I had some hyperinflated Hungarian banknote from the end of WWII, before they changed to HUF. Also some good pre-war ones. I should still have them somewhere I dunno where tho.
I'm not much of numismatic enthusiast.
These >>21021 seem clever but kitsch.

>>21051
wtfihatecthulhunow

>It is a mistake to allow Jews to mingle with Aryans as social equals. I have
>never been forced to do this, & at high school I drew the colour line at Jews as
>well as negroes, though of course there is no racial comparison between the two
>classes of undesirables.

>But I, thank the Gods, am an Aryan, & can rejoice in the glorious victory of T.
>Flavius Vespasianus, under whose legions the Jewish race & their capital were
>trodden out of national existence! I am an anti-Semitic by nature, but thought
>I had concealed my prejudice in my remarks concerning Isaacson. I showed him
>every consideration in my article, carefully saying that I attacked not the man,
>but the ideas. However, if Jerusalem wishes to start trouble, he will find in me
>a new Titus, eager to inscribe on my eagles the triumphant legend IVDAEA CAPTA!

Minas Gerais was the best possible launch pad for a coup d'état. Rio Grande do Sul had too many units, which would require a large conspiracy, Rio de Janeiro was under a tight oversight, São Paulo had an apparently legalist army general and a distinct Military Region/Infantry division and elsewhere was too weak and too far away from power. Minas Gerais had none of that. Mourão Filho was at the helm at both the division and Military Region. UDN governor Magalhães Pinto hoped to overthrow Goulart and run for President in 1965. Colonel José Geraldo of the police was on board. Together with retired marshal (being retired was a prerequisite for marshal rank) Odylio Denis and a number of subordinates they formed a kind of "revolutionary staff". One of their most important meetings was at 17:00, 28th of March on the Juiz de Fora airport. They had good contacts elsewhere. Mourão knew IPÊS, a think tank which also served as a medium of conspiratorial thoughts, and brigade-general Muricy, who at the time was powerless, occupying the Reserve Subdirectory in Rio de Janeiro. Muricy was called to Juiz de Fora and commanded the actual vanguard of the march.
In addition to this political advantage as the only state where a cohesive military-civilian conspiracy was possible, it was also blessed in its geography as it was in striking range of not one but two centers of power, Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. Brasília turned out to be a sideshow but the highest tension was in the Rio axis.

The state's geographical peculiarity is that, rather than a strip of land reaching into the interior from the coast, it is a much longer north-south stretch, almost reaching the coast but landlocked by two thin coastal states. The other states had their shape determined by the distribution of feudal-like plots bound by latitude, the sea and the Tordesillas longitude (in some of the northeast this was vertical, not horizontal). Such was the case for what would become the coastal states, but upon discovery of gold in the late 17th century, one of the measures to choke off and control the mines was to split off a wide expanse of inner land into another division, leaving two coastal territories. One was left thinly populated to serve as a "green wall", preventing any trade, and Rio de Janeiro with its natural ports became the export route for the gold.
The result of this was that in 1964 there was only a short stretch between Rio and a state border with another division's troops on the other side. Highlands were on the way but not insurmountable and they had roads for a long time. The course towards São Paulo is a straight line on easy terrain -the Paraíba do Sul valley- but it's longer. To make it even easier, the Military Region HQ was not on the state capital (Belo Horizonte) but on the major city closest to the border, Juiz de Fora, along with a regiment.

Forces in the state included:
20 thousand police, many of which took part in the rebel expeditions;
Sergeants' School in Três Corações, which refused to partake in the rebellion;
10th Infantry Regiment, Juiz de Fora;
11th "Tiradentes" Infantry Regiment, São João Del Rei;
12th Infantry Regiment, Belo Horizonte.

The plotters had different opinions on how to make their move. Mourão Filho wanted to march on Rio de Janeiro. He thought he could even just load the 10th on trucks in a Saturday night and pop up in Rio on a Sunday morning, occupy the army HQ and publish a manifesto signed by several governors. On the other hand, Magalhães Pinto and Guedes thought they could rise the whole state in rebellion (some sources even suggest a declaration of independence, and bizarrely he had named a secretary of Foreign Relations) to enter a standoff with Jango and lead other states to follow the example. This would probably backfired and the state would be defeated. In the past São Paulo, a much stronger state, had tried to take on the rest of the country alone and failed. The actual course of events was closer to Mourão Filho's vision.

The Planalto Military Command comprised the Federal District with the capital and the outlying state (now two). Brasília doesn't have much non-political importance, and its position as capital mattered less than today in 1964 as much of the bureaucratic machinery (military and civilian) was still in Rio de Janeiro, which was the target of rebels from São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Nonetheless Goulart did pass through the city, his chief of staff Darcy Ribeiro was diligent in trying to shore up the legalist position and a column would move from Minas Gerais to the capital.

The Military Command and the 11th Military Region were held by the same commander, brigade general Nicolau Fico, a coward who played both sides. Obeying Darcy and against requests from president of the Senate Auro de Moura Andrade, he did not repress legalist radio nor occupied key points in the city. But by the end he was calling Costa e Silva, rebel lynchpin in São Paulo, "my chief" and also taking orders from him. Darcy intercepted this and called him a "treasonous monkey". His duplicity did not save him and the new regime removed him from his post.
Below him were only a handful of units:
-6 Caçadores battalion, Ipameri;
-One MP battalion, Brasília;
-11th Mechanized Recon Squadron, Brasília, with M-41 tanks;

Darcy gathered a thousand Goulart supporters in the National Theater to occupy Congress and even form into armed resistance, but they were left unused by Goulart and never given weapons.

Congress had 6 SMGs and 12 rifles, but politically it and other civilian institutions were a central rebel power. The Presidents of the Senate, Andrade, of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzili, and of the Supreme Court rallied to the rebel side. Mazzili was particularly important as he was first in the presidential line of succession, and after Goulart's position was usurped he briefly occupied it.

This is what I was looking for. More curiosities were found. In the former 4th Cavalry Division mechanization was very late and horses were last used for transport in the mid-80s. Infantry in 1960 still used bolt-action rifles. There's a table comparing how many battalions and other formations should have existed according to the official division formation and how many were actually formed. There were supposed to be 63 infantry battalions but only 33 were in existence.

São Paulo is the strongest state but not militarily and to achieve political success a local rebellion had to march down the Paraíba valley to Rio de Janeiro. It also had to protect itself frp, a possible attack from legalists in the south.

The order of battle in São Paulo state consisted of:
SECOND ARMY, São Paulo
Commanded by Amaury Kruel, who was one of Goulart's most trusted men. He had supported the return of presidentialism and Goulart had helped get his son a job and finance his acquisition of a plot of land. The estate still exists and you can find its name. However he was also anticommunist, opposed to leftism among sergeants and didn't like Goulart's ideological turn; his wish was that the President would turn away from the left so he could remain loyal to him. He was aware of conspirators plotting a military revolution and at times was in contact with them, but refused to join. Some conspirators hoped to arrest him. In the course of events he kept silent and ambiguous, had everything prepared to join the rebels and only joined them late. Afterwards he continued his career and for a few years was a MDB Congressman.
2nd Caçadores Battalion, São Vicente
4th Caçadores Battalion, Lins
1st Light Tank Battalion, Campinas
Light tank battalions were considered infantry and followed the old French concept of tanks as infantry support. There were 3 of them which together had over a hundred M3 and M3A1 Stuarts.
17th Cavalry Regiment, Pirassununga
2ND MILITARY REGION, São Paulo
Commanded by Antônio Bandeira, who also took time to join the rebel side.
2nd 90 mm AA gun Group, Quitaúna
5th 90 mm AA gun Group, Campinas
2nd Automatic 40 mm AA gun Group, Barueri
5th Automatic 40 mm AA gun Group, Santos
2ND INFANTRY DIVISION, São Paulo
Commanded by Aluizio Mendes, at first a key legalist who even threatened to arrest Kruel if he defected, but later joined the rebels as well. The Divisional Infantry command was in Caçapava under brigade general Euryale de Jesus Zerbini, a legalist until the end, who used his power with some success to prevent the regiments from moving to Rio de Janeiro.
Note how the regiments are all aligned on the road to Rio de Janeiro.
4th Infantry Regiment "Raposo Tavares" , Quitaúna, x2 battalions
Colonel Cabral Ribeiro aligned with the rebels early. This regiment dispatched troops in both eastward and southward directions.
5th Infantry Regiment "Itororó", Lorena, x1 battalion
6th Infantry Regiment, Caçapava, x1 battalion
2nd 105 mm Howitzer Regiment "Deodoro", Itu, x1 group
Because of Zerbini's interference this was the earliest unit to arrive in Rio de Janeiro, and would have fought against the legalists if they moved on the opposite direction.
2nd Engineering Battalion, Pindamonhagaba
2nd Health Battalion, São Paulo

São Paulo's governor, Ademar de Barros, was on the rebel side and could count on his police forces.

