>Well the numbers show continuous increase. With the exception of vehicles and ships/submarines. So bombings weren't that much of problem, and other factors sure had to play a role in the fluctuation (like logistical: transporting units from one front to another could enjoy priorities over moving raw materials or parts).
The armaments index grew from 1943 to 1944 but only modestly. Compared to its previous 1942-3 growth it stagnated. It could have expanded more and it didn't, this means a large number of weapons that weren't produced.
The beginning of stagnation exactly matches the time major strategic bombing began and the causality was explained in Speer's own words. Of course as the book shows Speer presented reality in a biased manner and he could be trying to shift blame but he was right in this case. Troop movements weren't dramatically different from 1942 to 1943, they don't seem an important enough factor. And this bombing could have been even more effective if not for new defensive tactics and the Allied mistake of going for Berlin.
Then came the late 1944 strategic bombardment and it was extremely effective.

>With the exception that the East distracted almost the whole Wehrmacht from the West.
In the aftermath of an Eastern victory only some divisions committed would come back. A large garrison would have to be left to shield the very long (one Eastern front of length, to be exact) new border aswell as vast territories in the rear. A further number of fighting men would be dismissed to work in the factories as originally planned. A few divisions would perhaps attack towards the Indian Ocean. And any forces deployed to North Africa were guaranteed to be taken as POWS.
>he only reason why the Western Allies could land in Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy and south France. The only reason why they couldn't mow Brits down in Egypt and further in the Middle East.
In Normandy and southern France, maybe. But with Allied hegemony in the sea and crippling logistical deficiencies -the Axis had enough trouble supplying what it did have in Libya- defeat in North Africa and, consequently, the loss of a modest number of divisions is guaranteed.
>Except that the SU was an industrial giant. It would have depended on the surviving factories and industrial equipment.
France was an industrial giant. Its actual productive contribution to the German war economy was all but worthless. German-occupied Western Europe, although heavily industrialized, functioned at a fraction of its prewar productino. The East was poorer, more agrarian, had more intense fighting and a chunk of its prewar industry was evacuated upon the war's beginning. Tooze doesn't even bother to mention any arms production there.
>Also not having to replace destroyed equipment in the east, just concentrating on fighter aircrafts would have meant much.
It would only delay the inevitable. American production was gargantuan and dwarfed anything Germany could ever hope to produce. Even a full duplication of output would still leave the Luftwaffe outnumbered. The only way to match America would be having an American-sized economy. This was Hitler's long-term strategic vision but not something that could be done within the war years.
>The Germs could have concentrate also on their new tech most notably ballistic missiles (maybe they could reach the US too, who knows), and jet fighters.
Missiles weren't all that relevant in the grand scheme of things. Their development is to some part owed to political moves by Speer as the project was under his rather than the Luftwaffe's authority.
Jet fighters were pursued with all possible effort but it would still take time to get them into mass production.