This had backing from above:
His (Osvino's) association received 8 million Cr$ from the Presidency's Chief of Staff, of which five had to be given to a group of sergeants in São Paulo. This anarchy was protected by a few officers loyal to the government and tolerated by many others fearful of clashing with the "apparatus" [Jango's control of the higher echelons, this is an important point for later] and thus, risk the liquidation of their career.
The final days of March were the nadir. First came the Sailors' Revolt on the 25th. The Minister of the Navy ordered the arrest of 12 graduates who had made an Association of Sailors and Marines into a trade union-like organization with communist ties. In reaction sergeants, corporals and sailors headed by Corporal Anselmo barricaded themselves at the HQ of a communist-tied trade union and demanded freedom for the twelve. They were joined by civilian activists and declared their wider political positions. 23 soldiers sent in repression joined the mutiny. After negotiations the protesters were arrested in Army, not Navy quarters and then freed, which they did in triumph, cheering with two leftist admirals.
Then on the 30th he spoke to thousands of sergeants at the Automobile Club in Rio de Janeiro. His subordinates had pleaded him not to speak, but he did. His action was deemed an escalation of the crisis in the military, and his words, politically explosive as he asked his audience to back his radical reforms. A friend had chosen for him the most moderate of three possible texts for his speech; its writer was in fact Luís Carlos Prestes, head of the Communist Party.
Officers worried about military anarchy saw the past days as the last straw, and now believed the President was attacking the Armed Forces as an institution; this was fundamental in their decision to rebel.
On the other hand legalists were also motivated by the feeling that they still owed loyalty to the President as their formal superior. This had been important in previous crises but could not determine fate now. Many more were indecisive and stayed legalist until switching sides when they saw where the wind was blowing.
There was also an ideological factor concentrated in the military, a tradition of Positivist authoritarianism which had already played out in 1889 and Vargas' time. Positivism was also in the roots of Varguism which was part of the legalist political base. But many of the rebels had themselves previously fought for Vargas.

>So continuation is expected?
Yes, I'll casually read into this subject.