Bernd
12/20/2020 (Sun) 12:14:21
No.41700
del
12/20/2020 (Sun) 12:14:21
No.41700
del
>>41699
Cont
AKP is beginning to view MHP as more of a competitor than an ally. Bahçeli forces Erdoğan further to the right, costing AKP its centrist voters to the opposition, while its right-leaning voters are increasingly favoring MHP. In the 2019 local election, MHP beat AKP in most provinces where the two fielded separate candidates. MHP's support clearly grew since the 2018 parliamentary election. Conversely, AKP's performance was much stronger than expected in the southeast.
AKP and HDP on their own are relatively compatible as both parties have mostly pious voters who believe themselves to have been oppressed under the socioethnic policies of Atatürk's republic. Erdoğan prior to 2015 was the least nationalist leader in Turkish history, and would recapture large numbers of Kurdish votes by ending his alliance with MHP, which may not be possible with nationalists now dominating the state.
Bülent Arınç recently called for the release of Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş, and soon resigned from the Presidential High Advisory Board after Bahçeli struck back. While Erdoğan publicly rejected the release of the two high-profile prisoners, some believe he's testing the waters to reset relations with Europe and find a new coalition partner.
The next CHP presidential candidate will gain the electoral support of many liberals and Kurds who in the past would have voted for AKP or other parties, while also preparing for a possible political realignment.
İmamoğlu and Yavaş are both in the spotlight as potential presidential candidates, and both are performing very well in polls against Erdoğan. If no AKP-MHP rift takes place, İmamoğlu will be CHP's presidential candidate. For economic reasons, he may not favor immediate cooperation with MHP; however, he's keeping his options open, especially if HDP fails to pass the 10% threshold. İmamoğlu has vocalized support for Turkish security interests important to MHP and even issued a respectful commemoration for Alparslan Türkeş. If tensions grow between AKP and MHP, Yavaş will be CHP's candidate, and Bahçeli will sabotage Erdoğan's presidential campaign in favor of the Yavaş-Akşener alliance.
Erdoğan gets called a dictator by clueless observers when a closer look reveals he has no more control over the state now than he did before the 2016 failed coup. Some five years since using “nationalist” as an insult, he's being held hostage by Bahçeli. Turkey has made real gains against the PKK, but at the expense of relations with the West, causing a weaker economy. MHP will not allow another peace process even if it costs Erdoğan the next presidential election. After all, Bahçeli could easily switch over to Yavaş and Akşener, two former MHP members.
tl;dr: AKP is being held hostage, and any steps in favor of realignment with liberals and Kurdish nationalists will end in Bahçeli dealing a decisive blow to the party.
Cont
AKP is beginning to view MHP as more of a competitor than an ally. Bahçeli forces Erdoğan further to the right, costing AKP its centrist voters to the opposition, while its right-leaning voters are increasingly favoring MHP. In the 2019 local election, MHP beat AKP in most provinces where the two fielded separate candidates. MHP's support clearly grew since the 2018 parliamentary election. Conversely, AKP's performance was much stronger than expected in the southeast.
AKP and HDP on their own are relatively compatible as both parties have mostly pious voters who believe themselves to have been oppressed under the socioethnic policies of Atatürk's republic. Erdoğan prior to 2015 was the least nationalist leader in Turkish history, and would recapture large numbers of Kurdish votes by ending his alliance with MHP, which may not be possible with nationalists now dominating the state.
Bülent Arınç recently called for the release of Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtaş, and soon resigned from the Presidential High Advisory Board after Bahçeli struck back. While Erdoğan publicly rejected the release of the two high-profile prisoners, some believe he's testing the waters to reset relations with Europe and find a new coalition partner.
The next CHP presidential candidate will gain the electoral support of many liberals and Kurds who in the past would have voted for AKP or other parties, while also preparing for a possible political realignment.
İmamoğlu and Yavaş are both in the spotlight as potential presidential candidates, and both are performing very well in polls against Erdoğan. If no AKP-MHP rift takes place, İmamoğlu will be CHP's presidential candidate. For economic reasons, he may not favor immediate cooperation with MHP; however, he's keeping his options open, especially if HDP fails to pass the 10% threshold. İmamoğlu has vocalized support for Turkish security interests important to MHP and even issued a respectful commemoration for Alparslan Türkeş. If tensions grow between AKP and MHP, Yavaş will be CHP's candidate, and Bahçeli will sabotage Erdoğan's presidential campaign in favor of the Yavaş-Akşener alliance.
Erdoğan gets called a dictator by clueless observers when a closer look reveals he has no more control over the state now than he did before the 2016 failed coup. Some five years since using “nationalist” as an insult, he's being held hostage by Bahçeli. Turkey has made real gains against the PKK, but at the expense of relations with the West, causing a weaker economy. MHP will not allow another peace process even if it costs Erdoğan the next presidential election. After all, Bahçeli could easily switch over to Yavaş and Akşener, two former MHP members.
tl;dr: AKP is being held hostage, and any steps in favor of realignment with liberals and Kurdish nationalists will end in Bahçeli dealing a decisive blow to the party.