There is also a mention of Zerbini promising to mount resistance on Jundiaí. It is north of São Paulo, where the legend is. Doesn't make a lot of sense, might be a confusion with Jacareí. The tunnel was the same bitterly contested in 1932 >>38097
Governor Ademar made his proclamation at 22:30, but it was weak. A group entered his Palace and argued with him. He asked of one of them, a figure who “’’looks like a Mexican bandit, with a long mustache, who stared at me’’”, smoking a straw pipe in the back: it was Colonel Serpa, who told him to take a definition “’’or else’’”, and he made a stronger statetement.
Meanwhile Kruel met with his generals. On his orders, outside the room his S4 staff Colonel waited, ready to arrest his subordinates if they refused to join. Both this and his HQ relocation were already moves in the direction of joining the coup d’état, he had to be in control of his subordinates, but was still neutral.
As the undecided third party to the confrontation between the Ist Army and the 4th Infantry Division, the IInd Army was the kingmaker. Though much weaker than either the Ist or the IIIrd Armies -and the IIIrd was still legalist and a threat on its southern flank- it could still shake the balance of power. Castelo Branco had already made it clear that the coup’s only chance of success was with the IInd Army on their side.
Late at night, surrounded by his officers, he phoned the President and had their final conversations. There’s a confusion on the number of conversations they had but the final were in this hour. Kruel’s ultimatum:
-Part with the communists and “’’take concrete measures in this respect’’”
-Shut down the General Workers’ Command (CGT)
-Fire his most radical Ministers, Abelardo Jurema (Labor) and Darcy Ribeiro (Civil cabinet)
“’’Or else you might find yourself left to your own luck’’”.
The response: Goulart would not break his commitment to parties and popular forces. “’’I’ve never had the support of neither the political forces, nor the Armed Forces during my government. I’ve only had difficulties. If now, in this excruciating hour, I get rid of those who surround me, it’s like a suicide’’”.
For Goulart, accepting would mean something akin to the 1961 arrangement but with even less power. And he was interested in rulership, not the honors of the Presidential post. Being a figurehead ruler was not on his plans. Others besides Kruel also made similar offers.
In light of this negative, Kruel issued his manifesto, which railed generically against the reds but at no point mentioned Goulart or the Presidency; even at this point he still hoped he could just force him to negotiate without deposing him. This also reflected on his battle plan, activated in his movement, which had the options of marching into Rio de Janeiro or just laying siege to it. Besides it he also ordered the 16th Caçadores Battalion to head to Brasília.
The manifesto and battle plan were already ready early in the day, if not in the days before. Why did it take so long for him to decide ? It could be:
-The need to convince Aluísio and Bandeira
-His divided loyalty
-Waiting for news from Rio de Janeiro, which came with Colonel Restell in the afternoon
-Waiting for the official declaration from Minas Gerais, on 17:00
-Gaspari writes he and the IVth Army were waiting to see which way the wind was blowing