The backwater state of Espírito Santo had a single army formation, the 3rd Caçadores battalion in Vila Velha, directly under the Ist Army in Rio de Janeiro, and it did not take part in any operation. The governor had a neutral stance and allies in both the left and right, allowing him to survive in the new regime though he later fell to a political crisis. The local political atmosphere was parochial, distant from the radicalization in the core.
This state was irrelevant to Goulart's overthrow, but it leads to a controversial topic, that of American intervention.
The state's history and location >>36154 at once determined its irrelevancy and relevancy. The relevancy lies in being an alternative outlet to the sea for landlocked Minas Gerais, and thus a potential flashpoint if it entered a war with the primary sea route (Rio de Janeiro). This had already been the case in 1930, when it was invaded from Minas Gerais, and was even more now that there was a railway leading to the port in Vitória. A few months before March the governors of MG and ES had settled that in the event of a war troops would gather in Governador Valadares and supplies would be sent, allowing the coastal state to defend itself if it joined the rebel side. None of this happened. There was a police battalion in Governador Valadares but it moved to Juiz de Fora to join the column heading to Rio de Janeiro.

Darcy Ribeiro makes two claims, that the United States Navy was, in the 31 March- 1 April period, already in 12-50 nautical miles off Vitória, and that this included a land contingent which would land in the port and open a connection to Minas Gerais. Those are bold claims. As documents have been made public a clear picture of American intervention can be made.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm has the most relevant pieces of evidence.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d198 is of particular interest. Quoting it with the corrections made on the same day:
>Washington, March 31, 1964, 2:29 p.m.
>1301. For your personal information only, the following decisions have been taken in order be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done.
>1. Dispatch of US Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos April 13; following three tankers at one day intervals.2
>2. Immediate dispatch of naval task force for overt exercises off Brazil. Force to consist of aircraft carrier and two guided missile destroyers (expected arrive in area by April 10), four destroyers, task force tankers (all expected arrive about four days later).
>3. Assemble shipment of about 110 tons ammunition, other light equipment including CS agent for mob control for air lift to São Paulo (Campinas). Lift would be made within 24 to 36 hours upon issuance final orders and would involve 6 cargo planes, 6 tankers, and 6 fighters.
>Unloading of POL by US Navy tankers (item 1) and dispatch of airlift (item 3) would require further development politico-military situation to point where some group having reasonable claim to legitimacy could formally request recognition and aid from us and if possible from other American Republics. Dispatch of tankers from Aruba and of naval task force does not immediately involve us in Brazilian situation and is regarded by us as normal naval exercise.

Just noticed a misplaced position.

The Academy is the large slashed red area in the west and its units are in green. A motorized cavalry squadron of 70-80 men would fight a delaying action, including obstructing the road with heavy vehicles from a construction company. An engineer platoon would detonate two highway bridges, I've positively identified one of them, it's this. A reinforced infantry company of 250 men would hold out, backed by an artillery battery. A guard company from the Command and Service Battalion protected fuel stocks through the road. Médici relied on the psychological barrier of holding out with "kids", his cadets. I have their exact locations in km of the highway and reference points, though as my maps don't show where each km is the marked location is approximate. All the other forces are less exact.

In red are the IInd Army's forces. Some of its reserve force in São Paulo would later be dispatched to the south.

In blue is the School-Unit group, the battalion at the vanguard had 800 men. At 13:00 it was at the entrance of Barra Mansa, the last city before Resende.

In yellow is the 1st Armored Infantry Battalion. It shows up right in the middle of the road if you look at the formal hierarchy, but sources are completely silent on it. Only the Oral History, volume I (available online) clarifies that it allied with Médici, was with a very reduced structure and stayed in Volta Redonda. Why didn't it bolster the cadets along the highway? I can only speculate, as there's very little information in the only source. I've looked at the battalion's logs, available online, and they just mention that it entered readiness on the 31st with no information on the 1st.

Like elsewhere the rebels won a "moral" victory over the legalist military, a mortar platoon refused to fire and those two extra artillery batteries didn't mount to fire but instead, upon arrival at 14:00, raced at maximum speed and defected. Elsewhere at the same time Muricy's column was about to enter battle. In both cases there was not a single shot as the Ist Army's commander, Âncora, decided to visit the academy and negotiate with Kruel. This was after Goulart's had set flight from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília and the legalist hierarchy and position in the city began to melt, and at the suggestion of both Goulart and Costa e Silva, one of the two rebel masterminds. At 15:00 a truce was declared. Âncora arrived a devastated man, being received by Médici with full military honors despite calling himself defeated; Médici replied that only the fatherland's enemies were defeated. Then Âncora surrendered the Ist Army.

>>37575
Two towns in the southern highlands have flurries on a yearly basis and in some years real snow. The rest of the south has snowfall in rare years. See:
https://youtube.com/watch?v=YQBKDbCBXD0 [Embed]
https://youtube.com/watch?v=KFoGY7Lbocw [Embed]
The southeast has snowfall in the highlands on rare years, possibly it took place in São Paulo in 1918. But the southeast has a winter, most of it is made of highlands but even the tropical lowlands have a noticeably colder middle of the year.

I'll leave Mourão Filho's part for after I get the books but in the meanwhile I can already give a rundown on Rio de Janeiro and then narrate what happened in São Paulo, the almost-battle in Resende and events in Rio city.

Rio de Janeiro city was by far the highest-value target in the entire country. Most of the federal administrative machinery was still there much of it still is, in contrast all Brasília had was symbolic value and Congress. To win the rebels would have to seize it or at the very least lay siege to it and negotiate. Among this administrative machinery was the Army's supreme headquarters in the Duque de Caxias Palace, housing the Minister of War (Jair Dantas Ribeiro, who was hospitalized at the time rendering legalism acephalous), the commander of the Ist Army and the Chief of Staff.
There were two other key palaces just a short distance from each other: Laranjeiras, a Presidential residence, and Guanabara, the gubernatorial office. On the 31st of March both were occupied, the former by Goulart and the latter by Carlos Lacerda. Lacerda was a famous liberal-conservative whose name is still remembered by anyone with a minimum of historical literacy today, a politically engaged journalist who made the most drama out of his struggles, and took part in the downfall of Vargas in 1954 (when an assassination attempt against him led in a chain of events to the President's suicide) and Jânio Quadros in 1961 and was now in public office. He was set to run as the leading right-wing presidential candidate in 1965. Rhetorically he was Goulart's greatest enemy, a fiery oppositionist. Despite this he was of little importance in the conspiracy to overthrow the President, partly because the governor of Minas Gerais was a competitor within his party for the presidential run and partly out of his own decision as the city's garrison was too strong and he was too obvious of an enemy. But he did know in advance there'd be a coup d'état. At his disposal was the city's gendarmerie.

The city also housed a huge number of conspirators. Most important among them was the Chief of Staff division-general Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. Old and very prestigious, he was a veteran of the Italian Front and once commanded the IVth Army. His present position was a great honor and second only to the War Minister, but toothless - he commanded no troops. He was reluctant to join the conspiracy but once he did was accepted as its natural leader. He kept a low profile to take advantage of the "apparatus" not noticing his subversive intent as well as to gain more credibility among his peers when, as someone seen as a legalist, he opposed the government. He set up an informal "staff" for the revolutionary movement and helped tie together the several different plots across the country. As the most prestigious member of the movement he'd succeed Goulart as President.
Among his allies were Ernesto Geisel, President 1974-79, and Golberi do Couto e Silva, mastermind of the surveillance state and personal friend and source of Gaspari. He was a chief example of the "modernizer" wing of the military, who were tied to international capital and the most dynamic elites and had a comprehensive project of social and economic change. He was proud to be part of the "free world" and followed the "National Security Doctrine" which stated the need for the military to preempt a communist revolution with a counterrevolution and then to use capitalist development to fund a strong military (guns over butter) and defeat the internal threat of revolutionary war.

The 1932 civil war, though mostly restricted to a single state and its border regions, is even more exciting. It lasted longer than 1930, had a few thousand deaths, a total mobilized strength of at least 100-200 thousand men, armored trains, air combat, aerial bombardment of cities, a naval blockade and alpine warfare. The region around this tunnel was bitterly contested.

