Bernd
05/13/2020 (Wed) 14:49:54
No.36712
del
05/13/2020 (Wed) 14:49:54
No.36712
del
>>36696
>in Guderian's memoir, he was complaining that production was shifting back to civilian goods after the French campaign
And it wasn't just an anecdotal peception, but in the end it was a focus shift from ammunition (which had abundant stores) to exports (which were economically and geopolitically vital), it's not like Germany was sacrificing panzer production to make more consumer goods for its populace.
>mentions the Speer miracle and how he increased production by getting factories to work harder
It's not surprising he thought this because Speer was good at convincing everyone of it during and after the war.
But when Speer himself and others like Messerschmitt badmouthed other economic administrators, it contributed to the inflation of their own prestige.
For Speer after the war, an appearance of competence was also part of his struggle to rehabilitate himself in the new political order by looking "apolitical", as in Western minds there was a dichotomy between "competent, urbane, apolitical technocrats" and "irrational, plebeian ideological zealots", with the NSDAP deemed fundamentally irrational. Tooze doesn't follow his line as he shows ideologically committed Nazis with technical, economic rationality (e.g. Kehrl) as well as that there was rationality to the Nazi project itself.
>>36698
>it was also a legitimization for their politics they pursued and the right of the ideology they followed. Western world did similarly, they used the war in their narratives. Giving different explanations could serve them. No?
Yes, Speer was good at rhetoric but for Westerners to accept it they must've had some interest. Perhaps they were comparing themselves to the Third Reich as no.1 enemies of the USSR, and wanted to believe that their predecessor's failure was due to its system and they could have a better system and win.
>>36698
>in Guderian's memoir, he was complaining that production was shifting back to civilian goods after the French campaign
And it wasn't just an anecdotal peception, but in the end it was a focus shift from ammunition (which had abundant stores) to exports (which were economically and geopolitically vital), it's not like Germany was sacrificing panzer production to make more consumer goods for its populace.
>mentions the Speer miracle and how he increased production by getting factories to work harder
It's not surprising he thought this because Speer was good at convincing everyone of it during and after the war.
But when Speer himself and others like Messerschmitt badmouthed other economic administrators, it contributed to the inflation of their own prestige.
For Speer after the war, an appearance of competence was also part of his struggle to rehabilitate himself in the new political order by looking "apolitical", as in Western minds there was a dichotomy between "competent, urbane, apolitical technocrats" and "irrational, plebeian ideological zealots", with the NSDAP deemed fundamentally irrational. Tooze doesn't follow his line as he shows ideologically committed Nazis with technical, economic rationality (e.g. Kehrl) as well as that there was rationality to the Nazi project itself.
>>36698
>it was also a legitimization for their politics they pursued and the right of the ideology they followed. Western world did similarly, they used the war in their narratives. Giving different explanations could serve them. No?
Yes, Speer was good at rhetoric but for Westerners to accept it they must've had some interest. Perhaps they were comparing themselves to the Third Reich as no.1 enemies of the USSR, and wanted to believe that their predecessor's failure was due to its system and they could have a better system and win.
>>36698