Bernd
05/22/2020 (Fri) 11:17:58
No.36896
del
05/22/2020 (Fri) 11:17:58
No.36896
del
>>36895
Also put the paragraph about resources into the beggining of rationalisation part. I hope you don't mind.
Late rationalization
<Germany entered the war without the resources to satisfy its military production targets, and arms output did not really take off until February 1940, from which it rose until July and stabilized. In ’42 it entered an exponential growth, the classic phase of the ”Speer miracle”, until the middle of 1943, followed by much slower growth (stagnation in some sectors), a final burst in the first half of 1944 and a slide into oblivion (figure A).
>The paper trail shows bureaucratic infighting through the France-Barbarossa interval, with economic institutions accusing each other of incompetence. This corroborates older data on production and workforce which shows the former not catching up with the latter’s growth, suggesting a decline in productivity. The concluding picture is of early war Germany “squandering its armaments advantage” through ”egotism and incompetence”. But to truly grasp war production in anticipation for Barbarossa it is necessary to know what were its ends and whether it achieved them.
Also put the paragraph about resources into the beggining of rationalisation part. I hope you don't mind.
Late rationalization
<Germany entered the war without the resources to satisfy its military production targets, and arms output did not really take off until February 1940, from which it rose until July and stabilized. In ’42 it entered an exponential growth, the classic phase of the ”Speer miracle”, until the middle of 1943, followed by much slower growth (stagnation in some sectors), a final burst in the first half of 1944 and a slide into oblivion (figure A).
>The paper trail shows bureaucratic infighting through the France-Barbarossa interval, with economic institutions accusing each other of incompetence. This corroborates older data on production and workforce which shows the former not catching up with the latter’s growth, suggesting a decline in productivity. The concluding picture is of early war Germany “squandering its armaments advantage” through ”egotism and incompetence”. But to truly grasp war production in anticipation for Barbarossa it is necessary to know what were its ends and whether it achieved them.