>>38120
>Interesting structure.
It's a WWII American tank division, but incomplete, much like the rest of the army. Military doctrine was mostly French until WWII, then mostly American. Cavalry was still organized on French lines. Its formal structure was:
Tactical Group Command x3
Mechanized Recon Regiment
Tank Battalion x3
Heavy Tank Battalion (Missing)
Armored Infantry Battalion x3 (1 was missing)
Communications Company (no data)
Divisional Artillery (Entirely missing)
---Armored 105 mm Howitzer Group x3 (All 3 missing)
---Armored 155 mm Howitzer Group (Missing)
---Self-Propelled AA Group (Missing)
Armored Combat Engineering Battalion (Missing)
Army Police Company [i.e. provosts, but the state gendarmeries call themselves "Military Police"] (no data)
Intendancy Company (no data)
Maintenance Battalion
Health Company (no data)
Compare with the American organization.
>Is it know what kind of equipment they had?
Surplus American WW2 equipment. In the 60s the Army had in store:
437 M3 and M3A1 Stuart light tanks;
50 M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks;
83 M4, M4A1 and M4 Composite Hull Stuart medium tanks;
150 M8 Greyhound armored cars;
20 M20 Deerhound command cars;
400 M2, M2A1, M3, M3A1 and M5 half-tracks;
20 M59 APCs;
84 M3A1 Scout Cars.

>Means air mobile?
It'd develop into a paratrooper force with airmobile heavier elements.

>I'm impressed. Looks like one of those low level office ladies who didn't do anything worth of the slightest interest in their whole lives.,
Her organization conducted assassinations, kidnappings and a famous plane hijacking. But by most accounts her participation was only in the "rear guard".

Sousa Lobo he met in person, and Lacerda, through the telephone. He repeated his position as a legalist, to which Sousa Lobo agreed, and gave them orders. The regiments conducted recon and, I’m mostly sure, remained in their quarters. There is a vague mention that there was a force moving towards São Paulo which later had to reverse course, it might have been the 6th. On 11:00-11:30 he was phoned by the military cabinet chief, Assis Brasil, and Goulart himself. He stated his situation: in control, but on a disadvantage if the rest of the IInd Army defected and marched against him. He was promised reinforcements: the School-Unit Group and a tank battalion, which he considered good enough to mount a stand.

Such was the situation at night:
4th Infantry Division in rebellion against the government, moved towards Rio de Janeiro. To be exact, it only moved the Tiradentes detachment while fractions went north to Brasília.
Muricy (w/the Tiradentes detachment) on the Rio/Minas Gerais border with a bridgehead, facing a company of the 1st Caçadores Battalion
1st Caçadores Battalion and infantry and artillery of the 1st Infantry Division mobilized against Mourão Filho
School-Unit Group directed to the Paraíba valley to reinforce Zerbini
IInd Army formations in the Paraíba valley under Zerbini. Conduct reconnaissance.
IInd Army undecided, parts already moved towards the Paraíba valley.

Minas Gerais had around 4.000 men on the Army and 18.000 police, and its Tiradentes detachment had 2.714 men. The force moved to Brasília was ~2.000 men.
Rio de Janeiro had 30.000 men on the Army plus more in the marines. I’ve got no numbers on São Paulo.

As you can see 3 of Zerbini’s orders are northwards, to the rebellion in Minas Gerais, over the Mantiqueira range which is a strong defensive position with a handful of chokepoints, including the tunnel. The 6th Infantry’s recon made contact with the engineering battalion in Itajubá and found nothing out of the ordinary. There were two other potential threats, from a police battalion in the general region (but Zerbini wouldn’t know) and from an artillery group in Pouso Alegre. This group was, beyond Zerbini’s knowledge, moving to Belo Horizonte as part of the group that would advance on Brasília, and, without any knowledge of Zerbini, feared what could happen in São Paulo to their rear.
The other order was towards the rest of the IInd Army, on the Dutra’s bridge in Jacareí.

There is also a mention of Zerbini promising to mount resistance on Jundiaí. It is north of São Paulo, where the legend is. Doesn't make a lot of sense, might be a confusion with Jacareí. The tunnel was the same bitterly contested in 1932 >>38097.

Governor Ademar made his proclamation at 22:30, but it was weak. A group entered his Palace and argued with him. He asked of one of them, a figure who “’’looks like a Mexican bandit, with a long mustache, who stared at me’’”, smoking a straw pipe in the back: it was Colonel Serpa, who told him to take a definition “’’or else’’”, and he made a stronger statetement.

Meanwhile Kruel met with his generals. On his orders, outside the room his S4 staff Colonel waited, ready to arrest his subordinates if they refused to join. Both this and his HQ relocation were already moves in the direction of joining the coup d’état, he had to be in control of his subordinates, but was still neutral.

As the undecided third party to the confrontation between the Ist Army and the 4th Infantry Division, the IInd Army was the kingmaker. Though much weaker than either the Ist or the IIIrd Armies -and the IIIrd was still legalist and a threat on its southern flank- it could still shake the balance of power. Castelo Branco had already made it clear that the coup’s only chance of success was with the IInd Army on their side.

Late at night, surrounded by his officers, he phoned the President and had their final conversations. There’s a confusion on the number of conversations they had but the final were in this hour. Kruel’s ultimatum:
-Part with the communists and “’’take concrete measures in this respect’’”
-Shut down the General Workers’ Command (CGT)
-Fire his most radical Ministers, Abelardo Jurema (Labor) and Darcy Ribeiro (Civil cabinet)
“’’Or else you might find yourself left to your own luck’’”.

The response: Goulart would not break his commitment to parties and popular forces. “’’I’ve never had the support of neither the political forces, nor the Armed Forces during my government. I’ve only had difficulties. If now, in this excruciating hour, I get rid of those who surround me, it’s like a suicide’’”.
For Goulart, accepting would mean something akin to the 1961 arrangement but with even less power. And he was interested in rulership, not the honors of the Presidential post. Being a figurehead ruler was not on his plans. Others besides Kruel also made similar offers.

In light of this negative, Kruel issued his manifesto, which railed generically against the reds but at no point mentioned Goulart or the Presidency; even at this point he still hoped he could just force him to negotiate without deposing him. This also reflected on his battle plan, activated in his movement, which had the options of marching into Rio de Janeiro or just laying siege to it. Besides it he also ordered the 16th Caçadores Battalion to head to Brasília.

The manifesto and battle plan were already ready early in the day, if not in the days before. Why did it take so long for him to decide ? It could be:
-The need to convince Aluísio and Bandeira
-His divided loyalty
-Waiting for news from Rio de Janeiro, which came with Colonel Restell in the afternoon
-Waiting for the official declaration from Minas Gerais, on 17:00
-Gaspari writes he and the IVth Army were waiting to see which way the wind was blowing

Backtracking, still on the 31st, some stuff happened on the Santos lowland, São Paulo's outlet to the sea. Since the afternoon the vital steel factory and refinery were controlled by the striking unionists, and Kruel had ordered their takeover. However most commanders - of the 2nd Caçadores Battalion, which I missed, the air and naval bases, the 6th Motorized Coastal Artillery Group - were unwilling to act. The General in charge of the garrison was in a fort, quiet. Only the 3rd Coastal Battery's commander wanted to do something, but with his General's inaction he couldn't employ his own troops. So he grabbed one officer and the Maritime Police and broke into the refinery. The "red caps" were ready to detonate two tankers with ammonia at the entrance, but offered only verbal resistance.

According to Mourão Filho, during the final Kruel-Goulart talks the former had offered to crush the rebellion at the Rio/Minas border if his demands were satisfied, while the latter wanted to first crush it himself and then negotiate. Logically the President wanted to negotiate from a stronger position. He may have heard it from incorrect hearsay as Goulart never gave attack orders and distinctly lacked the will to fight. Explanations may be that he was more confident and planning to attack earlier on, or, more likely, that the defensive battle alone would give him the stronger hand - he had a larger and better armed force with several excellent natural defensive positions.

Once around midnight Kruel switched sides, São Paulo entered into war gear. Its vast economic power would be vital in a protracted civil war and it could within a few weeks count on fuel shipments from abroad. The war economy part was jointly coordinated by the Army, state government and productive classes (e.g. prominent industrialists). It included:
-Orders for thousands of blankets and mattresses
-Requisitioning of drugs, gauze and cotton
-Donation of vehicles, including 90 jeeps straight off the factory
-Requisitioning of fuel stocks
-Radios lended to the HQ
-Calling volunteers; 5 thousand enlisted
The security part consisted of:
-Mass arrests of leftist and unionist figures
-The 4th Infantry's "Operation X", already ready days before, placing machine guns and explosives through bridges in the capital
-Checkpoints and inspections of vehicles around the capital
-Police and antiair assets surrounding the Cumbica and campo de Marte airfields in the capital; the Navy was expected to help but not the Air Force
-Occupation of rail stations, where the strike was underway
-Control of one of the border posts to the south in Registro

The battle plan was to keep a reserve in São Paulo and move the rest, led by the 2nd Infantry Division's commander, to march first to Barra Mansa and then either to Guanabara proper, steamrolling the government, or to Viúva Graça. The latter is where the Dutra road, having taken a right turn towards leaving the Paraíba valley (downstream is the Minas border with Mourão Filho's regiments), crosses near the Araras hills and is right in front of the coastal plain. From there Kruel, in striking range of Rio de Janeiro, would have his boot on the government's neck and could perhaps, as he intended, bend it to his will rather than deposing it.
The IInd Army's decision changed the balance of power, though in theory the government was still stronger. Importantly it introduced a new political dimension to the power struggle between the rebels. Firstly, Mourão Filho had to rush to Rio de Janeiro - he wanted civilian government and thought a Kruel dictatorship would be equal or worse to the current government; to him, it was a race. Secondly, it'd play a role in the Costa e Silva/Castelo Branco struggle as Kruel and Castelo Branco were mortal enemies.

