>>43656
>We have hindsight and interpret each of those battlefield defeats in light of Germany's final defeat, but from different angles it's not as bad.
He compares the Soviet campaigns to the 1941 & '42 summer events essentially. How little time was needed for the Wehrmacht to gain huge amount of grounds and how it costs comparatively little in men and war material to them, and how much price the Red Army payed (time, men, and material) for smaller gain.
I also believe the short campaigns against Poland, West, and Balkans made a huge impression on him (and on many other of his contemporaries). Especially, considering he had first hand experience in the static meatgrinder of WWI.
Regarding to us, we see the Soviet retreat a temporary setback because we know it is. And when we see the German retreat as the beginning of the end, we do because we know it is. But if we cut everything at the end of 1943 we can only see the front moving fast to the East, than crawls back to the west (and not even to the starting position). The one who believes Germany is in control of the situation, and can throw more resources it, could easily make the conclusion: the Germans still can win this. Especially if the person thinks the successful advance of 1941, the crushing victories were the results of the brilliant German war command.
I could draw a parallel with the Korean War, btw, like how the front moved down and up, and down, and up again, and then solidified.
>the arms race was always against the Germans.
The dice had been cast. But it was loaded.

Gonna continue the South soon. He sees a couple of things so clearly, then he just disregards his insight, and focuses elsewhere.