While the Soviets calculated with nuclear weapons first, they also see the emergence of precision-striking weapons. They did not know about such drone warfare that goes on in Ukraine, but those weapons are also fall into the category of precision-striking.
Glantz writes that the Soviet thought:
Command and control centers, key logistical installations, and communications nodes will either have to be hardened, concealed, or become mobile enough to move frequently.
And:
Operational and tactical maneuver will become even more critical, and forces conducting maneuver will have to employ more extensively basic raiding techniques. Specialized forces such as air assault, reconnaissance-diversionary, and enveloping groups and detachments will acquire new importance as well. In this sense, the enemy will be engaged and defeated not by classic penetration and envelopment operations conducted by deeply echeloned, patterned forces employed in a specific and limited number of main attack sectors, but rather by numerous operational and tactical cutting blows delivered along numerous axes, by vertical desants, and by strikes against the enemy rear area by ground and airdelivered forces.
Now desant attacks are basically nonexistent (except that Ukrainian one from last year), but they opened the war with such, and the rest still suit for how warfare is conducted: numerous operational and tactical cutting blows delivered along numerous axes by DRG and enveloping groups.