Well, I estimate this is what Szálasi wrote about WWII in his incomplete study. Now at least this little can be found on the internet in English. I'm sure I made some mistakes, and it is a fact that I left out some details, but I tried to present the thing honestly and roundly.
Most likely it was written for later publication, after the war was won, so what he wrote had to reflect his belief in the final victory, and - from what I know of him - he really believed it will happen so. Beside limited information available to him - some of those were simply false to boot - this bias led him into speculations that turned out to be baseless. Couple of fatal flaws I want to point out, which really stood out for me: the conviction that total war was a next level of effort and not just a propaganda phrase, the underestimation of the importance of the events in the Mediterranean even after he clearly describes the theater's importance, the overestimation of the quality of Tripartite leadership, the soldiers, and the war material available, or the insistence that the change in the outcome of the war only possible in a form of a flashy giant decisive battle won by the Allies.
What I do not understand, how could he not raise criticism after the events of 1942 summer, when the German attack on the Easter Front did not target the area he deemed the last critical one that needed to be captured to effectively end the war against the Soviet, but they launched a pointless offensive which resulted in getting farther and farther away from the decision.
On the other hand in a hierarchical structure, like the military, commands arrive from upstairs without the reasoning behind them, without giving more information than absolutely necessary. Down below the guys have to just accept them and trust the guys up there that they know what they're doing. Szálasi with his military education, and career in the army, was accustomed with this system, and this had to make him consider that the Tripartite leadership make their decisions based on information that isn't available to him. And he trusted them as if in the military. There is no way in that system that the subordinates second guess their superiors (in practice there is, but this leads to falling morale and disorder in an army), the foundation of their actions is the blind faith in the superiors. Szálasi's baseline in his thought process was for this and the previously mentioned reasons that everything goes according to the plan - which he has no access to, and no information what it is built on. These are also the things he wanted to explore within his study.
Anyway this concludes my work, if Bernd wants to find the starting post, here >>43270 it is.