>>43402
>Manstein thought that the war was not lost until '44
Szálasi clinged to his idea, that the Germans are setting the country to total war and the decisive counter-move can be expected up to '45 spring-summer. He kept expecting the new miracle weapons - and to some extent the Germans really put some into use (ballistic rockets, jet airplanes), but we know how it ended.
Maybe if the Romanians hadn't switched side the Carpathians could have held for quite a while. On the other hand if we believe Tooze above (and he is quite convincing), there was no way German economy could have kept step, especially not against the USian.

>>43403
Turkey was resolute staying out of war and grabbed any opportunities to do so.
For example the '39 deal with the French and the Brits supposed that they'll make a military alliance in case something bad happens. Then the Germs conquered France, and the Brits turned to Turkey on the basis of the agreement. Turkey refused and said the agreement was with the Brits and the French, and the French ain't in it anymore.
The Turkish foreign ministry had people who were pro-Allies, and had people who were pro-Axis, but President Inönü kept both group in check, and kept the matters in his own hands (he constantly feared a German invasion). It worked out for them.
>aerodromes
What they did not allow.
>He also mentions talks with Stalin in '43 in which Stalin doesn't think it worth brining Turkey into the war. He thinks that Stalin probably never wanted Turkey in the war
During the subsequent conferences of '43 (Casablanca, Adana, Moscow, Tehran, Cairo) it is a returning theme, that the Soviet demanded Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies.

Heh, the Russian paper, Izvestia in '43 September also wrote that the Germans benefited from the neutrality of Turkey.

>>43401