At dawn on the 1st of April Zerbini's power slipped through his fingers as Kruel's direct orders to the 5th and 6th Regiments, core of the invasion force, overrid his. At 01:00 he phoned the 5th and heard everyone had got on trucks and left, leaving their quarters empty. He sent a motorized patrol to find out but never got any news from them. At 06:00 the 6th Infantry informed him they were marching east. After unsuccessful attempts at contact he finally phoned his commander, Aluísio, who was coming with a Mechanized Recon squadron and was now a turncoat. Zerbini convinced him to give him a lift. His only hope now as to delay the IInd Army and wait the legalist reinforcements.

A light tank company went by rail and the rest on the highway. Infantry Regiments were still foot infantry. The 5th had its trucks but still had to use 3 private buses. The 6th went on private trucks and a company's buses. At the Governor's orders, fuel was requisitioned on gas stations on the way just by leaving behind a note.

The best-covered unit movement was that of the artillery component, the 2nd 105 mm Howitzer Regiment "Floriano". It was in readiness since the 30th and had an incident at night on the 31st: a subliutenant tried to convince the soldiers not to fight against the government and the "worker's movement" as they, too, were workers. He was arrested. Such cases of legalists within rebel units and vice versa are ubiquitous.
The Regiment's most forward unit, the 1st Battery headed to São Paulo at 07:30. Part of its convoy were 4 donated civilian trucks (4 other were with the other batteries). 2 visibly carried munitions, and 2 were each covered with a canvas and the words "AMMUNITION - DANGER". Beneath, camping material. It was a weak Regiment, with a single Group of howitzers, on a weak Army.
Passing through Jundiaí they feared a reaction from the Divisional Artillery and 2nd 155 Howitzer Group commanders, whose loyalties were dubious. That Group's HQ had a clear view of the road and could block it. They phoned reliable officers and had them keep these commanders the Divisional Artillery's wasn't even there but in vacation at the Divisional Artillery HQ, far from the highway.
Curiously enough, though the 4th Infantry was part of the reserve, they were to meet with it. It was nowhere to be found and they went on.
"The march in Rio's direction was harsh. The first warm meal was served at 21:00. We all got our soup, and I went to my jeep, as it was starting to drizzle. The canvas had holes, a water funnel formed and fell over my dish; the potato soup was icy and tasted like canvas."

All of this happened with traffic still open on the road. Civilians shared the lanes with huge columns of trucks.

Cavalry Captain Correa had a phone call with Colonel Lima of the 1st Armored Infantry. He still thought it'd be dead ahead of them, the first line of defense against the GUEs, but Lima clarified they had moved to Volta Redonda to quell labor unrest.
From Médici's perspective this didn't matter as he needed the psychological barrier. For Lima it might seem overkill to employ an entire battalion for that, but he didn't know the scale of the threat (the unionists did ponder on acts such as detonating rail lines, which would have even military value) and it was a particularly sensitive city.
Volta Redonda houses Latin America's largest steel works, a vital pillar in the national security strategy. Its management was strongly tied to the military. Once unionists prepared to strike, it activated its contingency. The military-technocratic response was proactive and finely coordinated whereas the strike was reactive and dysfunctional. Management rapidly cut off communications and arrested the ringleaders. Work was only partially paralyzed. The 1st Armored Infantry shut down a radio after 06:30, dispersed pickets at the factory entrance at 07:00 and after 17:15 invaded the union headquarters.

This battalion had an indirect impact on the Minas Gerais front as it stood upstream of that other battleground, with a clear route. The 2nd Tank Battalion was also nearby, between the two theaters - since 1962 it was not in Rio de Janeiro but in Valença. Hence the Tiradentes Detachment, lacking any information and not knowing the 1st Armored Infantry was on their side (the books are completely silent on the 2nd Tank Battalion) sent a battalion of police and an antitank company to guard their flank against a possible attack from this side.

The Minas Gerais/Rio de Janeiro theater is more exciting and closer to a proper war campaign, all of it happening in a scenic landscape. It had not one but two "battles", the first decided not just by politics but also by conventional military intimidation.

The state was easily defensible, within reach of Rio de Janeiro and Brasília and with fully committed and integrated military and political elites. It was, however, militarily weak. Several ways were thought up to square the circle:

-Through negotiations with Espírito Santo, securing a port to funnel in weapons in wartime

-Expanding, training for war and integrating into the Army the police force to acquire muscle. It doubled in size in the decade and in 64 had 17.880 men. Training collaborated with the Army and focused on defensive warfare in the state's terrain. Weapons were purchased from Czechoslovakia, received from Army stores and mounted in workshops. This was a reversion to what the state gendarmerie always was, a state army; though they no longer fielded aircraft, artillery and the like they still had rifles, machine guns, mortars and a cavalry regiment.
Pictured are police convoys, marked with the state's triangle

-Accelerated training within the Army itself, as Mourão Filho conducted; the regiment within his reach was of servicemen with only a few months of service when the time came, and he made up for it with intense training. Anyone could've noticed he was up to no good, but they just thought he was mad.

-Mourão Filho's original draft for Operation Popeye, using surprise to make up for the lack of muscle. Specifically it envisioned:
-Moving what he had on hand in the city, the 10th Infantry, 2nd Police, 4th Mech Recon and 1st/4th Howitzers and sneakily entering Guanabara by daybreak
-Seizing the first obstacle on the way, the 1st Tank Battalion in Avenida Brasil
-Detach a force to arrest the President in his palace
-Storm the Army HQ
-If the garrison counterattacks, fight to the death

In Belo Horizonte the airbase's reaction was feared as the trustworthy commander had been replaced just prior to the outbreak. The police was ready to besiege it but the new one sided with the rebellion once it began.
Mourão Filho was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd at night. News of his proclamation rapidly spread through military units in the country, with many deciding to join.

By night at most the legalists were already on the road. It was imminent war. The terrain was rough with river lines and mountainous bottlenecks.

The Tiradentes Detachment had 2714 men and 193 vehicles per its internal bulletin (the true primary source which I can only indirectly access). Over half were young and barely trained, with the exception of Ferraro's 11th Infantry which had a longer service and hence was the best regiment at hand. The police battalions were only fit for urban combat and would melt away in the open. Ammunition would only last a few hours. The 10th Infantry came on civilian buses. The only reinforcements could be more police battalions and those were already tied down on Brasília and the home front.

The legalist force was numerically superior, one source gives 4 thousand rebels and 5 thousand legalists, other numbers are 300 in the 1st Caçadores and 2500 in the 2nd Infantry, not really reliable. Their training and armament were also superior, particularly the prestigious Sampaio, which came on proper trucks. There were many reserves, it was 4 thousand in Minas Gerais versus 30 thousand in Rio. They further had the Air Force which could trigger a rout in the enemy simply with a few sweeps overhead. The terrain was a difficulty but a skilled pilot could pull it off.

The legalist leadership was so certain of victory Cunha Melo told his staff they'd get to eat in Juiz de Fora. Yet the President never gave them offensive orders, so the task was just to block rebel movement. As the tip of the spear Kerensky would, without firing the first shot, delay at the border so the 1st Infantry could entrench at the Paraíba.
On his part, Muricy had discussed with the 4th Region's staff a middle ground between the defensive and offensive plans. He'd move the Detachment into Rio de Janeiro state for tactical and political gain and entrench at a defensible position, avoiding a wide open battle. With his previous revolutionary experience he knew the first 48 hours were an amorphous political environment, when sides were picked, and hence defections were open. This was the only way to offset his weakness.

The first chokepoint was on the shores of the Paraibuna river, in the moment with a lot of water. Here there were both rail and highway bridges, the former east-west and the latter north-south. On the northern bank, the Paraibuna rail station. Across an extremely narrow bridge, the village of Monte Serrat. The mighty Paraibuna Stone dominates the horizon. Then for a while the rail and highway proceed paralell to each other and the river, the latter on the southern bank, until the town of Comendador Levy Gasparian. The literature doesn't use urban names, only rail stations, and on the other side of the river is the station of Serraria. Note that none of the armies was actually using the railway. The bridge in the middle is part of the new highway which didn't exist then.

It was good defensive terrain, though so rocky it was hard to dig shelter. Dynamite was set on the bridge. It would've been easy to defend by detonating it and entrenching on the northern bank, but for the same reason the bridgehead was vital for offensive capacity.

