alleged violations of lawless UN “laws.”

Regardless of whether one views the prospect of the ICC sympathetically or with horror

and revulsion, it must be admitted by all who are fair-minded that U.S. accession to this treaty would represent a momentous, colossal change to our judicial and constitutional system. Who but a totalitarian would argue that a change of this magnitude should be even contemplated, let alone attempted, without an informed debate and a genuine public consensus? Yet there has been no public debate of this issue.

Ask yourself: Did you see the development of the ICC covered on the evening news on NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN? Did you see the supposed merits and real dangers debated on Face the Nation, Nightline, The Capital Gang, Hardball, 60 Minutes, Larry King Live, or 20/20? Of course you didn't, because those debates never happened. At the time that President Clinton announced the U.S. signing of the Rome Treaty, probably not one U.S. citizen in 100 had heard of the document, and not one in a thousand had any inkling of what it entailed. The organized forces for world government, however, had been intensely active for several years preparing to spring the ICC trap. Pro-ICC articles were appearing in the internationalist journals, pro-ICC studies were issued by globalist think tanks, a fortune in foundation grants was provided to pro-ICC academics and NGOs to attend international conferences and symposia — all of this was taking place on an enormous scale, while most Americans were completely in the dark.

The Campaign for an ICC

The vast majority of Americans today are blissfully ignorant of the fact that such a radical proposal is even under consideration. But the truth is that it is perilously close to becoming a reality. And unless the American public becomes sufficiently alerted, alarmed, and activated to oppose this incredibly subversive scheme, it will become reality. The formal campaign for an ICC was launched in the summer of 1998 at a United Nations summit convened in Rome. The monthlong conference concluded on July 17th with the announcement that 120 nations had voted in favor of approving the new "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" and that it would enter into effect and become binding upon the entire planet as soon as it was formally ratified by 60 nations. The ostensible targets of the new ICC are dictators, tyrants, and other nasty practitioners of "genocide, war crimes, aggression and crimes against humanity." But the UN membership is replete with murderous dictators, tyrants, and the worst practitioners of these and other heinous crimes. The likes of Fidel Castro, Yasir Arafat, Sam Nujoma, Mikhail Gorbachev, Li Peng, Vladimir Putin, and other bloodyhanded thugs have always been welcomed and honored at the United Nations.

The Real Targets of the ICC

Who, then, are the real targets of the ICC proponents? Those who stand in the way of their proposed "new world order," naturally. That includes, of course, so-called "right-wing dictators," like General Augusto Pinochet, who has never been forgiven by the international Socialist-Communist-Insider cabal for overthrowing the brutal Communist regime of their favored left-wing dictator: Salvador Allende in Chile. In 1998, while the 82-year-old Pinochet was visiting England for medical treatment, he was arrested and held

on a warrant issued by Baltazar Garzon, an investigative magistrate from Spain. Judge Garzon, a Marxist activist, was pursuing a revolutionary political agenda, not seeking justice for real crimes. Many legal authorities condemned Garzon's action for violating established canons of international law. Eduardo Fungarino, Spain's chief government prosecutor, filed a court motion charging that the judge had broken many legal procedures in issuing the arrest order, and that Garzon had "an absolute lack of jurisdiction" over alleged crimes committed outside of Spain against citizens of other countries.

But the phony "human rights" activists demanding Pinochet's scalp could not care less about genuine violations of human rights and real justice for bloody dictators. At the time of Pinochet's arrest in England on the Spanish warrant, Communist dictator Fidel Castro was welcomed to Spain and PLO terrorist leader Yasir Arafat was a guest of the Clinton White House. Likewise, Jiang Zemin, the butcher of Tiananmen Square, as well as the bloodyhanded Soviet tyrants Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin — and virtually every other mass-murdering despot of the left — have been conspicuously ignored by the selfrighteous frauds leading the ICC choir.

However, anti-Communist military leaders and heads of state like Pinochet are not the only — or even the chief — targets of the ICC. The primary target of the ICC architects is the United States and the American people. This was conspicuously obvious at the ICC Summit in Rome, where America-bashing was the order of the day. As one who was in Rome "at the creation," this reporter can attest firsthand to the fact that the long-standing hatred toward the United States by the vast majority of the pathetic regimes that comprise the UN menagerie is still alive and well. Day after day, throughout the ICC conference, the U.S. was subjected to tirades and condemnations — by official delegates as well as by NGOs — for supposed past and present sins. In fact, from the nonstop anti-U.S. invective one might imagine that America is the principal, if not the sole, source of evil in the world. The billions of dollars that we have ladled out over the past half-century to these countries and the UN itself have purchased us not an iota of good will.

Months before the Rome conference had even begun, the UN Commission on Human Rights had targeted the U.S. with a purely political attack alleging that this country unfairly applies the death penalty. The Insiders' White House agent Bill Clinton aided the scheme by inviting UN human rights monitor Bacre Waly Ndiaye to America to meet with U.S. officials and inspect our prisons. In September and October 1997, Mr. Ndiaye came to the U.S. and visited prisons in Florida, Texas, and California. The New York Times reported:

"For Mr. Ndiaye, the visit to the United States is important Government will show the way to other countries which have been resistant to United Nations mechanisms," he said."

Mr. Ndiaye's U.S. precedent-setting tour provided the Insiderfunded NGO radicals at Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the ACLU, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights with a propaganda bonanza. The Insider media cartel retailed all their

lurid charges of the horrors of the American justice system. In April 1998, shortly before the ICC Summit, the UN Commission on Human Rights released a report based on the Ndiaye investigation. The report charged that application of the death penalty in the United States is tainted by racism, economic discrimination, politics, and an excessive deference to victims' rights.

The Commission also accused the U.S. of being in violation of the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and called on the U.S. to suspend all further executions until U.S. state and federal laws were brought into compliance with "international standards." This provided the NGO cabal with another golden opportunity for a round of media-enhanced attacks on the U.S. legal system. One of the aims of this report and its companion NGO campaign was to sow seeds of doubt and guilt in American public opinion concerning the fairness of American justice; this would make the upcoming ICC proposals for an international system seem much more reasonable. This was all a colossal, insidious charade, of course. Not to mention the epitome of hypocrisy. At the very time that Kofi Annan's Commission was denouncing the U.S. justice system, the sainted Mr. Annan was suppressing information that he had been a key silent accomplice in the Rwandan genocide. Lt.-Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the former commander of Canada's UN "peace-keeping" mission to Rwanda in 1994, revealed that he had sent a fax to Annan's office warning that Rwandan security officials had been ordered to "register" the (predominantly Christian) Tutsis as an obvious prelude to mass liquidation. Annan's office ordered Dallaire to "assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to or illegally acquired by civilians," which, in effect, meant disarming the intended victims! So Mr. Annan, whose Commission was chastising the U.S. for gross abuses, was himself involved in one of the most atrocious genocides in world history. Likewise, many of the UN representatives at Rome who cited the Commission report in their denunciations of the U.S. were representing some of the most repressive and brutal regimes in the world.

We don't mean to imply that all of the U.S. bashing at Rome was emanating from Third World countries, Communist satrapies, or UN agencies. Canada, Norway, Britain, Germany, Italy, and other U.S. "allies" vied for top anti-U.S. honors, too. On the final day of the conference, when the very minimal objections of the U.S. to the ICC were soundly defeated, the assembled delegations erupted in a tumultuous and defiant display of anti-American jubilation — which was joined by much of the press corps, including "American" reporters. Naturally, the U.S. NGOs topped all others in attacking their homeland. As Reuters reported, "the American NGOs were the scourge of the United States," at the conference.

Shaping a Consensus

The enormity of the deception and the immense resources and coordination of this global network are amazing to behold. But even the astounding NGO-Insider spectacle at Rome fails to provide a full appreciation of the fact that it was but a part of a much larger scheme. The Rome gathering was the culmination of a multi-year program of PrepComs (Preparatory Committee meetings) that had been carefully orchestrated to arrive at the

contrived global “consensus” that is now being celebrated by the votaries of “world order.” The final PrepCom meeting, held from March 16th through April 3rd, 1998 in New York, was a minipreview of the Rome summit, with all the major actors, from UN officials and pro-ICC national delegates, to NGO activists, honing their skills, practicing their parts, and coordinating their activities with their Insider media allies. In order to get all of the cadres marching in sync, and to create the appearance of popular support, the Insiders had to set up a host of ongoing programs throughout the country before, during, and after the Rome summit. One of the major events attended by this writer was an ICC symposium at the luxurious Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles on February 26, 1998. The CFR leadership was obvious. The moderator of the program was Dr. Edwin M. Smith (CFR), professor of international law at the University of Southern California and formerly an appointee to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by President Clinton (CFR). The main speaker for the program was Ambassador Scheffer (CFR), formerly an adjunct professor of international law at Georgetown University Law Center, President Clinton’s alma mater. The program was sponsored by the United Nations Association; the World Federalist Association; Amnesty International; the American Civil Liberties Union; the American Bar Association; Friends of the United Nations; B’nai Brith; and the law firms of Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher, and Milbank, Tweed, Hadley, and McCloy. CFR members play prominent, if not dominant, leadership roles in all of these organizations.

These individuals and organizations are engaged in what Professor George C. Lodge (CFR) calls “quietly assembling global arrangements” and “shaping a consensus.” Lodge, who is a professor at the Harvard Business School and a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes in his 1995 book, *Managing Globalization in the Age of Interdependence*, that there are “energetic and creative individuals in government, interest groups, and corporations [who] are quietly assembling global arrangements to deal with crises and tensions. For the most part, they work outside of legislatures and parliaments and are screened from the glare of the media in order to find common interests, shape a consensus, and persuade those with power to change.”

The Proposed ICC

The proposed ICC has proceeded through this process, and has gone from “action recommendation” to “consensus” to (almost) full realization. The ICC is breathtakingly audacious on many counts but the most amazingly brazen claim, and one unprecedented even for so outrageous an outfit as the United Nations, is the assertion by the UN that once the Rome Statute is ratified by 60 countries (a completely arbitrarily selected number, by the way: totals ranging from 30 to 90 were considered), the newly established court will then have compulsory jurisdiction over all countries, even those that refuse to ratify it. This is, of course, a revolutionary and flagrant violation of the most fundamental principle of treaty law, namely, that a treaty is an agreement that is binding only upon those who are party to the treaty. Yet the ICC zealots had no qualms of conscience in repeatedly and piously invoking “the rule of law” to advance their totally lawless proposal. By December 31, 2000, when President Clinton signed the ICC treaty, 27 nations had

ratified the document, and the court's advocates were predicting that the requisite 60 ratifications would be obtained by 2002. The new court is to be headquartered in The Hague, Netherlands, which is already host to the World Court, the UN tribunal that was set up in 1945 to try cases between nations. The new ICC would try individuals who are accused of violating international laws.

Dr. Charles Rice, professor of law at Notre Dame University, has termed the ICC "a monster," both in concept and reality, noting that it effectively "repudiates the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence and cancels the 4th of July." "In our system," Professor Rice explains, "law is supposed to be a rule of reason which, in a sense, controls the state and compels the state to operate under the law." But the super-jurisdictional ICC, he points out, has no legitimate basis for its claimed authority, no protections against abuses, no accountability, and virtually no limits to its jurisdiction. "What are the limits on the ICC?" he asks, and then answers, "There are none. It's insane!"

Civilian Disarmament

I am a United Nations fighting person.... I would fire upon U.S. citizens who refuse or resist confiscation of firearms banned by the U.S. government. - from a "Combat Arms Survey" given to members of the United States Marine Corps, 1994

The incredibly audacious schemes for national disarmament set forth in Freedom From War, Blueprint for the Peace Race, the Gorbachev-CFR Global Security Project, and other programs discussed are transparent plots to subject all the nations of the world, including the United States of America, to a global military-police state under an empowered United Nations. This is perfectly clear from any reasonable reading of the documents themselves. Please understand this critically important point: These proposals do not advocate "world disarmament," as is generally supposed, based on the "peace" rhetoric used to promote them. Instead they propose to transfer world armaments from the nation states to the global superstate envisioned by the one-world Insiders and their Communist-socialist cohorts. This represents the most gigantic, naked grab for power this world has ever seen. No previous world power or dictator has ever enjoyed such vast, unchecked power.

These proposals amount to giant "trust me" schemes that are so facially fraudulent as to be ludicrous. They could be compared to the situation in which city officials get together with Mafia kingpins and announce that they are going to join forces to fight the crime and violence that are ripping the community apart. Under any circumstances, such a proposal would rightly be viewed as absurdly dangerous and a betrayal of office by those elected to uphold justice. The sanity and integrity of the officials involved would be immediately suspect. However, there would be no lingering doubts about integrity if it became known to citizens that the mayor is involved in a multimillion dollar business deal with a mafia-owned dummy corporation, the police chief's election campaign is being

financed by mob-controlled unions, the district attorney's former law firm (in which his wife and brother are still partners) is the main counsel for the chief mafia don, and all the top judges are driving Rolls Royces and springing gangsters from jail, on the flimsiest of excuses, faster than they can be apprehended.

Under such circumstances, only the most dimwitted or willfully blind would fail to see that the city is facing a campaign of systemic corruption conceived and orchestrated by a criminal conspiracy. And if the police chief appoints a notorious mob hit-man, with an arrest record as long as his arm, to head a "task force" of convicted felons to go about the city disarming all the citizens - in the interest of peace and security, of course — it should then be crystal clear that the good citizens had better organize immediately and sweep the criminals from office, if they hope to have any chance of saving themselves and their community. In the face of such overwhelming evidence, only total fools, complete cowards, or corrupt souls who had already joined the conspiracy would fail to heed the call to battle.

Who is really calling the tunes and setting the agenda for the gun control "citizens network"? As usual, if you really want to know, follow the money. Handgun Control Incorporated, the National Council for a Responsible Firearms Policy, the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, the ACLU, the National Council of Churches, and other groups that have led this campaign have been dependent upon these Insider feed troughs for funding. And they have depended on the CFR-dominated media cartel to disseminate their disinformation, while demonizing guns, gun owners, and all organized resistance to personal disarmament. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees "the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed," has to go. Free people with the means to defend themselves are viewed by the United Nations as a threat to "peace."

To cut this chapter a bit short: In 2016, gun control is a very active "every day" topic in the US media and during the presidential elections, a hidden camera video surfaced from one of the Clinton Campaign staff directly stating that taking all the guns is a major goal... which of course should not be said out loud.

The goal is "progressive controlled disarmament", i.e. restricting gun right further and further so that "no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force.... The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes."

"All other armaments would be destroyed." Notice that no provision is made to exempt arms owned by private citizens. An innocent oversight? Hardly. The UN itself, as we've already seen, is hardly sympathetic to private gun ownership. That's to be expected, since the Insiders who designed it and support it, along with all of the Communist regimes and most of the non- Communist countries who make up the UN membership, share a statist

hostility toward civilian possession of arms. Anyone familiar with the UN's history in this matter, as well as the history of its legal interpretation of treaties, will recognize that private arms are targeted for destruction under the term "all other armaments." We can expect that this terminology in Freedom From War and other agreements, conventions, and treaties will be cited as legally requiring the U.S. to disarm its civilian population. All under the guise of following "the rule of law."

This "gun grabbing", the disarmament of the people is not only limited to the US, it is a UN policy to be enforced everywhere. Interestingly, supplying and arming terrorist cells to fight proxy wars is still considered "ok" for the UN.

Regionalism

We cannot leap into world government in one quick step.... [T]he precondition for eventual globalization —genuine globalization — is progressive regionalization, because thereby we move toward larger, more stable, more cooperative units. — Zbigniew Brzezinski (CFR, TC), former National Security Advisor, 1995

The globalist Insiders and their Communist partners have done precisely this throughout the course of the 20th century. From one corner of the globe to the other, the Communists have sponsored revolutions and "wars of national liberation," pitting tribe against tribe, or exploiting some other division based upon race, creed, class, nationality, or past grievances. The Insiders, operating from their positions of power in the business, financial, political, and media worlds, have repeatedly supported these ruinous tumults. They have provided financial and propaganda assistance as well as undermined the targeted governments through direct political pressure or diplomatic intrigue from Washington, D.C. and London. (The prototype for these operations was first put into operation by the secret Rhodes network in South Africa in the late 19th Century. Carroll Quigley, in *The Anglo-American Establishment* (pp. 44-47 and 107-112) and *Tragedy and Hope* (pp. 136-144), provides an important inside look at the high-level conspiracy involved in the Jameson Raid (1895) and the instigation of the Boer War (1899-1902))

Through this convulsive process of controlled chaos, nations, kingdoms, and empires have been toppled, borders erased and redrawn, stable social and political systems uprooted, and whole peoples annihilated or driven as refugees into foreign lands. The maps of Europe, Africa, and Asia, especially, have been repeatedly redrawn in this fashion, with the result that the number of nation states in the world has increased from 72 at the end of World War II to 195 today. Some of these nations were artificially created by, and had their borders drawn by, the United Nations. Others, though not officially spawned by the UN, are the illegitimate offspring of the Insiders and the Communists who created the UN. In virtually every case where these new nations have been created or reformulated, the one-worlders have assured that corrupt, socialist regimes would be placed in power — either the totalitarian, revolutionary, socialist (Communist) variety, or the evolutionary, big-business, socialist (Fascist) variety. These newly created entities have been manipulated,

with relative ease, into joining various regional organizations established, ostensibly, for the mutual benefit of the countries involved. Thus, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the European Union (EU), the European Monetary Union (EMU), the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Middle East-North Africa economic area (MENA), and other regional organizations have sprouted and grown into sizable establishments wielding increasing power. (We cannot examine all of these groups here, but we especially direct the readers to the following articles from *The New American* for important exposes on the more recently launched APEC and MENA regional organizations. "The Free Trade Charade" (December 27, 1993) reveals the CFR-TC hands and machinations in the formation and control of APEC. "Play It Again, Uncle Sam" (December 12, 1994) tells the amazing story of the overt controlling role of the CFR in sponsoring (together with the World Economic Forum and the Socialist International!) the 1994 Casablanca conference that launched MENA. Both articles are available at www.thenewamerican.com.)

this, as in so many other areas we have already examined, we see an amazing parallelism between the plans of the Pratt House one-worlders and those of the Communist strategists. Joseph Stalin, for instance, recognized that populations will more readily merge their national loyalties with a vague regional loyalty — with which they may be able to find some sense of connection or identity — than they will for a world authority. In his 1912 essay, "Marxism and the National Question," the aspiring dictator insisted that "regional autonomy is an essential element in the solution of the national problem."⁵ (Emphasis in original.) Again and again over the decades, the Communists emphasized the necessity of creating "regional organs" to facilitate the "eradication" of nationalism. In 1936, the official program of the Communist International declared:

"This world dictatorship can be established only when the victory of socialism has been achieved in certain countries or groups of countries, when the newly established proletarian republics enter into a federative union with the already existing proletarian republics ... [and] when these federations of republics have finally grown into a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics uniting the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as a state."

The Communists and the Insiders were (and still are) working from the same page: They are building regional blocs with structures that override national sovereignty and can later be merged into a global superstructure. Two of the main regional IGOs that currently present a real and increasing danger to the United States are NAFTA and NATO, the former being a fairly recent creation formed for economic pretexts (trade, principally), and the latter of considerably older vintage established as a military alliance under a pretext of "collective security." Each of these IGOs is serving, in the words of a top globalist operative, as an "end run around national sovereignty, eroding it bit by bit."

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the campaign to secure its passage in Congress were closely modeled after the Insiders' game plan four decades earlier to

establish the Common Market, later known as the European Community (EC) and (most recently) the European Union. And it is very clear that the Pratt House one-worlders intend to “evolve” NAFTA into a full-fledged, supra-national, regional government like the EU, but on an accelerated timeline, accomplishing in one decade what it has taken them four to do in Europe. NAFTA, which was originally promoted as a tripartite “free trade” agreement that would open markets and expand trade between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, is now being transformed into a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Association (WHFTA), with a single currency (the U.S. dollar is being proposed, for now), a hemispheric central bank, and an entire hemispheric regime of regulations to “harmonize” business, industry, labor, agriculture, transportation, immigration, environment, health, trade, and other policies “from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.” NAFTA is not, and never was, about “free trade.” Free trade — real free trade — is a voluntary exchange between two parties, unhampered by government intervention.

But NAFTA, like the European Union, seeks to regulate and control virtually every industrial, agricultural, environmental, and labor matter. Rather than creating or permitting economic freedom by eliminating government intervention, NAFTA seeks to homogenize the plethora of socialist interventions that now hamstring the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian economies. Insider Jacques Delors, the socialist president of the European Community Commission in 1992, when the NAFTA debate was raging, clearly saw the parallels between the two regional organizations. Delors gloated that “NAFTA is a form of flattery for us Europeans. In many ways, we have shown what positive, liberating effect these regional arrangements can have.” Naturally, what a thorough socialist and internationalist like Delors considers “positive” and “liberating” tends to jarringly conflict with “negative” and “retrograde” concepts such as independence, sovereignty, free enterprise, property rights, and constitutional limitations on power.

The CFR journal *Foreign Affairs* led the way, with a continuous fusillade of pro-NAFTA articles. Some even conceded, in essence, a key point made by this author and other NAFTA opponents at the time, to wit, that NAFTA was, in reality, a stealth plan to foist an EU-type regional government scheme upon Americans. “The creation of trinational dispute-resolution mechanisms and rulemaking bodies on border and environmental issues may also be embryonic forms of more comprehensive structures” M. Delal Baer approvingly wrote in the Fall 1991 *Foreign Affairs*. “After all, international organizations and agreements like GATT and NAFTA by definition minimize assertions of sovereignty in favor of a joint rule-making authority” Dr. Baer was not telling anything new to the CFR’s top political operatives; they were already lined up behind the internationalist program. Republican President George Bush (the elder) (CFR), Democrat House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (CFR), and Republican House Minority Leader Newt Gingrich (CFR)* played the pivotal political roles in pushing “fast track” authority for NAFTA through Congress — with massive help from their CFR confreres in the worlds of business, banking, media, and academia. And the same players campaigned furiously and continuously for final approval of the deceitful agreement.

