Szálasi offers his opinion on the topic of fighting the Soviet Union.
On the example of Napoleon the usual view is that Russia just cannot be beaten, they can evade and retreat, until the attacking army is cut from it's power base, loses cohesion, the attrition wears it down, and then the Russians can beat it with ease.
He says to some extent, sure, it's like that. But they cannot retreat forever, there is a limit on area they can give up. If their power bases are denied from them, they will lose the war. He calls the Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad line a "crisis-line" as the farthest line they can afford to retreat. After that, there's only the Volga and the Ural. But the region between the Volga and the Ural offers little in industry or population, far from enough to do anything decisive from there.
He also drew up a "crisis-area" the last power base of the Soviet, in the Don-Oka-Volga triangle, with Stalingrad-Moscow-Kazan vertices, where the resources are present to support a decisive attack. This part they need to defend at all cost, and from this area can they hope to turn the war over. But this also means the Germans have to capture this area to win the war.
Since there is little need for the Germans to cross the Volga, the "road" from Europe to Siberia goes through another gullet in the Ural between Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg) and Chelyabinsk, and the front gets narrowed down from ~2000 km to 500, then entering Siberia further down to 200-300 kms. This is why Europe Strategic Space looks like that in the East. In the region of Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk there's another important industrial area (and higher concentration of population), but after losing the crisis-area, it is unlikely the Red Army could stand against the concentrated Wehrmacht, and it is sure they couldn't mount any attack from that position. The war at that point would be lost for them. Every European power base would be denied from them.