By 18:00 the 1st Caçadores arrived to take the bridge - but it was already taken. They entrenched between the river and the Paraibuna stone. There was now a frontline, tiny as the bridgehead itself. It was not the entire battalion, Muricy calls it a company, there were perhaps 5 platoons on the frontline, and the (not very reliable) figure of strength is 300.
Kerensky was in person. Muricy arrived by 21:00 and Mourão Filho very late.

By an oversight the federal government had not blockaded Minas Gerais and fuel trucks continued to head on its way. When they stumbled into the Tiradentes Detachment fuel, truck and driver were requisitioned into the column, keeping its tanks full in the field.

The next obstacle was the Paraíba river. If the 1st Infantry didn't want to defect, it already would have an impassable defensive line over it. It seems Kerensky was "successful" as even after his retreat the rebels spent hours in place and that was enough time for the 1st Infantry to reach the river. As it defected all of that was void. This is my own conclusion based on the timetable.

The vanguard crossed Três Rios at 10:30 and entrenched south of the river. An enemy jeep was spotted on recon, the enemy was not far.
The Armored Division now had battalions - 2nd Tank and 1st Armored Infantry - to the west, in the direction of the IInd Army's theater. The 1st Armored Infantry was actually on his side. The 2nd Tank may have deployed forces in the valley, based on a passing reference in the news, and its allegiance is a mystery. Muricy could only see the "fog of war" and accordingly prepared for the worst, sending the 2nd Police and an antitank company to shield his right flank.

Cunha Melo's forces had occupied the town of Areal for the whole morning, with explosives in the bridge. It was likewise confusing and intimidating for the locals. They entrenched between Areal and Três Rios, making contact with the rebels. Once again there was a frontline.
Cunha Melo had been Muricy's student; it was a professional, not personal conflict. And he was determined to fight. After checking his subordinates only Cpt Mendonça of his engineering company refused and got arrested.
Given how early Cunha Melo got to Areal it seems he could've won the race to the Paraíba, making his position much stronger. Perhaps he placed too much trust on the 1st Infantry? Sources don't touch on this but it came to my mind.

Another decision of his was entrenching between Areal and Três Rios; Muricy had identified the most defensible bottleneck as between Areal and Petrópolis. He was pleased to hear Cunha Melo chose the weaker position. Perhaps he wanted to conserve as much territory as possible?

Cunha Melo's objective was defensive, not just from lack of offensive orders, but also because the 1st Infantry's defection had changed the balance of power. Muricy considered he was now of equal or greater strength but still not ready for a regular open field battle. By noon he prepared an attack with the 11th Infantry and his group of howitzers. They'd get ahead of the column in a wider formation and charge enemy lines ASAP, even with a disorganized attack. The point was to strike fast to take advantage of the enemy not having much time to entrench. In the process they'd also get defections.
One source on the legalist perspective believed the 1st Group's 16 howitzers would've been brutal on a rebel attack, whether it'd succeed is not known. Cunha Melo didn't pick the best position but other sources still state it was excellent defensive terrain.

Between 13-14:00 a staff officer was sent back to Três Rios to address a delay in the food trains. Now Muricy learned of major developments -Goulart had left Rio de Janeiro and Âncora was to negotiate with Kruel. The following hours were a dialogue between opposing commanders through emissaries.

-M: I'm preparing to attack. Verify if the Âncora-Kruel summit is true and prevent unnecessary bloodshed.
-CM: I have no knowledge. I won't fire first but will fulfill my mission to defend.
-M: And I'll fulfill my mission to move to Rio de Janeiro. I attack in one hour.

Cunha Melo then confirmed the summit with his superiors and was told to do whatever he wanted. Then at 14:30:

-CM: I'll let you pass with no resistance, if 1)you don't occupy the fuel refineries, 2) don't enter Petrópolis there were two routes, through the city center and through the outskirts to not demoralize Kerensky and 3) don't immediately advance to make it seem a chase/rout.
-M: I need fuel and want to deprive you of it. I will decompose my column and will send part of it through the city center. I move in two hours, get out.
And Cunha Melo lost. The battle was over.

Around Areal the column was passed by an aircraft, briefly triggering panic and sending men and vehicles off the road. It was a recon plane personally flown by the legalist commander of Santa Cruz air base (the communist sympathizer was his commander in the Air Region), unarmed and without orders from above. In the morning another plane had dropped leaflets.

I haven't reconciled the timetables from all sources but several give 16:40-50 as the time of retreat. Muricy (a source in the form only of interviews) mentions times between emissaries and that he waited over an hour, not two, to advance, which other accounts repeat. He further mentions that after he won he gathered his officers, mentioned the situation and gave them the time to advance. One of my strongest sources ties 17:00 to the advance on Areal and 18:30 to the later split before Petrópolis. 16:50 and 17:00 are certainly tied but it can't have been a 10-minute delay (which a mention beneath a photograph in the next day's news suggests, speaking of a five-minute delay), particularly because of this briefing with the officers. Or the 10~ minutes were for entering Areal but the rebels stopped there until the 1+ hour mark.

In any case Cunha Melo retreated haphazardly. On their way the rebels found the 2nd Infantry in Pedro do Rio (also noteworthy, Col Raimundo was a trusted man of his divisional commander) whose commander declared himself loyal to the Minister of War but now this was void and he handed his forces. The same happened for the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Infantry in Itaipava. The Tiradentes Detachment had snowballed to 4-5 thousand men.

Next piece on the puzzle is what happened in Guanabara state, Rio de Janeiro proper. Here opposing forces were sometimes only meters from each other but there was no city-wide confrontation, only several local standoffs, some of which involved violence or the threat of it. All of it happened under the sights of the media and over 3 million civilians, on famous landmarks.

The pieces in the chessboard were:
-Governor Carlos Lacerda wielding the police and his supporters
-Castelo Branco wielding his inferior, general Mamede, who commanded ECEME (the Command and General Staff School) in the Urca peninsula (where the Sugarloaf lies), where several other military schools were also located
-Costa e Silva
-Rebels in the Navy
-Civilian supporters of the coup
-Goulart
-Admiral Aragão wielding his marines
-Major-Brigadier Francisco Teixeira wielding the 3rd Air Zone
-Âncora wielding the garrison
-General Moraes (under Âncora) wielding the coastal artillery
-Liutenant Colonel Arídio Brasil (under Moraes) wielding the Copacabana fort

Closing in on the city from afar:
-Mourão Filho
-Kruel

Carlos Lacerda knew an uprising would commence on the 2nd of April, that he'd be a prime target for the legalists, that they'd control his state in the beginning and that his police was no match for the Army's garrison. He was advised to shelter far away, but took a courageous attitude and chose to entrench in his palace and resist.
He already had a security plan since late 1963, with investment into radios, vehicles and weapons. In the days immediately before the outbreak his staff had prepared for the siege, arranging a medical service, food stocks and generators, spilling oil on the hills to the rear so the enemy would not bring artillery up the slope, etc. On the 30th the political section of the police (DOPS) arrested some union figures, which might have been the main reason for their haphazard mobilization. And on the 31st, by 09:00 part of his security ring was already activated. Radio patrols monitored key views in the city.

Meanwhile Castelo Branco failed to interrupt the coup and simply went to work on the Ministry of War's palace. Right from the nerve center of the legalist military he nonchalantly coordinated the uprising through the official telephone. In doing so he gave a demonstration of leadership. Costa e Silva and others couldn't miss out and joined him.
The handful of officers in the Army General Staff, wielding only pistols, called general Mamede to help. At 10:00 classes on ECEME were suspended; it was now the focal point of rebellion. The school had 400 officers, 28 revolvers, 30 rifles and 3 Thompsons plus 10 INA SMGs ceded by the police. Students formed shock teams of 20 each. Morale was high because the government dumped undesirable officers into it. Only 8 officers didn't want to join and were arrested.

And another piece was Goulart's civilian base, of course.

20 to 60 ECEME officers entered the Palace to protect Castelo Branco. This alarmed the legalists, who brought reinforcements. After 15:15 civilians were evacuated. The Mechanized Recon Regiment and 2nd Tank Battalion parked tanks on the avenue, blocking the main entrance. There were Presidential Guard and AA elements in the courtyard. Army Police flooded the lower levels.
It was a tense standoff. Legalists controlled the exterior and up to the 4th level. Rebels were on the 5th to the 8th level. The 9th and 10th levels were legalist again and prepared to fight the rebels going up. In turn, the rebels prepared to fight the legalists going up. Elevators were shut down and passages blocked. The rebels were on the disadvantage, some thought the Army Police would force them out with bazookas at night.

Âncora was two staircases above Castelo Branco. He had on his hands an order to imprison him at the Laje Fort. All he had to do was give it. So he did, at 18:00. Castelo Branco had left the building, completely unharmed, at 16:00. It is very possible Âncora deliberately stalled the order until its target could leave.
Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva fled into hiding places, from where they continued their work through telephone lines.

