The prewar years
1933
It has been said that Hitler did not have to take critical decisions until 1936, but from his very first days in office key choices were already taken and he had a general idea of the course that was to be taken. To carry them out the immediate seizure of power and Enabling Act were followed by a gradual sidelining of other forces besides the NSDAP which still had influence within the cabinet. Conservative resistance to the Battle for Work was outmaneuvered by the appointment of Fritz Reinhardt, party member, to a position within the RFM, though von Krosigk remained at its helm. Schacht, who opposed work creation but conceded the point to Hitler, took over from Hans Luther (together with Bruening, the man responsible for late Weimar austerity) at the Reichsbank. Hugenberg of the DNVP lost his positions on the RWM and Agriculture after, while on a diplomatic delegation, he did manage to embarrass the rest of the German delegation with an unscripted outburst in which he demanded not only the return of Germany's colonies, but also a free hand for expansion towards the east. (p.53) But within the NSDAP factions more radical or more conservative than the mainstream remained.
The DAF and RNS were set up, the latter building up stocks of grain after a bountiful harvest. Large funds were allocated to work creation, which continued to be the central theme in public media through the next year despite no more funds being assigned henceforth. Rearmament began with a time horizon of at least 8 years.
Abroad, the dollar devalued, grim news for the balance of trade. Schacht took an aggressive economic diplomacy with threats of a moratorium, though some level of payments still took place.

1934-5
This biennium saw the regime face and overcome at great cost its largest prewar crisis. At its root was the problem of the balance of trade. Exports were low because of the Reichsmark’s high value and widespread protectionism. Jewish emigration made the problem worse. No decisive solutions had been found, the balance was in the red and foreign exchange reserves were burned out to almost nothing, to the point that by June 1934 importers were receiving foreign currency not on a monthly but on a day-to-day basis.

Much was attempted to correct the balance of trade. Schacht’s aggressive diplomacy continued and paid off: trade with America, with whom Germany already had a deficit anyways, began its decline, while Britain got a favorable trade deal. Dawes and Young plan loans were still being paid, though only partially.
The export subsidy scheme at foreign creditors’ expense was set up but proved insufficient after several months. Under the Haavara Agreement the foreign exchange issue with Jewish emigration was alleviated. The RWM wanted to increase demand by lowering tax rates (such as the levies paid to the DAF and others) and the RFM wanted fiscal discipline but neither were successful. The main measure of the year was the institutionalization of import rationing, as seen in Trade. Coupled with it was an even greater restriction of imports and a funneling of available foreign exchange to the needs of rearmament.
Creating a whole bureaucracy to manage imports was already considered a desperate measure by Schacht. Even then it wasn’t enough: at first importers, now squeezed even more, resorted to stocks of raw materials, but soon those were running out. Thus in 1935 the industry-wide tax to subsidy exports was made, also in a spirit of emergency. Coupled with a more favorable global environment, this allowed exports to recover and thus sustain a bare minimum level of imports.