European Union

Because it is the internationalists' template for NAFTA/WHFTA, a rudimentary understanding of the EU — how it was launched and by whom, what it has become, and what it is becoming — is absolutely essential for American patriots, in order to be successful in stopping this insidious attack on our sovereignty and independence. Our treatment here must necessarily be brief. The following points are key to an understanding of the Common Market/United Europe movement and its counterpart, NAFTA, in this hemisphere:

- While posing as a “bottom-up” popular movement, it was completely a “top-down” enterprise, conceived and run entirely by an elite coterie of one-worlders.
- While posing as a native European movement, it was largely directed by U.S. Insiders and almost totally financed by U.S. taxpayers.
- Presented to Americans as a way to defend Western Europe from Communism, it has instead been used to drive Europe into socialism. • Warnings that the Common Market would erode national sovereignty were shouted down as paranoid ravings, but they have proven true.
- The national and local governments of the EU countries are being swallowed up and increasingly overruled by unaccountable Eurocrats and Eurojudges.
- The EU currency, the euro, and the Eurobank are destroying the value of the individual national currencies and the economic sovereignty of the member states.
- The EU governing institutions, acting in coordination with their fellow one-worlders in national governments, are becoming increasingly socialistic and oppressive.

All of this was foreseen by astute observers many years ago, when the foundations for this diabolical scheme were being laid. One of the most knowledgeable historians of the Common Market/EU, and an indefatigable critic of it, is Hilaire du Berrier, a contributing editor to *The New American* (and its predecessors *American Opinion* and *The Review of the News*). For more than four decades he has published his authoritative HduB Reports from Monte Carlo, Monaco and has repeatedly exposed the machinations and plans of the European and American Insiders for Europe and the world. “The CFR,” wrote du Berrier in January 1973, “saw the Common Market from the first as a regional government to which more and more nations would be added until the world government which the UN had failed to bring about would be realized. At a favorable point in the Common Market’s development, America would be brought in. But the American public had to be softened first and leaders groomed for the change-over.”

Mr. du Berrier chronicled in his reports the “secret history” of the Common Market, utilizing published statements from the European and American press, official documents of European governments, the diaries and memoirs of European Insiders, and his own unparalleled intelligence sources developed over a lifetime of direct participation in some of the most momentous events of the 20th century. Step by step, he detailed the Insider-

orchestrated program, from the pre-World War II era, through the war years, and then the post-WWII era. As du Berrier notes, the first concrete step toward the abolition of the European nation-states was taken in 1951 with the signing of the seemingly innocuous treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ostensible purpose of this move was to so integrate the basic industries of coal and steel that a future war between France and Germany would be “physically impossible.”

The next nail in the coffin of European national sovereignty came on March 25, 1957 with the signing by the six ECSC nations (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) of the two Treaties of Rome. These created the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which greatly furthered the process of merging the economic and energy sectors of the member states.

The next stage involved bringing the rest of Western Europe into the fold. In 1973 the United Kingdom, after more than two decades of resisting, came in, as did Ireland and Denmark-Greece joined in 1981, bringing the number of member states to ten. Spain and Portugal became the 11th and 12th members in 1986. The year 1986 also marked passage of the Single European Act, which mandated the establishment of “an area without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is ensured.” The 1991 Treaty of Maastricht committed the EU signatories to a single currency and a European central bank. The European Monetary Institute (EMI), the embryonic European central bank created by the treaty, was officially launched on January 1, 1994. Frankfurt was chosen as the site for the new entity and Alexander Lamfalussy, former head of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, was tapped to be president. (Significantly, the establishment of the EMI in Frankfurt coincided with that city’s March celebration of the founding of the Rothschild banking dynasty. About 80 members of the famous first family of international banking Insiders gathered in Frankfurt during the first week of March to commemorate the birth of dynasty founder Meyer Amschel Rothschild, who was born there 250 years ago. The Lamfalussy-BIS connection is also significant, inasmuch as the BIS has long been recognized by all observers of banking as the central bank of international banking.)

Work in the Shadows

Now let’s drop back for a moment and briefly examine the nutsand- bolts process and the main actors involved in putting this amazing scheme together, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Commission, or ECSC. “This was a truly revolutionary organization,” wrote Georgetown University Professor Carroll Quigley, the Insiders’ own inside historian, “since it had sovereign powers, including the authority to raise funds outside any existing state’s power.” The ECSC merged the coal and steel industries of six countries under a single High Authority. It was, Quigley pointed out, “a rudimentary government.” In his 1966 history of the world, *Tragedy and Hope*, Quigley wrote:

“This “supranational“ body had the right to control prices, channel investment, raise

funds, allocate coal and steel.... Its powers to raise funds for its own use by taxing each ton produced made it independent of governments. Moreover, its decisions were binding, and could be reached by majority vote without the unanimity required in most international organizations of sovereign states."

The proposal for the ECSC was introduced, amidst great fanfare, in May 1950 as the "Schuman Plan." (Although Jean Monnet, a consummate Insider and at that time head of France's General Planning Commission, was the real author of the plan) The American Insiders leapt to praise the Schuman Plan. John Foster Dulles, a CFR founder, called it "brilliantly creative." Dulles had become close pals with Monnet decades earlier, when both labored at Versailles following World War I to establish the League of Nations. Later, as Secretary of State, he would use U.S. power to help Monnet quash European opposition to a United Europe. Secretary of State Dean Acheson (CFR) termed it a "major contribution toward the resolution of the pressing political and economic problems of Europe."

Insider Jean Monnet, a life-long, self-avowed, multi-millionaire socialist, whom columnist Joseph Alsop (CFR) admiringly dubbed the "good, gray wizard of Western European union,"²⁰ was appointed the first president of the powerful new ECSC. Monnet knew full well just how subversive and revolutionary his new creation was. Merry and Serge Bromberger record in their biography *Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe* that when Monnet and his "brain trust" had outlined the basics of the ECSC proposal, they called in legal expert Maurice Lagrange to take care of the detail work. Monnet recognized that his scheme was so audaciously subversive it was doubtful that the governments of sovereign nations would ever agree to such a radical proposal. Unless, of course, the proponents just as audaciously employed deception, duplicity, bribery, extortion, and coercion. Which is precisely what they did. The Brombergers, who are ardent admirers of Monnet, admit the conspiratorial and totalitarian mind-set of their hero:

"Gradually, it was thought, the supranational authorities, supervised by the European Council of Ministers at Brussels and the Assembly in Strasbourg, would administer all the activities of the Continent. A day would come when governments would be forced to admit that an integrated Europe was an accomplished fact, without their having had a say in the establishment of its underlying principles. All they would have to do was to merge all these autonomous institutions into a single federal administration and then proclaim a United States of Europe.... Actually, the founders of the Coal and Steel Community would have to obtain from the various national governments —justifiably reputed to be incapable of making sacrifices for the sake of a federation — a whole series of concessions in regard to their sovereign rights until, having been finally stripped, they committed hara-kiri by accepting the merger."

Again, a bald admission that the Insider founders of the ECSC/EU knew from the start that they were slipping a noose around the neck of an unsuspecting Europe and that they Planned to gradually tighten it until it strangled their hapless victim — to death. Another very important source on this "hara-kiri" phenomenon is Insider Ernst H. van

der Beugel, honorary secretary-general of the Bilderberger Group, vice-chairman of the Netherlands Institute for Foreign Affairs (a CFR affiliate), member of the Trilateral Commission, Harvard lecturer, etc. In his book *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership* — which contains a foreword by “my friend Henry Kissinger” — van der Beugel explained the workings of the Monnet-CFR symbiosis and cited examples of the diplomatic bludgeoning of those officials who balked at administering national “hara-kiri.” For instance, he reported how Monnet’s Action Committee, which was “supported by funds from United States foundations,” ramrodded the negotiations for the Rome Treaties:

“Monnet and his Action Committee were unofficially supervising the negotiations and as soon as obstacles appeared, the United States diplomatic machinery was alerted, mostly through Ambassador Bruce ... who had immediate access to the top echelon of the State Department.... At that time, it was usual that if Monnet thought that a particular country made difficulties in the negotiations, the American diplomatic representative in that country approached the Foreign Ministry in order to communicate the opinion of the American Government which, in practically all cases, coincided with Monnet’s point of view.”

Monnet’s high-level friends, who assisted him in these strongarm tactics, included President Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, John J. McCloy, David Bruce, Averell Harriman, George Ball, and C. Douglas Dillon — all CFR one-worlders. All of this was occurring, remember, in the immediate post-WWII years, when war-ravaged Europe had become very dependent on U.S. aid and looked to the U.S. for protection from the growing (Insider backed) Soviet threat.

Western Hemisphere EU

With this knowledge in mind, the first thing an observant onlooker should have noticed when proposals for NAFTA and WHFTA began floating about was the Pratt House imprint. It wasn’t difficult to spot; the CFR logo was all over these schemes, as we have already seen in the case of NAFTA.

The Insiders have stepped up their political, economic and propaganda efforts for the next step, an EU for the Western Hemisphere. Following the pattern of the ECSC-EU, most of the important early activity for the WHFTA was taking place “below the surface of public attention.” In 1999, after years of preparation, the business pages of newspapers began buzzing over the startling proposal by Argentine President Carlos Menem to abandon his country’s peso for the dollar. Similar proposals soon started flowing in from the leaders of Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. All of a sudden, “dollarization” became the sexy economic issue of the day, with Republicans and Democrats alike lining up with euphoric praise for the ultra-radical scheme. What we were witnessing, in reality, was another CFR ventriloquism show; like the European leaders a generation earlier, the Western hemispheric choir hymning the dollarization theme were merely mouthpieces for the CFR puppet masters. In April 1974, the CFR telegraphed much of what was to come when Foreign Affairs published a remarkably frank attack on U.S. sovereignty.

Authored by Columbia University law professor and veteran State Department official Richard N. Gardner (Clinton's Ambassador to Spain), the article was entitled "The Hard Road to World Order." It began with CFR member Gardner's lamentation that like-minded internationalists had failed to achieve what he termed "instant world government." He proposed a new and more effective route to the creation of an all-powerful, global superstate, asserting:

"In short, the "house of world order" will have to be built from the bottom up rather than from the top down. It will look like a great "booming, buzzing confusion," to use William James' famous description of reality, but an end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much more than the old-fashioned frontal assault."

Gardner's piecemeal scheme for world government proposed, among other things, luring all nations into a variety of economic and political entanglements, including trade traps like NAFTA and WHFTA.

The Dollarization Bandwagon

In 1984, 10 years after Gardner's "Hard Road" manifesto, Foreign Affairs brought forth another audacious piece entitled "A Monetary System for the Future," by Richard N. Cooper (CFR, TC). Cooper, a professor of international economics at Harvard, boldly stated: "I suggest a radical alternative scheme for the next century: the creation of a common currency for all of the industrial democracies, with a common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue to determine that monetary policy."

The main problem with this scheme, Cooper realized, is that "a single currency is possible only if there is in effect a single monetary policy, and a single authority issuing the currency and directing the monetary policy." "How can independent states accomplish that?" he asked rhetorically. Naturally, he had the answer: "They need to turn over the determination of monetary policy to a supranational body"

More recently, in its July/August 1999 issue, Foreign Affairs explicitly took up the campaign for such a supranational power and dollarization, with an essay by Zanny Minton Beddoes of *The Economist*, one of Britain's leading Fabian Socialist periodicals. In the opening paragraph of his globalist propaganda tract, "From EMU to AMU?: The Case for Regional Currencies," Beddoes declared with oracular certainty: "By 2030 the world will have two major currency zones — one European, the other American. The euro will be used from Brest to Bucharest, and the dollar from Alaska to Argentina — perhaps even Asia."

Mr. Beddoes paid specific tribute to Richard Cooper's 1984 Foreign Affairs article, and threw bouquets to other "farsighted academics" who share his one-world view and chided skeptics who "argue that a national currency is a basic symbol of sovereignty that countries choose to forfeit only under extraordinary circumstances." Mr. Beddoes and his devious allies would surely like all of us to believe that a national currency is only

a “symbol of sovereignty,” but it is much more than that, of course. It is an essential ingredient of sovereignty, and a nation is at the fearful mercy of any entity to whom it may be foolish enough to forfeit so important a power. The Federal Reserve System and the International Monetary Fund have already vindicated that claim a thousand times over, and yet here we are about to be enticed into an even deeper abyss.

An even more extraordinary propaganda and disinformation salvo, this one aimed at a broader audience, was provided by the Time magazine cover story for February 15, 1999. Along with the headline, “The Committee to Save the World,” the cover featured the beaming visages of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (CFR), then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (CFR), and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers (CFR), who followed Rubin in the top Treasury post. The article bore this riveting subtitle: “The inside story of how the Three Marketeers have prevented a global economic meltdown — so far.” The adulatory piece, written by Time’s Joshua Cooper Ramo (CFR), reverently refers to the CFR triumvirate as “the Trinity” and suggests that they are uniquely possessed of near-divine virtues and insights, and, thus, deserve our trust in establishing new monetary authority over the hemisphere. The “conservative,” CFR-run Wall Street Journal assured its readers that “Dollarization has arisen as a spontaneous movement within our hemisphere,” and urged U.S. political leaders to embrace this opportunity to “score a powerful victory for free trade and free markets.” But the dollarization bandwagon is about as spontaneous as the Normandy invasion, and it has nothing to do with free markets.

The current dollarization-NAFTA/WHFTA drive we are now witnessing is the culmination of a massive, long-range effort that began many years ago as an intermediate stepping stone to world government. Myriad documents, publications, statements, speeches, conferences, meetings, and events from the past several decades copiously document that effort. One such document is Western Hemisphere Economic Integration, a study by Gary Clyde Hufbauer (CFR and former CFR vice president) and Jeffrey J. Schott, published in 1994 by the Institute for International Economics (IE). While hardly a household name in America, the IE, according to Martin Walker of the London Observer, “may be the most influential think-tank on the planet,” with “an extraordinary record in turning ideas into effective policy.”

The dedication at the beginning of this IE book reads: “TO DAVID ROCKEFELLER, For his lifelong devotion to promoting economic development in Latin America and to improving relations among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. His wisdom has been an enormous source of encouragement to the work of the Institute and inspired us to explore the important ties that unite the Americas.” Mr. Rockefeller, of course, was chairman of the CFR from 1970-85 and, as we will see, has played an especially key role in the dollarization and Western hemispheric economic convergence scheme. Likewise the IE, which is virtually joined at the hip to the CFR.

So what did the Hufbauer-Schott study published by the IE advocate? Very simply, “a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area (WHFTA)” following the sovereignty-destroying,

mega-state pattern of the European Union (EU). "After four decades of dedicated effort," said the report, "Western Europe has just arrived at the threshold of ... monetary union, and fiscal coordination. It seems likely that trade and investment integration will proceed at a faster pace within the Western Hemisphere...." "Finally," the study stated, "the more countries that participate in integration and the wider its scope, the greater the need for some institutional mechanism to administer the arrangements and to resolve the inevitable disputes, and the stronger the case for a common legal framework." (Which means supranational legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, naturally.) "The European Commission, Council, Parliament, and Court of Justice have many of the powers of comparable institutions in federal states," the report noted approvingly before commenting, "On this subject, we score Europe with a 5 [on a scale of 0 to 5]." Not satisfied with the EU model, the authors proposed going far beyond it. They asserted that "integration between NAFTA and Latin America should be legally open-ended; potentially the WHFTA should include countries outside the hemisphere." Indeed, presaging Beddoes, they asserted: "Economic logic suggests that the expansion of NAFTA in an Asian direction is just as desirable as its expansion in a Latin American direction."

In countless similar studies, speeches, lectures, and programs over the years, the CFR elitists have prepped the upper echelon of the U.S. and Western intelligentsia and business communities so that they would enthusiastically embrace this deadly nostrum - long before it appeared "spontaneously" for general public consumption.

The UN World Money System

In a globalized economy, everyone needs the IMF [International Monetary Fund]. Without the IMF, the world economy would not become an idealized fantasy.... [T]he IMF is the sovereign nations' credit union... — David Rockefeller, Trilateral Commission Founder, longtime former chairman of both the TC and CFR

[A] single currency is possible only if there is in effect a single monetary policy.... How can independent states accomplish that? They need to turn over the determination of monetary policy to a supranational body.... The key point is that monetary control ... would be in the hands of a new Bank of Issue, not in the hands of any national government.... — Professor Richard N. Cooper (CFR, TC), Harvard University, former U.S. Under Secretary of State

The fifth plank of the Communist Manifesto calls for "Centralization of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly." 8 It stands to reason: You can't establish the total state, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," if people are allowed the freedom to produce their own goods and services, buy and sell what they need and desire, and travel where they please when and how they please. Communism is about rationed scarcity and total regimentation. Under Communism, "the State" (i.e., the ruling oligarchy that rules in the name of "the people") controls and rations food, clothing, housing, transportation, fuel, health care, education,

communications, publishing, entertainment — everything.

Monopoly control by “the State“ of all money, savings, and credit is as essential to the totalitarian Communist system as its secret police, torture chambers, firing squads, and gulags. We have seen throughout the 20th century that everywhere the Communists have taken over they have religiously followed Marx’s dictate in this matter. The reason is simple: power, control. Power to exercise total control over all human activity. Any private, independent initiative is seen as a threat to this monopoly control and, therefore, cannot be allowed. Most people find it amazing, then, to learn that the world’s premier “capitalist“ bankers and financiers subscribe to the game Marxist program. For decades, led by the Rhodes-Milner-Morgan- Rockefeller-RIIA-CFR-TC cabal, in one country after another, the Insider bankers have successfully pushed for the establishment of central banks. These central banks are patterned after our own Federal Reserve System, a completely Marxist operation that was foisted upon the American people by the banking trust in 1913, in one of the most gigantic deceptions in world history.* While having all the appearances of being run by national governments, these central banks are, in reality, run by the private RIIA-CFR-TC banking fraternity.

Why do these “capitalists“ support Marx’s program? Again, the reason is simple: power, control. Recall that arch-conspirator Cecil Rhodes’ “simple desire“ was nothing less than “the government of the world.“ The one-world banksters, like their Bolshevik brethren, want to control the world. And these sup. posed “mortal enemies“ have worked hand in hand throughout much of the past century to bring about this totalitarian, global control. As Ford Foundation President H. Rowan Gaither (CFR) put it, he and his one-world associates were making “every effort to so alter life in the United States as to make possible a comfortable merger with the Soviet Union.“ Spearheading this capitalist-Communist “merger“ scheme for much of the past century has been one of America’s wealthiest and most famous dynasties: the Rockefeller family. Microsoft mogul Bill Gates, investment wizard Warren Buffet, and dot.com upstarts have grabbed headlines in recent years as the “world’s richest“ tycoons, but their economic and political influence doesn’t begin to compare with the global reach and power of the Rockefellers.

David Rockefeller, the current pater familias of the super-rich clan, was for many years chairman of the CFR (1970-85), chairman of the Trilateral Commission, and chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank (formerly the Chase National Bank). Although now officially retired, he has remained actively engaged as chairman emeritus of all three institutions. During the entire “Cold War“ (and for decades before), the Rockefellers served as the primary banker for the Reds (Communists). As Congressman Louis McFadden, chairman of the House Banking Committee, noted in 1933:

“Open up the books of Amtorg, the trading organization of the Soviet Government in New York, and of Gostorg, the general office of the Soviet trade organization, and of the State Bank of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and you will be staggered to see how much American money has been taken from the United States Treasury for the benefit of Russia. Find out what business has been transacted for the State bank of

Soviet Russia by its correspondent, the Chase Bank of New York....“

“Arch-capitalist“ David Rockefeller has always enjoyed immediate, privileged access to Communist countries and received the royal “red carpet“ welcome from them. His Chase Manhattan Bank’s Moscow branch enjoys the distinctive cache of being located at “1 Karl Marx Square.“ In 1974, the bank even saw fit to boast of this supposed trophy address in full-page newspaper advertisements that read, in part: “From 1 Chase Manhattan plaza to 1 Karl Marx Square, we’re international money experts with a knack for making good sense out of confusing East-West trade talk.“ David Rockefeller also expressed pride in the fact that Chase Manhattan was the first Western bank to open for business in Communist China.

A world central bank controlling all national monetary policies and currencies — until such time as a single global currency may be established — is essential to the one-worlders’ East-West merger scheme. Much of their scheming, naturally, goes on secretly, behind closed doors, at the continuous and mysterious meetings of such Insider circles of high-level finance as the G-7, G-22, IMF, World Bank, Bank for International Settlements, the Paris Club, the Bilderberg Group, and the World Economic Forum, as well as many smaller, informal conclaves. However, in order to advance their conspiratorial agenda, they must telegraph many of their plans to their lower-level operatives — in sanitized language, of course. By studying the documents, reports, speeches, and published utterances of these Insiders over the past several decades it is possible to determine their game plan and their ultimate goal. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the Insiders’ penultimate goal is to create regional blocs in which the nation-states will become so economically and politically interdependent and integrated that the nations are subsumed into regional supergovernments (the EU, WHFTA, APEC, etc.) with regional central banks and regional currencies. Once this is done, it is small work to merge the regional entities into a single global government.

Origins of Global Aid

The institutions of the current “international economic system“ grew out of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. In addition to the original World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), we now have an assortment of subsidiary institutions: International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the Witeveen Facility. Over the past half century, this group of institutions has devastated our planet by stealing hundreds of billions of dollars from taxpayers in the West to fund socialism worldwide. No Communist butcher, socialist potentate, or Third World kleptocrat has escaped the largesse of these compassionate UN bankers. The cumulative effect of their efforts has been to subsidize bankrupt Communist regimes while saddling the poor of the developing countries with an impossible debt load. Periodically, this has meant hitting up the taxpayers of Japan and the Western countries for additional tens of billions of dollars for the IMF and WB institutions so that they can issue new “loans“ to the Communist

and socialist kleptocracies to make payments on their loans from the global banksters.

Although we have mentioned U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White (CFR) previously, it is important to reemphasize his importance in the context of the Insiders' plan for a global monetary system. It was Soviet agent White who led the U.S. delegation and presided as the overall leader of the 45-nation Bretton Woods Conference. It was White — together with his inseparable “dear friend” John Maynard Keynes, the homosexual, Fabian Socialist, one-worlder — who designed the IMF. On November 6, 1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell announced: “Harry Dexter White was a Russian spy. He smuggled secret documents to Russian agents for transmission to Moscow.” Brownell also reported that “Harry Dexter White was known to be a spy by the very people who appointed him to the most sensitive and important position he ever held in Government service. The FBI became aware of White's espionage activities at an early point in his government career and from the beginning made reports on these activities to the appropriate officials in authority. But these reports did not impede White's advancement in the Administration....”