ECEME was paranoid about an armored attack and prepared 60 molotov cocktails. However after 17:00, with Mourão Filho officially proclaiming his uprising, they chose to keep a low profile, releasing prisoners, keeping lights out and resuming classes.

At 16:00 five M41s and a Scout Car from the 1st Mech Recon moved to protect the President in Laranjeiras palace. It is only a few blocks away from Guanabara palace and the police defensive line was in its perimeter. At night the Army Police was already in the area, face to face with Lacerda's police. The streets between the palaces were rigorously guarded but it was not a standoff.

Admiral Aragão considered himself "absolute lord of Rio for two days". But although his marines were intimidating, Guanabara's police also made themselves felt as a city-wide force, imprisoning union leaders. In one case they failed: 12 policemen busted a meeting in a building right in front of the Air Ministry, which sent troops to free the unionists. Heavily armed marines showed up and expelled the police.
Aragão was also proactive and guarded pro-government media and a few other buildings, as well as going on the offensive. The government had a sort of censorship in place and he enforced it; through night and the next day's morning his marines occupied some oppositionist media. He was very willing to act but restrained by lack of orders from above. Lacerda's campaign against the pro-government civilian bloc was largely successful, aside from that one case.

At 21-22:00 there was panic in Guanabara palace as a convoy of marines headed their way, but all they did was reinforce Laranjeiras. At this point Lacerda's was behind a multilayered defense centered on the 1st Independent Company and 2nd Battalion of his police, bolstered by more battalions and hundreds of volunteers further out. They stood behind garbage trucks or from apartment windows.

Lacerda had an escape plan through the hills to boats left in the beach.

At Botafogo beach (southeast of the palace) there were empty fuel tanks to obstruct any amphibious landing.

Despite all of this Lacerda could hold out no longer than two hours in combat. The decision to stand was by itself courageous, but would he die fighting or escape? That was never tested. Aragão wanted to attack and thought it'd be a moral triumph, but never received Goulart's approval. Likewise Francisco Teixeira received suggestions of bombing the palace, but refused out of lack of officer support and that such an attack on a densely populated area would just be terrorism.

At an unclear period there was an effort by coupist admiral Heck to acquire two submarines, but one had no crew and another missing parts.

Meanwhile in Urca, through dawn Mamede persuaded other military schools to his side. One notable reluctance was the Communication School's commander, who refused to hand him even a few radios. In time the São João Fort at the tip of the peninsula also joined. It'd been under orders to fire at any rebel warship trying to move, though as coastal artillery it was actually useless from technical failure.

At 07:00 in the morning 28 ECEME officers in private cars infiltrate into the Copacabana Fort. Liutenant Colonel Arídio Brasil already wanted to switch sides and just had to wait for his friend Kruel to move first and then for this reinforcement to compensate his sergeants, whom he distrusted. The Coastal Artillery HQ, right next to the Fort, remained legalist. They just lived with each other. When general Moraes paid a visit to the HQ, he had to cross a rebel platoon. The lieutenant had gotten his post thanks to Moraes and after a very awkward moment he was allowed in.
Moraes left at 10:00. He still had the HQ, the Duque de Caxias Fort and the 8th Motorized Coastal Artillery Group. He reinforced the HQ with a battery from the Duque de Caxias Fort and 100 men from the 8th Motorized, but somehow a Liutenant Colonel from the HQ, sent the latter away.

Goulart was getting bad news. Resistance among the admirals had immobilized Aragão's marines. Army Police and Presidential Guards, warned Âncora, were not enough muscle to hold the city. Though this shift in the Navy is critical, I've found no specifics on it other than the leading admiral. The IInd Army and 1st Infantry Regiment had defected. Late in the morning he was informed that if the rebels formed a government of their own, they'd receive American recognition. And very late his Minister of War gave him an ultimatum to break with the left, had it refused and resigned.
At 12:30 he left for Brasília. Which of the events motivated him is mostly speculation, but he informed Brasília of this decision at 09:00 and might've taken it at dawn. I think it was mainly Kruel's betrayal.

At the same time as he headed for the airport, generals Aguiar and Muniz Aragão met. Aguiar was attempting to usurp the 1st Infantry Division for himself, Muniz Aragão, the Aeroterrestrial. Inside the Vila Militar there was utmost tranquility. It had:
1st Infantry Regiment: One battalion
2nd Infantry Regiment: Left quarters
Infantry-School Regiment: Possibly one battalion
Andrade Neves Regiment (cavalry): Present
General Osório was in control. Any attempt at seizing the HQ would be met with violence. It was the same in the Aeroterrestrial. The Armored was also insensitive. Costa e Silva and ECEME wanted to usurp commands and encourage defections but the city's garrison was completely impervious. It did not really help the government, either. It just quietly stood in its quarters.
Hence the point of invading from Minas Gerais and São Paulo was to bring part of it far from the high commanders' grip. Only far away defections were highly successful.

ECEME did a number of other missions, like reinforcing Lacerda. One that never took off was sabotaging Santa Cruz airbase together with elements of the nearby 1st Engineer Battalion; this was at the request of the IInd Army, which feared the legalist Air Force (yet somehow kept its sole AA asset in reserve). Other coupists had more outlandish ideas. An Air Force group wanted to grab boats, land on coastal São Paulo, cross the mountains and seize the air base in Guaratinguetá.
Within Urca there was a marine outpost atop the Sugarloaf, established a few days earlier. It was isolated by disabling the cable car. Some marines showed up just to check out and were arrested with no resistance despite outgunning the ECEME patrols. In time the students entrenched at the peninsula's entrance, ready to fend off an assault.

>>40595
Ironically the legalists were the ones with a very public display of tanks in front of the Ministry building.

>>40597
Ancient idea, even had a much earlier city plan in a more traditional style. Very expensive to build. Removing the central bureaucracy from Rio de Janeiro was also expensive and was left incomplete. Brasília without the federal government is no more relevant than a lesser state capital. The planners wanted to engineer a society with less social division but afterwards there was regression to the mean and its society found ways to arrange itself like anywhere else. Likewise other aspects of city planning did not come out as desired. Rio de Janeiro declined. As its population has a capital mindset some are still upset about that.

What happens after Goulart leaves? Âncora also leaves to negotiate. The legalists simply evaporate out of apathy. In the afternoon many volunteers who had shown up for the legalist cause stood without orders, while a pro-Goulart demonstration was dispersed with two dead.
An ECEME team doing recon on the now empty Laranjeiras palace found the Army Police and marines had packed up and left. Only Lt Perdigão's platoon of tanks remained. They mediated his exit, two of his tanks reinforced ECEME and he ahead of the other 3 headed for the Guanabara palace. At first its defenders prepared to attack it with grenades but coming closer he traded his SMG for one of the blue and white cloths used by Lacerda's volunteers. The governor came to meet them and this was one of the day's most memorable moments.

The Ist Army occupied legalist radios. Lacerda's police swept up what was left of the unionists. On the other side of the bay Rio de Janeiro's governor Army and police officers arrested the police commander and Badger da Silveira, who had tried to remain neutral. The Duque de Caxias Fort remained legalist but was seized by an ECEME team after 18:00.
Goulart's civilian ministers only learned he'd left for Brasília while he was already in the air. At 18:00 ECEME received an anonymous tip that minister Jurema was at the IIIrd Air Zone ready to leave. A tiny team managed to imprison him despite the hostile presence of a greater number of legalist Air Force men. He was treated cordially. ECEME failed to notice there were more ministers in the air base and also released Jurema quite soon.

The Tiradentes Detachment arrived on the next day. There were constant rumors of a counterrevolution, numerous attacks which would play out, and it was called to reinforce a number of places but was kept in place by its commanders. All the rumors turned out to be false.

Goulart landed in Brasília at 15:00 or 16:30. I'll address that theater from morning on the 1st of April. It's notable for:
-The immense scale involved, from Cuiabá to Brasília there are 1,700 km of roads of which only 200 km were paved
-The ways in which those distances were covered
-The meager forces involved
-An attempted employment of urban and psychological warfare
-The historical obscurity of such events

The Planalto Military Command/11th Military Region had two caçadores battalions in Goiás and, in the capital, the Presidential Guard Battalion (BGP), 1st Independent Mechanized Recon Squadron and an AA battery.
At 05:00 the following tactical group left the BGP:
-4th Company of Fusiliers
-Section/battery of AA (more than one piece)
-Section/platoon tanks (2 or 3)
There's one mention that the two battalions would also be employed. They headed for the São Marcos river at the border with Minas Gerais, near Paracatu, to defend against the rebels.
As it crossed the streets Col Raimundo, the BGP's legalist commander, interrupted the column and imprisoned Lt Col Serra, an anticommunist, replacing him at the group's leadership Maj Henning, an incognita. Cap Pinheiro, company commander, said the men didn't want to go, to which Raimundo replied that would be met with imprisonment for cowardice. As there were no cowards the company departed.

