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DataRepublican (small r) @DataRepublican - .@RepMariaSalazar if you're name-dropping Mike Lee to imply he supports you, then please explain why he's making videos against the Dignity Act.
It's getting increasingly hard to not to read knowing intellectual fraud into that.
https://x.com/DataRepublican/status/2042383319476690968

David Limbaugh @DavidLimbaugh - Just to see what it would say and to get a few details, I asked Grok why it is so difficult to open the Strait of Hormuz, given that we've destroyed so much of Iran's military capabilities. You may or may not be interested in its answer. It may or may not be accurate. I pass it on for those who might be interested. You're welcome, if you're interested. My apologies, if you're annoyed. Thank you for your attention to this matter, or your inattention, if you prefer.
Even after the US degraded or destroyed the bulk of Iran's conventional military infrastructure (navy, mine-laying vessels, coastal bases on Kharg Island, etc.), forcibly "opening" the Strait of Hormuz by military means remains extremely difficult, risky, and resource-intensive. This isn't because Iran retains a peer-level navy—it doesn't—but because of geography, asymmetric tactics, and the nature of the threats that survive heavy airstrikes and naval engagements.
Why geography and tactics make it hard
The Strait is narrow (as little as ~21 miles wide at the choke point) and shallow in places, forcing large tankers and warships within easy range of Iran's mountainous northern coastline. Iran designed its defenses around this: anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, coastal artillery/rockets, drones, and small fast-attack boats can be hidden in caves, tunnels, cliffs, and urban areas along the shore, then popped out at close range. Many systems are mobile or can be launched from deep inland (over 1,000 miles in some cases). Air and naval strikes can destroy fixed sites and known launchers, but they can't instantly eliminate every dispersed, low-signature weapon or operator.
Mines are the biggest lingering problem. Iran has (or had) thousands of naval mines—estimates around 6,000—including simple but effective contact, influence, and drifting types that are cheap to deploy from small boats or shore. The US has already sunk dozens of Iranian minelayers, but mines already laid (or quickly re-laid from surviving small craft) turn the strait into a hazardous gauntlet. Clearing mines is slow, dangerous, and requires specialized ships, helicopters, and divers—capabilities the US Navy has in limited numbers right now (only a handful of dedicated mine-countermeasures assets in theater). Even one or two undetected mines can shut down commercial shipping for weeks due to insurance, fear, and delays.
Operational and strategic realities
- High risk to high-value assets: Sending US warships or escorted tankers into the strait puts billion-dollar ships and crews within "lucky shot" range of cheap Iranian weapons (missiles, drones, unmanned boats). The US can't quickly replace losses given shipbuilding constraints, and any sunk or damaged vessel would be a propaganda win for Iran while spiking global oil prices further.
- You can't just control the water—you need the land too: Experts note that true security requires neutralizing threats on the Iranian coastline itself. That could mean raids, seizing small islands, or sustained air/ground pressure—operations that divert aircraft, troops, and logistics from the broader campaign against Iran's regime and infrastructure. Ground involvement raises escalation risks dramatically.
- Scale and sustainability: Reopening the strait for the volume of traffic needed (dozens to over 100 vessels/day) requires a massive, ongoing escort and patrol presence. This isn't a one-day strike—it's a prolonged commitment that ties down a big chunk of the US fleet at a time when other priorities exist.
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