Attorney General Brownell made it clear that, in spite of his Red record, White had received Insider clearance from the very top: “White's spying activities for the Soviet Government were reported in detail by the FBI to the White House by means of a report delivered to President Truman through his military aide, Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn.” Comrade White was no ordinary “espionage” agent. As former Communist Whittaker Chambers observed, “Harry Dexter White's role as a Soviet agent was second in importance only to that of Alger Hiss — if, indeed, it was second.” It was Chambers who recruited White and introduced him to Col. Boris Bykov, of Soviet military intelligence, in 1937. In his capacity as U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White deliberately held up congressionally approved gold shipments to bolster China's currency during World War II. His purpose in doing so was either to bring down the anti-Communist Chiang Kai-shek or to force a coalition government between Chiang's Nationalists and the Communists. As Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson candidly explained at the time: “In China, we withheld our funds at the only time, in my opinion, we had a chance to save the situation. To do what? To force the Communists in.”

Serving as technical secretary at Bretton Woods and White's right-hand man was fellow Treasury official Virginius Frank Coe, also a Soviet agent. With White's help, Coe became the first secretary of the newly created IMF, a powerful post he immediately put in the service of the world revolution.²⁵ What is most extraordinary in all of this is not that a few clever Communists managed to penetrate the top levels of the U.S. government by “outsmarting” the “wise men” of the American Establishment. That was not how it happened. Instead, it was top U.S. Insiders in our government — Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, Nelson Rockefeller, Edward Stettinius, et al. — who repeatedly interceded to prevent exposure of the records of these Soviet agents, and to promote these traitors to even higher offices where they could increase their damage to

our nation!

Fruits of Global Aid

Under the leadership of White's and Coe's successors, the IMF has been subsidizing the global socialist revolution for decades. Cato Institute researcher Doug Bandow pointed out in 1994:

"[S]ix nations, Chile, Egypt, India, Sudan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, had been relying on IMF aid for more than 30 years; 24 countries had been borrowers for between 20 and 29 years. And 47, almost one-third of all the states in the world, had been using IMF credit for between 10 and 19 years.... Since 1947, Egypt has never left the IMF dole. Yugoslavia took its first loan in 1949 and was a borrower in all but three of the succeeding 41 years.... Bangladesh, Barbados, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia all started borrowing in the early 1970s and have yet to stop two decades later."

Like domestic welfare drones, once these parasites attach themselves to the taxpayers, they never let loose. With the admission in 1992 of virtually all of the "ex-Communist" countries into both the IMF and World Bank, UN officials and their international welfare lobbyists launched a sustained campaign for massive new infusions of capital, which have thus far siphoned billions into Russia and its "former" Warsaw Pact allies, all of which boast socialist regimes run by lifelong Communists, who are now called "reformers." None of the above should surprise us, since the IMF was designed, as we've shown, by Communists, socialists and oneworlders. The Socialist International has acknowledged that the IMF is "in essence a Socialist conception." Free market economist Henry Hazlitt, who stood virtually alone in exposing and opposing the IMF at its inception in 1944, clearly recognized its socialist essence. Forty years later, in his book *From Bretton Woods to World Inflation*, he warned: "The world cannot get back to economic sanctity until the IMF is abolished.... We will not stop the growth of world inflation and world socialism until the institutions and policies adopted to promote them have been abolished." The warnings of this wise economist were absolutely correct in 1944. They were just as correct in 1984. And they are still correct today.

The World Bank, of course, has also played a central role in the global socialist revolution. India, one of the most pathetic socialist examples, has been the WB's biggest recipient. From the bank's creation in 1946 until the late 1960s, the WB funneled billions of dollars into socialist regimes, but by today's standards, the amounts divvied out were relatively small. "Then, in 1968, Robert McNamara became bank president and dedicated himself to continually raising loan levels," writes James Bovard in *The World Bank and the Impoverishment of Nations*. "By 1981, when McNamara resigned, lending had increased more than 13-fold from 883million to 12 billion. Loan levels have continued soaring: now the bank exists largely to maximize the transfer of resources to Third World governments."

Unfortunately, Bovard points out, "the bank has greatly promoted the nationalization of Third World economies and increased political and bureaucratic control over the lives of the poorest of the poor." Whenever the public, the press, or members of Congress

raise a hue and cry over the bank's deplorable activities, he notes, WB officials go on a "rhetorical crusade in favor of the private sector." But their bankrolling of revolution continues unabated. "The bank, more than any other international institution," says Bovard, "is responsible for the Third World's rush to socialism and economic collapse."

The IMF and WB have worked in close tandem with the top CFR-TC braintrusters and bankers from the beginning. An example of this can be seen in the 1996 Annual Report of the CFR by Council Chairman Peter G. Peterson, who writes that "one of our most important initiatives in the recent past has been to expand our outreach to international institutions and to individuals supportive of the Council's work around the world. I am quite literally writing this letter on an airplane en route to Asia, where I will meet with leaders of the Hong Kong forum and then continue on to Beijing, where our unique and quite unprecedented 'home and home' dialogue with the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs moves into its next phase at a critical time in the U.S.-China relationship. This trip was immediately preceded by an all-day discussion with our distinguished International Advisory Board, chaired by David Rockefeller, and capped off with an intensive dinner discussion with James D. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank."

This account suggests a fascinating decision-making hierarchy in international affairs. The CFR's International Advisory Board, under the direction of David Rockefeller, set the policy guidelines for U.S.-Chinese affairs; CFR Chairman Peterson was dispatched to Beijing to confer with his counterparts in the Chinese equivalent of the CFR; a few months later, Secretary of State Warren Christopher (CFR) was sent to lay the groundwork for an eventual summit between heads of state Bill Clinton (CFR) and Jiang Zemin. And James Wolfensohn (CFR) gets new WB funds rolling for the joint Beijing-Insider projects.

Revolution Over Profits

In his 1979 book *With No Apologies*, Senator Barry Goldwater opined that "the Council on Foreign Relations and its ancillary elitist groups are indifferent to Communism. They have no ideological anchors. In their pursuit of a new world order they are prepared to deal without prejudice with a communist state, a socialist state, a democratic state, monarchy, oligarchy — it's all the same to them."

Although this cynical observation may seem, to the casual observer, an adequate explanation for the Insider-Communist symbiosis of the past few decades, it is sorely misleading. The Insiders are not "indifferent to Communism." It is not "all the same to them." Yes, they have done business with and arranged loans for democratic states, monarchies, and "right-wing" dictatorships and oligarchies, as well as socialist and Communist dictatorships. But the pattern that emerges is striking: Virtually always, they have used the leverage they have gotten through loans to undermine the non-socialist, non-Communist governments and push them into the Communist-socialist camp. David Rockefeller returned from a visit to Communist China in 1973 (in his capacity as chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank) declaring that "the social experiment in China under Chairman Mao's

leadership is one of the most important and successful in human history." According to the most reliable estimates, Mao Tse-tung's "social experiment" had by that time involved the murder of as many as 64 million Chinese by the Communists.

In April 1974, David Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank loaned the USSR \$150 million to build the world's largest truck factory near the Kama River. The first trucks out of that plant carried Soviet soldiers into Afghanistan in 1979.³⁷ In 1982 the chairman of the CFR, TC, and Chase Manhattan expanded on his business "philosophy" during a 10-nation swing through Africa, saying that "we have found we can deal with just about any kind of government, provided they are orderly and responsible." ³⁸ By that standard, Rockefeller would have had no trouble dealing with the "orderly and responsible" Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler. He found the Communist dictator of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, to be a "very reasonable and charming person" and said that the presence of 20,000 Cuban soldiers had no "direct bearing on American business operations in Angola. Clearly it has not interfered with our own banking relations."

Rockefeller has welcomed Fidel Castro, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and other assorted terrorists and tyrants to the CFR's prestigious headquarters. This is not just about "business" and "profit," as Senator Goldwater suggested, and as David Rockefeller's remarks above were intended to infer. This is about power.

Masterminding Economic Collapse

An interesting window into the mindset of these Insiders was provided in 1990 by Canadian journalist Daniel Wood, who journeyed to the sprawling southern Colorado estate of one of Canada's most renowned citizens, Maurice Strong. Mr. Strong is an engaging and controversial fellow: mega-millionaire industrialist, radical environmentalist, New Age spiritualist, United Nations plutocrat, fervent one-world socialist, economic savant, global gadfly, and close pal of David Rockefeller and Mikhail Gorbachev. Mr. Wood spent a week at Strong's Baca Grande ranch interviewing this illustrious "world citizen."

During the course of Wood's visit, Strong told him of a novel he had been planning to write. It was about a group of world leaders who decided the only way to save the world was to cause the economies of the industrialized countries to collapse. Strong explained how his fictional leaders had formed a secret society and engineered a worldwide financial panic and, ultimately, the economic crash they sought. Mr. Wood's account of that conversation appeared in the May 1990 issue of *West* magazine:

"Each year, he [Strong] explains as background to the telling of the novel's plot, the World Economic Forum convenes in Davos, Switzerland. Over a thousand CEO's, prime ministers, finance ministers, and leading academics gather in February to attend meetings and set economic agendas for the year ahead. With this as a setting, he then says: "What if a small group of these world leaders were to conclude that the principal risk to the earth comes from the actions of the rich countries? And if the world is to survive, those rich countries would have to sign an agreement reducing their impact on the environment. Will they do it?... The group's conclusion is 'no.' The rich countries won't do it. They

won't change. So, in order to save the planet, the group decides: Isn't the only hope for the planet that the industrialized civilizations collapse? Isn't it our responsibility to bring that about? ... It's February. They're all at Davos. These aren't terrorists. They're world leaders. They have positioned themselves in the world's commodity and stock markets. They've engineered, using their access to stock exchanges and computers and gold supplies, a panic. Then, they prevent the world's stock markets from closing. They jam the gears. They hire mercenaries who hold the rest of the world leaders at Davos as hostages. The markets can't close. The rich countries...."

Wood wrote that at that point the tycoon cum novelist "makes a slight motion with his fingers as if he were flicking a cigarette butt out the window." Pffffft! The fates of hundreds of millions, even billions, of people callously sealed with the flick of a finger—their livelihoods, life savings, jobs, businesses, homes, dreams—tossed out like a cigarette butt. All for a good cause ("to save the planet"), of course. Wood wrote: "I sit there spellbound. This is not any storyteller talking. This is Maurice Strong. He knows these world leaders. He is, in fact, co-chairman of the Council of the World Economic Forum. He sits at the fulcrum of power. He is in a position to do it."

Perhaps more important — and what makes this amateur, would-be novelist's tale so alarming — is that, from everything we know about the eminent Mr. Strong, he is very likely inclined to do it! Maurice Strong is the archetypal global elitist — a super-wealthy collectivist of unbridled arrogance, who believes that he, and a select few others, have been chosen to run the world and refashion it according to their Utopian designs. As Secretary-General of UNCED, the UN Earth Summit in Rio, Strong ranted against the lifestyles of "the rich countries" much like the "hero" of his novel. He declared that "the United States is clearly the greatest risk" to the world's ecological health. "In effect," Strong charged, "the United States is committing environmental aggression against the rest of the world."

In a 1991 UNCED report, Strong wrote: "It is clear that current lifestyles and consumption patterns of the affluent middle-class ... involving high meat intake, consumption of large amounts of frozen and 'convenience' foods, ownership of motor-vehicles, numerous electric household appliances, home and workplace air conditioning ... suburban housing ... are not sustainable." Moreover, he insisted, a shift is necessary "towards lifestyles ... less geared to ... environmentally damaging consumption patterns." Those are just a small sampling of Strong's eco-Stalinist tirades. And remember, as Daniel Wood said, this man is in a position to carry out the "fictitious" plan he outlined. Wood was not exaggerating. Maurice Strong is an Insider's Insider. The oil and energy magnate is the former head of Dome Petroleum of Canada, Power Corporation of Canada, Ontario Hydro, and Petro Canada. In 1972, he made his debut on the world stage as Secretary-General of the first UN environmental conference, held in Stockholm, Sweden. He was at the time also a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, one of the premier, longtime promoters of world government. Following the Stockholm confab, he was named to head the newly created United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). (Strong is also a mover

and shaker in such Insider circles of power as the Club of Rome, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, the World Federation of United Nations Associations, the World Economic Forum, the World Future Society, the Lindisfarne Association, Planetary Citizens, the World Wilderness Congress, the Business Council for Sustainable Development, the Trilateral Commission, the World Resources Institute, the Gorbachev Foundation, the World Bank, and the Commission on Global Governance.)

In 1991, Strong teamed up with David Rockefeller, founder of the Trilateral Commission, to write the promotional introductions to the Trilateral Commission plan for radical global “reform” entitled *Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World’s Economy and the Earth’s Ecology*. This eco-socialist paean to world government, Strong claimed, “provides the most compelling economic as well as environmental case for such reform that I have read.” One of the Trilateral “reforms” that Strong, no doubt, fancied was the proposal for “a new global partnership expressed in a revitalized international system in which an Earth Council, perhaps the Security Council with a broader mandate, maintains the interlocked environmental and economic security of the planet.”

As “luck” would have it, one of the new global entities that came into being as a result of the Earth Summit was an Earth Council. One guess as to who was appointed to head it. Yes, Maurice Strong is the chairman. Together with Mikhail Gorbachev and other one-world luminaries, Maurice Strong has been promoting the environmental manifesto known as the “Earth Charter.” This charter envisions a planetary socialist welfare state, which would, among other things, “promote the equitable distribution of wealth within nations and among nations.” And Messrs. Strong, Gorbachev, Rockefeller, et al., will be in charge of the distribution, of course. But before they can “distribute” the world’s wealth, they must first take full control of it. Which means it’s really about power. That’s what all wealth redistribution schemes are always really about.

The creation of a global central bank, a global currency, a global tax system, and a global trading authority have been key objectives of world government advocates for decades. Centralized monetary and economic institutions of this kind would make the orchestrated world financial collapse scenario Maurice Strong envisions mere child’s play. They would also facilitate the grand redistribute-the-wealth schemes of the UN’s bureaucrats. As was evident in the previous chapter with regard to the EU and WHFTA, the oneworld Insiders recognize that economic control is their sure path to political control.

Pooling Monetary Sovereignty

One of the Insiders’ leading technicians helping to design their envisioned “new world order” is Harvard University Professor Richard N. Cooper (CFR, TC). Writing in the Fall 1984 edition of the CFR journal *Foreign Affairs*, Cooper proposed “a radical alternative scheme” (his words) that would mean the end of America as we know it. In his article entitled “A Monetary System for the Future,” the Harvard don wrote:

“A new Bretton Woods conference is wholly premature. But it is not premature to begin thinking about how we would like international monetary arrangements to evolve in

the remainder of this century. With this in mind, I suggest a radical alternative scheme for the next century: the creation of a common currency for all of the industrial democracies, with a common monetary policy and a joint Bank of Issue to determine that monetary policy.”

“The currency of the Bank of Issue could be practically anything,” the CFR economist continued. “The key point is that monetary control — the issuance of currency and of reserve credit — would be in the hands of the new Bank of Issue, not in the hands of any national government....” (Emphasis added.) The problem, he noted, is that “a single currency is possible only if there is in effect a single monetary policy, and a single authority issuing the currency and directing the monetary policy. How can independent states accomplish that? They need to turn over the determination of monetary policy to a supranational body....” (Emphasis added.) As the *Washington Post* put it: “The real point is that a common currency means one common country, and all else is details to be filled in later.” (Emphasis in original.) Precisely! And the CFRTC ueberlords are more than willing to provide those details. Mr. Cooper realized that selling this flagrantly totalitarian idea to the public would not be an easy, overnight job. “This one-currency regime is much too radical to envisage in the near future,” he admitted. “But it is not too radical to envisage 25 years from now.... [I]t will require many years of consideration before people become accustomed to the idea.”

Overcoming objections to “a pooling of monetary sovereignty” - even with friendly nations — would be difficult under any circumstances. But how could Americans ever be expected to go along with a “radical scheme” to merge economically with Communist countries? It would be difficult, Cooper conceded, but doable, nonetheless. He wrote: “First, it is highly doubtful whether the American public, to take just one example, could ever accept that countries with oppressive autocratic regimes should vote on the monetary policy that would affect monetary conditions in the United States.... For such a bold step to work at all, it presupposes a certain convergence of political values....”

Creating Convergence

Cooper and his confreres in the CFR-dominated media, think tanks, and academia went to work to create that “convergence of political values” in the public mind. A flood of articles and op-eds in the *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Economist*, etc. soon began hammering home the theme that the United States and Western Europe must help Gorbachev’s “perestroika” transform the Soviet Union in the direction of “democracy” and a market economy. After the purported “collapse of Communism” in 1989, they stepped up the convergence drum beat, asserting that the taxpayers of the West must provide Russia and all the nations of her “former” satellite empire more billions of dollars in credits and aid to help them make the transition to freedom and stability.

The essential point here should not be missed: The advocates of world government intend that their planned global superstate, although “initially limited,” will, ultimately, exercise

unlimited planetary power, a power far beyond that realized by Hitler, Stalin, or Mao. Surely, if we do not stop their megalomaniacal plans, we will see them use this power in much the same way as outlined by Maurice Strong — and in ways even more brutal and horrific.

15.4 Bringing it Home

One-World Religion

“The histories and symbols that served our fathers encumber and divide us. Sacraments and rituals harbor disputes and waste our scanty emotions.... The modernization of the religious impulse leads us straight to the effort for the establishment of the world state as a duty...” — H.G. Wells, author, historian, and one-world Fabian Socialist, *The Open Conspiracy*, 1928

“We must now forge a new “Earth Ethic“ which will inspire all peoples and nations to join in a new global partnership of North, South, East and West.” — UN publication *In Our Hands: Earth Summit '92*

A majority of Americans still consider themselves Christian, but find they are increasingly in retreat before a steady onslaught of anti-Christian media assaults, court rulings, attacks from academia, and pop culture offerings. Meanwhile, hedonism, Satanism, witchcraft, astrology, vampirism, homosexuality, Eastern mystic cults, and “Indigenous Peoples“ religions are exalted by the same media mandarins and Hollywood elites who control our “news“ and “entertainment.“ What very few of these Americans realize is that this hideous “spiritual transformation“ is tied directly to the United Nations, where the oneworld architects intend to enthrone their planned New World Religion. And as this Satanic enthronement progresses (yes, we mean, literally, Satanic), Christians — and Orthodox Jews and Muslims as well — will find themselves increasingly in the crosshairs of the new world order, singled out as “bigoted,“ “dogmatic,“ and “intolerant“ for insisting on clinging to their “archaic“ and “divisive“ religious beliefs.

Religious leaders and adherents of all sects are being aggressively evangelized to adopt the UN’s new “global ethic,“ a gooey melange of religious syncretism, environmentalism, socialism, and militant secular humanism. People of all religious backgrounds are being enlisted to embrace this “global ethic“ as a “core belief“ of their religious faith. As more and more people adopt this new “planetary consciousness,“ the one-world Insiders know that support will grow for:

- global disarmament, for both individuals and nations
- world government
- paganism
- environmental extremism
- socialism and Communism

- religious persecution, in the name of “tolerance” and combating “hate”

If the above statements are shocking and incredible to you, then you are unaware of easily verifiable facts concerning events and developments that are dramatically impacting our society. Many of the steps in this diabolic scheme are taking place before our very eyes, in the open, as British novelist and Fabian Socialist historian H.G. Wells proposed in 1928 in his *The Open Conspiracy: Blue Prints For a World Revolution*. Wells, an ardent one-worlder and one of the most widely read authors and intellectuals of his day, conceded that human history has proven that religious ideals are essential to the sustaining of any society. However, having rejected Christianity and all other religions, he determined that only a new “modern” religion could sustain the socialist world government he was advocating. “The conspiracy of modern religion against the established institutions of the world must be an open conspiracy,” he averred, and must reject “secret methods or tactical insincerities.” This statement was itself a “tactical insincerity,” of course, since Wells and his one-world, socialist comrades never planned to be completely open about their schemes.

Indoctrination: Subordination to the State

Wells himself is very much alive in “world order” circles. Quotations from his works are scattered throughout New Age and new world order books and publications. The World Federalist Association (WFA), for instance, continues to publish some of his essays, including “How a Federal World Government May Come About,” taken from his book *The Outline of History* (1920). According to Wells, in that one-world polemic:

“The essential task of men of goodwill in all states and countries remains the same, it is an educational task, and its very essence is to bring to the minds of all men everywhere, as a necessary basis for world co-operation, a new telling and interpretation, a common interpretation, of history.... The world perishes unless sovereignty is merged and nationality subordinated.”

Wells sets down what he sees as “the broad fundamentals of the coming world state.” “It will be based,” he says, “upon a common world religion, very much simplified and universalized.... This will not be Christianity nor Islam nor Buddhism nor any such specialized form of religion, but religion itself pure and undefiled; the Eightfold Way, the Kingdom of Heaven, brotherhood, creative service, and self-forgetfulness. Throughout the world men’s thoughts and motives will be turned by education.... And education, as the new age will conceive it, will go on throughout life.” Sound familiar? This is precisely what we have been experiencing in our schools and colleges, as well as the government-directed “lifelong learning” programs that gradually have become an integral part of so many corporate and governmental jobs. Which is not to imply that we are, or ought to be, opposed to “lifelong learning,” as the term is commonly understood, in its most innocent and benign meaning. To the contrary, we accept it as a fact of life. Ours is not the first generation to realize that learning does not (or should not) end with

the completion of formal schooling; wise people (of all socio-economic and educational backgrounds) throughout the ages have recognized the need for (as well as the pleasure to be derived from) continuous lifelong education. In today's fast-changing, technology-driven world, it is more important than ever to be constantly updating skills and learning new ones.

However, in using the same terms, we do not all mean the same thing. We should be very familiar with this phenomenon by now. "Tolerance" no longer means "live and let live" civility; it means using the power of government to force majority acceptance of the perverse practices of a militant minority. "Peacekeeping" means carpet-bombing and/or invading and militarily subjugating whomever the UN has designated as villain du jour. "Multiculturalism" means demonizing Christian and European civilization for genocide, exploitation, and raping Mother Earth. "Investing" doesn't mean private individuals freely deciding what to do with their own capital assets; it means politicians and bureaucrats plundering your savings through taxation, and then spending it on socialist boondoggles. So we should not be surprised that the same coercive Utopians have also co-opted "lifelong learning." In their lexicon it no longer is an elective; the individual cannot be allowed to determine if and when he will take any continued formal schooling. Such important decisions must be made by superior "experts." Or as Wells put it, "we should have the collective affairs of the world managed by suitably equipped groups of the most interested, intelligent and devoted people" — such as himself and his fellow Fabians.