The garrison had no mood for fighting. At 10-11:00 Raimundo inquired his officers on their stance and most were "revolutionary". As they owed him friendship and respect he headed to General Fico and told him the BGP was in revolt. Raimundo gave no further tactical orders. Likewise in the AA battery only the commander was legalist.

Since previous days there was the idea of moving Congress elsewhere, as the oppositionists were now cornered. The couldn't fly or drive in or out of the city nor get past legalist censorship. The building was unprotected from the popular "militia" gathering on the National Theater, save for 3 machine guns, 6 SMGs and 12 rifles. Those were provided by the governor of Goiás, who together with that of Mato Grosso had joined the rebellion. Thus he betrayed Darcy Ribeiro, main legalist leader in the city. Darcy had organized the volunteers and in another moment even gathered two communists and gave them weapons and a hitlist of politicians, they called that terrorism.

Auro de Moura Andrade, President of the Senate, had requested General Fico to defend Congress. Fico agreed, then proceeded to ignore the request.

The BGP's column reached the river at 12:00. It had quite an impact for the leadership in Minas Gerais, who feared an invasion. By their sources it was made of 3 tanks, 11 buses and 600 men and sighted by air at night on the 31st. The size and date are inconsistent with the BGP's sources.
In response Lt Col Georgino's 10th Police Battalion was rushed to Paracatu in what has been described as a "drive worthy of a Rommel". It was on the road in the morning. Once in Paracatu, Georgino realized he was outgunned and entrenched in the town center. (This meant the opposing forces did not meet as the BGP was 40 km away in the river) This gave him a defensive advantage and endangered the locals; that was the point. With two visibly armed officers he informed the town hall on the result of a battle: "Paracatu would be destroyed"; "the blood of civilians would serve to rally Brazil against the communist bandits"; "those who opposed this glory would, too, be understood as communist bandits". The civilians went to the BGP to plead them not to attack.

Meanwhile at noon a motorized company of the 16th Caçadores Battalion, from Cuiabá, was already at the border with Goiás. It'd been sent by Col Meira Mattos in the previous day. Mato Grosso's capital received a reinforcement by the 2nd Border Battalion. According to Meira Mattos his drive would be backed by the 4th Cavalry Division from Campo Grande, but they didn't because of haste and confusion. Sources from Campo Grande say they didn't move to not waste money, and were also ready to reinforce São Paulo by rail if called.
By Goulart's landing Meira Mattos had requisitioned the 3 aircraft in the airport and airlifted another company to Jataí.

The President found himself as unsafe as in Rio. Allegedly (this is only in the Oral History of the Army and nowhere else) he even found his own bodyguard platoon were phoning the BGP to discuss his arrest. The BGP's 3rd Company even prepared to move but General Fico showed up to talk about how they should obey the government as, after all, they got paid extra to serve in Brasília.
The garrison was a mess with contradicting orders flying around. The Army Police company, with a legalist commander, and a company of the BGP were in mutual alert. At night Raimundo had to dissuade General Chaves, of the 10th Military Region, who wanted to grab the BGP and usurp Fico's command. And meanwhile the coupists were closing in from the west. It's mentioned Goulart knew at least of the company in Jataí. But in addition Meira Mattos removed the only obstacle on his path, the legalist in charge of the 10th Caçadores Battalion in Goiânia, by flying there and enlisting the support of the Goiás police.

Goulart conferenced. Some suggested he'd fight out from the Brasília, with the symbolic value of holding the capital. Fico insisted on his loyalty, and it was necessary for one thing - without the Army's protection, fear of the mob would keep Congress from attempting an impeachment or other maneuver. However the 11th Military Region's resources were too meager to resist. At 16:00 Goulart informed Porto Alegre that it'd be his next destination. He took off after 22:00.
The 4th Company of the BGP retreated after 21:00. There's no mention of their reaction to the civilian pleas, only that they wouldn't resist after Âncora's surrender. Whether they'd even fight is unknown. Maj Henning's allegiance is a mystery. His men had left with the intent to defect but in the field were a bit clueless.

>>40638
Not yet.

The Northeast was an area the size of Mongolia with 24 million people. It was agrarian and undergoing intense social strife, with a number of property invasions. The communist-tied "Peasant Leagues" were famous. Recife, largest city and "capital", housed Miguel Arraes, leftist governor of Pernambuco and a potential presidential candidate.
The other leading figure in Recife was general Justino, commander of the IVth Army. During WWII this area had a global strategic relevance due to its position in the Atlantic, housing an USAF presence and the newly-created 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions. Afterwards it returned to its backwater condition. The 14th division was gone and the newly-organized Army was the weakest of the four.
It did not have enough trucks to operate south of its area. For Justino, part of the conspiracy, his role was thus local, to crush the "internal enemy" - Arraes, the Peasant Leagues, the communists - who were expected to pose strong and violent resistance.
Arraes' position was impossible. He had some 4 thousand policemen against Justino's 20 thousand soldiers. The Army was hostile, and in the past year had moved troops to prevent leftist demonstrators from converging from the hinterland to the capital, notably putting an intimidating armed presence right in front of the state palace.
What was Goulart's reaction? Approval. Arraes could be his rival within the left and thus the federal government intimidated him through the IVth Army and sided with Pernambuco's conservatives. The state government's only strength was in the political field.

Arraes did not attempt any resistance. He knew he was outgunned, but even if he weren't, he'd only fight if he had any odds of success on the national level. Likewise the communists saw the balance of power and retreated underground, few of them getting arrested.

Upon the outbreak of the coup Justino remained neutral, but at night on the 31st he already had forces moving through the hinterland as part of his battle plan. At 23:00 the 15th Infantry Regiment was already in Goiana, entering Pernambuco. Both the battle plan and a hit list of arrests were ready days earlier. The IVth Army's silence and its prohibition of demonstrations were signs of which side it favored.
At dawn on the 1st of April Goulart phoned Justino, said he had the other three armies under his control (a lie) and asked of his. Justino replied it was "well, in rigorous readiness, President". His officers, overhearing the conversation, almost laughed.
At 09:00 the IVth Army made its stance public, backed by the 3rd Naval District and 2nd Air Zone. The Naval District's position was a surprise to Arraes, who expected it to be legalist. In the ranks there was no legalist reaction of note. It was a one-sided military sweep against civilian resistance.

The IVth Army's interventions in the hinterland seem like a random list of cities, but as explained in the Oral History, they were chiefly an invasion of Pernambuco from north and south, where the situation was under control; the governor of Alagoas was part of the coup and that of Paraíba folded under pressure and his police was employed. It was expected thar Arraes would try to move forces through the state and thus the roads were taken over. Meanwhile the capital's garrison moved against Arraes himself.

Peasant Leagues and others made a handful of insurrections, one weaker than the other. The greatest was in Vitória, where they occupied the town hall, media and rail station. The other locations were Caruru and Rio Tinto, the latter quelled by the police. On the 2nd the leftist mayor of Propiá was seen with an armed crowd but arrested by the 28th Caçadores.
And in southern Pernambuco there wasn't even an attempt: armed peasants could be seen in the roads but Gregório Bezerra, leading communist peasant leader, told them not to try. They wouldn't receive weapons from the state government, as expected. The 20th Caçadores left troops in the latifundia on their side of the border and then took part on the manhunt against Bezerra.

The 15th Infantry headed to Recife, where the IVth Army controlled all access and had an overwhelming presence. The 2nd Police Battalion defected. In the morning the 14th Infantry, 1st/7th Howitzer, 7th Army Police Company and a mech recon squadron besieged Arraes in his palace. The infantry was the left flank and the howitzers (who'd been rigorously trained for internal conflict months in advance) the middle. The 3rd Naval District was to be the right flank but didn't show up. The palace had a company or battalion of guards with MG nests. Justino didn't want bloodshed and first attempted diplomacy. Arraes stalled.
At 13:30 a platoon of the 1st/7th Howitzer rushed to the palace. The policemen were ordered to give their guard posts to the Army and obeyed. By at most 16:00 Arraes had been removed.
His police commander, Colonel Trench, entrenched himself in the HQ, but four light tanks made the defenders immediately rout and at 14:30 the HQ was captured.

Seixas Dória, governor of Sergipe, met the same fate. Rio Grande do Norte's governor sided with Justino while the mayor of Natal had to be overthrown. Other governors, by their poverty and dependence on the federal government, made declarations favorable to it but changed their stance under military pressure: those of Bahia and Piauí. The latter, before the declaration, had to concede to his police being spread through the capital as part of the security plan; little did he know the 25th Caçadores thus had a company ready to take the police HQ and another his palace, which wasn't necessary. Bahia's later thrived under the new regime.

