>>45071
>But problem that blockchain isn't public, and owners can replace it with different one if they want to publish it.
Hm. Well, I don't know how they implemented the system. I just assumed that the votes (blocks) were cryptographically blinded and thus the whole thing could be published without compromising anonymity. An oracle basically.
>Proving something from modified blockchain is pretty hard thing if it is modified properly
>Problem that even if person claims that his vote was changed, there is no hard proofs.
That would also not be the case in my just-now imagined system. I was guessing that the voter would, as part of the voting process, get back a signed certificate with something like the block hash and a blinded MAC of his party choice, his device verifies it, he approves it cross-sign it and submit it. Thus he would have a certificate to compare against what's found in the blockchain, which would prevent replacing the whole chain
>Technically there is no real way to make elections transparent with remote electronic vote
I work with computers and I have always known that electronic voting is a bad meme (paper-vote tampering at least requires a certain degree of distributed real-world effort by meat-and-bones fallible people, while an electronic voting system can theoretically be arranged for highly-centralized tampering, also software is such insecure shit). However, I thought a verifiable system (like blockchain-based) was at least interesting
>Maybe phasing out anonymous vote
Yeah, that's no good. In fact, even the "oracle" system I envisioned is problematic due to being vulnerable to rubberhose cryptanalysis