Subversive World Council of Churches

One of the early major attempts to co-opt religion in the service of world government came in 1942. Time magazine devoted considerable space in its March 16, 1942 issue to a report on a gathering at Ohio Wesleyan University of hundreds of delegates representing the more than 30 denominations called together by the notoriously pro-Communist Federal Council of Churches (FCC). The FCC (which later changed its name to the National Council of Churches, NCC) was the American branch of the Communist-controlled World Council of Churches, which still exists and has never ceased its subversive activities. Chairing the 1942 FCC Wesleyan confab was Insider John Foster Dulles, a founder of the CFR and, together with his brother Allen Dulles (CFR), a member of the Woodrow Wilson-Colonel House team that tried to foist the League of Nations on the United States. John Dulles would later go on to promote the new world order as Secretary of State under President Eisenhower. However, at the 1942 FCC conference he was lining up church support for the United Nations that would be coming three years later.

As Time reported, the Dulles-led conference produced a political program of "extreme internationalism." Some of the "high spots" of that program were, said Time:

- Ultimately, "a world government of delegated powers."
- Strong immediate limitations on national sovereignty.
- International control of all armies and navies.
- "A universal system of money...."

- Progressive elimination of all tariff and quota restrictions on world trade.

According to Time, the conference “held that ‘a new order of economic life is both imminent and imperative’ — a new order that is sure to come either ‘through voluntary cooperation ... or through explosive political revolution.’” “ ‘Collectivism is coming whether we like it or not,’ the delegates were told by no less a churchman than England’s Dr. William Paton, co-secretary of the World Council of Churches.” The problem is that Dr. Paton and his comrades did want collectivism, and they were doing everything in their power to fasten it upon the peoples of the world, through both patient gradualism and “explosive political revolution.” The Time story finished on this note:

“The ultimate goal: “a duly constituted world government ... an international court ... international administrative bodies with necessary powers, and adequate international police forces and provision for enforcing its worldwide economic authority.”

The Dulles-FCC propaganda parley no doubt greatly assisted the Insiders’ globalist plans, both in building religious support for U.S. entry into the forthcoming United Nations, and in neutralizing opposition to the same organization. In the decades since that confab at Ohio Wesleyan University, UN religious summitry has played an increasingly important part in the one-world transformation scheme.

The granddaddy of these convocations, the United Nations Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, was held in New York City in late August 2000 (not to be confused with the gathering of Heads of State at the UN’s Millennium Summit, which followed in September). The Peace Summit offered terrifying glimpses of the outrageous and demonic “global spirituality” the Insiders have planned for us. The outrages began even before the Peace Summit began, when the UN organizers announced that the Dalai Lama would not be invited because his attendance would offend Communist China! So, while more than a thousand religious leaders and gurus representing every conceivable “faith tradition” gathered in New York under banners of “tolerance,” “peace,” and “brotherhood,” one of the world’s best-known religious figures, the revered leader of millions of Buddhists, and a man who exemplifies those virtues the UN summit extolled, was barred from attendance — because the totalitarian, genocidal butchers who have been brutally occupying his tiny kingdom of Tibet for half a century would get upset!

In his address to the UN’s “spiritual” Peace Summit, Bishop Fu Tieshan, the puppet-stooge of these Red Chinese persecutors, said:

“Let us pray for the wisdom of the Holy Spirit, respect the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and from now on, guard against and put an end to anything that taint and desecrate religious purity... Today in China, facts and other practice genuinely reflect the harmony between different religions. And under the protection of the Constitution and other laws, we enjoy comprehensive and full religious freedom.”

In an obvious attack on the Dalai Lama and the many brave religious believers suffering

under the Communist regime, “Bishop“ Fu said: “At present, there are still many violent and evil activities going on ‘in the name of religion.’ Some people have made use of religious differences to fuel ethnic feuds and provoke so-called conflicts of civilizations; some want to trample upon the sovereignty of other countries under the pretext of ‘protecting religious human rights.’” Did any of the esteemed spiritual leaders attending the Peace Summit walk out in protest over this brazen display of hypocrisy? Did they announce their “solidarity“ with their brothers who are suffering for their religious convictions? Did they demand that Red China stop its vicious persecution of all religions? Did they even timidly ask our Beijing “partners“ to light en up with the truncheons and thumbscrews? Hah! Not even close! Instead, they politely applauded (some enthusiastically cheered) this puppet of the Communist persecutors. Most Americans, if they saw or heard any coverage of the Summit in the major CFR-dominated media, were not apprised of the cruel charade that was played out there. Few are aware that Bishop Fu Tieshan is a fraud or that religionists of all types are routinely persecuted in Red China.

CNN (Note: usually known as “Clinton News Network“ in 2016) certainly wasn’t going to expose this sham; CNN founder and current vice-chairman of CNN parent company Time Warner, Ted Turner, not only was a major financial sponsor of the Summit, but also honorary chairman of the event. Turner, who is infamous for his profanity, womanizing, and scathing verbal attacks on Christianity, Christian leaders, the Ten Commandments, and Biblical morality, couldn’t resist using the Summit podium to criticize the “very intolerant“ Christianity of his boyhood and to propose a more global, all-embracing spirituality for the “one human race.“

The “spirituality“ that One-World Ted and his fellow Insiders have in mind is to be found in the UN’s “Declaration of a Global Ethic,“ which UNESCO commissioned renegade “theologian“ Hans Kung to draft.³⁸ Yes, while real Christian heroes like Cardinal Kung, who suffer torture for their faith, are completely ignored by the CFR “news“ cartel, left-wing ideologues like Hans Kung are celebrated. For those who like their theology dished up from the likes of Ted Turner and Bishop Fu Tieshan — which appears to be most of the globalist folk who populate the UN diplomatic corps and delegations to UN conferences — Hans Kung was a perfect choice. In his 1991 book *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic*, Kung declared:

“Any form of... church conservatism is to be rejected.... To put it bluntly: No regressive or repressive religion — whether Christian, Islamic, Jewish or of whatever provenance — has a long-term future.“

Moreover, he said: “If ethics is to function for the well-being of all, it must be indivisible. The undivided world increasingly needs an undivided ethic. Postmodern men and women need common values, goals, ideals, visions.“ That’s right, UN “diversity“ is broad enough to embrace every imaginable navel-gazing mystic, diapered swami, saffron-robed guru, befeathered sachem, spellchanting shaman, New Age psycho-babbler, tree-worshipping pantheist, witch, warlock, druid, animist, or Marxian spiritualist — but not those terrible, monotheistic creeds. Mustn’t tolerate any of those “dogmatic,“ “absolutist“ faiths; of that

the “tolerant” globalists are dogmatically, absolutely certain.

Sri Chinmoy is the one-world, New Age guru who runs the UN’s Meditation Room and regularly leads the meditations. Chinmoy has offered his prophecy regarding the UN’s divine mission:

“The United Nations is the chosen instrument of God; to be a chosen instrument means to be a divine messenger carrying the banner of God’s inner vision and outer manifestation. One day, the world will ... treasure and cherish the soul of the United Nations as its very own with pride, for this soul is all-loving, all-nourishing, and all-fulfilling.”

“Spiritual Leaders” for the New Millennium

It was Master Chinmoy, appropriately, who presented the UN’s U. Thant Peace Award to Maurice Strong, the globe-trotting billionaire best known for his role as Secretary-General of the 1992 UN Earth Summit in Brazil. Strong was receiving the honor, said Chinmoy, for “his lifelong commitment to the soaring ideals of the United Nations.” The award was named for U Thant, the Burmese Marxist who served as the UN’s third Secretary-General and who, in 1970, brazenly declared: “Lenin was a man with a mind of great clarity and incisiveness.” Maurice Strong, who apparently shares Lenin’s “great clarity and incisiveness,” has been a driving force in bringing the most extreme enviro-Leninism and far-out religio-Leninism into the social, political, economic, religious mainstream.

- Mohammed Ramadan, president of the UN’s Society for Enlightenment and Transformation, which has offices in the basement of the UN building where every conceivable variety of “spiritual sage” — witch doctors, mystics, “channelers” UFO enthusiasts, reincarnated Masters — contribute their cosmic energies to the sacred mission of the UN.
- Apostate theologian Matthew Fox, whose radical New Age spirituality embraces Wicca, homosexuality, abortion, and oneworld socialism. An apostle of the Gaia (Earth Goddess) Gospel, Fox says, “I believe the appropriate symbol of the Cosmic Christ... is that of Jesus as Mother Earth crucified yet rising daily... [T]he symbol of which I speak holds the capacity to launch a global spirituality of untold dimensions appropriate for the third millennium.”
- Gerald Barney, founder and executive director of the Millennium Institute and a co-chair of the 1993 Parliament of World Religions. In his keynote address at that summit, he said that “an internationally famous, highly influential author on sustainable development told me bluntly, ‘Religion must die. It is the fundamental cause of virtually all social, economic, and ecological problems and much of the violence in the world.’”⁴⁷ The only alternative to the destruction of religion, Barney asserted, is the “reinterpretation and even rejection of ancient traditions and assumptions” and the creation of a “‘sustainable’ faith tradition on earth....”
- William Irwin Thompson, founder of the (Luciferian) Lindisfarne Association. “We have now a new spirituality, what has been called the New Age movement,” Thompson says.

“This is now beginning to influence concepts of politics and community in ecology... This is the Gaia [Mother Earth] politique ... planetary culture.”

- Mikhail Gorbachev, former Soviet dictator, butcher of Afghanistan, and chairman of the Gorbachev Foundation and Green Cross International. In a Los Angeles Times interview of May 8, 1997, Gorbachev insisted humanity must embrace “a new environmental legal code rooted in an Earth Charter ... a kind of Ten Commandments, a ‘Sermon on the Mount,’ that provides a guide for human behavior toward the environment in the next century and beyond.” “The most important thing,” he said, “is the shaping of a new value system” from a “new synthesis” of “democratic, Christian, and Buddhist values ... which affirm such moral principles as social responsibility and the sense of oneness with nature and with each other.”

Christian-Marxist “Unity”

Following the conclusion of the State of the World Forum 2000 (September 4th-10th) in New York, Mr. Gorbachev was off on a multi-week evangelistic crusade that took him to some surprising venues. He was received with apparent enthusiasm at churches in Florida and Tennessee. Then it was off to Salt Lake City, where Gorby addressed Franklin Covey’s International Symposium at the Salt Palace.* At a Salt Lake City press conference, the Nobel Prize winner lamented to the assembled media corps that “we do not have a new world order, the kind of new world order that we need.”

Later, in California, he shared a stage with William “Star Trek” Shatner, before beaming his “global ethic” sermonette to a global television audience from the Reverend Robert Schuller’s famous Crystal Cathedral. “I know that he calls himself an atheist,” Rev. Schuller said, but Schuller believed, nonetheless, that God had used Gorbachev “in a mighty way.” And he hoped that one day the former Communist dictator would become “a man of faith.”

Comrade Gorbachev, after all, is a “man of faith”: He believes in the gospels of Marx and Lenin. As we have already noted, Gorbachev declared in 1989: “I am a Communist, a convinced Communist. For some that may be a fantasy. But for me it is the main goal.” By both word and act, Gorbachev has confirmed many times since then his continued adherence to his revolutionary faith. To anyone familiar with Communist dialectical materialism as it concerns religion, Gorbachev’s fixation with religion over the past decade makes perfect sense. He is one of the leading global activists working to transform Christianity, to unite it with Marxism! As a master dialectician, he is expert in the use of words as weapons, particularly in using words that will appeal to and disarm Christians. According to one of Gorbachev’s old friends, Natasha Rimashevskaya, he had one phrase he loved to say: “‘As to this question, one must approach it dialectically.’ That meant he wanted to entertain a thesis and its contradiction at the same time.”

Gorbachev’s admiring biographer, Gail Sheehy, tells us: “Lenin is in his blood, say Gorbachev’s friends. And Lenin’s doctrine of ‘two steps forward, one step back’ — or complete tactical flexibility — appealed particularly strongly to him.” Gorbachev is fol-

lowing precisely the Leninist dialectical line that was spelled out by Li Wei Han of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1959, in instructions sent to Fidel Castro's new Communist regime. According to Comrade Li:

“The line of action to follow against the Church is to instruct, to educate, to persuade, to convince, and, gradually, to awaken and fully develop the political conscience of Catholics by getting them to take part in study circles and political activities. By means of these activities, we must undertake the dialectical struggle within religion. Gradually, we will replace the religious element with the Marxist element.” Have the Communists forgotten or abandoned this lesson? They have never been more active or aggressive in promoting it! In fact, Comrade Li's 1959 instructions have been reprinted in books currently available in Communist bookstores. While Christian leaders naively praise the new “openness” to religion in Communist countries, Leninists like Gorbachev know this is only a temporary, tactical “one step back.” There is no question that the Leninists — with the aid of foolish Christians, as well as agents posing as Christians — are “[replacing] the religious element with the Marxist element.” Thus we have seen a host of books and articles promoting the diabolic dialectic theme of “Christian-Marxist Unity.” One example of this, *Christian-Marxist Unity: A Miraculous, Explosive Prescription*, the influential text by Raimundo Garcia Franco, tells us: “Yes, Christian faith and Marxism-Leninism do share almost complete overlapping of common objectives in the building of socialism. We cannot look backward, since the path ahead is that of creative transformation to communism and to the Kingdom of God on this earth.”

This is the same subversive dialectic that permeates Gorbachev's annual State of the World Forums as well as all of the UN's “spiritual” confabulations. When the leaders of these events aren't directly “replacing the religious element with the Marxist element,” they are fast at work replacing the Christian element with various pagan and New Age elements, which they recognize as far more flexible and conducive to their Marxist one-world schemes than what they scornfully denounce as “dogmatic,” “rigid,” and “sectarian.”

Total War on the Family

Abolition of the family!.... Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty. — Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, 1848

The kindergarten or infant school has a significant part to play in a child's education. Not only can it correct many of the errors of home training, but it can prepare the child for membership ... in the world society.... As long as the child breathes the poisoned air of nationalism, education in world-mindedness can produce only rather precarious results. As we have pointed out, it is frequently the family that infects the child with extreme nationalism. The school should therefore use the means described earlier to combat family attitudes that favor jingoism. — United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 1949

If we want to talk about equality of opportunity for children, then the fact that children are raised in families means there's no equality.... In order to raise children with equality, we must take them away from families and communally raise them. — Dr. Mary Jo Bane, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Clinton administration

Every child is our child. — motto of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

One of the most terrifying features of totalitarian society is the control and brainwashing of children and youth by the Omnipotent State. The 20th century's experiments with such "education" must never be forgotten. Children were "transformed" through a "reshaping of consciousness." They were taught to publicly denounce (and even execute) their parents, to reject all tradition, to renounce their religion and embrace atheism, and to betray their countries. Matt Cvetic, who for nine years was an undercover agent in the Communist Party USA for the FBI, attended a secret meeting of top-level Communists in 1948, at which a Soviet agent relayed a speech that Stalin had given directing the American Communists to put new emphasis on the recruitment of youth. Here is part of Stalin's speech:

"Comrades, Hitler gained control of the Youth in Germany before he was able to wage a successful Nazi Revolution in Germany. We Communists gained control of the Youth in Russia before we were able to wage a successful Communist Revolution in Russia, and Comrades, we must gain control of the Youth in the United States if we are to wage a successful Communist Revolution in that nation. For this purpose, we are ordering our Comrades to set up a new Communist Youth group in the United States."

(One might hint at the words of Yuri Bezmenov from a previous chapter where he states that Ideological Subversion needs 15-20 years, i.e. one generation of children). As Cvetic pointed out, "Within a few short months after this meeting, more than 6,000 American students were recruited into this new Communist Youth movement known as the Labor Youth League."⁷ This youth apparatus has gone through various structural and name changes over the years, but its purpose has remained unchanged. In 1983, it was reorganized and renamed the Young Communist League (YCL), the name under which it still operates. However, the primary danger to American children and youth at that time emanated not from the YCL or other groups overtly associated with the Communist Party. Those efforts that were openly Communist only reached tens of thousands of young people. Far more dangerous were the pro-Communist, pro-UN, internationalist programs in our schools that were reaching tens of millions of students. Thanks to generous funding from the Carnegie Endowment, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the other Insider foundations, subversive textbooks and curriculum materials were flooding our schools. Thousands of teachers were being programmed at college to serve as "change agents." Change agents like Lydia Shchevchenko. In his memoirs, former Soviet dictator Nikita Khrushchev told of the lasting influence of this childhood teacher on his life:

"I suppose you could say my political education began during my boyhood in the little

village of Kalinovka where I was born. My schoolteacher there was a woman named Lydia Shchevchenko. She was a revolutionary. She was also an atheist. She instilled in me my first political consciousness and began to counteract the effects of my strict religious upbringing. My mother was very religious, likewise her father — my grandfather.... When I think back to my childhood, I can remember vividly the saints on the icons against the wall of our wooden hut, their faces darkened by fumes from the oil lamps. I remember being taught to kneel and pray in front of the icons with the grown-ups in church. When we were taught to read, we read the scriptures. But Lydia Shchevchenko set me on a path which took me away from all that."

Where did that path lead? Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent career was detailed in a seven-part study, *The Crimes of Khrushchev*, published by a congressional committee in 1959.⁹ During Stalin's bloody purges, the report notes, Khrushchev, "as the Number 1 Communist official in the Moscow area ... sent thousands to their death, scores of thousands to hideous slave-labor camps." When Stalin was ready to launch his planned genocide of the people of the Ukraine, Khrushchev "was sent in 1937 as Stalin's trusted killer.... When his two-year Ukrainian purge was over, an estimated 400,000 had been killed and terror gripped the whole population." Later, he added to his infamy, gaining the title of "the Butcher of Budapest" for his ruthless subjugation of Hungary.

State-of-Mind Marxists

How many would-be and wanna-be Khrushchevs have been created by Lydia Shchevchenko's myriad counterparts in America? The thought is frightening; the number is certainly far greater than most Americans would ever imagine. Khrushchev was born in 1894 and the time period of his revolutionary formation referred to above was probably around 1900-1910, before the Czar was overthrown and Lenin came to power. Khrushchev did not say whether Lydia was actually a member of one of the Communist organizations in Czarist Russia. The important point is that it is not necessary for someone like Lydia to be an actual disciplined Party member in order to be an effective "change agent" in carrying forward the Communist revolution. As Lenin said, "We must build Communism with non-Communist hands." Lydia Shchevchenko was, at the very least, a "state-of-mind Marxist." She had consciously rejected God and country, embraced the "revolutionary faith," and dedicated herself to its propagation. Like Lydia, there are many thousands of American educators who have imbibed of the "revolutionary faith," and, to varying degrees, have adopted and propagated its tenets. Many are "state-of-mind Marxists" without even knowing it. Some of these consider themselves Democrats, Republicans, liberals, or even conservatives and libertarians, but they are transmitting the Marxist contagion nonetheless. They are greatly assisted in this subversion, as we shall see, by the major teachers unions, the CFR-dominated tax exempt foundations, and the various agencies of the United Nations.

Equally important to this subversion process is the massive disinformation and moral corrosion provided by the Insider-run mass media and pop culture, most especially the so-called "entertainment" aimed at youth. Over the past two generations, we have seen

these educational and cultural elements carrying forward a massive, coordinated program of conquest through “a slow reshaping of consciousness,” as prescribed by Italian Communist theorist Antonio Gramsci. “In a developed society, ‘the passage to socialism’ occurs neither by putsch nor by direct confrontation,” Gramsci maintained, “but by the transformation of ideas, which is to say — a slow reshaping of consciousness.” “And the stake of this war of positions is the culture, that is — the source of values and ideas,” said Gramsci. “The seizure of political power is not possible until after the seizure of cultural power.”

Dumb Down, Bum Down, Numb Down, Scum Down

The Pratt House thought cartel has been doing all within its power to speed this “seizure of cultural power.” Like their Fascist and Communist brethren, the CFR one-worlders realize full well that for their global totalitarian vision to succeed, they must take control of the children and youth. For their New World Order to triumph they must have obedient, subservient masses — an unthinking, goose-stepping lumpen proletariat. In order to achieve this goal they know they must destroy, or “Reconstruct,” what they refer to as “mass thought patterns” and “consciousness” — most especially in children and youth — so they can “reconstruct” and “reshape” the thought patterns and consciousness according to their own designs.

Through their dominant influence in education, the mass media, and the centers and instruments that produce our popular culture, the Insiders’ change agents are aggressively pursuing this destruction-deconstruction/reshaping-reconstruction process. This process contains several components, which we refer to as the dumbing down, bumming down, numbing down, and scumming down of American society and culture. The dumbing down of America has been the subject of intense concern and great debate for several decades. The alarming 1983 report *A Nation At Risk*, by the National Commission on Excellence in Education, warned that “the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and a people.”¹⁶ That report and dozens of others before and since have cataloged the grim results of this dumbing-down process: widespread illiteracy, high student dropout rates, continuous decline in scores in all areas of academic achievement, the plummeting of the U.S. to last or near-last place on test scores, etc.

These results should not surprise: Traditional academic core subjects have been replaced with “politically correct,” multi-cultural programming; phonics instruction has been supplanted by various look-say, whole-word “reading” programs; and evolutionary dogma, sex education, and enviro-Leninist propaganda have replaced real science. The bumming down of America is proceeding on many fronts, but the attack through the schools is especially pernicious. The public (i.e., government) schools have trained several generations of children to look to Big Brother in Washington for the “solution” to every problem, whether real or contrived. Responsibility, initiative, pride of workmanship, self-sufficiency, and independence are being replaced by the irresponsibility, sloth, slovenliness, and dependence of the welfare state. The government schools are being transformed into

socialist cradle-to-grave, womb-to-tomb “community centers” that also serve as daycare centers, medical clinics, senior citizen centers, and providers of “lifelong learning” for adult education.

The numbing down and scumming down of America, likewise, are proceeding on many fronts, the educational system working in tandem with the CFR-controlled mass media and the “entertainment” industry to destroy every vestige of decency, honor, and virtue. Since fomenting the social upheavals of the 1960s, these same forces have been accelerating their attack, promoting alienation, rebellion, cynicism, hedonism, promiscuity, paganism, and false idealism. They are pressing on to destroy the residual Christian culture of America and the values system it upholds in order to clear the way for their planned “reshaping” process. (*For one of the most informative exposes of this scheme to intellectually cripple and subvert American children and youth, see: *The Deliberate Dumbing Down of America* by Charlotte Iserbyt (Ravenna, Ohio: Conscience Press, 1999). This 750-page, telephone book-size opus is a masterpiece of research and educational detective work by one of America’s top education experts.)

Attack From Within

The aforementioned study *A Nation At Risk* ominously noted: “If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands we have allowed this to happen to ourselves.... We have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral, educational disarmament.”

