Bernd
04/28/2021 (Wed) 08:12:45
No.43417
del
04/28/2021 (Wed) 08:12:45
No.43417
del
>>43416
>The Third Reich in its position fighting attrition warfare sounds like a dangerous idea
Szálasi thought they were forcing the attrition onto the Soviet. The Germans retreated slowly deeper into the gullet, making the Soviet pay in huge losses for every meter, while they cleared or destroyed anything. He mentions the Ukrainian crops, and and that the Soviet has to transport every material on longer and longer supply lines on nonexistent infrastructure.
>In the war economy sense
His chief concern (judging by the length and "frequency" he wrote about such) were the subversive actions of the Anglo-Jewish fifth column - which we probably can interpret as the normal opposition in every country, even in Germany -, and (from the subtext) the ideological preparation of the population, to steel the morals and endurance. I think he believed, that if there's enough will, then nothing is impossible. Probably coming from the favored view of WWI: "hinterland betrayed the armies, who could have won just with a little more effort from the people at home".
>Doesn't he consider Kursk as Germany going on the offensive?
Kursk is framed into a larger picture and it is described as a Soviet offensive maneuver (starting on July 4, a day before we date it). In the intro he wrote defense have to be done offensively (I think "proactively" would be descriptive) therefore he must have seen the German attacks as counter-attacks. He also mentions a premature Soviet attack forced by the Germans, but it is not clear if he means the Red Army counterattack during Kursk, or something else, because he does not go into the details of the battle. Maybe I'll translate the two passages where the battle comes up.
>Landing in the Netherlands would be particularly interesting
An intriguing scenario indeed. In the discussion of the Western theater, he mentions another hypothetical scenario, what the Allies should have done (he speculates it as a possible plan of theirs, due to their quick collapse he says it's hard to guess what they wanted to do), crossing the Rhein and force the Germans to fight a decisive battle between the Rhein and the Elbe. He criticize them that hey had 7 months to do so and did not.
>The Third Reich in its position fighting attrition warfare sounds like a dangerous idea
Szálasi thought they were forcing the attrition onto the Soviet. The Germans retreated slowly deeper into the gullet, making the Soviet pay in huge losses for every meter, while they cleared or destroyed anything. He mentions the Ukrainian crops, and and that the Soviet has to transport every material on longer and longer supply lines on nonexistent infrastructure.
>In the war economy sense
His chief concern (judging by the length and "frequency" he wrote about such) were the subversive actions of the Anglo-Jewish fifth column - which we probably can interpret as the normal opposition in every country, even in Germany -, and (from the subtext) the ideological preparation of the population, to steel the morals and endurance. I think he believed, that if there's enough will, then nothing is impossible. Probably coming from the favored view of WWI: "hinterland betrayed the armies, who could have won just with a little more effort from the people at home".
>Doesn't he consider Kursk as Germany going on the offensive?
Kursk is framed into a larger picture and it is described as a Soviet offensive maneuver (starting on July 4, a day before we date it). In the intro he wrote defense have to be done offensively (I think "proactively" would be descriptive) therefore he must have seen the German attacks as counter-attacks. He also mentions a premature Soviet attack forced by the Germans, but it is not clear if he means the Red Army counterattack during Kursk, or something else, because he does not go into the details of the battle. Maybe I'll translate the two passages where the battle comes up.
>Landing in the Netherlands would be particularly interesting
An intriguing scenario indeed. In the discussion of the Western theater, he mentions another hypothetical scenario, what the Allies should have done (he speculates it as a possible plan of theirs, due to their quick collapse he says it's hard to guess what they wanted to do), crossing the Rhein and force the Germans to fight a decisive battle between the Rhein and the Elbe. He criticize them that hey had 7 months to do so and did not.