>>23676 >11. The impossibility of keeping this force together for a longer period of time.
You are overestimating effect of army numbers on Soviet economy. Agricultural economy in late 30s was pretty much ok (for USSR) and there were plenty of manpower available even with large army. War proved that reserves were pretty big, and even after first mobilizations country was still relatively ok. Only after all mobilizations and loss of main agricultural regions USSR started to get problems, but even they were solved. Considering industry - USSR could restart everything after evacuation and power only grew in time, especially in late war periods.
>Many units were ordered to quickly erect some barracks. Then they were moved out of their temporary quarters to the frontier, where everyone got into tents. IN parallel with this the units of the SSE started to arrive but they weren't billeted in the barracks FSE left behind also were placed into tents.
That just common Soviet mismanagement. Mismanagement is a trait of commies anyway. For example, nuclear sub fleet suffered supply problems even in 80s. Ports at North Sea didn't had proper power, so subs often stayed with working reactors and their lifetime was seriously shortened. And this happened in 80s, not in 40s.
>12. They know the Germans will attack but they thought later. >So the GRU monitored this and while more and more German units were grouped to the border they reported the Germans weren't preparing for an attack because they weren't producing the material they would need to fight a war against the SU.
There were plenty of reports about forces movement, and movement of Soviet forces in early 1941 was and reaction to this. But yes, high government didn't believe that Germany would attack.