>>19634
assuming only traditional computers (aka real computers), it's very expensive, too expensive to do in bulk for very wealthy government and completely unaffordable for other
more effective strategyy is timing correlation: observe and record the flow of packets even if cannot read because encryption, then correlate them to reconstruct original chain from you to each of the proxies to the target (break anonymity), then just read or break target encryption layer (break confidentiality)
this is very easy and effective, the only difficulty is being able to observe enough connection points (be global adversary)
but sometimes you don't need to, for example if you connect from hungary to tor to hungary target, then single government can observe entry and exit which is only a bit more difficult but still easy to correlate

which also shows why that
>>19631
>>The data is encrypted, so they can see that you are connected to the Tor network but nothing that you access through it
is not so simple in fact, just imagine connection: you (hungary) -> tor -> http (plaintext) target website (hungary)
then hungary government can know WHO and WHAT very easy