General Justino thus became the most powerful man in the Northeast.

Camarinha and Garrastazú defected by morning, Poppe by 11:30. Ladário was particularly disappointed by Garrastazú's betrayal as he had pushed his career forward.
In the capital he still had momentum. After 11:00 the governor was surrounded by some two thousand demonstrators who he feared could storm his palace. What made his situation impossible was that he was he was under the hostile IIIrd Army's ultimatum to hand over the police until 14:00. Instead he activated his last-ditch contingency and escaped the capital, relocating his government to Passo Fundo in the hinterland, arriving at 20:40. There he had the 2nd Police battalion and an Army cavalry squadron. Gathering the northern police, volunteers and fuel he prepared a counteroffensive.
The ultimatum was hollow and the police requisitioning went nowhere as the state prosecutor declared it couldn't be done without a presidential decree.
The situation in the capital was mostly in control, but officers in the 19th Infantry Regiment immobilized their legalist commander before nighttime (probably on the 1st, but it's not very clear). Some legalist sergeants stayed entrenched in a corner ready to fight. In the 6th division pro-Adalberto officers hampered command.

Across the border the Argentine Army raised its alertness level.

In the 1st Cavalry two regiments (1st and 3rd) mutinied.

In all coupist divisions civilian control measures were taken, internal rifts faced and defensive measures taken against the legalists and even, under low information, between each other.

The 2nd Cavalry had to send a platoon to face the 1st Cavalry but the neighboring 1st Cavalry Regiment defected to it. The 5th Cavalry Regiment from Quaraí was moved forward to serve as a reserve. The Alegrete garrison (12th Engineer, 6th Cavalry, 3rd Self-propelled Gun) had to occupy Manoel Viana to secure communications, but had a legalist commander, coupist officers and legalist sergeants. Diplomacy dragged on through the 2nd and the 6th Cavalry was even readied to move against the commander's engineers, but it wasn't needed. Then night on the 2nd a squadron of the 3rd Motorized Cavalry occupied Cacequi, a rail hub and possible site of unionist activity.

In the 3rd Cavalry the 14th Cavalry Regiment remained legalist and the head itself, Bagé, was in conflict. Of the three units (3rd Horse Artillery Regiment, 12th Cavalry Regiment and 3rd Mech Recon Regiment), only in the artillery the commander had a good grip. The division HQ was occupied by legalist sergeants who took the officers hostage, only the commander and his staff weren't there.
So on the 1st of April the artillery neutralized the civilian enemies. On the next day the Mech Recon's sergeants wanted to support those at the HQ but were dissuaded by the artillery's threat. The 12th Cavalry was to move against the HQ but the sergeants mutinied. The task was left to the artillery which would move a gun as a threat. By a mistake the artillery's movement was stopped but the sergeants saw just enough of it to surrender.
Hence Garrastazú didn't consider himself fit to attack the capital and wasn't regarded as a strong force on the coupist side.

The 3rd Infantry only had problematic regiment commanders but they were kept in check. It secured the nearby directions.
Forces all across the state continued to defect on the 2nd of April. See in the second map, blue = legalist, red = coupist, split = divided, yellow = unclear.
The 3rd Highway Battalion was threatened by the AA asset to the south, which like the 2nd Railway Battalion (Bento Gonçalves) communicated its position to Poppe at dawn.

After 09:45 Poppe, at Camarinha and other's suggestion and as the most senior commander, proclaimed himself commander of the "Revolutionary IIIrd Army" in opposition to Ladário's authority. This kept the rebels under one command and prevented an isolated attack on the capital. Together with Meneghetti's government this meant there were competing civilian and military centers of authority in the hinterland versus the capital.

>>41208
Armies ordered off their subordinates into the field (Âncora, Kruel, Ladário). Divisions are meant to be field formations and only have field units, though in effect Bandeira commanded while Oromar Osório (1st Infantry) and Mourão delegated. Military Regions are the ones controlling conscription units, military hospitals and other administrative formations. When they do have combat formations >>36415 it's often support like AA or caçadores battalions, which are in effect territorial defense forces; many states in the order of battle are only defended by a single caçadores battalion at their capital. So the divisions focus on combat (nowadays they have proper brigades) and military regions on support and administrative functions.

The post-Goulart power struggle developed as follows:
Ranieri Mazzili was the new President but the highest power was with the "Supreme Command of the Revolution" composed of Costa e Silva, vice admiral Grünewald and liutenant brigadier de Mello, who also occupied the military ministries.
While heading to Guanabara at night on the 1st of April, Mourão Filho and Muricy heard on the car radio that Costa e Silva had taken over the Ministry of War and named general Ururahy to the Ist Army. At dawn he arrived on a Ministry full of sleeping officers. The Minister's cabinet was empty, Costa e Silva was soundly asleep in his old cabinet at the Works Department.
Mourão had big ambitions, of becoming Minister of War or at the very least, as the prize of a conqueror, the Ist Army. He was outraged at the opportunistic naming of someone else. Hence he and Costa e Silva argued over who should receive the Ist Army. Mourão was unconvinced but accepted Costa e Silva's decision as, although an usurper, he was still his legal superior.

There were now four contenders: Kruel, Mourão Filho, Costa e Silva and Castelo Branco.

Mourão's original plan was to march on Guanabara and storm the Ministry of War. That was still a possibility but he rejected it, refusing to go against the legal order. He distrusted Costa e Silva, already suspecting he wanted to be dictator. "Supreme Command of the Revolution" had an autocratic, "Spanish" ring to it - he even uses the term "El Supremo". Just look at his face. But he didn't know him enough to justify an attack, which would be on revolutionary, extralegal terms. He later wrote he'd have done it if he knew Costa e Silva better, and also thinks Muricy should've warned him.
Could he? He thinks he could. He had muscle, the original 2,714 men under Muricy at the Maracanã. Castelo Branco had none, Kruel was in the hinterland and Costa e Silva theoretically had the stronger Guanabara garrison through Ururahy but his grip was weak because he was new. Ururahy's regiments were precisely the ones that had defected. But the political situation would be different - coupist against coupist. There's little speculation on the subject but perhaps such an action would be poorly seen and end up in blood.

At Costa e Silva's request Mourão remained in Rio for a few days, but he had no more action. Castelist officers suggested he'd attack Costa e Silva, another poorly-covered event, but he refused. He despised Castelo Branco, who in turn scorned him. He returned empty-handed, disappearing from history books. He was brutally sidelined and lost the political fight.

>>41372
Haven't heard of that.

Found a figure charting the many tentacles of the years-long conspiracy, though it didn't necessarily lead to a coup; it was a destabilization effort and after 1963 several conspiracies for a forceful overthrow became serious. You can see the central role of Ipes bringing together business (yellow) and military (green) interests, which then spread their influence to politicians (teal) and further down, the press, trade unions, women's and student organizations. In miscellaneous groups (white) the CCC (Communist-hunting Command) was of paramilitary nature.

Now on a central topic in 1960s military society which proved central to how events unravelled: the relationship between officers and praças (enlisted).
The “class struggle” taking place in endless strikes, peasant movements, etc. extended into the military, pitting the lower class praças against the officers, between which existed a rift - e.g. marriage was allowed for officers but praças needed a long period of service. As NCOs were at the top of their side and directly faced the rift, it was chiefly a sergeants’ movement. Their demands were internal - more reasonable career progression, reformed punishments, greater freedom in their private lives and the rights to political expression and to be elected (the Constitution was ambiguous and in the 60s the Supreme Court came to oppose it) - and external, backing other leftist demands.
Most members of this movement were “unafilliated”, with the second largest group being, surprisingly enough, integralists (who still got purged after the coup); among others there were those closer to the officers, tied to the government, tied to several communist factions, etc.

The effect of this movement was a breakdown in hierarchy and discipline, the humiliation of officers and, at its most extreme, the ocurrence of revolts, namely the Sergeants’ Revolt in Brasília (September 1963) and the Sailors’ Revolt in Guanabara (March 1964), the former an actual violent uprising that left two dead and the latter a rally/mutiny.
Many officers saw this movement as the result of infiltration and subversion in their ranks, and the government’s lenient and supportive attitude to this movement - it was part of the popular pressure strategy - convinced them it was waging an attack on the military institution itself. The Sailors’ Revolt in particular pushed them into a hostile attitude.

An important note must be made. In the Navy, an elitist, aristocratic institution, the social rift between officers and praças was strong and so was this movement. For the Army there’s a 2013 paper demonstrating that the actual, not perceived strength of the sergeants’ movement was minimal; the revolt in Brasília only involved the Air Force and Navy, and in Guanabara, only the Navy. A similar breakdown of order in the ranks had taken place in the 30s and as a result a decades-long effort in qualification, socialization and control had conquered the NCO’s hearts and minds.

I'm compiling this in a .pdf, also have new, streamlined texts for Brasília and the south.