The statement is both true and false at the same time. While it is true that no foreign nation has “imposed” (in the military sense, that is) our educational disaster upon us, it is not alto-gether true that we have “done this to ourselves.” A close examination of the subversive educational “reforms” of decades past that produced our present catastrophe shows that the individuals and organizations most responsible do indeed constitute a power “foreign” to — and militantly hostile to — our constitutional and spiritual heritage. And they have indeed been carrying out unrelenting, total warfare against American society.

Integral to this total war is the rooting out of individualism and all loyalties that compete with supreme loyalty to the omniscient, omnipotent, omni-beneficent state — in this case, the world state. Thus the traditional family is viewed by these aspiring global overlords not just as a competitor, but as a mortal enemy. Philosophers as varied as Aristotle, Cicero, John Locke, and G.K. Chesterton have noted that the family is ordained by God and Nature to raise and educate children. That truth is plainly obvious. But the one-worlders will have none of that. The parents and the family must be supplanted by agents of the global state: the school and other social agencies.

This is basic Tyranny 101; it follows the statist, textbook dogmas of Rousseau, Marx, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and others of their totalitarian ilk throughout history. The Hitlerian UNESCO screed quoted at the head of this chapter, charging the family with

“infecting” the child with bad attitudes, is taken from a UNESCO program for teachers, published in 1949 under the heading *Towards World Understanding*. In this 10-part series, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) complained that “before the child enters school his mind has already been profoundly marked, and often injuriously, by early influences” — most particularly by parents, of course, who are deemed hopelessly ignorant and insufficiently “world-minded.”

Parents are seen by UNESCO as retrograde influences who tend to teach their children love for God and country, which UNESCO condemned as “infecting” the minds of children with “nationalism,” “chauvinism,” and “sclerosis of the mind.”

This pernicious one-world, anti-parent, anti-family, anti-patriotism sentiment was already being spread through the schools many years earlier by the radical National Education Association (NEA), the nation’s largest teachers union. When the United Nations was created, the NEA became (and remains) one of its biggest promoters. For the NEA, the United Nations became the hope of the world. In January 1946, Joy Elmer Morgan wrote in the *NEA Journal*:

“In the struggle to establish an adequate world government, the teacher has many parts to play. He must begin with his own attitude and knowledge and purpose. He can do much to prepare the hearts and minds of children for global understanding and cooperation.... At the very top of all the agencies which will assure the coming of world government must stand the school, the teacher, and the organized profession.”

The NEA’s ardor for the UN and a global school board has intensified over the years. In 1993, the militant teachers union took a major step in its push for one-worldism by launching Education International (EI), a worldwide federation of teachers unions. Mary Hatwood Futrell, the NEA’s radical-left former president, moved to Brussels, Belgium (headquarters for the European Union) to head EI’s new global union operation. Futrell, ever the darling of the CFR coterie, had proven her one-world bona fides by serving on many Carnegie panels and commissions and reliably promoting the big government, globalist line. The Insiders knew she could be entrusted with the task of spearheading this new global initiative. Education International, which now claims 24 million members through its 304 affiliate organizations, serves as an important teachers auxiliary to the Socialist International, dependably supporting just about every socialist scheme imaginable. EI boasts of its “privileged” status with UNESCO: “At UNESCO, EI is one of 16 organisations worldwide holding the coveted status of NGO in formal associate relations.” With Futrell holding the reins at EI, it is not surprising that the union behemoth follows the NEA lead, supporting every move to empower the UN, particularly in the area of education. The NEA’s 2000-2001 Resolutions include this paean to the UN:

“The National Education Association recognizes the interdependence of all people.... The Association urges all nations to develop treaties and disarmament agreements.... The Association further believes that the United Nations (UN) furthers world peace and promotes the rights of all people by preventing war, racism, and genocide.”

The NEA and EI support increased funding for the UN, increased authority for the World Court, creation of the International Criminal Court, ratification of most UN treaties, and expansion of UN power in virtually all areas. The NEA-EI education mafia is tailor-made for the Insiders' one-world purposes. With tens of millions of dollars in dues forcibly taken from members' paychecks, the union is a cash cow for revolution. With tens of millions of teachers worldwide as members, it can exert enormous influence in classrooms, as well as local, state and national elections.

The NEA one-world subversives also affect the classrooms and national and state education policy through think tanks like the National Training Laboratory (NTL) in Bethel, Maine. The NTL was set up by the NEA in the 1940s to reeducate teachers along politically correct lines. NTL says it works "to change teachers' inflexible patterns of thinking." An NTL teachers manual says of children: "Although they appear to behave appropriately and seem normal by most cultural standards, they may actually be in need of mental health care in order to help them change, adapt, and conform to the planned society in which there will be no conflict of attitudes or beliefs."

Another NEA-created and -supported think tank is the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD), one of the leading educational purveyors of "global think." At a 1985 international-curriculum symposium in Enschede, Netherlands, ASCD officials told participants of the need for a "world core curriculum" to meet the needs of our "increasingly global interdependency."³⁰ ASCD executive director Gordon Cawelti told symposium participants that the proposed world core curriculum would be based on UN guru Robert Muller's book *New Genesis: Shaping a Global Spirituality*.

At the beginning of his *World Core Curriculum Manual* Muller states that "the underlying philosophy upon which [his] School is based will be found in the teaching set forth in the books of Alice A. Bailey by the Tibetan teacher Djwhal Khul..." and M. Morya.³² This is quite an admission considering that Mrs. Bailey's exalted position in the occult theosophical firmament is second only to that of Theosophy founder and high priestess Madame Blavatsky. Bailey, who alleged that Khul and Morya communicated with her telepathically, was a rabid Luciferian and founded the Lucifer Publishing Company and the theosophical journal *Lucifer*.

So we are not engaging in hyperbole at all when we refer to the Insiders' attack on families and children as devilish, demonic, diabolic, or satanic. The totalitarian threat to the family posed by UNESCO, NEA, EI, NTL, ASCD, Carnegie, et al., is real and is thoroughly evil. The threat presents itself in three significant ways:

- **The Rule of Law.** The militant shock troops first lobby for ratification of UN treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Once ratified (or even before ratification), they fraudulently assign these treaties the exalted status of "international law," which, they assert, overrides all federal, state, and local authority. In order to show our respect for the "rule of law," they and their prostitute "legal scholars" say, we must "harmonize" our laws and policies with those of the "international community." They know

that most local officials, school board members, state legislators, and congressmen are unfamiliar with, and unable to muster an effective defense against, the supposed authority of “international law.” Thus the UN treaties provide the homegrown revolutionaries with the weapons to undermine our laws and transform our government and institutions into subservient instruments of the UN to enforce global political correctness.

- The Global School Board. Through UNESCO, NEA, EI, and hundreds of other organizations and think tanks, the global structure bureaucracy is already being established for a worldwide socialist system that is intended to provide school teachers with indoctrination and certification, schools with accreditation, and students with the subversive materials and programs they “need” for graduation.
- The New Faith. In our “interdependent” world, the UN provides the new focal point to teach children about our global “oneness.” Loyalty will be transferred from the family to the state and from the nation to the UN. Children will be (or are already being) taught to be “citizens of the world.” They are being programmed to reject “narrow,” “divisive,” “bigoted,” “dogmatic” Christianity and to adopt pagan and occult beliefs.

UNESCO Subversion

In the early 1950s, as the UNESCO programs began working their way into school textbooks and curricula, and as the truly subversive nature of the programs became known, a significant number of parents and educators became alarmed. They prevailed upon elected officials, who began to challenge and condemn the UN’s perfidious insinuation of collectivist propaganda into the schools. In 1953, Senator William Jenner (R-Ind.), the courageous chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, attacked the UNESCO subversion head-on, challenging his Senate colleagues in these words:

“How many of you Senators know what the UN is doing to change the teaching of the children in your own home town? The UN is at work there, every day and night, changing the teachers, changing the teaching materials, changing the very words and tones — changing all the essential ideas which we imagine our schools are teaching to our young folks. How in the name of Heaven are we to sit here, approve these programs, appropriate our own people’s money — for such outrageous “orientation” of our own children, and of the men and women who teach our children, in this nation’s schools?”

Some of the one-worlders were audacious and zealous enough candidly to admit the subversive agenda of UNESCO, though they praised it as a necessary and righteous subversion. Such, for instance, was the case at the Saturday Review, which, in 1952, published a wildly pro-UNESCO editorial which declared:

“If UNESCO is attacked on the grounds that it is helping to prepare the world’s peoples for world government, then it is an error to burst forth with apologetic statements and denials. Let us face it: the job of UNESCO is to help create and promote the elements of world citizenship. When faced with such a “charge,” let us by all means affirm it from the housetops.”

More astute Insiders realized, however, that the time was not yet ripe for open confrontation on such fundamental and emotionally charged issues. The wiser course was to ease up and drop back for awhile, and cloak their true aims in more noble-sounding and less threatening verbiage about “world peace,” “collective security,” “ending world hunger,” etc. Which is what they did. Now, however, after decades of softening up the American public with one-world propaganda, calculatedly undermining our morality and religious fervor with carnal and irreligious “entertainment,” and destroying patriarchal authority and responsibility and family ties through welfare statism, the totalitarian internationalists are pressing forward with fresh audacity.

They are rapturously pushing on toward the dystopic vision of the developing cradle-to-grave socialist world state outlined years ago by UNESCO director-general Julian Huxley. In 1947, Huxley announced that UNESCO would be exploring “the application of psychoanalysis and other schools of ‘deep’ psychology to education.” The use of such techniques to cultivate a sense of world citizenship, said Huxley, “would mean an extension of education backwards from the nursery school to the nursery itself.” This Huxleyite conception of lifelong, womb-to-tomb, UN-driven indoctrination (and re-indoctrination, repeated as often as the UN mandarins deem necessary) has been integral to the UNESCO drive over the decades. It has come frighteningly close to fruition in many current UN programs, declarations and proposals, such as the UN’s Millennium Forum Declaration of May 2000, which states that “education will be universal and lifelong, and will nurture a sense of world citizenship.”

The Rights of the Child

In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC), which, shorn of its pretended concerns for the welfare of children, is a blatant statist attack on the family and parental authority and responsibility. It proposes a massive intrusion of government into family matters. Implementation of the CROC would radically alter the parentchild relationship, interjecting government-appointed “child advocates” between parents and children. Ultimately, it aims at stripping parents of their traditionally recognized rights to control the upbringing and education of their children and to pass on to their children their religious values and beliefs. If the people of the United States allow the conspirators in our government to subject us to the supposed authority of the CROC, we will soon see UN-approved government child “experts” assuming complete control over our children and parental rights completely destroyed.

In March 1990, representatives from more than 150 countries met in Jomtien, Thailand, for a five-day World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA). Official sponsors of this Insider-run event included UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP (United Nations Development Program), the World Bank, other UN agencies, and one-world NGOs. Out of this major agenda-setting palaver came two documents: The World Declaration on Education for All, and The Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning Needs. The Framework set forth six education goals, which just happened to be virtually identical to the controversial

Outcome-Based Education (OBE) program set out by then-President George Bush (CFR) in his “America 2000” education plan.

In order to facilitate coordination of U.S. OBE policies with those of the UN globocrats, a U.S. Coalition for Education for All (USCEFA) was launched at a meeting held on October 30-November 1, 1991 in Alexandria, Virginia. Gathering under the banner of “Learning for All: Bridging Domestic and International Education” were movers and shakers from the government and private sector. Conference cosponsors included Apple Computer, IBM, the National School Board Association the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association, the U.S. Department of Education, the College Board, USAID — and the usual tax-exempt foundations. Heading up the USCEFA as president was Janet Whitla, director of the Education Development Center, Inc., infamous for its pro-homosexual, pornographic, promiscuity-promoting sex education programs and globalist curricula. The Coalition is pushing to make UNESCO the global school board which will dictate educational policy for the world.

For the past decade, unbeknownst to American parents, the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been in the process of implementation through the USCEFA programs. One indication of the frightening progress of this subversion is the increasing acceptance, especially in political and academic circles, of totalitarian sentiments. Among those promoting dangerous new state authority, we point to Professor Jack C. Westman of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Professor David Lykken of the University of Minnesota, and Connecticut Superior Court Judge Charles D. Gill, a co-founder of the National Task Force for Children’s Constitutional Rights (NTFCCR). Dr. Westman, Dr. Lykken, and Judge Gill are leaders in the despotic drive to mandate government licensing of all parents. “The United Nations Convention [on the Rights of the Child] clearly declares that the state has a role in child-rearing,” says Dr. Westman, approvingly. “Because the consent of children is not required for the exercise of parental power, it is in the privacy of their homes that their civil rights are least assured.”

In a 1991 law journal article, Judge Gill wrote: “The [UN] Convention makes a total break from previous approaches to children’s rights. Previous ‘rights’ were paternalistic, whereas the Convention makes the state directly responsible to the child.”⁴⁶ Westman, Lykken, Gill, et al., view the family and parents with outright hostility, while idolizing the state and its supposed capacity to raise better children. These extreme, totalitarian sentiments have been made “respectable” in influential circles thanks to help from the Pratt House one-world elites. These statist nostrums have moved from the stage of advocacy by socialist fringe groups to acceptance by “mainstream” Democrat and Republican politicians. The forces pushing this agenda have enormous financial resources at their disposal, and they are geared up for major, continuous, offensive action. If they are not aggressively exposed and opposed by a significant, growing, and increasingly determined constituency of parents, grandparents, and concerned citizens, an American version of the Hitler Youth or Red Guard — under the rubric of national service, of course — will not be long in coming. That is a terrifying prospect, but even that does not begin to

depict the full extent of the anti-family agenda the Insiders and their UN lackeys envision for their global police state. Space permitting, we would detail the UN programs for global:

- Forced abortion;
- Proliferation of chemical abortions (RU486);
- Coercive population control and eugenics programs;
- Forced mass population relocation;
- Mandatory school “sexual orientation” programs promoting homosexuality;
- Outlawing of independent home schooling and independent private and religious schools;
- Euthanasia and assisted suicide.

The piecemeal Marxist abolition of the family is a fact, and the UN is the instrument through which the one-world Insiders intend to carry out their abolition program world-wide.

15.5 What Must Be Done

[I]t does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people’s minds. — Samuel Adams

If we wish to be free ...we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight!! — Patrick Henry (March 23, 1775)

In the preceding chapters, we have painted, we admit, a very alarming picture of reality. It was entirely our intent to do so. We believe, like Founding Father James Madison, that it is proper and prudent to sound the alarm, wake the town, and tell the people when danger is threatening. In fact, it would be immoral not to warn others about an imminent peril. Madison wisely advised, as we have noted previously:

“[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens and one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it.”

Tragically, most Americans have forgotten this important lesson. We are long past “the first experiment on our liberties.” We are rushing headlong to destruction, tyranny, and slavery. Some will say that our concerns are wildly exaggerated, that the UN, while often obnoxious and corrupt, is toothless and can present no real danger to the mighty United States. And besides, they will aver, it still represents mankind’s noblest aspirations for peace. We can reform it and use it to good purpose. We can trust our president and Congress to watch out for our interests. Others will react in the opposite direction,

asserting that the Insiders' new world order and their plans to empower the UN have proceeded too far to be stopped now. The enemy is too rich and powerful, too well organized and deeply entrenched. Resistance is futile; we have already lost.

Both of these attitudes — blind, senseless optimism and hopeless defeatism — should be equally repugnant to free peoples. We assure you there is nothing exaggerated about the dire threat posed by the UN in anything we have written. But it is not necessary for anyone to rely on our word. We have quoted extensively from UN and U.S. documents and copiously cited the statements of many of the key players in this drama. Any person of ordinary intelligence, with an open, honest mind, can read the literature and compare it with readily verifiable facts concerning the rapidly growing “empowerment“ of the UN in all of the areas we have discussed. Let us take a lesson from the patriots who founded our nation. In the summer of 1775, these courageous souls faced a situation not dissimilar from our own. Some argued that, in spite of the Crown's tyrannical acts, things were not all that bad and that the prudent course was to continue entreating England for fairness and justice. Others warned that it would be futile and foolhardy to dare to challenge the British military might.

In his famous oration at St. John's Church, Patrick Henry addressed the faulty arguments of both the Panglossian optimists and the defeatists. He eloquently and forcefully expressed the position that full and complete information, even though unpleasant, was the necessary basis for a proper decision:

“[I]t is natural for a man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth — and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it might cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst and to provide for it.”

Mr. Henry then spoke words that are as relevant today (if not more so) as they were in that desperate time:

“They tell us, sir, that we are weak — unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British [or a UN] guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance by lying supinely on our backs, and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot? Sir, we are not weak, if we make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. Three millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, sir, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles

for us. The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat, but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged, their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston!... Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!'

The submission and slavery the American colonists faced was a very real and dire prospect, but was nothing compared to that which we will face under a fully empowered UN. The British government was autocratic, abusive, even tyrannical at times but not outright totalitarian. The organized one-worlders, however, intend to transform the UN into the global governing instrument of their ruthless, totalitarian "New World Order."

Projecting the Lines

Let us summarize the case we have made and, from what is already known, project the lines concerning what we can expect in the future — if, that is, by "irresolution and inaction" we allow the Insiders' plans for the UN to come to fruition. Those plans include:

- Creating a United Nations Military, with army, navy, air force, and nuclear weapons.
- Dispatching U.S. military personnel on ever-increasing UN missions throughout the world.
- Gradually disarming all nation states, including the U.S., so that the UN military forces will be unchallengeable.
- Establishing the International Criminal Court and rapidly expanding its jurisdiction.
- Establishing a global UN police force and bringing all local police under its control.
- Outlawing private ownership of firearms and disarming citizens.
- Imposing global draconian regulations on all human activity under the pretext of protecting the environment.
- Drastically restricting and, ultimately, destroying property rights.
- Forcing vast relocations of human populations in order to create "Wildlands" for UN-designated animal species.
- Imposing global "carbon taxes" on all fuels, a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions, and myriad other tax proposals.
- Placing a vast regulatory regime on all labor, business, and employment policies.
- Imposing population controls, including mandatory abortion a la Red China's UN-approved-and-funded "one child policy."
- Accelerating UN subversion in our schools and bringing all education under the jurisdiction of UNESCO.
- Subjecting all parents to licensing and claiming UN "protective" authority over all children.
- Striking down all laws against homosexuality and pedophilia/ pederasty.

- Greatly expanding the practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide.
- Promoting paganism, “New Age” spirituality, the occult, and Satanism under the guise of promoting peace, brotherhood, and a “Global Ethic.”

The list above is far from exhaustive. Anyone willing to study the facts will be able to readily verify that the Pratt House mafia promoting the UN is pushing for all of these insidious programs and more. All of these incredible grabs for power are, in fact, already in various stages of implementation. So what will be the consequences of inaction? What will an allpowerful UN government mean to life as Americans know it? Isn't it possible that our would-be slavemasters will be more benevolent than old-style Communist dictators? Surely American leaders would not want to preside over bloodletting, torture, and genocide. That is a dangerous assumption. First of all, while many of the Insiders of this one-world cabal are American citizens, they are not Americans; they are internationalists, with loyalties to no country. Many of them hold, or have held, public office and have sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution — while doing everything in their power to subvert and destroy it. Secondly, while no one can predict with absolute certainty what others would do given the power and opportunity, nonetheless there are compelling principles we dare not ignore. Let's look first at the lessons of history regarding the consequences of power.

We have previously invoked Lord Acton's famous maxim “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This principle was accepted as an undisputed truism by the American Founding Fathers. They were so firmly convinced that the best of men, regardless of character and intentions, could not be trusted with unrestrained power that they designed our government to thwart the ambitions of men. Thomas Jefferson expressed it this way: “In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.”

The situation is even worse when the system encourages the worst of men to gravitate to the top as happened so often in so many nations in the last century. Then we are no longer talking about “mischief with our liberties. Our lives, the lives of our families and neighbors, and the lives of billions of others are at stake. John Locke warned centuries ago that “he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary.” The history of the spectacularly bloody 20th century offers a definitive rebuke to those who believe that a world government would be a blessing. In his important book *Death by Government*, Professor R.J. Rummel documents that the case for global government rests entirely upon an essentially superstitious belief in the benevolence of government as an institution.

Rummel, a professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, is perhaps the world's foremost authority on the phenomenon of “democide” — the systematic murder of human beings by governments. “Democide is committed by absolute Power; its agency is government,” Rummel declares, and the death toll of democide is nearly incomprehensible:

“In total, during the first eighty-eight years of this [20th] century, almost 170 million men, women, and children have been shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to death; buried alive, drowned, hung, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways governments have inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citizens and foreigners. The dead could conceivably be nearly 360 million people.”

The “respectable” CFR elites have always been comfortable with mass-murdering thugs like Stalin, Mao, Tito, Castro, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Lumumba, Ben Bella, Ceausescu, Aristide, Mandela, Arafat, et al... As we have noted, David Rockefeller, one of the most powerful drivers of the Establishment agenda during the 20th century has praised “the social experiment in China under Chairman Mao’s leadership” as “one of the most important and successful in human history.” He made this incredible statement in spite of the wellknown fact that Mao Tse-tung’s “social experiment” had by that time (1973) cost the lives of as many as 64 million Chinese at the hands of their Communist masters! Rockefeller and his fellow one-worlders share with “Mao the Master Butcher” the addictive lust for absolute power. Again, Patrick Henry has provided us the proper attitude toward a record of tyranny. He said, “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided; and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging the future but by the past.” “And judging by the past,” he declared, “I wish to know what there has been in the conduct of the British ministry for the last ten years to justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to solace themselves...?”

What has there been in the conduct of the CFR-UN cabal in the last fifty years to justify any hopes of benign intent on their part? What could we expect from men with proven amoral character who would gain unrestrained power and the opportunity to do evil? Some may seek comfort in the illusion that tyranny is strictly a foreign phenomenon — that domination and exploitation of one’s fellow man are not in the heart of American leaders. After all, these men are cultured, genteel, and highly educated. They are some of the most famous political, business, and academic leaders. Some of them kiss babies, smile convincingly, and talk of God, patriotism, and family values. Some of them give millions of dollars to hospitals, schools, and charitable causes. They are courted and praised by the media and responsible, respectable members of society. Surely these eminent men are not capable of the criminal activities we suggest.

With more space, we could credibly demonstrate that U.S. Insiders (direct forebears to the current new world order cabal) orchestrated the rise of Communism to a world power in the USSR and in China (Well, this book has done this actually) and supplied these criminal regimes with Western technology and the means for nuclear weapons. It is also true that they willingly sent U.S. sons to die in no-win wars to build their new world order. They betrayed friendly, anti-Communist allies into Communist tyranny. They used U.S. foreign aid to further communize and socialize nations under petty despots. They supported brutal terrorist groups and Communist-directed wars of “national liberation.” They have facilitated the Communist drug offensive against the United States and frustrated all genuine efforts to expose and oppose it. They have then turned around and offered

dangerous, totalitarian proposals disguised as a “War on Drugs,” but which, in reality, are aimed at making war on our freedoms. They have promoted the destruction of morality and the family. They have sought the destruction of private property and the middle class. They have worked to subvert the influence of monotheistic religions. They have encouraged teaching methods that promote illiteracy, conformity known as political correctness, and worship of the Almighty State as God.

These and a host of other crimes too numerous to mention should leave no doubt that top leaders of the Pratt House presidium are out to create the kind of absolutist, all-pervasive, mind- and souldestroying, Big Brother dictatorship depicted with such horrifying force in George Orwell’s 1984. In case your memory of that nightmarish world has dimmed since you read Orwell’s classic in high school, it may help to recall commissar O’Brien’s hideous colloquy with the tortured protagonist, Winston Smith. After delivering an excruciatingly painful electric shock to Smith, who is strapped to a bed, O’Brien casually explains:

“Obedience is not enough. Unless he is suffering, how can you be sure that he is obeying your will and not his own? Power is in inflicting pain and humiliation. Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing. Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. [Emphasis in original.] Progress in our world will be progress toward more pain. The old civilizations claimed that they were founded on love and justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph, and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy — everything. Already we are breaking down the habits of thought which have survived from before the Revolution. We have cut the links between child and parent, and between man and man, and between man and woman. No one dares trust a wife or a child or a friend any longer. But in the future there will be no wives and no friends. Children will be taken from their mothers at birth, as one takes eggs from a hen.... There will be no loyalty, except loyalty toward the Party. There will be no love, except the love of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy.”

The brutish O’Brien then matter-of-factly continued his explanation to the helpless and supine Winston Smith. “But always — do not forget this, Winston — always there will be the intoxication of power, constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at every moment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation of trampling on an enemy who is helpless. If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face — forever.”

A Call to Action

A ruthless, tyrannical, Orwellian world state is precisely what the top Insiders plan to have. Like Orwell's O'Brien, they are intoxicated with power. They crave absolute power. And if they should ever attain it, we will experience a murderous "plague of power" such as this planet has not seen before. We will know democide on a scale not previously imagined. The moral man who fully realizes the terrible consequences of allowing such a future to come to pass by default will be highly motivated to join the battle against the forces of evil and oppression. The moral person who understands what is at stake — for himself, his loved ones, and the incredible heritage of freedom with which we have been blessed — will be imbued with a high level of commitment to stopping these would-be tyrants. But how does one go about such a daunting task?

Those committed to this UN world-government goal enjoy, as we have shown, enormous influence and prominent positions throughout our institutions, especially in the media. They are able to create the appearance of universal support for their agenda. As the late Admiral Chester Ward, a former longtime member of the Council on Foreign Relations, observed: "Once the ruling members of CFR have decided that the U.S. Government should adopt a particular policy, the very substantial research facilities of CFR are put to work to develop arguments, intellectual and emotional, to support the new policy, and to confound and discredit, intellectually and politically, any opposition."

Clearly, anyone who dares to sound the alarm or question the globalist agenda invites well-orchestrated attacks and ridicule. In short, Americans face a very perilous situation: the major power centers and safeguards on which they depend to protect their interests have either been compromised or are secretly working to enslave us. With the major channels of communication in internationalist hands, alerting other Americans to this situation is a formidable challenge. Yet, as we shall see, the situation is not hopeless if a core of responsible Americans will organize and act in pursuit of a sound plan.

A Commensurate Response

What needs to be done commensurate with the seriousness of the danger? Our answer: Enlist many more citizens to follow a sound program to get the United States out of the United Nations completely. With the UN as a foundation, the globalists are waging assaults on our sovereignty on an incredible number of fronts. And they have equally incredible resources at their disposal for doing so, including the support of now more than 1,000 NGOs lobbying for the UN agenda. We cannot expect to obtain the resources to defend against all of those attacks. Moreover, such a purely defensive strategy is always doomed to defeat. The only sensible strategy is to put the globalists' gains up for grabs by going after the foundation for their assaults — the United Nations itself.

"There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil," said Henry David Thoreau, "to one who is striking at the root." Rather than hacking at the ever-proliferating branches

of the UN program, we must concentrate our forces where it counts. We must wield a sharp axe to the root and trunk of the UN tree — by forcing the U.S. to withdraw from the UN. U.S. withdrawal before the UN acquires real, independent power would condemn the UN to the ash heap of history. Without U.S. support, the United Nations would share the same fate as its predecessor League of Nations. When the U.S. Senate wisely refused to have the U.S. join the League following World War I, the League soon faded into oblivion.

The UN is not the only program or assault on the U.S. system that has been mounted by the Establishment one-worlders. But it is a cornerstone of their plans — an investment of over five decades. As a mechanism to destroy our sovereignty, it threatens to take many other battles in resisting the collectivist assault out of the hands of Congress and the American people. Depriving the Conspiracy of its creation, the UN, is essential to the preservation of liberty and accomplishing this would be an incredible setback to the Insiders' plans. One very significant advantage we have on our side in this monumental effort is truth and the natural, God-given, human desire to be free. Another is the considerable freedoms and protections that still exist under what remains of our badly tattered constitutional system. There are many layers of strength not yet rotted and corrupted. One very important indication of that reality is the fact that the Insiders still must resort constantly to massive lies and deception to sell their fraudulent, totalitarian programs. If the fight were already over, as the defeatists claim, our enemies would not be going to such lengths to deceive; they would be flying their colors openly.

But they cannot promote their agenda openly. As dumbed-down, numbed-down, bummed-down, and scummed-down as a growing segment of the American public is, there is still sufficient residual morality and intelligence to force the conspirators for world tyranny to cloak their schemes in noble-sounding rhetoric and extravagant charades. This means they must invest hundreds of times (even thousands of times) more in labor and resources to sell their lies than what it takes to offset their lies by promoting the truth. The architects of the new world order have not yet been able to entirely erode the republican form of government that our Founding Fathers established and that has been passed on to us through the sacrifices of so many dedicated Americans who have gone before us. Concerned Americans (or rather every citizen within the UN) just need to inform themselves and use the rights, freedoms, and blessings we enjoy in order to reverse our course.

Sound Organization Required

Building sufficient understanding in time will require organization under extremely tough, responsible, and knowledgeable leadership. Taking on the UN means taking on the power and influence of the Establishment, and in particular the Council on Foreign Relations (the UN's creator and sponsor) as well as all of the politicians and media moguls the CFR has in its pocket. This battle can't be carried through to success without leadership that

understands the wiles of politicians and the pressures that the CFR can bring to bear. For example, as public understanding grows that the UN is not our friend, inevitably new proposals to “reform” the UN will be offered — which politicians will be tempted to support. This is not only a bad idea, but also a dangerous trap. No reforms will change the nature of the beast. The UN was designed from the beginning to promote global tyranny. But politicians love to champion “compromise” because they see a chance to pacify uninformed constituents while not risking the wrath of the globalists. Which also means that freedom loses. These politicians love to posture with calls for “reform” in order to deflect mounting pressure that would force them to take real action with real political consequences. Unfortunately, many conservative groups that oppose most of the UN’s agenda have already been co-opted to adopt the “reform the UN” agenda. That is a prescription for defeat.

To force serious political action (and keep politicians from wiggling, stalling, and doing nothing in the face of enormous pressure and deception from the Establishment) requires a well-informed, well-organized action group under sound leadership.

Our enemy’s success all stems from the ignorance, delusion, and lack of understanding of the American people. If good Americans gain a proper understanding of what is happening, our problems can be resolved within the institutions that George Washington and others fought to give us. If the people don’t gain the understanding to choose better leaders and hold their politicians accountable to the Constitution, they cannot expect to improve their government through revolution. In fact, just the opposite would happen. What is needed instead is to use the resources and the freedoms we have to inform our fellow citizens and put the government our Founding Fathers gave us back on track. But for success in the educational battle ahead, we do need to find the same spirit of patriotism and determination that Patrick Henry captured so well in his previously mentioned “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death” oration:

“If we wish to be free — if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending — if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained — we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight!! An appeal to arms and to the God of Hosts is all that is left us! ...Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”

16. The Fate of Empire

By Sir John Glubb

John Bagot Glubb was born in 1897, his father being a regular officer in the Royal Engineers. At the age of four he left England for Mauritius, where his father was posted for a three-year tour of duty. At the age of ten he was sent to school for a year in Switzerland. These youthful travels may have opened his mind to the outside world at an early age. He entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in September 1914, and was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in April 1915. He served throughout the first World War in France and Belgium, being wounded three times and awarded the Military Cross. In 1920 he volunteered for service in Iraq, as a regular officer, but in 1926 resigned his commission and accepted an administrative post under the Iraq Government. In 1930, however, he signed a contract to serve the Transjordan Government (now Jordan). From 1939 to 1956 he commanded the famous Jordan Arab Legion, which was in reality the Jordan Army. Since his retirement he has published seventeen books, chiefly on the Middle East, and has lectured widely in Britain, the United States and Europe.

Introduction

As we pass through life, we learn by experience. We look back on our behaviour when we were young and think how foolish we were. In the same way our family, our community and our town endeavour to avoid the mistakes made by our predecessors. The experiences of the human race have been recorded, in more or less detail, for some four thousand years. If we attempt to study such a period of time in as many countries as possible, we seem to discover the same patterns constantly repeated under widely differing conditions of climate, culture and religion. Surely, we ask ourselves, if we studied calmly and impartially the history of human institutions and development over these four thousand years, should we not reach conclusions which would assist to solve our problems today? For everything that is occurring around us has happened again and again before. No such conception ever appears to have entered into the minds of our historians. In general, historical teaching in schools is limited to this small island. We endlessly mull over the Tudors and the Stewarts, the Battle of Crecy, and Guy Fawkes. Perhaps this narrowness is due to our examination system, which necessitates the careful definition of a syllabus which all children must observe. I remember once visiting a school for mentally handicapped children. "Our children do not have to take examinations," the headmaster told me, "and so we are able to teach them things which will be really useful to them in life."

However this may be, the thesis which I wish to propound is that priceless lessons could be learned if the history of the past four thousand years could be thoroughly and impartially

studied. In these two articles, which first appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine*, I have attempted briefly to sketch some of the kinds of lessons which I believe we could learn. My plea is that history should be the history of the human race, not of one small country or period.

Learning from History

'The only thing we learn from history,' it has been said, 'is that men never learn from history', a sweeping generalisation perhaps, but one which the chaos in the world today goes far to confirm. What then can be the reason why, in a society which claims to probe every problem, the bases of history are still so completely unknown? Several reasons for the futility of our historical studies may be suggested. First, our historical work is limited to short periods—the history of our own country, or that of some past age which, for some reason, we hold in respect. Second, even within these short periods, the slant we give to our narrative is governed by our own vanity rather than by objectivity. If we are considering the history of our own country, we write at length of the periods when our ancestors were prosperous and victorious, but we pass quickly over their shortcomings or their defeats. Our people are represented as patriotic heroes, their enemies as grasping imperialists, or subversive rebels. In other words, our national histories are propaganda, not wellbalanced investigations. Third, in the sphere of world history, we study certain short, usually unconnected, periods, which fashion at certain epochs has made popular. Greece 500 years before Christ, and the Roman Republic and early Roman Empire are cases in point. The intervals between the 'great periods' are neglected. Recently Greece and Rome have become largely discredited, and history tends to become increasingly the parochial history of our own countries.

To derive any useful instruction from history, it seems to me essential first of all to grasp the principle that history, to be meaningful, must be the history of the human race. For history is a continuous process, gradually developing, changing and turning back, but in general moving forward in a single mighty stream. Any useful lessons to be derived must be learned by the study of the whole flow of human development, not by the selection of short periods here and there in one country or another. Every age and culture is derived from its predecessors, adds some contribution of its own, and passes it on to its successors. If we boycott various periods of history, the origins of the new cultures which succeeded them cannot be explained. Physical science has expanded its knowledge by building on the work of its predecessors, and by making millions of careful experiments, the results of which are meticulously recorded. Such methods have not yet been employed in the study of world history. Our piecemeal historical work is still mainly dominated by emotion and prejudice.

The Lives of Empires

If we desire to ascertain the laws which govern the rise and fall of empires, the obvious course is to investigate the imperial experiments recorded in history, and to endeavour to deduce from them any lessons which seem to be applicable to them all. The word 'empire', by association with the British Empire, is visualised by some people as an organisation consisting of a homecountry in Europe and 'colonies' in other continents. In this essay, the term 'empire' is used to signify a great power, often called today a superpower. Most of the empires in history have been large landblocks, almost without overseas possessions. We possess a considerable amount of information on many empires recorded in history, and of their vicissitudes and the lengths of their lives, for example:

The Nation	Dates of rise and fall	Duration in years
Assyria	859-612 B.C.	247
Persia	538-330 B.C.	208
Greece	331-100 B.C.	231
Roman Republic	260-27 B.C.	233
Roman Empire	27 B.C. - A.D. 180	207
Arab Empire	A.D. 634-880	246
Mameluke Empire	1250-1517	267
Ottoman Empire	1250-1570	250
Spain	1500-1750	250
Romanov Russia	1682-1916	234
Britain	1700-1950	250

This list calls for certain comments.

(1) The present writer is exploring the facts, not trying to prove anything. The dates given are largely arbitrary. Empires do not usually begin or end on a certain date. There is normally a gradual period of expansion and then a period of decline. The resemblance in the duration of these great powers may be queried. Human affairs are subject to many chances, and it is not to be expected that they could be calculated with mathematical accuracy.

(2) Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is sufficient resemblance between the life periods of these different empires to justify further study.

(3) The division of Rome into two periods may be thought unwarranted. The first, or republican, period dates from the time when Rome became the mistress of Italy, and ends with the accession of Augustus. The imperial period extends from the accession of Augustus to the death of Marcus Aurelius. It is true that the empire survived nominally for more than a century after this date, but it did so in constant confusion, rebellions, civil wars and barbarian invasions.

(4) Not all empires endured for their full lifespan. The Babylonian Empire of Nebuchadnezzar, for example, was overthrown by Cyrus, after a life duration of only some

seventy-four years.

(5) An interesting deduction from the figures seems to be that the duration of empires does not depend on the speed of travel or the nature of weapons. The Assyrians marched on foot and fought with spears and bow and arrows. The British used artillery, railways and ocean-going ships. Yet the two empires lasted for approximately the same periods. There is a tendency nowadays to say that this is the jet-age, and consequently there is nothing for us to learn from past empires. Such an attitude seems to be erroneous.

(6) It is tempting to compare the lives of empires with those of human beings. We may choose a figure and say that the average life of a human being is seventy years. Not all human beings live exactly seventy years. Some die in infancy, others are killed in accidents in middle life, some survive to the age of eighty or ninety. Nevertheless, in spite of such exceptions, we are justified in saying that seventy years is a fair estimate of the average person's expectation of life.

(7) We may perhaps at this stage be allowed to draw certain conclusions: (a) In spite of the accidents of fortune, and the apparent circumstances of the human race at different epochs, the periods of duration of different empires at varied epochs show a remarkable similarity. (b) Immense changes in the technology of transport or in methods of warfare do not seem to affect the life-expectation of an empire. (c) The changes in the technology of transport and of war have, however, affected the shape of empires. The Assyrians, marching on foot, could only conquer their neighbours, who were accessible by land—the Medes, the Babylonians, the Persians and the Egyptians. The British, making use of ocean-going ships, conquered many countries and subcontinents, which were accessible to them by water—North America, India, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand—but they never succeeded in conquering their neighbours, France, Germany and Spain. But, although the shapes of the Assyrian and the British Empires were entirely different, both lasted about the same length of time.

The Human Yardstick

What then, we may ask, can have been the factor which caused such an extraordinary similarity in the duration of empires, under such diverse conditions, and such utterly different technological achievements? One of the very few units of measurement which have not seriously changed since the Assyrians is the human 'generation', a period of about twenty-five years. Thus a period of 250 years would represent about ten generations of people. A closer examination of the characteristics of the rise and fall of great nations may emphasise the possible significance of the sequence of generations. Let us then attempt to examine the stages in the lives of such powerful nations.

Stage One. The Outburst

Again and again in history we find a small nation, treated as insignificant by its contemporaries, suddenly emerging from its homeland and overrunning large areas of the world. Prior to Philip (359-336 B.C.), Macedon had been an insignificant state to the north of Greece. Persia was the great power of the time, completely dominating the area from Eastern Europe to India. Yet by 323 B.C., thirty-six years after the accession of Philip, the Persian Empire had ceased to exist, and the Macedonian Empire extended from the Danube to India, including Egypt. This amazing expansion may perhaps he attributed to the genius of Alexander the Great, but this cannot have been the sole reason; for although after his death everything went wrong—the Macedonian generals fought one another and established rival empires—Macedonian pre-eminence survived for 231 years. In the year A.D. 600, the world was divided between two superpower groups as it has been for the past fifty years between Soviet Russia and the West. The two powers were the eastern Roman Empire and the Persian Empire. The Arabs were then the despised and backward inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula. They consisted chiefly of wandering tribes, and had no government, no constitution and no army. Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa were Roman provinces, Iraq was part of Persia.

The Prophet Mohammed preached in Arabia from A.D. 613 to 632, when he died. In 633, the Arabs burst out of their desert peninsula, and simultaneously attacked the two super-powers. Within twenty years, the Persian Empire had ceased to exist. Seventy years after the death of the Prophet, the Arabs had established an empire extending from the Atlantic to the plains of Northern India and the frontiers of China. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Mongols were a group of savage tribes in the steppes of Mongolia. In 1211, Genghis Khan invaded China. By 1253, the Mongols had established an empire extending from Asia Minor to the China Sea, one of the largest empires the world has ever known. The Arabs ruled the greater part of Spain for 780 years, from 712 A.D. to 1492. (780 years back in British history would take us to 1196 and King Richard Coeur de Lion.) During these eight centuries, there had been no Spanish nation, the petty kings of Aragon and Castile alone holding on in the mountains. The agreement between Ferdinand and Isabella and Christopher Columbus was signed immediately after the fall of Granada, the last Arab kingdom in Spain, in 1492. Within fifty years, Cortez had conquered Mexico, and Spain was the world's greatest empire. Examples of the sudden outbursts by which empires are born could be multiplied indefinitely. These random illustrations must suffice.

Characteristics of the Outburst

These sudden outbursts are usually characterised by an extraordinary display of energy and courage. The new conquerors are normally poor, hardy and enterprising and above all aggressive. The decaying empires which they overthrow are wealthy but defensive-

minded. In the time of Roman greatness, the legions used to dig a ditch round their camps at night to avoid surprise. But the ditches were mere earthworks, and between them wide spaces were left through which the Romans could counter-attack. But as Rome grew older, the earthworks became high walls, through which access was given only by narrow gates. Counterattacks were no longer possible. The legions were now passive defenders. But the new nation is not only distinguished by victory in battle, but by unrelenting enterprise in every field. Men hack their way through jungles, climb mountains, or brave the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans in tiny cockle-shells. The Arabs crossed the Straits of Gibraltar in A.D. 711 with 12,000 men, defeated a Gothic army of more than twice their strength, marched straight over 250 miles of unknown enemy territory and seized the Gothic capital of Toledo. At the same stage in British history, Captain Cook discovered Australia. Fearless initiative characterises such periods.

Other peculiarities of the period of the conquering pioneers are their readiness to improvise and experiment. Untrammelled by traditions, they will turn anything available to their purpose. If one method fails, they try something else. Uninhibited by textbooks or book learning, action is their solution to every problem. Poor, hardy, often half-starved and ill-clad, they abound in courage, energy and initiative, overcome every obstacle and always seem to be in control of the situation. VI The causes of race outbursts The modern instinct is to seek a reason for everything, and to doubt the veracity of a statement for which a reason cannot be found. So many examples can be given of the sudden eruption of an obscure race into a nation of conquerors that the truth of the phenomenon cannot be held to be doubtful. To assign a cause is more difficult. Perhaps the easiest explanation is to assume that the poor and obscure race is tempted by the wealth of the ancient civilisation, and there would undoubtedly appear to be an element of greed for loot in barbarian invasions. Such a motivation may be divided into two classes. The first is mere loot, plunder and rape, as, for example, in the case of Attila and the Huns, who ravaged a great part of Europe from A.D. 450 to 453. However, when Attila died in the latter year, his empire fell apart and his tribes returned to Eastern Europe. Many of the barbarians who founded dynasties in Western Europe on the ruins of the Roman Empire, however, did so out of admiration for Roman civilisation, and themselves aspired to become Romans.

A providential Turnover?

Whatever causes may be given for the overthrow of great civilisations by barbarians, we can sense certain resulting benefits. Every race on earth has distinctive characteristics. Some have been distinguished in philosophy, some in administration, some in romance, poetry or religion, some in their legal system. During the pre-eminence of each culture, its distinctive characteristics are carried by it far and wide across the world. If the same nation were to retain its domination indefinitely, its peculiar qualities would permanently characterise the whole human race. Under the system of empires each lasting for 250

years, the sovereign race has time to spread its particular virtues far and wide. Then, however, another people, with entirely different peculiarities, takes its place, and its virtues and accomplishments are likewise disseminated. By this system, each of the innumerable races of the world enjoys a period of greatness, during which its peculiar qualities are placed at the service of mankind.

To those who believe in the existence of God, as the Ruler and Director of human affairs, such a system may appear as a manifestation of divine wisdom, tending towards the slow and ultimate perfection of humanity.

The Course of Empire

The first stage of the life of a great nation, therefore, after its outburst, is a period of amazing initiative, and almost incredible enterprise, courage and hardihood. These qualities, often in a very short time, produce a new and formidable nation. These early victories, however, are won chiefly by reckless bravery and daring initiative. The ancient civilisation thus attacked will have defended itself by its sophisticated weapons, and by its military organisation and discipline. The barbarians quickly appreciate the advantages of these military methods and adopt them. As a result, the second stage of expansion of the new empire consists of more organised, disciplined and professional campaigns. In other fields, the daring initiative of the original conquerors is maintained—in geographical exploration, for example: pioneering new countries, penetrating new forests, climbing unexplored mountains, and sailing uncharted seas. The new nation is confident, optimistic and perhaps contemptuous of the 'decadent' races which it has subjugated. The methods employed tend to be practical and experimental, both in government and in warfare, for they are not tied by centuries of tradition, as happens in ancient empires. Moreover, the leaders are free to use their own improvisations, not having studied politics or tactics in schools or in textbooks.

USA in the Stage of Pioneers

In the case of the United States of America, the pioneering period did not consist of a barbarian conquest of an effete civilisation, but of the conquest of barbarian peoples. Thus, viewed from the outside, every example seems to be different. But viewed from the standpoint of the great nation, every example seems to be similar. The United States arose suddenly as a new nation, and its period of pioneering was spent in the conquest of a vast continent, not an ancient empire. Yet the subsequent life history of the United States has followed the standard pattern which we shall attempt to trace—the periods of the pioneers, of commerce, of affluence, of intellectualism and of decadence.

Commercial Expansion

The conquest of vast areas of land and their subjection to one government automatically acts as a stimulant to commerce. Both merchants and goods can be exchanged over considerable distances. Moreover, if the empire be an extensive one, it will include a great variety of climates, producing extremely varied products, which the different areas will wish to exchange with one another. The speed of modern methods of transportation tends to create in us the impression that far-flung commerce is a modern development, but this is not the case. Objects made in Ireland, Scandinavia and China have been found in the graves or the ruins of the Middle East, dating from 1,000 years before Christ. The means of transport were slower, but, when a great empire was in control, commerce was freed from the innumerable shackles imposed upon it today by passports, import permits, customs, boycotts and political interference.

The Roman Empire extended from Britain to Syria and Egypt, a distance, in a direct line, of perhaps 2,700 miles. A Roman official, transferred from Britain to Syria, might spend six months on the journey. Yet, throughout the whole distance, he would be travelling in the same country, with the same official language, the same laws, the same currency and the same administrative system. Today, some twenty independent countries separate Britain from Syria, each with its own government, its own laws, politics, customs fees, passports and currencies, making commercial co-operation almost impossible. And this process of disintegration is still continuing. Even within the small areas of the modern European nations, provincial movements demanding secession or devolution tend further to splinter the continent. The present fashion for 'independence' has produced great numbers of tiny states in the world, some of them consisting of only one city or of a small island. This system is an insuperable obstacle to trade and cooperation. The present European Economic Community is an attempt to secure commercial cooperation among small independent states over a large area, but the plan meets with many difficulties, due to the mutual jealousies of so many nations.

Even savage and militaristic empires promoted commerce, whether or not they intended to do so. The Mongols were some of the most brutal military conquerors in history, massacring the entire populations of cities. Yet, in the thirteenth century, when their empire extended from Peking to Hungary, the caravan trade between China and Europe achieved a remarkable degree of prosperity—the whole journey was in the territory of one government. In the eighth and ninth centuries, the caliphs of Baghdad achieved fabulous wealth owing to the immense extent of their territories, which constituted a single trade bloc. The empire of the caliphs is now divided into some twenty-five separate 'nations'.

The Pros and Cons of Empires

In discussing the life-story of the typical empire, we have digressed into a discussion of whether empires are useful or injurious to mankind. We seem to have discovered

that empires have certain advantages, particularly in the field of commerce, and in the establishment of peace and security in vast areas of the globe. Perhaps we should also include the spread of varied cultures to many races. The present infatuation for independence for ever smaller and smaller units will eventually doubtless be succeeded by new international empires.

The present attempts to create a European community may be regarded as a practical endeavour to constitute a new super-power, in spite of the fragmentation resulting from the craze for independence. If it succeeds, some of the local independencies will have to be sacrificed. If it fails, the same result may be attained by military conquest, or by the partition of Europe between rival superpowers. The inescapable conclusion seems, however, to be that larger territorial units are a benefit to commerce and to public stability, whether the broader territory be achieved by voluntary association or by military action.

Sea Power

One of the more benevolent ways in which a super-power can promote both peace and commerce is by its command of the sea. From Waterloo to 1914, the British Navy commanded the seas of the world. Britain grew rich, but she also made the Seas safe for the commerce of all nations, and prevented major wars for 100 years. Curiously enough, the question of sea power was never clearly distinguished, in British politics during the last fifty years, from the question of imperial rule over other countries. In fact, the two subjects are entirely distinct. Sea power does not offend small countries, as does military occupation. If Britain had maintained her navy, with a few naval bases overseas in isolated islands, and had given independence to colonies which asked for it, the world might well be a more stable place today. In fact, however, the navy was swept away in the popular outcry against imperialism.

The Age of Commerce

Let us now, however, return to the lifestory of our typical empire. We have already considered the age of outburst, when a littleregarded people suddenly bursts on to the world stage with a wild courage and energy. Let us call it the Age of the Pioneers. Then we saw that these new conquerors acquired the sophisticated weapons of the old empires, and adopted their regular systems of military organisation and training. A great period of military expansion ensued, which we may call the Age of Conquests. The conquests resulted in the acquisition of vast territories under one government, thereby automatically giving rise to commercial prosperity. We may call this the Age of Commerce. The Age of Conquests, of course, overlaps the Age of Commerce. The proud military traditions still hold sway and the great armies guard the frontiers, but gradually the desire to make money seems to gain hold of the public. During the military period, glory and honour

were the principal objects of ambition. To the merchant, such ideas are but empty words, which add nothing to the bank balance.

Art and Luxury

The wealth which seems, almost without effort, to pour into the country enables the commercial classes to grow immensely rich. How to spend all this money becomes a problem to the wealthy business community. Art, architecture and luxury find rich patrons. Splendid municipal buildings and wide streets lend dignity and beauty to the wealthy areas of great cities. The rich merchants build themselves palaces, and money is invested in communications, highways, bridges, railways or hotels, according to the varied patterns of the ages. The first half of the Age of Commerce appears to be peculiarly splendid. The ancient virtues of courage, patriotism and devotion to duty are still in evidence. The nation is proud, united and full of selfconfidence. Boys are still required, first of all, to be manly—to ride, to shoot straight and to tell the truth. (It is remarkable what emphasis is placed, at this stage, on the manly virtue of truthfulness, for lying is cowardice—the fear of facing up to the situation.)

Boys' schools are intentionally rough. Frugal eating, hard living, breaking the ice to have a bath and similar customs are aimed at producing a strong, hardy and fearless breed of men. Duty is the word constantly drummed into the heads of young people. The Age of Commerce is also marked by great enterprise in the exploration for new forms of wealth. Daring initiative is shown in the search for profitable enterprises in far corners of the earth, perpetuating to some degree the adventurous courage of the Age of Conquests.

The Age of Affluence

There does not appear to be any doubt that money is the agent which causes the decline of this strong, brave and self-confident people. The decline in courage, enterprise and a sense of duty is, however, gradual. The first direction in which wealth injures the nation is a moral one. Money replaces honour and adventure as the objective of the best young men. Moreover, men do not normally seek to make money for their country or their community, but for themselves. Gradually, and almost imperceptibly, the Age of Affluence silences the voice of duty. The object of the young and the ambitious is no longer fame, honour or service, but cash.

Education undergoes the same gradual transformation. No longer do schools aim at producing brave patriots ready to serve their country. Parents and students alike seek the educational qualifications which will command the highest salaries. The Arab moralist, Ghazali (1058-1111), complains in these very same words of the lowering of objectives in the declining Arab world of his time. Students, he says, no longer attend college to acquire learning and virtue, but to obtain those qualifications which will enable them to grow rich. The same situation is everywhere evident among us in the West today.

High Noon

That which we may call the High Noon of the nation covers the period of transition from the Age of Conquests to the Age of Affluence: the age of Augustus in Rome, that of Harun al-Rashid in Baghdad, of Sulaiman the Magnificent in the Ottoman Empire, or of Queen Victoria in Britain. Perhaps we might add the age of Woodrow Wilson in the United States. All these periods reveal the same characteristics. The immense wealth accumulated in the nation dazzles the onlookers. Enough of the ancient virtues of courage, energy and patriotism survive to enable the state successfully to defend its frontiers. But, beneath the surface, greed for money is gradually replacing duty and public service. Indeed the change might be summarised as being from service to selfishness.

Defensiveness

Another outward change which invariably marks the transition from the Age of Conquests to the Age of Affluence is the spread of defensiveness. The nation, immensely rich, is no longer interested in glory or duty, but is only anxious to retain its wealth and its luxury. It is a period of defensiveness, from the Great Wall of China, to Hadrian's Wall on the Scottish Border, to the Maginot Line in France in 1939. Money being in better supply than courage, subsidies instead of weapons are employed to buy off enemies. To justify this departure from ancient tradition, the human mind easily devises its own justification. Military readiness, or aggressiveness, is denounced as primitive and immoral. Civilised peoples are too proud to fight. The conquest of one nation by another is declared to be immoral. Empires are wicked. This intellectual device enables us to suppress our feeling of inferiority, when we read of the heroism of our ancestors, and then ruefully contemplate our position today.

'It is not that we are afraid to fight,' we say, 'but we should consider it immoral.' This even enables us to assume an attitude of moral superiority. The weakness of pacifism is that there are still many peoples in the world who are aggressive. Nations who proclaim themselves unwilling to fight are liable to be conquered by peoples in the stage of militarism— perhaps even to see themselves incorporated into some new empire, with the status of mere provinces or colonies. When to be prepared to use force and when to give way is a perpetual human problem, which can only be solved, as best we can, in each successive situation as it arises. In fact, however, history seems to indicate that great nations do not normally disarm from motives of conscience, but owing to the weakening of a sense of duty in the citizens, and the increase in selfishness and the desire for wealth and ease.

The Age of Intellect

We have now, perhaps arbitrarily, divided the life-story of our great nation into four ages. The Age of the Pioneers (or the Outburst), the Age of Conquests, the Age of Commerce, and the Age of Affluence. The great wealth of the nation is no longer needed to supply the mere necessities, or even the luxuries of life. Ample funds are available also for the pursuit of knowledge. The merchant princes of the Age of Commerce seek fame and praise, not only by endowing works of art or patronising music and literature. They also found and endow colleges and universities. It is remarkable with what regularity this phase follows on that of wealth, in empire after empire, divided by many centuries. In the eleventh century, the former Arab Empire, then in complete political decline, was ruled by the Seljuk sultan, Malik Shah. The Arabs, no longer soldiers, were still the intellectual leaders of the world. During the reign of Malik Shah, the building of universities and colleges became a passion. Whereas a small number of universities in the great cities had sufficed the years of Arab glory, now a university sprang up in every town.

In our own lifetime, we have witnessed the same phenomenon in the U.S.A. and Britain. When these nations were at the height of their glory, Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge seemed to meet their needs. Now almost every city has its university. The ambition of the young, once engaged in the pursuit of adventure and military glory, and then in the desire for the accumulation of wealth, now turns to the acquisition of academic honours. It is useful here to take note that almost all the pursuits followed with such passion throughout the ages were in themselves good. The manly cult of hardihood, frankness and truthfulness, which characterised the Age of Conquests, produced many really splendid heroes. The opening up of natural resources, and the peaceful accumulation of wealth, which marked the age of commercialism, appeared to introduce new triumphs in civilisation, in culture and in the arts. In the same way, the vast expansion of the field of knowledge achieved by the Age of Intellect seemed to mark a new high-water mark of human progress. We cannot say that any of these changes were 'good' or 'bad'. The striking features in the pageant of empire are:

- (a) the extraordinary exactitude with which these stages have followed one another, in empire after empire, over centuries or even millennia; and
- b) the fact that the successive changes seem to represent mere changes in popular fashion—new fads and fancies which sweep away public opinion without logical reason. At first, popular enthusiasm is devoted to military glory, then to the accumulation of wealth and later to the acquisition of academic fame.

Why could not all these legitimate, and indeed beneficent, activities be carried on simultaneously, each of them in due moderation? Yet this never seemed to happen.

The Effects of Intellectualism

There are so many things in human life which are not dreamt of in our popular philosophy. The spread of knowledge seems to be the most beneficial of human activities, and yet every period of decline is characterised by this expansion of intellectual activity. 'All the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing' is the description given in the Acts of the Apostles of the decline of Greek intellectualism. The Age of Intellect is accompanied by surprising advances in natural science. In the ninth century, for example, in the age of Mamun, the Arabs measured the circumference of the earth with remarkable accuracy. Seven centuries were to pass before Western Europe discovered that the world was not flat. Less than fifty years after the amazing scientific discoveries under Mamun, the Arab Empire collapsed. Wonderful and beneficent as was the progress of science, it did not save the empire from chaos.

The full flowering of Arab and Persian intellectualism did not occur until after their imperial and political collapse. Thereafter the intellectuals attained fresh triumphs in the academic field, but politically they became the abject servants of the often illiterate rulers. When the Mongols conquered Persia in the thirteenth century, they were themselves entirely uneducated and were obliged to depend wholly on native Persian officials to administer the country and to collect the revenue. They retained as wazeer, or Prime Minister, one Rashid al- Din, a historian of international repute. Yet the Prime Minister, when speaking to the Mongol Khan, was obliged to remain throughout the interview on his knees. At state banquets, the Prime Minister stood behind the Khan's seat to wait upon him. If the Khan were in a good mood, he occasionally passed his wazeer a piece of food over his shoulder.

As in the case of the Athenians, intellectualism leads to discussion, debate and argument, such as is typical of the Western nations today. Debates in elected assemblies or local committees, in articles in the Press or in interviews on television—endless and incessant talking. Men are interminably different, and intellectual arguments rarely lead to agreement. Thus public affairs drift from bad to worse, amid an unceasing cacophony of argument. But this constant dedication to discussion seems to destroy the power of action. Amid a Babel of talk, the ship drifts on to the rocks.

The Inadequacy of Intellect

Perhaps the most dangerous by-product of the Age of Intellect is the unconscious growth of the idea that the human brain can solve the problems of the world. Even on the low level of practical affairs this is patently untrue. Any small human activity, the local bowls club or the ladies' luncheon club, requires for its survival a measure of self-sacrifice and service on the part of the members. In a wider national sphere, the survival of the nation depends basically on the loyalty and self-sacrifice of the citizens. The impression

that the situation can be saved by mental cleverness, without unselfishness or human self-dedication, can only lead to collapse. Thus we see that the cultivation of the human intellect seems to be a magnificent ideal, but only on condition that it does not weaken unselfishness and human dedication to service. Yet this, judging by historical precedent, seems to be exactly what it does do. Perhaps it is not the intellectualism which destroys the spirit of self-sacrifice—the least we can say is that the two, intellectualism and the loss of a sense of duty, appear simultaneously in the life-story of the nation. Indeed it often appears in individuals, that the head and the heart are natural rivals. The brilliant but cynical intellectual appears at the opposite end of the spectrum from the emotional self-sacrifice of the hero or the martyr. Yet there are times when the perhaps unsophisticated self-dedication of the hero is more essential than the sarcasms of the clever.

Civil Dissensions

Another remarkable and unexpected symptom of national decline is the intensification of internal political hatreds. One would have expected that, when the survival of the nation became precarious, political factions would drop their rivalry and stand shoulder-to-shoulder to save their country. In the fourteenth century, the weakening empire of Byzantium was threatened, and indeed dominated, by the Ottoman Turks. The situation was so serious that one would have expected every subject of Byzantium to abandon his personal interests and to stand with his compatriots in a last desperate attempt to save the country. The reverse occurred. The Byzantines spent the last fifty years of their history in fighting one another in repeated civil wars, until the Ottomans moved in and administered the coup de grâce.

Britain has been governed by an elected parliament for many centuries. In former years, however, the rival parties observed many unwritten laws. Neither party wished to eliminate the other. All the members referred to one another as honourable gentlemen. But such courtesies have now lapsed. Booming, shouting and loud noises have undermined the dignity of the House, and angry exchanges are more frequent. We are fortunate if these rivalries are fought out in Parliament, but sometimes such hatreds are carried into the streets, or into industry in the form of strikes, demonstrations, boycotts and similar activities. True to the normal course followed by nations in decline, internal differences are not reconciled in an attempt to save the nation. On the contrary, internal rivalries become more acute, as the nation becomes weaker.

The influx of Foreigners

One of the oft-repeated phenomena of great empires is the influx of foreigners to the capital city. Roman historians often complain of the number of Asians and Africans in Rome. Baghdad, in its prime in the ninth century, was international in its population—Persians, Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Egyptians, Africans and Greeks mingled in its streets. In Lon-

don today, Cypriots, Greeks, Italians, Russians, Africans, Germans and Indians jostle one another on the buses and in the underground, so that it sometimes seems difficult to find any British. The same applies to New York, perhaps even more so. This problem does not consist in any inferiority of one race as compared with another, but simply in the differences between them. In the age of the first outburst and the subsequent Age of Conquests, the race is normally ethnically more or less homogeneous. This state of affairs facilitates a feeling of solidarity and comradeship. But in the Ages of Commerce and Affluence, every type of foreigner floods into the great city, the streets of which are reputed to be paved with gold. As, in most cases, this great city is also the capital of the empire, the cosmopolitan crowd at the seat of empire exercises a political influence greatly in excess of its relative numbers.

Second- or third-generation foreign immigrants may appear outwardly to be entirely assimilated, but they often constitute a weakness in two directions. First, their basic human nature often differs from that of the original imperial stock. If the earlier imperial race was stubborn and slowmoving, the immigrants might come from more emotional races, thereby introducing cracks and schisms into the national policies, even if all were equally loyal. Second, while the nation is still affluent, all the diverse races may appear equally loyal. But in an acute emergency, the immigrants will often be less willing to sacrifice their lives and their property than will be the original descendants of the founder race. Third, the immigrants are liable to form communities of their own, protecting primarily their own interests, and only in the second degree that of the nation as a whole. Fourth, many of the foreign immigrants will probably belong to races originally conquered by and absorbed into the empire. While the empire is enjoying its High Noon of prosperity, all these people are proud and glad to be imperial citizens. But when decline sets in, it is extraordinary how the memory of ancient wars, perhaps centuries before, is suddenly revived, and local or provincial movements appear demanding secession or independence. Some day this phenomenon will doubtless appear in the now apparently monolithic and authoritarian Soviet empire. It is amazing for how long such provincial sentiments can survive. Historical examples of this phenomenon are scarcely needed. The idle and capacious Roman mob, with its endless appetite for free distributions of food—bread and games—is notorious, and utterly different from that stern Roman spirit which we associate with the wars of the early republic. In Baghdad, in the golden days of Harun al-Rashid, Arabs were a minority in the imperial capital. Istanbul, in the great days of Ottoman rule, was peopled by inhabitants remarkably few of whom were descendants of Turkish conquerors. In New York, descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers are few and far between.

This interesting phenomenon is largely limited to great cities. The original conquering race is often to be found in relative purity in rural districts and on far frontiers. It is the wealth of the great cities which draws the immigrants. As, with the growth of industry, cities nowadays achieve an ever greater preponderance over the countryside, so will the influence of foreigners increasingly dominate old empires. Once more it may

be emphasised that I do not wish to convey the impression that immigrants are inferior to older stocks. They are just different, and they thus tend to introduce cracks and divisions.

Frivolity

As the nation declines in power and wealth, a universal pessimism gradually pervades the people, and itself hastens the decline. There is nothing succeeds like success, and, in the Ages of Conquest and Commerce, the nation was carried triumphantly onwards on the wave of its own self-confidence. Republican Rome was repeatedly on the verge of extinction—in 390 B.C. when the Gauls sacked the city and in 216 B.C. after the Battle of Cannae. But no disasters could shake the resolution of the early Romans. Yet, in the later stages of Roman decline, the whole empire was deeply pessimistic, thereby sapping its own resolution. Frivolity is the frequent companion of pessimism. Let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die. The resemblance between various declining nations in this respect is truly surprising. The Roman mob, we have seen, demanded free meals and public games. Gladiatorial shows, chariot races and athletic events were their passion. In the Byzantine Empire the rivalries of the Greens and the Blues in the hippodrome attained the importance of a major crisis. Judging by the time and space allotted to them in the Press and television, football and baseball are the activities which today chiefly interest the public in Britain and the United States respectively.

The heroes of declining nations are always the same—the athlete, the singer or the actor. The word ‘celebrity’ today is used to designate a comedian or a football player, not a statesman, a general, or a literary genius.

The Arab Decline

In the first half of the ninth century, Baghdad enjoyed its High Noon as the greatest and the richest city in the world. In 861, however, the reigning Khalif (caliph), Mutawakkil, was murdered by his Turkish mercenaries, who set up a military dictatorship, which lasted for some thirty years. During this period the empire fell apart, the various dominions and provinces each assuming virtual independence and seeking its own interests. Baghdad, lately the capital of a vast empire, found its authority limited to Iraq alone. The works of the contemporary historians of Baghdad in the early tenth century are still available. They deeply deplored the degeneracy of the times in which they lived, emphasising particularly the indifference to religion, the increasing materialism and the laxity of sexual morals. They lamented also the corruption of the officials of the government and the fact that politicians always seemed to amass large fortunes while they were in office. The historians commented bitterly on the extraordinary influence acquired by popular singers over young people, resulting in a decline in sexual morality. The ‘pop’ singers of Baghdad accompanied their erotic songs on the lute, an instrument resembling the modern guitar.

In the second half of the tenth century, as a result, much obscene sexual language came increasingly into use, such as would not have been tolerated in an earlier age. Several khalifs issued orders banning 'pop' singers from the capital, but within a few years they always returned. An increase in the influence of women in public life has often been associated with national decline. The later Romans complained that, although Rome ruled the world, women ruled Rome. In the tenth century, a similar tendency was observable in the Arab Empire, the women demanding admission to the professions hitherto monopolised by men. 'What,' wrote the contemporary historian, Ibn Bessam, 'have the professions of clerk, tax-collector or preacher to do with women? These occupations have always been limited to men alone.' Many women practised law, while others obtained posts as university professors. There was an agitation for the appointment of female judges, which, however, does not appear to have succeeded. Soon after this period, government and public order collapsed, and foreign invaders overran the country. The resulting increase in confusion and violence made it unsafe for women to move unescorted in the streets, with the result that this feminist movement collapsed.

The disorders following the military takeover in 861, and the loss of the empire, had played havoc with the economy. At such a moment, it might have been expected that everyone would redouble their efforts to save the country from bankruptcy, but nothing of the kind occurred. Instead, at this moment of declining trade and financial stringency, the people of Baghdad introduced a five-day week. When I first read these contemporary descriptions of tenth-century Baghdad, I could scarcely believe my eyes. I told myself that this must be a joke! The descriptions might have been taken out of *The Times* today. The resemblance of all the details was especially breathtaking—the break-up of the empire, the abandonment of sexual morality, the 'pop' singers with their guitars, the entry of women into the professions, the five-day week. I would not venture to attempt an explanation! There are so many mysteries about human life which are far beyond our comprehension.

Political Ideology

Today we attach immense importance to the ideology of our internal politics. The Press and public media in the U.S.A. and Britain pour incessant scorn on any country the political institutions of which differ in any manner from our own idea of democracy. It is, therefore, interesting to note that the life-expectation of a great nation does not appear to be in any way affected by the nature of its institutions. Past empires show almost every possible variation of political system, but all go through the same procedure from the Age of Pioneers through Conquest, Commerce, Affluence to decline and collapse.

The Mameluke Empire

The empire of the Mamelukes of Egypt provides a case in point, for it was one of the most exotic ever to be recorded in history. It is also exceptional in that it began on one fixed day and ended on another, leaving no doubt of its precise duration, which was 267 years. In the first part of the thirteenth century, Egypt and Syria were ruled by the Ayoubid sultans, the descendants of the family of Saladin. Their army consisted of Mamelukes, slaves imported as boys from the Steppes and trained as professional soldiers. On 1st May 1250, the Mamelukes mutinied, murdered Turan Shah, the Ayoubid sultan, and became the rulers of his empire. The first fifty years of the Mameluke Empire were marked by desperate fighting with the hitherto invincible Mongols, the descendants of Genghis Khan, who invaded Syria. By defeating the Mongols and driving them out of Syria, the Mamelukes saved the Mediterranean from the terrible fate which had overtaken Persia. In 1291, the Mamelukes captured Acre, and put an end to the Crusades.

From 1309 to 1341, the Mameluke Empire was everywhere victorious and possessed the finest army in the world. For the ensuing hundred years the wealth of the Mameluke Empire was fabulous, slowly leading to luxury, the relaxation of discipline and to decline, with ever more bitter internal political rivalries. Finally the empire collapsed in 1517, as the result of military defeat by the Ottomans. The Mameluke government appears to us utterly illogical and fantastic. The ruling class was entirely recruited from young boys, born in what is now Southern Russia. Every one of them was enlisted as a private soldier. Even the sultans had begun life as private soldiers and had risen from the ranks. Yet this extraordinary political system resulted in an empire which passed through all the normal stages of conquest, commercialism, affluence and decline and which lasted approximately the usual period of time.

The master Race

The people of the great nations of the past seem normally to have imagined that their pre-eminence would last for ever. Rome appeared to its citizens to be destined to be for all time the mistress of the world. The Abbasid Khalifs of Baghdad declared that God had appointed them to rule mankind until the day of judgement. Seventy years ago, many people in Britain believed that the empire would endure for ever. Although Hitler failed to achieve his objective, he declared that Germany would rule the world for a thousand years. That sentiments like these could be publicly expressed without evoking derision shows that, in all ages, the regular rise and fall of great nations has passed unperceived. The simplest statistics prove the steady rotation of one nation after another at regular intervals. The belief that their nation would rule the world forever, naturally encouraged the citizens of the leading nation of any period to attribute their pre-eminence to hereditary virtues. They carried in their blood, they believed, qualities which constituted them a race of supermen, an illusion which inclined them

to the employment of cheap foreign labour (or slaves) to perform menial tasks and to engage foreign mercenaries to fight their battles or to sail their ships.

These poorer peoples were only too happy to migrate to the wealthy cities of the empire, and thereby, as we have seen, to adulterate the close-knit, homogeneous character of the conquering race. The latter unconsciously assumed that they would always be the leaders of mankind, relaxed their energies, and spent an increasing part of their time in leisure, amusement or sport. In recent years, the idea has spread widely in the West that 'progress' will be automatic without effort, that everyone will continue to grow richer and richer and that every year will show a 'rise in the standard of living'. We have not drawn from history the obvious conclusion that material success is the result of courage, endurance and hard work—a conclusion nevertheless obvious from the history of the meteoric rise of our own ancestors. This self-assurance of its own superiority seems to go hand-in-hand with the luxury resulting from wealth, in undermining the character of the dominant race.

The Welfare State

When the welfare state was first introduced in Britain, it was hailed as a new high-water mark in the history of human development. History, however, seems to suggest that the age of decline of a great nation is often a period which shows a tendency to philanthropy and to sympathy for other races. This phase may not be contradictory to the feeling described in the previous paragraph, that the dominant race has the right to rule the world. For the citizens of the great nation enjoy the role of Lady Bountiful. As long as it retains its status of leadership, the imperial people are glad to be generous, even if slightly condescending. The rights of citizenship are generously bestowed on every race, even those formerly subject, and the equality of mankind is proclaimed. The Roman Empire passed through this phase, when equal citizenship was thrown open to all peoples, such provincials even becoming senators and emperors. The Arab Empire of Baghdad was equally, perhaps even more, generous. During the Age of Conquests, pure-bred Arabs had constituted a ruling class, but in the ninth century the empire was completely cosmopolitan.

State assistance to the young and the poor was equally generous. University students received government grants to cover their expenses while they were receiving higher education. The State likewise offered free medical treatment to the poor. The first free public hospital was opened in Baghdad in the reign of Harun al-Rashid (786-809), and under his son, Mamun, free public hospitals sprang up all over the Arab world from Spain to what is now Pakistan. The impression that it will always be automatically rich causes the declining empire to spend lavishly on its own benevolence, until such time as the economy collapses, the universities are closed and the hospitals fall into ruin. It may perhaps be incorrect to picture the welfare state as the high-water mark of human attainment. It may merely prove to be one more regular milestone in the lifestory of an

ageing and decrepit empire.

Religion

Historians of periods of decadence often refer to a decline in religion, but, if we extend our investigation over a period covering the Assyrians (859-612 B.C.) to our own times, we have to interpret religion in a very broad sense. Some such definition as 'the human feeling that there is something, some invisible Power, apart from material objects, which controls human life and the natural world'. We are probably too narrow and contemptuous in our interpretation of idol worship. The people of ancient civilisations were as sensible as we are, and would scarcely have been so foolish as to worship sticks and stones fashioned by their own hands. The idol was for them merely a symbol, and represented an unknown, spiritual reality, which controlled the lives of men and demanded human obedience to its moral precepts. We all know only too well that minor differences in the human visualisation of this Spirit frequently became the ostensible reason for human wars, in which both sides claimed to be fighting for the true God, but the absurd narrowness of human conceptions should not blind us to the fact that, very often, both sides believed their campaigns to have a moral background. Genghis Khan, one of the most brutal of all conquerors, claimed that God had delegated him the duty to exterminate the decadent races of the civilised world. Thus the Age of Conquests often had some kind of religious atmosphere, which implied heroic self-sacrifice for the cause.

But this spirit of dedication was slowly eroded in the Age of Commerce by the action of money. People make money for themselves, not for their country. Thus periods of affluence gradually dissolved the spirit of service, which had caused the rise of the imperial races. In due course, selfishness permeated the community, the coherence of which was weakened until disintegration was threatened. Then, as we have seen, came the period of pessimism with the accompanying spirit of frivolity and sensual indulgence, byproducts of despair. It was inevitable at such times that men should look back yearningly to the days of 'religion', when the spirit of self-sacrifice was still strong enough to make men ready to give and to serve, rather than to snatch. But while despair might permeate the greater part of the nation, others achieved a new realisation of the fact that only readiness for self-sacrifice could enable a community to survive. Some of the greatest saints in history lived in times of national decadence, raising the banner of duty and service against the flood of depravity and despair.

In this manner, at the height of vice and frivolity the seeds of religious revival are quietly sown. After, perhaps, several generations (or even centuries) of suffering, the impoverished nation has been purged of its selfishness and its love of money, religion regains its sway and a new era sets in. 'It is good for me that I have been afflicted,' said the psalmist, 'that I might learn Thy Statutes.'

New Combinations

We have traced the rise of an obscure race to fame, through the stages of conquest, commercialism, affluence, and intellectualism, to disintegration, decadence and despair. We suggested that the dominant race at any given time imparts its leading characteristics to the world around, being in due course succeeded by another empire. By this means, we speculated, many successive races succeeded one another as superpowers, and in turn bequeathed their peculiar qualities to mankind at large. But the objection may here be raised that some day the time will come when all the races of the world will in turn have enjoyed their period of domination and have collapsed again in decadence. When the whole human race has reached the stage of decadence, where will new energetic conquering races be found? The answer is at first partially obscured by our modern habit of dividing the human race into nations, which we seem to regard as water-tight compartments, an error responsible for innumerable misunderstandings. In earlier times, warlike nomadic nations invaded the territories of decadent peoples and settled there. In due course, they intermarried with the local population and a new race resulted, though it sometimes retained an old name. The barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire probably provide the example best known today in the West. Others were the Arab conquests of Spain, North Africa and Persia, the Turkish conquests of the Ottoman Empire, or even the Norman Conquest of England.

In all such cases, the conquered countries were originally fully inhabited and the invaders were armies, which ultimately settled down and married, and produced new races. In our times, there are few nomadic conquerors left in the world, who could invade more settled countries bringing their tents and flocks with them. But ease of travel has resulted in an equal, or probably an even greater, intermixture of populations. The extreme bitterness of modern internal political struggles produces a constant flow of migrants from their native countries to others, where the social institutions suit them better. The vicissitudes of trade and business similarly result in many persons moving to other countries, at first intending to return, but ultimately settling down in their new countries. The population of Britain has been constantly changing, particularly in the last sixty years, owing to the influx of immigrants from Europe, Asia and Africa, and the exit of British citizens to the Dominions and the United States. The latter is, of course, the most obvious example of the constant rise of new nations, and of the transformation of the ethnic content of old nations through this modern nomadism.

Decadence of a System

It is of interest to note that decadence is the disintegration of a system, not of its individual members. The habits of the members of the community have been corrupted by the enjoyment of too much money and too much power for too long a period. The result has been, in the framework of their national life, to make them selfish and idle. A

community of selfish and idle people declines, internal quarrels develop in the division of its dwindling wealth, and pessimism follows, which some of them endeavour to drown in sensuality or frivolity. In their own surroundings, they are unable to redirect their thoughts and their energies into new channels. But when individual members of such a society emigrate into entirely new surroundings, they do not remain conspicuously decadent, pessimistic or immoral among the inhabitants of their new homeland. Once enabled to break away from their old channels of thought, and after a short period of readjustment, they become normal citizens of their adopted countries. Some of them, in the second and third generations, may attain pre-eminence and leadership in their new communities.

This seems to prove that the decline of any nation does not undermine the energies or the basic character of its members. Nor does the decadence of a number of such nations permanently impoverish the human race. Decadence is both mental and moral deterioration, produced by the slow decline of the community from which its members cannot escape, as long as they remain in their old surroundings. But, transported elsewhere, they soon discard their decadent ways of thought, and prove themselves equal to the other citizens of their adopted country.

Decadence is not Physical

Neither is decadence physical. The citizens of nations in decline are sometimes described as too physically emasculated to be able to bear hardship or make great efforts. This does not seem to be a true picture. Citizens of great nations in decadence are normally physically larger and stronger than those of their barbarian invaders. Moreover, as was proved in Britain in the first World War, young men brought up in luxury and wealth found little difficulty in accustoming themselves to life in the frontline trenches. The history of exploration proves the same point. Men accustomed to comfortable living in homes in Europe or America were able to show as much endurance as the natives in riding camels across the desert or in hacking their way through tropical forests. Decadence is a moral and spiritual disease, resulting from too long a period of wealth and power, producing cynicism, decline of religion, pessimism and frivolity. The citizens of such a nation will no longer make an effort to save themselves, because they are not convinced that anything in life is worth saving.

Human Diversity

Generalisations are always dangerous. Human beings are all different. The variety in human life is endless. If this be the case with individuals, it is much more so with nations and cultures. No two societies, no two peoples, no two cultures are exactly the same. In these circumstances, it will be easy for critics to find many objections to what has been said, and to point out exceptions to the generalisations. There is some value in comparing the lives of nations to those of individuals. No two persons in the world are

identical. Moreover their lives are often affected by accidents or by illness, making the divergences even more obvious. Yet, in fact, we can generalise about human life from many different aspects. The characteristics of childhood, adolescence, youth, middle and old age are well known. Some adolescents, it is true, are prematurely wise and serious. Some persons in middle age still seem to be young. But such exceptions do not invalidate the general character of human life from the cradle to the grave.

I venture to submit that the lives of nations follow a similar pattern. Superficially, all seem to be completely different. Some years ago, a suggestion was submitted to a certain television corporation that a series of talks on Arab history would form an interesting sequence. The proposal was immediately vetoed by the director of programmes with the remark, "What earthly interest could the history of medieval Arabs have for the general public today?" Yet, in fact, the history of the Arab imperial age—from conquest through commercialism, to affluence, intellectualism, science and decadence—is an exact precursor of British imperial history and lasted almost exactly the same time. If British historians, a century ago, had devoted serious study to the Arab Empire, they could have foreseen almost everything that has happened in Britain down to 1976.

A Variety of Falls

It has been shown that, normally, the rise and fall of great nations are due to internal reasons alone. Ten generations of human beings suffice to transform the hardy and enterprising pioneer into the captious citizen of the welfare state. But whereas the life histories of great nations show an unexpected uniformity, the nature of their falls depends largely on outside circumstances and thus shows a high degree of diversity. The Roman Republic, as we have seen, was followed by the empire, which became a super-state, in which all the natives of the Mediterranean basin, regardless of race, possessed equal rights. The name of Rome, originally a city-state, passed from it to an equalitarian international empire. This empire broke in half, the western half being overrun by northern barbarians, the eastern half forming the East Roman or Byzantine Empire. The vast Arab Empire broke up in the ninth century into many fragments, of which one former colony, Moslem Spain, ran its own 250-year course as an independent empire. The homelands of Syria and Iraq, however, were conquered by successive waves of Turks to whom they remained subject for 1,000 years.

The Mameluke Empire of Egypt and Syria, on the other hand, was conquered in one campaign by the Ottomans, the native population merely suffering a change of masters. The Spanish Empire (1500-1750) endured for the conventional 250 years, terminated only by the loss of its colonies. The homeland of Spain fell, indeed, from its high estate of a super-power, but remained as an independent nation until today. Romanov Russia (1682-1916) ran the normal course, but was succeeded by the Soviet Union. It is unnecessary to labour the point, which we may attempt to summarise briefly. Any regime which attains great wealth and power seems with remarkable regularity to decay and fall apart

in some ten generations. The ultimate fate of its component parts, however, does not depend on its internal nature, but on the other organisations which appear at the time of its collapse and succeed in devouring its heritage. Thus the lives of great powers are surprisingly uniform, but the results of their falls are completely diverse.

Inadequacy of our Historical studies

In fact, the modern nations of the West have derived only limited value from their historical studies, because they have never made them big enough. For history to have meaning, as we have already stated, it must be the history of the human race. Far from achieving such an ideal, our historical studies are largely limited to the history of our own country during the lifetime of the present nation. Thus the timefactor is too short to allow the longer rhythms of the rise and fall of nations even to be noticed. As the television director indicated, it never even crosses our minds that longer periods could be of any interest. When we read the history of our own nation, we find the actions of our ancestors described as glorious, while those of other peoples are depicted as mean, tyrannical or cowardly. Thus our history is (intentionally) not based on facts. We are emotionally unwilling to accept that our forbears might have been mean or cowardly. Alternatively, there are 'political' schools of history, slanted to discredit the actions of our past leaders, in order to support modern political movements. In all these cases, history is not an attempt to ascertain the truth, but a system of propaganda, devoted to the furtherance of modern projects, or the gratification of national vanity. Men can scarcely be blamed for not learning from the history they are taught. There is nothing to learn from it, because it is not true.

Small Nations

The word 'empires' has been used in this essay to signify nations which achieve the status of great powers, or super-powers, in the jargon of today—nations which have dominated the international scene for two or three centuries. At any given time, however, there are also smaller states which are more or less self-contained. Do these live the same 'lives' as the great nations, and pass through the same phases? It seems impossible to generalise on this issue. In general, decadence is the outcome of too long a period of wealth and power. If the small country has not shared in the wealth and power, it will not share in the decadence.

The Emerging Pattern

In spite of the endless variety and the infinite complications of human life, a general pattern does seem to emerge from these considerations. It reveals many successive empires covering some 3,000 years, as having followed similar stages of development and

decline, and as having, to a surprising degree, 'lived' lives of very similar length. The life-expectation of a great nation, it appears, commences with a violent, and usually unforeseen, outburst of energy, and ends in a lowering of moral standards, cynicism, pessimism and frivolity. If the present writer were a millionaire, he would try to establish in some university or other a department dedicated solely to the study of the rhythm of the rise and fall of powerful nations throughout the world. History goes back only some 3,000 years, because before that period writing was not sufficiently widespread to allow of the survival of detailed records. But within that period, the number of empires available for study is very great.

At the commencement of this essay, the names of eleven such empires were listed, but these included only the Middle East and the modern nations of the West. India, China and Southern America were not included, because the writer knows nothing about them. A school founded to study the rise and fall of empires would probably find at least twenty-four great powers available for dissection and analysis. The task would not be an easy one, if indeed the net were cast so wide as to cover virtually all the world's great nations in 3,000 years. The knowledge of language alone, to enable detailed investigations to be pursued, would present a formidable obstacle.

Would it help?

is pleasing to imagine that, from such studies, a regular life-pattern of nations would emerge, including an analysis of the various changes which ultimately lead to decline, decadence and collapse. It is tempting to assume that measures could be adopted to forestall the disastrous effects of excessive wealth and power, and thence of subsequent decadence. Perhaps some means could be devised to prevent the activist Age of Conquests and Commerce deteriorating into the Age of Intellect, producing endless talking but no action. It is tempting to think so. Perhaps if the pattern of the rise and fall of nations were regularly taught in schools, the general public would come to realise the truth, and would support policies to maintain the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice, and to forestall the accumulation of excessive wealth by one nation, leading to the demoralisation of that nation.

Could not the sense of duty and the initiative needed to give rise to action be retained parallel with intellectual development and the discoveries of natural science? The answer is doubtful, though we could but try. The weaknesses of human nature, however, are so obvious, that we cannot be too confident of success. Men bursting with courage, energy and self-confidence cannot easily be restrained from subduing their neighbours, and men who see the prospect of wealth open to them will not readily be prevented from pursuing it. Perhaps it is not in the real interest of humanity that they should be so prevented, for it is in periods of wealth that art, architecture, music, science and literature make the greatest progress.

Moreover, as we have seen where great empires are concerned, their establishment may

give rise to wars and tragedies, but their periods of power often bring peace, security and prosperity to vast areas of territory. Our knowledge and our experience (perhaps our basic human intellects) are inadequate to pronounce whether or not the rise and fall of great nations is the best system for the best of all possible worlds. These doubts, however, need not prevent us from attempting to acquire more knowledge on the rise and fall of great powers, or from endeavouring, in the light of such knowledge, to improve the moral quality of human life.

Perhaps, in fact, we may reach the conclusion that the successive rise and fall of great nations is inevitable and, indeed, a system divinely ordained. But even this would be an immense gain. For we should know where we stand in relation to our human brothers and sisters. In our present state of mental chaos on the subject, we divide ourselves into nations, parties or communities and fight, hate and vilify one another over developments which may perhaps be divinely ordained and which seem to us, if we take a broader view, completely uncontrollable and inevitable. If we could accept these great movements as beyond our control, there would be no excuse for our hating one another because of them. However varied, confusing and contradictory the religious history of the world may appear, the noblest and most spiritual of the devotees of all religions seem to reach the conclusion that love is the key to human life. Any expansion of our knowledge which may lead to a reduction in our unjustified hates is therefore surely well worth while.

Summary

As numerous points of interest have arisen in the course of this essay, I close with a brief summary, to refresh the reader's mind.

- (a) We do not learn from history because our studies are brief and prejudiced.
- (b) In a surprising manner, 250 years emerges as the average length of national greatness.
- (c) This average has not varied for 3,000 years. Does it represent ten generations?
- (d) The stages of the rise and fall of great nations seem to be:
 - The Age of Pioneers (outburst)
 - The Age of Conquests
 - The Age of Commerce
 - The Age of Affluence
 - The Age of Intellect
 - The Age of Decadence.
- (e) Decadence is marked by:
 - Defensiveness
 - Pessimism
 - Materialism

Frivolity

An influx of foreigners

The Welfare State

A weakening of religion.

(f) Decadence is due to:

Too long a period of wealth and power

Selfishness

Love of money

The loss of a sense of duty.

(g) The life histories of great states are amazingly similar, and are due to internal factors.

(h) Their falls are diverse, because they are largely the result of external causes.

(i) History should be taught as the history of the human race, though of course with emphasis on the history of the student's own country.

17. Further Reading

Next to the books given in the introduction (of which I'd like to recommend "Tragedy and Hope" especially) used as sources for this book, here are some additional ones:

- **The Sleepwalkers** by Christopher Clark.
- **A History of the First World War** by Lidell Hart.
- **The Anglo-American-Establishment** by Carroll Quigley.
- **The First World War** by John Keegan.
- **Storm of Steel** by Ernst Jünger.
- **Icebreaker** by Victor Suvorov.
- **The War that had many Fathers** by Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof.
- **Conjuring Hitler, how Britain and America made the Third Reich** by Guido Giacomo Preparata.
- **America, Roosevelt And The Causes Of The Present War** by Ezra Pound.
- **The Origins Of The Second World War** by A.J.P. Taylor.
- **Atlas Of The World War II** by Richard Natkiel.
- **The Second World War** by Antony Beevor.
- **The Myth of German Villainy** by Benton L. Bradberry.
- **Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution** by Antony Sutton.
- **Inside the Third Reich** by Albert Speer.
- **Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany** by Thomas Goodrich.
- **The Gulag Archipelago** by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn.
- **The International Jew** by Henry Ford.
- **Propaganda** by Edward L. Bernays.
- **Hitler's Second Book** by Adolf Hitler.
- **Breaking the Interest Slavery** by Gottfried Feder.
- **Hitler's Table Talk.**
- **The Banking Swindle** by Kerry Bolton.
- **Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism** by Azar Gat.

- **The Psychotic Left** by Kerry Bolton.
- **Men Among the Ruins** by Julius Evola.
- **The Grand Chessboard** by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
- **The Decline of the West** by Oswald Spengler.
- **The Wealth of Nations** by Adam Smith.
- **Manufacturing Consent** by Noam Chomsky.
- **The War Against Boys** by Christina Hoff Sommers.
- **World Order** by Henry Kissinger.
- **Death of the West** by Patrick Buchanan.
- **Dissecting the Holocaust** by Germar Rudolf.
- **Debating the Holocaust** by Thomas Dalton.